When war comes for Iran’s cultural heritage

Source: The Conversation – France – By Parsa Ghasemi, Archaeologist, Postdoctoral research fellow at Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, and research member at ARSCAN Nanterre, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne

131 sites and museums have suffered damage or been destroyed during the US and Israeli war against Iran between February 28 and April 8. Amid uncertainty over what will happen next as peace talks failed during the two-week conditional ceasefire, it is an opportune time to take stock of the state of Iranian cultural heritage.

With its vast territory and strategic position in West Asia, Iran has long been one of the principal centres of human activity and cultural development.

As one of the world’s oldest centres of civilisation, Iran has preserved an exceptionally rich archaeological and historical landscape shaped over several millennia. This heritage reflects a long sequence of cultural traditions, from the Palaeolithic (prehistoric) times through the Elamite kingdom (2700 BCE and 539 BCE), the Median dynasty (c. 700 to 550 BCE), the Achaemenid (559 to 330 BCE), the Parthian (247 BCE to 224 CE) and Sasanian (224 to 651 CE) empires and into the Islamic periods.

This continuity is visible in the country’s archaeological sites, historic cities, monuments, and museum collections. It is estimated that Iran contains several hundred thousand archaeological sites, although only a small proportion have been formally registered on the national heritage list since the beginnings of state heritage protection in the early twentieth century.

The international significance of this heritage is underscored by the inscription of 29 Iranian properties on the UNESCO World Heritage List, comprising 27 cultural and two natural sites. Last month, the UN cultural agency weighed in, voicing concern over the protection of Iran’s national treasures and sites of “cultural significance”, such as the Qajar-era Golestan Palace, following airstrikes. In a recent statement, the International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS) condemned any destruction – whether intentional or incidental – of cultural and natural heritage, deploring the “serious implications for cultural continuity” and the “risk of irreversible loss”, more broadly across the region as a result of the conflict.

What’s the damage?

An emerging official inventory of cultural damage recorded by the Ministry of Cultural Heritage, Tourism and Handicrafts of Iran shows that more than 131 archaeological sites, museums, and historical monuments (Figure 1.) in Iran have been damaged across 17 provinces and 26 cities.

The highest concentration of damage has been recorded in Tehran, where 61 sites were affected. It should be noted, however, that these figures are based on city-level assessment and do not include archaeological sites situated outside urban areas. In addition, historic urban fabrics are listed separately. The inventory recorded up to March 29 reveals a grave and highly uneven impact on Iran’s heritage, with destruction concentrated in some of the country’s most important historic and monument-rich cities.

The 1954 Hague Convention states that damage to any nation’s cultural property is a loss to the heritage of all humanity, which is why it requires international protection. Protecting cultural heritage is also tied to protecting human rights, including cultural rights, identity, memory, and human dignity.

As a result, intentional attacks on cultural heritage during armed conflict are not only morally unacceptable they could also violate international law and constitute war crimes, as confirmed by the International Criminal Court in the Al Mahdi case. This protection is further strengthened by UN Security Council Resolution 2347 of 2017, which emphasises the importance of safeguarding cultural heritage in conflict situations.

Tehran and Isfahan: the worst hit

What emerges from the inventory is not a scattered pattern of isolated incidents. It is a concentrated “geography of damage”, falling most heavily on provinces that hold some of Iran’s richest cultural assets, above all Tehran and Isfahan.

These are not marginal places in the historical map of Iran. They are among the country’s principal repositories of architectural memory, museum collections, 15th to 19th-century royal compounds, religious monuments, and civic heritage.

The most significantly damaged monuments in Tehran include Golestan Palace, Tehran’s Historic Arg, the Historic Grand Bazaar of Tehran, Marble Palace, the Historic Shahrbani Building, the Former Senate Building, Sepahsalar Mosque, and the Farahabad Palace Museum.

In Isfahan Province, damage has been reported at the Naqsh-e Jahan Square complex, the Chehel Sotoun Palace, the Abbasi Friday Mosque, etc.

The provincial distribution is among the most revealing aspects of the inventory. Tehran alone accounts for 61 counted sites, representing 46.6 percent of the total. Isfahan follows with 23 sites, or 17.6 percent. Together, these two provinces contain 84 damaged entries, equivalent to 64.1 percent of the inventory. When Khuzestan and Kurdistan are added, the top four provinces account for 108 sites, or 82.4 percent of all counted entries.

This means the damage pattern is not spatially even. It is clustered in provinces, where museums, palace complexes, historic neighbourhoods, old institutions or schools, and monumental architecture are densely concentrated.

The hypothesis of a strategically targeted assault

The typological profile of the damaged heritage is equally telling. The largest single group consists of historical houses, mansions, and residences totalling 33 entries. These are followed by civic and institutional buildings, such as schools, with 16 entries, and famous historical mosques, with 12.

The inventory also identifies historical forts, mills, and baths (hammam). The report additionally records 10 palaces or royal complex entries dating back to the 15th-19th centuries CE, indicating that the damage reaches deeply into architectural forms associated with old districts of the war-affected cities.

The document states that 50 museum units refer to museum components embedded within larger complexes, palace compounds, and multi-part heritage sites.

The cultural loss is therefore both architectural and institutional, affecting not only structures but also the curatorial and interpretive frameworks housed within them. According to Science, cultural institutions are taking measures to protect its moveable heritage, including boxing up museum items for safekeeping and installing the Blue Shield logo designed to indicate protected heritage on more than 100 cultural monuments.

The source also names 7 historic urban fabrics separately, suggesting that the true scope of impact extends beyond single monuments to wider urban heritage zones across Tehran, Isfahan, Sanandaj, Kermanshah, Qom, Khansar, and Tabriz. Old parts of the cities function as “layered cultural organisms”.

When an urban fabric is damaged, what is threatened is not only a set of buildings, but a continuity of streets, spatial memory, social practice, and architectural identity and art. Some of these fabrics were used for several hundred years and are a testimony of old traditions, artefact production, and Persian culture and identity.

If future surveys and analyses of Iranian sites are carried out, we will see that many sites outside the urban centres have been damaged. This damage has not been limited to buildings and museums, but has also affected archives of ancient manuscripts held in collections and places of worship such as mosques, churches and synagogues.

The bombing of the Cultural Heritage Office in Khorramabad city makes the deliberate nature of this destruction even clearer. These intentional acts of destruction are not limited to cultural heritage, but also extend to essential infrastructure, such as the unfinished Bridge in Karaj, the Pasteur Institute, and universities such as Shahid-Beheshti, Sharif and Elm-o Sanat (Science and technology).

What is dangerous here, as we see, is a portrait of cultural loss at multiple scales, from individual structures to complex heritage environments.

The chronological range of the damaged sites is striking. It extends from Kuh-e Khawaja in Sistan, one of south-eastern Iran’s most important archaeological sites, with remains dating to the Parthian, Sasanian, and early Islamic periods, to Siraf in Bushehr, the famous late antiquity and early medieval port city on the Persian Gulf, and to the tomb of Baba Taher in Hamedan, the celebrated 11th-century Persian poet.

The damage was not confined to historical monuments alone, but also reached the modern building of the Iranian Cultural Heritage office.

The targeting of cultural heritage in Iran, the historical memory and enduring identity of one of the world’s longest-lasting civilisations and an irreplaceable part of the heritage of humanity, was not incidental but systematic. Such acts must be condemned in the strongest possible terms.

They represent an assault not only on monuments, museums, and archaeological sites, but also on the cultural legacy, historical consciousness, and collective memory of humanity itself.

The right to remedy and the law on war reparations

Under international law, the law of reparations for war damage stipulates that a State responsible for an internationally wrongful act must make full reparation for any damage, whether material or moral.

This destruction must never be repeated. Urgent and immediate measures are now required to ensure the protection, documentation, stabilisation, and restoration of Iran’s damaged heritage.

These efforts must be undertaken without delay and supported at international level through coordinated action by cultural institutions, professional bodies, and relevant global organisations.


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The Conversation

Parsa Ghasemi ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.

ref. When war comes for Iran’s cultural heritage – https://theconversation.com/when-war-comes-for-irans-cultural-heritage-280335

Delivery platform workers: a survey lifts the lid on extreme hardship

Source: The Conversation – France – By Marwân-al-Qays Bousmah, Chargé de Recherche, Ined (Institut national d’études démographiques)

The familiar silhouette of bike and scooter delivery workers has become part of Paris’ urban landscape. For many city dwellers who rely on them to deliver meals to their door, these precarious workers remain largely “invisible” in surveys and public statistics.

Yet, the availability of quality data about online platforms’ delivery drivers is a major issue. Legally, the transposition into French law of the European Directive (EU) 2024/2831 on the legal framework around platform work (which aims to provide better protection to delivery couriers), expected before December 2 2026, makes it essential to have a better understanding of this population in order to shed light on regulatory choices.

Where occupational health is concerned, an expert appraisal by Anses (March 2025) exposes an alarming situation, and underlines the lack of available data for understanding the health status of these gig workers and implementing appropriate public policies.

It is in this context that France’s Santé-Course project was launched. Led by an interdisciplinary research team from the Institut de recherche pour le développement (IRD) and the Institut national d’études démographiques (INED), associations working with delivery people (Association de mobilisation et d’accompagnement des livreurs, AMAL; Collectif pour l’insertion et l’émancipation des livreurs, Ciel; Maison des livreurs de Bordeaux; Maison des couriers de Paris; Médecins du monde) and a peer group made up of couriers or former couriers, this project focused on documenting working conditions as well as delivery workers’ physical and mental health, based on a survey conducted among more than 1,000 of them in Paris and Bordeaux.

The study also examines exposure to occupational risks, police checks and cases of discrimination. Hereafter, we turn attention to the profiles of these workers and their working conditions, but the full results are available here.

What does platform work consist of ?

The rise of digital work platforms in France dates back about fifteen years and results from the conjunction of two series of factors: the adoption of new legal norms (notably the Novelli law of 2008 establishing self-employment status), on the one hand, and the generalisation of information and communication technologies as well as the democratisation of their use, on the other. The first point has gradually made the labour market more flexible and paved the way for massive employment of self-employed workers who are taken on by these platforms, while the second one has provided the latter with the conditions for their large-scale deployment.




À lire aussi :
Requalifier ou réguler ? Les controverses du dialogue social des travailleurs des plates-formes


In the food delivery sector, digital platforms play a role as intermediaries between restaurant owners and customers, and between restaurateurs and deliverers. Their operations are based on matching algorithms, pricing, and disconnection that allow them to manage a vast network statutorily independent workforce, without having to resort to traditional company management methods.

Delivery drivers’ self-employed status places them outside the occupational health and safety regulatory framework that is applicable to employees. Their situation is similar to a return to task-based work, understood as project-based contractual work between clients and those who carry out the work.

As a result, social security contributions, which grant workers social protection and the legal obligations related to protecting workers, are transferred from the client to the self-employed worker. This puts delivery contractors in a highly precarious situation and makes them economically dependent on the platforms, which control access to deliveries and the terms of their remuneration.

A population that tends to be off the survey radar

Investigating platform delivery workers involves several methodological obstacles, the main one being admin-related: none of the company directories listing businesses located in France (Sirene, Sirus or Sine), usually used as sampling frames to draw samples from annual business surveys, allows reliable and exhaustive identification of platform deliverers. This makes it, therefore, difficult to know precisely their total number and their geographical distribution in France, thus making any approach by traditional sampling impossible.

Another problem is posed by the phenomenon of account leasing, which allows delivery drivers to carry out their activities under a third party’s account. This phenomenon also undermines the use of data from the platforms themselves, which lacks transparency (see the Anses March 2025 report).

As a result, only a direct canvassing protocol carried out in public places or community spaces is able to produce reliable data. This is how the Santé-Course project team managed : to meet delivery people at their pick-up destinations in Paris and Bordeaux.

The two French cities were selected because a significant part of these workers are concentrated there and they are home to partner associations of the Santé-Course project. In order to fully represent the diversity of situations experienced by delivery workers and, thus, obtain results that best reflect the reality of the entire population studied, an initial mapping survey of meeting points and the number of delivery people visiting them at different times of the day was carried out, which then served as a basis for the deployment of survey interviewers.

The survey was conducted during the first half of 2025, among delivery drivers over 18 years old, who had made at least one delivery via a digital platform in the month before the survey and were able to give informed consent. A total of 519 and 485 delivery people were interviewed in Paris and Bordeaux, respectively.

Nearly 1 in 2 delivery people spent an entire day without eating in the last twelve months

The results paint a remarkably homogeneous socio-demographic picture on several dimensions. The delivery workers are almost exclusively men (98.9%), immigrants (97.8%) and relatively young – their median age is 30 years old.

Their level of education, by contrast, is heterogeneous : while one quarter did not go beyond primary level education, nearly one in five went on to higher education, with significant differences between Paris (28.3%) and Bordeaux (9.6%).

Most of them recently arrived in France (median since 2020) and are mainly from West Africa and South Asia in Paris, from West Africa and North Africa in Bordeaux. Their administrative status is extremely fragile : nearly two thirds of them do not hold a residence permit.

This administrative hardship is coupled with material deprivation. The majority of the workers do not have a place to call their own : in Paris flat shares and lodging with people they know are the dominant trend, while communal supported housing and collective accommodation are more common in Bordeaux.

Even more worrying, nearly 18 % report living in unstable housing conditions (emergency accommodation, squats or welfare hotels). Food insecurity is just as significant : nearly one in two delivery people in Paris (48%) and more than one in three in Bordeaux (36.7%) report having spent at least a full day without eating, due to lack of money, over the past twelve months.

Nearly 73.5 % work under a third-party account

Those who were surveyed have been in business for some time: three quarters had never worked for a delivery platform before 2021, and more than one third of Parisian delivery workers started in 2024 or 2025.

Two platforms, Uber Eats and Deliveroo, largely dominate the market, but the simultaneous use of delivery services with several apps (or “multi-apping”) remains a very small minority, affecting less than 2% of them.

Economic dependence on this work is massive: 91% declare that delivery constitutes the bulk of their income, and about 95% do not engage in any other paid activity or are completing training alongside. Dependence on delivery work also appears to be largely constraine: nine out of ten deliverymen without a residence permit say they would cease or drastically reduce this type of work if they regularised their undocumented status.

Finally, the phenomenon of account rentals is massive: three quarters of delivery people work under the account of a third person, with a proportion reaching 81% in Paris. This phenomenon, which stems from the administrative precariousness of delivery people, many of whom are undocumented, considerably clouds the statistics produced by the platforms and highlights the need for surveys conducted directly with workers on the ground.

On average, 63-hour working weeks at a gross hourly rate of 5.83 euros

The delivery workers get an average gross monthly wage of 1,480 euros, or 880 euros after tax once all work-related charges are deducted. (including equipment and fuel expenses, insurance costs, taxes and, for three quarters of them, the rental cost of an account, which averages 528 euros per month and absorbs more than a third of gross income on its own).

The average gross hourly rate is a meagre 5.83 euros. This is well under France’s minimum wage (11.88 euros at the time of the survey) for significant volumes of work : on average 63 hours per week, six to seven days a week, ten months a year, with even more hours for those who rent an account. At this rate, they clock up 497 miles per month – such mileage is likely to be underestimated due to the omission of certain routes in the platform data.

This overview paints a picture of the “working poor”, a population forced to work extremely hard to earn an income after tax that remains well below the poverty line (set at 1,288 euros net per month for a single person).

The studies that will be conducted by our team over the coming months aim to shed light on the extent to which this situation affects the health of delivery workers.

More than half of the delivery drivers surveyed have already had at least one accident as a result of their work, and 44.8% of them believe that their health status has deteriorated compared to when they started working in the delivery industry.


This project received financing from l’Agence nationale de la recherche, l’Institut Convergences Migrations, la Ville de Paris, l’Inserm and l’Institut Paris Public Health at l’Université Paris Cité.


A weekly e-mail in English featuring expertise from scholars and researchers. It provides an introduction to the diversity of research coming out of the continent and considers some of the key issues facing European countries. Get the newsletter!


The Conversation

Les auteurs ne travaillent pas, ne conseillent pas, ne possèdent pas de parts, ne reçoivent pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’ont déclaré aucune autre affiliation que leur organisme de recherche.

ref. Delivery platform workers: a survey lifts the lid on extreme hardship – https://theconversation.com/delivery-platform-workers-a-survey-lifts-the-lid-on-extreme-hardship-280174

Les coûts économiques de la guerre vont bien au-delà des destructions matérielles

Source: The Conversation – France (in French) – By Mathieu Couttenier, Professeur d’économie, ENS de Lyon

Les effets les plus importants des conflits sont souvent les moins visibles : ils détruisent les parcours de vie, affectent la santé, plombent les économies, exacerbent les inégalités de genre, accélèrent les déplacements forcés… La guerre génère aussi des gagnants, intentionnels ou involontaires.

Cet article est publié en partenariat avec Mermoz, la revue du Cercle des économistes dont le numéro 10 est consacré aux « Violences : la société à vif ».


La guerre détruit des infrastructures, désorganise les économies, brise des trajectoires individuelles et recompose parfois les rentes. En mesurer le coût suppose de tenir ensemble ces différentes dimensions. Loin d’être un simple exercice comptable, cette quantification est indispensable pour identifier les populations les plus vulnérables et orienter les politiques de reconstruction.

Les coûts les plus visibles sont matériels. Les conflits contemporains détruisent massivement les infrastructures et désorganisent en profondeur les capacités productives. Dans le cas de l’Ukraine, les premières estimations situaient les pertes totales entre 500 milliards et 1 000 milliards de dollars (de 427,9 milliards à 855,8 milliards d’euros) dès 2022. Fin 2024, la Kyiv School of Economics chiffrait la reconstruction des seules infrastructures physiques à des dizaines de milliards de dollars : 60 milliards pour les logements, 38,5 milliards pour les routes, 14,6 milliards pour le secteur énergétique, 14,8 milliards pour l’agriculture. Ces chiffres ne rendent compte que des pertes tangibles ; ils laissent dans l’ombre la désorganisation plus profonde des tissus productif et social.

À l’échelle macroéconomique, les effets sont tout aussi sévères. Le génocide rwandais de 1994 s’est accompagné d’une chute de 40 % du PIB par habitant et d’un effondrement des investissements directs étrangers. À Gaza, le PIB réel a reculé de plus de 80 % au premier semestre 2024, tandis que la part de la population en situation de pauvreté multidimensionnelle est passée de 63,7 % avant la guerre à 97,9 % en 2024.




À lire aussi :
Économie de guerre : de quoi parle-t-on ?


Les enfants, premières victimes

Les coûts les plus importants sont souvent les moins visibles. La guerre perturbe les parcours de vie, détruit les actifs des ménages et fragilise durablement les mécanismes économiques de base. Les enfants en sont les premières victimes. En 2023, 473 millions d’enfants vivaient dans des zones de conflit, et plus de 30 000 violations graves de leurs droits ont été recensées.

La littérature économique montre que ces expositions précoces ont des effets durables sur le capital humain : au Pérou, une exposition à la violence avant l’âge scolaire réduit en moyenne la scolarité de 0,31 année à l’âge adulte ; au Rwanda, les enfants exposés au génocide accusent un retard d’environ 0,5 année de scolarité primaire.

Les conséquences sanitaires sont, elles aussi, profondes. Au Nigeria, les femmes exposées à la guerre civile entre 1967 et 1970 présentent, à l’âge adulte, une taille inférieure de 0,75 à 4,5 centimètres selon l’âge d’exposition, signe d’un environnement nutritionnel et sanitaire gravement détérioré (Akresh et coll., 2012).

Par ailleurs, le simple risque de violence, même en l’absence d’exposition directe, affecte les comportements et les conditions de vie. En Côte d’Ivoire et en Ouganda, une augmentation d’un écart-type du risque de violence entre la conception et la première année de vie accroît la mortalité infantile de 0,8 à 1 point de pourcentage. Les coûts du conflit ne se limitent donc pas aux seuls lieux où la violence se réalise.

Des liens sociaux désagrégés

Les effets sur les structures sociales sont plus ambivalents. De nombreux travaux documentent une baisse durable de la confiance et un renforcement des replis identitaires après les conflits, y compris longtemps après la fin des hostilités. D’autres mettent en évidence, dans certains contextes, des dynamiques inverses : montée de l’engagement civique et politique, comportements plus prosociaux, participation accrue à la vie collective. La guerre ne produit donc pas des effets sociaux uniformes. Si elle peut désagréger les liens, elle peut aussi, dans certains contextes, renforcer des formes d’engagement ou de coopération.

Les conflits exacerbent aussi les inégalités de genre. Près de 80 % des personnes déplacées sont des femmes (Banque mondiale, 2011), exposées à des risques sanitaires accrus et à des formes de violence spécifiques. Les violences sexuelles, documentées dans de nombreux contextes, ne sont pas seulement des effets collatéraux du conflit. Des travaux récents montrent qu’elles peuvent répondre à des logiques de contrôle territorial et d’extorsion économique, notamment dans les zones riches en ressources naturelles.

L’immigration des élites

Les déplacements forcés constituent une autre dimension majeure et souvent sous-estimée des coûts. Un conflit de faible intensité génère en moyenne 500 000 déplacés, un conflit meurtrier jusqu’à 1,2 million. Ces migrations ne sont pas aléatoires : les individus les plus éduqués et les mieux dotés économiquement sont souvent les plus mobiles. Cette sélection entraîne une perte durable de capital humain dans les zones d’origine, fragilisant la reconstruction et pouvant alimenter, à moyen terme, de nouvelles tensions.

Les entreprises subissent elles aussi des coûts importants, directs et indirects. La violence perturbe l’offre de travail, désorganise les chaînes d’approvisionnement et accroît l’incertitude sur les décisions d’investissement. Au Kenya, les violences postélectorales de 2008 ont provoqué une chute de plus de 50 % des exportations de fleurs.

Dans les territoires palestiniens occupés, les distorsions liées à l’accès aux intrants importés expliquent environ 70 % de la baisse de valeur ajoutée des entreprises exposées. Mais ces effets ne restent pas confinés aux zones de violence : dans le cas indien, environ trois quarts du coût économique total d’un conflit transitent par les chaînes de valeur, affectant des entreprises situées dans des régions pourtant épargnées. Ne comptabiliser que les firmes directement exposées conduit donc à sous-estimer massivement l’impact global.

France 24, 2023.

Des rentes redistribuées

Enfin, la guerre génère aussi des gagnants, et la distinction entre gagnants intentionnels et gagnants involontaires est ici essentielle. Les premiers cherchent activement à tirer profit du conflit : l’industrie de l’armement, dont le chiffre d’affaires cumulé atteignait 631,9 milliards de dollars (540,8 milliards d’euros) en 2023 en est l’exemple le plus évident. Certaines entreprises vont plus loin encore, en nouant des arrangements avec des groupes armés pour maintenir leur activité ; le cas Lafarge en Syrie en est l’illustration la plus emblématique.

Les seconds profitent du conflit par un concours de circonstances : la disparition ou l’affaiblissement de concurrents exposés à la violence redistribue mécaniquement des parts de marché en leur faveur, sans qu’ils l’aient recherché. Dans les deux cas, ces dynamiques rappellent que la guerre ne produit pas uniquement des destructions : elle redistribue aussi des rentes et des positions, ce qui contribue parfois à en prolonger la durée.

Au total, les coûts de la guerre s’étendent bien au-delà des destructions immédiates. Ils s’inscrivent dans les corps, les trajectoires scolaires, les structures familiales, les réseaux productifs et les équilibres sociaux, souvent pour des décennies. Les chiffrer rigoureusement ne revient pas à réduire la guerre à une équation ; c’est une condition pour hiérarchiser les urgences, cibler la reconstruction et limiter la reproduction de la violence.


Cet article est publié en partenariat avec Mermoz, la revue du Cercle des économistes dont le numéro 10 a pour objet « Violences : la société à vif ». Vous pourrez y lire d’autres contributions.

Le titre et les intertitres sont de la rédaction de The Conversation France.

The Conversation

Mathieu Couttenier ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.

ref. Les coûts économiques de la guerre vont bien au-delà des destructions matérielles – https://theconversation.com/les-couts-economiques-de-la-guerre-vont-bien-au-dela-des-destructions-materielles-280088

Intelligence artificielle : quels sont les apports concrets de la régulation européenne ?

Source: The Conversation – France in French (3) – By Chloé Dornbierer, Docteure en droit et Professeure à Kedge Business School, Kedge Business School

L’intelligence artificielle s’impose désormais au cœur de décisions qui engagent directement la vie, la santé et les droits des citoyens européens. Dans des entreprises, des administrations, des hôpitaux ou sur des plateformes numériques, des algorithmes trient, évaluent, recommandent et parfois décident. Face à cette automatisation croissante, une question centrale se pose : la réponse de l’Union européenne pour encadrer l’intelligence artificielle est-elle à la hauteur des risques qu’elle prétend prévenir ?


Imaginons qu’une entreprise décide d’utiliser une intelligence artificielle (IA) pour automatiser son processus de recrutement. L’algorithme, conçu pour analyser des milliers de CV, est entraîné sur les données RH de l’entreprise des dix dernières années. Or, les profils recrutés durant cette période sont majoritairement masculins. L’algorithme déduit alors de ces données que les candidats masculins sont préférables et exclut de fait les profils féminins.

Ce scénario n’est pas fictif : il s’inspire directement du cas d’Amazon, dont l’outil de recrutement par IA a dû être abandonné après la révélation de ces biais eu égard aux risques juridiques qu’ils engendraient. Cet exemple illustre précisément les risques que le législateur entend prévenir : erreurs algorithmiques, atteintes aux droits fondamentaux, captation et fuite de données, dépendance technologique.

En réponse, l’Union européenne a bâti depuis plusieurs années un arsenal juridique ambitieux, allant du Règlement général sur la protection des données (RGPD) au Règlement sur l’intelligence artificielle (RIA). Ces textes doivent relever un défi de taille : concilier innovation et protection, réguler les acteurs internationaux sans les éloigner du marché européen, et garantir les droits fondamentaux sans censure – le tout face à des technologies transversales, opaques et en constante évolution. Cet ensemble de règles constitue-t-il une réponse satisfaisante ?

Pas de régulation de l’IA, sans régulation des données

La régulation de l’intelligence artificielle ne saurait être envisagée indépendamment d’une politique structurée de la donnée. La donnée constitue en effet le carburant indispensable au développement et au perfectionnement des systèmes d’intelligence artificielle. En cela, la quantité de données compte tout autant que leur qualité.

C’est pourquoi, le législateur européen a d’abord cherché à réguler la donnée avant de réguler l’IA : d’une part avec le RGPD dont la finalité est de protéger les données à caractère personnel (les informations concernant une personne physique identifiée ou identifiable, comme un numéro de téléphone ou une adresse postale).

D’autre part avec une série de textes portant sur la régulation des données non personnelles (les informations ne se rapportant à aucune personne identifiable, comme une statistique ou un nombre d’accidents sur une autoroute visée). Ceux-ci comprennent le DSA, le DMA, le DGA, le Data Act et visent notamment à limiter la domination des géants du numérique et organiser le partage et l’accès de certaines données entre plateformes, entreprises, administrations publiques et utilisateurs, condition indispensable au développement de l’IA.

Ces textes relatifs aux données ont été le préalable à l’élaboration de la première réglementation générale au monde sur l’intelligence artificielle : le RIA.

Quelles sont les obligations imposées aux entreprises par le RIA ?

Contrairement aux États-Unis, qui privilégient une approche dérégulée, et à la Chine, qui encadre principalement certains usages ciblés, l’Union européenne a fait le choix d’un cadre juridique général et contraignant, s’appliquant à l’ensemble des secteurs et des systèmes d’intelligence artificielle, afin de poser les bases d’un véritable droit commun de l’IA au sein du marché européen depuis son entrée en vigueur le 1er août 2024.

Son objectif est d’encadrer

« le développement, la mise sur le marché et l’utilisation de systèmes d’intelligence artificielle, qui peuvent poser des risques pour la santé, la sécurité ou les droits fondamentaux ».

Pour atteindre cet objectif, le RIA commence par définir précisément le champ des technologies qu’il entend encadrer. Il distingue : les systèmes d’intelligence artificielle, qui correspondent aux applications concrètes utilisées par les utilisateurs (ex : un outil de tri de candidatures, ChatGPT) et les modèles d’intelligence artificielle à usage général, qui constituent le socle technologique sur lequel reposent ces applications, comme GPT-4 pour ChatGPT.

Pour assurer un équilibre entre protection des personnes et innovation, le RIA classe les systèmes d’intelligence artificielle en quatre niveaux de risque :

  • le risque inacceptable (ex : système de notation sociale des citoyens, présentant un risque d’une atteinte grave aux droits fondamentaux) impliquant l’interdiction du système d’IA.

  • le risque élevé (ex : une IA utilisée pour évaluer des salariés, présentant un risque d’atteinte au droit du travail et à la vie privée) imposant des obligations comme celle de réaliser des audits ou celle d’entraîner le système sur des données qualitatives et exemptes de biais.

  • le risque limité (ex : assistant conversationnel d’un service client, présentant le risque d’une collecte de données sans consentement éclairé) obligeant notamment les opérateurs à informer les utilisateurs de l’usage de l’IA.

  • le risque minimal (ex : IA intégrée dans un jeu vidéo) dont ne découle aucune obligation spécifique.

Pour chaque niveau de risque, des obligations spécifiques et proportionnées sont donc édictées en fonction de leurs effets potentiels sur les droits fondamentaux, la sécurité et la santé des personnes. Ces obligations s’imposent à différents opérateurs selon le moment où ils interviennent dans la chaîne de valeur de l’IA : fournisseur, mandataire, importateur, distributeur…

Par exemple, un système d’IA utilisé pour l’analyse d’images médicales, qualifié de système à risque élevé, est soumis à des obligations spécifiques qui varient selon l’opérateur concerné : le fournisseur doit concevoir le système en conformité avec les exigences de sécurité et de gestion des risques comme s’assurer qu’il ne peut pas y avoir de faux positif ou de faux négatif dans le diagnostic mais également que le système ne présente pas de biais du fait d’une sous-représentation de certains groupes ethniques ou de genre, l’importateur et le distributeur doivent vérifier que cette conformité a été respectée, et l’hôpital qui déploie le système doit s’assurer qu’il est utilisé correctement et sous supervision humaine.

Concernant les modèles d’IA à usage général (ex : GPT-4, algorithme sur lequel repose ChatGPT), le législateur européen a édicté différentes règles selon qu’ils présentent ou non un risque systémique.

L’article 3 § 65 du RIA définissant le risque systémique comme :

« un risque spécifique aux capacités à fort impact des modèles d’IA à usage général, ayant une incidence significative sur le marché de l’Union en raison de leur portée ou d’effets négatifs réels ou raisonnablement prévisibles sur la santé publique, la sûreté, la sécurité publique, les droits fondamentaux ou la société dans son ensemble, pouvant être propagé à grande échelle tout au long de la chaîne de valeur ».

Ce risque est évalué selon la puissance de calcul du modèle. Les modèles d’IA à usage général qui présentent un risque systémique doivent notamment signaler les incidents graves (des biais, des faux positifs, une cyberattaque), prendre d’importantes mesures de cybersécurité ou encore tester le modèle et atténuer les risques systémiques identifiés (grâce à des audits, des mesures de protection contre les piratages ou encore des mesures de détection de biais). Plusieurs autorités ont été désignées pour contrôler la bonne application du règlement, c’est le cas notamment du comité européen de l’intelligence artificielle au niveau européen, et de la CNIL au niveau national.

Les limites du RIA

Le RIA a suscité des critiques des experts du droit et du monde professionnel à propos de sa mise en œuvre. Ainsi, 46 dirigeants d’entreprise ont dénoncé, dans une lettre ouverte destinée à la présidente de la Commission européenne, « des règlementations européennes peu claires, qui se chevauchent et deviennent de plus en plus complexes ». La technicité du RIA conjuguée à la complexité des algorithmes compliquent l’application du texte, en particulier pour les obligations de transparence – incompatibles avec l’opacité des algorithmes – et pour l’identification des responsabilités, les entreprises peinant à déterminer quelles obligations leur incombent selon leur position dans la chaîne de valeur et le niveau de risque du système.

En découle alors une autre problématique, le risque de freiner les acteurs français et européens, comme Orasio, H Company ou DeepL, qui tentent de concurrencer les géants américains de l’intelligence artificielle qui ont davantage de moyens (juridiques, technologiques, financiers) pour mettre en œuvre les obligations du RIA.

À cet égard, il convient de relever que le législateur européen a finalement renoncé, le 11 février 2025, à adopter une législation spécifique relative à la responsabilité civile des acteurs de l’intelligence artificielle, dont la finalité était d’harmoniser les règles de responsabilité civile pour les dommages causés par l’IA, afin de protéger les victimes et d’unifier le cadre juridique au sein de l’UE. Cet abandon est intervenu suite à une opposition de certains États membres, notamment la France, mais aussi des critiques formulées par le lobbying de grandes entreprises technologiques qui dénonçaient un risque de surrégulation et une insécurité juridique susceptible de freiner l’innovation. En l’absence d’un tel cadre spécifique, ce sont donc les règles de droit positif de responsabilité civile qui demeurent applicables aux dommages causés par les systèmes d’intelligence artificielle.

Les enjeux de la régulation

En combinant protection des données, encadrement des usages et obligations pesant sur les acteurs les plus puissants, l’Union européenne a posé les bases d’un véritable droit commun de l’IA unique au monde.

Cependant, cette réponse n’est satisfaisante qu’à une condition : que son application ne transforme pas la régulation en barrière à l’entrée pour les acteurs européens tels que Mistral AI, NEURA Robotics ou Dust. En effet, le risque est de renforcer la domination des géants américains et chinois plutôt que de la combattre. D’autant que cette domination ne se limite pas au plan économique : elle s’exerce également sur le plan politique. Un rapport de Corporate Europe Observatory et LobbyControl, deux ONG spécialisées dans la surveillance du lobbying, montre ainsi que les Big Tech auraient une influence significative sur la rédaction des Codes de bonnes pratiques prévus par le RIA notamment en parvenant à affaiblir certaines obligations.

La véritable réussite de la régulation européenne ne se mesurera donc pas seulement à la protection des citoyens, mais à sa capacité à faire émerger une intelligence artificielle européenne, à la fois éthique, compétitive et souveraine.

The Conversation

Chloé Dornbierer ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.

ref. Intelligence artificielle : quels sont les apports concrets de la régulation européenne ? – https://theconversation.com/intelligence-artificielle-quels-sont-les-apports-concrets-de-la-regulation-europeenne-274299

Trois récits de vie pour comprendre le mal-être dans la fonction publique

Source: The Conversation – France in French (3) – By Aude Deville, Professeur des Universités, Université Côte d’Azur

« J’aimais mon métier d’enseignante, mais là, je n’avais plus le sens. Mon médecin m’a dit, “C’est un burn out” », témoigne une enseignante interviewée. FrameStockFootage/Shutterstock

Face à l’austérité budgétaire, certains agents de la fonction publique font face à des injonctions contradictoires – moins de moyens, mais une meilleure qualité de service –, des responsabilités floues et un manque de reconnaissance qui affectent leur bien-être. Pour comprendre ces enjeux complexes, une étude donne la parole à trois agents de la fonction publique d’État.


Une directrice d’école en burn out faute d’aide. Un cadre hospitalier en charge des décisions, sans pouvoir réel. Un fonctionnaire dont les compétences restent ignorées. Ces situations ne sont pas des cas isolés. Elles suggèrent une transformation silencieuse du management dans la fonction publique.

La fonction publique présente des défis managériaux spécifiques, documentés depuis plusieurs décennies. Ces défis oscillent entre sens du devoir, convictions et valeurs partagées, et contraintes telles que l’austérité budgétaire.

À partir de récits de vie d’agents publics, notre étude révèle des situations où les responsabilités augmentent, alors que les moyens et les marges de décision diminuent. Cette évolution contribue à affaiblir l’engagement des fonctionnaires et contractuels. Notre approche narrative permet d’appréhender les enjeux contemporains de la gouvernance publique d’État à partir de l’expérience vécue de professionnels.

Injonctions contradictoires

L’équilibre entre contrôle de l’activité des agents de la fonction publique et liberté décisionnelle nécessaire à toute prise de décision reste un sujet de débat. Depuis plus de vingt-cinq ans, le chercheur Christopher Hood questionne la mise en œuvre du New Public Management, tandis que Geert Bouckaert invite à repenser la notion de performance et ses critères dans le secteur public. Dans ce contexte, les fonctionnaires se retrouvent face à des injonctions contradictoires : préserver une qualité de service envers les concitoyens avec des moyens limités et des obligations de résultat.

Le New Public Management trouve sa transposition en France à travers des programmes d’actions interministériels lancés en 2007 et 2012. La Révision générale des politiques publiques (RGPP) a été notamment consacrée à la réorganisation des structures de l’administration publique. La modernisation de l’action publique (MAP) à l’amélioration de la qualité des services publics ou la simplification et de réorganisation administrative.

Notre analyse met en lumière les formes concrètes du désenchantement des ressources humaines dans la fonction publique et la dégradation de la qualité du management liées à ces évolutions, notamment à travers deux cadres théoriques :

  • La justice organisationnelle qui analyse les appréciations des salariés du caractère juste du traitement dont ils font l’objet au sein de la structure qui les emploie ;

  • Les conflits de rôles qui naissent quand les périmètres d’activités ne sont pas suffisamment bien définis ou l’existence d’une répartition déséquilibrée de la charge de travail entre agents de la fonction publique.

Manque de reconnaissance (premier récit de vie)

Appel aux consultants extérieurs

« Ce qui me désole au sein du ministère, c’est l’indifférence manifeste envers les CV des fonctionnaires. Il est vrai que nous avons été embauchés selon certaines conditions de niveau et de compétences, mais après plus de quatre ans comme moi au sein des services, les agents ont eu l’occasion d’acquérir de nouvelles compétences. Plutôt que de faire appel à des consultants externes pour leurs compétences, on pourrait exploiter les compétences internes qui sont réellement abondantes et variées. »

Tâches routinières

« Avant de rejoindre la fonction publique, j’ai occupé plusieurs postes dans divers cabinets d’expertise comptable, où j’ai géré de manière autonome la comptabilité d’entreprises reconnues. J’ai choisi la fonction publique pour satisfaire mon père qui valorise la stabilité et la sécurité qu’elle offre. Cependant, mon rôle actuel à la direction générale se limite à des tâches routinières et subalternes. Ce manque de reconnaissance de mon niveau de compétence et d’expérience me désole. »

Qui est responsable ? (second récit de vie)

« Je suis en position de responsabilité, en tant que cadre depuis cinq années. J’ai la charge de la gestion des soignants au sein d’une organisation hospitalière multi-sites. Il y a des difficultés pour accompagner tous nos patients, accueillis sur un site et quelquefois opérés sur un autre site. Il faut alors trouver des places pour l’hospitalisation. »

« Nous expliquons que c’est au chef de service de déterminer qui sera le premier patient de la journée et l’heure à laquelle il sera hospitalisé. À notre niveau, nous sommes des représentants administratifs. Nous devons répondre à des sujets qui sont pour eux administratifs, mais qui en réalité sont organisationnels. C’est compliqué : qui est responsable ? »

Gérer seule une situation difficile (troisième récit de vie)

Problématique en dehors des clous

« Je suis directrice dans une petite école et institutrice dans une classe de CE2. J’ai vingt-cinq ans d’expérience et on peut dire que je fais partie des piliers de l’école. Jusqu’à cette situation, j’étais passionnée et ce métier a toujours été une véritable vocation. »




À lire aussi :
Quand le cynisme mine l’engagement dans la fonction publique…


« Depuis la petite section, nous accueillons un enfant avec des troubles importants – sans connaître l’origine de ses troubles, car sa maman n’a jamais voulu fournir de bilan médical à l’école. Il a pu bénéficier d’un accompagnant d’élève en situation de handicap durant 5 ans, mais plus aujourd’hui. C’est donc un peu moi qui joue ce rôle, mais en plus je dois m’occuper des autres élèves de ma classe. »

Pas de soutien de l’académie

« La situation était tenable tant qu’il bénéficiait de cette personne dédiée. Il a toujours eu tendance à frapper les autres et je pense qu’une bonne partie des enfants de l’école y ont eu droit. Cette année, les problématiques se sont amplifiées. Il y a eu de nombreuses plaintes des parents. On m’a même dit : “Mais que faites-vous madame, vous ne surveillez pas ?” “Convoquez la mère !” »

« Je me suis donc retournée vers l’académie et l’inspecteur, en demandant conseils et aides. Il m’a été répondu qu’il ne faudrait surtout pas céder aux plaintes quotidiennes des parents. Je n’ai pas reçu d’aide ou de moyens supplémentaires. Je pleurais tous les jours. J’aimais mon métier d’enseignante, mais là, je n’avais plus le sens. Mon médecin m’a dit, “C’est un burn out”. »

Hypocrisie organisationnelle

L’ensemble de ces récits permet de proposer plusieurs perspectives d’analyse à la lumière de l’hypocrisie organisationnelle – discours et actes contradictoires. Par exemple, le troisième invite à se demander si cette hypocrisie ne sert pas à protéger l’organisation, ici l’éducation nationale.

Une autre perspective est celle du leadership. Les trois récits suggèrent que :

  • Les agents publics sont contraints d’endosser des responsabilités pour gérer des situations complexes, sans recevoir de reconnaissance lorsqu’ils réussissent à trouver des solutions. L’écart entre les missions confiées et les moyens disponibles devient difficilement supportable ;

  • Ils ne disposent parfois pas du pouvoir décisionnel nécessaire pour résoudre les problèmes auxquels ils sont confrontés ;

  • Ils restent souvent prisonniers d’un statut ou d’une organisation hiérarchique rigide, qui freinent l’évolution de leurs missions, malgré l’acquisition d’expérience ou de nouvelles compétences. Cette situation génère à terme démotivation ou démission, qu’elle soit silencieuse ou effective.

Ces récits illustrent une forme de « management du risque » de la part des niveaux hiérarchiques supérieurs, qui consiste à laisser les collaborateurs affronter seuls certaines situations, tout en revendiquant la maîtrise de la décision et de l’action. Ces extraits mettent en lumière l’importance cruciale de la reconnaissance et de la valorisation du travail, tant au sein de la fonction publique qu’au service de l’usager ou du citoyen. En filigrane se dessine la nécessité d’un leadership éclairé et bienveillant, capable de soutenir et guider ses équipes.

The Conversation

Les auteurs ne travaillent pas, ne conseillent pas, ne possèdent pas de parts, ne reçoivent pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’ont déclaré aucune autre affiliation que leur organisme de recherche.

ref. Trois récits de vie pour comprendre le mal-être dans la fonction publique – https://theconversation.com/trois-recits-de-vie-pour-comprendre-le-mal-etre-dans-la-fonction-publique-271891

Gamblers don’t understand ‘free bets’ – and the costs can be huge

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Jamie Torrance, Lecturer and Researcher in Psychology, Swansea University

Gorodenkoff/Shutterstock

“Welcome bonus: get 150% up to £150 on your first deposit”. It’s the kind of offer that greets anyone who visits a British online betting site. What it doesn’t say is that if you decide to spend £50 on this offer, you’d need to stake an additional £750 of your own money before any winnings could be withdrawn.

Recent research by colleagues and I asked nearly 600 UK bettors to work out the true cost of exactly that kind of offer. Nearly everyone got it wrong, underestimating the real amount often by hundreds of pounds.

Financial inducements, “free” bets, deposit matches and welcome bonuses are a standard part of signing up with almost any UK operator. Their behavioural harms are well established. They encourage people to gamble more often, push bettors towards riskier wagers and are linked to chasing losses. The heaviest effects tend to fall on those already experiencing gambling harm.

But behaviour is only half the story. Harm can also stem from something more basic: not understanding what an offer actually requires of you in the first place. That’s where wagering requirements come in – the rules saying you have to bet the bonus amount a certain number of times over before any winnings attached to it can be withdrawn.

Until recently, these multipliers could be as high as 50 times the bonus. Since January 2026, the UK Gambling Commission has capped them at ten times and required operators to make their terms clearer. It’s a meaningful step. But it stops short of requiring operators to show consumers what that ten times multiplier actually means in pounds and pence, and that omission turns out to matter.

Our research

We ran an online experiment with 585 adults who had gambled in the past year. Each participant saw a realistic welcome bonus modelled on a real 2025 promotion, fully compliant with the 2026 rules. Half saw it in the standard industry format. The other half saw the same offer with one addition: a three-sentence example spelling out what the 10 times wagering requirement actually meant for a £50 deposit.

The correct answer was £750. The median estimate was £500. More than 90% of participants underestimated the true cost. Only around 5% got it right.

The £500 figure is telling. It is exactly what you would get if you applied the 10-times multiplier to the £50 deposit but ignored the 150% bonus on top. Most people understood part of the calculation but missed the compounding effect.

Matched bonuses combined with wagering multipliers are among the most common inducements in the UK. Together, they appear to obscure the true cost in a systematic way.

Crucially, this misunderstanding was not confined to any one group. People at low risk of gambling harm miscalculated at almost the same rate as those at high risk. The issue is not that some bettors are bad at maths. It is that the offer itself is structured to make the true cost hard to calculate.

When we added the worked example, attractiveness ratings dropped significantly. Once people could see what the offer required, they found it far less appealing.

Man using online sports betting services on phone and laptop
Over 90% of UK bettors misjudge ‘free bets’ gambling bonuses.
Kaspars Grinvalds/Shutterstock

What bettors told us

Participants’ responses revealed three consistent themes. Many described the offers as manipulative, using words such as “predatory” and “deceptive”. Others argued they were economically worthless, with one participant saying “99% of people will fail to benefit”. Many also called for stronger regulation.

Several made a comparison worth taking seriously: gambling inducements, they argued, should follow the same upfront disclosure rules as credit products. One 23-year-old said wagering requirements should be shown on the advert itself, “similar to how interest rates need to be shown clearly on sites offering loans”.

They may have a point. The Annual Percentage Rate was introduced in UK consumer credit precisely because people couldn’t compare loan products when costs were hidden behind different headline formats. Gambling inducements present an almost identical problem.




Read more:
Why people are watching livestreams of influencers gambling – and how it could be fuelling addiction


Capping wagering requirements at ten times is welcome. But it’s not the same as making costs visible. Even a reduced multiplier still requires a multi-step calculation, and an understanding of compounding that many people do not have.

A worked example, shown in the same print size as the headline offer, would take only a few lines. It would not ban anything or restrict choice. But our study suggests it would change how people evaluate these offers. Denmark already requires something similar. Australia, Spain, Belgium and Italy have gone further, banning inducements to new customers altogether.

Worked examples are not a complete solution. But as a low-cost addition to existing Gambling Commission rules, they could help consumers see these offers for what they are before deciding whether to take them up.

The Conversation

Jamie Torrance has received, in the last three years: (1) Open access publication funding from Gambling Research Exchange Ontario (GREO), (2) Conference travel and accommodation funding from the Academic Forum for the Study of Gambling (AFSG), (3) A minor exploratory research grant from the ASFG and GREO, (4) Seed Grant funding from the International Centre for Responsible Gambling (ICRG), (5) Studentship funding from the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), (6) Rapid evidence review (RER) funding from UK Research and Innovation (UKRI), (7) Policy Fellowship funding from UKRI, and (8) A Gambling Harms Research and Innovation Partnership (GHRIP) award from UKRI.

ref. Gamblers don’t understand ‘free bets’ – and the costs can be huge – https://theconversation.com/gamblers-dont-understand-free-bets-and-the-costs-can-be-huge-279873

Video game nostalgia is powerful – but it only works if developers understand the psychology behind it

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Alan Stewart, Senior Lecturer in Games Development, University of Portsmouth

Nostalgia is a powerful emotion for gamers. Gorodenkoff/Shutterstock

When thinking back to the gaming experiences of your youth, it’s easy to get misty-eyed. Depending on your generation, you might yearn for Dizzy on the Commodore 64, marathon GoldenEye sessions with friends or your first Minecraft world.

And games publishers know this. Recognising the nostalgic appeal of games, there has been a recent slew of re-releases of beloved classics. Tomb Raider Remastered (2024), Croc: Legend of the Gobbos (2025) and System Shock 2: 25th Anniversary Remaster (2025) all show publishers know how to capitalise on nostalgia.

Our research into player engagement frequently encounters nostalgia as a key driver of player satisfaction. Nostalgia is both potent and delicate: powerful when done right, disappointing when not. So, why do some games nail nostalgia while others fail?

Cultural theorist Svetlana Boym has argued that two different types of nostalgia exist: restorative and reflective.
Restorative nostalgia is about conquering the past – a belief that what was lost can, once again, be found, with enough effort. Whatever your political views, there’s no denying that the slogan “Make America Great Again” is a clear encapsulation of a restorative nostalgic philosophy.

Trailer for The Blizzard Arcade Collection.

The Blizzard Arcade Collection (2021) is a good example of a game design underpinned by this restorative philosophy. Here, players can experience original versions of Blizzard’s early work with visual effects applied that mimic the effect of playing the games on old, grainy televisions from the 1990s.

By contrast, reflective nostalgia is less interested in accurately recreating the past and keener, instead, on recapturing a remembered feeling. For instance, instead of yearning for the specific place in which they grew up, a reflective nostalgic may realise it’s the sense of carelessness they felt as a kid they yearn for – not their actual hometown.

Shovel Knight’s (2014) design adheres to this philosophy wonderfully. Synergising a smorgasbord of inspirations from original NES games – a world map akin to Super Mario Bros 3’s (1988), themed bosses like those seen in Mega Man (1987) – it feels less like a specific game a millennial might’ve played as a child and more like their fragmented memories of playing games in the late 1980s.

Shovel Knight has sold well since its release and, as of 2026, has made an estimated US$12.5m (£9.3m) in revenue. This shows there’s a hunger for nostalgic content among players. But, this being the case, why aren’t all re-releases cash cows? The answer relates to the above nostalgic philosophies.

Nostalgic inconsistency in remasters

If Blizzard Arcade Collection and Shovel Knight represent a strict adherence to their respective nostalgic philosophical underpinnings, then Croc: Legend of the Gobbos Remastered (2025) serves as the antithesis. Croc is certainly not a bad attempt at a remaster, but its nostalgic inconsistency dampens its emotional impact.

Take the art direction. By dropping Croc’s original pixelated textures, the remake signals that it isn’t aiming for perfect authenticity. Instead, it reflects a nostalgic approach that priorities reinterpretation over faithful recreation. Some critics even argued that the new textures look flatter, losing the illusion of depth that the original textures created.

A direct comparison of the Croc: Legend of the Gobbos remaster and the original game.

At other times the game adheres rigidly to the original source material, aligning it with a restorative nostalgic philosophy in ways that feel incredibly dated. The anticlimactic pause screens that appear upon defeating a boss – who seems remarkably unaffected by the beating it just took – is one such example. So, too, is the lack of level scenery – indefensible in an era of high-powered PCs capable of rendering vastly more complex environments.

Personally, we’d have enjoyed a re-release of Croc that more wholeheartedly committed to the reflective philosophy – updating textures, sure, but also level scenery and boss animations. Doing so might have helped to better capture the joy we felt when playing the original even if it meant deviating more widely from the source material.

It’s true that dissatisfaction at the choices made when updating beloved cultural artefacts is nothing new though. Indeed, Boym cites the restoration of the Sistine Chapel ceiling frescoes as a potent symbol of this. In preserving Michaelangelo’s original work, the restoration team were lambasted for removing aspects that made the original artwork so special.

It’s likely you’ll always disappoint some when restoring a historical relic. But if more developers commit wholeheartedly to a nostalgic philosophy when remaking their games, we’d argue they’d more effectively nail nostalgia and, in turn, leave players more satisfied.

The Conversation

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Video game nostalgia is powerful – but it only works if developers understand the psychology behind it – https://theconversation.com/video-game-nostalgia-is-powerful-but-it-only-works-if-developers-understand-the-psychology-behind-it-277421

‘Protected’ seagrass meadows aren’t necessarily healthy – because pollution doesn’t stop at the shoreline

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Heidi McIlvenny, PhD Candidate, School of Biological Sciences, Queen’s University Belfast

_Zostera marina_ or common eelgrass is a type of seagrass. Ben Jones / Ocean Image Bank, CC BY-NC-ND

I spent last summer wading through seagrass meadows across Northern Ireland, from the sheltered waters of Strangford Lough to the exposed coast at Waterfoot Bay. I was collecting seagrass leaves and testing them for nitrogen pollution. Every meadow I visited sits inside a marine protected area – a stretch of sea that’s been given legal protection to safeguard the wildlife living there. And every single one was polluted beyond the limit for healthy seagrass.

Seagrass meadows are among the most valuable habitats in our coastal waters. They store carbon, nurture young fish and shellfish, stabilise sediment and buffer shorelines from storms. They are also woven into the heritage of coastal communities who have fished and foraged around them for generations. But they are disappearing worldwide, and nitrogen pollution from farming, sewage and urban runoff is one of the biggest reasons why.

It’s easy to assume that designating an area as “protected” keeps the habitat inside it safe. My research shows that, for seagrass, this assumption is dangerously wrong. Physical protection from anchors and dredging means little when pollution flows freely across the boundary from the land.

What matters most for seagrass is not lines drawn on a map, but what happens on shore.

To understand how much nitrogen pollution seagrass is absorbing, we can measure nitrogen content in the leaves themselves. Seagrass continuously takes up nutrients from the surrounding water, so the chemistry of its tissue works like a long-term pollution record. And my results showed that every meadow in Northern Ireland exceeded the pollution limit.

But knowing the pollution level is only useful if you know how much is too much, and what it means for the health of the meadow. To answer that, we pulled together data from 13 countries across the northern hemisphere and found a clear pattern.

catshark lying on seabed in seagrass meadow
A catshark shelters among seagrass.
Shannon Moran / Ocean Image Bank, CC BY-NC-ND

When nitrogen in the leaves rises above 1.8%, seagrass starts to suffer and loose plant growth. Above 2.8%, the decline accelerates rapidly, and in this danger zone small increases in pollution trigger disproportionately large plant losses. Think of it as a traffic light system: green is below 1.8% where meadows can cope; amber is between 1.8% and 2.8%, where managers should be watching closely and acting to reduce pollution; and red is above 2.8%, where urgent intervention is needed before the damage becomes irreversible.

The starkest example of a meadow in the red zone comes from Dundrum Bay, on the County Down coast. According to government assessments, it’s healthy. But my data tells a different story. Nitrogen levels here were nearly double the pollution limit of 1.8%. Surveys over the past decade paint an even bleaker picture: where lush meadows once thrived, dense mats of green algae now smother what little remains. This meadow has likely crossed a tipping point, and may never recover even if we clean up the pollution.

A few miles up the coast we see a very different picture. At Castle Espie, beside a wetland reserve in Strangford Lough, a seagrass meadow is thriving. The plants here belong to the same genetic population as struggling meadows elsewhere in the lough. But the difference is that the reserve’s reedbeds and willows act as natural filters, cleaning the water that runs from the land before it reaches the sea.

The same species with the same level of marine protection, but dramatically different outcomes. The difference is what happens on land. But current monitoring methods aren’t designed to spot this kind of trouble before it’s too late.

An early warning system

Current monitoring methods tend to measure how much seagrass is still there. But by the time a meadow visibly shrinks, the damage may already be done. The tissue chemistry approach we used picks up stress signals much earlier, while there is still time to act.

The nitrogen thresholds my research identifies could give environmental agencies a practical early warning system: meadows at or above 1.8% need closer watching, and those at or above 2.8% need urgent action to reduce nutrient pollution from catchments.

Seagrass meadows can recover but only if we tackle the pollution at its source. That means better management of urban and agricultural runoff, investment in sewage treatment and recognising that marine conservation cannot stop at the high tide mark. If we lose these meadows, we lose their carbon stores, their fish nurseries, the coastal protection they provide, along with a piece of our coastal heritage.

The Conversation

Heidi McIlvenny receives funding from the National Environment Research Council as part of the QUADRAT DTP. DAERA and Ulster Wildlife also part funded this PhD research.

Heidi McIlvenny is a member of Ulster Wildlife, RSPB and the National Trust, and Director of the Irish Ocean Literacy Network.

ref. ‘Protected’ seagrass meadows aren’t necessarily healthy – because pollution doesn’t stop at the shoreline – https://theconversation.com/protected-seagrass-meadows-arent-necessarily-healthy-because-pollution-doesnt-stop-at-the-shoreline-279805

What is the chance of a message in a bottle being found?

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Kevin Burke, Associate Professor in Statistics, University of Limerick

Jenny Sturm/Shutterstock

Recently, a cheerful 100-year-old message in a bottle was found on the south-west coast of Australia. In it, a world war one soldier proclaimed to be “as happy as Larry”.

If you’re a betting person, you probably wouldn’t expect great odds of this happening. A bottle cast into the ocean could end up absolutely anywhere.

If it floats to a remote location, there is little chance of somebody stumbling upon it. And if it lands somewhere more favourable where people could potentially find it, there are other issues. The message itself will deteriorate over time as light degrades it. If the bottle fills with water, it will sink and almost certainly never be found.

So, what are the chances of a message in a bottle being found and it being over 100? And what are your chances of finding this bottle?

Despite these many possibilities during a bottle’s lifetime, the probability we are after is a straightforward calculation. Just count up the number of bottles with messages that have been found and are over 100 years old, and divide by the number of messages that have been sent this way (assuming we know how many are sent):

Our diagram below shows a hypothetical situation where 20 bottles are sent in total, of which six are found (indicated in gold) and one of these is over 100 years old (indicated by the “100” stamp). So, one in 20 bottles are found and over 100 years old. (Note: This is only a hypothetical calculation, not the real data.)

Instead of calculating the probability directly, another way to do it is by breaking the problem into two parts: (A) a bottle with a message is found, and (B) the found bottle is over 100. These two probabilities can be calculated separately and multiplied together to get what we want:

This is known as the “multiplication rule” of probability, and we confirm from our hypothetical numbers that (6/20)×(1/6) = 1/20, as before.

Both approaches to calculating this probability are simple. However, the direct calculation requires knowing the total number of bottles sent out, which is very difficult to know in the real world.

The multiplication rule has the advantage that it breaks the calculation into two parts. We can tackle each separately, then bring the two results together to get the probability we want. This is useful in the real-world situation where we can draw information from different sources.

First, we’ll deal with the probability that a bottle with a message is found, irrespective of its age.

Experts from the Federal Maritime and Hydrographic Agency of Germany suggest a one in ten chance that a message in a bottle will be found. This aligns broadly with various historical “drift bottle” experiments, where oceanographers released large numbers of bottles to understand ocean currents.

For example, studies from the 1960s and ’70s in the North Atlantic Ocean led to recovery rates of 14% from the Gulf of Mexico, 8% from the Caribbean Sea and 7% from the northern Brazilian coast. A more recent and more northerly study (between Canada and Greenland) from the 2000s led to a 5% recovery rate.

We would expect the results to vary naturally from different experiments in different parts of the world. But to keep things simple, we will stick with 1/10 as the probability that a bottle with a message is found.

Now for the second piece of the calculation: of the bottles that are found, what proportion are over 100 years old?

The table below summarises data from news articles collected on Wikipedia about very old bottles with messages that have been found. However, only data on bottles over 25 years old has been collected, presumably because older bottles are more newsworthy.

So, we needed to estimate the number of 0- to 25-year-old bottles with messages ourselves – here’s how we did this.

The table shows that fewer bottles with messages are found as they get older. Messages in bottles degrade over time, which means the bottles have an increased chance of breaking and sinking, or just getting covered in layers of sediment. Plotting this data in the graph below helped us see the trend in the ages of found bottles more clearly.

We drew a line to match this observed trend in the ages of found bottles. This red line in the graph corresponds to the equation:

This equation provides an estimate of how many bottles have been found for any specific age range (where 25 = 0-to-25, 50 = 25-to-50 and so on). We are interested in the the 0- to 25-year-old bottles, so the equation suggests 46 bottles have been found in this range.

Adding up this and all of the numbers in the table gives a total of 106 bottles found, of which 12 are over 100 years old, and 12/106 is about one in ten.

Recapping the above, we have that: (A) one in ten bottles with messages are found, of which (B) one in ten are over 100 years old. Bringing these results together using the multiplication rule, we estimate the chance of a message in a bottle being found and it being over 100 years old to be (1/10)×(1/10) = 1/100.

So, if there are 100,000 bottles with messages floating around the oceans waiting to be found, we’d expect 1,000 of these to be found and be 100 or more years old. Assuming anybody in the world is equally likely to find one of these, with 8 billion people currently, that’s about a one in 8 million chance of you finding one – pretty unlikely.

However, some people are more persistent at message-in-a-bottle hunting than others. Following the paths of ocean currents (known as gyres) could provide clues on where to look.

Specifically, peninsulas or islands intersecting with these gyres could be good spots. For this reason, it has been suggested the Caribbean islands are ideally placed for finding bottles as they lie on the path of the North Atlantic Gyre. Which seems like a great reason to travel to the Carribean!

But let’s also spare a thought for the poor soul stranded on their desert island, who surely won’t appreciate the low odds of their SOS being found.

The Conversation

Kevin Burke receives funding from Research Ireland.

David O’Sullivan receives funding from Research Ireland

ref. What is the chance of a message in a bottle being found? – https://theconversation.com/what-is-the-chance-of-a-message-in-a-bottle-being-found-272122

Jane Austen in pictures: two graphic biographies bring the novelist’s life to the page

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Alex Fitch, Lecturer and PhD Candidate in Comics and Architecture, University of Brighton

To coincide with the 250th anniversary of her birth, last year saw the publication of two graphic biographies of Jane Austen.

These books take different approaches to the novelist’s life. The Novel Life of Jane Austen: A Graphic Biography, by Janine Barchas and Isabel Greenberg, is a slim volume in a cartoony style that begins in 1796. Kate Evans’ painterly book Patchwork: A Graphic Biography of Jane Austen, meanwhile, starts with Austen’s birth. The latter also includes historic digressions to give her writing additional context.

Both are handsome editions. The Novel Life of Jane Austen is slightly more approachable for the casual reader due to its brevity and smaller focus. But Patchwork may be more rewarding to graphic novel fans thanks to the painted artwork and a mixed-media collage approach that incorporates fabric cuttings into its pages.

Patchwork

Inspired by a patchwork coverlet sewn by Austen, her sister Cassandra and their mother, now displayed in Jane Austen’s House in Hampshire, Evans’ book shows how the bits and pieces of Austen’s life were recycled as material for her novels. Patchwork is an apt image for Austen, who “lopp’d and cropp’d” her prose as deftly as her cloth.

Some of Austen’s early biographers were fond of putting emphasis on the domestic tasks she undertook such as needlework, often deflecting attention from her desire to write and make money. As Austen researcher Kathryn Sutherland has recently observed in writing about Austen’s quilt: “Sewing, like letter writing, is not redundant work; it is necessary to social functioning.” It is apt that Evans’ includes this activity in her biography.

Evans also brings the bookish and close-knit Austen family vividly to life. The sense of the mischievousness and rebellion that brought Austen’s early work into being is present here. The comic strip renderings of her teenage skits and her spoof Plan of a Novel are wonderfully exuberant.

The texture of Austen’s life, and the threads that connect one life to others, is a distinct aspect of her approach. Evans’ shifts of focus add context to the author’s life. The material that Austen sews links ordinary domestic practice to the horrors of British colonialism which delivered cotton thread to Britain.

This incorporation of fabrics that Austen showed interest in during her life – with her family having to make do and mend during periods of impoverishment – is an continuing technique used by Evans in her graphic work. An earlier graphic novel by the artist – Threads: From the Refuges Crisis (2017) – included comic book documentation of interviews with women in the Calais “Jungle”. It embedded their embroidery and needlework in the book, made as a way of escaping the horror of their situation.

Patchwork uses the Austen family’s interest in fabric as a metaphor for their changing domestic experience in different decades and patchwork as a medium which gets added to over time. This works well as a visual leitmotif to accompany the narrative. It shows Evans’ continuing interest in depicting textiles alongside her artwork as a rich storytelling technique.

The Novel Life of Jane Austen

The structure of The Novel Life of Jane Austen echoes the typical triple volume publication of novels at the time. Budding Writer, Struggling Artist and Published Author indicate distinct phases of Austen’s writing life. They begin with a letter from August 1796 and end with Cassandra’s destruction of some of the correspondence in 1844 (the last pages acknowledge how her final house in Chawton has become a pilgrimage site for fans).

Barchas and Greenberg give a strong sense of Austen’s links with other writers, such as Shakespeare, whose “stunning literary celebrity” prefigures her own. For Evans, fictional influences can be seen in the presence on Austen’s bookshelf of those professional women authors (Frances Burney and Maria Edgeworth, for example) who did so much to set the stage for Austen’s success. However Samuel Richardson, whom Austen both revered and parodied, Henry Fielding, from whom she derived much of her facility with the burlesque and Samuel Johnson, an important influence on her sentence structure and tone, are either absent or fleetingly mentioned.

Like Evans, artist Isabel Greenberg uses a technique to contrast one aspect of Austen’s creative practice with another. While Evans contrasts Austen’s making patchwork fabrics with her writing, as two different but related creative pursuits, Greenberg uses different colour schemes to delineate ways that the author’s imagination operated at different times.

Most of the colour scheme is a combination of yellow and blue, including renditions of both Austen’s biography and performances of her novels. However, for scenes where the novelist enters a moment of reverie – imagining her characters’ inner lives – the colours used become red, purple and yellow. This signifies heightened feelings in contrast to the more muted emotions observed in her everyday life.

As with Evans’ mixed-media approach to graphic novel art, Greenberg’s use of heightened colour to separate everyday experience from imagination, is often found in the artist’s work. Her first two graphic novels The Encyclopedia of Early Earth (2013), and the recently adapted One Hundred Nights of Hero (2016) both contrast everyday experience in different historical time periods with characters’ storytelling activities.

Her previous project to illustrating The Novel Life of Jane Austen, was Glass Town (2020) which like the contrast between fantasy and reality in Austen’s life, took a similar approach to biography of Charlotte Brontë and her sisters.

Both of these Jane Austen graphic biographies are, in their different ways, reinvigorating guides. They emphasise different aspects of Austen’s life and times, using different visual techniques to bring the writer’s history vividly to life on the page. Most importantly, they both give prominence to the force of her imagination, and the innovative fiction it produced.

This article features references to books that have been included for editorial reasons, and may contain links to bookshop.org. If you click on one of the links and go on to buy something from bookshop.org The Conversation UK may earn a commission.

The Conversation

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Jane Austen in pictures: two graphic biographies bring the novelist’s life to the page – https://theconversation.com/jane-austen-in-pictures-two-graphic-biographies-bring-the-novelists-life-to-the-page-278006