Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Danny Bradlow, Professor/Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Advancement of Scholarship, University of Pretoria
US president Donald Trump’s address to the annual gathering of the United Nations general assembly in late September 2025 set a new low in international relations. Trump delivered a broadside attack on multilateralism – the effort to solve the world’s problems through collective endeavour – as well as issues that have found common cause among rich and poor countries alike, such as climate change.
So where does this leave the work of organisations such as the G20? The body was set up by the G7 in 1999 in the wake of the Asian financial crisis. The purpose was to create a bigger grouping of countries to help manage the governance of the global economy.
The group now represents about 67% of the global population and about 85% of the global economy. But it’s a strange beast: it is a self-selected group, which raises questions about its legitimacy. And it doesn’t have a permanent secretariat, which makes its work cumbersome.
We asked four leading scholars for their answers. Given the changing global context, is the G20 still useful?
Danny Bradlow, in addition to his position at the University of Pretoria, is Senior G20 Advisor to the South African Institute of International Affairs, a Senior Non-Resident Fellow, Global Development Policy Center, Boston University and co-chair of the T20 task force on sustainable finance.
My research is funded by the Grantham Foundation for the Protection of the Environment.
Sandy Africa is the Research Director of the Mapungubwe Institute for Strategic Reflection (MISTRA) and a Research Associate at the University of Pretoria and writes here in her personal capacity. MISTRA is providing technical support to the RSA government during its G20 Presidency.
Ana Saggioro Garcia does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
All have begun to highlight the connection between climate outcomes and inequality. They are stressing that inequality should be viewed as posing systemic and macroeconomic risk. Inequality has been found to undermine democracy, social and political cohesion and economic stability. Inequality also undermines our ability to deal with climate and environmental challenges.
In a recent summary paper we analysed how environmental policies can be designed and implemented with an inequality-reduction lens. We used examples from South Africa, Colombia, Indonesia and Mexico.
As researchers in the research department of the French development agency the AFD, specialising in the analysis of inequality and the social implications of energy and economic transitions, we have seen how climate action can either narrow or deepen existing divides, depending on how policies are designed.
The core of the case we make is that reducing inequality should be a guiding principle in decisions on climate change. There are numerous cases we studied in which it’s clear that countries often simply opt for compensating those who stand to lose from environmental transitions rather than seeking more equitable solutions. This needs to change. But a shift requires focusing on a meaningful reduction of inequality as well as understanding who wins from the transition.
The green transition and the absence of equity
We take the just transition as a starting point as it is increasingly cited as the accepted framework for building sustainable economies. This approach focuses on the social dimension of the ecological and energy transition and highlights the need to secure the livelihood of those negatively affected by the green transition. It highlights an inclusive transition to a low-carbon and sustainable economy, leaving no one behind.
Countries are progressively incorporating just transition principles into their national climate strategies. Examples include South Africa’s 2022 just transition framework and Mexico’s upcoming NDC 3.0. But when it comes to the actual design and implementation of policies, equity is rarely treated as the central concern. This becomes obvious when we look at some of the characteristics of the current green transitions.
Green jobs: The promise often is that these jobs are better, more stable and more sustainable. But the research we coordinated in Colombia with the University of Los Andes shows that these opportunities benefit groups that already have advantages. Examples include university-educated urban men. Women, youth and rural populations remain largely excluded.
Green infrastructures: We looked at who owns green infrastructures, such as solar parks, wind farms, smart grids, and storage systems. We often saw it remained largely in the hands of large private and multinational companies. In South Africa, for instance, the union Numsa has pushed back against a profit-driven renewable energy programme that transferred risks to the state and kept electricity tariffs high. The main beneficiaries of the programme are financial actors and multinational corporations. This is a good illustration of how ownership determines who controls energy as well as who truly gains from the transition.
Environmental protection policies. These include:
protected areas – defined spaces with the goal of nature conservation and the preservation of ecosystems
biodiversity offsets – intended to compensate for environmental damage caused by development projects.
These policies and plans for environmental protection can generate inequalities as they are often designed top-down. As a result, local communities can lose out.
What needs to shift
Putting inequality reduction at the centre means more than adding a social component to existing programmes.
In Colombia, the findings point to the need for early and targeted public policies to address labour market disparities. Examples include:
integrating training in renewable energy, energy efficiency and other sustainability-related skills into technical and vocational training
using approaches tailored to local needs and that are sensitive to gender differences.
Another thing that needs to change is the level of support for businesses and particularly small enterprises so that they can contribute to job creation. Most of them operate informally and rely on survivalist strategies. Evidence from South Africa showed that they’re excluded from just energy transition plans.
We also identified areas that need improvement around taxation. A fair climate policy should start with recognising that carbon taxes are not neutral: their burden falls differently across income groups.
In Indonesia, the study we led with our partners using microsimulation found that a €30-per-ton carbon tax would slightly increase costs for lower-middle income households. But when revenues were recycled through targeted cash transfers to low-income and energy-poor households, the policy had positive outcomes.
This example shows that equity depends less on the tax itself than on how its proceeds are used.
Finally, democratising ownership of the energy transition process is key to ensuring that it’s just. Our evidence shows that community and user-owned models can make renewable infrastructure inclusive as well as viable. Examples include community-owned solar installations, worker share ownership schemes and multistakeholder cooperatives.
In Mexico’s Río Lagartos, for example, a local fishing cooperative invested in a solar-powered ice machine. This led to costs being cut and local incomes being boosted.
Next steps
Inequalities threaten the commitment to existing efforts in the climate domain. Embedding the reduction of inequality into climate action is an opportunity for a meaningful transformation.
The examples we found of best practice as well as the weaknesses in initiatives can help guide policymakers. The needle is moving in discussions on inequality. The suggestion by the G20 Extraordinary Committee of Independent Experts on Global Inequality is a case in point. It has recommended the creation of a global panel to provide guidance to countries on how they can ensure that reducing inequality sits at the heart of their development trajectories.
The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Source: The Conversation – in French – By Normand Mousseau, Directeur de l’Institut de l’énergie Trottier, Polytechnique Montréal et Professeur de physique, Université de Montréal
Feux de forêt records, résidus agricoles sous-utilisés, scieries fragilisées : le Canada se retrouve avec une grande quantité de biomasse sous-valorisée. Pourtant, cette ressource pourrait devenir l’un de ses meilleurs alliés dans la lutte contre les changements climatiques, à condition d’en planifier l’usage avec rigueur.
Les secteurs de la biomasse au Canada font face à de fortes incertitudes à cause de perturbations politiques et naturelles. Le secteur forestier canadien a récemment été frappé par de nouveaux tarifs douaniers annoncés par l’administration américaine sur les produits forestiers canadiens, portant le total des droits imposés sur le bois d’œuvre canadien à 45 %. Le secteur agricole et agroalimentaire est également particulièrement vulnérable, car il exporte plus de 70 % de ses principales cultures.
En plus de faire face à ces incertitudes politiques, les secteurs de la biomasse subissent de plus en plus les effets des catastrophes climatiques. En 2025, les incendies avaient brûlé 8,3 millions d’hectares de forêts canadiennes au 30 septembre, soit la deuxième pire saison de feux de forêt au Canada. Avec le changement climatique, les phénomènes climatiques extrêmes, tels que les feux de forêt et la sécheresse, risquent de devenir plus fréquents et plus intenses.
Les transformations s’accélèrent et les risques augmentent. Pour les industries et les communautés qui dépendent de la biomasse, le moment est venu d’imaginer une vision à long terme de son rôle dans la transition climatique.
Les ressources de la biomasse : un élément clé
Le Canada a besoin de se diriger vers une économie carboneutre et les secteurs de la biomasse ont un rôle clé à jouer dans cette transition.
La disponibilité de diverses ressources de biomasse dans les forêts et les terres agricoles au Canada, combinée aux nouvelles technologies pour la convertir en bioproduits et bioénergie, fait de la biomasse une solution potentielle pour réduire les émissions de carbone dans plusieurs secteurs, comme l’industrie, le bâtiment et tous les modes de transport (routier, maritime, ferroviaire et aérien).
La biomasse peut faire partie des stratégies d’atténuation du changement climatique. Bien utilisée, elle peut remplacer les combustibles et produits fossiles, et aider à stocker le carbone de différentes façons : dans des matériaux durables fabriqués à partir de bois ou de résidus agricoles, sous forme de biochar qui retient le carbone dans le sol, ou grâce à la bioénergie combinée au captage et au stockage du CO2 (BECSC), qui empêche le carbone libéré lors de la production d’énergie de rejoindre l’atmosphère.
L’intérêt pour les matières premières de la biomasse par de nombreuses industries est élevé, comme le démontrent plusieurs projets récents. En 2025, la première usine de biochar à échelle industrielle du Canada a été inaugurée au Québec, tandis que la raffinerie Strathcona en Alberta, qui deviendra la plus grande installation de diesel renouvelable du Canada, a été achevée.
Le rôle de la biomasse ressort clairement dans les modélisations de trajectoires possibles pour atteindre les objectifs climatiques du Canada. Ces analyses montrent que, si une partie importante de la biomasse disponible était utilisée différemment, il serait possible de séquestrer jusqu’à 94 millions de tonnes équivalant CO2 par an grâce au BECSC et au biochar.
Ces résultats soulignent la nécessité pour le Canada de planifier soigneusement les développements de nouveaux projets et de répartir judicieusement la biomasse entre ses usages traditionnels et émergents.
Identification des utilisations optimales de la biomasse
Comme nous l’expliquons dans un rapport récent, plusieurs facteurs influencent le potentiel de la biomasse à réduire les émissions, notamment le type d’écosystème où elle est récoltée, l’efficacité de sa conversion, les combustibles employés et les produits qu’elle remplace dans les secteurs concernés. Autrement dit, les bénéfices climatiques de la biomasse ne sont pas automatiques : ils dépendent des choix faits à chaque étape de la chaîne de valeur. Ainsi, si les transformations ou le transport des ressources exigent beaucoup d’énergie fossile ou si le produit final déplace une alternative peu émettrice, le gain pour le climat peut devenir marginal, voire négatif.
Pour utiliser la biomasse de façon optimale, il faut bien comprendre les ressources disponibles dans un contexte de changement climatique, ainsi que leur réel potentiel de réduction des émissions. Un potentiel qui dépend à la fois de l’efficacité des technologies et des réalités culturelles, environnementales et économiques des communautés.
Il manque encore une vision à long terme
Les décideurs doivent éviter de travailler en vase clos et tenir compte des effets collatéraux de l’allocation des ressources. Les pratiques dans les secteurs de la biomasse, qu’il s’agisse de la foresterie ou de l’agriculture, évoluent lentement. Les forêts, notamment, suivent de longs cycles de croissance et de récolte : les choix faits aujourd’hui influenceront les émissions pour des décennies.
Pourtant, malgré l’importance de ses ressources, le Canada n’a pas de stratégie définissant une vision du rôle de la biomasse dans la transition vers la carboneutralité d’ici 2050.
Le Canada s’est doté de plusieurs cadres liés à la bioéconomie, notamment le Cadre renouvelé de la bioéconomie forestière (2022) et la stratégie canadienne pour la bioéconomie (2019). Mais il manque encore une stratégie d’ensemble qui définirait la place de la biomasse dans les différents secteurs, énergétiques ou non, dans la perspective d’un avenir carboneutre.
Le Canada peut s’inspirer de sa propre Stratégie canadienne pour l’hydrogène pour concevoir une stratégie similaire sur la biomasse, appuyée sur une modélisation intégrée de son potentiel dans différents secteurs de l’économie canadienne. Il est urgent d’adopter une approche réaliste, fondée sur des analyses à plusieurs échelles – du régional au national – plutôt que sur des cibles sectorielles isolées.
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De nombreux acteurs du secteur soulignent l’urgence d’adopter une stratégie nationale claire pour la bioéconomie, afin d’offrir plus de prévisibilité aux industries de la biomasse au Canada. Dans un article publié par Biomass Magasine, Jeff Passmore (fondateur et président de Scaling Up) déclare attendre que le Canada élabore une stratégie nationale concrète en matière de bioéconomie. Dans un article publié par Bioenterprise en 2023, il est souligné que « l’un des éléments clés nécessaires pour construire l’avenir de la biomasse au Canada est une stratégie nationale de bioéconomie solide à long terme, soutenue par l’industrie et les gouvernements ».
Enfin, un article de Bioindustrial Innovation Canada recommande de « réviser la stratégie nationale pour la bioéconomie en fixant des objectifs mesurables visant à assurer une coordination interministérielle et intersectorielle, assortis d’une feuille de route claire pour la collaboration entre l’industrie et le secteur public ».
La biomasse ne se gère pas à l’aveugle. Ses impacts varient selon les régions et les usages. Pour que les projets futurs contribuent réellement aux objectifs climatiques du Canada, il faut dès maintenant une vision nationale cohérente.
Dans le cadre du travail rapporté pour cet article, Normand Mousseau a reçu des financements d’Environnement et Changements climatiques Canada, de la Fondation familiale Trottier (via son soutien pour les activités de l’Institut de l’énergie Trottier) et de l’Accélérateur de transition, un organisme à but non lucratif donc le mandat est d’appuyer la transition énergétique dans divers secteurs économiques. Aucun droit de regard sur les analyses et les conclusions n’ont été accordés aux organismes qui ont financé ce texte ou des rapports sur lesquels il s’appuie. Les auteurs sont seuls responsables de celles-ci.
L’Institut de l’énergie Trottier de Polytechnique Montréal a été créé grâce à un généreux don de la Fondation familiale Trottier. Sa mission couvre la recherche, la formation et la diffusion d’information en lien avec les enjeux de décarbonation des systèmes énergétiques.
Pour soutenir le mandat de recherche du Groupe consultatif sur la carboneutralité, le projet de l’IET sur la biomasse a été réalisé avec le soutien financier du gouvernement du Canada. Le financement a été réalisé par le Fonds d’action et de sensibilisation pour le climat du Fonds pour dommages à l’environnement, administré par Environnement et Changement climatique Canada. Aucun droit de regard sur les analyses et les conclusions n’ont été accordés aux organismes qui ont financé ce rapport. Les auteurs sont seuls responsables de celles-ci.
Roberta Dagher travaille à l’Institut de l’énergie Trottier en support à l’Accélérateur de transition. Roberta Dagher ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article.
Source: The Conversation – UK – By Rosie Williams, Postdoctoral Researcher, Toxicology, Institute of Zoology, Zoological Society of London
In 2017, a new global treaty was meant to bring mercury pollution under control. But three decades of data from UK harbour porpoises show mercury is still increasing, and is linked to a higher risk of dying from infectious disease.
When the Minamata convention came into force eight years ago, it was hailed as a turning point. The global treaty on mercury commits countries to reducing mercury from coal-fired power plants, industry and products, like batteries and dental fillings.
Yet mercury levels are still rising in many parts of the ocean. Human activities such as the burning of fossil fuels have already tripled mercury in shallower ocean waters (less than 1,000m in depth) since the industrial revolution. Warmer seas and shifting food webs are exacerbating the problem by increasing the rate of accumulation in the marine food chain.
In our new study, my colleagues and I analysed liver samples from 738 harbour porpoises that stranded along UK coastlines between 1990 and 2021. We found mercury levels increased over time and animals with higher levels are more likely to die from infectious disease.
Harbour porpoises are sentinels of ocean health because they are long lived (often for more than 20 years) and high up the food chain. This makes them more vulnerable to certain pollutants. The contaminants that build up in them are a warning for the marine ecosystem – and for us.
We measured trace elements as part of the UK’s strandings programmes in England, Wales and Scotland – the Cetacean Strandings Investigation Programme (CSIP) and the Scottish Marine Animal Stranding Scheme (SMASS). Stranded animals die from a range of causes, including bycatch in fishing gear and disease. When found washed up, a subset are sent to our London laboratory for post-mortem examination to help us better understand the population and the threats they face.
We sampled each animal to measure eight trace elements, including mercury, in their liver, which plays a critical role in the metabolism, detoxification and accumulation and tends to be where concentrations are highest. We analysed how concentrations changed over time, how they varied geographically around the UK, and whether levels were related to cause of death.
Over the last 30 years, mercury concentrations in porpoise livers rose by about 1% per year. By 2021, the average mercury concentration was almost double that of early 1990s. A worrying minority (about one in ten animals in the last decade) had mercury levels where serious health effects are expected.
In contrast, lead, cadmium, chromium and nickel declined, reflecting past bans and tighter controls on these pollutants (such as the ban on lead petrol).
We then investigated whether metal burdens were linked to health. Comparing porpoises that died of infectious disease with those that died of trauma, such as bycatch in fishing gear, we found that animals with higher burdens of mercury had a significantly greater risk of dying from infectious disease.
In parallel, we saw a steady increase in the proportion of porpoises dying from infectious disease and a corresponding decline in deaths from trauma. That doesn’t prove mercury is the sole cause. Many factors, including nutritional stress and other pollutants like industrial chemicals called polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), also affect immune function. But our study strongly suggests that mercury is part of the problem.
Why mercury is rising
Large amounts of mercury from past coal burning, industry and mining are already present in the oceans. Much of it sits in deeper waters acting as a source supplying shallower water and can take decades or centuries to be removed. This may explain why declines aren’t evident.
Climate change and overfishing are also disrupting marine food chains. This affects the formation and bioaccumulation (build up in tissues) of methylmercury (the toxic organic form of mercury), increasing levels in the fish that porpoise prey on. And global emissions have not stopped: coal power, cement production and sources such as dental amalgam still release mercury to the environment.
Our findings highlight that mercury ins’t just a historical problem. It is a current, growing pressure on marine mammals that face multiple other stresses: bycatch, noise pollution, habitat degradation, climate-driven prey shifts and exposure to forever chemicals.
Because mammals share many aspects of physiology and immune function, the trends in porpoises offer a warning for human health too. If top predators in UK coastal waters are becoming more contaminated, the same processes may be affecting some of the fish and shellfish we eat.
Harbour porpoises are small, shy and easily overlooked. But their tissues are quietly recording the story of our chemical footprint in the sea. Right now, that story is telling us something uncomfortable: even after a global treaty, mercury pollution is still rising, and it is affecting the health of marine wildlife.
Mercury and climate change are two sides of the same problem: burning fewer fossil fuels cuts CO₂ and mercury, while missing climate targets risks driving more methylmercury into marine food webs. A safer ocean for porpoises and for people can be achieved by phasing out coal more quickly, reducing industrial emissions and moving away from mercury-containing products wherever safer alternatives exist.
The outlook for marine mammals can also be improved by addressing other human threats such as bycatch, underwater noise and other pollutants. None of this works without long-term monitoring, so continued investment in programmes, like the UK strandings network that underpinned our study, is essential to assess progress.
Don’t have time to read about climate change as much as you’d like?
In late October 2025, as much as US$2 billion vanished from a digital marketplace. This wasn’t a hack or a bubble bursting. It happened because one company, Valve, changed the rules for its video game Counter-Strike 2, a popular first-person shooter with a global player base of nearly 30 million monthly users.
For years, its players have bought, sold and traded digital cosmetic items, known as “skins.” Some rare items, particularly knives and gloves, commanded high prices in real-world money – up to $1.5 million – leading some gamers to treat the market like an investment portfolio. As a result, many investment-style analytics websites charge monthly fees for financial insight, trends and transaction data from this digital marketplace.
In one fell swoop, Valve unilaterally changed the game. It expanded the “trade up contract,” allowing players to exchange – or “trade up” – a number of their common assets into knives or gloves.
By flipping this switch, Valve instantly upended digital scarcity. The market was flooded with new supply, and the value of existing high-end items collapsed. Prices plummeted, initially erasing half the market’s total value, which exceeded $6 billion before the recent crash. Although a partial recovery brought the net loss to roughly 25%, significant volatility continues, leaving investors unsure whether the bottom has truly fallen out.
Many of those who saw their digital fortunes evaporate immediately wondered whether there was anything they could do to get their money back. Speaking as a law professor and a gamer myself, the answer isn’t what they want to hear: no. In fact, the existing legal structure largely protects Valve’s ability to engage in this sort of digital market manipulation. Players and investors were simply out of luck.
The Counter-Strike 2 crash reveals a troubling reality that extends far beyond video games: Corporations have built exchange-scale investment markets governed primarily by private terms-of-service agreements, rather than the robust set of public regulations that oversee traditional financial and consumer markets. These digital economies occupy a legal blind spot, lacking the fundamental guardrails of property rights, meaningful consumer protection or even securities regulation.
Buyer’s guides like this one have cropped up on YouTube.
Your digital ‘property’ isn’t really yours
If you spend real money on a digital item, it may feel like you should own it. Legally, you don’t.
The digital economy is built on a crucial distinction between ownership and licensing. When users sign up for Steam, Valve’s platform, they agree to the Steam subscriber agreement. Buried in that contract is a critical piece of legalese stating that all digital assets and services provided by Valve, including the Counter-Strike 2 skins, are merely “licensed, not sold.” The license granted to users “confers no title or ownership” at all. This isn’t meaningless corporate jargon; it’s a legal standard routinely affirmed by U.S. courts.
The legal implication is clear: Because players only license their skins, they have no property rights over them. When Valve changed the game’s mechanics in a way that collapsed the items’ market value, it didn’t steal, damage or destroy anyone’s “property.” In the eyes of the law, Valve simply altered the conditions of a license, something that its terms-of-service agreement allows it to do unilaterally, at any time, for any reason.
Consumer protection laws don’t apply
While the Counter-Strike 2 crash may seem like a violation of consumer rights, current laws are ill-equipped to handle this type of corporate behavior.
Lawmakers have begun addressing concerns about digital goods, primarily focusing on instances where purchased movies or games disappear entirely from user libraries. For example, California recently enacted AB 2426. This law requires transparency, prohibiting terms like “buy” or “purchase” unless the consumer confirms that they understand they will receive only a revocable license.
As commendable as this law is, it protects only against confusion and loss of access, not loss of market value when platforms rebalance virtual economies. Valve can comply with consumer transparency laws and still adjust the supply of digital items, rendering them valueless overnight. Ultimately, current consumer protection laws are designed to ensure users know what they are licensing. They do not, however, create ownership interests or protect the speculative value of those digital items.
Game items are treated like unregulated stocks
Perhaps the most significant legal vacuum is the absence of financial regulation. The Counter-Strike 2 economy, a multibillion-dollar ecosystem with dedicated investors and third-party cash markets, looks and behaves like a traditional financial market. Yet, it remains outside the purview of any financial regulator, such as the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.
Under U.S. law, the primary standard for determining whether an asset should be governed as a security is the Howey test. According to this Supreme Court precedent, an asset is a security if it meets four criteria. Securities involve an “investment of money” in a “common enterprise” with a reasonable expectation of “profits” derived from the “efforts of others.”
Counter-Strike 2 skins arguably meet all of these criteria. Participants invest real money in a common enterprise – Valve’s platform – with an expectation of profit. Crucially, that profit depends on the “efforts of others.” The SEC notes this prong is met when a promoter provides “essential managerial efforts” that affect the enterprise’s success. Valve controls the game’s development, manages the platform and – as the recent update proves – dictates item supply and scarcity.
If a publicly traded company unilaterally changed its rules in a way that predictably tanked the price of its own shares, regulators would immediately investigate for market manipulation. So how can Valve get away with this? Three things cut against the skins’ status as securities.
First is their “consumptive intent” – skins are primarily game cosmetics. Second, there’s no way to convert the skins into dollars within Valve’s own ecosystem. In other words, third-party markets allow users to cash out, but these markets operate outside Valve’s own immediate control. And finally, the Howey test generally governs assets, such as stocks and bonds, that grant investors enforceable rights. Valve’s licensing scheme attempts to circumvent this by ensuring players hold nothing but a revocable license.
In my view, the $2 billion crash is a wake-up call. As digital economies grow in financial significance, society must decide: Will these markets continue to be governed solely by private corporate contracts? Or will they require integration into more robust legal frameworks, such as securities regulation, consumer protection and property law?
João Marinotti does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
For many American men, the draw of the international dating industry is the idea of ‘more traditional’ women.Kurgenc/iStock via Getty Images Plus
Fifteen years ago, when I started studyingthe international dating industry, few people took the subject seriously. The term “mail-order bride” was treated as a punch line – something outdated, associated with lonely men and poor women who migrated from Eastern Europe, Asia or other places to meet their new husbands in the United States.
But I’ve seen firsthand how ideas about gender, intimacy and global mobility have shifted. In 2025, a man going abroad to look for love might call himself a “passport bro” – and celebrate his lifestyle on TikTok.
This new generation of young men may have rebranded international dating, but they reflect an age-old theme. Social and economic changes shape how people negotiate love and labor across borders, as I explore in my 2025 book, “Economies of Gender.” In a chaotic world, some men and women turn to traditional gender roles as a source of seeming stability – and that often leads them abroad.
Old industry, new look
The term “mail-order bride” dates back to the 19th century, when so-called frontier brides advertised themselves in newspapers to single men in the American West. After the Civil War, when large numbers of men had died on the East Coast, some women saw migrating to the frontier to marry someone sight unseen as a way to secure stability. That narrative still lingers today in Western novels and films.
The modern international matchmaking industry, however, took shape in the 1970s, when catalogs of mostly Filipino women’s photos and addresses were sold to American men. After being pen pals, men would travel to the Philippines to meet and decide whether they wanted to get married. Some scholars consider this a form of human trafficking, but that has been challenged by other scholarship.
These catalogs emerged as more U.S. women were entering the workforce and earning their own money. Some men sought wives abroad who they believed would embody more traditional values – prioritizing domestic work and devoting themselves to men and children.
By 2010, the catalog system had moved online and expanded into a global industry that generated US$2 billion dollars per year. Today, it takes many forms. Most of the industry is online, with email and chat correspondence that charges men but not women. Some agencies provide in-person tours for male clients, and there are higher-end, more personalized matchmaking services as well.
From taboo to televised
What was once stigmatized has become more normalized through reality TV. TLC’s hit series “90 Day Fiance,” which came on air in 2014, has transformed international dating into a lucrative entertainment franchise.
The show and its numerous spin-offs show couples navigating the K-1 visa process, which gives 90 days to marry after a partner enters the country. If the wedding is called off, the foreign fiance or fiancee must return to their country of origin.
Many of the featured couples met randomly, in person. A significant number, however, connected through online dating or language-learning sites. Numerous couples’ storylines highlight family and friends of the American partner who question the girlfriend’s or boyfriend’s motives, accusing them of faking love for financial gain and access to a green card.
Audiences might watch the show for drama or love stories, but the underlying themes mirror what I’ve seen in the field: relationships shaped by economic inequality and migration, with women often exchanging emotional, domestic and sexual labor in return for financial stability.
Rise of the ‘passport bros’
In recent years, the mail-order bride industry has gotten a cultural revamp, with younger and more diverse men who identify as “passport bros.” This crowd is typically younger than men participating in the commercial international dating industry and more likely to identify as men of color.
These men are less likely to pay for formal dating and introduction services. They travel on their own, using free dating apps such as Tinder to meet local women – mostly in Colombia, Brazil and the Dominican Republic.
Passport bros say they travel abroad to meet women who are more traditional than the ones they meet at home. Many of the American men I interviewed between 2010 and 2022 talked about Western women as too focused on career, which challenged their idea of themselves as financial providers.
In my interviews, American men looking abroad talked about feeling empowered and having choices, while being ignored in the U.S. dating market. Some recognized that their relative wealth is the cause of this. As one man on a romance tour in Ukraine told me in 2012, “I am here to exchange my financial stability for some Ukrainian woman’s youth and beauty, and I am OK with that.”
What appears to be a return to the past is, in reality, an adaptation to the present. The romance tours, the “90 Day Fiance” phenomenon and the passport bros speak to how people use relationships to navigate the economic instability of the modern world. Gender roles become a way to reestablish order and identity.
In the past two decades, rising inflation, stagnant wages and housing shortages have left many people, especially younger generations, feeling economically trapped. The COVID-19 pandemic deepened these inequalities, forcing millions out of the workforce and amplifying the strain of unpaid caregiving, particularly for women.
In times of uncertainty, societies often retreat to familiar narratives. Traditional gender roles offer an illusion of stability and order, even if they reinforce inequality. The fantasy of the dependable male provider and the nurturing homemaker resurfaces because it seems to resolve anxieties that the modern economy has made harder to bear.
As a sociologist, I study these dynamics not just to understand dating trends but to trace how societies reproduce inequality through intimacy. Until our society addresses stagnant wages, rising costs and the erosion of social safety nets, I believe nostalgia for a clear, gendered hierarchy will continue. In this hierarchy, men are guaranteed women’s labor, and women hold out hope for economic security – which is often seen as romance.
Julia Meszaros receives funding from East Texas A&M and Florida International University to support her research. She volunteers for the nonprofit organization RISE Travel Institute.
Following the federal government’s changes to COVID-19 vaccine eligibility and recommendations in 2025, many people are wondering whether they can get COVID-19 vaccines for themselves or their children.
It’s not just the public that is confused. Many physicians and pharmacists also have questions about whether and how they can administer COVID-19 vaccines.
As philosophers with expertise in bioethics and legal philosophy, we have been following the ethical and regulatory landscape for COVID-19 vaccines since they first became available in late 2020.
In the fall of 2025 that landscape looks a bit different in light of the new guidelines. While it is causing understandable confusion, most people who want to get a COVID-19 vaccine can do so. Broad access is possible, in part, through what in health care is called “off-label use.”
“Off-label” refers to using an FDA-approved product for a different purpose, or with a different population, than that for which it received approval. Off-label prescriptions are common in health care, particularly in pediatrics.
COVID-19 vaccines from 2020-2025
People likely recall that COVID-19 vaccines were developed faster than any vaccine had been previously, thanks to efforts such as the U.S. government’s Operation Warp Speed. Initially limited in supply, the vaccines first became available through “emergency use authorization” in December 2020, with health care workers among the first prioritized by the government to receive them.
Understanding the role of federal agencies such as the FDA and the CDC, as well as medical professional organizations and guidelines, can help untangle the complicated picture for access to COVID-19 vaccines.
Critics of the changes note that when a vaccine is available but not recommended, fewer may choose to be vaccinated and more disease may circulate unchecked in the general population.
2025 changes to FDA and CDC guidance
It’s helpful to understand the process through which vaccines become approved and endorsed by government agencies in the U.S.
Next, the CDC recommends products that the FDA has approved or authorized. These recommendations have a different regulatory function than the initial FDA decisions. The CDC issues public health guidelines for which vaccines people should receive and which ones public and private insurance must cover. In some states, the CDC’s recommendations also affect whether pharmacies can administer vaccines.
Until September 2025, when the CDC shifted its stance, the agency broadly recommended COVID-19 vaccines for everyone 6 months of age and older, regardless of their underlying conditions. These recommendations supported public health and ensured that public and private insurance covered 100% of the cost of these vaccines as preventive health care.
When the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices, or ACIP – the committee that advises the CDC on vaccine policy – met in mid-September, it voted to recommend that anyone 6 months and older can get a COVID-19 vaccine according to “individual-based decision-making.” The committee also voted to require continued funding of COVID-19 vaccines through private and public health insurance and the Vaccines for Children program that provides free vaccines to children who are Medicaid eligible, uninsured or underinsured. In October, the interim CDC director adopted the ACIP recommendations as the formal guidance from the CDC for the 2025-2026 COVID-19 vaccines.
These recommendations from the CDC and medical professional organizations are difficult to square with the FDA labeling changes for COVID-19 vaccines. The CDC is recommending that people make individual decisions with their medical providers about COVID-19 vaccination, regardless of their eligibility through FDA approval.
This is possible because anyone who doesn’t meet FDA eligibility can get a COVID-19 vaccine through off-label use.
The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists still recommends that people who are pregnant get the COVID-19 vaccine. Olga Rolenko/Moment via Getty Images
While uncommon, off-label vaccination is sometimes recommended. One example is off-label vaccination against measles, mumps and rubella, or MMR, for children under 12 months old who plan to travel to areas where measles is not eradicated, or are exposed to a disease outbreak.
Moreover, the CDC’s 2025-2026 COVID-19 vaccine recommendations remove certain barriers that typically accompany off-label use.
For example, products used off-label are not always covered by insurance. Many private insurers already committed to covering COVID-19 vaccines as preventive care for the 2025-2026 vaccine season. The recommendations from ACIP and the CDC subsequently guaranteed that private and public health insurance plans would continue to cover COVID-19 vaccines in full. This includes COVID-19 vaccines under the Vaccines for Children program that purchases vaccines for approximately half of U.S. children.
Off-label use of a product is ethically and legally permissible if a physician believes its benefits outweigh its risks for their patient. But the CDC’s recommendation for individual decision-making may also lessen clinicians’ worries about liability. So might the guidance from the American Academy of Pediatrics, as well as the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists’ vaccine recommendations that anyone who is pregnant should get an updated COVID-19 vaccine during pregnancy.
Off-label use is typically done via a doctor’s prescription. Yet many COVID-19 vaccines are administered in pharmacies. Getting vaccinated in a pharmacy is especially helpful for people without primary care doctors or the time or money for a clinic visit. Many states have taken steps to remove barriers to obtaining off-label COVID-19 vaccines at pharmacies. The CDC’s October 2025 recommendations for individual decision-making also enable COVID-19 vaccination by pharmacists.
For people who would like to be vaccinated against COVID-19, knowing how off-label use fits into current regulations may be helpful for understanding their access to vaccines this respiratory virus season, and medical treatment in general.
The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
In my view, by making GLP-1 drugs more accessible to patients, this agreement represents one of the most significant advances the federal government has made to address obesity, one of the country’s most pressing public health issues. However, this reduced price tag alone may not make a meaningful dent in rates of obesity in American adults without additional policy changes.
Treating obesity
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention estimates that about 40% of adults in the U.S. – more than 70 million people – have obesity. Researchers and clinicians generally define obesity based on a measure called body mass index, or BMI, which is the ratio of a person’s weight in kilograms to their height in meters, squared.
Between television commercials, advertisements on social media and suggestions from family and friends, Americans are bombarded by approaches to losing weight. For many of these approaches, there’s little to no evidence showing they successfully help people lose weight. However, extensive and rigorous research supports the use of GLP-1s for treating obesity. Studies show that these medications can reliably help people lose about 15% of their body weight in six to 12 months.
Evidence-based approaches for weight loss include GLP-1 drugs, surgical treatment and behavior changes such as adopting a healthier diet. Alexandr Kolesnikov/Moment via Getty Images
There are two other evidence based-approaches. Lifestyle changes, such as consuming fewer calories and increasing physical activity, can help people lose about 5% of their weight in the same period of time. With surgical treatment, now referred to as metabolic and bariatric surgery, patients can achieve a loss of about 30% of their body weight after about 18 months.
Which of these treatment approaches is appropriate for a given person depends on their circumstances and is best discussed with their health care provider. But in my experience, too few health care professionals refer their patients to any of these therapies.
In clinical trials, people taking GLP-1 drugs to treat obesity generally maintained their weight loss for a year if they stayed on the medication. However, participants in the trials did not have to pay for the medications. Research suggests that more than half of people using the drugs stop taking them after six months, most often because they can’t afford them.
GLP-1 drugs currently cost more than US$1,000 per month for people unable to get them covered by health insurance – and many insurance plans do not.
According to the Nov. 6 White House announcement, starting in early 2026, certain GLP-1 drugs covered by the agreement will be available for $350 per month or less through an online marketplace the government plans to launch.
Some drugs will be as cheap as $150, according to the announcement. Companies will also drop the amount that Medicare and Medicaid pay for them, and certain Medicare patients would be able to access them with a $50 co-pay.
These costs are not temporary. Most patients with obesity and related health problems will likely need to use these medications indefinitely. According to emerging research, people who stop taking them typically regain the weight they lost. Realistically, very few people who take GLP-1 drugs can maintain their weight loss with lifestyle changes alone.
Studies suggest that patients who use GLP-1 drugs for weight loss will likely have to use them indefinitely. aprott/iStock via Getty Images Plus
Beyond cost
The reduced pricing for GLP-1 drugs is an important first step in increasing affordability and access to these treatments. Given that the food environments people live in make it difficult to make healthy choices, I believe that this move will only meaningfully benefit the health of all Americans if it is combined with other policy changes.
While several countries have a national plan to prevent and treat obesity, the U.S. does not. Instead, American public health policies are largely set state by state. They often include strategies such as free school meals for children or more robust insurance coverage for treating obesity and related health conditions. However, most such policies are often too narrow to have significant benefits at the population level.
Broader policy shifts and legislation targeting obesity prevention could move the needle.
For example, research is increasingly showing that ultraprocessed foods play a role in promoting weight gain and potentially other diseases, such as colorectal cancer. Legislators could draw on that research to better regulate these foods – for example, to limit the use of certain especially harmful ingredients, to restrict marketing of ultraprocessed products, or to limit their inclusion in school meals.
Another policy change that may help would be to build more extensive nutrition education into the training that medical students and other health care providers receive. This may better position the next generation of clinicians to help their patients make the healthiest choices to maintain their weight and health.
These and other policy changes will be critically important in efforts to reduce the rate of obesity among Americans in the future.
David B. Sarwer’s program of research has been funded by grants from the National Institutes of Health for over the past 20 years. He also serves as Editor-in-Chief of the journal Obesity Science and Practice.
Source: The Conversation – USA – By Stefani Langehennig, Assistant Professor of Practice, Daniels College of Business, University of Denver
Colorado was first to pass comprehensive AI legislation in the U.S.wildpixel/Getty Images
When the Colorado Artificial Intelligence Act passed in May 2024, it made national headlines. The law was the first of its kind in the U.S. It was a comprehensive attempt to govern “high-risk” artificial intelligence systems across various industries before they could cause real-world harm.
What Colorado does next will shape whether its early move becomes a model for other states or a lesson in the challenges of regulating emerging technologies.
I study how AI and data science are reshaping policymaking and democratic accountability. I’m interested in what Colorado’s pioneering efforts to regulate AI can teach other state and federal legislators.
The Colorado AI Act defined “high-risk” AI systems as those influencing consequential decisions in employment, housing, health care and other areas of daily life. The law’s goal was straightforward but ambitious: Create preventive protections for consumers from algorithmic discrimination while encouraging innovation.
When the law passed in May 2024, policy analysts and advocacy groups hailed it as a breakthrough. Other states, including Georgia and Illinois, introduced bills closely modeled after Colorado’s AI bill, though those proposals did not advance to final enactment. The law was described by the Future of Privacy Forum as the “first comprehensive and risk-based approach” to AI accountability. The forum is a nonprofit research and advocacy organization that develops guidance and policy analysis on data privacy and emerging technologies.
Legal commentators, including attorneys general across the nation, noted that Colorado created robust AI legislation that other states could emulate in the absence of federal legislation.
Politics meets process, stalling progress
Praise aside, passing a bill is one thing, but putting it into action is another.
Immediately after the bill was signed, tech companies and trade associations warned that the act could create heavy administrative burdens for startups and deter innovation. Polis, in his signing statement, cautioned that “a complex compliance regime” might slow economic growth. He urged legislators to revisit portions of the bill.
CBS News Colorado reports on state lawmakers racing to replace the state’s artificial intelligence law before February 2026.
In my opinion, Colorado can remain a leader in AI policy by pivoting toward “small ball,” or incremental, policymaking, characterized by gradual improvements, monitoring and iteration.
This means focusing not just on lofty goals but on the practical architecture of implementation. That would include defining what counts as high-risk applications and clarifying compliance duties. It could also include launching pilot programs to test regulatory mechanisms before full enforcement and building impact assessments to measure the effects on innovation and equity. And finally, it could engage developers and community stakeholders in shaping norms and standards.
This incrementalism is not a retreat from the initial goal but rather realism. Most durable policy emerges from gradual refinement, not sweeping reform. For example, the EU’s AI Act is actually being implemented in stages rather than all at once, according to legal scholar Nita Farahany.
A video from EU Made Simple explains the EU’s AI regulation, which was the first in the world.
Colorado’s AI law may represent the start of a similar trajectory: an early, imperfect step that prompts learning, revision and eventual standardization across states.
The core challenge is striking a workable balance. Regulations need to protect people from unfair or unclear AI decisions without creating such heavy burdens that businesses hesitate to build or deploy new tools. With its thriving tech sector and pragmatic policy culture, Colorado is well positioned to model that balance by embracing incremental, accountable policymaking. In doing so, the state can turn a stalled start into a blueprint for how states nationwide might govern AI responsibly.
Stefani Langehennig receives funding from the American Political Science Association’s (APSA) Centennial Center Research Center.
Even his new book, “Unfettered,” is not your typical political memoir, and thus is entirely on-brand for Fetterman. Most political memoirs are written to advance the politician’s career. Fetterman’s, however, discusses his dissatisfaction with Congress and spends far more time on his battles with depression than his role as a senator.
As a politics professor who studies Philadelphia and Pennsylvania, I find that one of the most unique things about Fetterman is his political rise from mayor of Braddock, Pennsylvania – a small borough outside Pittsburgh with fewer than 2,000 residents – to the U.S. Senate.
And yet, while this sort of political leap is highly unusual, it also reflects a recent trend in American politics. Over the past five years, more mayors of small and midsized cities have developed national political profiles in a way they hadn’t before.
It’s a phenomenon that has roots in suburbanization and 1990s-era political trends, and it’s one we will likely see again in 2028, at least among Democrats.
Boroughs are the smallest form of municipality in Pennsylvania, and there are more than 950 of them in the state. The office of borough mayor is so insignificant that in Braddock, it came with a small stipend instead of a salary.
Yet after holding that obscure position for a decade, Fetterman mounted a credible campaign to be the Democratic candidate for a U.S. Senate seat in 2016. He fell short but captured nearly 20% of the primary vote against three other candidates.
It may seem incredible that someone could jump from being a borough mayor to lieutenant governor and then U.S. senator. But other politicians over the past decade have used their positions as mayors of small-to-midsized cities to run for national office, including the U.S. presidency.
Cory Booker, for instance, was elected mayor of Newark, New Jersey, in 2006; U.S. senator in 2013; and briefly ran for the Democratic presidential nomination in 2020.
Booker was joined in the early race to be the Democratic presidential nominee by Pete Buttigieg, who was elected mayor of South Bend, Indiana, in 2011; and Wayne Messam, who was elected mayor of Miramar, Florida, in 2015.
The 2020 presidential primaries also included some big-city mayors like then-New York Mayor Bill DeBlasio and his immediate predecessor, Mike Bloomberg. Eric Garcetti, mayor of Los Angeles at the time, was apparently also considering a presidential run in 2020.
Of course, Fetterman has never run for president, but then, few mayors ever run for U.S. Senate either. As Booker noted in his 2017 memoir, “United,” he was, in 2013, the 1,949th person to ever be sworn in as a U.S. senator, but “only the 21st person since 1789 to ascend directly from mayor to Senator.”
Free trade and fractured bonds
How did this trend start? I trace it back to the eight years of the Clinton presidency, from 1993 to 2001, and more specifically, the North American Free Trade Agreement that went into effect in 1994 and the Clinton administration’s focus on community and civil society.
NAFTA was a treaty signed by the U.S., Mexico and Canada agreeing to lift tariffs and other barriers to trade. It had bipartisan support, but it was also politically divisive, especially with labor unions, historically a key pillar of the Democratic Party, which did not want to see manufacturers move their operations to Mexico to take advantage of lower labor costs.
NAFTA is often blamed for, among other things, the “hollowing out” of U.S. communities in the Rust Belt that stretches from the Northeast to the Upper Midwest states that surround the Great Lakes. In this vast area, there are thousands of small and midsized towns and cities, many of which depended on single industries like paper milling or auto parts manufacturing. Once those businesses relocated, residents found themselves unemployed, underemployed and stranded in increasingly poorer towns.
At the same time, President Bill Clinton convened a series of seminars on American democracy and community at Camp David and the White House. He invited some of the country’s most prominent “communitarian” intellectuals to glean policy and speech ideas from them. He also established the AmeriCorps program, which expanded and provided support for various civic-oriented volunteer opportunities.
Of the mayors who developed national political profiles in the 2010s, arguably the most successful were Booker, Buttigieg and Fetterman. All three came from Rust Belt communities that had suffered severely from the deindustrialization that many residents and analysts of various stripes blamed on NAFTA, and all three spoke effectively about their personal experience with it in their communities.
Each mayor was also able to tell stories about personal interactions and interventions in their cities that spoke to the sense of a lost community that came to define the turn of the 21st century. The hardest evidence for this lost community came from the book “Bowling Alone” by American political scientist Robert Putnam, who participated in the White House seminars on community and American democracy.
It’s also notable that, prior to running for mayor of Braddock, Fetterman worked at an AmeriCorps program in a poor Pittsburgh neighborhood.
Immediately after World War II, federal mortgage guarantees and massive investment in highways fueled suburban housing construction, for which the returning GIs and the baby boom created huge demand.
Along with suburbanization has come political polarization. Urban areas are increasingly composed of people with liberal ideologies, while rural areas are increasingly more conservative. Suburban areas fall somewhere in between – often serving as key battlegrounds in statewide elections.
Midsized cities like South Bend or Miramar are often suburban in nature and design. They typically don’t carry the Democratic ideological baggage of large cities, but they are often also dealing with so-called urban problems such as poverty and crime. This is especially true of Braddock, a suburb with uniquely high levels of poverty and unemployment.
A mayor like Fetterman can therefore show how he’s able to address fundamental and widespread problems while at the same time being relatively nonpartisan about it. Among his better-known accomplishments as Braddock mayor were building a new community center, rehabbing properties, establishing an urban farm and running a youth program.
No doubt, Fetterman is a unique politician. But he is also the product of a specific moment in American political development and culture when mayors became viable actors on the national stage. My guess is that this trend will continue in what will most likely be a crowded Democratic presidential primary race in 2028.
Richardson Dilworth does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
