Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s killing plays into Shiite Islam’s reverence for martyrs, but not for all Iranians

Source: The Conversation – USA (3) – By Eric Lob, Associate Professor of Politics and International Relations, Florida International University

A banner with the image of Ali Khamenei during a memorial vigil in Tehran, Iran. Majid Saeedi/Getty Images

The day Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was killed, the Iranian government called for 40 days of public mourning in line with Shiite tradition. It also praised the supreme leader for his martyrdom – a concept considered sacred and significant in the Islamic Republic and Shiite Islam.

While some Iranians came out to commemorate Khamenei, others celebrated his demise. The scenes reflected the contradictions in how Khamenei was perceived: by some as a martyr, and by others as an oppressor.

Women in headscarves hold portraits of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
Demonstrators mourn the death of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei outside the Israeli consulate in Istanbul, on March 1, 2026.
AP Photo/Khalil Hamra

The theology of martyrdom

The roots of Shiite reverence for martyrdom date back centuries. After the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632, a dispute emerged over who would inherit the leadership of the Muslim community. On one side was the prophet’s senior companion and father-in-law, Abu Bakr. On the other was his cousin and son-in-law, Ali ibn Abi Talib, who became the first Shiite imam.

In 680, the Battle of Karbala took place in present-day Iraq between Hussain ibn Ali – the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad and the third Shiite imam – and Yazid ibn Mu’awiya. Yazid was the second Umayyad caliph, which means deputy of God, and the ruler of the early Islamic empire.

Before the battle, negotiations had failed between Hussain and Yazid’s governor. Hussain refused to swear allegiance to Yazid, believing him to be unjust and not the rightful successor. In a 10-day battle that followed, most of Hussain’s army, including some of his closest companions and relatives, was slain. Hussain’s followers, who believed him to be the third Imam – after his father Ali and older brother Hasan ibn Ali – came to be called Shiites. Since then, martyrdom has held a central place among Shiites. They comprise the smaller of the two main branches of Islam, with Sunni being the larger one.

Iran has become the epicenter of Shiite Islam, which is the official state religion. Ninety to 95% of the population identify accordingly.

Every year on the 10th of Muharram, the first month of the Islamic calendar and the same day as the Battle of Karbala, Shiite Muslims inside and outside of Iran observe Ashura and commemorate the slaying of Hussain by reenacting his death and performing self-flagellation, among other rituals.

Iranian political rhetoric

In Iran and other parts of the Muslim world, contemporary politics is often framed in this seventh-century language of moral resistance.

After the Islamic Republic of Iran was established under Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in 1979, martyrdom appeared as a central theme. This was particularly the case during and after the Iran-Iraq War, which lasted eight years in the 1980s and was perceived and portrayed as a holy war.

During the war, the Islamic Republic suffered hundreds of thousands of casualties. After Khomeini reluctantly accepted a United Nations-brokered ceasefire, he compared the decision to drinking a “poisoned chalice.” In other words, he considered the compromise a crushing defeat that contradicted his goal of overthrowing Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, even if it enabled the Iranian regime to survive.

After the war, public space in Iran was increasingly filled with revolutionary and religious symbols related to wartime sacrifice and martyrdom. They included street signs named after prominent people who died in the war, murals and posters of the fallen, and media programs and publications dedicated to the conflict – symbols which were still prominent when I visited Iran between 2009-2011.

The Islamic Republic’s Foundation of Martyrs and Veterans Affairs – Bonyad-e Shahid va Omur-e Ithargaran – provided services for veterans and families of the fallen in the war and other conflicts. Like other foundations under the purview of Khamenei, who succeeded Khomeini after his death in 1989, it also participated in profit-seeking activities.

It is against this backdrop that Khamenei’s actions leading up to the American and Israeli strikes on Feb. 28 that cost him his life must be seen.

During the three rounds of U.S.-Iran negotiations in Oman and Geneva before the current conflict, Khamenei refused to capitulate to President Donald Trump’s demands. They comprised curbing not only Iran’s nuclear enrichment, but also its missile program and support for its regional proxies. Khamenei directed his negotiators not to yield ground, particularly on those last two points, seen as red lines in Tehran – even as Trump amassed the most military assets in the region since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003.

Authoritarianism, protests, polarization

Demonstrators carry Iranian flags and chant slogans during a rally.
Iranian demonstrators living in Cyprus attend a protest outside the presidential palace in Nicosia on Feb. 14, 2026.
AP Photo/Petros Karadjias

For over three decades, Khamenei subjected Iranians to severe authoritarianism and repression, culminating in him ordering the security forces to shoot and kill thousands of Iranians during the protests in January 2026, not to mention those in previous years.

He deprived the families of deceased protesters from holding funerals for their loved ones. His regime also reportedly required them to pay for the ammunition that had been used to kill their relatives before receiving the body for burial.

And despite recurrent waves of protests – the January unrest followed similar waves in 2017-18, 2019-20 and 2022-23 – Khamenei refused to listen to the demands of demonstrators for political, economic and social change. The furthest he was willing to go was to make cosmetic concessions while ruthlessly repressing citizens.

He also refused to reform the system from within and placed the political elites who pushed him in that direction under house arrest or in prison.

During his almost 37-year rule, Khamenei accumulated massive power and wealth. As supreme leader, he commanded the armed forces, appointed the head of the judiciary, supervised the state media, and possessed a parallel body that vetted electoral candidates and vetoed parliamentary legislation.

Although Khamenei appeared austere in public, he held sizeable assets. Setad, a quasi-state organization under his direct control, was estimated to be worth US$95 billion as of 2013.

He continued support for regional proxies, such as Hamas and Hezbollah, while maintaining a confrontational rhetoric toward the U.S. and Israel. Since 2024, these actions led to Israeli and American intervention in Iran that brought death and destruction to the country, and ultimately the strikes that killed him. The strikes also killed some of his closest relatives, including his daughter, son-in-law, grandchild and daughter-in-law.

In the end, some Iranians will remember Khamenei as a martyr – someone who stood firmly by his principles and faced a more powerful enemy, even if it meant losing his life.

But others, now rejoicing in the streets, will remember him as an oppressor who put personal power and profit above the public interest.

The Conversation

Eric Lob is affiliated with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

ref. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s killing plays into Shiite Islam’s reverence for martyrs, but not for all Iranians – https://theconversation.com/ayatollah-ali-khameneis-killing-plays-into-shiite-islams-reverence-for-martyrs-but-not-for-all-iranians-277207

How male rape myths stop some victims of sexual assault from getting justice – new study

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Lee John Curley, Lecturer in Psychology, Glasgow Caledonian University

Brian A Jackson/Shutterstock

Are juries really impartial? Or is it the beliefs and attitudes they bring to trial that leads them to vote guilty or not? These questions are particularly important when it comes to the influence that rape myths may have on juror and judicial decision-making in sexual offence trials.

Rape myths are widely held but misleading ideas about sexual violence: who commits it, who experiences it and what it’s supposed to look like. Common rape myths include beliefs about what “real rape” looks like (that people are only raped by strangers), or blaming the victim for their rape based on their behaviour or what they were wearing. In England and Wales, the government recently announced reforms to counter these myths in court.

Most research on rape myths has focused on cases where the complainant is female. Rightly so, as women and girls are disproportionately affected in rape and sexual assault crimes.




Read more:
How rape myths and unconscious biases prejudice the judicial system against women – and rape survivors in particular


However, men and boys are also victims of sexual offences. The Crime Survey for England and Wales reported in 2022 that 275,000 men experienced sexual assault in that one-year period alone. This is likely to be an underestimate, because men often don’t report these crimes for a variety of reasons.

This is why our new study explores how rape myths influence verdicts in male-on-male rape trials.

Previous research has suggested that rape myths relating to male survivors often blame victims, minimise the harm or exonerate the accused. One example is the belief that “real men” are able to stop unwanted sexual assaults from happening. Or jurors might believe that there would be some sign of physical resistance in “real” rape trials.

A key difference between rape myths about men and women relates to masculine archetypes and men’s perceived ability to “fight off” sexual advances. These attitudes can mean that jurors might not believe survivors who have alleged they have been raped, for example, if they had previously consented to sex with the same man.

We presented 463 mock jurors with a mock trial, in which one man accused another of rape. There were six versions of this experiment, involving men of different ethnicities, and both straight and gay men. The same evidence was presented in each of these versions, however, and the ethnicity or sexual orientation of the men involved did not appear to influence the jurors’ decision.

Jurors first completed the male rape myth acceptance scale, a tool developed by researchers to measure how strongly someone believes in male rape myths. They then evaluated the evidence presented in our mock trial and reached a verdict of guilty or not guilty.

Our findings suggested that those more likely to believe male rape myths were more likely to believe the accused, less likely to believe the complainant, and thus more likely to reach a not guilty verdict.

The opposite pattern was true for those with low belief in rape myths, with guilty verdicts being more likely. Essentially, male rape myths influenced how jurors constructed stories surrounding the evidence and ultimately influenced verdict preferences. These findings align with what other research has found in male-on-female rape trials.

Juror decisions and implications

We also asked jurors to tell us how they made their decisions. This qualitative data helped to explore the findings in more detail.

People who strongly believed common myths about male rape were much more likely to doubt the evidence. Jurors in this group had doubts about the reliability, clarity or sufficiency of the evidence presented in the mock trial.

They also frequently drew upon rape myths to explain their not guilty verdict decisions. One juror said: “He didn’t at any point say no or stop him touching his penis. Removed his own clothes, rolled over. There’s not enough evidence to prove guilt.”

In comparison, those who had low acceptance of male rape myths were more likely to perceive that the intoxication mentioned in the same trial was a clear barrier to consent. They rejected victim-blaming narratives. For instance, one mock juror said: “The complainant was too drunk to consent, drunk enough to cause sickness and need support in moving to his bedroom, if he can’t move around by himself he cannot consent to sex.”

A young man covering his face
Men are less likely than women to report sexual assault, due to stigma and fear of not being believed.
Bricolage/Shutterstock

Other recent research has found that male rape myths were frequently discussed by jurors in their deliberations. The justice system therefore clearly needs to use different tools to counter male rape myths – similar to what has been suggested to combat female rape myths.

These could be in the form of judicial instructions, educational videos or expert witnesses who can direct jurors away from the myths and nudge them towards the facts. Similar recommendations have been made by the UK government to counter rape myths in trials where the complainant is female.

Another solution could be more scientific juror selection. In the US, attorneys and judges use a process called voir dire to deselect biased jurors.

This process varies widely by length, whether questionnaires (such as scales that measure biases, like the rape myths scale) are allowed and who conducts it (judge only or attorneys and judge). Nevertheless, measures such as the male rape myths scale could be used to move those with high belief in rape myths from male-on-male rape trials, to other trial types where this bias is unlikely to influence decision-making (such as white collar crime).

Whatever the method, tackling rape myths is necessary to ensure justice for those who suffer sexual violence, regardless of their gender.

The Conversation

Lee John Curley receives funding from Leverhulme/British Academy.

Dominic Willmott received funding from The British Academy (SRG2223231748) to carry out the research project to which this article relates.

Kennath Widanaralalage does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. How male rape myths stop some victims of sexual assault from getting justice – new study – https://theconversation.com/how-male-rape-myths-stop-some-victims-of-sexual-assault-from-getting-justice-new-study-274247

Time to retrain? How to future-proof your career in the AI age

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Kirk Chang, Professor of Management and Technology, University of East London

StratfordProductions/Shutterstock

These days, gen Z appears to be pivoting towards skilled trades, perhaps driven by a desire for “AI-proof” job security. Many young workers now view blue-collar careers as more stable than office jobs in the face of rapid change.

It’s not just the youngest workers. A growing sense of unease about AI is reshaping how many people think about work. Within younger groups, this shift is showing up in hard numbers. In the UK, hiring of gen Z workers (those born in or after 1997) in construction and trade roles rose by 16.8% in the year to January 2026. The result is what some are calling the “toolbelt generation”.

But elsewhere in the workforce, many professionals are taking a pragmatic approach. Instead of competing with automation, they are learning how to work alongside it. Building fluency with AI tools is increasingly seen as a form of career insurance.

The goal is to move into roles designing, managing or directing AI systems. In that model, technology becomes a force multiplier (that is, it increases productivity), rather than a threat.

This shift is also driven by economics. AI-related skills command a clear premium in the jobs market. Beyond pay, there are other benefits. AI systems are particularly effective at handling repetitive, process-heavy tasks. When those functions are automated, employees can redirect their energy towards strategy, creative problem-solving and higher-value decision-making.

Many find that this shift not only improves productivity but also makes their work more engaging and meaningful.

Importantly, entering the AI space does not always require a computer science degree. Through online learning, bootcamps or just practical experimentation, workers can gain expertise in areas such as prompt engineering, workflow automation or AI application. The barrier to entry is lower than many assume, especially for those who already understand a specific industry.

Industry knowledge is, in fact, a major advantage. Organisations increasingly want people who can bridge domain expertise with technical capability. A healthcare professional who knows what patients need as well as understanding AI tools; a finance specialist who can apply machine learning to risk analysis; or a tradesperson who uses smart systems for efficiency can all bring unique value.

These hybrid profiles are becoming central to how companies integrate AI, creating interdisciplinary roles that did not exist a few years ago.

The flip side: risks and challenges

AI is creating opportunity, but it also brings risks and trade-offs. One of the most immediate challenges is the pace of change. Keeping skills current can feel like trying to hit a moving target. Over time, constantly doing more can lead to fatigue and burnout, particularly in highly competitive environments where staying relevant is tied to job security.

There is also an upfront cost. Transitioning into AI, especially into more technical or advanced positions, can require an investment of time and money before any financial return materialises.

And AI is said to be contributing to a hollowing out of traditional career ladders. Many entry-level roles, once considered stepping stones into industries such as finance or marketing are being automated or cut back. As a result, entry pathways into certain professions may narrow before new ones are established.




Read more:
AI could mark the end of young people learning on the job – with terrible results


Finally, working in AI often means grappling with complex ethical and safety questions. Workers must consider issues such as data bias, privacy, transparency and accountability. Decisions made during system design and deployment can have wide-reaching consequences. Navigating these responsibilities requires sound judgement and a clear understanding of these consequences.

Looking ahead

In many sectors, AI is unlikely to eliminate entire professions. Instead, it will reshape them. Tasks will be automated, workflows will evolve and job descriptions will shift. For most professionals, the practical response is not to abandon their field, but to integrate AI into it.

At the same time, technical fluency alone will not be enough. As automation takes over routine and rules-based work, human skills become more important. Critical thinking, judgement, empathy, communication and complex problem-solving remain difficult to replicate with algorithms. The more advanced the technology becomes, the more valuable distinctly human strengths appear to be.

There is also a widening gap across industries. AI is generating new, high-paying roles in areas such as engineering, data science and AI strategy. However, in positions where automation only partially replaces tasks, productivity may increase while wages do not. In some cases, partial automation can stifle pay or reduce opportunities for promotion.

female health professional wearing scrubs in a medical setting and holding a tablet computer.
AI may open up new roles and opportunities within your current sector.
DC Studio/Shutterstock

Retraining and career pivoting in the AI age is becoming a mainstream response to structural change. AI is reshaping how work is done across sectors, while opening up new roles that are centred on oversight, integration, strategy and innovation. For many professionals, the question is not whether change is coming but how proactively they choose to respond.

The most resilient path forward is rarely about abandoning your field entirely. More often, it involves layering AI fluency on top of existing expertise. A finance professional who understands automation tools, for example, is better positioned than someone relying on legacy skills alone. In this sense, the objective of retraining is to move closer to the decision-making layer of work.

Ultimately, the AI era is not about a binary choice between optimism and fear. It is about positioning. Retraining and career pivoting are becoming central strategies for navigating this shift with intention rather than reacting after the fact.

The Conversation

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Time to retrain? How to future-proof your career in the AI age – https://theconversation.com/time-to-retrain-how-to-future-proof-your-career-in-the-ai-age-276694

Seven tips for talking to children and young people about generative AI

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Dónal Mulligan, Lecturer, School of Communications, Dublin City University

Bricolage/Shutterstock

For most of us, generative AI (GenAI) has moved from novelty to everyday infrastructure astonishingly fast. Many adults now use tools like chatbots at work or casually, and many children are already encountering them through homework “help”, entertainment, or social sharing.

Unsupervised use of generative AI can expose children and young people to confidently presented misinformation, manipulative “keep chatting” dynamics, and inappropriate or emotionally risky content. The tone and conversational dynamics of many chatbots can encourage secrecy and over-reliance, or mimic authority without real understanding or duty of care. In school contexts, GenAI can quietly undermine learning, turning homework and writing into shortcuts rather than skill-building.

I’ve helped create new school resources on GenAI, including guidance for parents. But the most effective safety measures still depend on adults setting boundaries, modelling critical thinking, and staying close enough to a child’s digital life to notice what’s changing in it. What follows are some practical ways to talk about, assess, and limit younger people’s GenAI use.

1. Begin with curiosity – not crackdowns

If you start by telling a child that they shouldn’t use GenAI, you may prompt secrecy about their current and further uses. A better opener could be a simple request to demonstrate to you the AI tools or uses they’re familiar with. Ask what they like about it, what it helps with, and what they’d never use it for. The initial aim should be to normalise discussing AI, though not to normalise unrestricted use.

From here it’s easier to acknowledge that these are powerful and intriguing tools, but not a person or an authority, and not without risks and necessary considerations.

2. Don’t treat stated age limits as optional

An awkward reality that parents may currently have missed is that many popular AI services set 13 as a minimum age (with parental permission under 18). OpenAI states that ChatGPT “is not meant for children under 13”, and still requires parental consent for ages 13 to 18. The AI chatbot ecosystem is inconsistent, however. Anthropic requires Claude users to be 18+, explicitly citing heightened risks for younger users. Google, meanwhile, allows supervised access to Gemini for under-13s via parent-enabled controls.

Your practical rule should be to treat age limits as a clear safety signal rather than a box-ticking exercise. If a service says “13+” or “18+”, that’s telling you something about risk, content exposure and the likelihood of harm from unsupervised use by young people.

3. Encourage fact-checking

Children (and indeed plenty of adults) can mistake confidence for correctness. When talking about GenAI with children, emphasise that AI chatbots can and regularly do “hallucinate”. They invent plausible-sounding details and mix fabrication with fact. Understanding that their speedy and well-stated responses come at a cost of large and small inaccuracies is key.

Girl frowning at laptop
Encourage young people to check what GenAI tells them.
Pheelings media/Shutterstock

Encourage verifying anything important – news, health claims, law, school facts, statements that may be repeated as “true”.

4. Help them know when to stop

Large language models (LLMs) are designed to keep conversation flowing. They compliment, encourage, reassure and suggest what to do next. This may be helpful for brainstorming but it’s potentially dangerous for emotionally loaded topics where a young person is vulnerable, impressionable, or isolated.

Recent litigation around “companion” chatbots has alleged that vulnerable young users were pulled into harmful spirals, including self-harm risk and secrecy from parents. These are complex and unfolding cases, but they are serious enough to treat as a major warning sign about unsupervised, open-ended AI conversations for minors.

Parents and teachers should name a firm boundary: no chatbot is a counsellor, therapist, or trusted confidant. If a conversation becomes sexual, self-harm related, frightening, or intensely personal, the rule should be to stop and speak to a trusted adult.

5. Don’t feed the machine personal data

Young people often understand privacy better when it’s framed as something tangible. Some rules: don’t share a full name, address, school, phone number, or identifiable photos. Don’t upload private documents or screenshots. Don’t paste in other people’s personal information. If you wouldn’t post it on a public noticeboard, don’t paste it into a chatbot.

6. AI should support the work, not do the work

GenAI poses an educational risk that deserves far more attention: cognitive off-loading. This happens when the tool performs the thinking step – the learner may finish faster, but will learn less. Research is increasingly linking heavier AI reliance with reduced critical thinking and lower cognitive effort, with off-loading and automation bias proposed as mechanisms. A practical way to explain this to young people is that “AI can help you learn, but it can also help you avoid learning”.




Read more:
How generative AI is really changing education – by outsourcing the production of knowledge to big tech


If you’re helping with homework, allow the use of GenAI for asking for an explanation in simpler terms, or requesting feedback on a draft. Don’t allow writing the essay, answering the homework questions directly, or producing a solution that the student can’t explain.

7. Make AI use visible and social

Where AI use is permitted, aim to reduce secrecy. Use AI in shared spaces at home. Set agreed times, not late-night private use. Coordinate with other adults: parents should share their concerns and approaches with other parents and with school staff.

We should treat Generative AI as we wish we’d treated social media much earlier – not as just another app, but as a behavioural technology that shapes attention, learning, confidence and relationships. Being AI aware is not about panic, but about adults building enough knowledge and confidence to guide children toward safe, age-appropriate, genuinely educational use, while regulation and curriculum development catch up.

The Conversation

Dónal Mulligan has received research funding from the EU’s Erasmus+ program. He is affiliated with Webwise, the Irish Internet Safety Awareness Centre, and with Media Literacy Ireland.

ref. Seven tips for talking to children and young people about generative AI – https://theconversation.com/seven-tips-for-talking-to-children-and-young-people-about-generative-ai-275718

Will AI tools make better police officers?

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Federico Iannacci, Senior Lecturer in Management, University of Sussex Business School, University of Sussex

Police officers often work with partial information under severe time constraints in situations that can change in seconds. Whether investigating a crime or patrolling a neighbourhood, they regularly have to make predictions based on instinct.

This “gut policing” isn’t just guesswork – it’s fast pattern recognition. It comes from training and years of dealing with real incidents, learning from colleagues, and building an instinctive sense of what matters and what doesn’t.

But instincts are no longer the only way police connect the dots. Many police forces are investing in AI-enabled tools, including predictive policing algorithms that forecast crime hotspots and offender assessment systems designed to support decision-making.




Read more:
A ‘black box’ AI system has been influencing criminal justice decisions for over two decades – it’s time to open it up


This reflects a wider global trend: police forces are integrating AI into everyday policing. These AI-enabled tools draw on large volumes of data and patterns that would be impossible for any single officer to analyse in real time. The aim is straightforward: to help ensure decisions are based on strong evidence and reliable data, rather than relying solely on instinct or experience.

Many people appear to accept the use of AI technology by police forces – so long as there are clear guidelines in place first.


AI has long been discussed as a threat to jobs and livelihoods. But what’s the reality? In this series, we explore the impact AI is already having on specific occupations – and how people in these jobs feel about their new AI assistants.


In England, police forces are already using AI tools in day-to-day work. These include Untrite Thrive, which helps staff in police control rooms decide how to allocate resources. Another example is Qlik Sense, used by Avon and Somerset Police for monitoring the likelihood of reoffending or perpetrating a crime. These developments align with a broader government agenda focused on efficiency and cost reduction.

But once you swap human judgment for more automated predictions, the value of officers’ traditional connect-the-dots police logic can be lost. There have been plenty of examples where AI tools have flagged the wrong people, the wrong places, or the wrong risks.

Unverified information

A House of Commons select committee recently highlighted serious failings in West Midlands Police’s use of the AI assistant Microsoft Copilot in its decision to stop Israeli fans of Maccabi Tel Aviv football club from travelling to Birmingham for a Europa League match against Aston Villa last November.

Claims made by this force about alleged disorder involving Maccabi fans at past matches were based on inaccurate information generated by Copilot, including a supposed game between the Israeli club and West Ham United that never happened.

“Information that showed the Maccabi fans to be a high risk was trusted without proper scrutiny,” explained the committee’s chair Karen Bradley. “Shockingly, this included unverified information generated by AI.”

This inaccurate AI‑generated information was repeated by senior police officers in safety advisory group meetings and even in oral evidence to MPs, demonstrating a lack of due diligence and overreliance on unverified AI outputs. The case is now subject to an investigation by the Independent Office for Police Conduct.

Video: Channel 4 News.

And this was not an isolated incident. The Harm Assessment Risk Tool deployed by Durham Constabulary was found to have displayed many flaws, from overestimation of the likelihood of reoffending to discrimination in its datasets.

And the Metropolitan Police’s now-discontinued Gang Matrix, a database that recorded intelligence related to alleged gang members, was heavily criticised by the Information Commissioner’s Office for unfairly labelling young black men as high‑risk based on flawed scoring.

Relying on AI-driven tools can be a double-edged sword in policing. They can improve decisions, but can also reinforce bias and amplify mistakes. In our experience of working with police forces in England, AI‑supported decision‑making works best when police officers combine their operational experience with data‑driven insights.

Reinforcing biases

Our ongoing study of AI use in policing shows that uncritical reliance on AI risks reinforcing existing biases, disproportionately affecting the poorest and most marginalised communities.

Our research, which is yet to be published, suggests that effective use of AI requires a difficult balance: officers must both trust and mistrust AI recommendations at the same time, maintaining a vigilant mindset.

To prevent biases creeping into AI‑supported decisions, police forces should invest in bias‑awareness training that prepares officers to question AI outputs regularly and constructively.

The National Police Chiefs’ Council covenant mandated that AI should support rather than replace human judgment. This is a step in the right direction. Yet even this principle can backfire if police officers treat AI recommendations as objective truth, rather than guidance that requires careful scrutiny.

These concerns take on renewed urgency in light of the government’s introduction of a national predictive policing prototype, announced in August 2025. The system, scheduled for nationwide deployment by 2030, combines AI‑powered crimemapping with behavioural‑pattern analysis, supported by a £4 million initial investment.

It draws on data from police forces, local councils and social services, and builds directly on the expanding fleet of live facial recognition vans now operating across seven forces across England and Wales.




Read more:
Facial recognition technology used by police is now very accurate – but public understanding lags behind


At the same time, developments inside policing organisations highlight the limits of technological oversight. The Met was recently reported to have begun using AI tools to flag potential officer misconduct by analysing internal data such as sickness records, absences and overtime patterns.

While the Met argues that such systems help raise standards and rebuild public trust, critics warn that such monitoring risks misclassifying workplace pressures as misconduct and eroding accountability rather than strengthening it.

Ultimately, whether AI technology improves policing outcomes depends on the governance surrounding it. Ensuring there is a vigilant human in every AI loop should be a non-negotiable safeguard.

The Conversation

Federico Iannacci has received funding from the British Academy for a small research grant entitled “Investigating the future of work in policing: a Qualitative Comparative Analysis of police forces in England and Wales.”

Stan Karanasios does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Will AI tools make better police officers? – https://theconversation.com/will-ai-tools-make-better-police-officers-277258

Why the UK’s trade deficit makes household bills so vulnerable to global shocks

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Erhan Kilincarslan, Reader in Accounting and Finance, University of Huddersfield

Anderson Leung/Shutterstock

The UK’s trade deficit of goods is the widest it has ever been. In 2025, the country spent £248.3 billion more on things than it sold to the rest of the world.

This is not just some abstract number, of interest only to markets and economists. The UK’s trade deficit has practical consequences which help to explain why global events show up so quickly in people’s food and energy bills.

Nor is this a new situation. While the UK runs a strong surplus in services such as finance and professional consulting, it consistently imports more goods than it exports.

On its own, that is not necessarily a problem. Many advanced economies run trade deficits of goods. The more important issue is what a country imports, and how essential those imports are to daily life.

For example, the UK relies heavily on imports for many things that households cannot easily live without, such as 40% of the food they consume.

It imports much of its energy too – and although the UK produces some domestic oil and gas, wholesale energy prices are strongly influenced by international markets.

Food and energy are not optional purchases. Households cannot simply stop eating or heating their homes when prices rise. Economists describe these goods as “inelastic”, meaning that demand does not tend to fall even when the price increases.

And this creates a direct link between global volatility and household vulnerability. When global supply chains are disrupted, whether it’s because of geopolitical tensions, extreme weather or commodity price spikes, any country which is dependent on imported essentials (Germany, Italy and Japan are other examples) feels the impact quickly.

The Bank of England has highlighted how global energy and food price shocks played a major role in the recent surge in UK inflation. International adjustments feed quickly into domestic cost-of-living pressures.

Currency changes

The UK’s trade deficits also mean it needs plenty of foreign currency to pay for all of the things it imports. When financial markets become volatile, the pound can weaken, increasing the cost of these imported goods – which leads to rising inflation.

For an economy that depends heavily on imported food, fuel and manufactured goods, currency movements can amplify inflationary pressure. Households may not follow exchange rate fluctuations, but they do notice higher supermarket prices and energy bills.

Not everything is in deficit, though. The UK runs a significant surplus in services, particularly in finance.

But this creates a disconnect between the UK’s overall national economic performance and household experience. While the export of services supports national income and employment, it does not directly reduce the prices people pay for imported food or energy.

This is why everyday price vulnerability can remain high even when overall trade figures appear manageable.

Also, import-driven price shocks do not affect all households equally. Lower-income households spend a larger share of their income on essentials such as food and energy. When prices rise, they have less flexibility to absorb the increase. Higher-income households may cut back elsewhere, but lower-income households often cannot.

When import costs rise, the financial strain is therefore more intense for those people with the least. The same global shock can be manageable for some households but seriously disruptive for others.

Shipping container with overlay of UK flag.
The UK is reliant on many imported goods.
Sunshine Seeds

Part of the reason for this general situation is that since the early 1990s, global trade policy has prioritised efficiency through trade liberalisation and manufacturing processes being spread across multiple countries.

Importing goods from the most competitive global suppliers reduced prices in stable periods. But efficiency often comes at the expense of resilience. When supply chains are disrupted, countries that rely heavily on imports for essential goods have fewer domestic buffers. Politicians may then struggle to stabilise prices because the source of volatility lies abroad.

Trade off

The result is something many households recognise. Events far away can rapidly translate into higher bills at home.

But the issue is not trade itself. International trade brings clear benefits, including lower prices, greater choice and access to global goods and services.

The question is whether the UK’s balance between efficiency and resilience leaves households overly exposed to volatility. Recent cost of living pressures have demonstrated how quickly global shocks can reach household budgets.

Trade policy is therefore not just about competitiveness or GDP growth. It is also about economic resilience – how well households are protected from forces beyond their control. But this does not mean reversing global trade or pursuing full self-sufficiency, which would be likely to increase costs.

Instead, the government should be working on the UK’s resilience through things like diversified supply chains and stronger strategic reserves. Clearer contingency planning for essential goods would reduce the UK’s vulnerability to global shocks.

While the UK’s trade deficit is often treated as an abstract macroeconomic statistic, for many households its consequences are felt in something far more tangible – grocery and energy bills.

The Conversation

Erhan Kilincarslan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Why the UK’s trade deficit makes household bills so vulnerable to global shocks – https://theconversation.com/why-the-uks-trade-deficit-makes-household-bills-so-vulnerable-to-global-shocks-276991

Britain’s military presence in the Middle East – and how it could be dragged into war

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Geraint Hughes, Reader in Diplomatic and Military History, King’s College London

The British government confirmed on Monday that the RAF base at Akrotiri, Cyprus, had been hit in a drone strike. The resumption of US and Israeli air attacks on Iran – and Iranian reprisal strikes on its neighbours – also highlights the risks to around 300,000 British citizens in the Persian Gulf.

And there is clearly a danger of wider, direct UK military involvement in what appears to be an escalating regional war. Following the launch of “Operation Epic Fury” – the US and Israel’s coordinated strikes across Iran – on Saturday, the UK prime minister, Keir Starmer, confirmed that RAF aicraft were flying missions to protect allies in the region from Iranian retaliation.

Starmer has also allowed the US to use UK military bases in the Middle East, strictly for “defensive” strikes on Iranian missile sites. He initially refused to allow the US to use the joint military base at Diego Garcia, prompting criticism from Donald Trump. The prime minister said his position changed as it became clear Iran’s retaliatory strikes in the region were putting British lives at risk.




Read more:
Iran has been attacked by US and Israel when peace was within reach


The UK’s armed forces have long had a presence across the Middle East. Bahrain hosts the United Kingdom Naval Support Facility, which supports Operation Kipion, the Royal Navy’s longstanding maritime security mission in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. This operation dates back to the Armilla Patrol during the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s. The base and its 300 personnel were close to the Iranian missile strike that targeted the US Fifth Fleet’s headquarters on February 28.

Operation Kipion has effectively been suspended as the Royal Navy has withdrawn its two vessels from the Gulf. The frigate HMS Lancaster was decommissioned in December 2025, and the minesweeper HMS Middleton left the Gulf the week before US and Israeli airstrikes began, to return to the UK.

The RAF has a joint squadron with the Qatari Emiri Air Force – 12 Squadron – which is currently deployed to the emirate. One of the RAF’s Typhoon jets with 12 Squadron shot down an Iranian drone launched against Qatar (which also hosts a US air base at Al Udeid) on March 1.

Oman has longstanding defence ties with the UK dating back to the establishment of its armed forces – initially under British command – in July 1958. It has frequently hosted British army and RAF exercises. The port of Duqm has been developed into a logistics hub and a naval base. Britain’s signals intelligence service, GCHQ, also reportedly has three listening posts in the sultanate.

In the wider Middle East and Mediterranean region, the Royal Navy has been an active participant in Operation Prosperity Guardian. This is a US-led mission to protect commercial shipping passing in and out of the Red Sea via the Bad el Mandab Strait from missile and drone attacks by the Houthis. The Houthis are aligned with Tehran and have targeted shipping bound for Israel since November 2023.

Britain also has two Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus (Akrotiri and Dhekelia), with a GCHQ listening post reportedly at Ayios Nikolaos, part of Dhekelia.

As part of the Five Eyes alliance related to intelligence-sharing, GCHQ closely coordinates its eavesdropping operations with its US counterpart, the National Security Agency.

Future UK involvement

The Labour government’s position is that British military assets are being used to support the defence of the Gulf states against Iranian reprisal attacks. But, as I have previously written, the issue of whether Britain should support US military action against Iran is politically controversial.

There is very little domestic support for Britain actively supporting Operation Epic Fury. A YouGov poll taken February 20 found 58% oppose allowing the US to launch air strikes Iran from RAF bases in the UK. And yet, figures on the right, including Conservative leader Kemi Badenoch and Reform UK leader Nigel Farage, have accused the Labour government of weakness for not getting more involved.

Since seemingly refusing to initially allow the US to use Diego Garcia, Starmer has announced that the US can use British bases to target Iranian ballistic missiles, on the grounds that these pose a threat to the UK’s Arab allies. The Greens and Liberal Democrats have called for Starmer to put this decision to a vote in parliament.

Starmer has emphasised that Britain will not join in “offensive action”. But Tehran is unlikely to acknowledge this distinction between “defensive” operations and more “offensive” ones targeting its leadership, armed forces and suspected nuclear facilities.

The Iranian missile strike on the US Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain demonstrates that British military personnel could potentially be at risk from an Iranian attack, even if indirect. The two ballistic missiles fired in Cyprus’s direction may well have been aimed at the USS Gerald Ford and its task group, which is currently in the eastern Mediterranean.

Fundamentally, however, the Islamic regime in Iran is profoundly Anglophobic. It presumes that the US and Britain will always collaborate with each other – just as they did when the CIA and SIS orchestrated the coup that overthrew Iran’s democratically elected prime minister Mohammed Mossadeq in July 1953.

It is therefore possible that Tehran has assumed British complicity in the launching of Operation Epic Fury, and may well target the UK’s military assets in the Gulf and beyond as a result. Whatever the UK government’s intentions, Britain may find itself drawn into a war it had no say in starting.

The Conversation

Geraint Hughes does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Britain’s military presence in the Middle East – and how it could be dragged into war – https://theconversation.com/britains-military-presence-in-the-middle-east-and-how-it-could-be-dragged-into-war-277316

The oil price surge is just one symptom of a supply chain network that is not fit for this age of global tensions

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Maryam Lotfi, Senior Lecturer in Sustainable Supply Chain Management, Cardiff University

The escalating conflict between Iran, the US and Israel has taken a critical turn. The strait of Hormuz – one of the most important shipping routes for oil and gas – is facing significant disruption. The strait is the main route connecting Persian Gulf ports in Iran and some of the region’s other oil producers to the open ocean.

The strikes on Iran are already having tangible effects: energy flows are slowing, markets are reacting and supply chains are under pressure. This is not just a regional conflict – it is a global supply chain crisis unfolding in real time.

As an expert on supply chains, I am acutely aware of how central the strait is – not only for the stability of the region but also to the functioning of the global economy.

This narrow corridor is one of the world’s most critical chokepoints – around a fifth of the world’s oil passes through the strait daily. Its sudden disruption represents a “chokepoint failure” – a breakdown at a critical node that triggers cascading effects across global systems.

Tanker traffic has dropped sharply, with vessels waiting in surrounding waters as ship owners reassess the risks. Oil prices surged in response to the strikes and the threat to shipping routes. Analysts have warned that prices could climb significantly higher if the disruption persists.

But crucially, this reaction was not driven solely by actual shortages. Markets respond to uncertainty itself. The mere possibility that several million barrels per day could be disrupted is enough to push prices up, even before supply is properly hit. This reflects a broader feature of geopolitical risk: expectations and perceptions can be as economically powerful as material disruptions.

Because energy underpins almost every sector, these price increases transmit rapidly through supply chains. Higher fuel costs raise transportation expenses, increase production costs and ultimately feed into inflation across goods and services that eventually land with consumers.

The strategic importance of the Gulf states

The disruption is not confined to the strait. Instability across the wider Gulf region also affects the United Arab Emirates, as well as other strategically important energy producers and logistics hubs, such as Qatar, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

This dimension matters because the Gulf functions not only as an energy supplier but also as a crossroads in global trade and logistics.

Ports such as Dubai handle vast volumes of international shipping, linking Asia, Europe and Africa. As tensions spread, the reliability of these logistics systems is increasingly called into question.

The result is a shift to more widespread insecurity, where both energy flows and trade infrastructure – things like major container ports, shipping lanes, export terminals and storage facilities – are simultaneously at risk.

Energy is the heart of global supply chains. Manufacturing depends on electricity and fuel, transport relies on oil-based logistics and agriculture depends heavily on natural gas-derived fertilisers. When energy flows are disrupted or become more expensive, the effects propagate across entire networks.

Research on geopolitical crises shows that disruptions to key inputs such as oil and gas quickly translate into broader supply chain instability. This affects production, trade and the availability of goods far beyond the conflict zone. The Iran crisis reflects this dynamic. What begins as disruption in a maritime corridor can become a global economic issue within days.

For decades, global supply chains have been optimised for efficiency. This means that they concentrate sourcing and production in regions that minimise costs. This model has delivered large economic benefits, but it has also created weaknesses in the structure.

map of the strait of hormuz
The crisis in the strait of Hormuz is a prime example of a chokepoint failure.
AustralianCamera/Shutterstock

The concentration of energy flowing through a single chokepoint such as the strait of Hormuz exemplifies this trade-off. When it is disrupted, the system lacks resilience.

In response, supply chains are likely to accelerate efforts to diversify and invest in alternative energy routes and sources. Countries that are heavily dependent on oil transiting through the Gulf will seek to expand strategic reserves, diversify their import routes and invest in pipelines that bypass maritime chokepoints.

But at the same time, geopolitical instability strengthens the case for renewable energy, electrification and regional energy integration. Expanding solar, wind and green hydrogen capacity reduces exposure to concentrated fossil fuel corridors. And cross-border electricity connections can improve flexibility during shocks. In this sense, resilience is also an energy transition issue.

At the same time, instability in conflict-hit regions can fuel the rise of informal and illegal supply chains, particularly where governance is weakened. These can include things like unregulated oil trading, goods being smuggled through informal maritime routes and labour exploitation hidden within subcontracting chains.

What’s more, supply chains themselves are increasingly shaped by geopolitical forces, as states use trade, energy and logistics networks as instruments of power.

For consumers, this could mean greater price volatility, shortages and reduced choice as firms adjust sourcing strategies in response to sanctions, trade restrictions or security risks. In some cases, it may also mean higher costs over the long term, as businesses prioritise resilience over efficiency.

A turning point for globalisation?

The situation in the strait of Hormuz may mark a turning point in how global supply chains are understood. It has shone a light on a fundamental tension at the heart of globalisation. Efficiency depends on sourcing and production being concentrated in a few locations, but resilience depends on diversification. When critical links in the chain fail, the consequences extend far beyond their immediate location.

This war demonstrates that supply chains are not merely economic systems. They are deeply embedded in geopolitical realities. The challenge ahead is not simply to manage disruption, but to redesign supply chains and energy sources for a world in which geopolitical risk is no longer exceptional, but structural.

The Conversation

Maryam Lotfi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. The oil price surge is just one symptom of a supply chain network that is not fit for this age of global tensions – https://theconversation.com/the-oil-price-surge-is-just-one-symptom-of-a-supply-chain-network-that-is-not-fit-for-this-age-of-global-tensions-277277

NASA announces a big shake-up of the Artemis Moon program

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Gordon Osinski, Professor in Earth and Planetary Science, Western University

Illustration of Artemis astronauts on the moon. (NASA)

As we wait for the historic Artemis II mission — with Canadian astronaut Jeremy Hansen on board — NASA has announced major changes to the Artemis program.

The next mission, Artemis III, will now no longer land humans on the surface of the moon, but will instead feature a series of technology tests in Low Earth orbit. Artemis IV will then be the first human landing on the moon, sometime in 2028.

I am a professor, an explorer and a planetary geologist. I am a member of the Artemis III Science Team and have been supporting NASA in developing geology training for Artemis astronauts.

My research involves investigating Apollo samples and lunar meteorites to better understand the geology of the moon.

Why the changes?

While it’s not impacted by last week’s NASA announcement, recent delays to the Artemis II mission are a symptom of the challenges that have faced the entire Artemis program for years.

Following an initial setback due to a liquid hydrogen leak encountered during a wet dress rehearsal on Feb. 3, further issues for Artemis II arose during the second wet dress rehearsal from Feb. 19 to 20. As a result, the earliest launch date is now April 1.

This would make it over three years since the first Artemis mission. Such long gaps between missions limit the ability to refine systems quickly and mean that the same issues (for example, fuel leaks) keep recurring. With the loss of more than 4,000 employees — approximately 20 per cent of its workforce — in 2025, NASA is also dealing with significant workforce challenges, causing further strain to the Artemis program.

These challenges appear to have been recognized by NASA’s new administrator, Jared Isaacman, who wrote in a recent social media post that “the days of NASA launching Moon rockets every 3 years are over.”

A big part of the plan involves standardizing the Space Launch System (SLS) rocket “upper stage” — this is the part of the rocket that propels the spacecraft from Low Earth orbit toward the moon.

A reinvigorated Artemis program

There have been lots of news stories circulating since NASA’s announcement about the shake-up of the Artemis program, many of them referring to the “cancellation” of the Artemis III mission. This is not a fair or accurate representation of the new plans. Many people, including myself, think the new plans are not only more realistic, but also exciting in their own right.

It’s true that Artemis III will now not be the first human landing on the moon since Apollo 17 in 1972. Instead, the mission will launch the Orion crew capsule with astronauts on board into Low Earth orbit, where they will conduct in-space testing of critical technologies, including life support, propulsion and communications systems.

While in orbit, it’s also hoped that Orion will rendezvous and dock with one, or both, of the commercially developed lunar landers built by the companies SpaceX and Blue Origin. This makes sense as the original Artemis plan went from Artemis II straight to the surface without testing out these critical aspects of the mission.

A spacesuit
The Artemis spacesuit prototype, the AxEMU, developed by Axiom Space.
(KBR/Axiom Space)

The crew may also test the new spacesuits designed by Axiom Space, which is important because these suits haven’t yet been worn for an actual space mission.

This new plan, therefore, actually reduces the risks and increases the likelihood of a successful human mission to the surface of the moon in 2028 — Artemis IV instead of Artemis III.

The most exciting, and surprising, part of the recent announcement was that NASA will try for not just one, but two moon landings in 2028, and then a mission every year thereafter. Suddenly, this is becoming much more like the Apollo program, which launched 11 crewed missions in four years.

What about the Lunar Gateway?

There was a notable absence in last week’s announcement — a mention of the Lunar Gateway. This is the small space station that will orbit the moon as part of the Artemis program.

In the original plans, the second lunar landing, Artemis IV, was meant to go to the surface of the moon via the Lunar Gateway.

Lunar Gateway is very important to Canada because it will be home to Canadarm3. As the name might suggest, Canadarm3 is Canada’s next-generation robotic arm and is a $2-billion contribution to the Artemis program.

It builds on Canada’s robotics heritage from Canadarm and Canadarm2, but is far more advanced, featuring artificial intelligence — which is necessary due to the distance it will operate from Earth. As NASA works out the plans for the second and subsequent lunar surface missions, I hope for the sake of the Canadian space program that the Lunar Gateway with its Canadarm3 will still be in the mix.

The Conversation

Gordon Osinski founded the company Interplanetary Exploration Odyssey Inc. He receives funding from the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada and the Canadian Space Agency.

ref. NASA announces a big shake-up of the Artemis Moon program – https://theconversation.com/nasa-announces-a-big-shake-up-of-the-artemis-moon-program-275025

Frappes en Iran : le risque politique de Trump à quelques mois des midterms

Source: The Conversation – in French – By Frédérique Sandretto, Adjunct assistant professor, Sciences Po

Les frappes aériennes menées par les États-Unis en coordination avec Israël en Iran surviennent à un moment où Donald Trump, qui avait pourtant promis lors de sa dernière campagne électorale qu’il n’engagerait pas son armée sur des théâtres lointains, fait face à une pression politique croissante liée aux révélations qui s’enchaînent dans l’affaire Epstein. En cas d’enlisement et de pertes importantes dans les rangs de l’armée, le Parti républicain pourrait, lors des élections de mi-mandat, être sanctionné par ses sympathisants.


L’embrasement militaire contre l’Iran a eu l’effet d’un électrochoc politique à Washington, offrant à Donald Trump une échappatoire spectaculaire au moment précis où la pression judiciaire et parlementaire menaçait de l’encercler.

Au lendemain des auditions successives de Bill Clinton et de Hillary Clinton devant une commission de la Chambre des représentants consacrée, à l’affaire Epstein les 26 et 27 février, l’exécutif états-unien apparaissait fragilisé par une séquence politique défavorable. Plusieurs responsables du Parti démocrate venaient de réclamer l’audition du président lui-même, estimant que les éléments révélés au cours de ces dépositions justifiaient l’extension de l’enquête. La réapparition dans l’espace public de la question des cinquante-trois pages manquantes d’un ancien dossier judiciaire, impliquant l’accusation formulée par une plaignante mineure de treize ans à l’époque des faits contre l’actuel occupant de la Maison-Blanche, accentuait encore la vulnérabilité politique de la présidence, malgré l’absence de conclusion judiciaire définitive.

C’est dans ce contexte de tension intérieure maximale que, quelques heures après la déposition de Bill Clinton, Trump s’est adressé à ses concitoyens pour les informer du début de l’opération « Epic Fury » contre des cibles iraniennes.

Trump se pose en libérateur du peuple iranien

La soudaineté de l’opération a immédiatement déplacé l’attention médiatique et politique vers le registre stratégique et militaire. La concomitance entre la séquence des auditions parlementaires et l’engagement armé a nourri les interrogations sur l’articulation entre politique intérieure et action extérieure.

Le discours prononcé par Donald Trump le 28 février au matin constitue le pivot de cette reconfiguration.

Le président y présente l’opération non comme une démonstration de force, mais comme une entreprise morale visant à « rendre la liberté » au peuple iranien. La rhétorique mobilisée insiste presque exclusivement sur des valeurs positives : liberté, dignité, sécurité des populations civiles, avenir démocratique. En décrivant la mission comme « noble », il ajoute à la logique géopolitique une justification éthique, se positionnant explicitement en protecteur d’un peuple décrit comme victime de l’oppression de ses dirigeants. Cette construction discursive transforme l’intervention militaire en geste de libération, inscrivant « Epic Fury » dans une tradition messianique de politique étrangère où les États-Unis se perçoivent comme porteurs de principes universels et d’une responsabilité particulière en matière de défense des droits fondamentaux de par le monde.




À lire aussi :
Donald Trump et les diverses traditions de la politique étrangère américaine


L’insistance sur la libération de l’oppression iranienne constitue le cœur de la nouvelle posture présidentielle. Donald Trump évoque à plusieurs reprises le « droit du peuple iranien à vivre libre », reprenant un vocabulaire rarement associé jusque-là à sa propre doctrine. Il affirme vouloir « ouvrir une ère nouvelle » pour la région, suggérant que l’action militaire pourrait provoquer une transformation politique interne en Iran.

Cette vision, qui fait de l’usage de la force un instrument de délivrance, vise à légitimer l’opération auprès de l’opinion internationale tout en redéfinissant l’image du président sur la scène intérieure. En se posant comme le défenseur d’une population étrangère contre le propre régime de celle-ci, il endosse un rôle de libérateur qui transcende les clivages partisans américains et mobilise un imaginaire politique puissant, fondé sur la promesse d’émancipation et de renouveau historique.

Une place dans l’Histoire ?

Un autre aspect central du discours réside dans la volonté affichée de « faire l’histoire ». Trump inscrit explicitement son action dans une perspective mémorielle, affirmant que cette intervention sera jugée par les générations futures comme un tournant décisif.

Cette projection dans le temps long répond à une logique de présidentialisation du récit national : en se plaçant dans la lignée des dirigeants qui auraient redéfini l’ordre international, il cherche à transformer une décision conjoncturelle en moment fondateur.

La référence implicite aux grandes interventions américaines passées suggère une ambition de marquer durablement la politique étrangère des États-Unis et d’inscrire son mandat dans une chronologie héroïsée. Dans cette optique, la libération supposée du peuple iranien devient non seulement un objectif stratégique, mais aussi un instrument de construction d’une mémoire présidentielle destinée à survivre aux controverses du présent.

Un calcul de politique intérieure

Enfin, cette séquence peut également être interprétée comme une stratégie de communication visant à restaurer une image affaiblie et à préparer les échéances électorales de mi-mandat prévues en novembre.

En déplaçant le débat national vers la sécurité internationale et en adoptant la posture du chef de guerre humanitaire, Donald Trump pourrait chercher à recomposer une coalition électorale autour du patriotisme et du leadership présidentiel. La mise en scène d’une intervention présentée comme libératrice permet de marginaliser les controverses intérieures et de substituer au récit de la fragilité politique celui de la détermination historique. Dans cette perspective, la guerre en Iran ne serait pas seulement un épisode géopolitique, mais aussi un levier destiné à redorer le blason du locataire de la Maison-Blanche et à influencer le rapport de forces électoral à l’approche des élections de mi-mandat.

En effet, l’offensive contre l’Iran intervient en effet à un moment particulièrement sensible du calendrier politique aux États-Unis. En novembre prochain, les élections de mi-mandat détermineront l’équilibre du pouvoir au Congrès pour la seconde moitié du mandat présidentiel. En déclenchant une opération militaire d’ampleur sans autorisation préalable du Congrès, Donald Trump s’expose à une double contestation, institutionnelle et électorale. Plusieurs élus démocrates dénoncent une violation du War Powers Act, estimant que le président n’a pas le droit d’engager le pays dans un conflit sans l’accord du Congrès.

La controverse est renforcée par l’absence perçue d’une menace immédiate justifiant une action préventive, ce qui alimente l’idée d’une guerre de choix plutôt que d’une guerre de nécessité.

Dans ce contexte, l’opération iranienne pourrait devenir un enjeu central de la campagne de mi-mandat, les démocrates cherchant à transformer la question de la légalité et du contrôle parlementaire en argument électoral majeur contre l’administration.

Ralliement autour du drapeau ou rejet d’une intervention qui n’était pas indispensable ?

Sur le plan de l’opinion publique, les premiers indicateurs apparaissent ambivalents et potentiellement dangereux pour la majorité présidentielle. En effet, les conflits extérieurs peuvent produire un effet de ralliement patriotique à court terme, mais ils deviennent rapidement coûteux électoralement lorsque les pertes humaines s’accumulent sans victoire décisive. Trois militaires américains ont déjà été tués depuis le début de l’opération, et la perspective d’un nombre élevé de pertes constitue un facteur susceptible d’éroder le soutien à l’intervention et de fragiliser les candidats républicains dans les circonscriptions les plus disputées.

Si le conflit devait s’enliser ou provoquer une escalade régionale entraînant des attaques meurtrières contre des forces américaines, dont des dizaines de milliers se trouvent actuellement au Proche-Orient, le calcul politique initial pourrait se retourner contre le président. Les pertes militaires renforceraient la position de ceux qui reprochent à l’exécutif d’avoir engagé la vie de soldats sans débat national préalable. Pour les démocrates, l’argument serait stratégique : faire de la crise iranienne le symbole d’une présidence imprudente et d’un contournement des procédures constitutionnelles, afin de mobiliser un électorat inquiet d’un retour à des guerres longues et coûteuses au Moyen-Orient.

Dès lors, les élections de mi-mandat apparaissent comme un test politique indirect de la guerre elle-même. Une défaite républicaine serait interprétée comme une sanction populaire de la décision d’entrer en conflit, tandis qu’un succès pourrait être présenté par la Maison-Blanche comme une validation de la posture de fermeté adoptée face à Téhéran. Le pari de Donald Trump consiste donc à obtenir des résultats stratégiques rapides – ou du moins une perception de succès – avant que la dynamique électorale ne cristallise les critiques. À défaut, l’intervention en Iran pourrait devenir non pas un instrument de consolidation du pouvoir présidentiel, mais le catalyseur d’un rééquilibrage institutionnel imposé par les urnes.

The Conversation

Frédérique Sandretto ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.

ref. Frappes en Iran : le risque politique de Trump à quelques mois des midterms – https://theconversation.com/frappes-en-iran-le-risque-politique-de-trump-a-quelques-mois-des-midterms-277272