Supreme Court ruling on Colorado conversion therapy case is not a clear win for conservatives

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Kevin Cope, Professor of Law, University of Virginia

The U.S. Supreme Court found a Colorado law banning conversion therapy for gay and transgender minors likely violates free speech. Roberto Schmidt/Getty Images

In an 8-1 decision authored by Justice Neil Gorsuch, the Supreme Court held on March 31, 2026, that a Colorado law prohibiting licensed counselors from performing “conversion therapy” on minors was likely unconstitutional as applied to talk therapy. Justice Elena Kagan filed a separate concurrence, joined by Justice Sonia Sotomayor. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson dissented.

I am a law professor and political scientist who teaches and writes on free expression and discrimination. I see this holding as a potentially important decision at the intersection of free speech and health care.

Colorado’s law defines conversion therapy broadly. It bans practices that attempt not only to “change an individual’s sexual orientation or gender identity” but also to reduce same-sex attraction. The law allows therapists to provide “acceptance, support, and understanding” of gay or transgender identity. However, they may not help a client suppress those identities. Penalties include fines, probation and loss of license.

People hold signs outside a tall building under construction protesting conversion therapy.
Demonstrators with the Human Rights Campaign stand outside the United States Supreme Court during oral arguments in October 2025. The court released its decision on a free speech challenge to a ban on conversion therapy on March 31, 2026.
Jabin Botsford/The Washington Post via Getty Images

Kaley Chiles challenged the law as a violation of her First Amendment free speech rights. As a therapist who only offers talk therapy, Chiles’s objection was limited to her talk therapy. She didn’t contest the ban on what she called “long-abandoned, aversive” conversion practices. And – notably, considering she is an evangelical Christian – Chiles said she never set out to convert her clients. She says she respects her clients’ “fundamental right of self-determination” and determines her therapy approach only after a client identifies his or her own objectives. But she argued that some of her clients wish to “reduce or eliminate unwanted sexual attractions (or) change sexual behaviors,” and the law prevents her from expressing support for any of those goals.

Colorado’s failed ‘professional speech’ argument

Colorado faced a major obstacle in defending the Colorado conversion therapy law. The law was transparently driven by the government’s views about the well-documented inefficacy and harmful effects of conversion therapy. And outside of certain contexts, such as government grants, public employees, advertising and threats, courts have treated such viewpoint-based laws as constitutionally dead on arrival.

Colorado’s best hope in defending the law, then, was to argue that it wasn’t principally a restriction on speech at all. Rather, the state framed the law as a restriction on professional conduct — an area where states have broad regulatory latitude. That framing would mean the law burdened Chiles’ speech only incidentally.

A CBS News Colorado report on Coloradans’ conflicted feelings about the Supreme Court ruling.

In NIFLA v. Becerra, decided in 2018, the court rejected the argument that professional speech was a less-protected category. But it acknowledged that laws “regulating conduct in ways that incidentally sweep in speech” – particularly where they “fall within the traditional purview of state regulation of professional conduct” – might survive under a lower standard of scrutiny.

Colorado attempted to demonstrate such a tradition here, citing medical licensing laws, informed-consent requirements and malpractice liability.

A divided 10th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals had agreed with Colorado’s argument, as did Jackson in her dissent. But the Supreme Court majority rejected it. Gorsuch wrote that a government cannot evade First Amendment scrutiny by relabeling restricted speech as “conduct,” “treatment” or a “therapeutic modality.” Quoting the dissent of U.S. Circuit Judge Harris Hartz, he called Colorado’s argument a “labeling game.”

For Gorsuch, the key question is whether the law restricts speech in practice. And in Chiles’ case the answer was yes. Colorado was plainly restricting what she wished to tell her clients about their sex and gender issues.

Not just content but viewpoint discrimination

More than that, the majority noted, Colorado’s law doesn’t regulate therapists’ speech based on its content. The law discriminates based on viewpoint, permitting expressions of acceptance and support for a client’s self-identity while forbidding expressions that attempt to change it.

Under 1995’s Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, viewpoint discrimination is an “egregious form” of content regulation. Governments must “nearly always abstain” from it. The court remanded the Colorado case back to the 10th Circuit to resolve the case under this standard.

Jackson’s dissent: Medical treatment, not speech

Jackson’s solo dissent emphasizes that states have long enjoyed broad power to regulate how licensed medical professionals treat patients. To Jackson, the First Amendment should not interfere simply because a treatment is applied through words rather than instruments.

The court’s 2018 NIFLA decision, she argues, distinguished between speech restricted “as speech” and speech restricted “incidentally” as part of a medical treatment the state is otherwise entitled to regulate. According to Jackson, the majority arbitrarily collapses that distinction simply because the treatment is delivered orally. A talk therapy session and a drug infusion are both medical treatments, she argues, and the analysis should not turn on whether the provider uses a syringe or a sentence.

Jackson’s dissent also raises difficult line-drawing problems, such as the validity of less controversial potential prohibitions, such as those on encouraging a patient to smoke or to take their own life.

Implications are broader, narrower than most believe

First, only talk therapy is implicated.

The holding is narrow in this sense. It leaves room for policymakers still hoping to limit the practice of conversion therapy. Because Chiles challenged the statute only as applied to her, the majority’s analysis does not invalidate conversion therapy bans wholesale – neither Colorado’s nor those of more than 20 other states – but applies only to the extent they ban conversion talk therapy.

State legislatures can define conversion therapy a bit more narrowly, for example, by prohibiting the physical and more coercive techniques that initially gave rise to these bans. States can then leave the regulation of talk therapy to other legal and professional mechanisms, such as malpractice or enforcement of professional ethics.

Second, the standard of scrutiny that the lower court must now apply is not strict scrutiny; it is more demanding. Strict scrutiny is a legal test that validates a law if it is “narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest.” Contrary to what some legal commentators have implied, Gorsuch never directs the lower court to use strict scrutiny.

The opinion emphasizes that the law doesn’t just discriminate against certain types of content – a trigger for strict scrutiny; it discriminates based on viewpoint. The strict scrutiny standard is demanding, but laws sometimes survive it. Viewpoint discrimination, on the other hand, is subject to a near-absolute prohibition: Governments must “nearly always abstain” from it. This language is stronger and more categorical than that for strict scrutiny. The implication is that the law should certainly be invalidated as applied to talk therapy.

Not a clear win for conservatives

Finally, the holding is a double-edged sword for conservatives with traditional views of gender identity. And for those discouraged by the outcome, seeing it only as a victory for religious conservatives, the holding’s logic offers a silver lining.

Kagan’s concurrence makes explicit that a “mirror image” law – one barring talk therapy that affirms gender identity – would raise the same constitutional problems.

Dr. John Fryer revolutionized mental health care by speaking publicly about being gay at a 1972 conference of psychiatrists. This NBC News report covers Fryer’s legacy.

The majority makes a similar point. As late as the 1970s, the American Psychiatric Association still classified homosexuality as a mental disorder. Under Colorado’s position, a law from that era prohibiting counselors from affirming gay clients’ identities would have been constitutionally sound.

Today, more than 20 states have moved to restrict gender-affirming care, and the federal government is pressuring state medical boards to adopt skeptical positions on gender transition. It’s not implausible that a legislature would attempt to ban gender-affirming, talk-based therapies. If and when conservative policymakers attempt that move, Chiles will be a formidable obstacle.

Read more of our stories about Colorado.

The Conversation

Kevin Cope does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Supreme Court ruling on Colorado conversion therapy case is not a clear win for conservatives – https://theconversation.com/supreme-court-ruling-on-colorado-conversion-therapy-case-is-not-a-clear-win-for-conservatives-279820

The two lives of Chuck Norris

Source: The Conversation – USA (2) – By Ben Pettis, Assistant Professor of Rhetoric and Communication Studies, University of Richmond

Actor and martial artist Chuck Norris died on March 19, 2026, at the age of 86. Jean-Jacques Bernier/Gamma-Rapho via Getty Images

“Chuck Norris doesn’t do push-ups. He simply pushes the world down.”

“Chuck Norris counted to infinity – twice.”

“Chuck Norris once strangled someone – with a cordless phone”

In the late 2000s and early 2010s, Chuck Norris, the 1980s action star, became a tongue-in-cheek model of toughness and masculinity in viral internet memes known as “Chuck Norris Facts.”

Although these memes waned in popularity, they never fully fizzled out. One Facebook group has over 400,000 members, many of whom regularly contribute new jokes about the “Walker, Texas Ranger” star.

But when news of Norris’ death broke on March 19, 2026, those memes returned, and memories resurfaced of their glory days.

In fact, they almost overshadowed remembrances of the movie star’s life.

What does it mean that many memories of Norris are more connected to a meme than his actual life and career? What gets left behind when a person becomes a digital object that we send over the internet? And what can memes tell us about how everyday people relate to celebrities – and to one another?

In the case of Norris, the actor and martial artist’s death forced some people to reconcile the memes with the man.

Macho man

Memes aren’t just memes. They might seem like trivial jokes, but my research has shown that they can shape how people understand and debate bigger cultural questions.

For example, Chuck Norris memes gave people a way to critique over-the-top ideas of masculinity and the pressure to live up to them. Whether it was memes crowing about his ability to slam a revolving door or kill two stones with one bird, only Norris, who stood at the apex of manliness, could pull off such impossible feats.

Other times, Norris’ “memeified” macho persona was deployed to advance misogyny: “Chuck Norris told a woman to CALM DOWN, and she did.” (As internet scholar Whitney Phillips explains, memes and humor have always been close relatives of the more toxic parts of online culture.)

Of course, Norris is hardly the only celebrity to have become memeified, and other celebrity memes routinely tap into the cultural zeitgeist.

When pop star Miley Cyrus released the music video for her song “Wrecking Ball” in 2013, it was quickly parodied and become the subject of countless memes. Many parodied her overt sexuality by swapping her out for someone decidedly less sexy on the wrecking ball. Or they spoofed her performance by playing the song over videos of other forms of destruction.

The man, the myth, the legend

Missing from all the meme nostalgia: Who was the real Chuck Norris?

After Norris’ death, social media users pointed to his past homophobic comments, in which he condemned the Boy Scouts of America’s – now Scouting America – inclusion of gay youth and leaders. There were his right-wing politics, including his friendships with Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush and his 2017 endorsement of Alabama U.S. Senate candidate Roy Moore – who, as the state’s chief judge, had ordered Alabama probate judges not to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples even after same-sex marriage had been legalized nationwide.

If those views and actions conflict with your own values, can you still laugh at Chuck Norris memes?

I certainly think so. Memes are special because there isn’t ever one fixed definition of what they mean, and the humor of a Chuck Norris meme can land even if you know nothing about his real life and career.

At the same time, in life and in death, the meme of Norris will always be connected to the person. The past few weeks have certainly brought these two versions of Norris into contact with one another. It’s up to everyone else to decide which version they remember most.

Democratizing stardom

For me, one of the most interesting aspects of memes is that stardom can happen from the ground up. Regular people decide what a meme is. Fame is no longer largely determined by film studios and mainstream media outlets.

The “Numa Numa Guy” – Gary Brolsma – became a meme after his 2003 video went viral. The “Success Kid” – Sammy Griner – turned into a meme thanks to a photo of him as a toddler clenching his fist in a display of satisfaction.

Why did these people become memes, but countless other YouTubers or kids making funny poses failed to launch? That’s just the unpredictability of the internet and the messiness of online culture.

Memes of existing celebrities also reflect this broader shift in control. No matter how much a studio tries to manage a star’s image, a meme can be created that takes on a life of its own.

Take, for example, Keanu Reeves, who was memeified after a photo of the actor sullenly eating a sandwich went viral. The meme began as a paparazzi photo but took off when everyday people photoshopped Reeves into ridiculous scenarios.

But whether they’re everyday people or famous celebrities, there’s a darker side to reducing people to pixelated, repurposed images: Over time, it can be incredibly difficult to separate the real person from the meme.

Laina Morris, for instance, has tried to move on from the image of her grinning, bug-eyed face that became a popular meme portraying her as an overly protective and clingy girlfriend.

People magazine profiled Morris for an article headlined “Overly Attached Girlfriend Gets Honest About Becoming a Meme,” which explored what it’s like to be constantly recognized as “that girl from that meme.”

Yet the fact that the publication still used “Overly Attached Girlfriend” in its headline shows just how difficult – or even impossible – it is to sever oneself from internet fame.

Chuck Norris, perhaps more than anyone, knew that all too well.

The Conversation

Ben Pettis does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. The two lives of Chuck Norris – https://theconversation.com/the-two-lives-of-chuck-norris-279430

The costume maker who convinced Hersheypark to embrace candy mascots and ‘chocolatize’ their old-timey theme park

Source: The Conversation – USA (2) – By John Haddad, Professor of American Studies, Penn State

The park, with its name originally two words, Hershey Park, opened in the early 1900s when Milton Hershey built it for his chocolate factory workers and their families. Mitchell Layton/Getty Images

A theme park has to have an identity. If you want to know the two things that Hersheypark does especially well, just approach the entrance.

There you will meet a friendly candy mascot – perhaps a Hershey bar, Reese’s Cup or Jolly Rancher. Soon thereafter, you will encounter Candymonium, one of the park’s newest colossal roller coasters. These marvels of engineering elevate riders as high as 210 feet (64 meters), send them through dizzying loops and corkscrews and propel them at speeds as high as 76 mph (122 kilometers per hour).

If you were to reduce the park’s formula for success to basic math, it would look like this: candy theme + thrill rides = fun.

It wasn’t always like this. Hersheypark became a theme park in 1973. If you had visited that year, no 7-foot Hershey bar would have greeted you. Instead, you would have experienced England during the reign of Queen Elizabeth, petted farm animals and watched a blacksmith bend metal into a horseshoe inside a barn.

And the only major roller coaster back then, the wooden Comet, had made its debut way back in 1946 and was hardly a marvel of modern engineering.

As a professor of American studies at Penn State Harrisburg who recently wrote a book on Hersheypark, I was surprised to learn in my research that the park has undergone a complete transformation since the 1970s.

An amusement park in decline

Hershey Park dates back to the early 1900s, when company founder Milton Hershey built it as a recreational venue for his chocolate factory workers and their families. The name was changed to Hersheypark, one word, in 1973.

Over the years, it evolved into a major amusement park that thrived in the 1940s and 1950s. On summer days, residents of Hershey and nearby towns would flock to the park to enjoy a day of picnics, carnival rides, band concerts, swimming and dancing. Looking back with nostalgia, many later referred to those decades as the golden era.

It was in the 1960s that the park first encountered problems. The rides had become old and outdated, and there were acts of vandalism. Many families stopped coming. One Hershey executive called it “an iron park with a bunch of clanging rides.”

In 1971, Hershey Estates, which owned the park, faced a momentous decision: renovate the park or close it forever. It chose the former.

Black-and-white photo of girl and boy standing in front of whirling amusement ride
Kids wait their turn for the carousel at Hershey Park circa 1965.
David Strickler/FPG/Hulton Archive via Getty Images

Disney raises the bar

Renovating required more than minor touch-ups. That was because the amusement park industry was evolving, thanks to Walt Disney. Actually, “evolving” does not capture the speed and magnitude of the change.

In 1955, Disneyland exploded on the scene as the nation’s first theme park. Theme parks differ from the old amusement parks in several ways. Enclosed behind a barrier, a theme park is immaculately clean and features fancy landscaping and roving mascots who pose for photos and spread positive vibes. The price of admission grants visitors access to all rides and attractions, which are, of course, themed.

Disneyland’s massive popularity sparked a theme park-building craze across the country in the 1960s that put pressure on traditional amusement parks, like Hershey Park, which suddenly seemed old-fashioned and behind the times.

In 1971, Hershey Estates hired the top firm in theme park design, Randall Duell and Associates, to convert Hershey Park into a Disneyland of the Northeast. They enclosed the park in fencing, charged a single price for admission and themed the whole place.

But what theme would work best? The answer seems like a no-brainer: Hershey’s famous candy brands, of course. But the brands were the property of Hershey Foods, which was separate from Hershey Estates. Hershey Foods, viewing Hersheypark as new and untested, did not want to risk visitors associating its brands with what could be a failing theme park.

Designers opted instead for a historical theme.

Adults and children on and around an amusement ride called 'Mini Comet'
The Mini Comet kiddie roller coaster at Hersheypark circa 1976-1978.
Maryann Brunner, CC BY-SA

A quaint makeover

If you were to visit Hersheypark in the 1970s, you would be taken back in time to experience Tudor England, the German Rhineland from the 18th century, the agrarian culture of the Pennsylvania Dutch, small-town America of yesteryear and the coal mining districts of Pennsylvania’s past.

The strategy was twofold. The local population could relish seeing their own history recreated, from the early migrations from Europe to the present day. At the same time, tourists from New York, Philadelphia, Washington and Baltimore could enjoy escaping their hectic urban lifestyles by traveling back to what was portrayed as simpler times.

In 1974, the park added mascots. It took a page out of Disney’s playbook and introduced the Furry Tales, a trio of woodland animals: Dutch the bear, Chip the chipmunk and Violet the skunk. The Furry Tales were Hersheypark’s answer to Mickey and Minnie Mouse and Donald Duck.

The person hired to fabricate these cute animal costumes was Bill Scollon. One day, Scollon asked Bruce McKinney, a Hershey executive, if he had considered candy-themed characters. After McKinney explained the unfortunate roadblock with Hershey Foods, Scollon had a hunch. When he acted on it, he would change Hersheypark forever.

Man in blue T-shirt and sunglasses hugs a chocolate bar mascot
In the early 1970s, Hershey Park changed its name to Hersheypark and became a one-price admission theme park.
Najlah Feanny/Corbis via Getty Images

Chocolatizing the park

Scollon suspected that Hershey Foods had failed to recognize the magic of product characters because they could not see and touch one. So he constructed a Reese’s Peanut Butter Cup suit, which he showed to McKinney. Impressed, McKinney escorted Scollon, in costume, to places where Hershey Foods executives would be. They too were delighted, and their resistance promptly melted away.

Once product characters strolled into the park in 1974, the floodgates opened. “We started to chocolatize Hersheypark,” McKinney recalled. “We Hersheyized everything.”

Hersheypark now had chocolate theming, but not thrill rides. Randall Duell’s firm discouraged parks from investing in costly roller coasters that appealed to teenagers but not other age demographics. Hersheypark reversed course in 1976, and this time McKinney was the catalyst.

That year, he was flipping through an industry trade journal when he happened upon a photograph of the Revolution, the first looping roller coaster of the modern era, under construction in West Germany. Later that year, the Revolution attracted huge crowds when it opened in Magic Mountain, a California theme park.

“I harbored all of these feelings,” McKinney recalled, “of what it would be like to have that thing in Hershey.”

The price tag was steep: US$3 million, which was a staggering amount at the time. But McKinney secured his prize. Hersheypark commissioned the company responsible for the Revolution to design a similar looping coaster for Hershey. In 1977, visitors streamed into Hersheypark all summer to experience the sensational sooperdooperLooper – and many then purchased an “I survived” T-shirt.

This spectacular success kindled a desire in Hersheypark officials to invest heavily in thrill rides. Today, the skyline in Hershey is dominated by roller coasters

What happened to those 1970s attractions? The Furry Tales coexisted with candy characters for about a decade before quietly vanishing in the 1980s. As for the history-themed areas, the thrill rides effectively pushed them to the background. Though some have been torn down and replaced by new and more exciting attractions, others have survived. That is because Hersheypark makes a conscious effort to preserve its colorful past. So if you look carefully as you stroll about the park, you will still witness remnants of this bygone era.

Read more of our stories about Philadelphia and Pennsylvania, or sign up for our Philadelphia newsletter on Substack.

The Conversation

John Haddad does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. The costume maker who convinced Hersheypark to embrace candy mascots and ‘chocolatize’ their old-timey theme park – https://theconversation.com/the-costume-maker-who-convinced-hersheypark-to-embrace-candy-mascots-and-chocolatize-their-old-timey-theme-park-269780

Iran’s president appeals to Americans − but does his office still hold any real power?

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Roxane Razavi, Visiting scholar in contemporary Middle Eastern history, Princeton University

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian attends the Quds Day march in Tehran on March 13, 2026. Hassan Ghaedi/Anadolu via Getty Images

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian penned an open letter to “the people of the United States” on April 1, 2026, in which he implored Americans to “look beyond” misinformation that portrayed Iran as a threat to the world.

It was, perhaps, his most prominent intervention during the current conflict. Despite being the president of a country in the midst of crisis, Pezeshkian hasn’t had the highest of war profiles.

Criticized by conservatives at home for his conciliatory tone, the reformist politician has also been sidelined by Iran’s adversaries. Western media initially appeared more interested in the musings of Pezeshkian’s son, Yousef. President Donald Trump has barely mentioned Pezeshkian, other than in an oblique social media post on April 1 in which he claimed “Iran’s new regime president” had asked the U.S. for a ceasefire – something denied by Iran.

International attention has instead largely centered on the role of Iran’s supreme leader. First, it was about who would succeed Ali Khamenei after his killing in the first strikes of the war, and then what was known about his successor and son, Mojtaba Khamenei.

As a researcher of contemporary Iranian politics, I think this focus on the supreme leader over the president inadvertently confirms a trend in Iran that has been happening for years: the cementing of a political structure that increasingly resembles a centralized dictatorship.

A man clasps his hands while sat in front of a photo of three men.
Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian records a video message on March 20, 2026.
AA Video/Anadolu via Getty Images

An uneasy balance

The concentration of power around one figure sits uneasily with one of the founding impulses of the 1979 revolution that ushered in the Islamic Republic. A wide spectrum of revolutionary actors – Islamists, leftists and secular nationalists – were involved in the ousting of the shah. But they shared at least one principle: the rejection of monarchy.

The idea that one generation could not determine the political future of the next was precisely what many revolutionaries, despite their internal differences, had fought against.

As such, the system that initially emerged in 1979 was neither a pure theocracy nor a conventional republic. The supreme leader would exercise ultimate religious and political authority, and an elected president was to embody the republican dimension of the state. This second part gave institutional form to the revolutionary promise that people, through elections, would periodically renew political authority.

In the first decade after the revolution, this balance functioned, albeit in a fragile and conflictual manner.

The authority of Ruhollah Khomeini, the Islamic Republic’s first supreme leader, coexisted with the presidency – most notably during the brief presidency of Abolhassan Bani Sadr. Elected in 1980, Bani Sadr quickly came into conflict with clerical factions over the direction of the revolution and the conduct of the Iran-Iraq war.

Accused of political incompetence, Bani Sadr was impeached by parliament in 1981 and subsequently fled into exile.

A man in glasses stands behind microphones
Iran’s first post-revolution president, Abolhassan Bani Sadr, in exile in France in 1981.
Marc Bulka/Gamma-Rapho via Getty Images

The presidency of his successor, Ali Khamenei, marked a period of relative alignment with the supreme leader. Operating under Khomeini’s authority, Khamenei operated less as an autonomous political force than as an instrument embedded within a broader clerical and revolutionary consensus.

The dynamic between president and supreme leader was further redefined by the 1989 constitutional revision following Khomeini’s death and the elevation of Khamenei from president to supreme leader. The post of prime minister was abolished, consolidating executive authority in the presidency. At the same time, the institutional and political supremacy of the supreme leader was strengthened.

The weakening presidency

The presidency of Mohammad Khatami, who was elected in 1997, demonstrated that the office could still function as a significant locus of power. As Khatami’s tenure showed, presidents were still able to shape public discourse and policy agendas, particularly in areas such as cultural policy, foreign relations and economic management.

But a major turning point in the power of the office occurred in 2009 with the contested reelection of the hard-liner president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, amid widespread allegations of electoral fraud.

It led to mass demonstrations that became known as the “Green Movement.” The state responded with the repression of protesters, followed by a consolidation of the security apparatus – particularly the expanding influence of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps around the supreme leader.

At the same time, it marked the beginning of Ahmadinejad’s falling out of favor. His populist rhetoric and attempts to build an independent political base led to confrontations with clerical authorities in the early 2010s. It also exposed the regime’s intolerance for even a relatively autonomous presidency.

It contributed to a power struggle between Ahmadinejad and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei that became public in 2011 when the then-president sought to dismiss Intelligence Minister Heydar Moslehi – only to be overruled by Khamanei.

Ahmadinejad was subsequently excluded from the 2017 presidential race by the Guardian Council, a body handpicked by the supreme leader. In so doing, Khamenei made it clear that while the office of the presidency could remain, it would cease to function as an independent center of decision-making and power.

Since then, presidents have continued to be elected, but their capacity to reshape the political order has been diminished sharply.

Two women hold posters with a man's face on it.
Supporters of hard-line Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
Salah Malkawi/Getty Images

The presidency of Hassan Rouhani briefly appeared to be an exception. His election in 2013, and the subsequent negotiation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, generated both domestic expectations and significant international attention.

Yet the durability of the agreement remained contingent on decisions taken beyond the presidency, both internationally and domestically. Its eventual unraveling during the first Trump administration confirmed suspicions among Iranian hard-liners around the supreme leader that reform, an independent power center in the presidency and diplomacy with the U.S. had been a mistake.

With even the limited form of democratic expression as embodied through an elected president suppressed, political disengagement has followed. Although voter turnout remained significant in the years immediately following 2009, a longer-term trend has seen people give up faith in elective politics in Iran. In the last election, held in 2024, just 39.9% of Iranians turned out to vote.

Consolidation of power

This diminishing of the role of the presidency and political legitimacy forms the background to any questions of succession now. But by reducing the political future of the country to the identity of future supreme leaders, observers risk normalizing the transformation of what was historically a contested and hybrid political system into one defined by a single office.

The bloody suppression of the January 2026 protests, the constraints imposed by wartime conditions and the increasing marginalization of elective institutions have all contributed to weakening the presidency.

The fallout of the current war may, of course, see a reorganization of political institutions in Iran. But for now, when Pezeshkian seeks diplomacy with Americans, the pertinent question is: Does his office still matter?

The Conversation

Roxane Razavi receives funding from the EHESS (PhD funding).

ref. Iran’s president appeals to Americans − but does his office still hold any real power? – https://theconversation.com/irans-president-appeals-to-americans-but-does-his-office-still-hold-any-real-power-278705

An ancient oracle warned invading Persia would backfire – from Croesus to Trump, rulers have failed to listen

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Peter Edwell, Associate Professor in Ancient History, Macquarie University

Photo by Stefano Bianchetti/Corbis via Getty Images

Invasions of ancient Persia were always daunting tasks. They often led to disaster.

In the 6th and 5th centuries BCE, the Persian empire came to dominate a vast and varied geography with Iran at its heart.

Comprising modern Iran, Iraq, Turkey, the Persian Gulf and parts of other neighbouring countries, the Persian Empire was established and ruled by the Achaemenids. This powerful dynasty lasted all the way to about 330 BCE when Alexander the Great defeated its last ruler, Darius III.

But in the early days of this Achaemenid Persian expansion (546 BCE), the legendary King Croesus (from Lydia, in western Turkey) decided to challenge it.

Reputedly the richest man in the world, Croesus consulted the famed Oracle of Apollo at Delphi (in Greece). The oracle, according to ancient writer Herodotus, told Croesus:

that if he should send an army against the Persians he would destroy a great empire.

Croesus’ subsequent invasion and defeat by the Persian king, Cyrus, saw the destruction of his own empire. The oracle accurately foretold the outcome but not as Croesus had hoped.

Croesus wasn’t the last ruler to invade Persia and realise he’d bitten off more than he could chew.

From the 6th century BCE to the 4th century CE, Greeks and Romans invaded Persia multiple times. The risks were high, the logistics complicated.

In fact – as US President Donald Trump is now discovering – wars like these, in this part of the world, are a lot easier to start than they are to end.

Complex and high-risk

The vast resources and manpower of the Achaemenid empire, together with its varied geography, made any invasion of Persia complex and high-risk.

When Alexander the Great (also known as Alexander III of Macedon) invaded in 334 BCE, he led stunning military successes against the Persians over the next few years.

But by the time of his premature death in Babylon in 323 BCE, organisation of the vast territory he had conquered was a hodge-podge of short-term arrangements.

Over time, the memory of Alexander in the Iranian territories he conquered was one of contempt. The Persian territory he conquered couldn’t be held by his successors.

Around 70 years after Alexander’s death, a new dynasty emerged in Iran.

Known as the Arsacid Parthians, they would dominate much of the former Achaemenid territory for centuries.

The Arsacid Parthians became the key rivals of the Romans as they (the Romans) expanded further east from the 1st century BCE onwards.

The first invasion of the Parthian empire by the Romans ended in total disaster – for the Romans.

The Roman general Crassus invaded Parthian imperial territory in southern Turkey in 53 BCE. The Parthian army annihilated Crassus’ forces near the city of Carrhae. Around 20,000 Roman soldiers died (including Crassus and his son) and 10,000 were captured.

This disaster would live in the Roman memory for centuries.

‘A source of constant wars and great expense’

Even when Roman invasions of the Parthian empire in the 2nd century CE were successful, there was often a sting in the tail. The emperor Trajan invaded all the way to the Persian Gulf in 116/117 CE but couldn’t hold any of his gains.

Later in the 2nd century CE, Roman invasions of the Parthian empire did see territorial gains in Mesopotamia (southern Turkey).

But one contemporary Roman writer, Cassius Dio, thought these gains were more trouble than they were worth:

He [emperor Septimius Severus] used to declare that he had added a vast territory to the empire and had made it a bulwark of Syria. On the contrary, it is shown by the facts themselves that this conquest has been a source of constant wars and great expense to us.

From loss to ultimate humiliation

In the 3rd century CE, the Sasanian dynasty took control of Iran and Mesopotamia from the Parthians. The Sasanian Persians inflicted serious defeats on invading Roman armies in the centuries ahead.

The Roman emperor Gordian III died in battle against the Sasanians in 244 CE. He led a large-scale invasion of the Persian empire but died trying to attack the capital, Seleucia-Ctesiphon. His successor (Philip I) signed a humiliating peace treaty to ransom what was left of the army.

But the ultimate humiliations for Roman emperors were yet to come.

In 260 CE, the emperor Valerian was captured by the Persian king, Shapur I.

Legendary accounts claimed Valerian served as a footstool for Shapur when he mounted his horse.

Rock reliefs from the 3rd century depicting Valerian and Philip I in subjection to Shapur survive in Iran to this day.

Around a century later, the emperor Julian died while invading the Persian empire. Leading an army of 60,000 men, Julian suffered a heavy defeat and was killed north of the Persian capital, Seleucia-Ctesiphon.

The ensuing peace treaty saw Rome lose key territory and fortresses in northern Mesopotamia.

It would take more than a century for Rome to recover from this defeat.

Most ancient invasions of the Persian empire caused serious problems for those who prosecuted them.

The varied and sometimes harsh nature of the geography was an important factor. The national resolve and military preparedness were others.

While the current US-Israel war against Iran is different in many ways to ancient wars directed at Persia, the 3rd-century Sasanian rock reliefs are reminders of what can go wrong.

The Conversation

Peter Edwell receives funding from the Australian Research Council.

ref. An ancient oracle warned invading Persia would backfire – from Croesus to Trump, rulers have failed to listen – https://theconversation.com/an-ancient-oracle-warned-invading-persia-would-backfire-from-croesus-to-trump-rulers-have-failed-to-listen-279750

Where is transatlantic intelligence-sharing headed under the Trump administration?

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Hager Ben Jaffel, Docteure en relations internationales spécialisée dans la sociologie du renseignement et de la sécurité, Institut catholique de Lille (ICL)

Repeated threats to annex Greenland, controversial diplomatic statements, and, more broadly, the antagonistic stance of the American executive toward Europeans point to an unprecedented climate of distrust among transatlantic allies, of which the latest Davos forum provided a revealing example. But what about alliances between intelligence services?

Often perceived as domestic instruments of political power, intelligence services are, in fact, highly internationalised and enjoy significant autonomy in their dealings with foreign counterparts, though this can occasionally be disrupted by political interference.

A history of long-standing collaborations

Cooperation between intelligence services is not new. Some partnerships date back at least to the First World War and are often the result of agreements between services themselves rather than formal decisions by governments. Whether bilateral or multilateral, these alliances underpin a wide range of activities: liaison officers posted abroad, listening stations, participation in international conferences, and routine exchanges of information.

International cooperation built on common ground and trust

Research in the social sciences has shown how, over time, a dense network of relationships has developed around shared interests. Counterterrorism, nuclear non-proliferation and other perceived imminent threats have provided strong justification for cooperation, including the exchange of data on individuals, organizations or states considered “dangerous.” The widely held belief that sharing information helps prevent attacks has also encouraged the expansion of surveillance mechanisms – often at the expense of robust democratic oversight.

One example is the many partnerships between the National Security Agency (NSA) and several European counterparts. These collaborations have enabled the pooling of advanced technologies – such as artificial intelligence and algorithmic analysis – to collect and process large volumes of private communications. This work also depends on explicit alliances between intelligence agencies and major tech companies, which have become key intermediaries that, willingly or not, make their users’ data available to intelligence services.

The solidarity and trust on display should not obscure the fact that international cooperation remains a space marked by strong rivalries. Services compete to access information, shape priorities and secure an advantageous position in relationships where resources – financial, human, or technical – are unevenly distributed. In this context, espionage between services and other disloyal practices are also part of the game.

These dynamics suggest that intelligence alliances follow a logic of their own rather than unwavering loyalty to political authority. It is in this context that the Danish military intelligence service monitored the communications of several European political leaders on behalf of the NSA. Above all, because they possess in-depth knowledge of the threats facing the world, intelligence services are able to position themselves at the heart of security decision-making, making political leaders dependent on their expertise.

Continuity despite political interference

That said, these alliances are not immune to political pressures. Disputes between intelligence services and political leaders have always existed, but the openly hostile attitude of the “reactionary internationale” embodied by the Trump administration and its MAGA supporters has raised concerns about a possible breakdown – or at least a significant weakening of cooperation.

Faced with an unfavourable political context, they are often able to adjust and even turn the situation to their advantage.

Several European intelligence services have thus strengthened their cooperation, even raising the possibility of creating a European Five Eyes – in reference to the Anglosphere intelligence alliance linking Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States to countries in Europe and Asia.

Others have specifically developed units to better anticipate the unpredictability of the American executive, with tangible effects: staffing in the unit dealing with the United States within France’s DGSE has increased, and the budgets of several European intelligence services are set to rise, benefiting from broader increases in defence spending.

More broadly, history shows that ties between services remain strong even when governments hold divergent positions. In the early 2000s, exchanges between the DGSE and the CIA continued despite disagreements over the war in Iraq.

A more recent example is Brexit, which did not lead to any major rupture in relations between the British police and their European counterparts, who continue to facilitate the flow of intelligence.

As in any relationship, signs of caution, distrust, or even ambivalence can emerge. For example, the British and Danish intelligence services have indicated that they are limiting – but not completely halting – their exchanges with their American counterparts, concerned about the legal implications and, more broadly, the politicisation of US intelligence. Irritated by repeated provocations over Greenland, the Danish military intelligence service went so far as to designate the United States as a national security threat, alongside China and Russia.

Nonetheless, it would be incorrect to assume that, under more normal circumstances, intelligence sharing would happen without any restrictions. Services do not share all their secrets, all the time, with everyone. On the contrary, the restraint shown by some reflects a routine asymmetry in exchanges that persists and can even be heightened during periods of turbulence.

Signs of continuity are evident, underscoring a key reality: intelligence primarily falls under the purview of career professionals, not politicians. Earlier this year, the Davos forum hosted European and Anglo-American intelligence chiefs, including the CIA, in a key meeting to preserve ties with the “Old Continent”.

Trump and the ‘deep state:‘ a love-hate relationship

Concerns among European services are partly linked to Donald Trump’s stated desire to dismantle the “deep state.” While he did follow through on some threats by dismissing personnel within intelligence agencies, these institutions have neither disappeared nor ceased to function. In practice, the executive branch remains dependent on them.

The appointment of controversial figures to lead several agencies, instead of career officials, reflects an effort to align leadership more closely with political and ideological priorities. Current international developments show that intelligence services remain essential to the implementation of foreign policy. Long criticised, the CIA now appears to have returned to favour with the White House, taking advantage of the opportunities offered by the fight against drug trafficking and the conflict in Iran to reaffirm its relevance and legitimacy to political power.

Taken together, these developments highlight the complexity of the relationship between intelligence services and political power – one shaped by both distance and proximity.


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The Conversation

Hager Ben Jaffel ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.

ref. Where is transatlantic intelligence-sharing headed under the Trump administration? – https://theconversation.com/where-is-transatlantic-intelligence-sharing-headed-under-the-trump-administration-279135

Les médias français sont-ils racistes ?

Source: The Conversation – in French – By Pascale Colisson, chercheure en science de l’information et de la communication, IPJ, associée à la chaire management diversités et cohésion sociale, Université Paris Dauphine – PSL

Allusion au fait que l’« Homo Sapiens descend des singes », au « chef de tribu », au « mâle dominant » : sur la chaîne Cnews, Bally Bagayoko, nouveau maire de Saint-Denis, en Seine-Saint-Denis, a été victime de propos racistes. Ce dernier appelle à un grand « rassemblement citoyen » contre le racisme et les discriminations samedi 4 avril. Mais au-delà de ces attaques récentes, il est essentiel d’interroger les stéréotypes qui imprègnent la culture médiatique dominante.


Les propos tenus dans certains médias à l’encontre de maires noirs nouvellement élus provoquent réactions et indignations sélectives et interrogent la responsabilité des journalistes dans la perpétuation des stéréotypes racistes. Mais si certains propos véhiculés consciemment par une parole d’extrême droite cristallisent le débat, cela ne doit pas occulter le fait que ces biais racistes s’invitent depuis toujours, sous une forme plus ou moins consciente, dans les productions médiatiques.

Selon le sociologue Samuel Bouron, l’extrême droite diffuse ses idées en jouant sur la culture du buzz et la captation des affects, mais aussi sur les contraintes journalistiques en détournant leurs normes. Une stratégie portée par la recherche de l’audience fondée sur l’économie de l’attention et la surmédiatisation de certains faits, en particulier les faits divers contribuant à la fabrique de paniques morales, ce que le sociologue britannique Stanley Cohen définit par « une réaction collective disproportionnée à des pratiques culturelles ou personnelles en général minoritaires, considérées comme “déviantes” ou néfastes pour la société ».

Les stéréotypes, constante de la production médiatique

Nombreux sont les rapports, études et travaux de recherche qui montrent comment les stéréotypes liés à l’origine, la couleur de peau, la religion, se croisant parfois avec le lieu de résidence, en particulier les banlieues, imprègnent de façon plus ou moins consciente et conscientisée les pratiques professionnelles. La sociologie du journalisme montre ainsi comment les acteurs et actrices du métier partagent une identité aux contours flous, marquée par des représentations sociales très ancrées, très souvent stéréotypées, et assez peu conformes à la réalité.

Dès 2000, des travaux sur la représentation des minorités dites visibles à la télévision sont réalisés, lesquels pointent la minorisation et la disqualification de ces minorités. C’est d’ailleurs à partir de 2000 que le CSA, ancêtre de l’Arcom, modifie le cahier des charges des télévisions publiques et les conventions des chaînes privées pour leur imposer de « prendre en considération, dans la représentation à l’antenne, la diversité des origines et des cultures de la communauté nationale ».

Par ailleurs, les chaînes publiques comme les chaînes privées doivent rendre un bilan annuel sur « la représentation des minorités », obligation étendue aux radios en 2005.

Pourtant, le baromètre de la diversité, publié tous les ans par le CSA puis par l’Arcom depuis 2012, signale que, sur la période 2013-2023, les personnes non blanches sont représentées en moyenne à hauteur de 15 %, mais dans les programmes d’information/magazine/documentaire, elles apparaissent deux fois plus souvent parmi celles ayant une attitude négative que parmi celles ayant une attitude neutre. Cette attitude négative relève souvent d’activités décrites comme marginales ou illégales.

Si, sur cette période, les personnes perçues comme noires étaient représentées en moyenne 1,5 fois plus souvent parmi celles ayant une attitude négative que parmi celles ayant une attitude neutre, on observe une recrudescence de leur représentation négative puisque, en 2023, elles étaient 4 fois plus souvent représentées parmi les personnes ayant une attitude négative que parmi les personnes ayant une attitude neutre.

Les Noirs ont un corps, les Blancs ont un cerveau

Les nombreux travaux de recherche dans le domaine du sport montrent de façon significative une récurrence des renvois aux dispositions naturelles et une dimension « animale » voire « sauvage » pour les athlètes de couleur, des qualités de stratèges, de tacticiens et d’éthique pour les athlètes blancs.‬

Dans un autre cadre, des travaux ont mis en lumière le positionnement médiatique de l’origine des personnes au prisme de l’égalité des sexes. Nacira Guénif-Souilamas a ainsi analysé le stéréotype de la « beurette » qui porte une injonction à l’émancipation, et donc d’intégration, avec en sous-texte les valeurs républicaines contre le machisme présupposé inhérent au « garçon arabe », perçu comme naturellement violent et prédateur et supposément opposé à l’égalité femme-homme.

Les traitements médiatiques de l’origine, de l’immigration ou encore de l’islam se rejoignent souvent au sein d’un même territoire, celui que l’on réduit au terme de « banlieue », une désignation très réductrice au regard de la multiplicité des situations économiques et sociales de ces grands ensembles urbains. Les « banlieues » concentrent ainsi une forme d’intersectionnalité des stéréotypes négatifs. Une réalité mise en lumière en particulier par l’analyse de la couverture médiatique de la banlieue par le « 20 heures » de France 2 réalisée par le sociologue Jérôme Berthaut en 2013.

Cela commence par la conférence de rédaction, puissant lieu de prescription des priorités éditoriales et des bonnes façons de faire du journalisme. Cela se poursuit par l’action sur le terrain où les contraintes qui pèsent sur les reporters les encouragent à opter pour des procédés de raccourcis qui favorisent, dès la phase de la collecte de l’information, la mobilisation, sous un mode non réflexif et relevant de la routine, de stéréotypes récurrents sur « les banlieues ». Ceci se poursuit au moment du choix final, dans la sélection des sources, des images gardées au montage, les commentaires et la validation de la hiérarchie.

Les travaux de Julie Sedel complètent l’analyse en relevant la place prépondérante donnée aux faits divers violents lorsque les médias traitent des quartiers défavorisés de banlieue :

« La montée d’un traitement “fait-diversier” des “banlieues”, qui s’est opéré dans les années 1990 dans la presse, constitue bien le symptôme d’une dépolitisation dans la mesure où est évacuée la dimension “sociale”, c’est-à-dire aussi, politique, conflictuelle, au profit d’un fétichisme des “faits” et, en particulier, des faits de délinquance », écrit-elle.

La composition des rédactions en question

D’un point de vue qualitatif, j’ai mené un travail de recherche sur la diversité dans les médias fondé sur des entretiens avec 40 jeunes journalistes travaillant dans tous types de médias, pour tenter d’éclairer le débat sur trois dimensions : 1) Comment le fait de ne pas se reconnaître dans le groupe dominant affecte la façon dont on se positionne dans une rédaction, à la fois de façon personnelle et professionnelle ; 2) Quels sont les freins qui limitent les personnes, dites de la diversité, dans le fait d’être pleinement reconnues pour ce qu’elles sont, et pleinement légitimes à exercer le métier de journaliste ; 3) Quelles sont leurs marges de manœuvre en matière de transformation organisationnelle et de production de l’information.

Ces jeunes journalistes expriment toutes et tous le fait de vivre l’expérience minoritaire :

« Et comme d’habitude, je comptais en arrivant le nombre de personnes noires dans la rédaction, et j’étais toujours la seule, systématiquement la seule. »

Bien souvent, la prise en compte de la diversité ethno-raciale reste un impensé : il s’agit moins d’une volonté d’exclusion que d’une absence de prise en considération de la question soulevée :

« Bien sûr, on est ouverts, on est tous bienveillants, on n’est pas du tout racistes. Après les journalistes, ils sont tous blancs, les seuls Arabes, ils sont aux réseaux sociaux et les seuls Noirs, ils font le ménage. Mais on va t’expliquer que c’est parce qu’on n’a pas les profils et que, de toute façon, comme on ne voit pas les couleurs, quand on recrute, on ne fait pas attention. Bah oui, mais quand on ne voit pas les couleurs, on ne recrute que des gens blancs. »

Plusieurs témoignages évoquent des situations de racisme à la suite de certains faits d’actualité, en particulier ceux qui relèvent d’attentats, de terrorisme et d’islam. S’instaure un présupposé identitaire de leurs sympathies ou affinités, et un procès en militantisme récurrent dès qu’ils et elles tentent de proposer un autre récit médiatique.

Une différence d’appréciation qui se cristallise particulièrement sur certains sujets de société vus comme clivants, comme ceux de l’origine, de l’islam et du voile :

« Le directeur du web (d’une chaîne de télévision nationale) vient nous voir et nous dit : “Ah, super votre émission ! mais ce serait bien de montrer comment les femmes sont soumises, comment elles sont obligées de porter le voile.” Et on lui explique que notre sujet, c’était une petite femme de 1,60 m, voilée, qui prend des repris de justice pour les insérer socialement en leur faisant faire des maraudes, de l’aide humanitaire, etc. Et il fait comprendre un peu plus directement qu’il aimerait avoir ce sujet-là, sur les femmes voilées soumises, qui correspond à son imaginaire. »

Le choix médiatique de montrer à l’écran une femme portant le voile est si clivant qu’il peut générer une forme d’autocensure, anticipant sur les réactions présupposées de la hiérarchie :

« Pour le JT, moi, je n’ai jamais filmé une femme voilée. Je le savais, avec des collègues, qu’au montage, ça ne passait pas. Donc pourquoi aller filmer ? À part si tu fais un sujet sur l’islam. Mais, par exemple, un sujet sur l’informatique, une femme voilée qui est prof, tu ne peux pas aller la filmer. Ils ont tellement peur du téléspectateur ou de ce qu’ils projettent sur le téléspectateur, il y a un truc de l’ordre du : “On va se prendre 15 000 lettres, il va y avoir les tweets, machin, donc faisons simple.” »

Ces jeunes journalistes jouent de leur marge de manœuvre, même restreinte, pour semer des petites graines, en proposant un traitement de l’information, visant à sortir de l’assimilation de certaines personnes à certains sujets, qui relève souvent de stéréotypes très ancrés dans la profession :

« Pour le premier tour de l’élection présidentielle, j’ai recueilli des témoignages d’électeurs ou d’abstentionnistes et il y avait madame Martin, il y avait monsieur Sekou, éboueur à Pantin, qui a la nationalité française depuis quinze ans et pour qui le vote, c’est super important, il y avait une femme d’origine maghrébine, une jeune femme blanche. Mon objectif, c’est d’essayer d’aller vers des profils les plus différents possibles pour des sujets de monsieur et madame Tout-le-Monde. »

On voit à quel point la question du racisme et des stéréotypes dans les médias relève de causes multifactorielles, qui participent à la perpétuation d’un modèle dominant des récits. Le chemin est encore long et il commence par le fait de sortir d’une forme de déni, à tous les niveaux de l’organisation. Le mot de la fin sera celui d’un jeune journaliste :

« Je ne pense pas que le fait d’être d’autres origines ou d’avoir une histoire différente permette d’être un meilleur journaliste. Cela permet d’avoir un regard différent, une parole différente, ça oui. Je ne dis pas que quelqu’un qui a toujours vécu en milieu aisé, blanc, aseptisé, et d’une culture en particulier, ferait un moins bon journaliste, mais il aura un regard différent. En fait, je pense qu’il faut tous les regards et toutes les expériences pour raconter toutes les histoires qui composent une société, pour raconter le monde de la manière la plus fidèle possible. »

The Conversation

Pascale Colisson ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.

ref. Les médias français sont-ils racistes ? – https://theconversation.com/les-medias-francais-sont-ils-racistes-279934

Comment est fixé le prix d’un litre de carburant ?

Source: The Conversation – France (in French) – By Salomée Ruel, Professeur, Pôle Léonard de Vinci

Pour un litre d’essence à 2,03 euros, le droit d’accise (ex-TICPE) représente 40,4 %, le pétrole brut 28,6 %, la distribution 14,4 %, la TVA 8,6 %. Gautier Normand/Shutterstock

Les prix à la pompe montent comme une fusée, mais descendent comme une plume. Un paradoxe en apparence mystérieux. En réalité, un litre de carburant est la somme de trois paramètres : le produit, à savoir le pétrole brut qui est ensuite raffiné, le couple logistique et distribution, et surtout les taxes. Comprendre cette décomposition clarifie les éventuelles marges de manœuvre de l’État, des producteurs et des distributeurs.


Au début était le produit, l’« or noir ». Le carburant vient du pétrole brut, souvent indexé sur le prix du Brent, converti du dollar vers l’euro, puis transformé dans des raffineries. À l’ouverture de la bourse, le 15 février 2026, le prix d’un baril de Brent était de 68,54 dollars (59,77 euros), de 100,88 dollars (87,98 euros) le 24 mars 2026 et de 106,6 dollars (92,97 euros) le 30 mars 2026.

Décomposition du prix de SP95 en France en 2026.
Roole

Logiquement, lorsque le prix d’un baril de Brent augmente (ou quand l’euro baisse), le coût de matières premières dans le prix final du carburant augmente lui aussi. À l’inverse, si le prix du pétrole brut diminue, mécaniquement le coût de matière première baisse, mais pas toujours instantanément ! En effet, il existe des délais liés aux stocks ou aux circuits d’approvisionnement.

Un ordre de grandeur aide à se repérer : un baril de Brent contient 159 litres. Une variation de dix dollars supplémentaires par baril (8,69 euros) fait monter le prix d’un litre d’essence de 6 cents de dollars (0,052 centime d’euro) « avant taxes », auxquels s’ajoutent les effets du taux de change et du raffinage.

Prix d’un baril de Brent au 31 mars 2025, 73,76 dollars ; au 31 mars 2026, 115,04 dollars.
Boursorama

Du dépôt pétrolier vers la station-service

Une autre partie du prix concerne le transport, le stockage et la vente de carburant depuis les dépôts pétroliers vers les stations-service.

Ces coûts logistiques augmentent année après année du fait de l’inflation – 5,2 % en 2022 et 0,9 % en 2025. Des salaires plus hauts ou une mise aux normes auront des conséquences sur le prix du carburant. D’après l’Insee, depuis 2022, les coûts de transport-distribution ont augmenté « plus modérément » que le pétrole brut et le raffinage, mais tout de même d’environ + 9 centimes d’euros par litre sur la période étudiée.

Avant même la marge des stations-service, une part du prix reflète des marges en amont, notamment la marge de raffinage et les conditions du marché de gros. Elles peuvent varier rapidement, notamment en cas de tensions logistiques.

Autre point important : malgré les débats, la marge nette d’une station-service reste généralement faible. De 2 centimes d’euros par litre pour les stations en grande distribution à environ 8 centimes d’euros par litre pour des stations plus onéreuses du réseau des indépendants.

Les consommateurs peuvent suivre en temps réel les prix des carburants dans les stations-service de l’Hexagone.
Gouv.fr

Taxes de l’État

Les taxes, fixées par l’État et complétées par les régions, sont la part la plus visible du prix d’un litre de carburant. Elles représentent entre 50 % et 60 % du prix final, selon le type de carburant et le niveau du baril. Résultat : quand le prix du brut varie, seule une partie du prix à la pompe peut s’ajuster, le reste étant fiscal et donc relativement rigide.

Deux éléments sont à prendre en compte :

  • L’accise (ex-taxe intérieure de consommation sur les produits énergétiques, ou TICPE), qui représente 36 % du prix à la pompe du gazole et 39 % de celui du sans-plomb (SP95). Le montant fixe par litre (en 2026, hors majorations régionales, est de 68,29 centimes d’euros par litre pour l’essence et 59,40 centimesd’euros par litre pour le gazole. L’accise nationale est stable depuis 2018.

  • La taxe sur la valeur ajoutée (TVA), à 20 % depuis 2006, qui s’applique sur le prix hors taxe, mais aussi sur l’accise. Quand le prix du produit monte, la TVA augmente mécaniquement.

En 2025, toutes les régions, sauf la Corse, ont adopté la majoration maximale du taux de l’accise.

Effets contre-intuitifs d’une baisse de taxe

Du côté de l’État, le principale marge de manœuvre est fiscale. Par exemple, modifier l’accise temporairement ou durablement, et jouer sur des dispositifs de compensation comme les « remises » universelles ou ciblées.

En 2026, le gouvernement de Sébastien Lecornu privilégie un plan de soutien de 70 millions d’euros avec des « aides ciblées ».




À lire aussi :
Comment la révolution iranienne engendra le second choc pétrolier de 1979


Toute baisse de taxe a un coût budgétaire très significatif, car l’accise sur les carburants reste une recette majeure. En 2022, les remises sur les prix à la pompe avaient coûté plus de huit milliards d’euros à l’État ; en 2023, les chèques carburants près d’un milliard.

À noter un élément essentiel contre-intuitif : quand les prix augmentent, les automobilistes finissent souvent par réduire leur consommation. Or, l’accise est perçue par litre. Par conséquent, si les volumes baissent, les recettes d’accise baissent aussi, ce qui peut annuler (voire inverser) le gain de TVA lié à un prix plus élevé.

Marges (faibles) des distributeurs

Affiche de l’« opération transparence » carburant.
40 millions d’automobilistes, CC BY-NC

Côté distributeurs, les stations-service, comme celles Shell, Avia, TotalEnergies, Carrefour, Leclerc ou Esso, peuvent ajuster leurs marges. Sur un produit très concurrentiel comme le carburant, il n’est question que de quelques centimes seulement.

C’est pourquoi la Fédération nationale de l’automobile et l’association 40 millions d’automobilistes (opposée aux radars urbains et aux pistes cyclables à Paris après le confinement) ont lancé le 19 mars 2026 « l’opération transparence ». L’enjeu : afficher à leur caisse le détail précis du prix d’un litre de carburant.

« Rockets and Feathers »

« Les prix montent comme une fusée, mais descendent comme une plume. » En économie, ce phénomène est connu sous le nom de Rockets and Feathers. Une étude sur le marché britannique souligne que les prix de détail s’ajustent plus rapidement quand les coûts augmentent que lorsqu’ils baissent. Une autre étude, aux États-Unis, confirme cette contradiction.

Évolution des prix des carburants en France de 2007 à 2026.
Roole, CC BY-NC

Cette asymétrie apparaît pour plusieurs raisons.

Délais et stocks

Une station vend « aujourd’hui » du carburant acheté « hier ». Si le brut baisse, le prix « théorique » baisse tout de suite, mais le carburant en cuve a été payé à l’ancien coût.

À l’inverse, quand les coûts montent, le risque de vendre à perte rend l’ajustement plus rapide. Car, la vente à perte est une pratique commerciale interdite.




À lire aussi :
Pourquoi les frappes sur l’Iran nous rappellent qu’il est urgent d’abandonner le pétrole


Coûts d’ajustement et de coordination

Dans beaucoup de réseaux de distribution, les prix sont modifiés « par salves » plutôt qu’en continu. Les stations ne révisent pas leur affichage à chaque microvariation du marché, mais à des moments précis (par exemple, une ou deux fois par jour), souvent en regardant les prix des stations voisines. Ce mode d’ajustement peut rendre les baisses plus lentes, parce que la station attend davantage d’informations (confirmation de la baisse) ou le « bon moment » pour s’aligner.

Comportement des automobilistes

Quand les prix flambent, les consommateurs comparent plus, changent de station, et la concurrence « s’active » : d’où les mises à jour de prix plus régulières. Quand les prix baissent, la pression concurrentielle est généralement moins intense. La baisse se diffuse alors plus lentement.

Taxes « rigides »

La présence d’une accise fixe, ou « rigidifie », le prix. Quand le produit baisse, la part fiscale reste la même. Logiquement, la baisse totale à la pompe est mécaniquement moins spectaculaire que la variation du pétrole (et donc, parfois moins visible).

Coûts à long-terme

Quand l’actualité géopolitique se tend, notamment dans le détroit d’Ormuz, c’est surtout le « paramètre produit » qui s’emballe, puis qui se transmet implacablement vers les pompes des stations-service. Par conséquent, les automobilistes voient leur facture en carburant augmenter inexorablement.

Pour pallier ces hausses tarifaires, l’État dispose d’un levier réel via les taxes (TVA et droit d’accise), mais il est politiquement sensible et coûteux pour les finances publiques.

Les producteurs de pétrole, comme le Canada, l’Arabie saoudite ou le Kazakhstan, influencent l’amont via le niveau de production et le prix d’un baril de pétrole brut (Brent). Les distributeurs jouent surtout sur la vitesse de répercussion des prix, avec des bénéfices limités.

Ces marges de manœuvre existent, mais elles sont rarement immédiates, et presque toujours assorties d’un coût à moyen terme et long terme.

The Conversation

Salomée Ruel ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.

ref. Comment est fixé le prix d’un litre de carburant ? – https://theconversation.com/comment-est-fixe-le-prix-dun-litre-de-carburant-279632

Pam Bondi’s extreme political loyalty to Trump wasn’t enough to save her job

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Austin Sarat, William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Jurisprudence and Political Science, Amherst College

President Donald Trump participates in a roundtable discussion in Memphis, Tenn., with Attorney General Pam Bondi on March 23, 2026. AP Photo/Bruce Newman

After President Donald Trump fired Attorney General Pam Bondi on April 2, 2026, news reports suggested that she fell from grace, not for being too independent, but for not being effective enough at defending him and prosecuting his political enemies.

As The New York Times reported the previous day, Trump was disappointed with “Ms. Bondi’s handling of the Jeffrey Epstein files, which has become a political liability for Mr. Trump among his supporters. He has also complained about her shortcomings as a communicator and vented about what he sees as the Department of Justice’s lack of aggressiveness in going after his foes.”

The president has long indicated that whoever served as attorney general in his administration should see themselves as his lawyer rather than as someone representing the U.S. government.

During his first presidential term, Trump was gravely disappointed with Jeff Sessions, his first attorney general, who recused himself from the investigation into alleged political interference in the 2016 election. He replaced Sessions with William Barr, who abandoned Trump when the president did not accept the results of the 2020 election.

Having learned from those mistakes, Trump set out to find a political ally and loyalist to take the helm at the Justice Department in his second administration.

As a scholar of law and politics, and someone who has written about the role of the attorney general, I think Trump’s desire has a familiar ring to it. It is not unusual for presidents to put people who share their views and policy preferences into the role. But Trump has gone far beyond what is usually done.

A man dressed in a suit and tie lifts his right hand in front of a panel of lawmakers.
Jeff Sessions is sworn in as attorney general before the House Judiciary Committee on Capitol Hill on Nov. 14, 2017.
AP Photo/Alex Brandon

Bondi’s ascent

Florida Congressman Matt Gaetz was Trump’s first choice for attorney general during the president’s second term. Many commentators viewed Gaetz as a firebrand who was temperamentally unsuited for that position. Some criticized him for calling the president an “inspirational leader of a loving and patriotic movement” in the aftermath of the Jan. 6, 2021, attack on the Capitol. In the face of growing opposition generated in part by allegations of his misconduct, Gaetz withdrew.

Trump turned to Bondi a few hours later. She had served as Florida’s attorney general and drawn praise from across the political spectrum for her professionalism.

A bipartisan group of former state attorneys general wrote a letter attesting to their “firsthand knowledge of her fitness for the office” and her “wealth of prosecutorial experience and commitment to public service.”

In addition, as PBS noted at the time of her appointment, Bondi was “a longtime Trump ally and was one of his lawyers during his first impeachment trial, when he was accused — but not convicted — of abusing his power as he tried to condition U.S. military assistance to Ukraine on that country investigating then-former Vice President Joe Biden.”

She also showed her loyalty by attending Trump’s New York trial for paying hush money to porn actor Stormy Daniels, with whom he allegedly had an affair.

At the time of her nomination, Bondi seemed to have the attributes of an attorney general. She had the credentials to take on the job of running the DOJ and the confidence of the president who appointed her.

From confirmation to downfall

During her confirmation hearings, Bondi promised to safeguard the Justice Department’s independence and bolster its transparency. She also vowed to not serve as the president’s personal attorney.

And in response to a question from Rhode Island Senator Sheldon Whitehouse, she pledged in January 2025 that “there will never be an enemies list within the Department of Justice.”

But she also showed her willingness to joust with Democrats on the Senate Judiciary Committee. She hewed to the MAGA script by refusing to say that the president had lost the 2020 election. And she mounted a spirited attack on the Biden Justice Department, which she claimed had been “weaponized for years and years and years.”

A woman speaks in front of a microphone as a man stands behind her.
Attorney General Pam Bondi and Deputy Attorney General Todd Blanche speak to reporters in Washington on March 18, 2026.
Nathan Posner/Anadolu via Getty Images

Once in office, Bondi took on the difficult task of leading the Justice Department while also pleasing the president. She stood by when Trump used an appearance at the department to give, according to The New York Times, a “grievance-filled attack on the very people who have worked in the building and others like them.” The Times added: “He appeared to offer his own vision of justice in America, one defined by personal vengeance rather than by institutional principles.”

Bondi apparently did not do enough to deliver on that version of justice.

Last year, Trump had to urge Bondi to take action against his political enemies, including former FBI Director James Comey, California Senator Adam Schiff and New York Attorney General Leticia James.

“They’re all guilty as hell,” Trump posted on his social media platform, Truth Social, “but nothing is going to be done. “We can’t delay any longer, it’s killing our reputation and credibility,” he added. “They impeached me twice, and indicted me (5 times!), OVER NOTHING. JUSTICE MUST BE SERVED, NOW!!!”

Bondi took her marching orders and launched investigations of those the president named. However, she was not able to secure any convictions. NBC News quoted a former official in the Trump White House who said that failing to secure indictments “is a problem for job security with the president.”

If that wasn’t enough, Trump was also reportedly frustrated with the way Bondi had handled the release of the Epstein files, first promising full disclosure and then botching the rollout of the files.

Contending visions of the attorney general’s job

Bondi’s tenure illustrates the conflicting visions of what an attorney general should do that animate today’s American politics.

The questions Democrats asked her during her confirmation were designed to get her to commit to their view of what the attorney general should do. Those questions signaled their belief that anyone occupying that office should maintain their distance from the president and uphold the Justice Department’s independence.

But right from the start of the republic, presidents have chosen close political allies to serve as attorney general.

It’s common for presidents to appoint their friends and supporters to be attorneys general. Since Franklin D. Roosevelt, many presidents have chosen their campaign manager or their party’s national chairperson to be attorney general of the United States.

But even compared with this history, Trump and his allies have a radically different vision, seeing the attorney general as just another Cabinet member whose responsibility is to carry out the president’s policies and implement his directions. As Trump put it in a 2017 interview with The New York Times, he has the “absolute right to do what I want to do with the Justice Department.”

In the end, it seems that Bondi was fired for her failure to be effective in the political role assigned to her. It is likely that the president will want to replace her with someone even more political than she was, who promises to deliver more of the results he wants.

The Conversation

Austin Sarat does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Pam Bondi’s extreme political loyalty to Trump wasn’t enough to save her job – https://theconversation.com/pam-bondis-extreme-political-loyalty-to-trump-wasnt-enough-to-save-her-job-279926

Will row over Iran conflict spell the end of Nato?

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Jonathan Este, Senior International Affairs Editor, Associate Editor, The Conversation

This is the text from The Conversation UK’s World Affairs Briefing email. Sign up here to receive weekly analysis of the latest developments in international relations, direct to your inbox.


Anybody who tuned in to Donald Trump’s prime-time speech to the American people last night hoping to hear that he plans an end to the US attacks on Iran and will focus instead on reaching an agreement over opening up the Strait of Hormuz would have been bitterly disappointed. I know I was.

Instead of a strategy to restore the vital flow of oil and gas through the strait – something which would have immediately calmed the markets and started to bring down energy prices – the US president opted for a familiar mix of revisionism, self-aggrandisement and bloodcurdling threats.

So we heard that it was never his intention to force regime change in Iran (despite having said exactly that on day one of the special military operation). We had the miraculous achievements of his administration over the past year which had restored “a dead and crippled country after the last administration” to what is now “the hottest country anywhere in the world by far”.

And instead of seeking a deal with Iran over the Strait of Hormuz, Trump promised to “hit them extremely hard over the next two to three weeks. We’re going to bring them back to the Stone Ages, where they belong.”

Along the way, the US president took a potshot at America’s Nato allies who have been reluctant to get involved in this war, exhorting them to “build up some delayed courage. Should have done it before. Should have done it with us as we asked.”

Donald Trump addresses the American people, April 1 2026.

In the event, Nato secretary-general Mark Rutte and many of Nato’s European leaders will probably feel as if they have got off lightly. Trump and his secretary of state, Marco Rubio, have been outspoken in their criticism of Nato in recent days. Rubio told Fox News host Sean Hannity that the US would “reexamine the value of Nato”, while the president, when asked if the US was reconsidering its Nato membership, said the question was “beyond reconsideration”, adding that the alliance is a “paper tiger, and Putin knows that too, by the way.”

Trump is not the first US president to question the operation of Nato and worry about the outsized burden borne by the US. But none before has done so much to publicly undermine the alliance. But then, as Andrew Gawthorpe explains, Nato’s focus on European security has been a huge benefit to the US over the decades. Gawthorpe, an expert in American foreign policy at Leiden University, presents us with a cost-benefit analysis of US leadership of Nato, spelling out the many advantages which he says “generations of American strategists, military officers and diplomats have viewed as worthwhile”.

It’s not as if the US-Israeli military operation in Iran is a matter for Nato in any case, writes David Galbreath. Nato is a defensive alliance. Article 5 of its founding treaty holds “an armed attack against one NATO member shall be considered an attack against all members, and triggers an obligation for each member to come to its assistance”. This is clearly not the case in Iran.

To be sure, as Galbreath notes, Nato’s focus has shifted at times over the years. From aiming purely at collective defence – defined as coming to the aid of a fellow member whose territory is threatened by a third party – at times Nato has intervened in issues of regional security, most notably in the 1990s wars in the former Yugoslavia.

But an individual member’s foreign policy adventures have never mandated nato’s involvement: indeed the US actively opposed the UK and France during the Suez crisis in 1956 and in turn UK minister, Harold Wilson, resisted pressure from US president Lyndon Baines Johnson to get involved in the US war in Vietnam. It would, Galbreath concludes, be tragic if – having weathered these storms – Nato falls apart over this war of questionable legality.




Read more:
Nato has survived some serious rifts but the Iran war shows how the US has soured on the transatlantic alliance


Israel’s forever war?

Not just questionable legality, either. After the US president’s speech last night the world is no wiser as to how long this might continue. But Trump’s enthusiasm for Operation Epic Fury will, to an extent, be calibrated by how he and his close advisers judge it might affect his party’s chances in the midterm elections in November. High gasoline prices and inflation (as well as continuing entanglement in a war – something he pledged not to do on the campaign trail in 2024) are likely to lose him votes.

For Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, the calculation will be different. He also faces an election in the autumn. But when Israelis cast their ballots on October 27, they’ll be voting on different issues. Netanyhu’s appeal to voters on security grounds is a potent one. There’s a clock in Tehran which counts down to 2040 by which time the late supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei swore Israel would no longer exist.

A leader who could neutralise that threat for good could use that accomplishment to good purposes on the campaign trail, whether or not his methods are deemed legal in international law.

Leonie Fleischmann, a scholar of Israeli politics at City St George’s, University of London, has researched Israeli security policy over decades, particularly when it comes to the way it has been enacted by Netanyahu. The current prime minister, she writes, is a disciple of the founder of Revisionist Zionism, Ze’ev Jabotinsky. For Jabotinsky, the watchword was “strength first, diplomacy second”.

But, Fleischmann notes, there is an important secondary concern for Netanyahu beyond the security of his people. That is that at present the polls suggest that while his party might be the most popular with voters, the support is not enough to enable him to form a coalition government. And if he loses, Netanyahu could face trial for bribery and corruption and a possible jail term. So arguably, his security is at stake, too.




Read more:
Why Benjamin Netanyahu needs the Iran conflict to continue


On the Russian front

There’s a bizarre twist to the US-Israeli operation in Iran. In the initial years of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Moscow was relying heavily on Shahed drones supplied by Iran. Now Russia is returning the favour, supplying its drones to Iran and – as a bonus – providing data to help Iran identify and hit its targets.

Meanwhile Kyiv is understandably increasingly concerned that US involvement in the Middle East has inevitably meant that US munitions previously available for purchase by Ukraine’s allies are instead being used against Iran. If so – and it seems a reasonable assumption – it will seriously undermine Ukraine’s ability to defend itself.

ISW map showing the state of the war in Ukraine, April 1 2026
State of the war in Ukraine, April 1 2026.
Institute for the Study of War

Meanwhile, in an attempt to control rising oil prices, the US has removed some sanctions preventing Russia from selling its oil. So the war in Iran has the potential to be an utter disaster for Ukraine.

The one silver lining towards the end of last year was that Russia was losing far more men on the battlefield than Ukraine. But Charlie Walker and Bettina Renz have been following Russia’s recruitment and write that good salaries and lavish signing on bonuses continue to attract plenty of new soldiers.

Walker and Renz believe that Vladimir Putin has worked hard in recent years to repair and enhance conditions in the Russian military, prompting the in-house newspaper of the defence ministry to trumpet that “contract soldiers are becoming the country’s middle class”. Needless to say, the in-house defence ministry newspaper is bound to take a rosy view of conditions in the military, but the confidence with which this has been asserted suggests that anyone hoping for a collapse in Russian military morale in 2026 might be disappointed.




Read more:
Despite massive casualties in Ukraine, Russia is unlikely to run out of soldiers anytime soon – here’s why



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ref. Will row over Iran conflict spell the end of Nato? – https://theconversation.com/will-row-over-iran-conflict-spell-the-end-of-nato-279898