Category: Academic Analysis

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Neil Mabbott, Personal Chair of Immunopathology, University of Edinburgh

Vaccines have traditionally worked by teaching the immune system to recognise a specific virus or bacterium – in effect, showing it a wanted poster for a single suspect. But what if one vaccine could protect against dozens of different infections at once? Researchers have now developed a potential candidate for such a vaccine, and a new study in mice, published in the journal Science, has given promising results.

What is this new vaccine, and how does it work?

Most vaccines work by introducing the immune system to a specific pathogen – a weakened version of it, or a key protein from its surface – so that the body can recognise and fight it if encountered later.

This vaccine takes a fundamentally different approach. Rather than targeting any one bug, it contains molecules that mimic the signals the body naturally produces when it is under attack from a virus or bacterium. The effect is to put certain immune cells into a prolonged state of high alert, ready to respond rapidly to a wide range of threats, rather than being trained to spot just one.

However, the consequences to dialling up the immune system beyond its normal state won’t be known until human trials are conducted.

Why is it given as a nasal spray rather than an injection?

The nose, throat and lungs are lined with what scientists call mucosal surfaces – the moist tissues that act as the body’s main point of contact with the outside world, and its first barrier against infection. The immune system in these tissues responds more powerfully when a vaccine is delivered directly to them, rather than into a muscle in the arm.

That principle already underlies the routine flu vaccine given to young children in the UK, which comes as a nasal spray. Research has also shown that COVID vaccines can block infection more effectively in animals when delivered this way, rather than by injection. Spraying the new vaccine into the nose allows it to reach immune cells deep in the lungs.

How can one vaccine protect against so many different pathogens?

The vaccine works by enhancing communication between two key types of immune cell. The first are alveolar macrophages – large cells positioned in the tiny air spaces of the lungs, where they act as a first line of defence against anything harmful that is inhaled. When primed by the vaccine, they are able to engulf and destroy invading pathogens far more rapidly than usual.

The second are T cells, which are pushed to mount faster antiviral responses. Because the vaccine is boosting these general frontline defences rather than targeting any specific pathogen, it can in theory work against a broad range of threats.

In mice, it also appeared to suppress allergic reactions – to house dust mites, for example – because the strong inflammatory immune response it triggers appears to displace the quite different response that drives allergies.

The study was done in mice. How confident are scientists that it will work the same way in humans?

Cautiously hopeful, but not yet confident. There are well-documented differences between mouse and human immune systems, and promising results in animals frequently fail to translate to people. The critical next step will be controlled human infection studies – trials in which healthy volunteers are vaccinated, exposed to a specific pathogen under close medical supervision, and carefully monitored for both safety and immune response.

Could this really replace multiple jabs a year? And which ones, specifically?

Potentially, yes – at least for some. If it proves effective in humans, a vaccine of this kind could in principle replace the need for separate annual jabs against flu, COVID and common cold viruses, all of which are RNA-based viruses, meaning their genetic material is RNA rather than DNA. Whether it would extend to DNA-based viruses – those responsible for chickenpox or hepatitis, for example – is far less certain and would require separate investigation.

How long does the protection last, and would people need a booster?

In mice, protection lasted up to three months. This is considerably shorter than conventional vaccines in humans, some of which offer protection for years or even a lifetime. How long this type of vaccine might provide protection for in humans is not currently known. A similarly short period of protection in humans could be viewed as a real limitation, but not necessarily a fatal one

If the vaccine were given each autumn, it could provide meaningful protection to vulnerable people across the winter months, when respiratory infections peak. Even time-limited immunity, deployed strategically, could save lives.

What are the next steps before this reaches the public?

Demonstrating safety is the immediate priority. Because the vaccine is designed to keep parts of the immune system in a heightened state for an extended period, there is a need to confirm that this does not cause unintended harm to healthy tissue.

Scientists also need to establish that the strong inflammatory response it triggers does not increase susceptibility to other infections – intestinal parasites, for instance – whose biology overlaps with allergic responses.

How the vaccine performs in older people, who are most vulnerable to severe respiratory illness, is another important unknown. During ageing, a low level of background inflammation, known as inflammaging, can also contribute to age-related diseases and reduce immunity to past infections.

How soon could we have this?

The study’s senior author, Bali Pulendran, says that in the best-case scenario a universal respiratory vaccine might be available in five to seven years.

However, progress will depend heavily on how early human trials perform. If the vaccine proves less potent in people than in mice, or if safety concerns emerge, the formulation will need to be revised, adding time at every stage.

A strong early showing, on the other hand, could build momentum. Either way, developing a human-ready formulation, completing safety trials, and testing how effective it is against multiple real-world pathogens is a substantial undertaking that cannot easily be rushed.

Could this work against future pandemic viruses we haven’t even encountered yet?

This is arguably where the potential is greatest. Conventional vaccines against flu and COVID require regular updating because the viruses mutate. And when the vaccine strain does not closely match what is actually circulating, protection can fall short.

A vaccine that places the immune system on broad, non-specific high alert could offer a critical first layer of defence against a new pandemic pathogen, limiting serious illness and death while a targeted bespoke vaccine is developed. In a world still living with the memory of COVID, that possibility alone makes this research worth watching.

Neil Mabbott receives research funding from the UK Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council, the Roslin Foundation, the Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Foundation, and Zoetis.

– ref. Universal vaccine to treat colds, flu and COVID developed – and a new study suggests it just might work – https://theconversation.com/universal-vaccine-to-treat-colds-flu-and-covid-developed-and-a-new-study-suggests-it-just-might-work-276558

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Sara Brown, Grant Chair of Dermatology, Wellcome Trust Senior Research Fellow, University of Edinburgh

Creams marketed to lighten skin tone are being sold illegally on British high streets, including in butchers and specialist food shops. It is an unsettling discovery, but perhaps not a surprising one. Demand for these products is real and the profits are significant. But the ingredients that make them effective are also what make them dangerous.

Healthy human skin comes in a wide range of diverse tones. These can change over time because of illness, hormones, sunlight or ageing. Some people want to lighten their overall skin tone, and “colourism” – discrimination or prejudice that favours lighter skin tones over darker ones – may contribute to psychological distress among people of colour. Others want to fade darker patches.

Acne, eczema and other inflammatory skin conditions can leave areas darker or lighter than the surrounding skin. This is known as hyperpigmentation (darkening) or hypopigmentation (lightening). Hormonal changes can also disrupt pigment, and scars can permanently alter skin colour.

Often, the skin will gradually return to its natural tone. But this can take months or even years. The desire to speed up that process has led to the development of chemicals that reduce or block melanin – the pigment that gives skin its colour.

Some of these chemicals have a powerful effect. Because of the risks, their sale is tightly controlled. Yet concern is growing about products sold in the UK that contain banned ingredients. These include mercury, hydroquinone and strong steroid drugs.

Mercury – sometimes called quicksilver – is a liquid metal once used in thermometers and in hat making. On the skin, it blocks an enzyme needed to produce melanin, which can make the skin appear lighter.

But mercury is highly toxic. It can damage the skin directly and be absorbed into the body, harming the kidneys, liver, lungs, nerves and brain.

Hydroquinone also reduces melanin production in the outer layer of the skin. In the UK it is available only on prescription and can be used to treat conditions such as melasma, a common form of facial pigmentation.

But it must be used carefully. It can irritate the skin and, in some cases, cause a long-term grey-blue discolouration known as ochronosis.

Steroid creams are widely prescribed for inflammatory skin conditions. Stronger forms are available only on prescription because of well-known side-effects, including thinning of the skin and absorption into the bloodstream. There is also increasing concern about “topical steroid withdrawal”, a condition where the skin flares badly after stopping prolonged use of these creams.

Potent steroids can lighten skin quickly by narrowing blood vessels and, over time, by affecting the cells that produce pigment. They are sometimes added to skin-lightening products to reduce irritation from other ingredients. But long-term use can cause acne, stretch marks, diabetes and osteoporosis. In the UK, stronger corticosteroids are only available with a prescription.

The legal products

Not all skin-lightening products are illegal. Some cosmetics are designed to gently reduce dark spots. These may contain antioxidants such as vitamin C, which can reduce pigmentation, or niacinamide (a form of vitamin B3), which can help even out skin tone over time. Others contain retinoids – vitamin A-related compounds – including retinol and retinal. These can gradually improve pigmentation.

There are also prescription-only retinoids, such as tretinoin, which doctors use for acne and certain pigment problems. But all retinoids can irritate the skin. However, irritation itself can trigger further darkening, known as post-inflammatory hyperpigmentation. In other words, a product meant to lighten the skin can sometimes make patches darker.

Under UK law, cosmetic products must list the manufacturer or importer, provide an address and include a full ingredient list. If this information is missing, alarm bells should ring.

Enforcement action has been taken before, with retailers brought to justice. Still, illegal products continue to surface in places that seem safe and familiar.

If a cream promises dramatic lightening, especially at a low price, it is worth asking why. When it comes to skin, safer and slower is usually better than fast and risky. But the message is clear: colourism and unrealistic beauty standards that fuel demand for skin lightening products pose harm for all in our society.

Sara Brown currently receives funding from the Wellcome Trust, UKRI/MRC, British Skin Foundation, Rosetrees Trust, Stoneygates Trust and anonymous donations from people living with eczema. Sara is a medical adviser for Eczema Outreach Support and the Ichthyosis Support Group.

– ref. Skin lightening creams sold illegally on British high streets – the hidden dangers – https://theconversation.com/skin-lightening-creams-sold-illegally-on-british-high-streets-the-hidden-dangers-276309

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of Birmingham

Four years ago, on February 24 2022, Russian president Vladimir Putin announced that his forces had begun a full-scale invasion of Ukraine – the reasons for which we have explored here. Within minutes, explosions were heard in major Ukrainian cities as Russian troops flooded across the border.

Russian forces made swift gains, capturing key areas near the capital of Kyiv. But the offensive soon stalled and, by December, Russia had been forced to withdraw its forces and consolidate in the east where the war has ground on ever since.

We asked Stefan Wolff, Tetyana Malyarenko, Scott Lucas and Mark Webber, four regular contributors to the Conversation UK’s coverage of Ukraine, for their take on the most surprising development of the war so far and its likely trajectory from here.

A very traditional war – with added drones

Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of Birmingham; Tetyana Malyarenko, Professor of International Security, and Jean Monnet, Professor of European Security, National University Odesa Law Academy

For us, the most surprising development remains Moscow’s decision to launch a large-scale ground invasion of Ukraine in the first place. Even though many Russian and western analysts expected a swift Ukrainian defeat, this always seemed unlikely from the perspective of Ukraine.

The mobilisation of Ukrainian society early on in the war testified to this and underlined that there was no realistic scenario under which the Kremlin could swiftly achieve its goals – to oust President Volodymyr Zelensky and “demilitarise” and “denazify” Ukraine.

Much less surprising was Russia’s transition to a war economy and a traditional war of attrition, which became a foregone conclusion as soon as Moscow’s plan for a victory parade in Kyiv within weeks of the full-scale invasion turned out to be a pipe dream.

Combat methods have evolved over the past four years, especially regarding the integration of drones. Russia has exploited drone technology to attack the whole range of critical infrastructure in Ukraine, not just military targets. But the foundation of Russian and then Soviet military doctrine – the use of mass armies and tactics of mass destruction – has remained untouched.

Moving forward, both sides have sufficient resources and external support to maintain the status quo. They will continue to fight each other in the hope of exhausting their opponent. But neither side is likely to reach this point of exhaustion soon. And until it does happen, political, economic and social stagnation in both Russia and Ukraine will continue to take its toll on their citizens.

Putin’s hopes are pinned on Trump

Scott Lucas, Professor of International Politics, University College Dublin

On the day the war broke out, I was in a discussion group of political and military analysts. When we got the news that Russian special forces had landed at the Hostomel airbase near Kyiv, each of us thought the capital would fall within a few weeks.

However, four years have passed and Ukraine now controls more territory than it did in June 2022. This is despite facing the second-most powerful military in the world, Russia’s disinformation assault and political warfare trying to split Europe, and abandonment by the Trump camp.

The Russian president’s unwillingness to give up his quest for Ukraine as part of a “Greater Russia” and the Trump camp’s willingness to sacrifice Ukrainian and European security are less of a surprise.

Putin made clear in an essay in 2021 that this would be his legacy project. So any soundbites about “peace around the corner” – particularly from Trump’s envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner – are cynical declarations or wishful thinking.

The Kremlin will not accept less than the seizure of all of the strategic Donetsk region, the rest of the country without effective security guarantees, and the fall of the Zelensky government. Putin cannot accept less because this would be the failure of his project at the cost of 1.3 million casualties and counting.

His hope is that Trump’s envoys will enable him to achieve what he cannot on the battlefield. The Trumpists do not believe in alliance but in transactional relationships, which is why the Kremlin is now dangling joint economic projects in front of the US government.

But, irrespective of this, I see no change in the war’s trajectory in the near future. A negotiated end to the invasion is close to impossible because of the Kremlin’s quest for “victory” through Kyiv’s capitulation. That capitulation is unlikely.

Russia has made only marginal advances on the ground. And Zelensky is maintaining his line over sovereignty, territory and security. Although Ukraine’s energy infrastructure has been seriously damaged, most Ukrainians support continued resistance.

While cumbersome in its support, which has been complicated by pro-Kremlin figures like Hungary’s Viktor Orbán and Slovakia’s Robert Fico, the EU is also stepping up its backing of Kyiv and partially filling the gap that has been left by Trump.

The Kremlin is facing a tightening of economic constraints on its quest. It is cutting social spending and increasing taxes to maintain the war. However, as there has been no widespread public pressure domestically that could curb the Kremlin’s ambitions, the invasion will grind on.

Two ways to overcome the stalemate

Mark Webber, Professor of International Politics, University of Birmingham

For me, the biggest surprise so far has been the resilience and adaptability of the Ukrainian war effort. Most observers, myself included, assumed in 2022 that the Ukrainians would buckle under the Russian onslaught.

Nato-led training programmes have undoubtedly been important for Ukrainian defenders. But seemingly more vital has been the determination provided by national identity. Putin’s 2022 claims that Ukraine had been committing genocide against Russian speakers and that its government was a neo-Nazi dictatorship were both spurious and counterproductive.

I too believe Russia’s war methods in Ukraine were grimly predictable. Waves of infantry assaults designed to overwhelm defences through sheer volume have been a recurring strategy in previous Russian military campaigns in Chechnya, Georgia and Syria.

But this strategy has resulted in a stalemate in Ukraine with the frontlines effectively frozen. There are two things that could alter this. The first is a change of approach by China, which has effectively subsidised Russia’s war effort through technology transfers and energy purchases.

Beijing could cut off some of the technology it provides Russia and exert pressure on Moscow to encourage flexibility in the peace negotiations. But, at present, it has no interest in abandoning Russia. Their alliance is a way of balancing the US and Nato in the global competition for influence.

The second possible agent of change is a massive armament effort on behalf of Ukraine. This would require Germany, France and Britain to boost already significant arms provisions and to allow their use in a manner that is not constrained by fears of escalation.

However, this scenario also seems unlikely. These three countries lack the domestic political imperative to back Ukraine to victory. And the US, which was overly cautious even under the presidency of Joe Biden, has now left the field of battle.

Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU’s Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Trustee and Honorary Treasurer of the Political Studies Association of the UK and a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London.

Mark Webber is a Senior Non-resident Fellow at the NATO Defence College in Rome and a trustee of NATO Watch. He has previously received funding from the Economic and Social Research Council and the British Academy to carry out research on NATO.

Tetyana Malyarenko receives funding from the Research Council of Norway (project WARPUT, 361835, implemented by Norwegian Institute of International Affairs).

Scott Lucas does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Ukraine war: after four surprising years, where does it go next? Experts give their view – https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-after-four-surprising-years-where-does-it-go-next-experts-give-their-view-276706

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Andrew Gawthorpe, Lecturer in History and International Studies, Leiden University

As the US continues to assemble military assets in the Middle East and Europe ahead of a possible strike against Iran, Donald Trump is running up against two problems that have plagued American presidents before him.

The first is civilian misunderstanding of war. Fresh from what he sees as quick and easy victories against Iran last June and Venezuela this January, Trump wants military options which allow him to damage Iran at little risk or cost. But unfortunately for the president, no such option exists. And there are reports – which Trump denies – that his top general has warned him about the risks involved.

Despite the damage it has sustained in recent conflicts with the US and Israel, Iran maintains formidable capabilities. It has the ability to harass and perhaps close key shipping lanes, launch missile strikes against US forces and allies across the region, and perhaps carry out terrorist attacks throughout the world.

Trump’s repeated threats to overthrow the Iranian government make it much more likely Tehran will use these capabilities rather than exercising restraint as it did when the US attacked it last year.

According to several media outlets, Trump’s military advisors have informed him of these risks. The president is reportedly not taking the news well. CBS News reports that Trump is “frustrated with what aides describe as the limits of military leverage against Iran” and is pushing for options that will give him a painless victory.

These exchanges between the military and its civilian masters are reminiscent of the interventions of the 1990s. During the Clinton administration, the White House repeatedly pushed the Pentagon to come up with low-risk plans for engagement in Somalia and the Balkans. The president and his staff wanted to be seen as doing something about urgent humanitarian tragedies, but they also didn’t want to risk a political upset by getting American soldiers killed.

Top military officers, particularly the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, Colin Powell, pushed back against the civilians. War entails risk, they told the White House, and American soldiers could die if risks were not weighed appropriately.

In his memoirs, Powell recalled his response to a question from Clinton’s secretary of state, Madeleine Albright: “‘What’s the point of having this superb military that you’re always talking about if we can’t use it?’ I thought I would have an aneurysm.”

As so often with Trump, he is pushing this dynamic of civilian ignorance meeting military expertise to extremes. The current build-up against Iran started not with a clear strategy or objective, but a presidential social media message promising Iranian protesters that “help is on the way”. His current frustration stems from the difficulty of translating that vague promise into an actionable military plan.

Pushing at the limits of action

The second theme that is shaping and limiting Trump’s options is imperial overstretch. However powerful the US military is, it has limits – and in recent years, it has been pushing against them.

In particular, the US has a critical shortage of key missile defence munitions such as Thaad interceptors and Patriots. These platforms would be vital in defending against Iranian retaliation, but the US has been burning through them in recent years by providing them to Israel, Ukraine and Taiwan. The navy has also run down its own stocks of SM-2, SM-3 and SM-6 missiles, which are vital for defending the fleet and other American forces.

The result is that the US lacks the munitions to sustain a long, high-intensity conflict with Iran. If it gets into one, it will have to draw missiles from elsewhere, leaving its forces in Europe and the Indo-Pacific even more understocked than they already are. And because the country has a limited production capacity of these missiles, it could be literally years until the US can replenish its stocks and be ready for contingencies in places like Taiwan.

For a president who promised to avoid unnecessary overseas entanglements and put “America First”, this risk of overstretch is particularly ironic. But it is a function of Trump’s lack of serious strategic vision.

‘Strategic incontinence’

One name for it might be “strategic incontinence”. Rather than focusing on a few vital national interests and assigning capabilities accordingly, Trump seems to pinball between different regions of the globe without regard for whether the US has the capabilities to achieve his goals. He seems to tweet his way into commitments – too many of them – without asking basic questions about military capabilities or missile stocks.

Trump may still attack Iran. He has already put himself in a difficult position, engaging in a massive military build-up and threats of action before he knew whether he could follow through, or at what risk. For a president who is particularly concerned with avoiding looking weak, backing down now might be out of the question.

If Trump does attack Iran despite the warnings of his military advisers, it will be one of the riskiest military decisions that a US president has taken in a very long time. The geopolitical consequences and political price will be his to bear, but could affect us all.

Andrew Gawthorpe is affiliated with the Foreign Policy Centre in London as a senior fellow.

– ref. Trump’s plan for strikes on Iran carries major risks – and the US military knows it – https://theconversation.com/trumps-plan-for-strikes-on-iran-carries-major-risks-and-the-us-military-knows-it-276775

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Renaud Foucart, Senior Lecturer in Economics, Lancaster University Management School, Lancaster University

New US tariffs set at 10% have come into effect, days after the country’s Supreme Court blocked the bulk of President Donald Trump’s sweeping import taxes. The shock move came as a major blow to the president’s determination to rebalance US trade and bring manufacturing back home.

For more than 30 years, the United States has been importing substantially more goods and services from the rest of the world than it exports.

In many ways, this trade deficit is a good problem to have. US citizens are among the richest in the world. Every time citizens or governments buy more than they sell, someone must pay the difference. In the US, this deficit is financed by foreign investments and public debt. The US owes the rest of the world US$27.61 trillion (£20.5 trillion) more than it is owed back, a unique position.

Foreign investors are not doing it out of generosity: those US investments have been doing very well, and many countries have been able to sustain export-led industries to a large extent thanks to US deficits. The AI investment boom, for instance, is driven by investors from all over the world betting on the success of a handful of US-based companies.

But cheap imports from the rest of the world have a dark side. They played a major role in the reduction of manufacturing jobs and the social and political consequences – such as the surge of left and rightwing populist movements – that followed. In 2000, 17 million Americans were employed in manufacturing; there are only 13 million now.

The stubborn US trade deficit

At least since the first term of President Barack Obama, the deficit has been seen as a major problem.

Obama’s objective was to encourage US exports by making it easier to sell to foreign markets. But he also pursued a policy of energy independence – the “all of the above” strategy of encouraging fracking, oil extraction and investment in renewables. This strategy has been a tremendous success, to the point where the US now exports more energy than it imports.

But it did not end trade deficits.

Joe Biden took over in the White House and launched two vast programmes aimed at restoring manufacturing jobs. The goal was to use the US position as the global investment destination to steer cash towards states such as Ohio, Indiana or Michigan, which were traditionally reliant on factory jobs.

This led to a boom in green energy and semiconductors. But as it also made Americans richer, they imported more and it did not end trade deficits.

Trump’s two mandates took a more direct approach: taxing imported goods. The first term was haphazard, and tariff wars with China led to higher consumer prices while failing to deliver the political gains he expected.

But the second mandate has so far been much more organised, starting with “liberation day”, when he announced he would tax US imports in proportion to the bilateral trade deficit with each country.

Just like those of Obama and Biden, Trump’s strategy did not reduce the deficit – in fact it was higher in 2025 than in 2024. But it has so far been a major success in bullying traditional partners into submission with the threat of tariffs.

Perhaps the most consequential moment was the collective decision of members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to carve out a US exception to the global minimum tax on multinational companies. This international effort, intended to make the likes of Amazon and Apple pay a fair amount of tax, was designed to apply to the entire world, even without US approval.

The theoretical logic was flawless. If any country does not tax at least 15% of the profit located on its territory, other signatories can tax it instead. But America’s traditional economic partners in the OECD feared Trump enough to grant the US an exemption. It will be the only country allowed to practise tax competition.

As the US Supreme Court has now ruled most of Trump’s tariffs illegal, this may be a turning point in his second presidency.

Trump has not backed down from his claims, but may no longer be able to act on the stroke of a pen, and could be forced to tax all trading partners at a similar rate.

This is undoubtedly great news for countries like Canada, which chose not to bow down to threats, or China, which managed to bring Trump to the negotiating table by systematically retaliating against his threats.

In contrast, the European Union agreed to a deal allowing the US to tax EU imports but not the other way around. As the UK exports far fewer goods to the US than the EU does, it accepted a slightly preferential deal. But pledges to invest billions in the UK as part of the package were cancelled just days after they were announced.

The short-term benefits of signing those asymmetric deals were obvious – after all, no one wins a trade war and tariffs are mostly a tax on the consumers of the importing country. But the long-term reputational costs will be much harder to manage. In an increasingly multipolar and uncertain world, European nations have sent a clear message that they are easy to manipulate with a bit of projected strength.

Renaud Foucart does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. The Supreme Court has curbed Trump’s ability to bully his allies. But tariffs were never going to end the US trade deficit – https://theconversation.com/the-supreme-court-has-curbed-trumps-ability-to-bully-his-allies-but-tariffs-were-never-going-to-end-the-us-trade-deficit-276781

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Philip Murphy, Director of History & Policy at the Institute of Historical Research and Professor of British and Commonwealth History, School of Advanced Study, University of London

The arrest of Andrew Mountbatten-Windsor was, without a doubt, a shocking moment. The release by US officials of 3.5 million pages of documents regarding Mountbatten-Windsor’s longtime friend, the disgraced financier Jeffrey Epstein, have led to multiple allegations of wrongdoing on the part of the eighth in line to the throne – which he denies.

But as an expert in British and Commonwealth history, I’m baffled by some of the headlines claiming that this moment is “the worst constitutional crisis” in the modern age.

In fact, the affair pales in significance beside the abdication crisis of 1936. The latter has tended to be portrayed in the media as a romantic saga of forbidden love – with the young Edward VIII being forced to choose between the crown and his desire to marry his soon-to-be twice divorced lover, Wallis Simpson.

Yet in retrospect, it more resembles a rather genteel coup, with raised eyebrows taking the place of tanks on the palace forecourt.

A set of key establishment figures, including the prime minister, the archbishop of Canterbury and the editor of the Times, effectively used the marriage crisis to lever from the throne a monarch whose morals and judgement they distrusted.

There might have been room for a compromise on the matter. Edward raised the possibility of a “morganatic marriage” with Wallis, under the terms of which any offspring would not be in line to the throne. Yet prime minister Stanley Baldwin, who kept negotiations over the king’s future tightly under his own personal control, would not hear of this.

The stakes were infinitely higher than in 2026. Britain was still a great global economic and military power, and its monarch was the figurehead of an empire of more than 500 million people. The British government was deeply concerned that the damage done to the monarchy’s prestige could weaken its own authority overseas.

Meanwhile, at home, the right to vote for all adults was still a relatively new experiment. A government still dominated by the rural and urban elites worried about how working-class voters would react to a scandal at the pinnacle of Britain’s social hierarchy. Luckily for them, the British press and the BBC maintained a wall of silence around the king’s relationship with Simpson until just days before the abdication. This ensured that the government’s narrative dominated the headlines.

Ejecting Edward from the throne brought about the accession of his brother, whose debilitating shyness made him ill-suited to a public role.

The abdication crisis had concrete constitutional repercussions. In its immediate wake, the government of the Irish Free State, which had been granted dominion status by the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921, passed two bills designed to weaken ties with London and the crown.

They removed all mention of the king and his representatives from the Irish constitution, while allowing the monarch a limited role in the country’s diplomatic relations. The following year, the taoiseach (as he then became), Éamon de Valera, introduced a new constitution under which southern Ireland effectively became a republic in all but name.

The abdication crisis signalled very publicly that the monarch was obliged to follow the will of the of the civil authorities, even in matters relating to his private life. Arguably, this played an important role in the evolution of the British constitutional monarchy, helping to ensure its survival into the 21st century.

Even the death of Diana, Princess of Wales, in 1997 certainly seemed at the time to present a more serious threat to the House of Windsor than the current scandal. In sharp contrast to the deferential restraint of the press in 1936, the media seemed determined to whip up public grief in ways that many observers found disturbing.

The mood of the moment found expression in hostility towards the members of the royal family, including Queen Elizabeth II herself, for their supposedly “unfeeling” response to the tragedy. Downing Street felt obliged to step in when the palace proved incapable of handling the public relations fallout of Diana’s death.

Is the monarchy under threat?

Recent polling has suggested that public confidence in the crown is at an all-time low. Yet although support for the outright abolition of the monarchy has grown in recent decades, it remains relatively low at only around 15%.

Furthermore, the crown is so deeply embedded in the British political system that no government – without a staggering amount of self confidence and a lot of time on its hands – is likely to embark on the task of extracting it.

By contrast, of course, it will be relatively simple to remove Mountbatten-Windsor from the line of succession in UK domestic legislation, although the British government will want to coordinate this with the other Commonwealth realms which could prove more complicated.

The royal family has time to redeem itself. And as Winston Churchill pointed out, it’s a mistake to ever let a good crisis go to waste.

Looking ahead to what may be a lengthy reign, Prince William, who has given strong hints that he is impatient with the status quo, has the perfect excuse when he accedes to the throne to sideline opponents of reform.

For a would-be reforming king, there’s plenty of low-hanging fruit. There’s the antiquated honours system with its embarrassing use of the label “empire”. There’s the headship of the now largely obsolete Commonwealth, with its own embarrassingly imperial connotations. And with less than half the population of England and Wales now describing themselves as Christian, renouncing the supreme governorship of the troubled Church of England seems long overdue.

Although the fate of a disgraced uncle may be relatively peripheral to all this, Mountbatten-Windsor is still a potent symbol of the dangers of business-as-usual. His fall might just be the crisis the royal family needs.

Philip Murphy has received funding from the AHRC.. He is a member of the European Movement UK.

– ref. Andrew Mountbatten-Windsor arrest: this isn’t even close to the worst constitutional crisis the monarchy has faced – https://theconversation.com/andrew-mountbatten-windsor-arrest-this-isnt-even-close-to-the-worst-constitutional-crisis-the-monarchy-has-faced-276552