À quand des déchets plastiques biodégradables, à composter chez soi ?

Source: The Conversation – France (in French) – By Jules Bellon, Doctorant en science des matériaux, UniLaSalle

Et si, au lieu de les trier pour les recycler, on pouvait simplement jeter ses emballages plastiques au compost, avec nos déchets organiques ? Les plastiques biodégradables semblent la meilleure solution pour réduire la pollution produite par ces matériaux. La biodégradabilité de ces matériaux doit cependant encore être améliorée dans ces conditions.


Ils sont partout, et rien ne semble les arrêter. Les plastiques ont envahi notre quotidien, nos paysages… et même nos organismes. Depuis les années 1950, la production de ce matériau à la fois pratique, polyvalent et bon marché a explosé. Aujourd’hui, tous les secteurs y ont recours : emballages, vêtements, objets du quotidien, instruments de musique, dispositifs médicaux… jusqu’aux cœurs artificiels, dont certaines parties sont désormais faites de plastique.

Face à cette omniprésence, le recyclage tente de limiter l’impact environnemental, mais il reste insuffisant. Le plastique s’accumule dans les océans en d’immenses plaques flottantes à la dérive, mais aussi de façon invisible sous forme de micro – et nanoparticules que nous ingérons en mangeant, en buvant, ou en respirant.

Contre cette pollution massive, il existe des leviers d’action, parfois méconnus, qui méritent toute notre attention. Parmi eux : les plastiques biodégradables, à condition de leur offrir des conditions de fin de vie réellement adaptées.


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Des matériaux qui se dégradent rapidement

À l’image de la cigarette, le meilleur plastique est sans doute celui qu’on ne consomme pas. Mais dans certains cas, il reste difficile de s’en passer complètement. Prenons un exemple courant : les barquettes de viande en supermarché. Leur emballage plastique protège les aliments des contaminations microbiennes et prolonge leur durée de conservation, limitant ainsi le gaspillage alimentaire.

C’est dans ce contexte que les plastiques biodégradables prennent tout leur sens. Bien qu’ils soient souvent issus de ressources renouvelables – végétales ou microbiennes – ce n’est pas toujours le cas : un plastique peut être biodégradable sans être biosourcé, et inversement. Pour les plastiques biosourcés, leurs constituants élémentaires peuvent être extraits, par exemple, de l’amidon contenu dans les grains de blé. D’autres, comme les polyhydroxyalcanoates (PHAs), sont synthétisés directement par certaines bactéries en tant que réserves d’énergie. Ces polymères sont déjà utilisés aujourd’hui pour la fabrication de pailles ou de vaisselle à usage unique.

Contrairement aux plastiques conventionnels, qui peuvent persister pendant des siècles dans l’environnement, ces matériaux sont conçus pour se biodégrader plus rapidement. Ils ont la capacité de se décomposer en éléments naturels (eau, dioxyde de carbone, biomasse) sous l’action de micro-organismes, à condition que les bonnes conditions de température, d’humidité et d’aération soient réunies. Comme tous les plastiques, ils sont constitués de chaînes de molécules attachées entre elles. Mais dans les plastiques biodégradables, ces liaisons chimiques sont plus fragiles, notamment les liaisons dites esters ou glycosidiques. Cela les rend accessibles à des micro-organismes capables de les dégrader, en les utilisant comme source de carbone et d’énergie. Dans les bonnes conditions, ce processus permet d’éviter la formation de micro – ou nanoparticules persistantes.

En comparaison, les plastiques conventionnels ne sont pour l’instant recyclés qu’en faible proportion. Et contrairement au verre ou au métal, leur recyclage ne peut être répété indéfiniment : à chaque cycle, leurs propriétés mécaniques se détériorent et il est donc nécessaire d’ajouter à la matière recyclée du plastique neuf. L’incinération, autre option, reste coûteuse et génère des émissions polluantes, malgré les dispositifs de récupération d’énergie.

Améliorer la filière comme alternative au recyclage

Une fois dégradés par les micro-organismes, ces plastiques sont transformés en composés simples, comme du dioxyde de carbone ou de l’eau, et permettent aux bactéries de se multiplier. Ils ne nourrissent pas directement les plantes, car ils sont le plus souvent dépourvus des éléments minéraux nécessaires à leur nutrition. En revanche, une fois dégradés, ils peuvent malgré tout réintégrer le cycle biologique des sols en soutenant l’activité microbienne.

Leur biodégradabilité peut même être améliorée en ajoutant certains constituants organiques dans leur composition. Ce peut-être par exemple des déchets provenant de l’industrie agroalimentaire, comme de la poudre de pelures d’orange ou de bananes, après une étape de séchage et de broyage. En plus d’accélérer le processus de biodégradation, cela permet de valoriser économiquement ces biodéchets, qui finissent souvent en décharge et polluent les sols et les cours d’eau environnants.

Cette capacité à disparaître a cependant un coût : les plastiques biodégradables présentent souvent des propriétés mécaniques plus limitées, encore variables selon les formulations. Par exemple, les sacs en plastique biodégradables peuvent avoir une plus faible résistance à la traction, les rendant plus susceptibles de se rompre sous le poids de leur contenu. Ils sont également, pour l’instant, plus coûteux à produire que leurs équivalents conventionnels. Toutefois, le développement de filières industrielles dédiées et la mise en place d’unités de production à grande échelle pourraient, à terme, permettre de réduire ces coûts grâce à des économies d’échelle.

Le compostage domestique des plastiques : (presque) que des avantages

Mais attention : pour qu’un plastique biodégradable se décompose réellement, certaines conditions doivent être réunies. Cela nécessite une température et une humidité suffisantes, ainsi qu’une population microbienne capable de rompre les liaisons chimiques spécifiques du matériau. Or, tous les environnements naturels ne remplissent pas ces critères. C’est pourquoi il est essentiel de leur assurer une fin de vie appropriée – par exemple, dans un tas de compost, milieu riche en bactéries et en champignons. On distingue alors deux types de compostage : le compostage centralisé (ou industriel) et le compostage domestique.

Le compostage industriel repose sur la collecte des biodéchets, leur transport et leur traitement dans des installations spécifiques. Ce modèle exige des infrastructures coûteuses, du personnel qualifié, une logistique importante, et génère une empreinte carbone liée au transport. En France, cette filière reste encore en développement. Si elle devait devenir un canal privilégié pour les plastiques biodégradables, elle nécessiterait un effort de structuration conséquent.

À l’inverse, le compostage domestique permet d’éviter en grande partie ces contraintes. Depuis janvier 2024, le tri des biodéchets à la source est devenu obligatoire pour les ménages. Les emballages à usage unique portant une certification de compostabilité domestique (comme la norme NF T51-800) peuvent donc être ajoutés aux déchets alimentaires dans un bac à compost familial.

La dégradation des plastiques biodégradables est certes plus lente en compostage domestique qu’en compostage industriel, en raison de températures plus basses et de conditions moins contrôlées. Pourtant, ce mode de traitement local, sans coûts de collecte ni de transport, présente un réel potentiel dans une logique d’économie circulaire. Pour que cette filière décentralisée puisse se développer de manière crédible, accessible et efficace, il reste toutefois essentiel d’améliorer la biodégradabilité des plastiques, en particulier celle des principaux polymères utilisés dans les formulations.

Améliorer le processus et sensibiliser par l’action individuelle

Plusieurs pistes émergent pour relever ce défi, comme le développement de biocomposites intégrant des coproduits organiques, ou encore des stratégies d’enrichissement biologique du milieu de compostage. Par exemple, des souches microbiennes spécifiques ou des additifs naturels (comme le lait écrémé) peuvent stimuler l’activité microbienne et accélérer la biodégradation. Ces approches pourraient donner lieu à la commercialisation de nouveaux « activateurs de compost », utilisables aussi bien par les ménages que par les collectivités ou entreprises assurant la gestion de composteurs dits communautaires – une autre voie prometteuse pour un compostage décentralisé, à l’échelle des quartiers ou des communes.

Enfin, au-delà de l’aspect technique, ce modèle a une vertu éducative : en participant à la dégradation des emballages, les consommateurs prennent conscience de leur impact environnemental. Cette prise de conscience peut les inciter à réduire leur production de déchets, à privilégier le vrac ou à adopter des contenants réutilisables. Et c’est ainsi que se met en marche, peu à peu, un véritable cercle vertueux.

The Conversation

Jules Bellon a reçu un financement de la Région Normandie (RIN50: 22 E01400 – 00123402) afin de mener ses travaux de recherche.

Feriel Bacoup et Gattin Richard ne travaillent pas, ne conseillent pas, ne possèdent pas de parts, ne reçoivent pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’ont déclaré aucune autre affiliation que leur poste universitaire.

ref. À quand des déchets plastiques biodégradables, à composter chez soi ? – https://theconversation.com/a-quand-des-dechets-plastiques-biodegradables-a-composter-chez-soi-257914

Alcohol and colonialism: the curious story of the Bulawayo beer gardens

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Maurice Hutton, Research Associate, School of Environment, Education and Development, University of Manchester

Kontuthu Ziyathunqa – Smoke Rising – was what they used to call Bulawayo when the city was the industrial powerhouse of Zimbabwe. Now, many of its factories lie dormant or derelict. The daily torrent of workers flowing eastward at dawn, and back out to the high-density western suburbs at dusk, has diminished to a trickle.

But there is an intriguing industrial-era institution that lives on in most of the older western suburbs (formerly called townships). It is the municipal beer hall or beer garden, built in the colonial days for the racially segregated African worker communities. There are dozens of these halls and garden complexes, still serving customers and emitting muffled sounds of merriment to this day.




Read more:
Mbare Art Space: a colonial beer hall in Zimbabwe has become a vibrant arts centre


Like other urban areas in Rhodesia (colonial Zimbabwe), Bulawayo was informally segregated from its inception, and more formally segregated after the second world war. Under British rule (1893-1965) and then independent white minority rule (1965-1980), municipal drinking amenities were built in the townships to maintain control of African drinking and sociality. At the same time, they raised much-needed revenue for township welfare and recreational services.




Read more:
Zimbabwe’s economy crashed – so how do citizens still cling to myths of urban and economic success?


I researched the history of these beer halls and gardens as part of my PhD project on the development of the segregated African townships in late colonial Bulawayo. As my historical account shows, they played a key role in the contested township development process.

From beer halls to beer gardens

Bulawayo’s oldest and most famous beer hall, MaKhumalo, also known as Big Bhawa, was built more than a century ago. It still stands at the heart of the historic Makokoba neighbourhood. It’s enormous, but austere, and in the early days it was oppressively managed. Drinkers would describe feeling like prisoners there.

The more picturesque beer gardens began to emerge in the 1950s, reflecting the developmental idealism of Hugh Ashton. The Lesotho-born anthropologist was educated at the Universities of Oxford, London and Cape Town, and took up the new directorship of African administration in Bulawayo in 1949.

He was tuned into new anthropological ideas about social change, as well as developmental ideas spreading through postwar colonial administrations – about “stabilising” and “detribalising” African workers to create a more passive and productive urban working class. He saw a reformed municipal beer system as a key tool for achieving these goals.

Ashton wanted to make the beer system more legitimate and the venues more community-building. He proposed constructing beer garden complexes with trees, rocks, games facilities, food stalls and events like “traditional dancing”. So the atmosphere would be convivial and respectable, but also controllable, enticing all classes and boosting profits to fund better social services. As we shall see, this strategy was full of contradictions…

Industrial beer brewing

MaKhumalo, MaMkhwananzi, MaNdlovu, MaSilela. These beer garden names, emblazoned on the beer dispensaries that stick up above the ramparts of each garden complex, referenced the role that women traditionally played in beer brewing in southern Africa. This helped authenticate the council’s “home brew”.

But the reality was that the beer was now produced in a massive industrial brewery managed by a Polish man. It was piped down from steel tanks at the tops of the dispensary buildings into the plastic mugs of thirsty punters at small bar windows below. (It was also sold in plastic calabashes and cardboard cartons.)

And the beer garden bureaucracy, which offered a rare opportunity for African men to attain higher-grade public sector jobs, became increasingly complex and strictly audited.

As the townships rapidly expanded, with beer gardens dotted about them, sales of the council’s “traditional” beer – the quality of which Ashton and his staff obsessed over – went up and up.

Extensive beer advertising in the council’s free magazine mixed symbols of tradition (beer as food) with symbols of modern middle-classness.

Beer monopoly system

The system’s success relied on the Bulawayo council having a monopoly on the sale of so-called “native beer”. This traditional brew is typically made by malting, mashing, boiling and then fermenting sorghum, millet or maize grains. Racialised Rhodesian liquor laws restricted African access to “European” beers, wines and spirits.

So, the beer hall or garden was the only public venue where Africans could legally drink (apart from a tiny elite, for whom a few exclusive “cocktail lounges” were built). The council cracked down harshly on “liquor offences” like home brewing.

This beer monopoly system was quite prevalent in southern and eastern Africa, though rarely at the scale to which it grew in Bulawayo. Nearly everywhere, the system caused resentment among African townspeople, and so it became politically charged.

In several colonies, beer halls became sites of protest, or were boycotted (most famously in South Africa). And they usually faced stiff competition from illicit drinking dens known as shebeens.

In Bulawayo, the more the city council “improved” its beer system after the Second World War, the more contradictory the system became. It actively encouraged mass consumption of “traditional” beer, so that funds could be raised for “modern” health, housing and welfare services in the townships. Ashton himself was painfully aware of the contradictions.

In his guest introduction to a 1974 ethnographic monograph on Bulawayo’s beer gardens, he wrote:

The ambivalence of my position is obvious. How can one maintain a healthy community and a healthy profit at one and the same time? I can almost hear the critical reader questioning my morality and even my sanity. And why not? I have often done so myself.

Many citizen groups – both African and European – questioned the system too. They called it illogical, if not immoral; even some government ministers said it had gone too far. And when some beer gardens were constructed close to European residential areas, to cater for African domestic workers, many Europeans reacted with fear and fury.

As Zimbabweans’ struggle for independence took off in the 1960s, African residents increasingly associated the beer halls and gardens with state neglect, repression, or pacification. They periodically boycotted or vandalised them. Nevertheless, with few alternative options, attendance rates remained high: MaKhumalo recorded 50,000 visitors on one Sunday in 1970.

After independence

After Zimbabwe gained independence in 1980, the township beer gardens remained in municipal hands. They continued to be popular, even though racial desegregation had finally given township residents access to other social spaces across the city.

The colonial-era municipal beers continued to be produced, with Ngwebu (“The Royal Brew”) becoming a patriotic beverage for the Ndebele – the city’s majority ethnic group.

But with the deindustrialisation of Bulawayo since the late 1990s, tens of thousands of blue collar workers have moved to greener pastures, mostly South Africa. The old drinking rhythm of the city’s workforce has changed, and for the young, the beer gardens hold little allure. Increasingly, they have been leased out to private individuals to run.




Read more:
Beer, politics and identity – the chequered history behind Namibian brewing success


Nevertheless, there is always a daily trickle of regulars to the beer gardens, where mugs and calabashes are passed around among friends or burial society members. Some punters play darts or pool. And there are always some who sit alone, ruminating – perhaps in the company of ghosts from the past.

The beer gardens of Bulawayo embody the moral and practical contradictions of late colonial development – and the ways in which such systems and infrastructures may live on, but change meaning, in the post-colony.

The Conversation

Maurice Hutton received funding from the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) and the University of Edinburgh’s College of Humanities and Social Sciences to conduct the research on which this article is based.

ref. Alcohol and colonialism: the curious story of the Bulawayo beer gardens – https://theconversation.com/alcohol-and-colonialism-the-curious-story-of-the-bulawayo-beer-gardens-256511

Samora Machel’s vision for Mozambique didn’t survive: what has taken its place?

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Luca Bussotti, Professor at the PhD Course in Peace, Democracy, Social Movements and Human Development, Universidade Técnica de Moçambique (UDM)

Samora Moisés Machel, the first president of independent Mozambique, was born in 1933 in Gaza province, in the south of the country. He died in an unexplained plane crash on 19 October 1986, in Mbuzini, South Africa.

Authoritarian and popular, humble and arrogant, visionary and tactical. All these words have been used to describe Machel. Despite these contradictions, there was one quality that everyone recognised in him: his charisma. At the time this gift wasn’t lacking in many political leaders of emerging countries, especially those of Marxist-Leninist inspiration. Cuba’s revolutionary leader Fidel Castro above all.

Their common faith went beyond any personal or family interest. It was a faith for the progress of humanity, for the liberation of oppressed peoples from the colonial yoke, from the chains of capitalism and from traditional values and practices considered regressive.

Machel’s enlightenment programme was as fascinating as it was difficult to achieve in Mozambique in the mid-1970s. Small farmers, with all their “traditional” beliefs, made up the majority of the population. It was a political battle for social justice as well as a cultural crusade.

Machel’s speech on 25 June 1975, at the Machava Stadium in Maputo, proclaiming Mozambique’s independence from Portugal, highlighted the contradictions. The new head of state addressed the “workers”, who represented a small minority of the Mozambican people. At the same time, he called for freedom from colonial-capitalist oppression and the effective, total independence of the new country, already identifying its possible enemies: the unproductive and exploitative bourgeoisie.

The task of nation-building

Machel’s charisma recalled that of the proto-nationalist hero Gungunhana, who had tried to resist the Portuguese occupation at the end of the 19th century. Machel’s grandfather, Maguivelani, was related to the “terrible” Gungunhana, the last emperor of Gaza, who was defeated in 1895 by Mouzinho de Albuquerque after years of struggle. He was deported to Portugal, where he died in 1906.

Paradoxically, the anti-traditionalist Machel was the descendant of a great traditional chief. This heritage played a role in shaping his personality and political action.

Machel’s main task was to build a nation that only existed because of political unification under the Portuguese. The initial choices, embedded in the Cold War atmosphere, forced the nationalist Machel to opt for a rapprochement with the Soviet Union. Mozambique formally adopted a Marxist-Leninist doctrine at its Third Congress in 1977.

That approach meant political intolerance and the repression of “dissidents”, as well as the marginalisation of certain ethnic groups, above all the Amakhuwa people, who did not sympathise with Machel’s party, Frelimo.

The forces opposed to the Marxist-Leninist solution expected democratic elections to be held after the proclamation of independence from Portugal. But this opportunity never came. Portugal handed over power to Frelimo (Lusaka Accords, 1974), ignoring the existence of other political groups.

The treatment of leaders who opposed Frelimo’s vision was harsh. On their return from abroad, many were imprisoned in concentration camps in the north of the country.

They included the resistance leader Joana Simeão, along with others such as Uria Simango, former vice-president of Frelimo, his wife, Celina Simango, and Lázaro Kavandame, the former Makonde leader who left Frelimo because he didn’t agree with its political line.

They were put on arbitrary trial and executed. The dates and the method of execution are still officially unknown, despite the former president Joaquim Chissano’s public apology, in 2014, for these deaths.

About a year after independence, an armed opposition, Renamo, was formed. It was financed first by Ian Smith’s Southern Rhodesian government, and then by the South African apartheid regime.

Renamo, contrary to Machel’s expectations, had a solid popular base in central and northern Mozambique, especially among peasant populations who had expressed opposition to the policies of collectivisation and cooperation imposed by the Marxist-Leninist government.

And it was war which led Machel to a controversial agreement with the South African apartheid enemy. The Nkomati Accords, signed in 1984, provided for the end of Mozambique’s logistical support to the exiled African National Congress in Mozambique and South Africa’s military and financial support to Renamo.

This agreement did not bring peace. On the contrary, the war intensified, as the South African regime continued to finance Renamo.

Machel died in 1986, with the war still raging, unable to see the end of a conflict that had devastated Mozambique and which defeated the socialist principles.

The General Peace Accords between the Mozambican government, represented by the president, Chissano, and Renamo, represented by its leader, Afonso Dhlakama, were only signed in Rome in 1992.

End of an era

Machel took the first, important steps towards a rapprochement with the west, as demonstrated by his visit to Ronald Reagan in Washington in September 1985.

It can be said that with his death the First Mozambican Republic ended, with all its positive and negative elements. The dream of building a fair Mozambique with an equitable distribution of national wealth came to an end.

Machel had worked hard to ensure that health, education, transport, water and energy were distributed equally among Mozambicans. A poor but fair welfare state was born. But it was quickly dismantled in the years following his death. The Mozambican state had very few resources to devote to the welfare state. The rest was done by the rapid abandonment of an ideology, the socialist ideology, which by then the Frelimo elite no longer believed in.

In addition, international financial institutions entered the country, with the notorious structural adjustment policies, as early as 1987.

Corruption, which Machel sought to combat with various measures, and which he addressed at many of his rallies, spread across the country and all its institutions. The Frelimo political elite soon became the richest slice of the nation.

Several observers began to speak of a kleptocracy. The country suffered from continuous corruption scandals. One of the biggest became known as “hidden debt,” in which the political elite, including one of ex-president Armando Guebuza’s sons and former intelligence chief, Gregório Leão, were convicted of a scheme that cost the public treasury more than US$2 billion.

However, the main defeat was the fall of an inapplicable socialism.

The adoption of a capitalist, liberal and democratic model, at least formally, put an end to the arbitrary violations of human rights as in the age of the socialist state, such as “Operation Production” of 1983. The programme aimed to move “unproductive” people living in cities to the countryside to promote agricultural production.

In reality, it turned into arbitrary detentions and displacement of entire families, increasing the systematic violation of human rights by the state.

At the same time, the end of socialism meant democratic openness. Since the 1990 constitution, Mozambique has had as its fundamental principles respect for civil and political freedoms based on the 1948 Declaration of Human Rights. Still, socio-economic rights have been denied as a result of the dismantling of the welfare state.

How he’s remembered

Today, many people miss Machel’s rule. Those who were close to him, such as José Óscar Monteiro, the former interior minister, recall him as an ethical statesman, intolerant of corruption and abuses against “his” people. So do some of the international media.

Others, since the 1980s, such as Amnesty International, have denounced the serious violations of the most basic human rights by the Mozambican government and its leader.

What remains of Machel today is above all his ethical teaching. He died poor, committed to the cause of his nation, leaving his heirs moral prestige.

It is curious that his figure is associated, even in musical compositions by contemporary rappers from Mozambique, with his historical enemy, Dhlakama, who died in 2018.

This popular tribute is proof of the distance between the country’s current ruling class and a “people” who are looking to the charismatic figure of Venâncio Mondlane, the so-called “people’s president”. But that’s another story that won’t fit here.

The Conversation

Luca Bussotti does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Samora Machel’s vision for Mozambique didn’t survive: what has taken its place? – https://theconversation.com/samora-machels-vision-for-mozambique-didnt-survive-what-has-taken-its-place-260110

West Africa terror: why attacks on military bases are rising – and four ways to respond

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Olayinka Ajala, Associate professor in Politics and International Relations, Leeds Beckett University

More than 40 Malian soldiers were killed and one of the country’s military bases was taken over in early June 2025 in a major attack by an al-Qaeda linked group, Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM), on the town of Boulikessi.

The same group launched an attack on the historic city of Timbuktu. The Malian army claimed it repelled the Timbuktu attack and killed 14 terrorists.

Terrorist groups have attacked Boulikessi in large numbers before. In October 2019, 25 Malian soldiers were killed. The target was a G5 Sahel force military camp.

Timbuktu has been in the sights of terrorist groups since 2012. JNIM laid siege to the city for several months in 2023. Timbuktu has a major airport and a key military base.

In neighbouring Burkina Faso, there have been running battles in recent months between the military and terrorist groups. About 40% of the country is under the control of groups linked to al-Qaeda and Islamic State. Military bases in the country have also been targeted.

Mali and Burkina Faso are under military rule. Insecurity, especially increasing terrorist attacks, were key reasons the military juntas gave for seizing power in both countries.

I have been researching terrorism and the formation of insurgent groups in west Africa and the Sahel for over a decade. What I am observing is that the terrorist groups are becoming more daring and constantly changing tactics, with increased attacks on military camps across the region.

Military camps are attacked to lower the morale of the soldiers and steal ammunition. It also sends a message to locals that military forces are incapable of protecting civilians.

I believe there are four main reasons for an increase in large scale attacks on military bases in the region:

  • the loss of the US drone base in Niger, which has made surveillance difficult

  • an increase in human rights abuses carried out in the name of counter terrorism

  • a lack of a coordinated approach to counter terrorism

  • constant changes of tactics by the terrorists.

Identifying and addressing these issues are important to counter the trend.

Why are the attacks increasing?

First is the loss of the US drone base in Agadez, Republic of Niger, in 2024 after the military seized power in the country.

I was initially sceptical when the drone base was commissioned in 2019. But it has in fact acted as a deterrent to terrorist groups.

Terrorist organisations operating in the Sahel knew they were being watched by drones operating from the base. They were aware surveillance information was shared with member states. The loss of the base has reduced reconnaissance and surveillance activities in the region.

Second, an increase in human rights abuse in the fight against terrorism in the region is dividing communities and increasing recruitment into terrorist groups. A report by Human Rights Watch in May 2025 accused the Burkina Faso military and allied militias of killing more than 130 civilians during counter-terrorism operations.

The report argued that members of the Fulani ethnic group were targeted in the operations because they were perceived to have relationships with terrorist groups. Terrorist groups are known to use such incidents to win the hearts and minds of local populations.

Third, the lack of a coordinated approach to counter terrorism in the region is reversing the gains made in the last decade. Major developments have included the dissolving of the G5 Sahel. This grouping was created in 2014 to enhance security coordination between members. The members were Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Mali, Chad and Niger. The organisation launched joint counter-terrorism missions across member states but was dissolved in December 2023 after Niger and Burkina Faso withdrew.

The weakening of the Multinational Joint Task Force due to the military coup in Niger and the countries’ strategic repositioning is undermining counter-terrorism initiatives. Task force members were Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria and Benin.

The mandate of the task force is to combat Boko Haram and other terrorist groups operating around the Lake Chad basin. After its establishment in 2015 the task force achieved significant progress. In January 2025, Niger suspended its membership, putting the fight against terrorism in the region in jeopardy.

Fourth, terrorist groups in the region are becoming more sophisticated in their approach. In April 2025, JNIM terrorists were suspected of launching a suicide drone attack on Togolese military positions.

For its part, the military in the Sahelian countries are struggling to adapt to the terrorists’ new tactics. In the last few years, there has been a proliferation of drones in Africa by states and non-state actors.

Halting the trend

To combat the increasing attacks by terrorist groups, especially large-scale attacks on military positions, four immediate steps are necessary.

First, nation states need to invest in surveillance capabilities. The loss of the drone base in Niger means Sahelian states must urgently find new ways of gathering and sharing intelligence. The topography of the region, which is mainly flat, with scattered vegetation, is an advantage as reconnaissance drones can easily detect suspicious movements, terrorist camps and travel routes.

There is also a need to regulate the use of drones in the region to prevent use by non-state actors.

In addition, countries fighting terrorism must find a way to improve the relationship between the military (and allied militias) and people affected by terrorism. My latest publication on the issue shows that vigilante groups engaged by the military forces are sometimes complicit in human rights abuse.

Training on human rights is essential for military forces and allied militias.

Terrorism funding avenues must be identified and blocked. Large scale terrorist attacks involve planning, training and resources. Funding from illegal mining, trafficking and kidnapping must be identified and eradicated. This will also include intelligence sharing between nation states.

Finally, the Sahelian countries must find a mechanism to work with the Economic Community of West African States.

As the numbers and intensity of terrorist activities are increasing across the Sahel, immediate action is necessary to combat this trend.

The Conversation

Olayinka Ajala does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. West Africa terror: why attacks on military bases are rising – and four ways to respond – https://theconversation.com/west-africa-terror-why-attacks-on-military-bases-are-rising-and-four-ways-to-respond-258622

Conservateur ou progressiste : quel type de donateur êtes-vous ?

Source: The Conversation – France (in French) – By Thomas Leclercq, Professeur ordinaire en marketing, IESEG School of Management (LEM-CNRS 9221), Head of Marketing and Sales Department, IÉSEG School of Management

Lorsqu’un conservateur reçoit une communication d’une association présentant un bénéficiaire qu’il considère comme étant proche, la probabilité de faire est don est de 73 %. Lightspring/Shutterstock

En 2025, la politique influence nos dons. Après la distinction entre la gauche et la droite, une étude démontre que la générosité des Français oppose conservateur et progressistes. Les premiers sont enclins à donner à des associations près de chez eux, résolvant des problèmes. Les seconds, pour des projets de justice sociale, apportant un changement ou un progrès. Résultat en chiffres et en graphiques.


Dans un contexte de polarisation politique croissante, nos choix en tant que consommateurs s’entremêlent de plus en plus avec nos convictions. L’expert en marketing Benjamin Bœuf souligne que les consommateurs préfèrent des marques qui démontrent un positionnement politique similaire au leur. Elle pousse les entreprises à intégrer ce critère dans leur stratégie marketing, ou à se positionner sur des questions de sociétés.

Mais cet impact dépasse largement nos décisions d’achat. Nos préférences politiques façonnent également nos élans de générosité et les causes que nous choisissons de soutenir. Cette influence s’explique en partie par le fait que notre orientation politique reflète des valeurs morales qui nous sont propres, qui guident nos actions et nos choix.

À travers notre recherche, nous avons mis en lumière trois tendances majeures qui révèlent comment ces orientations politiques influencent le comportement des donateurs : le cadrage du message, la proximité du bénéficiaire et le sentiment de justice sociale sous-jacent, la démarche de l’organisation caritative. Pour ce faire, nous avons mené une série d’études manipulant des communications provenant d’organisations caritatives, mesurant l’effet sur la propension à faire un don.

Vision conservatrice vs progressiste

Au-delà des préférences de chacun pour certains partis, les études sur l’orientation politique du psychologue social américain John Tost mettent en évidence la polarité entre les conservateurs et les progressistes (ou libéraux sur les graphiques), également décrite par la distinction gauche-droite. Les personnes de sensibilité progressiste estiment que chacun doit être libre de poursuivre son propre développement, et que la société doit être organisée dans un souci de justice sociale. À l’inverse, les conservateurs considèrent que l’être humain est fondamentalement individualiste, que la vie en société requiert dès lors des structures et des règles régissant la liberté de chacun.

Ce positionnement politique détermine la manière dont chacun perçoit la société et le rôle des individus au sein du collectif. Selon le professeur en psychologie Graham, une vision conservatrice met davantage l’accent sur la responsabilité individuelle et la préservation des structures sociales existantes. Une vision progressiste valorise la responsabilité collective et les initiatives visant à corriger les inégalités systémiques. L’orientation politique progressiste peut dès lors être mesurée en demandant aux répondants d’indiquer leur degré d’accord vis-à-vis d’affirmations telles que « J’ai une tendance à m’opposer à l’autorité ». On demandera aux répondants d’indiquer leur accord vis-à-vis d’affirmations telles que « Je pense que l’application des lois devrait être renforcée ». Ces différences fondamentales influencent directement le type d’organisations caritatives auxquelles les individus choisissent de donner.

Évitement d’un danger vs changement

Les personnes ayant une orientation politique conservatrice sont davantage attirées par des organisations qui communiquent sur l’évitement d’un danger ou la résolution d’un problème. « Votre don nous aidera à protéger des populations des risques d’épidémies » ou « votre geste permettra de mettre en œuvre des actions pour protéger notre planète ». Ces messages, centrés sur la protection ou la sécurité, trouvent un écho particulier auprès de ce public.

À l’inverse, les individus ayant une orientation politique progressiste privilégient des causes qui mettent en avant des opportunités positives de changement ou de progrès, avec un accent sur l’optimisme et l’amélioration. « Aidez-nous à créer un monde plus vert » ou « relevons ensemble le défi de l’égalité sociale ».


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Changement vs évitement

Afin de démonter cette préférence, nous avons présenté une expérimentation auprès de 150 répondants à travers laquelle les participants complétaient un questionnaire concernant leur orientation politique. À la suite de ce dernier, ils étaient invités à soutenir une association dont nous avons fait varier le message via trois groupes :

  • Un message neutre décrivant l’activité de l’organisation

  • Un message centré sur l’évitement

  • Un message centré sur le progrès




À lire aussi :
Cibler les consommateurs sur leurs convictions politiques : une stratégie dangereuse


La probabilité qu’une personne d’orientation progressiste donne à une cause présentée sous la forme d’un progrès est de 85 %, contre 30 % pour les conservateurs recevant cette même communication. En revanche, la communication mettant en exergue la protection ou l’évitement d’un risque fait monter la probabilité de don à plus de 60 % pour les conservateurs, contre 36 % pour les progressistes.

Cause proche de son quotidien

Les conservateurs montrent une préférence pour des causes où le bénéficiaire est perçu comme étant proche d’eux, que ce soit culturellement, géographiquement ou socialement. Pour confirmer cette hypothèse, nous avons proposé un questionnaire sur l’orientation politique à 243 répondants. À la suite de celui-ci, nous leur avons proposé de soutenir une organisation caritative via un don.

Dans un groupe, cette dernière était décrite comme aidant les personnes dans la ville du répondant, dans l’autre nous présentions la même association pour un autre pays. Lorsqu’un conservateur reçoit une communication présentant un bénéficiaire qu’il considère comme étant proche, la probabilité de faire est don est de 73 %, contre 68 % quand le bénéficiaire est éloigné.

Justice sociale

En revanche, les progressistes sont davantage motivés par des causes centrées sur la justice sociale. L’enjeu est de corriger des inégalités ou de soutenir des groupes marginalisés comme les aides aux sans-abris ou le combat contre les drogues. Ces sujets sont centraux, car ils représentent les principales missions des organisations caritatives à but social. Pour démontrer cette tendance, nous avons administré un questionnaire sur l’orientation politique à 270 participants. À l’issue de celui-ci, ils ont été invités à soutenir une organisation caritative en réalisant une promesse de don.

Pour un premier groupe, l’organisation était présentée comme luttant pour un traitement égalitaire entre les hommes et les femmes, tandis que pour un second groupe, elle agissait contre l’abus et la cruauté envers les animaux domestiques. Les résultats indiquent que, chez les répondants progressistes, la probabilité de don atteint 76 % lorsque la cause est liée à la justice sociale, contre 58 % quand elle ne l’est pas de manière explicite.

Cibler les donateurs

Ces résultats offrent aux organisations caritatives un véritable levier pour optimiser leur communication. En comprenant mieux les différences d’orientation entre les publics conservateurs et progressistes, elles peuvent adapter leurs messages pour maximiser leur impact. Une campagne destinée à un public conservateur pourrait, par exemple, insister sur des enjeux de sécurité ou de préservation des valeurs locales. En revanche, une communication visant un public progressiste gagnerait à mettre en avant des projets innovants ou des initiatives pour réduire les inégalités sociales.

En ciblant mieux leurs donateurs, les organisations peuvent non seulement accroître leur efficacité, mais aussi s’assurer que leur message résonne profondément avec les convictions de leurs publics. Dans un monde de plus en plus polarisé, cette capacité à adapter la communication devient un atout clé pour mobiliser un soutien durable.

The Conversation

Les auteurs ne travaillent pas, ne conseillent pas, ne possèdent pas de parts, ne reçoivent pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’ont déclaré aucune autre affiliation que leur organisme de recherche.

ref. Conservateur ou progressiste : quel type de donateur êtes-vous ? – https://theconversation.com/conservateur-ou-progressiste-quel-type-de-donateur-etes-vous-255442

Dix ans après leur entrée en vigueur, les directives de fin de vie sont peu utilisées. Voici pourquoi

Source: The Conversation – in French – By Ariane Plaisance, Research scientist, Université Laval

Les directives médicales anticipées (DMA), qui permettent à une personne de faire connaître ses volontés pour le jour où elle ne serait plus capable de s’exprimer ou de décider pour elle-même, restent encore peu utilisées, tant par les citoyens que par les professionnels de la santé. Pourtant, leur valeur juridique est bien établie.

Cette faible utilisation peut s’expliquer par plusieurs lacunes déjà soulevées par des juristes, que notre équipe a voulu explorer de plus près.

Instaurées le 10 décembre 2015 lors de la mise en vigueur de la Loi concernant les soins de fin de vie (LCSFV), les directives médicales anticipées permettent à une personne majeure et apte à consentir aux soins d’accepter ou de refuser en avance cinq soins médicaux, soit la réanimation cardiorespiratoire, la ventilation assistée par un respirateur, la dialyse, l’alimentation artificielle et l’hydratation artificielle.

Ces directives s’appliquent dans trois circonstances bien précises :

  • En cas de maladie grave et incurable, en fin de vie

  • En situation de coma irréversible ou d’état végétatif permanent

  • En cas de démence avancée sans possibilité d’amélioration.

Les DMA sont complétées par acte notarié ou devant témoins au moyen du formulaire prescrit par le ministre, puis déposées dans un registre administré par la Régie de l’assurance maladie du Québec.

Dans son rapport quinquennal 2018-2023 déposé le 18 février dernier, la Commission sur les soins de fin de vie soulève des questionnements quant au nombre limité de personnes ayant complété des DMA et sur l’effet presque inexistant du régime.

Et si une partie de la réponse se trouvaient dans les écrits juridiques ?

Nous sommes une équipe de recherche interdisciplinaire comprenant des étudiantes à la maîtrise en droit notarial et moi-même, chercheuse spécialisée sur les pratiques de fin de vie. Grâce à un financement de la Chambre des notaires du Québec, nous avons fait une analyse des écrits de spécialistes du droit ayant émis des réserves face au régime des DMA.




À lire aussi :
Emploi et handicap au Québec : un modèle à bout de souffle


L’aptitude à consentir : un fondement légal fragile

Selon Robert P. Kouri, docteur en droit et professeur titulaire à la Faculté de droit de l’Université de Sherbrooke, les dispositions de la loi par rapport à l’aptitude à consentir aux soins présentent une incohérence. Bien que cette aptitude soit présumée, certaines personnes peuvent ne pas être en mesure de l’exercer pleinement.

Le notaire a une obligation de diligence pour vérifier la capacité du signataire, mais ne possède généralement pas l’expertise pour évaluer l’aptitude à consentir aux soins. Quant aux DMA signées devant témoins, aucun mécanisme ne permet de vérifier l’aptitude, malgré la mention préimprimée affirmant que la personne est « majeure et apte ».

Comme le soulignait déjà Me Danielle Chalifoux en 2015, le rôle des témoins se limite à valider la signature, sans exigence d’indépendance ou de vérification de l’aptitude. Si la DMA a été reçue devant notaire et surtout lorsqu’elle a été reçue devant témoins, comment des professionnels de la santé pouvaient s’assurer, des années plus tard, qu’il s’agit bel et bien de l’expression émanant d’une personne légalement apte au moment de la complétion et que ces volontés sont toujours les mêmes, questionne Me Kouri ?

Le consentement éclairé : un idéal souvent irréaliste

La Loi sur les soins de fin de vie part du principe que la personne qui remplit des DMA a reçu toute l’information nécessaire pour prendre une décision éclairée. Or, selon Me Kouri et Me Chalifoux, cette présomption repose sur l’hypothèse d’une consultation avec un professionnel de la santé compétent. Dans les faits, il est peu réaliste de croire que des personnes en bonne santé prennent cette initiative dans un contexte hypothétique de fin de vie.

Il est même irréaliste de croire que des personnes malades aient eu accès à un médecin en mesure de leur expliquer les risques et bénéfices d’accepter ou de refuser les cinq soins contenus dans les DMA. Une telle conversation prend du temps, plus longtemps que la durée d’un seul rendez-vous médical ! Il devient donc difficile d’affirmer honnêtement que la décision est réellement éclairée, d’autant que la volonté exprimée peut évoluer, parfois considérablement, avec le temps.




À lire aussi :
Planification anticipée de l’AMM : les notaires sont-ils prêts à leur nouveau rôle ?


Quand les proches sont exclus des décisions

Dans un texte publié en 2019, Louise Bernier, professeure de droit de la santé à l’Université de Sherbrooke, et Catherine Régis, professeure à la Faculté de droit de l’Université de Montréal, critiquent l’exclusion des proches dans le processus d’application des DMA. Une fois le formulaire entre les mains des professionnels de la santé, la loi n’accorde aucun rôle officiel à la famille pour compléter l’information ou interpréter les volontés exprimées.

Pourtant, les proches sont souvent les mieux placés pour comprendre l’évolution des valeurs ou des préférences de la personne. Les professeures Bernier et Régis dénoncent une conception réductrice et individualiste de l’autonomie, qui fait fi de la dimension relationnelle essentielle dans les soins palliatifs et en fin de vie.


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Un régime à repenser

L’analyse des critiques juridiques permet de mieux comprendre la faible adhésion aux DMA. Les enjeux entourant la présomption d’aptitude, la présomption de consentement éclairé et l’absence de rôle reconnu pour les proches minent la crédibilité et l’efficacité de ce mécanisme légal.

Dans ce contexte, il n’est pas surprenant que les professionnels de la santé puissent hésiter à se fier pleinement aux DMA. De même, la population semble peu encline à recourir à cet instrument, soit par méconnaissance, soit par doute quant à sa capacité réelle de refléter leurs volontés profondes dans des circonstances imprévisibles.

Ces constats invitent à revoir en profondeur ce régime. Peut-être serait-il temps de miser davantage sur les objectifs de soins – un processus évolutif déjà en place depuis 1994, qui consiste à discuter avec la personne et ses proches pour établir les grandes orientations de traitement selon son état de santé, ses volontés et ses valeurs. Ce mécanisme, plus souple, évolutif, et mieux adapté à l’accompagnement clinique, permet aussi l’implication des proches.

La Conversation Canada

Les auteurs ne travaillent pas, ne conseillent pas, ne possèdent pas de parts, ne reçoivent pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’ont déclaré aucune autre affiliation que leur organisme de recherche.

ref. Dix ans après leur entrée en vigueur, les directives de fin de vie sont peu utilisées. Voici pourquoi – https://theconversation.com/dix-ans-apres-leur-entree-en-vigueur-les-directives-de-fin-de-vie-sont-peu-utilisees-voici-pourquoi-257179

Célibataire ? Voici 5 conseils pour vous épanouir

Source: The Conversation – in French – By Yuthika Girme, Associate Professor, Department of Psychology, Simon Fraser University

De nombreuses personnes passent la vingtaine et la trentaine à se découvrir et à construire une vie indépendante. Parallèlement, la société leur dit qu’elles devraient chercher l’amour, se ranger et fonder une famille. Ces étapes sont encore largement considérées comme des symboles de l’âge adulte et de la réussite.

Comment cela se traduit-il pour le nombre croissant de célibataires dans la vingtaine et la trentaine ?

Au Canada, le célibat est en constante augmentation chez les jeunes adultes. Malgré cette tendance, le discours dominant continue de présenter les relations romantiques comme l’idéal à atteindre. Le célibat est souvent perçu comme une étape temporaire, plutôt que comme un mode de vie légitime et épanouissant.

Je suis professeure agrégée à l’Université Simon Fraser, où je dirige le laboratoire «Singlehood Experiences and Complexities Underlying Relationships» (Expériences du célibat et complexités sous-jacentes aux relations). Mes recherches visent à comprendre les conditions qui permettent aux célibataires et aux couples de s’épanouir et d’être heureux.

Voici ce que j’ai appris au fil des ans sur ce que vivent les adultes célibataires dans la vingtaine et la trentaine.


25-35 ans : vos enjeux, est une série produite par La Conversation/The Conversation.

Chacun vit sa vingtaine et sa trentaine à sa façon. Certains économisent pour contracter un prêt hypothécaire quand d’autres se démènent pour payer leur loyer. Certains passent tout leur temps sur les applications de rencontres quand d’autres essaient de comprendre comment élever un enfant. Notre série sur les 25-35 ans aborde vos défis et enjeux de tous les jours.

Le célibat est de plus en plus répandu

Au Canada, 59,8 % des 25-29 ans et 37,6 % des 30-34 ans déclarent ne pas être mariés ni vivre en union libre.

La proportion de jeunes de 20 à 34 ans qui ne vivent pas en couple est passée de 50,5 % en 1996 à 60,3 % en 2021.

En outre, parmi les personnes qui souhaitent un jour s’engager dans une relation, nombreuses sont celles qui repoussent leur décision. L’âge moyen du mariage au Canada a augmenté de près de huit ans depuis les années 1970, passant de 23,3 ans en 1971 à 31,2 ans en 2020.

Ces tendances peuvent être le reflet de divers facteurs : priorisation de la carrière, volonté de voyager, difficulté à rencontrer quelqu’un ou préférence pour le célibat au début de l’âge adulte.

Elles peuvent également refléter le fait qu’un nombre croissant de personnes se considèrent comme des «célibataires dans l’âme» et choisissent délibérément le célibat, car elles apprécient leur liberté et leur solitude.

La pression de former un couple

Malgré le nombre croissant de personnes dans la vingtaine et la trentaine qui sont célibataires, que ce soit par choix ou en raison des circonstances, la pression sociétale incite les gens à vivre une relation amoureuse et à se ranger. Cela s’explique en grande partie par le fait que notre société met fortement l’accent sur le couple, le mariage et la vie de famille.

Il est certain que vouloir fonder une famille et entretenir une relation amoureuse est un choix de vie commun et légitime. Toutefois, placer les relations amoureuses sur un piédestal peut se faire au détriment des célibataires.


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Les célibataires sont souvent considérés comme incomplets, simplement parce qu’ils ne sont pas en couple. Une étude que j’ai menée avec des collègues montre que les célibataires se sentent souvent exclus, mis à l’écart ou pris en pitié, ce qui peut nuire à leur bien-être. Ils peuvent également être victimes de stéréotypes négatifs et avoir le sentiment d’être perçus comme égoïstes, sans cœur, solitaires ou antisociaux.

Ces discours ne viennent pas uniquement de la société : les célibataires peuvent aussi les intérioriser, ce qui peut avoir des conséquences néfastes.

Dans une autre étude, nous avons examiné ce que nous appelons «les croyances liées à l’idéalisation de la vie amoureuse», c’est-à-dire la mesure dans laquelle les gens pensent qu’ils doivent être en couple pour être vraiment heureux. Nous avons constaté que les célibataires qui y adhèrent sont plus susceptibles de craindre le célibat et, par conséquent, de se déclarer insatisfaits de leur vie.

Comment être célibataire et heureux ?

Comment les célibataires peuvent-ils mener une vie heureuse, établie et satisfaisante, malgré les messages de la société sur l’importance des relations amoureuses ?

Pour répondre à cette question, mes collègues et moi-même avons passé en revue les études sur le célibat afin de mieux comprendre la différence entre les célibataires qui s’accommodent de leur situation et ceux qui s’y épanouissent. Nous avons constaté que, si certains célibataires trouvent la vie en solo difficile et aspirent à être en couple, de nombreux autres sont heureux et épanouis.

Voici quelques facteurs associés à un célibat heureux :

1) Avoir confiance en soi. Les personnes sûres d’elles qui sont capables de faire confiance à leurs proches et de compter sur eux font partie des célibataires heureux. Elles se disent plus satisfaites de leur vie et ont de bonnes habiletés en matière de régulation émotionnelle. Les célibataires sûrs d’eux peuvent être ouverts à l’idée de vivre une relation amoureuse tout en étant heureux et épanouis dans leur célibat.

2) Avoir des amis qui nous soutiennent. Les célibataires ont tendance à accorder davantage d’importance à leurs relations amicales que les personnes en couple. Les célibataires qui s’investissent dans leurs amitiés ont un sentiment d’appartenance, affichent une bonne estime de soi et sont satisfaits leur célibat.

Trois personnes assises autour d'une table de café en train de discuter
Les célibataires ont tendance à accorder davantage d’importance à leurs relations amicales que les personnes en couple.
(Shutterstock)

3) Répondre à ses besoins d’intimité. Les célibataires ont également des besoins sexuels et d’intimité. Selon les recherches, les célibataires qui savent y répondre apprécient davantage leur célibat et cherchent moins à être en couple. Par ailleurs, les célibataires satisfaits sur le plan sexuel finissent souvent par former un couple avec le temps.

4) Être plus âgé. Plus on approche de la quarantaine, plus le célibat est bien vécu. Cela découle sans doute du fait que les personnes d’âge mûr s’investissent pleinement dans leur vie de célibataire et ont moins tendance à subir la pression sociale qui les incite à correspondre à certaines attentes.

5) Accorder de l’importance à la liberté, au plaisir et à la créativité. Les recherches nous apprennent que les personnes célibataires qui apprécient la liberté, le plaisir et la créativité se sentent généralement plus heureuses.

Si on est célibataire dans la vingtaine et la trentaine, ce peut être un bon moment pour se concentrer sur son développement personnel, sa carrière, ses aspirations et ses relations avec la famille, les amis et la communauté. Ce sont des éléments importants pour vivre une vie heureuse, et ce, peu importe si on choisit de vivre seul ou en couple.

La Conversation Canada

Yuthika Girme bénéficie d’un financement du Conseil de recherches en sciences humaines du Canada.

ref. Célibataire ? Voici 5 conseils pour vous épanouir – https://theconversation.com/celibataire-voici-5-conseils-pour-vous-epanouir-256933

Here’s a way to save lives, curb traffic jams and make commutes faster and easier − ban left turns at intersections

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Vikash V. Gayah, Associate Professor of Civil Engineering, Penn State

Research shows left turns at intersections are dangerous and slow traffic. Benjamin Rondel/The Image Bank via Getty Images

More than 60% of traffic collisions at intersections involve left turns. Some U.S. cities – including San Francisco, Salt Lake City and Birmingham, Alabama – are restricting left turns.

Dr. Vikash Gayah, a professor of civil engineering at Penn State University and the interim director of the Larson Transportation Institute, discusses how left turns at intersections cause accidents, make traffic worse and use more gas.

Dr. Vikash Gayah discusses why left turns should be banned at some intersections.

The Conversation has collaborated with SciLine to bring you highlights from the discussion, edited for brevity and clarity.

How dangerous are left turns at intersections?

Vikash Gayah: When you make a left turn, you have to cross oncoming traffic. When you have a green light, you need to wait for a gap in the oncoming traffic before turning left. If you misjudge when you decide to turn, you could hit the oncoming traffic, or be hit by it. That’s an angle crash, one of the most dangerous types of crashes.

Also, the driver of the left-turning vehicle is typically looking at oncoming traffic. But pedestrians may be crossing the street they’re turning on to. Often the driver doesn’t see the pedestrians, and that too can cause a serious accident.

On the other hand, right turns require merging into traffic, but they’re not conflicting directly with traffic. So right turns are much, much safer than left turns.

What are the statistics on the unique dangers of left turns?

Gayah: Approximately 40% of all crashes occur at intersections − 50% of those crashes involve a serious injury, and 20% involve a fatality.

About 61% of the crashes at intersections involve a left turn. Left-hand turns are generally the least frequent movement at an intersection, so that 61% is a lot.

Why are left turns inefficient for traffic flow?

Gayah: When left-turning vehicles are waiting for the gap, they can block other lanes from moving, particularly when several vehicles are waiting to turn left.

Instead of the solid green light, many intersections use the green arrow to let left-turning vehicles move. But to do that, all other movements at the intersection have to stop. Stopping all other traffic just to serve a few left turns makes the intersection less efficient.

Also, every time you move to another “phase” of traffic – like the green arrow – the intersection has a brief period of time when all the lights are red. Traffic engineers call that an all-red time, and that’s when the intersection is not serving any vehicles. All-red time is two to three seconds per phase change, and that wasted time adds up quickly to further make the intersection less efficient.

An aerial view of a cars traveling around a roundabout.
Roundabouts reduce the need for left turns, but they don’t work everywhere.
Pete Ark/Moment via Getty Images

What restrictions have been tried in different cities?

Gayah: When a downtown is not very busy – in the off-peak periods – allowing left turns is fine because you don’t need that additional ability to move vehicles at each intersection.

Some cities are implementing signs that say no left turns at intersections from 7 to 9, which is the morning peak period, or 4 to 6, which is the afternoon peak period. In San Francisco, for example, Van Ness Avenue restricts left turns during peak periods.

But cities aren’t implementing these restrictions on a larger scale. Restrictions are more along individual corridors or isolated intersections instead of essentially the entire downtown, where possible. That would make the downtown street network more efficient.

Roundabouts are one approach to avoiding left turns.

Gayah: Roundabouts are safe because there’s no longer a need to cross opposing traffic. Everyone circulates in the same direction. You find where you need to go and then exit.

But restricting left turns, in general, is more efficient. Roundabouts aren’t as efficient when it’s busier. The roundabout gets full, which can cause a gridlock, and no vehicle can move. Traditional intersections are less prone to gridlock.

Roundabouts also take up more space. Installing a roundabout might mean expanding the intersection. In some downtowns, that means tearing down buildings or removing sidewalks. Restricting left turns only requires a sign that says “no left turns” or “no left turns during peak periods.” That’s it.

What are the benefits to banning left turns in urban areas?

Gayah: Any way you cut it, eliminating left turns will result in longer travel distances. I’ll have to travel a longer distance to get to where I need to go. The worst case is having to circle the block. I’m actually traveling four extra block lengths to get to where I need to go.

But not all trips require circling the block. In a typical downtown, each trip will be about one block length longer on average. That’s not a lot of extra distance. And that extra driving is more than offset by the fact that each intersection with banned left turns is now moving more vehicles. Which means every time you’re at an intersection, you wait less time, on average. So you travel a slightly longer distance but get to where you’re going more quickly.

Does avoiding left turns improve fuel efficiency?

Gayah: Our research found that even though vehicles travel longer distances on average with the restricted left turns, they spend less fuel – about 10% to 15% less per trip – because they don’t stop as much at intersections.

This is why UPS and other fleets route their vehicles to avoid left turns. There’s less idling and fewer stops.

Do you think banning left turns could become widely accepted?

Gayah: It’s a new strategy, so it’s uncomfortable for some people. But when they get to their destination faster, I think people will latch onto it.

Watch the full interview to hear more.

SciLine is a free service based at the American Association for the Advancement of Science, a nonprofit that helps journalists include scientific evidence and experts in their news stories.

The Conversation

Vikash V. Gayah’s research has been funded by various State Departments of Transportation (including Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Washington State, Montana, South Dakota and North Carolina), US Department of Transportation (via the Mineta National Transit Research Consortium, the Mid-Atlantic Universities Transportation Center, and the Center for Integrated Asset Management for Multimodal Transportation Infrastructure Systems), Federal Highway Administration, National Cooperative Highway Research Program, and National Science Foundation..

ref. Here’s a way to save lives, curb traffic jams and make commutes faster and easier − ban left turns at intersections – https://theconversation.com/heres-a-way-to-save-lives-curb-traffic-jams-and-make-commutes-faster-and-easier-ban-left-turns-at-intersections-257877

Nations are increasingly ‘playing the field’ when it comes to US and China – a new book explains explains why ‘active nonalignment’ is on the march

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Jorge Heine, Outgoing Interim Director of the Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future, Boston University

Brazil President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, center, flanked by India Prime Minister Narendra Modi, left, and South Africa President Cyril Ramaphosa, speaks at the summit of Group of 20 leading economies in Rio de Janeiro on Nov. 19, 2024. Mauro Pimentel/AFP via Getty Images

In 2020, as Latin American countries were contending with the triple challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic, a global economic shock and U.S. policy under the first Trump administration, Jorge Heine, research professor at Boston University and a former Chilean ambassador, in association with two colleagues, Carlos Fortin and Carlos Ominami, put forward the notion of “active nonalignment.”

A book cover with the title 'The Non-Aligned World.'

Polity Books

Five years on, the foreign policy approach is more relevant than ever, with trends including the rise of the Global South and the fragmentation of the global order, encouraging countries around the world to reassess their relationships with both the United States and China.

It led Heine, along with Fortin and Ominami, to follow up on their original arguments in a new book, “The Non-Aligned World,” published in June 2025.

The Conversation spoke with Heine on what is behind the push toward active nonalignment, and where it may lead.

For those not familiar, what is active nonalignment?

Active nonalignment is a foreign policy approach in which countries put their own interests front and center and refuse to take sides in the great power rivalry between the U.S. and China.

It takes its cue from the Non-Aligned Movement of the 1950s and 1960s but updates it to the realities of the 21st century. Today’s rising Global South is very different from the “Third World” that made up the Non-Aligned Movement. Countries like India, Turkey, Brazil and Indonesia have greater economic heft and wherewithal. They thus have more options than in the past.

They can pick and choose policies in accordance with what is in their national interests. And because there is competition between Washington and Beijing to win over such countries’ hearts and minds, those looking to promote a nonaligned agenda have greater leverage.

Traditional international relations literature suggests that in relations between nations, you can either “balance,” meaning take a strong position against another power, or “bandwagon” – that is, go along with the wishes of that power. The notion was that weaker states couldn’t balance against the Great Powers because they don’t have the military power to do so, so they had to bandwagon.

What we are saying is that there is an intermediate approach: hedging. Countries can hedge their bets or equivocate by playing one power off the other. So, on some issues you side with the U.S., and others you side with China.

Thus, the grand strategy of active nonalignment is “playing the field,” or in other words, searching for opportunities among what is available in the international environment. This means being constantly on the lookout for potential advantages and available resources – in short, being active, rather than passive or reactive.

So active nonalignment is not so much a movement as it is a doctrine.

Two men in suits sit behind a desk chatting.
Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba, right, and Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser attend the first Conference of Non-Aligned Countries in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, in September 1961.
Keystone/Hulton Archive/Getty Images

It’s been five years since you first came up with the idea of active nonalignment. Why did you think it was time to revisit it now?

The notion of active nonalignment came up during the first Trump administration and in the context of a Latin America hit by the triple-whammy of U.S. pressure, a pandemic and the ensuing recession – which in Latin America translated into the biggest economic downturn in 120 years, a 6.6% drop of regional gross domestic product in 2020.

ANA was intended as a guide for Latin American countries to navigate those difficult moments, and it led us to the publication of a symposium volume with contributions by six former Latin American foreign ministers in November 2021, in which we elaborated on the concept.

Three months later, with the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the reaction to it by many countries in Asia and Africa, nonalignment was back with a vengeance.

Countries like India, Pakistan, South Africa and Indonesia, among others, took positions that were at odds with the West on Ukraine. Many of them, though not all, condemned Russian aggression but also wanted no part in the West’s sanctions on Moscow. These sanctions were seen as unwarranted and as an expression of Western double standards – no sanctions were applied on the U.S. for invading Iraq, of course.

And then there were the Hamas attacks on Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, and the resulting war in the Gaza Strip. Countries across the Global South strongly condemned the Hamas attacks, but the West’s response to the subsequent deaths of tens of thousands of Palestinians brought home the notion of double standards when it came to international human rights.

Why weren’t Palestinians deserving of the same compassion as Ukrainians? For many in the Global South, that question hit very hard – the idea that “human rights are limited to Europeans and people who looked like them did not go down well.”

Thus, South Africa brought a case against Israel in the International Court of Justice alleging genocide, and Brazil spearheaded ceasefire efforts at the United Nations.

A third development is the expansion of the BRICS bloc of economies from its original five members – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – to 10 members. Although China and Russia are not members of the Global South, those other founding members are, and the BRICS group has promoted key issues on the Global South’s agenda. The addition of countries such as Egypt and Ethiopia has meant that BRICS has increasingly taken on the guise of the Global South forum. Brazil President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, a leading proponent of BRICS, is keen on advancing this Global South agenda.

All three of these developments have made active nonalignment more relevant than ever before.

How are China and the US responding to active nonalignment – or are they?

I’ll give you two examples: Angola and Argentina.

In Angola, the African country that has received most Chinese cooperation to the tune of US$45 billion, you now have the U.S. financing what is known as the Lobito Corridor – a railway line that stretches from the eastern border of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to Angola’s Atlantic coast.

Ten years ago, the notion that the U.S. would be financing railway projects in southern Africa would have been considered unfathomable. Yet it has happened. Why? Because China has built significant railway lines in countries such as Kenya and Ethiopia, and the U.S. realized that it was being left behind.

For the longest time, the U.S. would condemn such Chinese-financed infrastructure projects via the “Belt and Road Initiative” as nothing but “debt-trap diplomacy” designed to saddle developing nations with “white elephants” nobody needed. But a couple of years ago, that tune changed: The U.S. and Europe realized that there is a big infrastructure deficit in Asia, Africa and Latin America that China was stepping in to reduce – and the West was nowhere to be seen in this critical area.

In short, the West changed it approach – and countries like Angola are now able to play the U.S. off against China for its own national interests.

Then take Argentina. In 2023, Javier Milei was elected president on a strong anti-China platform. He said his government would have nothing to do with Beijing. But just two years later, Milei announced in an Economist interview that he is a great admirer of Beijing.

Why? Because Argentina has a very significant foreign debt, and Milei knew that a continued anti-China stance would mean a credit line from Beijing would likely not be renewed. The Argentinian president was under pressure from the International Monetary Fund and Washington to let the credit line with China lapse, but Milei refused to do so and managed to hold his own, playing both sides against the middle.

Milei is a populist conservative; Brazil’s Lula a leftist. So is active nonalignment immune to ideological differences?

Absolutely. When people ask me what the difference is between traditional nonalignment and active nonalignment, one of the most obvious things is that the latter is nonideological – it can be used by people of the right, left and center. It is a guide to action, a compass to navigate the waters of a highly troubled world, and can be used by governments of very different ideological hues.

Two men in suits turn away from each other.
Brazil President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva and Argentina President Javier Milei at the 66th Summit of leaders of the Mercosur trading bloc in Buenos Aires on July 3, 2025.
Luis Robayo/AFP via Getty Images

The book talks a lot about the fragmentation of the rules-based order. Where do you see this heading?

There is little doubt that the liberal international order that framed world politics from 1945 to 2016 has come to an end. Some of its bedrock principles, like multilateralism, free trade and respect for international law and existing international treaties, have been severely undermined.

We are now in a transitional stage. The notion of the West as a geopolitical entity, as we knew it, has ceased to exist. We now have the extraordinary situation where illiberal forces in Hungary, Germany and Poland, among other places, are being supported by those in power in both Washington and Moscow.

And this decline of the West has not come about because of any economic issue – the U.S. still represents around 25% of global GDP, much as it did in 1970 – but because of the breakdown of the trans-Atlantic alliance.

So we are moving toward a very different type of world order – and one in which the Global South has the opportunity to have much more of a role, especially if it deploys active nonalignment.

How have events since Trump’s inauguration played into your argument?

The notion of active nonalignment was triggered by the first Trump administration’s pressure on Latin American countries. I would argue that the measures undertaken in Trump’s second administration – the tariffs imposed on 90 countries around the world; the U.S. leaving the Paris climate agreement, the World Health Organization and the U.N. Human Rights Council; and other “America First” policies – have only underscored the validity of active nonalignment as a foreign policy approach.

The pressures on countries across the Global South are very strong, and there is a temptation to give in to Trump and align with U.S. Yet, all indications are that simply giving in to Trump’s demands isn’t a recipe for success. Those countries that have gone down the route of giving in to Trump’s demands only see more demands after that. Countries need a different approach – and that can be found in active nonalignment.

The Conversation

Jorge Heine does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Nations are increasingly ‘playing the field’ when it comes to US and China – a new book explains explains why ‘active nonalignment’ is on the march – https://theconversation.com/nations-are-increasingly-playing-the-field-when-it-comes-to-us-and-china-a-new-book-explains-explains-why-active-nonalignment-is-on-the-march-260234

Thailand’s judiciary is flexing its muscles, but away from PM’s plight, dozens of activists are at the mercy of capricious courts

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Tyrell Haberkorn, Professor of Southeast Asian Studies, University of Wisconsin-Madison

Thai Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra is swarmed by members of the media after a cabinet meeting at Government House on July 1, 2025. Anusak Laowilas/NurPhoto via Getty Images

Thai Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra is currently feeling the sharp end of the country’s powerful judiciary.

On July 2, 2025, Thailand’s Constitutional Court suspended Paetongtarn from office as a result of a leaked phone conversation in which she was heard disparaging Thailand’s military and showing deference to former the prime minister of Cambodia, Hun Sen, despite an ongoing border dispute between the two countries. Initially set for 14 days, many onlookers believe the court’s suspension is likely to become permanent.

Meanwhile, far from the prime minister’s office is Arnon Nampa, another Thai national whose future is at the mercy of the Thai judiciary – in this case, the Criminal Court.

Arnon, a lawyer and internationally recognized human rights defender, is one of 32 political prisoners imprisoned over “lèse majesté,” or insulting the Thai monarchy. He is currently serving a sentence of nearly 30 years for a speech questioning the monarchy during pro-democracy protests in 2020. Unless he is both acquitted in his remaining cases and his current convictions are overturned on appeal, Arnon will likely spend the rest of his life in prison.

The plights of Paetongtarn and Arnon may seem distant. But as a historian of Thai politics, I see the cases as connected by a judiciary using the law and its power to diminish the prospects for democracy in Thailand and constrain the ability of its citizens to participate freely in society.

Familiar troubles

The Shinawatra family is no stranger to the reach of both the Thai military and the country’s courts.

Paetongtarn is the third of her family to be prime minister – and could become the third to be ousted. Her father, Thaksin Shinawatra, was removed in a 2006 military coup. Her aunt, Yingluck Shinawatra, was ousted prior to the May 22, 2014, coup. In common with past coups, the juntas who fomented them were shielded from the law, with none facing prosecution.

For now, it is unclear whether Paetongtarn’s suspension is the precursor to another coup, the dissolution of parliament and new elections, or a reshuffle of the cabinet. But what is clear is that the Constitutional Court’s intervention is one of several in which the nine appointed judges are playing a critical role in the future of Thai democracy.

Protecting the monarchy

The root of the judiciary’s power can be found in the way the modern Thai nation was set up nearly 100 years ago.

On June 24, 1932, Thailand transitioned from an absolute monarchy to a constitutional monarchy. Since then, the country has experienced 13 coups, as the country has shifted from democracy to dictatorship and back again.

But throughout, the monarchy has remained a constant presence – protected by Article 112 of the Criminal Code, which defines the crime and penalty of lese majesté: “Whoever defames, insults, or threatens the king, queen, heir-apparent or regent shall be subject to three-to-fifteen years imprisonment.”

The law is widely feared among dissidents in Thailand both because it is interpreted broadly to include any speech or action that is not laudatory and innocent verdicts are rare.

Although Article 112 has been law since 1957, it was rarely used until after the 2006 coup.

Since then, cases have risen steadily and reached record levels following a youth-led movement for democracy in 2020. At least 281 people have been, or are currently being, prosecuted for alleged violation of Article 112, according to Thai Lawyers for Human Rights.

Challenging the status quo

The 2020 youth-led movement for democracy was sparked by the Constitutional Court’s dissolution of the progressive Future Forward Party at the beginning of that year, the disappearance of a Thai dissident in exile in Cambodia, and economic problems caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

In protests in Bangkok and in provinces across the country, they called for a new election, a new constitution and an end to state repression of dissent.

A man next to illuminated building gestures to the crowd
Pro-democracy activist leader Arnon Nampa speaks to protesters.
Peerapon Boonyakiat/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images

On Aug. 3, 2020, Nampa added another demand: The monarchy must be openly discussed and questioned.

Without addressing such a key, unquestionable institution in the nation, Arnon argued, the struggle for democracy would inevitably fail.

This message resonated with many Thai citizens, and despite the fearsome Article 112, protests grew throughout the last months of 2020.

Students at Thammasat University, the center of student protest since the 1950s, expanded Arnon’s call into a 10-point set of demands for reform of the monarchy.

Making it clear that they did not aim to abolish the monarchy, the students’ proposal aimed to clarify the monarchy’s economic, political and military role and make it truly constitutional.

As the protests began to seem unstoppable, with tens of thousands joining, the police began cracking down on demonstrations. Many were arrested for violating anti-COVID-19 measures and other minor laws. By late November 2020, however, Article 112 charges began to be brought against Arnon and other protest leaders for their peaceful speech.

In September 2023, Arnon was convicted in his first case, and he has been behind bars since. He is joined by other political prisoners, whose numbers grow weekly as their cases move through the judicial process.

Capricious courts

Unlike Arnon, Paetongtarn Shinawatra is not facing prison.

But the Constitutional Court’s decision to suspend her from her position as prime minister because of a leaked recording of an indiscreet telephone conversation is, to many legal minds, a capricious response that has the effect of short-circuiting the democratic process.

So too, I believe, does bringing the weight of the law against Arnon and other political prisoners in Thailand who remain behind bars as the current political turmoil plays out.

The Conversation

Tyrell Haberkorn does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Thailand’s judiciary is flexing its muscles, but away from PM’s plight, dozens of activists are at the mercy of capricious courts – https://theconversation.com/thailands-judiciary-is-flexing-its-muscles-but-away-from-pms-plight-dozens-of-activists-are-at-the-mercy-of-capricious-courts-260408