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July 5, 2025

What keeps girls from school in Malawi? We asked them and it’s not just pregnancy

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Rachel Silver, Assistant Professor, York University, Canada

Coverage of the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic shutdowns on girls in Malawi emphasised the risks they faced as a result of not attending school. In particular, concerns about pregnancy garnered significant media attention.

The United Nations Children’s Fund, for example, published an article in March 2021 entitled “Schoolgirl shakes off COVID-19 regret: Lucy’s return to school”. Under a glossy photograph of a smiling girl, readers learn about 16-year-old Lucy, one of 13,000 Malawian students who became pregnant during COVID-19 school closures. The story went on to detail the dire consequences of sexual activity to Lucy’s well-being, and the redemptive power of an eventual return to school.

The Unicef piece echoed thousands of similar publications circulated after March 2020 that analysed COVID-19’s unique risk for girls in the global south and lamented lost returns to girls’ education.

In response to COVID-19 surges, Malawian schools closed for over seven months, during which the percentage of pregnancies to young women aged 10-19 did increase from 29% to 35% of total pregnancies.

Yet, our research has demonstrated that international development organisations and media outlets focused mostly on narrow, sexualised framings of risk to African girls and women rather than on the many intersecting and ongoing barriers to their well-being and school retention. These challenges both predate and extend beyond COVID-19.

As scholars of international development education who have conducted research in Malawi for over a decade, we decided to join Malawian educational activist and collaborator Stella Makhuva to research how girls themselves narrated their experiences of the COVID-19 years. What did they consider a risk to their schooling?

Together, we designed a longitudinal study from 2020 to 2023 that included multiple rounds of interviews and participatory journalling methods with 22 upper primary and secondary school girls in southern Malawi.

We found that for girls in our study, COVID-19 was less a rupture – an unusual event that threatened their education in unprecedented ways – than an added variable in the already complex calculations girls and their families made about whether and how to remain in school.

We argue that it was not pregnancy itself, but escalating resource constraints, that kept girls from school. And that interventions must do something about the real problem: inequitable systems.

The stories told by the girls illustrate this. (All the names are pseudonyms.)

Their stories

When Faith joined our study in 2020, she was attending a peri-urban
primary school near her home. She lived in a mud and grass-thatched house with her parents, both subsistence farmers who supported Faith’s and her siblings’ education. During school closures, she studied with friends to keep up with academic content when she was not helping with her parents’ farm.

Yet school costs threatened Faith’s return to school upon reopening. Despite primary school being officially “free” by government mandate, students at her school were required to contribute 800 Malawi kwacha (close to US$1 at the time) per term to a school fund for infrastructure projects and upkeep. Not paying into the fund resulted in exclusion from classes.

When Faith eventually passed the Primary School Leaving Certificate Exam and enrolled in secondary school, the costs to schooling rose from 5,000 kwacha (about US$6.50 in early 2021) to 20,000 kwacha (about US$19 in late 2022). Faith worried about whether her parents, whose maize and tomato yields suffered from poor rains, would be able to pay.

On top of this, Faith paid other costs, from exam fees and bicycle rental fees to supplemental lessons in which she learned material never covered during school hours. She said she and her family often sacrificed eating sufficiently to save money.

Still, Faith was repeatedly pushed out of school until her fee balance was met. Before, during, and after COVID-19 school closures, girls like her were pushed out of school for a lack of regular fee payments.

Faith’s school-going was also threatened by warming temperatures and new rain patterns that left her family with diminished food and income. Added to this were volatility in government agricultural subsidies to small farmers, inflated school fees, and the increasing privatisation of public education in Malawi.

Like Faith, all of the girls in our study worked to supplement their schooling with part time lessons, holiday classes, or by repeating grades given educational quality concerns. Based in under-resourced schools with low exam pass rates, girls knew that they were provided an incomplete education.

According to Brightness,

We do not learn fully what we are supposed to cover, and some teachers tend to be absent during their lessons. This makes us lag behind … As a result during exams they ask some questions which some of us … did not learn.

Empirical evidence has shown how teacher engagement has long been influenced by the region’s high disease burden, especially due to HIV/Aids. This has left teachers both ill and caring for ill relatives.

While teacher disengagement, therefore, reflected factors such as competing care responsibilities, professional dissatisfaction and stress, girls were deeply frustrated by what felt like abandonment.

Rethinking pregnancy and parenting

Mainstream discourses that missed key barriers to girls’ school retention and performance, such as privatisation and food insecurity, misrepresented student pregnancy as an emergent “crisis”.

Prior to the pandemic, sexuality and school-going already overlapped for many girls in Malawi, where adolescent pregnancy rates were threefold the global average. Still, girls in our study countered the idea that schooling and sex were incompatible. They also challenged the idea that school was inherently safe and that it was pregnancy that kept them from school.

Many of the girls’ stories emphasised continuity with what came before the pandemic.

We have found this in past research. Schooling and sexuality are not necessarily opposed; but parents and teachers try to protect girls from sexuality; and parenting and non-parenting girls alike face significant resource-related barriers to schooling.

Conclusion

If girls’ choices, particularly around sexuality, do not represent the greatest or only source of risk for girls’ schooling, interventions must respond to this reality. They should support well-being and address the broader conditions in which girls live and learn. The problem is inequity, not pregnant girls.

Rachel Silver has received funding from the National Academy of Education/Spencer Foundation and the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

Alyssa Morley has received funding for this work from the Spencer Foundation and Michigan State University’s Center for Gender in Global Context.

– ref. What keeps girls from school in Malawi? We asked them and it’s not just pregnancy – https://theconversation.com/what-keeps-girls-from-school-in-malawi-we-asked-them-and-its-not-just-pregnancy-258401

July 5, 2025

Can academics use AI to write journal papers? What the guidelines say

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Sumaya Laher, Professor, University of the Witwatersrand

Artificial intelligence (AI) refers to “intelligent machines and algorithms that can reason and adapt based on sets of rules and environments which mimic human intelligence”. This field is evolving rapidly and the education sector, for one, is abuzz with discussion on AI use for writing.

This matters not just for academics, but for anyone relying on trustworthy information, from journalists and policymakers to educators and the public. Ensuring transparency in how AI is used protects the credibility of all published knowledge.

In education and research, AI can generate text, improve writing style, and even analyse data. It saves time and resources by allowing quick summarising of work, language editing and reference checking. It also holds potential for enhancing scholarly work and even inspiring new ideas.

Equally AI is able to generate entire pieces of work. Sometimes it’s difficult to distinguish original work written by an individual and work generated by AI.

This is a serious concern in the academic world – for universities, researchers, lecturers and students. Some uses of AI are seen as acceptable and others are not (or not yet).

As editor and editorial board member of several journals, and in my capacity as a researcher and professor of psychology, I have grappled with what counts as acceptable use of AI in academic writing. I looked to various published guidelines:

the Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE), a UK nonprofit organisation which provides expert guidance, education and training in academic publishing
Sage Publishing, a US academic publishing company
the American Psychological Association, an organisation representing psychology academics, professionals and students
the Academy of Science of South Africa, through its South African Journal of Science platform.

The guidelines are unanimous that AI tools cannot be listed as co-authors or take responsibility for the content. Authors remain fully responsible for verifying the accuracy, ethical use and integrity of all AI-influenced content. Routine assistance does not need citation, but any substantive AI-generated content must be clearly referenced.

Let’s unpack this a bit more.

Assisted versus generated content

In understanding AI use in academic writing, it’s important to distinguish between AI-assisted content and AI-generated content.

AI-assisted content refers to work that is predominantly written by an individual but has been improved with the aid of AI tools. For example, an author might use AI to assist with grammar checks, enhance sentence clarity, or provide style suggestions. The author remains in control, and the AI merely acts as a tool to polish the final product.

This kind of assistance is generally accepted by most publishers as well as the Committee on Publication Ethics, without the need for formal disclosure. That’s as long as the work remains original and the integrity of the research is upheld.

AI-generated content is produced by the AI itself. This could mean that the AI tool generates significant portions of text, or even entire sections, based on detailed instructions (prompts) provided by the author.

This raises ethical concerns, especially regarding originality, accuracy and authorship. Generative AI draws its content from various sources such as web scraping, public datasets, code repositories and user-generated content – basically any content that it is able to access. You can never be sure about the authenticity of the work. AI “hallucinations” are common. Generative AI might be plagiarising someone else’s work or infringing on copyright and you won’t know.

Thus, for AI-generated content, authors are required to make clear and explicit disclosures. In many cases, this type of content may face restrictions. Publishers may even reject it outright, as outlined in the Committee on Publication Ethics guidelines.

What’s allowed and what’s not

Based on my readings of the guidelines, I offer some practical tips for using AI in academic writing. These are fairly simple and could be applicable across disciplines.

The guidelines all say AI tools can be used for routine tasks like improving grammar, revising sentence structure, or assisting with literature searches. These applications do not require specific acknowledgement.
Across the guidelines reviewed, AI generated content is not allowed unless there are clear reasons why this was necessary for the research and the content is clearly marked and referenced as such. Thus, depending on how AI is used, it must be referenced in the manuscript. This could be in the literature review, or in the methods or results section.
Sage and the Committee on Publication Ethics emphasise that authors must disclose when AI-generated content is used by citing this appropriately. There are different conventions for citing AI use but all seem to agree that the name of the generative tool used, the date accessed and the prompt used should be cited. This level of transparency is necessary to uphold the credibility of academic work.
Other aspects linked to AI assistance like correcting code, generating tables or figures, reducing word count or checking on analyses cannot be referenced directly in the body of the manuscript. In line with current best practice recommendations, this should be indicated at the end of the manuscript.
Authors are responsible for checking the accuracy of any AI content, whether AI assisted or AI generated, ensuring it’s free from bias, plagiarism, and potential copyright infringements.

The final word (for now)

AI tools can undoubtedly enhance the academic writing process, but their use must be approached with transparency, caution, and respect for ethical standards.

Authors must remain vigilant in maintaining academic integrity, particularly when AI is involved. Authors should verify the accuracy and appropriateness of AI-generated content, ensuring that it doesn’t compromise the originality or validity of their work.

There have been excellent suggestions as to when the declaration of AI should be mandatory, optional and unnecessary. If unsure, the best advice would be to include the use of any form of AI (assisted or generated) in the acknowledgement.

It is very likely that these recommendations will be revised in due course as AI continues to evolve. But it is equally important that we start somewhere. AI tools are here to stay. Let’s deal with it constructively and collaboratively.

Sumaya Laher does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Can academics use AI to write journal papers? What the guidelines say – https://theconversation.com/can-academics-use-ai-to-write-journal-papers-what-the-guidelines-say-258824

July 5, 2025

We set out to improve literacy among struggling readers in Kenya – what we learnt

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Fridah Gatwiri Kiambati, Post Doctoral research scientist, African Population and Health Research Center

Literacy – being able to read, write and understand written or spoken language – is a cornerstone of educational achievement. Yet, for millions of children worldwide, acquiring basic literacy skills is a significant challenge.

This is a result of systemic inequalities, poverty, conflict, displacement and gender disparities. A Unicef report on global literacy levels in 2023 found that 89% of 10-year-olds in sub-Saharan Africa were unable to read or comprehend a basic story.

In Kenya, the gap in foundational literacy is stark. A nationwide evaluation of over 44,000 children across 1,973 primary schools in 2023 found that three in 10 grade 6 learners aged 11 struggled to read grade 3-level (age 8) texts.

These numbers highlight the critical need to address reading difficulties in early grades to ensure that learners do not fall behind irretrievably.

When learners aren’t able to read, they are likely to fall behind in literacy and other learning areas. This is because foundational learning skills – which include literacy (reading) and numeracy (basic maths) – are the building blocks for learning in later years of schooling and for lifelong learning.

I am an inclusive education researcher. I was involved in the Developing Readers Study. It set out to design and pilot an intervention to improve literacy skills among grade 2 and 3 learners who are furthest behind in reading.

The study, implemented by the African Population and Health Research Center, was aimed at providing policy-relevant evidence on how support for struggling readers can be formally and systematically incorporated into school timetables and education systems.

In 13 weeks, more than a third of the learners had become fluent readers.

The study

The Developing Readers Study was implemented in 15 schools in Kiambu County, which neighbours the Kenyan capital Nairobi. This was strategic to design, test and refine the intervention before scaling up.

The intervention started with the preparation of instruction materials. These included a teachers’ guide and assessment booklet, as well as homework packets for the learners. Teachers were trained on how to deliver the structured intervention while accommodating individual learner needs.

Learners were assessed to identify those with reading difficulties. Out of 2,805 learners from 15 schools screened, 920 (33%) learners had reading difficulties.

They were then categorised into three groups as per their reading levels at baseline:

module 1 for non-readers, who numbered 410 (45%)
module 2 for beginning readers, who could read 1-9 correct words per minute (212 learners, or 23%)
module 3 for intermediate readers who could read 10-16 correct words per minute (298 learners, or 32%).

The learners were then taken through remedial lessons for English and Kiswahili for 13 weeks. Each lesson lasted 30 minutes. During the intervention period, teachers received support from curriculum support officers, and quality assurance and standards officers in Kiambu County.

In addition, these officers observed the lessons to identify the support needed. Cluster meetings were held to gather teacher feedback on the implementation process.

Parents were also engaged through homework packets. This encouraged a supportive home environment for learning.

The results

The study led to significant improvements in literacy outcomes among participating learners over the 13 weeks.

The proportion of non-readers who couldn’t read any correct word per minute reduced from 43.3% (following a few dropouts) to 18.9% at endline. This improvement highlights the power of targeted instruction to transform learning outcomes for struggling readers.
Both boys and girls benefited from the programme. However, girls consistently outperformed boys in tasks like syllable and oral passage reading. These insights highlight the importance of designing interventions that address gender-specific learning needs.
The programme equipped teachers with practical tools and strategies to give learners individual attention according to their needs. By the endline assessment, 92% of teachers were closely following the structured lesson guides, demonstrating increased confidence and competence.
Parents played a pivotal role in the programme’s success. Weekly homework packets provided opportunities for learners to practise reading at home.
Over a third of the learners (37%) advanced to emergent and fluent reading levels, meaning they no longer required remedial support. This progression was particularly notable among younger learners in grade 2, underscoring the value of early intervention.

The developing readers intervention stands out because it goes beyond addressing literacy challenges at the classroom level. It also brought in education officials, rigorous teacher training and contextualised learning materials.

Its findings demonstrate that structured, targeted interventions can effectively address foundational literacy gaps. This same model can be used elsewhere.

What next

The study provides a roadmap for addressing Kenya’s literacy crisis. Its positive outcomes demonstrate that early, targeted interventions can put struggling readers on the path to success.

Scaling up this programme offers an opportunity to ensure no child is left behind in acquiring foundational literacy skills.

To achieve this, policymakers must make sure remedial interventions take place at schools. They must also provide resources for teacher training and promote home-school collaboration.

With sustained investment and a commitment to evidence-based strategies, Kenya can bridge its literacy gap and pave the way for a brighter future for its learners.

Fridah Gatwiri Kiambati works for the African Population and Health Research Center. The Developing Readers Study, which this article is based was funded by the Gates foundation.

– ref. We set out to improve literacy among struggling readers in Kenya – what we learnt – https://theconversation.com/we-set-out-to-improve-literacy-among-struggling-readers-in-kenya-what-we-learnt-253252

July 5, 2025

AI can be a danger to students – 3 things universities must do

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Sioux McKenna, Professor of Higher Education, Rhodes University, South Africa, Rhodes University

Generative artificial intelligence (AI) is trained on enormous bodies of text, video and images to identify patterns. It then creates new texts, videos and images on the basis of this pattern identification. Thanks to machine learning, it improves its ability to do so every time it is used.

As AI becomes embedded in academic life, a troubling reality has emerged: students are extremely vulnerable to its use. They don’t know enough about what AI is to be alert to its shortcomings. And they don’t know enough about their subject content to make judgements on this anyway. Most importantly, they don’t know what they don’t know.

As two academics involved in higher education teaching, we argue that there are four key dangers facing students in today’s world of AI. They are:

blind trust in its abilities
using it to side-step actual learning
not knowing how it works
perpetuating the gap between expertise and uncritical yet confident noise.

Given our experiences as academics who have developed curricula for students and who research generative AI, we think there are three things universities can do. They should teach critical AI literacy, emphasise why developing knowledge is important, and teach students why being an expert matters if they’re going to engage meaningfully with AI.

The four dangers

Blind trust in AI’s false confidence. A recent Microsoft report showed that those who know the least about a topic are the most likely to accept AI outputs as correct. Generative AI programs like ChatGPT and Claude produce text with remarkable confidence. Students lacking domain expertise can’t identify when these systems are completely wrong.

Headlines already demonstrate the consequences of this in the workplace: lawyers submitting fabricated case citations generated by AI, and hospitals using AI transcription tools that invent statements never actually made.

Generative AI can get it wrong because it doesn’t understand anything in the human sense of the word. But it can identify and replicate patterns with remarkable sophistication. These patterns include not only words and ideas but also tone and style.

Missing the power of education. A core purpose of higher education is to give students a new way of understanding the world and their place in it. When students use AI in ways that sidestep intellectual challenges, they miss this essential transformation.

When students simply outsource their thinking to AI, they’re getting credentials without competence. They might graduate with degrees but without knowledge and expertise.

The false confidence trap. Even students who develop critical awareness about AI’s limitations face what Punya Mishra, a learning engineer professor at Arizona State University, calls “the false confidence trap”. They might recognise that AI can produce errors but lack sufficient subject knowledge to correct those errors.

As Mishra puts it:

It’s like having a generic BS detector but no way to separate truth from fiction.

This creates a dangerous half-measure where students recognise AI isn’t perfect but can’t effectively evaluate its outputs.

Perpetuating the knowledge gap. As AI becomes ubiquitous in workplaces, the gap between those with genuine expertise and those relying solely on AI will widen. Students who haven’t developed their own knowledge foundations will be increasingly marginalised in a world that paradoxically values human expertise more, not less, as AI advances.

Answers

There are three steps universities can take.

Integrate critical AI literacy. Students need to understand how generative AI works – how AI is trained on massive databases of human-created texts and images to identify patterns by which to craft new outputs.

It’s not enough to have an “Intro to AI” course. Every discipline needs to show students how AI intersects with their field and, most significantly, empower them to reflect on the ethical implications of its use. This includes engaging in questions around the use of copyrighted materials for the training of generative AI, the biases inherent in AI generated texts and images, and the enormous environmental cost of AI use.

Emphasise knowledge development. Higher education institutions must actively counter the view that university is merely about the provision of credentials. We need to help students see the value of acquiring domain expertise. This is not always self-evident to those students who understand higher education only as a means to a job, which encourages them to engage with knowledge in an instrumentalist way – and thus to use AI in ways that prevent engagement with complex ideas. It is a personal relationship with knowledge that will prepare them for a future where AI is everywhere. Advocating for the power of knowledge needs to be a central part of every academic’s job description.

Model dual expertise. Academics should model what Mishra calls “the dual expertise challenge” — combining domain knowledge with critical AI literacy. This means demonstrating to students how experts engage with AI: analysing its outputs against established knowledge, identifying biases or gaps, and using AI as a tool to enhance human expertise rather than replace it.

As AI becomes increasingly sophisticated, the value of human expertise only grows. Universities that prepare students to critically engage with AI while developing deep domain knowledge will graduate the experts that society needs in this rapidly evolving technological landscape.

We have our work cut out for us, but expertise remains highly valued.

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. AI can be a danger to students – 3 things universities must do – https://theconversation.com/ai-can-be-a-danger-to-students-3-things-universities-must-do-255652

July 5, 2025

Nigeria’s economy is growing but rural poverty is rising: 5 key policies to address the divide

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Stephen Onyeiwu, Professor of Economics & Business, Allegheny College

The Nigerian economy grew at a robust rate of 3.4% in 2024, the highest it has been since 2019 (except 2021 when the COVID rebound occurred).

This should have been cheering news, worthy of firecrackers and champagne-popping. Rather it came with a catch: the country’s poverty profile worsened.

In its annual review of the country, the World Bank applauded Nigeria for its economic reforms. These include the removal of fuel subsidies, liberalisation of the foreign exchange market and maintenance of a contractionary monetary policy. This is a policy of raising interest rates, reducing money supply and increasing borrowing costs to rein in inflation.

But the bank also drew attention to the fact that the country’s poverty profile has become grim. About 31% of Nigerians lived in poverty prior to the COVID-19 epidemic. Since then, an additional 42 million have become poor, increasing the poverty rate to about 46% in 2024.

Poverty is even worse in Nigeria’s rural communities: 75.5% live on US$2.15 or less per day (based on 2017 prices). The average poverty rate for sub-Saharan African countries was 36.5% in 2024 and 0.8% for East Asia and the Pacific.

Nigeria’s poverty rate would have been higher if the multidimensional poverty index had been used. In addition to income, the index considers access to education, health, decent housing, nutrition, sanitation, electricity and water. Access to these critical services has worsened for many Nigerians, despite improvements in macroeconomic stability.

A challenge for policy makers is how to translate impressive macroeconomic outcomes into high-paying jobs, lower poverty rates and access to health, good sanitation, education, electricity and affordable housing. The question is even more acute for people in rural areas.

As an economist who has studied the Nigerian economy for over four decades and lived in a rural community, I believe Nigeria needs a radical shift in its economic policy approach.

One major step should be a change in the country’s growth drivers. Oil, information and communications technology and finance are the major drivers of growth in Nigeria.

These sectors are not employment-intensive, and they require skills that most Nigerians don’t have. Because of the lack of employment opportunities in these sectors, most Nigerians gravitate towards the informal sector, which accounts for about 90% of employment in the country.

By continuing to urge Nigerians to be patient for economic reforms to have a positive impact on their living conditions, the Tinubu administration appears to assume that improvements in macroeconomic performance will eventually manifest in lower unemployment and poverty rates. This notion of “trickle-down economics” is misconceived and illusory.

The government needs to intentionally create transmission mechanisms through which economic growth and macroeconomic stability can raise living standards.

Fostering growth with development

Concerted efforts will be needed to target poverty in general, and rural poverty in particular.

Five key policies could get Nigeria closer to this goal:

Building productive capacities: People who live in rural areas in Nigeria are eager to work and full of creative ideas and entrepreneurial spirit. But they lack the resources and opportunity to fully unleash their potential.

Building their productive capacities would entail giving them access to basic education, technical and managerial skills, and other productive resources such as tools, equipment, finance and land. The government should identify the comparative advantage of different rural communities, and put in place policies that encourage those communities to use their comparative advantage and distinctive competencies.

Opportunity to diversify incomes: In developed countries, many people hold multiple jobs. Most rural dwellers in Nigeria, however, rely on agriculture as their only source of livelihood.

Because of limited access to inputs and modern technology, and outdated agricultural practices, their productivity is often very low. Their low income makes it difficult to save and invest in education, health and housing.

Non-agricultural activities, especially manufacturing, need to be located in rural communities, to give rural dwellers the opportunity to diversify their income sources.

Agriculture-led industrial strategy: This would involve the location of manufacturing plants close to the sources of agricultural raw materials.

Nigerian manufacturers locate their factories in urban areas. The result of urban-biased development strategy in Nigeria has been the lack of employment opportunities in rural communities, and a decline in the rural population, from about 85% in 1960 to 46% in 2023.

Moving manufacturing to rural areas would require massive investment in infrastructure such as electricity, water, roads and health services.

Ending patriarchy and male domination: Women disproportionately bear the burden of rural poverty in Nigeria. A study in rural south-east Nigeria found that the poverty rate among women was 98%, compared to 85% for men. Men are often given preference regarding access to land, education, skills acquisition and financial inclusion.

Women are also imbued with the responsibility of caring for children, the elderly and the sick, as well as household chores. This leaves them with little time for paid work or opportunities to acquire marketable skills.

Ability to absorb shocks and vulnerability: Rural poverty is often exacerbated by shocks and vulnerability such as extreme weather conditions, attacks by insurgents and other criminal groups, and illness. With no safety nets, and little or no saving, most rural dwellers are unable to withstand shocks.

The Tinubu administration plans to disburse N25,000 (about US$17) each to 60 million Nigerians. But these kinds of support are too small, non-pervasive, irregular and unpredictable.

What India and China have to teach

Nigeria could do well to borrow from the Indian model of an institutionalised safety net.

India issues “ration cards” to eligible households. The cards enable poor people to purchase essential food items such as grains, milk, eggs, cooking oil and bread at subsidised prices from designated stores.

Nigeria could finance this kind of programme with a special tax on oil companies and financial institutions, which frequently post huge after-tax profits.

China has had an impressive record of poverty reduction. Using the US$1.90 poverty line, China’s poverty rate decreased from 88.1% in 1981 to 0.3% in 2018.

The fall in rural poverty is even more dramatic, from 96% in 1980 to 1% in 2019.

This reduction was accomplished in stages, starting with an increase in agricultural productivity. It then shifted focus to the development of non-agricultural sectors of the economy, including manufacturing. These sectors were able to draw surplus labour from the agricultural sector, giving them skills that led to higher wages and poverty alleviation.

Next steps

The World Bank in its report noted that addressing pressing social and humanitarian challenges remains critical to ensuring inclusive and sustainable growth in Nigeria.

Cash transfers and social assistance programmes could provide temporary relief for the poor in rural communities. But a long-term solution is to build their productive capacities and transform rural communities in ways that provide opportunities for income diversification.

Stephen Onyeiwu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Nigeria’s economy is growing but rural poverty is rising: 5 key policies to address the divide – https://theconversation.com/nigerias-economy-is-growing-but-rural-poverty-is-rising-5-key-policies-to-address-the-divide-257152

July 5, 2025

Are Chinese investors grabbing Zambian land? Study finds that’s a myth

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Yuezhou Yang, Research Fellow, London School of Economics and Political Science

Media coverage of Chinese land investments in African agriculture often reinforces narratives of a “weak African state” and the “Chinese land grab”, highlighting power imbalances between the actors involved in these land deals.

Are Chinese actors grabbing land in Africa and jeopardising local people’s land rights and food security?

China’s “Agriculture Going Out” policy, launched in 2007 as part of its broader “Going Out” strategy, was reinforced by the Belt and Road Initiative from 2013. Backed by these policies, Chinese foreign direct investment in Africa rose from US$74.81 million in 2003 to US$4.99 billion in 2021. By 2020, US$1.67 billion was invested in African agriculture, with nearly two-thirds targeting cash crop cultivation. Zambia ranked among the top ten African countries receiving Chinese foreign direct investment and loans.

My research on Zambian agriculture finds that Chinese land grabbing is a myth. Instead, Chinese investors have preferred different investment models according to the specific rules of land access, transfer and control of three land tenure systems in Zambia.

What ties the three types of Chinese agricultural investments together is this: land institutions matter. Whether it’s central government rules or traditional authority, these systems shape how foreign investment happens and what impact it has.

Each of the three models raises new opportunities and challenges for rural development and land governance. These findings matter because they offer insights into the future of land rights, livelihoods and state-building in African countries.

Not all land is the same

After independence, all land in Zambia was vested in the president, held in trust for the people. Today, the country still operates under a dual land system, as outlined in the 1995 Lands Act. State land, managed by the central government, includes both private and government leaseholds. Customary land, on the other hand, remains under the authority of traditional chiefs. The exact proportion of state and customary land in Zambia is contested, with estimates of customary land ranging widely from 94% to 54%.

This tenure distinction is significant because each type of land is governed by different rules regarding foreign access and ownership, which shape how foreign investors choose their investment models.

Over four months of fieldwork in Zambia, I gathered data on 50 Chinese agricultural projects (41 remained active) through 96 qualitative interviews. These projects were spread across three types of land tenure: private leasehold (37), government leasehold (1), and customary land (3).

Model 1: Commercial farm on private land

My fieldwork data showed that the majority of Chinese agricultural investments in Zambia are located on private leasehold land, typically following the commercial farm model. This type of land functions much like private property, held under 99-year leases that can be bought, sold or transferred. Investors use it for large-scale farming operations, such as maize, soybean and wheat production.

Even in these seemingly privatised spaces, however, state power remains influential. When Zambia proposed a draft National Land Policy in 2017 aimed at tightening rules for foreign land ownership, Chinese investors responded strategically. Many began aligning their projects with Zambia’s development priorities, emphasising contributions to local food security, donating to charities, and promoting themselves as responsible corporate actors.

Model 2: Farm block on government land

In northern Zambia, for example, a Chinese company partnered with the government to develop a farm block on state-owned land that had been converted from customary tenure for national development. Unlike the commercial farm model, the government played a central role, selecting the investor, managing the land and negotiating the deal. The project promised infrastructure and jobs, enhancing the political standing of local officials.

But this kind of state-led development works only when the promises are delivered. In other areas where farm blocks failed to materialise, traditional chiefs reclaimed the land. In the northern case, actual physical infrastructure investment helped reinforce state authority.

Model 3: Contract farming on customary land

The third model is very different. For instance, a Chinese agribusiness company arranged contract farming deals with over 50,000 smallholders in Zambia’s Eastern Province. Instead of buying or leasing land, the company provided seeds and bought cotton from farmers after harvest. This let the company access land informally, without triggering the legal and political risks of converting customary land to leasehold.

Operating on customary land posed challenges for investors. When farmers defaulted on loans or engaged in side-selling, companies had limited legal recourse and often had to negotiate with chiefs and local communities rather than the state. In such contexts, traditional authorities – not the central government – wielded the decisive power over land and its governance.

Why this matters

In a world where land deals are often controversial, understanding how local rules shape global investment is crucial. It’s not just about who buys the land, but under what terms, and how those terms are enforced. African governments are not just passive bystanders; they’re active players who use land institutions to negotiate power and development.

This research urges us to look beyond the headlines about “land grabs” and instead focus on the everyday politics of land. If African states want to steer rural development on their own terms, understanding and strengthening land institutions – both statutory and customary – is key.

This research is developed from Yuezhou Yang’s MRes/PhD project, which is supported by funding from the China Scholarship Council 201708040015.

– ref. Are Chinese investors grabbing Zambian land? Study finds that’s a myth – https://theconversation.com/are-chinese-investors-grabbing-zambian-land-study-finds-thats-a-myth-257644

July 5, 2025

African finance ministers shouldn’t be making bond deals: how to hand over the job to experts

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Misheck Mutize, Post Doctoral Researcher, Graduate School of Business (GSB), University of Cape Town

Eurobonds, debts owed in a foreign currency, have become a quick and attractive way for African countries to borrow money. They are behind a sharp rise in commercial borrowing as a percentage of total external debt: it has nearly doubled from 27% in 2011 to 52% in 2020. This has increased the debt vulnerability of most African countries.

Recent developments, however, show that most of the bonds have not been structured properly. As a result, African countries are paying way over the odds relative to their sovereign risks.

Based on my bond price modelling expertise, it is my view that there are two major drivers of the mispricing of African government bonds. They are interlinked.

Firstly, a lack of expertise in debt management offices, whose job it is to negotiate the terms of any debt deals and to oversee their execution. This is a topic I explored in a recent article.

The second factor, which I address here, is that in many African countries, finance ministers have assumed primary responsibility for Eurobond issuance. They engage directly with investment bankers, legal advisors and credit rating agencies.

In my view they shouldn’t.

Finance ministers should stay away from debt negotiations because they are political appointees. They operate under incentives tied to electoral cycles, not fiscal sustainability. Their short tenures and desire to fund visible projects often conflict with the long-term nature of sovereign debt obligations.

They don’t have the necessary expertise to handle the technical complexity required to get the best possible deal, either.

Simply calling for ministers to step aside would ignore the institutional realities in most African countries. In particular, debt management offices have severe capacity constraints.

Nevertheless, as global financial conditions tighten and African countries seek to refinance maturing Eurobonds or issue new instruments, the risks of politicised borrowing must be minimised. Ministers should spend their energies on ensuring their debt management offices are well staffed with top quality teams. They should then leave it up to these technical staff to prepare and arrange the financing.

This would leave room for ministers to manage any disagreements between technical staff and the banks when necessary. And to close the final deal.

Ministers versus the experts

Eurobond issuance involves advanced financial engineering – pricing models, investor engagement, covenant structuring and legal compliance across jurisdictions. It takes a deep understanding of capital markets.

When debt management offices are operating at their best, they are filled with people who have this knowledge. They have a combination of financial market and public policy skills, including debt portfolio management, risk analysis and debt transaction processing.

In discussions with debt managers at the African Sovereign Debt Conference it’s become clear to me that debt managers are sidelined in the international bond issuance negotiations. They are also sidelined in the execution process, except for administrative support.

What happens instead is that finance ministers are usually key contacts of the investment bankers. By approaching a minister directly, investment bankers get to close their mandates faster.

But this minimises due diligence and bypasses internal safeguards. Ministers may not pay attention to complex legal clauses under foreign jurisdictions, details of investor negotiations and fee structures. They may accept unfavourable terms, ignore sustainability assessments and obscure fiscal vulnerabilities in pursuit of political wins and quick disbursements.

For example, in 2018, Ghana’s then finance minister was internationally lauded for financial stewardship. Ghana was the first African issuer of a longest tenure and a zero-coupon bond. A year later, the country defaulted, suggesting the bond terms weren’t great for the country. The minister nevertheless received several awards as the best and most prudent in Africa.

There is also the issue of conflicts of interest. When the same actor – in this case the finance minister – proposes, negotiates and approves a debt instrument, the system lacks accountability.

In many African countries, parliaments, audit institutions and civil society have limited understanding about the technical details of bond agreements. Ministers can easily sideline procurement rules and transparency mechanisms, resulting in non-competitive contracts and opaque fees paid to underwriters and advisors.

Investment bankers prefer this arrangement as it works in their favour.

Reforms that are needed

Before finance ministers can hand over control, debt management offices must be equipped. This requires targeted reforms, including:

Capacity building through strategic partnerships: African debt management offices should work with international issuing syndicates and development partners to gain first-hand exposure to structuring, pricing and marketing global bonds.
Human capital reforms: Governments must attract and retain highly skilled debt managers by offering competitive pay, professional development opportunities and protection from political interference.
Debt management offices must be staffed by dedicated quantitative analysts. They must also be equipped to use real-time market intelligence systems and formal investor relations programmes.
Gradual delegation: Authority can be shifted, starting with less complex debt instruments.

The role of the finance minister must evolve. Ministers should provide strategic leadership: approving borrowing strategies, ensuring alignment with macroeconomic goals, and engaging parliament and the public.

Their function should shift from operational to institutional oversight and accountability.

Structural reforms must embed the capacity, autonomy and transparency required for debt management offices to lead effectively.

In South Africa, for example, the assets and liabilities management division of the National Treasury department manages government’s annual funding programme.

Professionalising the debt issuance process is not just about avoiding technical mistakes. It’s also about creating resilient institutions that can withstand political turnover. That fosters credibility and long-term access to capital.

Ministers should remain accountable to the public, and debt management offices must do their work based on technical merit.

Misheck Mutize is affiliated with the African Union – African Peer Review Mechanism as a Lead Expert on credit ratings

– ref. African finance ministers shouldn’t be making bond deals: how to hand over the job to experts – https://theconversation.com/african-finance-ministers-shouldnt-be-making-bond-deals-how-to-hand-over-the-job-to-experts-259017

July 5, 2025

Migrants in South Africa’s economic powerhouse often go hungry: the drivers and what can be done about it

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Adrino Mazenda, Senior Researcher, Associate Professor Economic Management Sciences, University of Pretoria

About 281 million people globally have migrated from their country of origin to another country. This movement can be temporary or permanent and can occur for various reasons, including economic opportunities, family reunification and education. Then there are also millions who are escaping conflict and seeking refuge in another country.

Countries at different stages of development also experience large volumes of internal migration. Migration within a country can be temporary or permanent too, and reflect economic reasons or insecurity.

Both types of migrants sometimes experience food insecurity: the physical and financial inability to access nutritious, safe and sufficient food to fulfil a person’s dietary requirements.

There are an estimated 2.89 million documented foreign migrants in South Africa, accounting for about 5% of the country’s population. Most immigrants in South Africa come from the Southern African Development Community countries. South Africa also experiences a high annual internal migration rate. About 850,0000 people temporarily and permanently relocate from rural to urban areas.

Gauteng, the province which contributes more than a third of South Africa’s economic output, attracts a disproportionate share of internal and international migration.

As social scientists who have been studying migration and food security, we conducted research to explore the food security status of migrant households (international and internal) and native Gauteng households, and to understand their differences, if any.

The study used data from the 2020/21 Quality of Life survey. This is one of the largest social surveys in South Africa, and respondents include both internal and international migrants. It is conducted every two years by the Gauteng City Region Observatory. Quantitative research methods and statistical analysis were then applied to identify patterns and relationships between food insecurity and migration variables.

Food insecurity remains a pressing concern in South Africa’s major cities, particularly among migrant populations. Not all migrants experience food insecurity the same way, however. Internal and international migrants differ not only from native Gauteng residents but also from one another. There are different factors influencing their vulnerability.

The differences

One differentiating factor between the internal and foreign migrants is government social support services. They seem to play a key role in determining the well-being of internal migrants. International migrants don’t qualify for such services. But they sometimes fared better than internal migrants or natives, likely due to age, education, or resourcefulness (social support networks).

Internal migrants experienced their own set of challenges. For example, poor health service provision and lack of medical aid were strong predictors of food insecurity. This suggests that addressing food access requires improvements in health services, insurance, and broader social infrastructure.

Improved access to healthcare reduces the financial burden on households dealing with medical expenses, so they can spend more on food. Access to maternal and child health services enhances nutritional knowledge and practices. That in turn improves the way households use food. Health insurance and unemployment insurance protect households from income shocks that could otherwise lead to food insecurity.

A stronger social infrastructure improves food access by enhancing education, healthcare, and social protection systems. Education boosts income and nutritional knowledge. Preventive healthcare reduces illness and medical expenses, freeing up resources for food. Social protection measures help households withstand financial shocks, ensuring consistent access to food.

Of course all this support has a cost that needs to be funded from the public purse, but its benefits may well outweigh the cost.

Gender disparities

Immigrants contribute significantly to South Africa’s economy. Migration enhances labour market flexibility, promotes economic dynamism, and supports livelihoods in both urban and rural areas, making it essential for inclusive economic growth.
Internal migrants provide labour in sectors such as mining, construction and services, while also supporting rural households through remittances. They help stimulate urban informal economies.

International migrants bring valuable skills and resilience to various sectors, including agriculture, healthcare, manufacturing and construction. They contribute local income taxes. Some operate small and large formal businesses, which adds to job creation.

However, employment data reveals a pronounced gender disparity among international migrants and internal migrants.

In all population groups (native residents, internal migrants and international migrants), men are more likely to be employed than women. Among international migrants, over 1 million men were employed compared to 400,000 women. More women (281,553) than men (88,598) were classified as economically inactive – not available for work.

The primary reason for internal migration among both men and women was the search for paid employment. For men, the second most common reason was job transfers or accepting new employment.

In contrast, female migrants cited moving to live with or be closer to a spouse, family, or friends, often due to marriage, as their main motivation.

Way forward

Our study highlights the determinants of food insecurity among migrant populations. It also challenges harmful stereotypes and invites more inclusive thinking about social support and job creation.

The study’s findings can help inform the public about who needs more support and why. It shows that food aid and government support systems aren’t working as intended.

The main conclusions we reached from the study were that:

Rural health infrastructure is in dire need of public support.
Increased inequities in healthcare access are unjustified.
The medical and health bills of foreign citizens can be shared between home and host countries to reduce the strain on the host’s infrastructure through a combination of policy reforms, bilateral agreements and global cooperation mechanisms. Key to this is an inter-government billing system where host countries track migrants’ healthcare use and send bills to their home country governments or insurers.
It is desirable for migrants to hold valid health insurance as a condition of entry or residency.
Policies to promote agriculture and rural areas, particularly developing new rural housing schemes, appear to be a promising way to abate food insecurity.
Revitalising special economic zones, the designated areas offering incentives to attract investment, boost trade and create jobs, can help limit the concentration of migrants in Gauteng.

– ref. Migrants in South Africa’s economic powerhouse often go hungry: the drivers and what can be done about it – https://theconversation.com/migrants-in-south-africas-economic-powerhouse-often-go-hungry-the-drivers-and-what-can-be-done-about-it-256907

July 5, 2025

Africa’s development banks are being undermined: the continent will pay the price

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Danny Bradlow, Professor/Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Advancement of Scholarship, University of Pretoria

Ghana and Zambia’s official creditors are pressing them to default on loans to two African multilateral financial institutions: the African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank) and the Trade and Development Bank (TDB).

These creditors, in effect, are demanding that the two countries prioritise repayments to themselves over payments to these two banks.

As academics who have worked on the challenges of financing sustainable development in Africa, we believe this action is short-sighted.

The action by Ghana and Zambia’s official creditors has two significant implications.

First, they are demanding that the two countries treat Afreximbank and the Trade and Development Bank as commercial creditors. This would undermine the banks’ credit ratings and increase their borrowing costs. It would also reduce their capacity to finance sustainable development in Africa.

Second, pressing Ghana and Zambia to default, rather than supporting pragmatic restructuring aligned with their strong growth prospects, exacerbates Ghana and Zambia’s financial vulnerability. Either they would have to use scarce resources to pay these debts or default on their obligations, in which case, the banks might well sue them.

Quotes from Ghana and Zambia’s ministries of finance suggest the decision to default is their own. However, they faced intense pressure from their official creditors to treat the two African multilateral financial institutions differently from all their other multilateral creditors.

Why does this differential treatment matter?

Preferred creditor status

Multilateral financial institutions, including the World Bank and African Development Bank, have a preferred creditor status. This is in recognition of the special role they play. They are expected to provide relatively low-cost funding for public investment, economic stability and long-term sustainable development in low- and middle-income countries.

Their preferred creditor status ensures that, when countries experience debt distress, their development mandate is prioritised over the concerns of commercial creditors. Commercial creditors normally only fund commercially viable transactions. They charge high interest rates to compensate for the risk of default on these transactions.

Both Afreximbank and Trade and Development Bank were created to fill a gap in Africa’s access to critical development finance. They provide financing for projects and transactions that commercial institutions and other multilateral financial institutions cannot – or will not – provide, because of capital limits, regulations or perceptions of risk.

For example, Afreximbank’s charter notes that

the decline in African exports has impacted adversely on the economies of African states and hindered their ability to achieve a self-reliant development.

It further recognises that stimulating economic development

can best be achieved through the creation of a trade financing international institution whose principal purpose is to provide and mobilise the requisite financial resources.

Historically, it has enjoyed preferred creditor status to support its role in meeting this purpose.

Why preferred creditor status is being challenged

The two countries’ official creditor committees, the rating agency Fitch and other commentators are challenging the preferred creditor status of the two African institutions. They argue that the two banks are different from multilateral financial institutions like the World Bank and the African Development Bank that only have states as shareholders. They suggest that the private shareholders in the two African banks should not benefit from preferred creditor status. Instead, they should receive the same status as commercial creditors.

This view ignores the reason that Afreximbank’s and the Trade and Development Bank’s member states authorised them to have private shareholders. It was a deliberate, pragmatic measure designed to fill a gap in Africa’s access to affordable development finance.

The idea was to create new multilateral institutions that could raise capital flexibly and quickly on terms that the individual African states could not match on their own. Several other regional development banks have this hybrid model, including CAF, a highly rated development bank in Latin America.

It is perverse that this creative and pragmatic approach to filling a gap in the global financial system is now being used against the two African banks.

The consequences

The cost of capital for the two African financial institutions will increase if they are treated like commercial creditors. This will reduce their capacity to lend and their financing will become more expensive. It will also deepen inequality in the global financial system. Lastly, it will increase the risk of future African sovereign debt defaults.

In other words, downgrading their status risks undermining the very stability that official creditors claim to safeguard. It will also create another obstacle to Africa’s efforts to access stable, predictable and affordable flows of development finance.

The eventual outcome of the official creditors’ action will ultimately depend on negotiations between Ghana and Zambia and their creditors. This will include the two African institutions. It will also be influenced by how these different groups of creditors behave in other African sovereign debt restructurings.

However, the international community can seek to influence the outcome by taking actions in appropriate international settings.

Global leaders are searching for ways to scale up and strengthen the capacity of regional and subregional development banks like Afreximbank and the Trade and Development Bank. This requires respecting their preferred creditor status and increasing their access to affordable capital.

This is precisely the opposite of what is unfolding.

There is still time for the creditor governments to change course by demonstrating their support for African multilateral financial institutions.

Danny Bradlow, in addition to his position at University of Pretoria, is Senior G20 Advisor to the South African Institute of International Affairs and co-chair of the T20 sask force on sustainable financing.

Lisa Sachs does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Africa’s development banks are being undermined: the continent will pay the price – https://theconversation.com/africas-development-banks-are-being-undermined-the-continent-will-pay-the-price-259404

July 5, 2025

Kwame Akoto-Bamfo: the Ghanaian artist using work about slavery to find justice and healing

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Rachel Ama Asaa Engmann, Associate Professor and Director of Christiansborg Archaeological Heritage Project, Associate Graduate Faculty, Rutgers University

Thousands of sculpted heads – captive African men, women, and children – meticulously created by the artist Kwame Akoto-Bamfo, emerge from the soil at the Nkyinkyim Museum, as a sacred gathering of ancestors. Together, they form a powerful monument to the horror, violence, and resistance to enslavement, as well as the ongoing work of remembrance and healing.

Kwame Akoto-Bamfo is a Ghanaian multidisciplinary artist who engages with the histories and legacies of the transatlantic slave trade and colonialism at home and, increasingly, internationally, on both sides of the Atlantic.

As an archaeologist who works in the field of critical heritage studies, Akoto-Bamfo’s work is important for its powerful engagement with memory, material culture and restorative justice. I feature it in a chapter of a new book that I co-edited called Architectures of Slavery: Ruins and Reconstructions.

Who is Kwame Akoto-Bamfo?

Akoto-Bamfo studied at the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology in Kumasi. He obtained his bachelor’s and master of fine arts degrees, both in sculpture. After graduating, the artist worked as a school teacher and a university lecturer.

In 2015, Akoto-Bamfo rose to international fame through a series of large-scale installations. He called it ‘Nkyinkyim’ (“twisting” in the Ghanaian Twi language, as in the proverb, “Life’s journey is twisted”).

Four years later, he established the ‘Nkyinkyim Museum’, a non-profit organisation known as the ‘Ancestor Project’. This open-air museum is located in Nuhalenya-Ada, a two-hour drive from Accra. It has become a space for people of African descent to engage in restorative healing through art and education.

Nkyinkyim Museum

At the site’s entrance, three twenty-five-foot monuments are displayed. They are made of stone, concrete and wood. The first is inspired by North and Eastern Africa, and the second by Sudano-Sahelian architecture. The third is inspired by the Forest regions in Central and West Africa.

The collection includes multiple installations in collaboration with the local community. They illustrate “the diversity in our narratives surrounding history, philosophy, and religious beliefs”. The artist himself, demonstrates a mastery of multimedia art forms, working in cement, terracotta, brass, copper, and wood, noting “one can reach different heights with different technologies.”

Today, the museum features a sacred healing space with a compelling display of thousands of unique concrete life size heads and 7,000 terracotta miniature sculpted heads. They include captive Africans abducted, sold and forcibly trafficked during the transatlantic slave trade.

His sculptures capture captives’ shock, horror, anger, distress and fear—emotions. This is communicated through their facial expressions in an installation that is disturbingly evocative and profoundly haunting. It is inspired by ‘nsodie’, an Akan funerary sculpture tradition, that dates back to approximately the twelfth century. Akoto-Bamfo explains during our conversations relating to the research for book:

I wanted to draw upon Akan belief in commemoration and remembrance after death in order to honour the young, old, men and women, who originated from various ethnic groups and who died in the Atlantic Ocean during the Middle Passage and did not get that chance.

Each year, the annual ‘Ancestor Veneration’ ceremony takes place under the guidance of chiefs, priests, and priestess from various ethnic groups.

Visitors are invited to participate in certain Akan rites and ceremonies – free from photography and selfies that undermine or commercialise sacred funerary art practices. Says Akoto-Bamfo:

I am Akan, so initially I began with Akan traditional rites, but now our ceremonies welcome other African ethnic groups including the Ga-Dangme, Ewe, and Yoruba, from Ghana and Nigeria, as well as African descendant people in the African diaspora.

In contrast, the ‘Freedom Parade Festival’ allows participants to creatively express and contribute to an evolving heritage tradition, without the specified observances. For example, painted bodily adornment applied directly onto the skin, yet without the necessary spiritual rites.

A protest monument

Akoto-Bamfo’s sculptures have also gained recognition beyond Ghana’s borders. For instance, the permanent installation at the Legacy Museum and National Museum for Peace and Justice in Montgomery, Alabama in the US.

More recently, in 2021, his Blank Slate Project Monument toured throughout the United States. This included stops at Times Square in New York and the King Center in Atlanta. It depicts an enslaved ancestor, bent forward with his hands behind his back, head turned sideways, face on the ground, with a booted foot on his head.

Akoto-Bamfo describes this work as “a noisy one — a protest piece that speaks against racist Civil War monuments.” The work was completed prior to the police killing of George Floyd that led to widespread protests in the US in 2020. It was first unveiled in a private viewing in Ghana, prior to its shipment to the United States.

He says:

We had a lot of discussions among those involved in the project: some feared it might incite violence, others said that it was a prediction.

The work is interactive. It holds a removable placard that invites viewers to inscribe their reactions to the statue, which are then exhibited. Akoto-Bamfo emphasises:

I wanted ordinary people, both individuals and communities, to relate, and to contribute to, not only towards my artwork but also to the wider ongoing discussions. As an artist, I believe that I do not have the sole right to speak. I wanted ordinary Americans to add their voices because I am already contributing.

In Europe too, his work is featured at the 169 Museum in Germany.

In Ghana, Akoto-Bamfo’s work was initially seen as too controversial. The artist shares:

At first, I had to be extremely resilient because my work was concerned with the slave trade, slavery, colonialism, racism, and human rights. I embraced uncomfortable dialogue. Yet these were difficult topics for galleries and the art world at that time in Ghana.

He adds:

Today, however, some even view me as a spiritual leader… but I have always had an innate antipathy towards injustice. My work is not only about the past but what is unfolding now.

Akoto-Bamfo offers a closing reflection on why this kind of memory work matters:

I just want to use the little knowledge that I have to contribute towards the work of restorative and transformative justice.

Rachel Ama Asaa Engmann does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Kwame Akoto-Bamfo: the Ghanaian artist using work about slavery to find justice and healing – https://theconversation.com/kwame-akoto-bamfo-the-ghanaian-artist-using-work-about-slavery-to-find-justice-and-healing-259184