The psychological toll of hurricanes – major storms leave more than wreckage behind

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Gulnaz Anjum, Assistant Professor of Climate Psychology, Centre for Social Issues Research, Department of Psychology, University of Limerick

When a hurricane strikes, the first images we see are of roofs ripped off, trees uprooted and streets turned into rivers. But the psychological toll is just as real, and it often lasts far longer than the physical damage. In countries such as Jamaica, each storm hits communities that are already vulnerable, disrupting sleep, hope and mental health in ways that rarely make the headlines.

Once the winds fall silent, anxiety and grief settle in. In Jamaica, where Hurricane Melissa made landfall as a category 5 storm, these emotional effects are already visible. The fear, disconnection and exhaustion that follow a disaster of this scale are not fleeting. They can shape lives for years.

The damage is not only about what is lost, but about what is transformed. Familiar spaces become wreckage. This disorientation tears at a person’s sense of safety and belonging, creating what psychologists call “environmental grief”: the distress that comes from seeing a cherished environment damaged beyond recognition. Rebuilding is essential, but it rarely restores that sense of home.

Hurricanes create deep anticipatory anxiety, along with fear of recurrence. Being unable to reach loved ones in the aftermath can be one of the most distressing experiences. When power lines collapse, mobile phone towers fail and the internet disappears, silence itself becomes terrifying. Not knowing whether a loved one is safe brings panic and helplessness.

Studies show that when communication systems collapse, anxiety levels rise sharply and sleep problems become common. Nightmares and flashbacks can continue long after electricity is restored. For many survivors, this psychological isolation is worse than physical displacement.

Repeated exposure to hurricanes – through direct loss, evacuation or even media coverage – can heighten psychological sensitivity over time. Research shows that each subsequent storm compounds mental strain, leaving people more vulnerable to lasting emotional distress.

Long-term studies after Hurricane Katrina found that symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) can persist for more than a decade. One in six low-income mothers were still experiencing symptoms consistent with PTSD 12 years later. Those who already had mental health challenges before the hurricane were even more likely to suffer long-term effects.

Life in limbo

Research on displacement and trauma describes recovery as “life in limbo” – a period when survivors are neither in crisis nor in full recovery, suspended between exhaustion and obligation. This state is increasingly common in communities recovering from climate-related disasters as they try to rebuild their homes, social networks and sense of stability.

As people pick up the pieces, the emotional cost grows. Many spend weeks clearing mud, repairing homes and navigating bureaucracy to access aid, often while caring for children or elderly relatives. These overlapping burdens deepen fatigue and despair.

Even the sounds of recovery – chainsaws, water pumps, cranes and bulldozers – can keep people on edge. Such noises may trigger fear or panic long after the winds have passed. Chronic uncertainty about jobs, shelter and safety drains both body and mind. A 2023 study found that people in hurricane-affected regions reported up to 14.5% more “poor mental health days” each month for years after the event.

For women, the psychological weight of climate disasters is often heavier. Research shows that women in climate-affected communities, particularly in the developing world, shoulder much of the emotional labour. They calm children, care for elders, manage scarce resources and suppress their own fear to hold families together. In low and middle-income settings, this invisible care work sustains households but takes a lasting toll on women’s mental health.

Beyond resilience

Hurricanes are not simply sources of “stress.” They are collective traumas. Across the Caribbean, emotional wreckage remains long after debris is cleared.

This is why the idea of resilience deserves scrutiny. Headlines that celebrate the “resilience” of island communities risk masking deeper psychological impacts. Endurance is not empowerment. It often reflects the necessity to survive amid weak infrastructure, limited aid and fragile mental health systems.

Calling people resilient can sound like praise, but it can also hide the reality that many are forced to endure impossible conditions. Survival is not proof of strength – it is often a response to inequality, neglect and the absence of real support.

The idea of resilience sounds positive, but it can be misleading. When communities are praised for being resilient, it implies they can cope without help. This framing risks excusing the inequality and neglect that make recovery so hard. People are surviving because they must, not because the conditions are acceptable.

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change reports that warmer oceans are already making tropical cyclones stronger and rainfall heavier. As climate change drives more frequent and intense storms, adaptation must go beyond rebuilding homes and roads. It must also include psychological preparedness for recurring trauma and uncertainty.

True recovery is collective, not individual. Communities need trust, shared care and systems that protect mental health as much as physical safety.

For Jamaica, recovery will mean more than clearing mud or rebuilding homes. Fear and anxiety will linger long after the infrastructure is repaired. Markets, churches and neighbourhoods that once anchored communities may be gone. Families relocated inland may feel disconnected from the coasts that shaped their lives.

Images of people “picking up the pieces” may look like resilience, yet beneath them lies deep exhaustion. Survival should never be mistaken for wellbeing. The winds of Hurricane Melissa have passed, but their echo will live on in the minds of those who endured them. These communities – and their mental health – must not be forgotten.

The Conversation

Dr Gulnaz Anjum is a climate and community psychologist. She works as an Assistant Professor at the Department of Psychology, University of Limerick, Ireland. Dr Anjum also leads Global North–South research and educational collaborations at the Solidarity Hub, University of Oslo (Norway), and the Karachi Urban Lab (Pakistan).

Dr Mudassar Aziz is a climate psychologist and a researcher at University of Oslo.

ref. The psychological toll of hurricanes – major storms leave more than wreckage behind – https://theconversation.com/the-psychological-toll-of-hurricanes-major-storms-leave-more-than-wreckage-behind-268617

How the Day of the Dead is being used to protest violence against women

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Jane Lavery, Associate Professor in Latin American Studies, University of Southampton

Known in Spanish as Día de Muertos, the Day of the Dead is celebrated every year on November 1 and 2. Blending Mesoamerican, Roman Catholic and pagan roots, this celebration sees families gather in many parts of Mexico and around the world to honour and commemorate their departed loved ones.

Enjoying a festive atmosphere, people build altars or visit cemeteries where they bring flowers and picnics, light candles and celebrate cherished relatives with storytelling and song.

The ritual is celebrated globally by many migrant Mexican and non-Mexican communities, and is in a process of continual reinvention responding to different social and cultural needs.

For example, during the COVID pandemic, women leaders from Mexican migrant communities in the UK and Ireland organised Day of the Dead events to celebrate their heritage and remember those who had succumbed to the virus. Elsewhere, a youth group in the US reimagined Día de Muertos as an expression for healing in their community following the killing of George Floyd.

The celebration has also been co-opted by Mexican grassroots feminist organisations protesting against gender-based violence, as our new book, Changing Configurations of Día de Muertos During the COVID-19 Pandemic in Mexico and Beyond, explores.

With a focus on the tumultuous pandemic years of 2020-21, the book charts how the Day of the Dead evolved and changed in that period. These adaptations were also shaped by global anxieties surrounding the so-called “shadow pandemic” – a term used to describe the surge in gender violence over the same period.

La Catrina

The Day of the Dead is associated with the iconic image of the Catrina, depicted in the world-famous illustration La Calavera Garbancera (1910) by artist José Guadalupe Posada. Inspired by Mictēcacihuātl, the Aztec goddess of death, today the Catrina is probably Mexico’s most commodified visual emblem.

Since 2016, Mexico City’s spectacular Mega Desfiles de Catrinas y Catrines parade has also drawn millions of people, with women dressed in traditional Catrina costumes and men wearing skeleton-themed formal attire.

The Catrina has proved an appealing inspiration for women seeking to protest against the unacceptably high levels of gender-based violence in Mexico. The country has one of the highest rates of femicide in the world – a term used to denote deadly violence against women because of their gender.

Alongside the glitzy parade is an alternative event called the Marcha de las Catrinas. In Mexico City, this march follows a route between two monuments dedicated to female victims of violence, starting at the Glorieta de las Mujeres que Luchan on Avenida Reforma and ending at the Anti-monumenta on Avenida Juárez.

There, protesters erect marigold-adorned altars and crosses bearing victims’ names, and post messages of solidarity. But unlike the traditional marigold and monarch butterfly-decorated Catrina costumes, many marchers wear dresses covered in photographs of murdered or missing women and girls.

Día de Muertos and the missing voices

Such was the momentum to channel the Day of the Dead to protest against gender-based violence in Mexico that a specific Día de Muertas (day of the dead women) was proposed by the NGO Voces de la Ausencia (the missing voices), led by journalist Frida Guerrera and held since 2018.

During the COVID pandemic, social distancing measures intended to protect public health inadvertently created conditions that increased the vulnerability of women and girls by sometimes isolating them with abusers and limiting access to support services.

Feminist protests held during these years were both national and international in scope, signalling global anger at the explosion in violence triggered by lockdown policies and social isolation. A strong intergenerational dimension characterises the collective resistance, as was attested by activist Norma García Andrade during the Marcha de las Catrinas in 2020:

I rejoice in the fact that young people have joined our struggle because before, the majority was just us mothers shouting. Now we are accompanied by all these young women who help us to scream for justice.

The practice of taking up public space with one’s own body to protest gender-based violence – known as acuerpamiento – has increased in intensity in Mexico, and is best showcased during International Women’s Day marches every March. Channelling an intergenerational rage, in 2020 and 2021 women dressed as Catrinas adorned themselves with feminist fist symbols and slogans such as #TruthAndJustice, #Niunamás (not one more) and #Nuncamas (never again).

Some wore green scarves around their necks, advocating for the decriminalisation of abortion – an increasingly prominent symbol of international feminist activism across Latin America. Many Catrinas lay on the ground emulating dead corpses, surrounded by marigolds and with photos of the victims placed on altars.

These interventions use what Hispanic studies scholar Francesca Dennstedt calls tactics of feminist disappropriation, and resonate with feminist anthropologist Rita Segato’s ideas around performative disobedience.

With this takeover of public space by protesting Catrinas, these feminist groups re-imagine Mexico’s most visually alluring representation of death for a 21st-century global audience.

The Conversation

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. How the Day of the Dead is being used to protest violence against women – https://theconversation.com/how-the-day-of-the-dead-is-being-used-to-protest-violence-against-women-267559

A landfill tax could halt the vast amounts of healthy soil that are needlessly thrown away

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Jess Davies, Chair Professor in Sustainability, Lancaster University

ungvar/Shutterstock

UK government proposals to increase the cost of sending soil to landfill have received strong pushback from the construction industry. But there is a strong environmental case for protecting healthy soils in this way.

The Treasury plans to up the cost of sending rock, soil and other “inert” materials to landfill. Charges could rise from £4.05 to up to £125 per tonne of soil landfilled by 2030. Concerns have been raised that this tax increase will be damaging for the construction industry and a major hindrance to meeting the UK government’s targets on new homes.

But as soil scientists working with practitioners across the planning and construction industry in England, we see many benefits to increasing the cost of sending soil to landfill.

The amount of soil going to landfill in the UK is staggering. Soil is one of the largest components of our waste streams: in 2020, it made up almost 60% of the material received by UK landfills.

In England alone in 2021, around 25 million tonnes of soil went to landfill. That’s about eight times more than the total amount of soil thought to be eroded across all farmland in England and Wales annually.

Since most of this soil comes from construction sites, it’s easy to assume this is contaminated. But that doesn’t appear to be the case. Only 1.5% of soils arriving at waste facilities in England in 2021 were classed as hazardous, suggesting we are throwing away mostly healthy, usable soil.

woman's hand holding earthworms, healthy dark soil
Soil is not inert. It plays vital roles in reducing flood risk, boosting biodiversity and storing carbon.
New Africa/Shutterstock

This is a massive loss of a vital natural resource. Soil isn’t easily replaced. It can take hundreds to thousands of years to form a single centimetre.

And soil is not just inert dirt: it is thought to be the biggest biodiversity reservoir on Earth, hosting more than half of the world’s species. Every truckload sent to landfill is an ecosystem destroyed – a piece of our natural heritage more or less gone for good.

While some degree of soil removal during building is inevitable, a lot more is being removed than is necessary, according to our research, to “get the muck away” and make sites easier to work on. When soils are excavated, damaged or removed from construction sites, the vital functions they provide are also being stripped away.

Different types of soil help regulate the flow and storage of water in the landscape, for example. A metre of healthy soil can hold up to 60cm of rainfall. Maintaining healthy soils in the built environment can help reduce flood risk, making our towns and cities better able to cope with extreme weather.

Removing soils during development can also make it harder and more expensive to establish and maintain gardens, trees and shared greenspaces that play an important role in our wellbeing and urban cooling.

Soil-smart building

In our experience, many people in the construction industry recognise there’s a huge opportunity to manage soils better through the planning and construction process, producing benefits for both industry and communities.

By reducing the amount of soil that’s unnecessarily excavated or sent offsite, projects can cut both the financial and carbon costs associated with moving and disposing of this material. Better soil management could also save money later on, reducing the need to buy new topsoil for landscaping or costly remediation work to fix drainage and plant establishment problems.




Read more:
How healthy soils make for a healthy life


Increasing the cost of sending soil to landfill could act as a powerful incentive for developers to think more carefully about how soil is managed during construction.

At present, the price of disposal in the UK is up to ten times cheaper than in much of Europe and the US. This low cost makes it far too easy to simply dump soil, discouraging industry innovation and good practice.

However, increasing landfill costs need to go hand-in-hand with better support for soil reuse. Encouragingly, the UK government’s Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) has committed to piloting a new soil reuse scheme across England, aimed at reducing the amount of soil that ends up being classed as waste – with a planned start date in 2026.

Ideally, this scheme would be rolled out alongside the landfill reforms. This could help the construction sector make better use of valuable soil resources, while preventing potential unintended consequences such as illegal dumping as landfill prices rise.

This is about establishing strong climate-resilient foundations for healthy green spaces which enhance our wellbeing and community connections. Sending soils to landfill is damaging to society and it should not be cheap and easy to do. It’s time we stop treating these amazing ecosystems like inert dirt.


Don’t have time to read about climate change as much as you’d like?

Get a weekly roundup in your inbox instead. Every Wednesday, The Conversation’s environment editor writes Imagine, a short email that goes a little deeper into just one climate issue. Join the 45,000+ readers who’ve subscribed so far.


The Conversation

Jess Davies receives funding from UKRI research councils. She is affiliated with the Soils in Planning and Construction Task Force.

John Quinton receives funding from UKRI research council, the EU and Defra. He is affiliated with the Soils in Planning and Construction Task Force (soilstaskforce.com).

ref. A landfill tax could halt the vast amounts of healthy soil that are needlessly thrown away – https://theconversation.com/a-landfill-tax-could-halt-the-vast-amounts-of-healthy-soil-that-are-needlessly-thrown-away-268687

Bugonia: a brilliant abduction thriller with Yorgos Lanthimos’s distinct absurdist stamp

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Matt Jacobsen, Senior Lecturer in Film History in the School of Society and Environment, Queen Mary University of London

Greek director Yorgos Lanthimos’s fourth film with actress Emma Stone finds the pair once again galvanising one another to extraordinary work. The partnership has produced two of the finest films of the last decade – The Favourite (2018) and Poor Things (2023) – as well as the less successful but still fascinating Kinds of Kindness (2024).

Like Alfred Hitchcock with Ingrid Bergman, or Ingmar Bergman with Liv Ullmann, this has emerged into a true creative partnership where director and actress are equals in the artistic process. This latest collaboration is a hugely funny, horrifying and intense experience that defies expectations even for audiences who are prepared for the unique absurdism, visionary style and flouting of narrative logic that marks Lanthimos’s film.




Read more:
Bugonia: why some people’s brains cling to the idea that aliens are real


Teddy (Jesse Plemons) is a paranoid, suggestible conspiracy nut who, fuelled by internet diatribes, abducts corporate CEO Michelle (Emma Stone). He is convinced Michelle belongs to an alien race planning to enslave and oppress humanity. What ensues in the confines of a grim suburban basement is a tense, close quarters negotiation between slickly posed, disingenuous corporate figurehead Michelle and delusional warped fantasist Teddy.

The core of the film and its greatest asset is Stone’s nimble, pivoting performance as her character tries any number of strategies to break Teddy’s resolve and make him reflect on the folly of his actions. “I think you’re in an echo chamber,” she says becoming increasingly desperate. She is driven to rationalising with a man clearly in no mental state to accept the accusation.

Plemons returns brilliantly to the toxic narcissism that he played so well in his standout Black Mirror episode “USS Callister” and its sequel. As in those superb pieces of satirical TV, he may be tragic and ridiculous, a man who feels the world has failed him utterly. But he is still frightening and dangerous, despite a surface of goofy comic ineptitude.

While Bugonia pointedly evokes contemporary ideological conflict, neither character espouses either left- or right-wing political leanings. It’s neither a satire of the woke debate or the culture wars. Nor does it jab at Trump and his voters.

Teddy’s feelings of abuse by the “system” (whatever that might comprise in the mind of this tragically paranoid and traumatised man) are scattershot and unfocused. His only recourse in the overwhelming noise of internet chatter is to assume that the situation is so dire it simply has to be aliens manipulating events to their own obscure purpose.

This deeply uncanny film keeps itself strange through tonal shifts between the silly and the shocking. The offbeat editing, full of sudden jarring cuts scored with orchestral stabs, keeps the audience in an uncomfortably uncertain position. Surely we should recognise Teddy as a deluded lunatic. But might he actually be right about Michelle’s origins? Her cool, collected corporate ease certainly seems so fluid and precise as to be jarringly alien.

Despite Lanthimos’s visionary style and absurdist tone, the film still sits firmly within the conventions of the subgenre of abduction horror films. These are sometimes called “bottle thrillers” for their confined locations (The Black Phone, 10 Cloverfield Lane, Green Room all mine effective scares from this setup). It is absurd and comic, but it still works well as a gripping if offbeat thriller.

Bugonia is a remake, fairly closely following the broader plot of South Korean film Save the Green Planet! (Jigureul Jikyeora!, 2003). Director Jang Joon-hwan was inspired by the film of Stephen King’s Misery, one of the most celebrated bottle thrillers, whose antagonist Annie Wilkes (Kathy Bates) he felt lacked complexity. To counter this, in Save the Green Planet! it turns out that the kidnapped CEO runs a pharmaceutical company that the kidnapper blames for personal tragedy – a narrative turn Bugonia preserves.

The often profoundly uncomfortable intensity of Bugonia ratchets up as the film progresses, pivoting the audience wildly between brash comedy and abject horror. This remake plays differently to the original in its casting of a woman as the CEO. From the moment when Teddy instructs cousin Don, his gullible and impressionable accomplice, to shave off Michelle’s hair – “to prevent her contacting her alien mothership” – the audience is clear on the possibility of shocking violence.

What the film’s title means is not really elucidated during its two-hour run. But knowing that bugonia is a ritual based on the ancient Mediterranean myth that bees spontaneously generate from the carcasses of cattle helps a little when it comes to the film’s central message.

Teddy keeps bees, a mindful activity that appears to offer some comfort to an otherwise cluttered mind, oversaturated and baffled by the cacophony of internet polemics. Falling somewhere between cynical nihilism and reflective mourning, Bugonia is clearly telling us that the world might be better off if we left it to the bees.


Looking for something good? Cut through the noise with a carefully curated selection of the latest releases, live events and exhibitions, straight to your inbox every fortnight, on Fridays. Sign up here.


The Conversation

Matt Jacobsen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Bugonia: a brilliant abduction thriller with Yorgos Lanthimos’s distinct absurdist stamp – https://theconversation.com/bugonia-a-brilliant-abduction-thriller-with-yorgos-lanthimoss-distinct-absurdist-stamp-268819

‘You can’t eat electricity’: how rural solar farms became the latest battlefront in Britain’s culture war

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Alex Heffron, PhD Candidate in Geography, Lancaster University

Sean Matthews, the Reform UK leader of Lincolnshire County Council, has said he’ll “lie down in front of bulldozers” to stop Britain’s largest solar farm being built in the county. He’s taking sides in a new rural culture war that pits green energy against the countryside’s traditional image of food and farming.

Reform’s opposition to renewables isn’t surprising. Fossil fuel interests have provided around 92% of the party’s funding according to research by DeSmog (when contacted by DeSmog, Reform did not comment on that finding). But solar farms have become a way for the party to mask these interests by presenting itself as a defender of farms, fields and “common sense” against what Matthews called the “nonsense” of net zero.

Meanwhile, the protest group Farmers to Action has urged supporters to “keep the land growing, not glowing”. Its leader, Justin Rogers, has called climate change “one of the biggest scams that has ever been told”, and the group now operates in lockstep with the Together Declaration, a rightwing campaign group with an explicit anti-net zero agenda.

Yet a recent protest organised by these groups in Liverpool, at the Labour party conference, suggests there is limited enthusiasm in the farming community for these culture wars. While most of the speakers were farmers, very few working farmers showed up. (One of us, Tom, who has been to around 15 of these protests, was there in person and estimates about 50 out of around 300 people present were farmers.)

Those mobilising the culture wars are trying to turn localised rural resentments against solar panels into a wedge issue, and in the process win over rural voters to Reform as the party of anti-net zero. If Reform wins the election, it will seek to impede necessary renewable energy projects.

However, this conflicts with the majority of farmer sentiment, which shows they are concerned by climate change. So, while Reform UK is positioning itself as anti-climate, is the party, despite the rhetoric, actually anti-farmer?

‘You can’t eat electricity’

Research by the Energy and Climate Intelligence Unit (ECIU) found 80% of UK farmers are “concerned about the impact of climate change on their ability to make a living”, while 87% have experienced reduced productivity due to heatwaves, floods or other climate change-induced extreme weather.

For farmers, productivity isn’t just about profit – it’s a central pillar of what sociologists have called the “good farmer” identity. This is the idea that being a successful food producer is central to how many farmers see themselves and their role.

Since the second world war, agricultural innovations have largely been aimed at producing more food, as a way to improve domestic food security.

Now, in essence, they are being asked to shift their identity to embrace energy production along with food production. But planting fields with solar panels clashes with the productivity aspect of what it means to be a good farmer. The truism that “you can’t eat electricity”, as Farmers to Action put it, is trying to speak to this sentiment.

The accusation is that taking land out of production threatens food security. In fact, only around 0.5% of UK farmland needs to be converted to solar to achieve the government’s target figure.

At the same time, as the research by ECIU has found, the very productivity of farming is being threatened by climate change. This presents an apparent tension.

Without urgent climate action, British farms will continue to bear the costs and consequences. Environmentalists and climate activists might wish to take advantage of this tension between what farmers need and what Reform is offering. While Nigel Farage, Richard Tice and co shake their fists at the sun, farmers suffer in the heat.

Corporate profits or community interest?

Many objections to large solar farms are driven by a sense of fairness. For example, a tenant farming family in Yorkshire is about to lose 110 acres of their best arable land – half their farm – to solar panels, without any compensation. This will have a devastating impact on their business – where they have lived and farmed for many decades.

For the landowner, the switch will probably be very lucrative, with energy companies reportedly offering rents as high as £1,000 per acre per year, on long-term contracts.

In this scenario, the landowner wins and the tenant loses, which goes against the principle of a just transition, the idea that those affected by the shift to net zero should not lose out. This is despite the prime minister, Keir Starmer, making a pre-election pledge that tenant farmers would be protected.

Effective green policy must ensure that green transitions benefit those doing the work or opposition will grow. Perhaps if the profits were recouped by local communities, not far-off corporations and large absentee landowners, nimbyism wouldn’t fester so easily.

There are fairer ways to deploy renewables, via initiatives which involve and benefit local communities. An example of this is Cwm Arian Renewable Energy, near to where one of us, Alex, lives. It has used the income from wind energy to support the local community in various ways, such as offering good employment, putting on community events and teaching land skills.




Read more:
Family farmers say their way of life is an impossible dream when ‘the bread of life is worth less than rusty metal’


Farmers, like the rest of society, are paying the price of high energy costs. Recent research has shown that wind energy alone has reduced British energy costs by at least £104 billion. Making clear that renewable energy developments can help with lowering energy bills could go some way to overcoming opposition.

Ultimately, farmers still want to farm and produce food. At the same time, agriculture must fit into broader green transitions. The challenge is to take on board the voices and concerns of farmers and see them as part of the transition – not treat them as obstacles to it. If not, there are plentiful voices on the right who are eager to offer them an alternative.


Don’t have time to read about climate change as much as you’d like?

Get a weekly roundup in your inbox instead. Every Wednesday, The Conversation’s environment editor writes Imagine, a short email that goes a little deeper into just one climate issue. Join the 45,000+ readers who’ve subscribed so far.


The Conversation

Tom Carter-Brookes receives funding from Leverhulme Trust.

Tom Carter-Brookes is a member of the Green Party.

Alex Heffron does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. ‘You can’t eat electricity’: how rural solar farms became the latest battlefront in Britain’s culture war – https://theconversation.com/you-cant-eat-electricity-how-rural-solar-farms-became-the-latest-battlefront-in-britains-culture-war-268128

Peace in Sudan? 3 reasons why mediation hasn’t worked so far

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Samir Ramzy, Researcher, Helwan University

Sudan has been embroiled in a civil war between the army and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces since April 2023, sparked by a power struggle between the two parties. The war has displaced more than 14 million people. Over half the population of about 50 million is facing acute levels of hunger.

Several mediation initiatives have been launched since the start of the war, with limited success. The African Union has also been unable to get the main warring parties to agree to a permanent ceasefire.

The four countries leading the main peace mediation effort (known as the Quad) are the US, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. They issued a joint statement in September 2025, calling for a ceasefire in Sudan and offering a roadmap to end the internal conflict.

I’ve been researching Sudan for over a decade, and in my view, these countries’ capacity to deliver a final political settlement for Sudan is severely constrained.

The prospects for peace rest on the resolution of three factors:

  • the sharp differences between the Sudanese army and the Quad over who should participate in post-war politics

  • a widening rift between the main protagonists in the war on the terms of ending it

  • internal divisions within the Quad – particularly between Egypt, the UAE and Saudi Arabia – over how to balance support for the army, curb Islamist influence and manage competing regional interests.

The Quad’s plan called for an immediate ceasefire, a three-month humanitarian truce and an inclusive political process to resolve disputes within nine months.

The statement was initially welcomed by the Rapid Support Forces and Sudan’s army leaders.

However, follow-up meetings between the Quad and representatives of the warring parties have failed to translate any of these proposals into action.




Read more:
Sudan’s rebel force has declared a parallel government: what this means for the war


Meanwhile, the paramilitary troops and their allies captured the city of El-Fasher in North Darfur after a bloody 500-day siege. This was the army’s last major stronghold in Darfur.

Darfur encompasses nearly 20% of Sudan’s territory. It borders Libya, Chad and the Central African Republic. The capture has fuelled concerns of a de facto partition of the country in the western region.

Against this backdrop, the Quad’s latest initiative seems unlikely to achieve more than a fragile ceasefire.

The obstacles

Efforts to broker peace in Sudan are hindered by three key challenges.

1. Diverging agendas between the Quad and the Sudanese army

Despite broad similarities between the Quad’s roadmap and a proposal the army submitted in March 2025 to the United Nations, key differences remain.

The core disagreement lies in the design of the political process to follow the ceasefire. The Quad insists that Islamist factions should be excluded from consultations over fears that these factions have close ties to terrorist groups and Iran. The army’s proposal, by contrast, opposes the exclusion of any party.

The military leadership has alliances with elements of the former Islamic Movement. Its fighters still help stabilise the army’s frontlines.

2. A widening gap between the army and Rapid Support Forces on the terms of ending the war

The army’s roadmap implicitly allows the paramilitary troops to remain in parts of Darfur for up to nine months, provided that local authorities consent. However, it also requires the withdrawal of the group from El-Fasher and North Kordofan.

The Rapid Support Forces’ behaviour on the ground reveals a very different mindset. Rather than preparing to withdraw, the group has expanded militarily in North Kordofan and intensified its drone attacks on Khartoum and other regions.

At its core, the dispute reflects conflicting end goals. The paramilitary group seeks to enter negotiations as an equal to the army. It wants a comprehensive restructuring of the armed forces. The army insists that it should be the only unit that supervises any reform of Sudan’s military institutions – the very issue that triggered the outbreak of war in 2023.

3. Internal divisions within the Quad

The Quad’s own cohesion has been undermined by internal rifts that have derailed several meetings. The most visible divide lies between Egypt and the UAE.

Cairo leans towards the army, seeing it as the guarantor of Sudan’s state institutions against collapse. Abu Dhabi prioritises dismantling the influence of Islamist leaders as the main precondition for peace.

Saudi Arabia is wary of Emirati involvement, especially since the Sudanese army has repeatedly rejected UAE mediation and the Rapid Support Forces has attacked Egyptian policy towards Sudan.

Washington has tried to manage these tensions by limiting direct mediation roles for Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE while keeping them within the broader negotiation framework. These nations have significant leverage over the warring factions.

How Sudan got here

Sudan’s fragile transition began after the ousting of long-time ruler Omar al-Bashir in 2019.

An uneasy power-sharing arrangement between the army and civilian leaders collapsed in 2021 when army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Rapid Support Forces leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, jointly seized control in a coup. Their alliance fractured two years later and sparked the 2023 civil war.

Despite international pressure, neither side has given in or gained a decisive advantage since.

The conflict has been devastating for Sudan’s population of 50 million. Death toll reports since the start of the war have varied between 20,000 and 150,000 people. The country is facing the world’s worst displacement crisis, and health and education systems have collapsed. Further, more than 12 million girls and women, and an increasing number of men, are at risk of sexual violence.

Is breakthrough still possible?

Despite existing divisions, shifting dynamics on the ground could still produce a limited breakthrough.

The worst scenario for the military would be the paramilitary group’s renewed advance into territories it had been pushed out of.

That prospect might push army leaders to accept a preliminary ceasefire. This would allow the army to regroup and consolidate existing positions without conceding ground politically.

For the Rapid Support Forces, the calculation is different. After spending more than 18 months battling to capture El-Fasher, the group recognises that advancing further towards the capital would come at a high human and political cost. A temporary truce, therefore, could allow it to entrench its governance structures in Darfur and strengthen its military presence there.

In this sense, a short-term ceasefire remains the most practical outcome for both sides. Washington’s eagerness to secure conflict-ending deals is likely to push the Quad towards this scenario.

But a final political settlement in Sudan remains distant.

For now, the most any diplomatic initiative can achieve is to pause the fighting, not to end the war, as it remains difficult to bridge the political gaps between Sudanese powers.

The Conversation

Samir Ramzy does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Peace in Sudan? 3 reasons why mediation hasn’t worked so far – https://theconversation.com/peace-in-sudan-3-reasons-why-mediation-hasnt-worked-so-far-268541

Jihadists have blockaded Mali’s capital. What’s at stake

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Olivier Walther, Associate Professor in Geography, University of Florida

A coalition of jihadist groups affiliated with al-Qaida have laid siege to landlocked Mali’s capital. For over a month, they have attacked convoys supplying Bamako with fuel, putting considerable pressure on the military junta that has been ruling the country for five years.

The security situation has deteriorated to such an extent that the United States has asked all its citizens to leave the country immediately. After more than 10 years of civil war, will the jihadist blockade lead to the fall of the capital? The Conversation Africa spoke to researchers from the Sahel Research Group at the University of Florida.

What is the current situation in Bamako?

Attacks on transport infrastructure and convoys travelling between urban centres in the Sahel region have increased dramatically since the late 2010s. Our research shows that certain transport routes in Mali are particularly targeted by jihadist groups. One is the route connecting Bamako to Gao, a strategic economic centre with a large military base. These attacks are combined with the blockade of other urban centres like Farabougou, Timbuktu, Kayes and, more recently, Bamako.

Bamako, which is in the south-western part of the country, has experienced jihadist attacks before, notably in 2015 and in 2024. But those were limited terrorist strikes. The current blockade reflects much greater ambition and capacity by the jihadists. In July, coordinated attacks in south-western Mali marked a new stage of Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin’s southward expansion.

For weeks now, Bamako has been isolated from its external sources of supply, particularly fuel, which must be imported from its coastal neighbours. The government was recently forced to declare the closure of schools and universities due to lack of transport.

Why Bamako?

Bamako is by far Mali’s most important city in terms of population, economy and politics. Its fall would have catastrophic consequences and determine the country’s future trajectory.

With a population of 4.24 million in 2025, according to Africapolis, the Bamako urban agglomeration is more than 10 times greater than the second-largest city, Sikasso. Bamako’s importance is not only demographic. All executive functions are concentrated there, including ministries, the national television broadcaster and the international airport.

Bamako also accounts for a large share of the national economy. Our studies suggest that more than 90% of formal businesses are located in the Bamako metropolitan area.

Capturing Bamako would obviate the need to capture larger territories and could decide the fate of the Malian conflict. Control of a capital often serves as the de facto criterion for political recognition. For instance, despite commanding little beyond Kinshasa in his final years, Mobutu Sese Seko remained recognised as Zaire’s leader until Laurent-Désiré Kabila took the capital in May 1997.

Capturing the capital city has also been the central step in the resolution of many African civil wars. In 2011, the capture of Abidjan by the forces of Alassane Ouattara, France and the United Nations brought an end to the second Ivorian civil war.

Would the capture of an African capital by jihadists, rather than by conventional rebels, trigger an external intervention by western or African powers? This is unlikely. With the exception of its partners in the Alliance of Sahel States, Mali’s government is very isolated diplomatically.

France was forced to depart just a few years ago, and was stung by its deep unpopularity in the region. A new French intervention seems unimaginable. The US is currently more interested in transactions than in new interventions, especially in Africa.

Mali’s break with the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) would also seem to prevent a coordinated regional response. Even Burkina Faso and Niger, Mali’s neighbours and its partners in the Sahel alliance, are bogged down with their own jihadist insurgency.

What then for Bamako and Mali?

Three broad scenarios seem imaginable:

  • a military surge in which the Malian junta manages to break the blockade

  • a negotiated settlement that would presumably lead to a new form of government

  • political chaos following the fall of Bamako.

The first scenario would require a successful mass mobilisation by the military regime in power. With the help of the Alliance of Sahel States and most likely Russian mercenaries, Malian forces would need to concentrate in the Bamako metropolitan area and also regain control of key routes.

This strategy seems to us the least likely. Not just because of the limitations of the Malian military, but considering that very little fighting has taken place in urban areas in the Malian conflict. Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal have been variously conquered or “liberated” without fighting. Government forces, rebels and jihadists preferred to withdraw when their opponents advanced.

A second, perhaps more likely, scenario is some sort of a negotiated political settlement between Mali’s military authorities and jihadist actors. We have suggested for many years that a political agreement is the only way to end a conflict that cannot be won militarily by any of the parties.

Calls for dialogue have recently resurfaced and gained traction among religious, political and business leaders in Mali. However, the issue remains divisive. Prominent advocates for this option include Alioune Nouhoum Diallo, former president of the National Assembly, and Mossadeck Bally, president of the National Employers’ Council.

Proponents often cite experiences of settlements reached via dialogue between Islamists and state actors elsewhere in the region, particularly in parts of the Maghreb. Those cases, however, were shaped by very different traditions of state-Islam relations.

A negotiated political settlement in Mali would require substantial revisions to, or even abandonment of, the country’s constitutional principle of laïcité (secularism). Successive elites, including the current military, have refused to consider this. And given the jihadists’ upper hand, government would have to make concessions that would undercut its legitimacy.

That said, a mediated dialogue might be more likely should Bamako fall into the hands of the jihadists. Governing a city of that scale, and securing cross-border flows of fuel and trade, would almost certainly need negotiated arrangements with neighbouring states which are hostile to the jihadists. In such a scenario, jihadist groups might accept a less hostile governing authority as part of a pragmatic settlement. Potential figures to lead or broker such a process include the exiled Imam Mahmoud Dicko. Even in exile, he wields influence over Malian politics.

A final scenario is one in which the jihadist coalition conquers Bamako and displaces the current regime. While an entry into the city is now imaginable, it would be much less likely that the jihadists could form a cohesive government. The groups that form the coalition have a long and convoluted history of splits, mergers and rivalries. They also have a conflictual relationship with the Islamic State – Sahel Province, the Sahelian branch of the Islamic State, which is active in eastern Mali.

If the jihadist coalition were to gain control of the capital, it is more than likely that the Islamic State would demand to be involved in the exercise of national power. This could fuel rivalries between the two groups. Somalia and Afghanistan have both experienced versions of this scenario.

The highly fluid and confused situation makes predictions about the likelihood of any of these scenarios highly speculative. What does seem clearer is that the crisis at the heart of the Sahel is not likely to be resolved in the near future.

The Conversation

Olivier Walther receives funding from the OECD.

Leonardo A. Villalón has previously received funding for academic research on the Sahel from the US Governments’s Minerva Initiative.

Alexander John Thurston, Baba Adou, and Cory Dakota Satter do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Jihadists have blockaded Mali’s capital. What’s at stake – https://theconversation.com/jihadists-have-blockaded-malis-capital-whats-at-stake-268692

Bamako under siege: why Mali’s army is struggling to break the jihadist blockade of the capital

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Oluwole Ojewale, Research Fellow, Obafemi Awolowo University, Regional Coordinator, Institute for Security Studies

When the military overthrew the democratically elected government in Mali in 2020, coup leader General Assimi Goita promised to root out jihadists in the north of the country. Mali had been struggling to defeat them for nearly a decade.

Multiple terrorist groups operate in Mali. An al Qaida-linked group known locally as Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) is the most lethal, considering the audacity and scale of its attacks. The group rejects the state’s authority, and seeks to impose its interpretation of Islam and sharia.

Despite the military government’s pledge to enhance security, there has been a 38% rise in violence directed at civilians in Mali in 2023, as reported by the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.

Human Rights Watch reports that Islamist armed groups carried out 326 attacks against civilians between 1 January and 31 October 2024, and 478 people were killed.

In September 2024, JNIM attacked Bamako’s international airport and a military barracks in the capital city.

After years of mounting attacks, Mali’s insurgency has entered a new phase. Violence has now diffused from northern and central Mali to southern Mali. JNIM’s blockade of southern Mali since September 2025 has cut off trade routes, starved towns, and tested the limits of the Malian state’s control over the landlocked country.

As a security scholar with a focus on west and central Africa, I have researched security in Mali on broader issues like terrorism and arms trafficking. I believe JNIM’s latest strategy is particularly dangerous because the objective is strategic, economic, psychological and political.

Such blockades are deliberate instruments of coercive governance and asymmetric warfare (a conflict between irregular combatants and the army), designed to weaken the military government, incite the public and possibly consolidate control.

My view is that the Malian military has been unable to dislodge the terrorists because the blockade zones are vast, semi-arid, and crisscrossed by ungoverned routes that defy easy surveillance. Many of these areas lie beyond the reach of effective state presence. There, the army’s movements are predictable and slow, while insurgents blend into local communities and forests with relative ease.

The terrain favours guerrilla tactics: narrow roads, bush paths and seasonal rivers create natural obstacles to mechanised military movement. Terrorist groups with motorbikes can easily get around.

The blockade

The blockade of southern Mali, which began in September 2025, has cut off the region from essential supplies. It’s creating severe humanitarian and economic consequences.

Mali recently suspended schools and universities due to a severe fuel scarcity caused by the blockade. The siege underscores the fact that the Malian army is ill-equipped, overstretched and strategically disadvantaged in countering evolving terrorist tactics.

The blockade is not a conventional military siege involving trenches or fortified positions. Instead, it operates as a networked disruption, blocking roads that link Mali to its coastal neighbours, particularly Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire.

These roads are vital arteries in Mali’s economy, serving as corridors for trade, fuel and humanitarian supplies. Cutting them off not only isolates communities but also undermines public confidence in the state’s ability to govern and secure its peripheries.

The army’s constraints

The inability of the Malian army to lift the blockades is rooted in the fact that it is fighting an irregular, asymmetric conflict against a mobile and deeply entrenched insurgent group. The Malian Armed Forces are structured for conventional warfare but are being drawn into a battle that requires flexibility, intelligence dominance, and rapid response capabilities.

JNIM, on the other hand, thrives on mobility and decentralisation. Its fighters move lightly, using motorcycles and small arms. They can strike swiftly and retreat into difficult terrain before state forces can respond.

The army also has logistical and operational shortcomings. As I’ve written elsewhere, Mali lacks military capabilities and cannot easily acquire them under current sanctions and international isolation.

Although the junta has sought help from military partnerships with Russia’s Wagner Group (now the Africa Corps), such collaborations have yielded little.

When JNIM imposes multiple blockades simultaneously in southern Mali, the army faces an impossible task. Its forces are too dispersed to mount a coordinated and sustained counteroffensive. Reinforcements face ambushes on poorly maintained roads or find themselves in unfamiliar terrain.

Geography, governance and strategic decentralisation

Geography helps explain Mali’s military paralysis. The blockade zones are vast and out of reach. The terrain is full of natural obstacles.

The Malian state has long struggled to extend state presence beyond urban centres like Bamako and Segou. In rural areas, the army’s arrival is often seen not as a return of governance but as an intrusion, with the risk of human rights abuses.

Decades of neglect, corruption and abusive counterinsurgency practices have alienated local populations and eroded intelligence networks.

The blockade operations aim to paralyse Bamako. Once confined to the country’s northern deserts and central plains, JNIM has, over the past few years, steadily advanced southward, carrying out sporadic attacks near the capital.

What explains this growing audacity of a group armed with little more than motorcycles and Kalashnikovs?

The answer lies in organisational logic. Unlike movements that depend on a single command structure, JNIM operates as a highly decentralised network of semi-autonomous cells. This allows it to adapt quickly to local conditions, exploit state weaknesses, and expand its influence without overstretching its resources. Each cell draws upon local grievances to recruit and sustain operations. Adaptability is JNIM’s greatest strength and the Malian state’s most enduring vulnerability.

The paradox of militarisation

Despite increased military spending, new alliances and aggressive rhetoric, JNIM’s territorial reach and tactical sophistication have only deepened.

The more the state militarises, the less secure its citizens appear to become.

This paradox reflects a broader trend in the Sahel. Counterinsurgency efforts are mostly military, without addressing the socioeconomic and governance conditions that sustain insurgencies.

Corruption, inequality and local marginalisation are some of these conditions. Thus, military campaigns become mere exercises in containment rather than resolution. In this context, JNIM’s blockades and incursions are not only military manoeuvres but political statements about who truly controls Mali’s hinterlands.

A war beyond firepower

The blockade in southern Mali reveals the limits of state-centered military power in an asymmetric war. To lift blockades for good requires more than tactical victories; it demands rethinking security.

The military government must cooperate with neighbours such as Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire.

More importantly, reclaiming territory must go hand-in-hand with rebuilding trust, restoring governance and addressing grievances. Until then, the motorcycles and AK-47s of JNIM will outpace the tanks and rhetoric of Mali’s military junta.

The Conversation

Oluwole Ojewale does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Bamako under siege: why Mali’s army is struggling to break the jihadist blockade of the capital – https://theconversation.com/bamako-under-siege-why-malis-army-is-struggling-to-break-the-jihadist-blockade-of-the-capital-268521

Lutte contre le paludisme : les scientifiques découvrent une faille cachée dans le système de défense du parasite

Source: The Conversation – in French – By Tawanda Zininga, Lecturer and Researcher, Stellenbosch University

Le paludisme reste l’une des maladies infectieuses les plus dévastatrices au monde, causant plus d’un demi-million de décès chaque année. En Afrique, la maladie est principalement causée par un parasite transmis par les moustiques, le Plasmodium falciparum.

Lorsque le parasite envahit le corps humain, il se retrouve dans un environnement hostile : forte fièvre, attaques du système immunitaire et stress causé par les médicaments antipaludiques. Il parvient néanmoins à survivre grâce à un système de défense interne composé de molécules « auxiliaires » appelées protéines de choc thermique.

Parmi celles-ci, un groupe puissant appelé petites protéines de choc thermique agit comme la dernière ligne de défense du parasite. Ces molécules se comportent comme de minuscules gardes du corps, protégeant les autres protéines à l’intérieur du parasite contre les dommages lorsque les conditions deviennent extrêmes. Elles constituent l’équipe de secours d’urgence du parasite lorsque ses réserves d’énergie sont dangereusement faibles, par exemple en cas de forte fièvre ou d’exposition à des médicaments.

Dans mon laboratoire de biochimie, nous cherchons des moyens de perturber ces gardes du corps.

Francisca Magum Timothy, étudiante en master, et moi-même utilisons des outils avancés de chimie des protéines pour examiner trois petites protéines de choc thermique présentes dans le parasite. Celles-ci partagent une structure centrale commune, mais se comportent différemment.

Nous avons découvert qu’elles peuvent être perturbées chimiquement. C’est une piste prometteuse pour la recherche sur le paludisme. Au lieu de tuer directement le parasite, cette approche vise à désarmer ses défenses, permettant ainsi à d’autres traitements ou au système immunitaire de l’organisme de faire le reste.

L’étape suivante consiste à trouver de petites molécules de type médicamenteux qui peuvent cibler et désactiver spécifiquement ces protéines parasitaires sans nuire aux cellules humaines. Cela nécessitera une modélisation informatique avancée, des tests en laboratoire et, à terme, des études sur des modèles animaux afin de s’assurer que cette approche soit à la fois efficace et sûre. En cas de succès, cela pourrait déboucher sur une nouvelle classe de médicaments antipaludiques qui agissent d’une manière complètement différente des traitements actuels. Il s’agit d’un objectif particulièrement important, car la résistance aux médicaments existants continue de croître.




Read more:
Lutte contre le paludisme : des victoires, des avancées et des combats à remporter encore


Entre les premiers travaux en laboratoire et le développement d’un médicament pouvant être testé sur des humains, il faudra probablement compter entre huit et dix ans, en fonction des performances des candidats à chaque étape de la recherche. Néanmoins, la découverte de ces cibles protéiques de choc thermique représente un grand pas en avant et offre un réel espoir pour lutter efficacement et durablement contre le paludisme à l’avenir.

Percer les mystères de trois protéines

Nous avons constaté des différences nettes entre les trois protéines que nous avons testées en laboratoire.

L’une était la plus puissante et la plus stable des trois. Une autre était plus flexible mais moins stable, tandis que la dernière était la moins protectrice.

Lorsqu’elles ont été testées dans des conditions de stress, les trois protéines ont agi comme des « éponges moléculaires », empêchant les autres protéines de s’agglutiner. Il s’agit d’une étape cruciale pour la survie du parasite pendant la fièvre. Mais leur pouvoir protecteur variait : l’une offrait la défense la plus constante, tandis que l’autre perdait plus facilement sa structure.

Ces résultats laissent penser que le parasite s’appuie sur une sorte de travail d’équipe entre ces trois protéines, chacune jouant un rôle légèrement différent en situation de stress.

Nous nous sommes donc demandé si des composés naturels présents dans les plantes pouvaient perturber ces gardes du corps. Notre équipe s’est concentrée sur la quercétine, un flavonoïde d’origine végétale. Les flavonoïdes font partie des composés qui donnent aux plantes leurs couleurs vives, comme le rouge des pommes, le violet des baies ou le jaune des citrons. Ils aident à protéger les plantes du soleil, des parasites et des maladies. Ils sont présents en abondance dans les pommes, les oignons et les baies. La quercétine est déjà connue pour ses propriétés antioxydantes et anti-inflammatoires. Certaines études ont déjà suggéré qu’elle pourrait ralentir la progression des parasites du paludisme.

Lorsque nous avons exposé les protéines du parasite à la quercétine, nous avons observé des effets remarquables. Le composé a déstabilisé les petites protéines de choc thermique, modifiant leur forme et réduisant leur capacité à protéger d’autres protéines. En termes simples, la quercétine semblait perturber ou affaiblir les gardes du corps du parasite.

D’autres tests ont confirmé que la quercétine ralentissait également la croissance des parasites du paludisme dans des cultures de laboratoire. Lorsque les parasites du paludisme ont été cultivés dans des conditions de laboratoire contrôlées et exposés à la quercétine, ils se sont multipliés plus lentement que d’habitude, y compris les souches résistantes aux médicaments standard. Ce résultat est encourageant, car il suggère que la quercétine elle-même, ou de nouveaux médicaments conçus pour agir comme elle mais de manière encore plus efficace, pourraient devenir le point de départ du développement d’un nouveau type de médicament antipaludique à l’avenir.




Read more:
Paludisme : les scientifiques étudient comment utiliser les bactéries intestinales pour éradiquer la maladie


Par ailleurs, les petites protéines de choc thermique entrent en action lorsque les réserves d’énergie du parasite – appelées ATP, son « carburant » principal – sont presque épuisées. Autrement dit, lorsque le parasite est sur le point d’épuiser son énergie et fait face à un danger, ces protéines agissent comme sa dernière ligne de défense.

Prochaines étapes

Nos résultats ouvrent la voie à la conception de médicaments capables de bloquer ces protéines indépendantes de l’ATP, pour frapper le parasite précisément au moment où il est le plus vulnérable.

Bien que la quercétine elle-même soit un composé naturel présent dans de nombreux aliments, sa puissance et sa stabilité ne sont pas encore suffisantes pour un usage médical. L’équipe envisage donc de modifier chimiquement sa structure afin de créer des dérivés plus actifs et dotés de meilleures propriétés thérapeutiques.




Read more:
Le premier traitement contre le paludisme pour les bébés est une étape majeure vers l’éradication de la maladie en Afrique


Alors que les efforts mondiaux pour éliminer le paludisme sont confrontés à des défis croissants liés à la résistance aux médicaments, des innovations comme celle-ci redonnent espoir. En retournant le mécanisme de survie du parasite contre lui-même, les scientifiques ont peut-être trouvé un moyen subtil mais puissant de vaincre l’un des plus anciens ennemis de l’humanité.

The Conversation

Tawanda Zininga reçoit un financement de la Fondation nationale pour la recherche et du Conseil de la recherche médicale, qui ne jouent aucun rôle dans le projet et ses résultats.

ref. Lutte contre le paludisme : les scientifiques découvrent une faille cachée dans le système de défense du parasite – https://theconversation.com/lutte-contre-le-paludisme-les-scientifiques-decouvrent-une-faille-cachee-dans-le-systeme-de-defense-du-parasite-268452

Why was it ‘necessary’ for King Charles to take action on Andrew – and why now?

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Francesca Jackson, PhD candidate, Lancaster Law School, Lancaster University

The man formerly known as Prince Andrew will now simply be known as Andrew Mountbatten Windsor after he was stripped of all his official titles. In a statement, Buckingham Palace said the king has “initiated a formal process” to remove his brother’s titles. This refers to letters patent – the mechanism by which the monarch can remove titles like “prince”.

At the heart of the matter is Mountbatten Windsor’s relationship with convicted paedophile sex offender Jeffrey Epstein, and the allegations by Epstein victim Virginia Giuffre that she was forced to have sex with the then prince as a teenager. Mountbatten Windsor denies the accusations. The palace said:

Their Majesties wish to make clear that their thoughts and utmost sympathies have been, and will remain with, the victims and survivors of any and all forms of abuse.

Mountbatten Windsor will also be evicted from his Windsor residence, Royal Lodge, and will reportedly move to a property at Sandringham, the royal residence privately owned by the king.

But why was it, in the words of Buckingham Palace, “necessary” for King Charles to “censure” his brother in this way – and why now?

Ever since Mountbatten Windsor announced that he would no longer use his official titles, including Duke of York, public and political pressure had been mounting on the King to go further. There was a sense that the promise not to use the titles didn’t go far enough – and that they should be formally removed.

His titles were technically only in abeyance. They still existed, even if he was not going to use them. He was also still a prince and lived as such in his 30-bedroom Royal Lodge mansion.

Royal image tainted

The last royal to have his “prince” title removed was the Duke of Cumberland in 1917. But he was a traitor who fought for the Germans during the first world war. “De-princing” Mountbatten Windsor in this way conveys the sense that he has betrayed the confidence of his family and country.

Image is vitally important for the royal family, so the public perception that Mountbatten Windsor was tainting the brand will have added to the pressure on the king.

According to the 19th-century writer Walter Bagehot, known for his work on constitutional matters, the monarchy is the “dignified” part of the constitution which provides a “moral example” for people to follow by displaying “virtues”. King Charles is part of a long line of monarchs who have strained to project (and protect) this image.

Clearly it is unrealistic for royals to, in Bagehot’s words, “do no wrong” all the time. But historically where an individual member has been engulfed in scandal, the palace has been quick to take action to protect the rest of the institution. For example, in 1937 when Edward VIII wanted to marry the American divorcee Wallis Simpson, he was forced to abdicate the throne and effectively exiled to the Bahamas as its governor (before later moving to Paris).

But the late queen allowed Mountbatten Windsor to try to control the narrative around his friendship with Epstein – and, in trying to continue to present a dignified account of himself, he failed spectacularly.

First came his infamous 2019 Newsnight interview in which he claimed that he “did not regret” his friendship with Epstein and did not end their friendship sooner because he was “too honourable”. The disastrous appearance forced him to step down as a working member of the royal family.

But he was allowed to continue to take what he saw as his rightful place, among the most senior royals at the grandest state occasions, including the queen’s funeral and the king’s coronation. He also continued to live a life of entitled luxury at the palatial Royal Lodge.

What seems to have made it necessary for the king to intervene now is the revelation that his brother remained in contact with Epstein for longer than he had previously claimed. In an email, Mountbatten Windsor also told Epstein – who by that point had been to prison for procuring a minor for prostitution – “Let’s play some more soon!”

This, coupled with the publication of his accuser Virginia Giuffre’s posthumous autobiography, which included damning new claims about their relationship, led to Mountbatten Windsor’s announcement that he would no longer use the title Duke of York. However, his statement on the matter lacked contrition and represented yet another missed opportunity for him to show sympathy towards Epstein’s victims. Instead, he said that, in deciding not to use his titles, he was “putting my duty to my family and country first”.

It all meant that he had become deeply unpopular with the public: 80% wanted him to be formally stripped of his dukedom. However, the formal removal of titles could only be done by either parliament or, as the public preferred, the king himself.

In failing to take this action against his brother, Charles risked being viewed as complicit in the scandal, as illustrated when he was heckled by a member of the public asking how long he had known about Mountbatten Windsor and Epstein.

Political pressure

Political pressure was also mounting on the monarch to act. Ministers initially said it was a matter for the royal family, but as public clamour grew the tone started to change. Rachael Maskell, MP for York Central, tabled a bill to strip Mountbatten Windsor of his title.

Unusually for a high-profile government minister, the chancellor Rachel Reeves also publicly criticised him, stating that he “shouldn’t have been associated with a convicted paedophile”. And the push by MPs to launch an inquiry questioning him about Royal Lodge – where he has effectively paid no rent for more than 20 years – was publicly backed by Keir Starmer.

The threat by Liberal Democrat MPs to “humiliate” Mountbatten Windsor by using their opposition day debate to discuss him in Parliament and bring him before a parliamentary select committee appears to have been the final straw.

Mountbatten Windsor was sparking wider scrutiny of the monarchy’s constitutional affairs more generally, from its secretive funding to outdated rules preventing MPs from criticising the royals in parliament.

That’s why Charles had to act now. Bagehot wrote that the monarchy needs to maintain an air of “mystery” in order to survive: “When there is a select committee on the Queen, the charm of royalty will be gone.” The king appears to have shared Bagehot’s view that the “poking around” of politicians would be too damaging to the monarchy’s dignified façade.

The Conversation

Francesca Jackson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Why was it ‘necessary’ for King Charles to take action on Andrew – and why now? – https://theconversation.com/why-was-it-necessary-for-king-charles-to-take-action-on-andrew-and-why-now-268797