Mali’s armed groups fill a government vacuum – addressing this is key to ending the violence

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Norman Sempijja, Associate professor, Université Mohammed VI Polytechnique

Mali has been in a state of political turmoil since 2012. That year saw a military coup as well as armed groups taking over northern regions of the west African country. In the intervening years, efforts at establishing transitional governments have failed, culminating in the military junta dissolving and banning all political parties in May 2025.

In addition, the country has seen waves of military interventions by outside players like France, the US and most recently Russia. All have invested heavily in trying to contain the extremist threat in Mali.

But groups linked to al-Qaeda and the Islamic State have continued to expand their influence. And in late April 2026 the military government found itself having to fend off coordinated attacks from separatists and jihadists across the country. The defence minister, General Sadio Camara, was killed.

Foreign interventions over the past decade have often misunderstood what was happening on the ground. Extremist groups have capitalised on issues such as land disputes, corruption, and resource competition to gain legitimacy, often aligning with the community’s tensions. The weakness of state institutions and security forces has allowed groups such as Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) to consolidate power.

These groups have adapted by forming alliances and tailoring their narratives to local grievances, prioritising immediate issues over ideological objectives.

We are political scientists who have researched the security situation in Mali and the Sahel. Our recently published paper showed that non-state armed groups in the Sahel, particularly in Mali, have emerged as key power brokers, shaping local governance by filling gaps left by weak state institutions.

While external actors such as France, the US and Russia have prioritised counter-terrorism and state-building, they often overlook the governance functions of non-state armed groups. These groups often provide essential services and gain local legitimacy.

Recognising the role of armed groups as local power holders does not mean accepting or legitimising their actions. However, ignoring this reality has led to policies that miss the mark. When interventions focus only on military solutions, they risk misunderstanding why people interact with these groups in the first place.

Our findings challenge conventional interventions that focus solely on defeating non-state armed groups or reinstating centralised state control. We argue that security solutions alone are insufficient. We advocate for a more nuanced approach that integrates the potential for non-state armed groups when it comes to governance, legitimacy and local agency. Non-state armed groups have provided governance over territories in countries like Colombia, Syria and South Sudan, among others.

Armed groups as de facto authorities

Armed groups in Mali are not just fighting forces. In many parts of the country, they play a more complex role. It is difficult to estimate the exact number of groups operating within Mali. The largest and best known, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wa al-Muslimeen, is a coalition of five organisations and claims to have over 10,000 fighters in the country.

In central and northern Mali, bordering Algeria, the state is often distant, absent or mistrusted. Armed groups step into this vacuum. They settle disputes, enforce rules, collect taxes, and sometimes provide a basic sense of order.

For communities living with daily insecurity, these functions are not abstract; they shape everyday life.

Our study established that this does not necessarily mean the population agrees with these groups or supports their ideology. Many do not. However, when there are few alternatives, people adapt. They follow the rules because they need to survive, not because they believe in them.

This distinction is important. This helps explain why these groups are so difficult to dislodge. Their strength does not come only from weapons but also from how deeply they are embedded in local realities.

Why military strategies fall short

International efforts have largely focused on fighting these groups and rebuilding the authority of the Malian state. Although well intentioned, these kinds of interventions often overlook something essential: what happens to the spaces these groups leave behind?

An example is France’s 2013 intervention. The French army helped the Malian army to regain control of the northern part of the country from advancing Islamists during Operation Serval. The aim was to stop extremist forces from advancing to Bamako. This did not end the conflict. Many fighters moved to rural areas where the state had little presence and built ties with local communities.

In central Mali, where cattle farming is a key source of income, this dynamic contributed to the spread of violence between Fulani and Dogon communities, reinforcing grievances exploited by extremist groups.

Simultaneously, attempts to strengthen state institutions have struggled. In some places, security forces are seen as ineffective and even abusive.

Faced with this reality, people often turn to whoever can offer some level of predictability and protection, even if that actor is an armed group.

External involvement has also become increasingly fragmented. France’s withdrawal, rising anti-western sentiment, and the arrival of Russian-linked forces have created a crowded and sometimes conflicting intervention landscape.

Different actors bring different agendas, and their presence does not always translate into greater security. In some cases, it can even worsen things by reinforcing tensions or weakening trust in already fragile institutions.

Caught in the middle, civilians make difficult choices daily. Their decisions are rarely ideological but rather about survival.

Rethinking the response

We conclude from our findings that a more grounded approach would begin by listening to local realities. It would address the gaps that allow armed groups to take root. This means improving access to justice and security, supporting local institutions, and taking grievances seriously. It also means recognising that legitimacy is built from the ground up, not imposed from above.

Mali’s experience shows that there are clear limits to what military force can achieve on its own. As long as interventions overlook the everyday realities of governance and survival, they are unlikely to bring about lasting change. Until that shift happens, armed groups will remain hard to dislodge, not only because they can fight but also because, in many places, they have become part of how life is organised.

The Conversation

Norman Sempijja is affiliated with Mohammed VI polytechnic University and based at the Faculty of Governance Economics and Social Sciences.

Mouhammed Ndiaye does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Mali’s armed groups fill a government vacuum – addressing this is key to ending the violence – https://theconversation.com/malis-armed-groups-fill-a-government-vacuum-addressing-this-is-key-to-ending-the-violence-281648

UAE’s departure from Opec tells a story about the limited future of oil production

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Adi Imsirovic, Lecturer in Energy Systems, University of Oxford

The decision by the United Arab Emirates to leave the oil producers’ cartel Opec after 59 years is more than a symbolic break. It highlights a growing divide among major oil producers over how to respond to a changing energy landscape, and will weaken the group’s ability to manage global supply.

In the short term, the impact of the UAE’s exit will be limited. The world still needs every available barrel of oil, and the UAE accounts for some 3-4% of global production. But the forces behind the decision are more significant than the move itself. They are both economic and political – and the war in Iran helped the two align.

For years, the UAE has been investing heavily to expand its oil production capacity, spending around US$150 billion (£111 billion) to push its potential daily output close to 5 million barrels. But Opec quotas have prevented it from fully exploiting that capacity. Actual production has remained well below its potential at about 3.5 million barrels a day (mbd), with some 5 mbd capacity, constrained by the Opec quota system designed to restrict supply and support prices, generally shaped by the de facto leader, Saudi Arabia.

Table showing Opec production quotas for 2026.
Opec production quotas for 2026.
Opec

This has created a tension. Why invest to produce more oil if you are not allowed to sell it?

Abu Dhabi’s answer reflects a different economic model. The UAE can balance its budget at much lower oil prices than Saudi Arabia (just below $50 v Saudi $90 a barrel or more), giving it less incentive to restrict output. Instead, it has prioritised maximising its oil exports.

That strategy is also shaped by expectations about the future. As countries such as China accelerate the electrification of transport, the hitherto steady and reliable demand for oil is slowing and becoming less reliable. Over time, it is likely to plateau. UAE is also well ahead of the Saudis in energy transition – and maintain their net zero target as 2050, compared to the Saudi 2060.

From the UAE’s perspective, the bigger risk is not falling prices, but leaving oil in the ground that may never be sold.

Shifting geopolitics

The timing of the exit is not just about economics. It also reflects shifting political and security calculations, particularly after the UAE came under heavy, sustained attack during the war in Iran.

In Abu Dhabi, there is a growing sense that regional institutions and partnerships, such as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) offered limited support during that period. Anwar Gargash, a senior presidential adviser, told reporters that: “The GCC’s stance was the weakest historically, considering the nature of the attack and the threat it posed to everyone,” adding that he “expected such a weak stance from the Arab League … But I don’t expect it from the GCC, and I am surprised by it.”

That experience has reinforced a more independent foreign policy. The UAE has strengthened ties with the US and Israel, building on the agreement it signed as part of the 2020 Abraham accords. The relationship with Israel is seen not just an economic and security partnership, but as a channel for influence inside the White House.

At the same time, relations with Saudi Arabia have become more strained, with differences over regional conflicts in Somalia and Yemen and economic strategy increasingly visible. Leaving Opec is both an economic decision and a geopolitical signal.

The UAE’s departure also raises questions about the future of Opec itself. The group once controlled more than half of global oil production. Today, its share is much smaller (no more than 35%), and internal divisions over production quotas are more pronounced. Quotas, long the core of its strategy, are increasingly seen as uneven constraints rather than shared commitments.

UAE energy minister, Suhail Al Mazrouei, explains the decision to leave Opec.

Saudi Arabia remains the only member with significant spare capacity, giving it outsized influence. The result is an organisation that still matters, but is less cohesive than it once was.

Not necessarily a win for the US

Some have hailed the UAE’s exit as a victory for Donald Trump, who has repeatedly criticised Opec for keeping oil prices high. A weaker OPEC would indeed lead to higher output and lower prices at the pump.

But sustained lower prices would also put pressure on higher-cost producers, including the US oil patch, which has been one of Opec’s main competitors in recent years. It benefited from the cartel’s restraint when it came to capping oil production. So what now looks like a geopolitical win could, over time, become an economic challenge.

For now, I believe that the UAE’s exit will not dramatically reshape oil markets. Demand remains strong enough to absorb additional supply, particularly as countries rebuild their inventories when Iran reopens the Strait of Hormuz. But the deeper significance lies in what the decision reveals.

Oil producers are no longer aligned around a single strategy. Some are trying to manage scarcity and keep prices high. Others are racing to monetise their resources before demand peaks and they end up with stranded assets. That divergence is likely to grow – and may ultimately prove more consequential than any single country leaving the cartel.

We may be entering a new age where oil is going to play a much lesser role in our lives.

The Conversation

Adi Imsirovic does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. UAE’s departure from Opec tells a story about the limited future of oil production – https://theconversation.com/uaes-departure-from-opec-tells-a-story-about-the-limited-future-of-oil-production-281755

Proposed high-speed rail will not make a big dent in Canada’s greenhouse gas emissions

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Ryan M. Katz-Rosene, Associate Professor, School of Political Studies, with Cross-Appointment to Geography, Environment and Geomatics, L’Université d’Ottawa/University of Ottawa

In February 2025, the Canadian government announced Alto, a high-speed rail line that will eventually connect Toronto to Québec City. In November, the government said it would introduce new legislation to speed up the project.

One of its proposed benefits is that electrified, high-speed rail will help Canada reduce emissions and meet its climate targets. Alto says the project will help prevent many short-haul flights and remove the carbon emissions equivalent to 100,000 cars from the road each year.

But Alto is unlikely to meaningfully reduce Canada’s GHG emissions. There are indeed benefits from high-speed rail development, including bolstered regional connectivity and economic growth. However, a significant reduction in emissions is not a realistic outcome.

Claimed emissions reductions

Alto — the federal Crown corporation developing the project — said that by getting passengers out of vehicles, “we can collectively remove up to 90 billion vehicle kilometres travelled from the roads over the project’s lifecycle, equivalent to approximately 100 thousand cars’ worth of travel removed annually from the roads.”

While 39 million tonnes may sound large, it’s a relatively small GHG reduction from the point of view of a national-scale infrastructure project lasting more than 60 years. It’s akin to only 0.65 megatonnes of CO2 per year of the project through to the mid-2080s.

For reference, Canada’s annual emissions today are about 1,000 times greater than that. When framed in the context of existing annual emissions, the claimed reductions are modest.

Induced demand

Alto’s expected reduction in vehicle and air travel is likely an overestimate. Research into 210 projects in 14 nations found that ridership forecasts for high-speed rail are often higher than what eventually comes to pass. This gets at another challenge with high-speed rail’s energy impacts: induced demand.

One of the real benefits of high-speed rail development is economic growth. This arises because a new high-speed train makes new forms of economic activity possible.

It reduces the time it takes to travel between cities, making greater connectivity possible, while also increasing tourism opportunities. In theory, it also expands the distance that workers are willing to commute, which could create new housing development opportunities in regions that otherwise would not have experienced them.

Nevertheless, these same benefits potentially undermine some of the environmental arguments for high-speed rail. These new economic opportunities induce new transport demand — not only for the new train but for other modes of travel as well.

Research in this area suggests that about 20 per cent of high-speed rail traffic could be made up of new travellers who would not have made the trip otherwise. That does leave up to 80 per cent of high-speed rail travellers switching from another mode of transportation. However, there are a couple of reasons why that may not result in significant GHG reductions in Canada.

First, many travellers will be those who would have taken the conventional train and who will merely switch to the high-speed train instead. This would indeed mark a lower emissions journey given that VIA Rail’s current trains are diesel-powered. But it’s not as substantive a reduction as switching from air travel, for example.

In addition, sales of electric vehicles are expected to increase rapidly in the coming years. If EVs become more commonplace, or even the norm, the government must consider whether a diverted automobile trip in the decades to come would be diverting a passenger from a (GHG-emitting) combustion engine or a (non-emitting) electric one.

Much of the diverted automobile traffic for high-speed rail — by the time the train line is built — will likely come from EVs. That leaves diverting traffic from aircraft as the main way to reduce transport emissions. Yet even this sector is also expected to electrify in the coming decades.

In fact, it is precisely the short-haul flight market within the busy Québec City-Windsor corridor where small electric aircraft are set to debut in Canada. Airlines have already put in orders for electric planes, which may even enter into service before the first rail link is built.

Emissions from construction

Another significant effect that could increase GHG emissions would be the construction of the rail infrastructure itself. This would not be inconsequential: 1,000 kilometres of dedicated tracks within a swathe of land several dozen metres wide, featuring overpasses and tunnelling to ensure there are no grade crossings with roads, not to mention the need for overhead power lines.

The sheer amount of concrete, steel and copper required to build Alto will be immense, and would contribute to Canada’s GHG emissions during construction.

This is not to say Alto shouldn’t be built, nor that it’s a bad idea. The construction and operation of a high-speed rail line would generate growth and socioeconomic value for Canada.

It would create tens of thousands of construction jobs, billions of dollars in new opportunities annually and could help revive Canada’s suffering steel sector (currently dealing with tariff pressures from the United States).

Such infrastructure could very well be operated without producing much GHG emissions, and fit well within Canada’s aims for a future net-zero society. But this doesn’t mean that introducing a high-speed train itself would substantially help in Canada’s near-term climate mitigation efforts. It won’t.

The Conversation

Ryan M. Katz-Rosene does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Proposed high-speed rail will not make a big dent in Canada’s greenhouse gas emissions – https://theconversation.com/proposed-high-speed-rail-will-not-make-a-big-dent-in-canadas-greenhouse-gas-emissions-280893

Why your pet reptile ‘surfs’ the glass or rubs against the barriers of their enclosure

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Melanie Denomme, PhD Student, Biological Sciences, Brock University

Every day, millions of people watch their pet reptiles run, dig, swim or climb up against the walls of their enclosure. Reptile keepers call this “glass surfing,” but among scientists, this conduct is typically considered to be a type of repetitive behaviour, akin to pacing in polar bears.

Repetitive interactions with the barriers of a tank or cage might initially be endearing — because it seems like the reptile is eager to explore — but can quickly become distressing if a reptile simply does not stop. Many people feel helpless as they watch their beloved pet rub the scales on their nose off, causing ulcerations or deformities, or dig at the walls of an enclosure until streaks of blood are left behind.

Why do they do this, and how can we stop them?

Our lab examined the behaviour of one of the most popular pet reptiles around the world — the bearded dragon — and discovered some interesting similarities between repetitive behaviours in reptiles and mammals.

A common desire to escape

Mammalian carnivores, such as mink, polar bears and lions, sometimes perform repetitive pacing in captivity. And while there may be multiple reasons for the behaviour, researchers have found that thwarted escape is a common motivation.

A polar bear walking on rock.
Polar bears in captivity commonly engage in repetitive pacing behaviours.
(Unsplash/Mike Gattorna)

In other words, mammalian carnivores may pace when they want to escape, and anything that increases their motivation to escape might elicit pacing.

We wanted to find out whether the same is true for reptiles. Inspired by a study of the repetitive behaviours of caged mice from the 1990s, we examined exactly where lizards directed their repetitive behaviours within their homes. After all, if this behaviour represents a motivation to escape, then it should be biased towards escape routes.

Our results supported the common theory: Lizards climbed up, dug at or walked against the only “door” in their enclosure more than any other barriers. When this door was partially obscured, their behaviour became even more focused on the remaining transparent portion.

Pooping away from home

But this raises the question: What are reptiles trying to escape from?

A ball python in a terrarium with greenery behind.
Ball pythons (pictured here), bearded dragons, leopard geckos and crested geckos make for favourite reptile pets.
(Unsplash/ Crissta Ames-Walle)

Enclosures that are too hot, small or boring may be a common cause of wanderlust. As a result, increasing the size or complexity of a reptile’s home can often reduce rubbing on enclosure barriers. However, there are also cases where this hasn’t worked, suggesting we don’t yet have the full picture.

Remarkably, in our study, we found that defecation was 15 times more likely to occur within periods when bearded dragons were performing repetitive barrier interactions. This suggests that — like rodents and other lizards — bearded dragons may prefer to do their business away from where they sleep and eat. Though whether defecation results in repetitive behaviours, or repetitive behaviours cause defecation, is still unclear.

Wild females roam in spring

We also found that female bearded dragons rubbed incessantly against enclosure barriers more in the spring compared to the winter and compared to males.

This may reflect how, during springtime, female lizards in the wild tend to roam widely whereas male lizards typically patrol a territory. Captive females could be more motivated to escape in the spring compared to captive males, who can still patrol the inside of their tank.

There were also some interesting things we didn’t find. For example, although repetitive pacing in mammalian carnivores often correlates with feeding, the same was not true for our lizards. This may be because, compared to mammalian carnivores, bearded dragons are much less active foragers. As adults, they are primarily vegetarians and may wait for insects to come to them. Therefore, feeding may not influence their motivation to escape.

Furthermore, although our lizards sometimes performed a lot of repetitive rubbing, digging or scrambling, they never got stuck performing those behaviours, as can happen for many other vertebrates. Whether this holds true for all reptiles may provide valuable insight into how repetitive behaviours change and develop over time.

A red-eared slider on a log.
A red-eared slider in its natural habitat.
(Unsplash/ John Dobbs)

Owners must observe and adapt

Our research shows that reptiles may sometimes scrabble against the walls of their enclosures for relatively benign reasons, like the need to poop.

It also shows how important it is to understand a species’ natural habitat and behaviour. For example, if female bearded dragons want to explore new areas in the spring, regularly moving the items inside the lizards’ home may simulate this exploration, reducing their need to escape.

Resolving repetitive behaviours in reptiles will not have a one-size-fits-all solution — decades of research have examined repetitive pacing in mammals, and these behaviours are still troublesome. The motivation behind a reptile’s behaviour could even differ day-to-day.

Caring for reptiles means that we must learn and observe with an open and curious mind, accept when we are wrong and adapt. Large and naturalistic enclosures will often improve a reptile’s welfare, but are not a one-time cure-all. As reptile keepers, we have the unique privilege of rising to this challenge.

The Conversation

Melanie Denomme receives funding from Natural Sciences and Engineering Council (NSERC).

ref. Why your pet reptile ‘surfs’ the glass or rubs against the barriers of their enclosure – https://theconversation.com/why-your-pet-reptile-surfs-the-glass-or-rubs-against-the-barriers-of-their-enclosure-281298

Sencos: the government’s plans for Send reform in England hinge on these overworked school staff

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Julie Wharton, Senior Lecturer, Institute of Education, University of Winchester

Krakenimages.com/Shutterstock

Sencos – special educational needs coordinators – play a vital role in maintained mainstream English schools, nursery schools and sixth forms. If you are a parent, you may encounter them if you have concerns about your child’s progress or the support available, or during review meetings. Children may meet them through assessments, pupil interviews or informal check-ins.

They are teachers who take on additional leadership responsibility for special educational needs and disabilities across the school. In many cases, they continue to teach classes, but in larger schools the role is increasingly non-class based due to its scale and demands.

Despite its importance, the Senco role is often hampered by excessive workload, inconsistent status – many Sencos are still not part of school leadership teams as this is not a requirement in legislation – and a limited understanding of its scope. These factors affect both effectiveness and retention.

The government’s recent policy proposals for special educational needs and disabilities support make frequent mention of Sencos and the role they play in schools. As a former Senco, and as someone who has worked in Senco professional development for almost twenty years, I have scoured the proposals to understand what they mean for the profession.

Statutory support

The reforms – still under consultation and not yet law – formalise much of what Sencos already do. However, they also signal a profound shift. The role is set to become more data-driven and more central to whole-school development than before.

Sencos oversee Sen Support – internal school provision for learners with special educational needs. They also oversee support for children with education, health and care plans (EHCPs). EHCPs are legal documents issued and funded by local authorities for children with more complex needs. They outline a child’s needs, required provision and targeted outcomes across education, health and care.

Group of business people meeting
Sencos often are not part of a school’s senior leadership team.
fizkes/Shutterstock

The recent policy proposal sets out a system of school-based individual support plans for every child and young person identified with special educational needs. These digital plans would be statutory, monitored and reviewed annually at minimum.

Sencos would therefore be responsible for ensuring that each individual support plan accurately identifies any barriers to learning (such as sensory needs or a specific learning difference), and records support and reasonable adjustments (such as adapted materials or additional processing time). While the terminology may be new, this practice is not. Individual support plans largely formalise what Sencos already do for learners at Sen Support.

However, the statutory nature of individual support plans represents an expansion of legal accountability, borrowing from policy implemented in recent years in Wales. Whereas EHCPs apply to a small proportion of pupils in schools, statutory individual support plans could apply to a greater percentage of the school population.

This risks creating a compliance-heavy model of inclusion. Sencos may spend increasing amounts of time on producing evidence rather than working directly with teachers and families.

EHCPs will remain for a smaller number of children – those with the most complex needs – who will receive specialist support packages. The definition of complex needs has not yet been defined in the policy proposals, which may be an area for contention.

By tightening access to EHCPs while expanding individual support plans, the reforms shift the pressure point from local authorities to schools. Sencos may become the public face of a rationed system. They will need to mediate between school resources, parental expectations and local authorities, as well as colleagues working in health and care.

There is the risk that trust in Sencos may decline unless schools are given the capacity to deliver the promised support. At the same time, Sencos will have to navigate families’ worries about tighter access to EHCPs.

Overseeing mainstream support

A central message of the policy proposals is that mainstream education must be strengthened in terms of its ability to include pupils with special educational needs and disabilities. This is a laudable aim, but it requires significant investment in teacher expertise, curriculum flexibility and environmental adaptation.

For Sencos, it will mean leading whole-school early identification and targeted support. They will need to build teacher confidence in adaptive and inclusive education and provide more robust evidence when specialist placements are requested. They will lead in helping families school provision. This shift may increase contested decisions and appeals, with Sencos becoming the key point of contact for families navigating changing legal boundaries.

One of the government’s most ambitious proposals is the Experts at Hand service. This is designed to give schools quicker access to educational psychologists, speech and language therapists and other specialists. It’s likely to place the Senco at the centre of multi-agency work, coordinating referrals, implementing specialist advice and contributing to wider planning.

What’s more, every member of school staff will complete a national special educational needs training programme. It’s likely that Sencos will take a lead in delivering much of this professional development. This will elevate the Senco as a driver of whole-school pedagogy.

The proposals amount to a significant widening of the Senco remit. Their success hinges on whether the Senco role is finally given the leadership status, time and support it requires. Without structural changes such as protected leadership time, a place on leadership teams, administrative support and clear career pathways, the reforms risk accelerating burnout. However, with the right support and sufficient resourcing, Sencos can be leaders shaping the cultures, systems and partnerships that help every child to learn and flourish.

The Conversation

With sincere thanks to Christopher Robertson, the Co-ordinator of the SENCo Forum, who shared his insights with me as I was writing this article.

ref. Sencos: the government’s plans for Send reform in England hinge on these overworked school staff – https://theconversation.com/sencos-the-governments-plans-for-send-reform-in-england-hinge-on-these-overworked-school-staff-279773

Welsh countryside: what Greens and Reform are promising they would change after election

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Michael Woods, Professor of Human Geography, Aberystwyth University

Issues in rural Wales have been a key area for campaigns to highlight. Threeeyedravensproductions/Shutterstock

In the last of our series on environmental issues and the Wales election campaign, we look particularly at countryside policies of two parties that are new contenders for seats in the Senedd.

The elections to Wales’s parliament, the Senedd, on May 7 are set to be the most unpredictable since the creation of the devolved government in 1999. With current polling indicating close contests in many constituencies, rural voters could make a critical difference to the final result.

Issues such as farming support, windfarms, pylons and changes to rural healthcare services are contentious, but they form part of a larger question about the future of rural Wales. Interestingly, the two parties projected to win seats in the Senedd through election for the first time – Reform UK and the Green party (Reform UK has two seats in the outgoing Senedd through defections) – represent contrasting visions of the Welsh countryside.

Reform’s rural vision

Reform UK has directly targeted discontented rural voters. With a cover image showing daffodil-covered green hills, Reform’s manifesto says it will “back Welsh farmers”. It promises “agriculture will be treated as a strategic national asset”.

Specific policies include: reforming the new post-Brexit Sustainable Farming Scheme to emphasise food production, funding for young farmers’ clubs, scrapping net zero targets and banning new onshore wind farms and solar arrays, reducing environmental regulations and protecting lawful game bird release. It also plans to “streamline planning regulations” and cut back on “red tape”.




Read more:
Why windfarms and electricity pylons have become a major issue in the Welsh election


Reform is competing with the Conservatives for the voters that this version of rural Wales appeals to. Although the Conservative manifesto is less dramatic in tone, especially on net zero, it also plans to scrap the Sustainable Farming Scheme and introduce a moratorium on industrial scale wind and solar power stations.

A Green vision

The strongest prospects for the Green party are in urban constituencies. However, their platform contains policies that would have significant implications for rural Wales. They include a Land Reform Act, making it easier for communities to buy land, a “Welsh Right to Roam” offering “responsible access to the countryside”, a national rewilding strategy and commitments to a Sustainable Farming Scheme that rewards “nature-friendly farming” and renewable energy targets.

These represent a very different vision for the Welsh countryside to Reform. But they also reflect an alternative, almost counter culture, strand of Welsh rural society that has welcomed people who moved to rural areas in search of a new way of life since the 1960s and pioneered organic farming and low impact development.

There are currently Green councillors in rural Monmouthshire and Powys. Some projections suggest the party could win two or three Senedd seats in significantly rural constituencies.

Welsh farmers protest government plans to connect subsidies for agriculture to planting trees.

If the Greens achieve more than 10% of the vote nationally, they are likely to do so by taking votes from Plaid Cymru, including in rural areas.

Plaid Cymru needs both rural and urban seats to become the biggest party. Its manifesto contains a significant section on rural policies, but with less prominence than Reform UK’s. Plaid’s rural policies broadly share the pro-environmental approach of the Greens, but the influence of conservative rural voters in its heartlands is evident in careful positioning on farming, windfarms and pylons, as well as the absence of mentions of rewilding.

On rural and environmental issues the Greens are more aligned with Labour, while Plaid Cymru are closer to the Liberal Democrats.

Politics in rural Wales

Wales is sometimes described as predominantly rural, but while 80% of the land is countryside, most people live in the towns and cities. Nevertheless, around a third of Wales’s population lives close to the countryside, in largely rural local authorities.

Over the last 25 years rural Wales has experienced substantial social and economic restructuring, including declining work in farming and manufacturing, along with many young people leaving to find jobs. These areas face challenges from low wages, sparse infrastructure, precarious public services and competing visions for land use.

Three issues in particular have attracted attention. First, plans for the Sustainable Farming Scheme (the Welsh government plans for agriculture subsidies to replace EU funding) provoked protests by Welsh farmers in 2024, especially over proposed requirements for 10% of farmland to be planted with trees. The later was subsequently withdrawn.

Second, there’s been opposition to new windfarm developments and pylon lines. Rewilding projects have also been controversial. Third, downgrading of services at hospitals serving rural areas and closure of village schools, have sparked local campaigns.

Public anger over these and other issues has often been directed at Welsh Labour, the governing party in Wales since 1999, with other parties trying to cast it as urban focused.

Labour did win rural constituencies in the 2024 UK general election, and current First Minister Eluned Morgan has a long-standing interest in rural affairs, outlining a plan for rural Wales in 2017. The Labour manifesto promises to “increase rural Wales’ skills and productivity” and to promote “food, farming and forestry”.

The traditional stronghold of nationalist Plaid Cymru is in the rural north and west Wales. While the Conservatives’ strongest support is in rural districts close to the English border and in parts of south Wales. The most enduring areas of support for the Welsh Liberal Democrats are in rural mid Wales.

Results to watch for

A few key results will provide an indication of the political temperature in rural Wales:

  • Whether Plaid Cymru or Reform UK get most votes in Brycheiniog Tawe Nedd, Gwynedd Maldwyn and Sir Gaerfyrddin

  • Whether the Greens win a seat in Ceredigion Penfro, Gwynedd Maldwyn, or Sir Fynwy Torfaen

  • Whether the Conservatives get seats in Bangor Conwy Môn, Brycheiniog Tawe Nedd and Ceredigion Penfro, and the Liberal Democrats retain their seat in Brychceiniog Tawe

  • Whether Labour’s Eluned Morgan can hold on to her seat in Ceredigion Penfro.

If, as seems likely, no party has a majority, rural issues will play an important role in coalition discussions. A shared rural vision could assist agreement between Reform UK and the Conservatives; while negotiations between Plaid Cymru, Labour or the Greens will need to resolve differences in rural and environmental policies. This may have profound consequences for the future of rural Wales.

The Conversation

Michael Woods receives funding from UKRI. He is a member of the Liberal Democrats.

ref. Welsh countryside: what Greens and Reform are promising they would change after election – https://theconversation.com/welsh-countryside-what-greens-and-reform-are-promising-they-would-change-after-election-281451

The six best Shakespeare adaptations that aren’t in English

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Sarah Olive, Senior Lecturer in Literature, Aston University

The future of Shakespeare may well lie beyond the English language. That was the striking message I took away from a talk by translation studies scholar Professor Susan Bassnett at the British Shakespeare Conference in Hull in 2016.

Her point was simple but powerful: Shakespeare’s works are likely to survive and flourish not only in English, but through translation, adaptation and reinvention across the world. Inspired by this, I asked six of my colleagues around the globe to share some Shakespeare adaptations in other languages that you might enjoy.

1. Goliyon Ki Raasleela Ram-Leela (2013)

Hindi, based on Romeo and Juliet

Ram‑Leela is as heady a mix as Shakespeare’s own play, in equal parts comic and tragic, tender and flamboyant. Director Sanjay Leela Bhansali relocates the action of Verona to an Indian town riven by two criminal clans: Rajadis and Sanedas. Violence saturates daily life. Bullets spill from spice jars and a Rajadi child urinating on Saneda territory ignites a vicious brawl.

The trailer for Goliyon Ki Rasleela: Ram-Leela.

In such a world, can love bring peace? The leads’ scorching chemistry makes us hope. My students practically swooned during a screening. At the end, soulful lyrics such as “Tera naam ishq / Mera naam ishq” (“Your name is love / My name is love”) frame the film’s Romeo and Juliet – Ram and Leela – through love rather than their hate-fuelled lineage.

The film also gives depth to its Lady Capulet and nurse figures, while Leela is sensual, witty and brave. Juliet exactly as Shakespeare imagined her.

Varsha Panjwani teaches at New York University, London, and is the creator and host of the podcast Women and Shakespeare.

2. Otel·lo (2012)

Catalan, based on Othello

An award-winning work of Catalan cinema, Otel·lo transposes Shakespeare’s play to a contemporary film studio. Such a meta-narrative approach feels in line with the play’s focus on the enticing power of storytelling – famously embodied in the character of Iago as its arch-villain.

The trailer for Otel.lo.

Blending documentary, mockumentary and thriller aesthetics, the film turns Iago into an unscrupulous filmmaker willing to cross every boundary in the name of art. With his role played by the actual director of the film (Hammudi Al-Rahmoun Font), the adaptation skilfully integrates form and content. We are, like Othello, manipulated into thinking that the fiction he has created is reality.

The film asks: To what extent are the images we absorb real? What purpose do they serve? And how do they affect our views on gendered and racialised minorities?

Inma Sánchez García is a lecturer in European languages and culture at the University of Edinburgh.

3. Throne of Blood (1957)

Japanese, based on Macbeth

The genius of Throne of Blood is that despite being set in 16th century Japan and changing almost everything about the original, it is immediately recognisable as the Scottish play. It’s considered by many to be the greatest Shakespeare film ever made.

The trailer for Throne of Blood.

The mist-swirled locations, the screeching flute and ominous drumbeats, the spooky old lady in the forest, and above all the samurai, barking orders and getting lost on their horses, can mean only that “Macbeth doth come”. The final scene when Washizu’s (Macbeth’s) soldiers turn on him with a hail of arrows may even represent an improvement on Shakespeare. Meanwhile his poker-faced lady clearly wears the kimono-trousers in their marriage.

Daniel Gallimore is a professor of literature and linguistics at Kwansei Gakuin University

4. Bhrantibilas (1963)

Bengali, based on Comedy of Errors

If you asked me to pick a favourite Shakespeare film, I’d probably surprise people by saying Bhrantibilas. It’s one of the earliest filmed Shakespeare adaptations in Indian cinema. It was also the inspiration for the globally popular film Angoor (1982).

A scene from Bhrantibilas.

What I love about it is how confidently it relocates Shakespeare’s farce into a Bengali urban world without ever feeling like a dutiful “literary” exercise. A huge part of its lasting appeal is Bengali superstar Uttam Kumar. It’s pure pleasure watching him play the twin roles – Antipholus of Syracuse and Antipholus of Ephesus, identical twins separated at birth, whose accidental reunion causes chaos. His comic timing is razor-sharp, and there’s also an ease and charm that makes the confusion feel human, never mechanical.

Decades on, audiences still return to Bhrantibilas, often knowing every gag by heart, which says a lot about its cultural afterlife. For me, it’s a perfect example of how Shakespeare survives not through reverence but through reinvention – absorbed into popular cinema and kept alive by star power, humour and sheer re-watchability.

Koel Chatterjee is a lecturer in English at Regent College, and the creator and host of The Shakespop Podcast and The Shakesfic Podcast.

5. Rahm (2016)

Urdu, based on Measure for Measure

Measure for Measure has long been regarded as a “problem play”. Disfavoured among Shakespeare’s works for centuries, it hit stages again in the 20th-century and reached new audiences through its resonances with the #MeToo movement.

The trailer for Rahm.

A local leader tells a devout woman that if she loses her virginity to him, he will spare her imprisoned brother’s life. This film shifts the action from early modern, Catholic Vienna to an ambiguous period in Islamic Lahore. Moderate and extremist versions of faith contend, against the backdrop of the city. This film’s billing as a thriller, and status as the only big screen version of the play, help raise it from obscurity.

Sarah Olive is a senior lecturer in English literature at Aston University.

6. To The Marriage of True Minds (2010)

Arabic, based on Sonnet 116

This freely available short film expands on one of Shakespeare’s shortest forms: the sonnet. It riffs on Sonnet 116, heard at countless weddings: “Let me not to the marriage of true minds … admit impediments.” Here, its Arabic translation provides both the back story to – and future hope for – an asylum-seeking couple in a same-sex relationship, Falah (Amir Boutrous) and Hayder (Waleed Elgadi).

The story of their journey by sea, and shots of a tossed-about paper boat reference the poem’s sea-voyage imagery. Over 12 tense minutes, we hold our breath to see whether the Iraqi poet and his childhood beloved will overcome the impediments of religious conservatism, on one shore, and an apparently hostile asylum system on the other.

Sarah Olive is a senior lecturer in English literature at Aston University.

This article features references to books that have been included for editorial reasons, and may contain links to bookshop.org. If you click on one of the links and go on to buy something from bookshop.org The Conversation UK may earn a commission.

The Conversation

Sarah Olive does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. The six best Shakespeare adaptations that aren’t in English – https://theconversation.com/the-six-best-shakespeare-adaptations-that-arent-in-english-277804

Why omega-3s may be vital to getting the most out of your daily workouts

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Fernando Naclerio, Professor in Strength and Conditioning and Sports Nutrition, University of Greenwich

People who exercise regularly may want to consider taking an omega-3 supplement. Olenaduygu/ Shutterstock

Most people know omega-3 fish oils are good for health – especially heart health. But what many people might not realise is that these friendly fats can also be beneficial to your workouts.

Research has linked omega-3s to better exercise performance – making them a potentially valuable supplement for people who train regularly.

Omega-3 fatty acids are special fats found mainly in fish, seafood, nuts and seeds (such as walnuts and flaxseed), as well as some plant oils.

The main forms of omega-3s are eicosapentaenoic acid (EPA) and docosahexaenoic acid (DHA). EPA and DHA are essential for the structure and function of cells, especially in the muscles, heart and brain. This is because they help with “membrane fluidity” – the flow of nutrients or chemicals into cells.

To ensure adequate omega-3 levels, people need to get them from their diet. Although there’s no universal agreement on how much to eat, most health bodies recommend 1.4-2.5g a day of omega‑3 – with 140-600mg per day coming specifically from EPA and DHA. Around 500mg daily of EPA and DHA combined is enough to support health and benefit exercise.

Omega-3s and exercise

Exercise – especially resistance training (such as lifting weights) and hard-training sessions (such as cross-fit) – places stress on the muscles, causing small amounts of damage that triggers inflammation as part of the body’s repair process. Some inflammation is necessary for adaptation, but too much or prolonged inflammation may delay recovery and reduce performance.

Omega-3s have been found to act like “traffic controllers,” helping regulate the body’s inflammatory response to exercise so muscles recover more efficiently.

EPA also appears to support better blood flow to muscles after training and enhances the process of muscle protein synthesis (the body’s way of building new muscle tissue). Both of these processes may improve recovery following repeated sessions.

Research in physically active adults has even shown that taking fish oil containing EPA and DHA for several weeks enhanced muscle strength gains in resistance exercise performance compared to those who did the same type of training but did not take an omega-3 supplement.

EPA and DHA therefore appear to help the body recover and adapt to training more effectively over time.

DHA is important for the brain and nervous system, supporting cognitive function and nerve signals that help muscle to work efficiently while exercising. People who exercise regularly and take an omega-3 supplement also have higher DHA levels in their muscle cell membranes compared to those who are sedentary. This could be key for recovery and adaptation from exercise.

Omega-3 balance

Although omega-3 can be obtained from the diet, the amount of EPA and DHA in food can vary depending on the type of fish, whether it’s wild or farmed, what these farmed fish are fed and how the food is stored or cooked.

Modern diets also often provide far more omega-6 than omega-3, which may promote inflammation. This is because omega-6 fats produce pro-inflammatory compounds, whereas omega-3s produce anti-inflammatory ones. This balance can be improved by increasing omega-3s, reducing consumption of processed foods and omega-6-rich oils (such as corn, safflower and soybean oils).

An overview of omega-3 rich foods laid out on a table, including salmon, sardines, eggs and nuts.
Many foods are also rich in omega-3s.
mama_mia/ Shutterstock

To support a healthy omega‑3 status, include a variety of fatty fish, seafood and plant sources such as chia or linseed. Also aim to choose low glycaemic carbohydrates such as oats, legumes and most fruits. This is because low glycaemic foods release sugar slowly into the blood, which helps your body use fats as fuel more effectively.

High-glycaemic foods on the other hand, such as white bread, sugary drinks or refined grains, release sugar quickly. This can reduce how well omega-3s are incorporated into cells and may increase inflammation.

Most people can get enough omega-3 from a healthy diet that contains oily fish, but supplements can be a practical option if these foods aren’t eaten or if higher intakes are needed. While fish oil supplements can be a beneficial strategy to boost your omega-3 levels, to see measurable changes in muscles and overall health, daily intake for at least two weeks is recommended.

For most active people, this means 3-5g of fish oil per day, ideally with a high concentration of EPA and DHA. Omega-3s are best absorbed when taken with meals containing some fat. Therefore, splitting the dose (such as taking some with breakfast and dinner) improves absorption and tolerance.

For muscle growth and functional performance, a supplement providing around 1.8g of EPA and 1.5g of DHA per day is suggested. This is roughly equivalent to the omega-3 content found in 200–400g of fatty fish such as salmon, herring or sardines.

If your goal is to support brain health, cognitive function or mood, a higher proportion of DHA may be beneficial. So instead of getting a supplement containing an equal 1:1 ratio of EPA and DHA, aim to purchase a supplement containing a 1:8 ratio of EPA to DHA (such as 100mg EPA and 800mg DHA). Typical products vary widely, so readers should check the EPA and DHA content rather than the total fish oil amount.

Omega-3 supplements are generally safe, but some people may experience a mild, fishy aftertaste or upset stomach after taking one – particularly when taking higher doses or when taken without food. Intakes above 5g per day of EPA+DHA from supplements should be avoided, unless medically advised.

Omega-3s may help support both health, recovery and adaptation to training, and indeed may be an important nutritional component for those who exercise regularly. While a balanced diet should come first, omega-3 supplements can be helpful in keeping up with training demands when diet is insufficient.

The Conversation

Professor F Naclerio has previously received external research funding unrelated to this article.

Professor Roberts has previously received external research funding unrelated to this article.

ref. Why omega-3s may be vital to getting the most out of your daily workouts – https://theconversation.com/why-omega-3s-may-be-vital-to-getting-the-most-out-of-your-daily-workouts-279409

Philanthropy is reshaping global health. Here’s how

Source: The Conversation – France – By Annabelle Littoz-Monnet, Professor in International Relations, Graduate Institute – Institut de hautes études internationales et du développement (IHEID)

Over the past two decades, global health has undergone a profound transformation. As public funding for international health and development has become increasingly unpredictable, private philanthropy has largely stepped in to fund global programmes.

It is well known that large foundations, such as the Gates Foundation, Bloomberg Philanthropies, or the Chan Zuckerberg Initiative, to list a few, now largely contribute to the budgets of the World Health Organization (WHO), a number of public-private partnerships, or initiate private initiatives.

What is less visible though is the way philanthropic organisations are increasingly producing the data, research, and knowledge infrastructures through which global health problems are known, prioritised and eventually governed. This shift is often presented as pragmatic, in the face of constrained budgets and an urgent global health crisis. Yet the expanding epistemic presence of philanthropic actors in global health is interrogating, when it shapes the very frameworks though which health issues are understood.

When philanthropic foundations produce global health data

Philanthropic foundations have, in recent years, widely invested in the production of metrics on the “burden” of specific health conditions and the “costs” and “returns” of given health interventions.

These metrics, while necessary, do not only describe reality, but define what counts as a health problem and what kinds of interventions are deemed valuable.

In 2007, the Gates Foundation (formerly known as the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation) created the Institute of Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME) to provide “timely, relevant, and scientifically valid evidence to improve health policy and practice” (IHME website).

Since its establishment, the IHME’s has been calculating the so-called Global Burden of Disease (GBD) metrics.

The GBD is the largest-scale project ever set up aimed at measuring morbidity and mortality rates throughout the globe using the metric of DALYs (Disability Adjusted Life Years).

The IHME, which has benefited from generous funding from the Gates Foundation, produces profuse metrics and estimates, calculations, and projections, which nowadays deeply shape the way health problems are being known, compared, and governed.

Although the WHO initially attempted to equal the IHME as a provider of health metrics, the IHME has now reached a position of dominance in global health. The WHO itself now increasingly relies on those numbers for its own sense-making and agenda-setting exercises.

Other “data” initiatives have since then further stabilised the strong presence of philanthropists in global health. In 2015, Bloomberg Philanthropies, for instance, launched its own Data for Health initiative, also co-funded with the Australian government and the Gates Foundation, to “strengthen and standardise birth and death records and to better inform policymaking and improve public health outcomes”.

Vital Strategies, which describes itself as a global health non-profit organisation, entirely funded by Bloomberg Philanthropies, acts as the implementing partner of Data for Health. In that capacity, Vital Strategies supports the WHO in its risk monitoring work. As their resources often surpass those of the WHO, philanthropists’ data centers have come to sit at the core of global infrastructures of quantification, providing data and metrics to the WHO and supporting it in its own monitoring work.

It is on the basis of those estimates that philanthropic organisations themselves and global health actors at large produce calculations to identify which health interventions could “save the most lives” and be most cost-effective. Interventions considered to be “best buys” and funding priorities have, thus, been identified on the basis of such metrics.

Effects on global health governance

GBD results have highlighted that diseases like malaria, HIV, and later non-communicable diseases (NCDs) account for a massive “burden” of DALYS.

Such numbers have helped, for instance, scale-up interventions for malaria and HIV treatment. The distribution of hundreds of millions of insecticide-treated nets has become a flagship intervention to solve malaria, with quantifiable impact, supported by the Gates Foundation but also global health actors at large. As philanthropic foundations increasingly partner with the WHO and other global health actors, they can, indeed, effectively translate this evidence in identifiable targets which all global health actors try to reach.

While supporting such interventions is in itself laudable, what is questioning is that this calculative logic introduced a particular way of valuing health interventions, toward an approach in which ‘results’ must be continuously and quantitatively evidenced. This logic has favoured, first, a move toward population-based interventions, which alone can be shown to be producing significant and measurable results. This approach implies that problems are seen mainly in terms of their magnitude and that interventions need to have “scalability” and “reach population impact”. Such interventions enable funders to calculate impact and returns on investment in a standardised way.

Second, this approach also favours highly technical interventions, rather than complex, structural interventions, as it is easier to produce evidence on their impact and the economic returns they generate.

With regard to the treatment of high blood pressure, for instance, anti-hypertensive therapy has been privileged. While philanthropists and the WHO also promote interventions that target salt intake and trans-fat in food, these tend to be less central and fashioned by philanthropists as more complex, because population-based impact measurements are unavailable. The identification of hypertensive therapy as a most effective intervention was largely identified through the funding of modelling scenarios and projections by Bloomberg Philanthropies, which has largely invested in the field to find out which hypothetical interventions would bring the best returns.

The involvement of philanthropists has therefore contributed to reinforcing a solutionist approach to health, where “quick fixes” are favoured, while factors relating to socioeconomic and environmental conditions problems are too often ignored.

Understanding this shift is crucial. It reveals that as private resources are called in to fill existing funding gaps, such a move is not neutral but deeply political.

Although the prevention of diseases is in itself a laudable objective for improving public health, what is interrogating is how the knowledge produced by these philanthropic actors, largely rooted in for-profit strategies and logics, is instrumental in making health conditions known, treated, and governed.


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The Conversation

Annabelle Littoz-Monnet a reçu des financements du Fonds National Suisse de la recherche Scientifique (FNS).

ref. Philanthropy is reshaping global health. Here’s how – https://theconversation.com/philanthropy-is-reshaping-global-health-heres-how-280942

Why the world needs the UN to keep an eye on AI

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Yu Xiong, Chair Professor of Business Analytics, University of Surrey; Northumbria University, Newcastle

Summit Art Creations/Shutterstock

AI doesn’t have a boss. It doesn’t really care about rules. And most of us don’t have any say over what it will do next.

Yet the technology is all around us, firmly established in workplaces, financial systems, healthcare and defence. So maybe it needs someone to keep an eye on its progress and set some boundaries.

The UN certainly thinks so, and recently decided to set up an independent panel to monitor AI’s future development. It seems like a sensible move, but this attempt to create a successful forum for “rigorous, independent scientific insight” also highlights the inherent difficulties of governing technology on a global scale.

For a start, the US, which dominates AI development, doesn’t want anything to do with the panel. It voted against the UN’s idea (so did Paraguay), calling it “significant overreach”.

But the UN argues that AI affects everyone, and requires some global coordination. UN secretary-general António Guterres has described the new panel as the first “fully independent scientific body dedicated to helping close the AI knowledge gap and assess the real impacts of AI”.

As with some of the UN’s other forums, like the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change or the International Atomic Energy Agency, the AI panel would not write the laws, but would help establish common ground rules and standards that everyone can agree on.

AI is a different beast though. Unlike climate policy or nuclear materials, which are the responsibility of national governments, AI’s progress is largely driven by private – and very wealthy – firms.

International coordination is much more difficult, and already the US, the EU and China are taking different approaches to governance.

The EU takes a fairly cautious line, with strict rules on high-risk applications in areas like recruitment or law enforcement. The US favours voluntary standards within the industry. Meanwhile, China treats AI development and control as a matter of state.

When different parts of the world approach things so differently, there is a risk that any attempt at global cooperation will simply not work. Big firms could simply move their headquarters to whichever part of the world they consider to be the least restrictive. Technical rules can then become geopolitical tools rather than shared protections.

But the biggest challenge goes beyond technical coordination, because AI is fundamentally a technology of power which involves control over information, opportunity and surveillance.




Read more:
Could revisiting Asimov’s laws help us avoid AI’s ‘Chernobyl moment’?


There have already been cases of AI being used in predictive policing models that disproportionately target communities. It has been part of automated welfare systems that exclude the vulnerable and decide on access to credit or housing.

Digital accountability

This is not the first time that a powerful digital force has surged ahead while oversight lags behind.

I witnessed this firsthand with research I carried out with colleagues about Bitcoin.

When we published our findings about Bitcoin’s massive energy footprint in 2021, the reaction was immediate and global. It triggered a debate that shook the industry, and demonstrated that digital systems can cause to the world.

AI is now on the same path, but the stakes are exponentially higher, affecting not just energy grids, but society itself.

AI-generated political statements, religious sermons and news footage circulate on screens everywhere. And when people cannot reliably distinguish authentic authority from artificial output, social trust is eroded.

AI could make online incitement easier, cheaper, more personalised and more widespread. Some civil leaders have claimed that digital radicalisation, the process by which people adopt extremist views through online content, could be intensified by these tools.

Societies everywhere are already grappling with AI’s wider social consequences.

The head of the Muslim World League, an international non-governmental Islamic organisation, Mohammad bin Abdulkarim Al-Issa, has warned that AI may “manipulate the ideologies and beliefs that connect and influence billions” with extremist messaging.

Having seen how groups like Islamic State exploited social platforms for recruitment and division, he also argues that the danger lies not only in what is said, but in the loss of identifiable authority behind it. Elsewhere, the Pope has warned that AI must never diminish human dignity or reduce people to data points.




Read more:
AI laws overlook environmental damage – here’s what needs to change


These kinds of worry reflect legitimate concerns about how technological platforms can fracture societies when ethical guardrails fall behind. And this is precisely where the UN may have an important role to play.

The UN building in New York.
UN v AI?
Aditya E.S. Wicaksono/Shutterstock

Historically, its strength has never depended on enforcement power so much as on symbolic authority and its ability to articulate widely shared goals designed to improve people’s lives.

The UN’s 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights became the foundation of modern human rights law, by reshaping what governments could plausibly justify. Likewise, the global eradication of smallpox showed how a shared UN-backed objective could enable cooperation even across geopolitical divides.

Perhaps the real question, then, is not whether the UN should try to regulate AI directly. It is whether the world can afford a fragmented AI order defined solely by markets, geopolitics and billionaires, with no common ground.

Because while the promise of AI is staggering, serious and dangerous failings could yet emerge from the unfilled gaps in governance. The UN could help to avoid them.

The Conversation

Yu Xiong does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Why the world needs the UN to keep an eye on AI – https://theconversation.com/why-the-world-needs-the-un-to-keep-an-eye-on-ai-277143