Category: Academic Analysis

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Arnim Langer, Professor, KU Leuven

Almost 70 years after independence was gained across the continent, many African countries continue to face the complex task of managing ethnic diversity and building national cohesion. National cohesion is a broad and often abstract concept. It refers to the extent to which people within a country share a sense of common purpose and belonging. It is often reflected in the strength of national identities and the degree of pride individuals feel in being part of the nation.

The fact that borders in colonial Africa were drawn in the late 19th century to the early 20th century by European powers without regard for ethnic and cultural realities and histories meant that post-colonial African governments had to develop a sense of national consciousness and belonging.

To address this task, many African countries have made efforts to promote a shared national identity which could bridge ethnic and regional divides. Governments have experimented with a diverse range of policies: promoting national languages, establishing civic education, celebrating national holidays, and reforming state institutions. Other measures have included abolishing traditional kingdoms, redistributing land, renaming capital cities, compulsory military service, and national youth service programmes.

Research into the effectiveness of these African initiatives has been limited and inconclusive. In recently published research, researchers at the Centre for Research on Peace and Development at KU Leuven addressed this gap by analysing the impact of Ghana’s National Service Scheme. Our research shows that, under certain conditions, participation in this programme can meaningfully enhance feelings of national belonging.

Ghana’s experience with national service

Established in 1973, Ghana’s National Service Scheme requires university graduates to spend one year serving in diverse roles throughout the country. This sometimes takes them to regions far from their homes.

While Ghana is widely regarded as a model for the peaceful management of ethnic diversity, the establishment of the National Service Scheme in 1973 was necessary. It was partly a response to the deep regional and ethnic divisions that marked the country’s early postcolonial period. Notably, in the years leading up to the scheme’s introduction, political rivalry between Ashanti and Ewe elites played a significant role in the country’s political instability.

Initially designed to counteract such ethnic divisions, the scheme continues to engage very large numbers of graduates each year. Over 100,000 were deployed in 2025. The programme aims not only to strengthen national cohesion, but also to promote manpower development and address key social challenges. These include unemployment, illiteracy and poverty.

Participants are deployed across a range of sectors, including education, healthcare, agriculture and public administration. While the vast majority of participants are assigned to teaching roles in primary or secondary schools or to positions in healthcare institutions, others take on administrative roles within government agencies or the private sector. These deployments are meant to expose them to different communities and foster intergroup contact under conditions that promote social bonding and reduce prejudice.

But can national service also contribute towards fostering stronger feelings of national belonging?

To answer this question, we conducted a large-scale panel survey among almost 3,000 service personnel. They had participated in the scheme between August 2014 and September 2016. The participants were surveyed three times: before their deployment and again within weeks after completing their national service.

The survey was aimed at examining their feelings of national pride before, during, and after their year of national service. Our study provides compelling evidence that national service significantly boosts participants’ feelings of national pride and belonging.

We found that the mechanism behind this impact lies in intergroup contact. This is described as positive, meaningful interactions between individuals from diverse ethnic and regional backgrounds. Participants who reported frequent and meaningful interactions, including developing new friendships and gaining deeper knowledge of other cultural groups, showed the most significant increases in their sense of national pride.

Importantly, the greatest improvements were observed among participants who initially identified less strongly with the nation.

We further found that the positive effects of participation were not short-lived. It persisted well beyond the year of service.

Key takeaways for policymakers

Governments aiming to strengthen national identity through youth service programmes should consider four key lessons from Ghana’s experience.

Mandatory participation is crucial. Voluntary schemes tend to attract individuals who are already inclined towards inter-ethnic harmony. This limits their broader societal impact. Ghana’s mandatory approach ensures that a wide and diverse range of participants are included. This enhances the programme’s reach and effectiveness.

Structured interactions must be actively promoted. Simply placing people from different backgrounds together is not enough. Successful programmes, such as Ghana’s, intentionally create opportunities for meaningful engagement. These structured interactions help participants develop lasting relationships and deepen their understanding of other cultures.

Youth should be engaged during formative years. Recent graduates are at a stage in life when attitudes and identities are still forming. National service programmes that target this age group can have a lasting influence. Especially on how young people perceive national unity and their role within it.

Diverse placements are essential. National service programmes should deploy participants in settings that are diverse. The geographical location is of secondary importance. Exposure to diverse settings will challenge assumptions and broaden perspectives. It will also foster stronger national bonds across ethnic and regional lines.

Why national service pays off in the long run

National youth service programmes, when well-designed and properly managed, are a promising yet underused tool for promoting national unity in Africa’s ethnically diverse societies. These initiatives can create meaningful opportunities for young people to engage across regional and ethnic lines. This helps to build trust, civic responsibility, and a shared sense of national identity.

Yet, in recent decades, many of these programmes have been scaled back or discontinued across the continent. Examples are Botswana, Tanzania, Zimbabwe and Zambia. The main reason? Cost. Governments have often viewed the logistical and financial demands of deploying tens of thousands of graduates each year as unsustainable. But this short-term budget logic misses the bigger picture.

Ghana’s scheme shows what’s possible. In recent years, the scheme’s deployment figures have reached record highs. It is now common for around 100,000 national service personnel to be mobilised in a single service year. The positive outcomes observed in Ghana offer clear, evidence-based lessons for policymakers across the continent. Investing in national service is not just a cost – it’s a commitment to a more united future.

Arnim Langer receives funding from Research Foundation Flanders (FWO).

Bart Meuleman receives funding from Research Foundation Flanders (FWO)

Lucas Leopold receives funding from Research Foundation Flanders (FWO).

– ref. University graduates in Ghana must serve society for a year – study suggests it’s good for national unity – https://theconversation.com/university-graduates-in-ghana-must-serve-society-for-a-year-study-suggests-its-good-for-national-unity-258743

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Julie Shantone Rubbi Nunan, Senior Lecturer in the Department of Early Childhood Education and Development, University of South Africa

South African primary schools are facing a crisis. Every day, learners fight, bully, destroy property, and intimidate other learners and teachers, turning what should be safe spaces into places of fear and mistrust.

Research shows that learner behaviour frequently involves violence, bullying and vandalism (damage to school property) that threatens the safety of both learners and staff.

The media usually report only serious cases of violence, but schools and teachers face challenging and dangerous behaviour every day that often goes unreported. This underreporting is not unique to South Africa; it’s a challenge seen in other countries too.

Research shows that this kind of behaviour disrupts teaching and learning, leading to poor learner performance and school dropouts.

Teachers frequently face aggression and intimidation from learners, which undermines their ability to teach effectively. They feel unsafe and frustrated when learners act aggressively, and this problem worsens when parents protect their children’s bad behaviour instead of addressing it.

Violence, bullying, and damage to school property don’t just cause harm to learners and teachers. They also cost schools money to repair the damage and cause emotional trauma and suffering for victims and their families.

Given these realities, it is important to carefully explore the lived experiences of teachers, school leaders and caretakers to fully understand the severity and complexity of challenging learner behaviour. This understanding is essential for developing effective policies and interventions aimed at restoring safety and improving learning environments in South African primary schools.

As part of a wider study of challenging learner behaviour, I interviewed 21 participants from three primary schools in Durban, South Africa. It was a qualitative case study, in which the small sample size was well-suited and provided relevant and credible information on challenging learner behaviour. Thematic analysis was appropriate for identifying patterns and themes for further exploration.

The aim was to probe the participants’ perspectives to understand how learners’ challenging behaviour is experienced in primary schools. I wanted to know more about how behaviour stemming from children’s homes and environments, playing out at school, was affecting teachers and the overall school climate.

The interviews indicated that teachers were unhappy and wanting to quit the profession, learner victims faced constant fear and distress, and caretakers felt degraded. If this is a sign of how teachers, children and caretakers are feeling around South Africa, it points to the need for ways to reduce their stress.

Voices from schools

The schools in my study are located in semi-urban areas within the same district and serve learners from grade R (about age 5) to grade 7 (about age 12). The surrounding communities face high levels of unemployment, domestic violence, and various social challenges.

Fifteen teachers, three governors, and three caretakers shared their experiences through interviews, enabling open discussion and deeper insights. Consistency across school sites supported the trustworthiness of the findings. Ethical guidelines were followed throughout.

Across the three schools, participants described an environment where serious learner misconduct was a common, everyday problem.

Teachers, governors, and caretakers reported daily disruptions that affected teaching, learning and emotional wellbeing. Aggression and violence were constant. Learners engaged in physical fights – punching, kicking, and using sharp objects like pencils and knives. These were not minor scuffles but incidents that caused serious injuries. Teachers were also threatened, shouted at, and occasionally physically harmed.

Bullying was widespread, both verbal and physical. Learners harassed peers through name-calling, exclusion, extortion and intimidation, often in unsupervised spaces like toilets and tuckshops. Victims lived in fear, while teachers struggled to maintain discipline and protect vulnerable learners.

Vandalism and property damage were routine. Learners tore up textbooks, damaged desks and windows, defaced walls with vulgar graffiti, and clogged toilets with rubbish. Caretakers faced degrading tasks like cleaning and scrubbing faeces and graffiti off the walls. The costs of repairing damage strained already limited school budgets.

Adding to the tension, gang-like behaviour emerged. Small groups banded together to provoke fights, intimidate others, and sometimes fuel unrest rooted in xenophobia or local politics, creating fear, uncertainty and division among learners.

Some incidents had gendered and criminal implications, including the reporting of boys violating the privacy and rights of other boys in the school toilets, and girls being inappropriately touched and harassed. This contributed to emotional trauma and, in some cases, learner dropout – especially among girls. The United Nations Children’s Fund posits that school violence contributes to girls dropping out of school. The dropout rate is a concern in South Africa.

Stealing and lying were common. Learners stole from classmates, teachers, and school offices, often without remorse, and frequently lied or blamed others when confronted, further eroding trust and accountability.

Read more:
Dealing with unruly behaviour among schoolchildren in a tumultuous world

Many participants believed learners expressed unspoken pain or mirrored violence and instability seen at home and in their communities. According to social cognitive theory, such behaviours are learned. Children exposed to violence, neglect, or chaos often replicate these actions in school. Without consistent guidance, role models, or consequences, the cycle intensifies.

Moving forward

In short, these schools are no longer safe havens for learning – they are in crisis. Without urgent and effective intervention, the very mission of basic education – and the wellbeing of children – is at risk.

Primary schools depend on governing authorities and communities for their safety and success. Stakeholders must take collective action to reclaim schools as safe learning spaces.

Governing authorities should address the issues raised by reviewing policies and implementing support programmes, including counselling, family-school partnerships, and teacher training to handle challenging behaviour in positive and sustainable ways.

Julie Shantone Rubbi Nunan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Bullying, violence and vandalism in primary school: study explores a growing crisis in South Africa – https://theconversation.com/bullying-violence-and-vandalism-in-primary-school-study-explores-a-growing-crisis-in-south-africa-260111

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Philipp Kastner, Senior Lecturer in International Law, The University of Western Australia

The governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Rwanda concluded a peace treaty in June 2025, aimed at ending a decades-long war in eastern DRC. The United Nations welcomed the agreement as “a significant step towards de-escalation, peace and stability” in the region.

I have analysed several different peace negotiations and agreements. It’s important to distinguish between what’s needed to get warring parties to the table, and what’s eventually agreed on. In this article, I examine whether the DRC-Rwanda deal has got the four essential components that usually signal that an agreement will hold.

Two broad points about peace agreements, first – and one particular complication in the DRC-Rwanda case.

Firstly, one agreement is rarely enough to resolve a complex conflict. Most deals are part of a series of agreements, sometimes between different actors. They often mention previously concluded ones, and will be referred to by subsequent ones.

Secondly, peace is a process, and requires broad and sustained commitment. It is essential that other actors, like armed groups, are brought on board. Importantly, this also includes civil society actors. An agreement will be more legitimate and effective if different voices are heard during negotiations.

One major complication in relation to the DRC-Rwanda deal is that the United States has been the prime broker. But rather than acting as a neutral mediator trying to bring about peace, Washington seems to be pursuing its own economic interests. This does not bode well.

There is no simple recipe for a good peace agreement, but research shows that four elements are important: a serious commitment from the parties, precise wording, clear timelines and strong implementation provisions.

What underpins a good agreement

First, the parties need to be serious about the agreement and able to commit to its terms. It must not be used as a cover to buy time, re-arm or pursue fighting. Moreover, lasting peace cannot be made exclusively at the highest political level. Agreements that are the result of more inclusive processes, with input by and support from the communities concerned, have a higher success rate.

Second, the agreement must address the issues it aims to resolve, and its provisions must be drafted carefully and unambiguously. When agreements are vague or silent on key aspects, they are often short-lived. Previous experiences can guide peace negotiators and mediators in the drafting process. Peace agreement databases established by the United Nations and academic institutions are a useful tool for this.

Third, clear and realistic timelines are essential. These can concern the withdrawal of armed forces from specified territories, the return of refugees and internally displaced persons, and the establishment of mechanisms providing reparations or other forms of transitional justice.

Fourth, an agreement should include provisions on its implementation. External support is usually helpful here. Third states or international organisations, liked the United Nations and the African Union, can be mandated to oversee this phase. They can also provide security guarantees or even deploy a peacekeeping operation. What is crucial is that these actors are committed to the process and don’t pursue their own interests.

Read more:
DRC and Rwanda sign a US-brokered peace deal: what are the chances of its success?

To know what to realistically expect from a specific peace agreement, it’s important to understand that such agreements can take very different forms. These range from pre-negotiation arrangements and ceasefires to comprehensive peace accords and implementation agreements.

A lasting resolution of the conflict should not be expected when only a few conflict parties have concluded a temporary ceasefire.

The DRC-Rwanda agreement: an important step with lots of shortcomings

It’s difficult to tell at this point how serious the DRC and Rwanda are about peace, and if their commitment will be enough.

Their assertion that they will respect each other’s territory and refrain from acts of aggression is certainly important.

But Rwanda has a history of direct military activities in the DRC since the 1990s. And the treaty only includes rather vague references to the “disengagement of forces/lifting of defensive measures by Rwanda”. It doesn’t specifically mention the withdrawal of the reportedly thousands of Rwandan troops deployed to eastern DRC.

The Paul Kagame-led Rwandan government has also supported Tutsi-dominated armed groups in the DRC since the Rwandan genocide in 1994. The Mouvement du 23 Mars (M23) is the current primary military actor in eastern DRC. But the agreement between the governments of DRC and Rwanda didn’t include the M23 or other groups. The two governments only commit themselves to supporting the ongoing negotiations between the DRC and the M23 facilitated by Qatar.

The agreement also foresees the “neutralisation” of another armed group, the Hutu-dominated Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda (FDLR). This group claims to protect Rwandan Hutu refugees in the DRC, but is considered “genocidal” by the Rwandan government. The group has reacted to this plan by calling for a political solution and a more inclusive peace process.

What’s needed

The DRC-Rwanda agreement includes provisions that are vital to the people most affected by the conflict, such as the return of the millions of people displaced because of the fighting in eastern DRC. But it does not address other key issues.

For instance, aside from a general commitment to promote human rights and international humanitarian law, there is no reference to the widespread violations of human rights and war crimes reportedly committed by all sides. These include summary executions, and sexual and gender-based violence, including violence against children.

Some form of justice and reconciliation mechanism to deal with such large-scale violence should be considered in this situation, as for instance in the fairly successful 2016 agreement between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People’s Army (FARC). This could contribute to preventing further violations as it sends a clear signal that committing crimes will not be rewarded. It also helps the population heal and gives peace a better chance.

There is no single model for this, and so-called transitional justice (defined as the “range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation”) remains highly controversial. For instance, insisting on war crimes trials can be seen as endangering a fragile peace process.

But peace agreements across the world, from Libya to the Central African Republic, have over past decades moved away from blanket amnesties. They have increasingly included provisions to ensure accountability, especially for serious crimes. The DRC-Rwanda deal is silent on these questions.

A twist in the tale

The DRC-Rwanda deal is complicated by Washington’s role and pursuit of economic interests.

The two states agreed to establish a joint oversight committee, with members of the African Union, Qatar and the United States. It foresees a “regional economic integration framework”, which has been criticised as opening the door for foreign influence in the DRC’s rich mineral resources. The country is the world’s largest producer of cobalt, for instance, which is essential for the renewable energy sector.

Such a neocolonial “peace for exploitation bargain” does not send a positive signal. And it will probably not contribute to ending an armed conflict that has been fuelled by the exploitation of natural resources.

Philipp Kastner does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. 4 things every peace agreement needs – and how the DRC-Rwanda deal measures up – https://theconversation.com/4-things-every-peace-agreement-needs-and-how-the-drc-rwanda-deal-measures-up-260944