Author: MIL-OSI Publisher

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Duncan Depledge, Senior Lecturer in Geopolitics and Security, Loughborough University

Earth’s average temperature rose more than 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels in 2024 for the first time – a critical threshold in the climate crisis. At the same time, major armed conflicts continue to rage in Ukraine, Gaza, Sudan and elsewhere.

What should be increasingly clear is that war now needs to be understood as unfolding in the shadow of climate breakdown.

The relationship between war and climate change is complex. But here are three reasons why the climate crisis must reshape how we think about war.

Wars and climate change are inextricably linked. Climate change can increase the likelihood of violent conflict by intensifying resource scarcity and displacement, while conflict itself accelerates environmental damage. This article is part of a series, War on climate, which explores the relationship between climate issues and global conflicts.

1. War exacerbates climate change

The inherent destructiveness of war has long degraded the environment. But we have only recently become more keenly aware of its climatic implications.

This follows efforts primarily by researchers and civil society organisations to account for the greenhouse gas emissions resulting from fighting, most notably in Ukraine and Gaza, as well as to record emissions from all military operations and post-war reconstruction.

One study, conducted by Scientists for Global Responsibility and the Conflict and Environment Observatory, has made a best guess that the total carbon footprint of militaries across the globe is greater than that of Russia, which currently has the fourth-largest footprint in the world.

The US is believed to have the highest military emissions. Estimates by UK-based researchers Benjamin Neimark, Oliver Belcher and Patrick Bigger suggest that, if it were a country, the US military would be the 47th-largest emitter of greenhouse gases in the world. This would put it between Peru and Portugal.

These studies, though, rest on limited data. Sometimes partial emissions data is reported by military agencies, and researchers have to supplement this with their own calculations using official government figures and those of associated industries.

There is also significant variation from country to country. Some military emissions, most notably those of China and Russia, have proved almost impossible to assess.

Wars can also put international cooperation on climate change and the energy transition at risk. Since the start of the Ukraine war, for instance, scientific cooperation between the west and Russia in the Arctic has broken down. This has prevented crucial climate data from being compiled.

Critics of militarism argue that the acknowledgement of war’s contribution to the climate crisis ought to be the moment of reckoning for those who are too willing to spend vast resources on maintaining and expanding military power. Some even believe that demilitarisation is the only way out of climate catastrophe.

Others are less radical. But the crucial point is that recognition of the climate costs of war increasingly raises moral and practical questions about the need for more strategic restraint and whether the business of war can ever be rendered less environmentally destructive.

2. Climate change demands military responses

Before the impact of war on the climate came into focus, researchers debated whether the climate crisis could act as a “threat multiplier”. This has led some to argue that climate change could intensify the risk of violence in parts of the world already under stress from food and water insecurity, internal tensions, poor governance and territorial disputes.

Some conflicts in the Middle East and Sahel have already been labelled “climate wars”, implying they may not have happened if it were not for the stresses of climate change. Other researchers have shown how such claims are deeply contentious. Any decision to engage in violence or go to war is always still a choice made by people, not the climate.

Harder to contest is the observation that the climate crisis is leading militaries to be deployed with greater frequency to assist with civilian emergencies. This encompasses a wide range of activities from combating wildfires to reinforcing flood defences, assisting with evacuations, conducting search-and-rescue operations, supporting post-disaster recovery and delivering humanitarian aid.

Whether the climate crisis will result in more violence and armed conflict in the future is impossible to predict. If it does, military force may need to be deployed more frequently. At the same time, if militaries are depended upon to help respond to the growing frequency and intensity of climate-related disasters, their resources will be further stretched.

Governments will be confronted with tough choices about what kinds of tasks should be prioritised and whether military budgets should be increased at the expense of other societal needs.

3. Armed forces will need to adapt

With geopolitical tensions rising and the number of conflicts increasing, it seems unlikely that calls for demilitarisation will be met any time soon. This leaves researchers with the uncomfortable prospect of having to rethink how military force can – and ought to be – wielded in a world simultaneously trying to adapt to accelerating climate change and escape its deep dependence on fossil fuels.

The need to prepare military personnel and adapt bases, equipment and other infrastructure to withstand and operate effectively in increasingly extreme and unpredictable climatic conditions is a matter of growing concern. In 2018, two major hurricanes in the US caused more than US$8 billion (£5.95 billion) worth of damage to military infrastructure.

My own research has demonstrated how, in the UK at least, there is growing awareness among some defence officials that militaries need to think carefully about how they will navigate the major changes unfolding in the global energy landscape that are being brought about by the energy transition.

Militaries are being confronted with a stark choice. They can either remain as one of the last heavy users of fossil fuels in an increasingly low-carbon world or be part of an energy transition that will probably have significant implications for how military force is generated, deployed and sustained.

What is becoming clear is that operational effectiveness will increasingly depend on how aware militaries are of the implications of climate change for future operations. It will also hinge on how effectively they have adapted their capabilities to cope with more extreme climatic conditions and how much they have managed to reduce their reliance on fossil fuels.

In the early 19th century, the Prussian general Carl von Clausewitz famously argued that while war’s nature rarely changes, its character is almost constantly evolving with the times.

Recognising the scale and reach of the climate crisis will be essential if we are now to make sense of why and how future wars will be waged, as well as how some might be averted or rendered less destructive.

Duncan Depledge receives funding from the UK Economic and Social Research Council. He is an Associate Fellow of the London-based Royal United Services Institute and a Non-Resident Fellow of the Washington D.C.-based Center for Climate Security (part of the Council on Strategic Risks).

– ref. Three reasons why the climate crisis must reshape how we think about war – https://theconversation.com/three-reasons-why-the-climate-crisis-must-reshape-how-we-think-about-war-262469

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Tim Bale, Professor of Politics, Queen Mary University of London

Thanks to the media interest in his election as leader of the Green party of England and Wales, there’s now plenty of information available about Zack Polanski, the so-called “eco-populist” who won a landslide victory over his arguably more moderate rivals.

But what do we know about the nearly 65,000 grassroots members who gave Polanski an overwhelming 85% of the vote, albeit on a turnout of just 38%? A survey we conducted of party members following the 2024 election sheds light on why he won so convincingly. It also gives us some idea of how easy Polanski will find it to achieve his goal of moving the party in a more radical, left-liberal direction.

As part of the Party Members Project, we’ve surveyed members of the country’s five most popular nationwide parties, including 732 people who belonged to the Greens.

The Greens had easily the most gender-balanced membership, coming in at a satisfyingly precise 50:50. However, in common with those of other parties, Green members are no spring chickens: fewer than one in 20 were in the 18-24 age group. The rest were evenly spread across the 25-49, 50-64 and 65+ groups.

And, like most other parties (Reform UK being a partial – but only a partial – exception) Green members are overwhelmingly middle class. Indeed, to use a commonly employed classification, some 83% of Green members we surveyed were ABC1s – meaning they come from one of the three higher (and generally better-off) social grades.

Geographically, they are rather more likely than the population as a whole to live in London, the south and the east of England rather than in the north or the Midlands.

How leftwing are Green members?

In terms of attitudes and values, some 88% of Green members voted Remain in the 2016 Brexit referendum compared to just 5% who plumped for Leave. And when asked whether “the government should increase taxes and spend more on public services or cut taxes and spend less on public services?” agreement with the first option was near universal at 96%. This beats even the 89% of Labour and Lib Dem members who said the same.

When asked to place themselves on a left-right scale, some 27% of Green members labelled themselves “very left wing”, with 54% picking “fairly left wing” and 16% going for “slightly left wing”. This again suggests the Greens’ grassroots stand somewhere to the left of Labour’s membership.

More broadly, Green members are clearly at the far end of what political scientists sometimes refer to as the green alternative libertarian v traditional authoritarian nationalist, GAL-TAN scale. This appears, these days, to be as if not more important than its left-right equivalent.

Predictably enough, some 98% of Green members supported cutting emissions to get to net zero. On immigration only 18% thought it had been too high over the last decade, with 29% thinking it had actually been too low and 41% “about right”. Eight out of ten disagreed with the notion that men and women had different roles in society, and three quarters said they weren’t proud of this country’s history.

Were we betting people, then, all the above would have led us to put a fair bit of our spare cash on Polanski to win the Green party leadership – and to do so fairly easily. Our findings suggest, too, that he’ll have considerable support in his bid to take the party in a more radical direction.

We also, incidentally, asked party members what qualities they thought it important for a leader to possess, getting them to pick their top three from a list we gave them. For the Greens, having “a strong moral compass” came in at number one, selected by two thirds of members.

Second was being “a good communicator”, picked by just over half. Number three on their list, mentioned by just under half of Green members, was “the ability to empathise with others”.

Reading the portraits of him published since his big win, and judging by his media appearances both during and after the contest, Polanski would appear to be just the kind of leader the Green grassroots is looking for. Whether that’s also true of voters remains to be seen.

Tim Bale has received funding from the ESRC and Research England (via QMUL) to conduct research on party members.

Paul Webb has previously received funding from the ESRC to conduct research on political parties.

Stavroula Chrona does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Our survey of Green party members suggests Zack Polanski has the mandate to take his party in a more radical direction – https://theconversation.com/our-survey-of-green-party-members-suggests-zack-polanski-has-the-mandate-to-take-his-party-in-a-more-radical-direction-264510

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Emily Blackwell, Senior Lecturer in Animal Behaviour and Welfare, University of Bristol

Many cat owners don’t realise that just like humans, cats can suffer from dementia. A recent paper has even found many similarities between feline and human dementia, finding that cognitive impairment may develop in similar ways.

Some of the symptoms of dementia in cats are even similar to what we might see in humans – though not all of them, of course. Knowing what signs to look out for is important so you can provide your cat with the best care during this phase of its life.

Feline cognitive dysfunction syndrome (also known as feline dementia) is an age-related decline in a cat’s cognitive abilities. It’s generally characterised by behavioural changes that cannot be attributed to other medical conditions.

Feline dementia is thought to be very common in older cats. One study found that by 15 years of age, more than half of cats showed signs of dementia. However, some behaviour associated with the condition has also been identified in cats as young as seven. A separate survey of cat owners also found that around 28% of cats aged between 11 and 14 exhibited at least one behavioural change associated with dementia.

Behavioural changes are often the first indication that there may be something wrong. There are eight signs to look out for that might indicate your cat has dementia.

1. Unusual vocalisation: Your cat might start to vocalise excessively, or in new situations. A common example of this is meowing loudly at night.

2. Altered interactions: Cats with dementia sometimes seek attention more often or become “clingy”. Equally, cats with dementia might interact less than previously, appear irritable or seem not to recognise familiar people.

3. Sleep changes: You may notice changes in your cat’s sleeping habits – often becoming restless at night and sleeping more during the day.

4. House soiling: Changes in toilet habits can be a sign of several different conditions, but toileting outside the litter tray can be a common sign of dementia in cats.

5. Disorientation: Just like people with dementia, cats may show signs of confusion or wandering behaviour. This might appear as losing their bearings, staring blankly at walls, getting stuck behind objects or going to the wrong side of the door.

6. Changes in activity levels: A cat with dementia may be more or less active than usual. They may play less often or be less inclined to explore. You might also notice them spending less time taking care of themselves, for example grooming or washing themselves less.

7. Appearing anxious: A cat with dementia might show signs of anxiety in situations that they were previously confident with – such as around familiar people, places or sounds. An anxious cat might hide more often, going under the bed or on top of cupboards to escape.

8. Learning problems: Cats with dementia may be less unable to perform previously learned tasks, such as finding their food bowl, and may have difficulty learning new tasks.

Caring for your cat

There’s significant overlap between symptoms of feline dementia and other common conditions, such as arthritis and kidney disease . So if you see any of these behavioural changes in your cat, you should speak to your vet to rule out these other conditions.

Research into feline dementia is limited. Much of what we know about prevention and treatment is extrapolated from research into humans and dogs. And, as with these other species, there’s no cure for dementia in cats. But there are ways of limiting the impact of the disease.

Certain environmental modifications can help stimulate cats, activating their brains and causing nerves to grow. But the severity of your cat’s dementia must be considered before making any of these changes.

In healthy or mildly affected cats, promoting play or simulating hunting with interactive toys and encouraging exploration using hide and seek games is thought to delay the progression of cognitive dysfunction.

But in cats with severe cognitive impairment, changing their environment could lead to confusion and anxiety – worsening behavioural symptoms.

Diet changes – specifically the addition of supplements containing antioxidants (vitamin E and C) and essential fatty acids – may also help to reduce inflammation in the brain, slowing the disease’s progression.

However, only dog-specific supplements have been tested in scientific research and proven to enhance cognition in dogs. But if you do want to try giving these supplements to your cat, be sure you only give them supplements approved for felines. Dog supplements should not be given to cats as they may include substances that are toxic to cats – such as alpha lipoic acid.

Feline dementia is a condition both highly prevalent and challenging to manage. Knowing what symptoms to look out for can ensure your cat gets diagnosed earlier on. This will also ensure you’re able to make the necessary changes to its environment or diet that will ultimately improve its quality of life.

Emily Blackwell receives funding from Cats Protection, Zoetis, Defra and Waltham Petcare Science Institute.

Sara Lawrence-Mills receives funding from Zoetis.

– ref. Cats can get dementia too – here are the eight signs to look out for – https://theconversation.com/cats-can-get-dementia-too-here-are-the-eight-signs-to-look-out-for-263148

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Richard Jones, Director of Journalism, Politics and Contemporary History, University of Salford

The proposed reorganisation of council boundaries was probably not the issue which prompted British voters to elect hundreds of Reform councillors at May’s local elections.

Nigel Farage’s surging party won 677 seats and gained control of ten councils, including Nottinghamshire in the East Midlands. There, a choice about whether the districts of Gedling or Rushcliffe should be included in a redrawn Nottingham city council has led to an apparent split in the new Reform council contingent. This was reported by Nottinghamshire Live, the online brand used by venerable local newspaper the Nottingham Post.

Council leader Mick Barton was so angry, he banned all his Reform councillors from speaking to Nottinghamshire Live. Its journalists won’t be sent press releases or be invited to council events.

Requests for interviews will be rejected, although they can still attend council meetings held in public. The same goes for its BBC-funded local democracy reporters.

Branding the article “misinformation”, Barton said he welcomed “scrutiny” but added: “We also have a duty to protect the credibility of our governance and the voices that we represent. For this reason, we will not be engaging with Nottinghamshire Live or with any other media outlet we consider to be consistently misrepresenting our policies, actions or intentions.”

Nottinghamshire Live editor Natalie Fahy pointed out this rather goes against Reform’s stated interest in upholding free speech and transparency, and warned: “When the press is not welcome, you know democracy itself is in danger.”

A Guardian editorial called Barton’s decision “petty and alarming”. Spokespeople for the other main UK parties chimed in, with the Liberal Democrats fretting about Donald Trump-style politics. Even Reform UK backed away, with a national party spokesperson saying it supported free speech and it was up to the local party to explain its decision.

There was already a bit of history between local reporters and Nottinghamshire Reform’s group of mostly inexperienced politicians. An excruciating video interview with Reform councillor James Walker-Gurley was widely shared online in June. It’s fair to say he was not yet fully across his cabinet portfolio of economic development.

Local journalism and democracy

This gets us to why it matters. Reporting local politics is a classic function of journalism. The fact that our politicians regularly meet, consider business and debate issues in public has long been part of democracy.

But hardly anyone actually goes to council meetings. It is journalists who can keep a close eye and tell us all what’s happening, including Nottinghamshire’s 800,000 plus residents.

Not that scrutiny means constant criticism. While councillors and reporters often do bump up against each other, studies of the local press have generally bemoaned it for being more of a lapdog than a watchdog, guilty of skirting controversy and avoiding proper scrutiny of institutions.

In their seminal 1973 book on local government and the media, researchers Harvey Cox and David Morgan argued local newspaper editors have always been interested in “the good of the town” as a general concept, and those editors are therefore in favour of anything that fits into this theme rather than being too negative.

A broadly constructive connection between town hall and local paper is normal and helps both sides, in turn allowing citizens to be better informed. Reform’s posturing in Nottinghamshire harms its relationship with a key player that may be as likely to help trumpet the party’s successes as point out its failures.

While Reform’s attitude to reporters in Nottinghamshire is a concern, a far bigger threat to local journalism than grumpy politicians is money, or the lack of it. The business model of newspapers has been under desperate stress for two decades, as advertising cash floods to digital platforms and print sales decline.

In 2007, the local sector employed about 9,000 journalists and had revenue of £2.4 billion. By 2022, those figures had declined below 3,000 and £600 million.

Consigned to regional hubs and home offices, local journalists are no longer working for grand civic institutions. However, flexible use of digital publishing tools and a continuing commitment to public interest journalism, alongside lighter content, has kept titles such as Nottinghamshire Live prominent in our social feeds.

In the US these trends have moved faster, so we can see where we might be heading. In last year’s presidential election, Donald Trump won 91% of counties which are so-called “news deserts”. These are areas without a remaining professional source of local news. Voters in these places turn more to national media and therefore make choices based on national issues, not local ones.

American academics Danny Hayes and Jennifer Lawless have argued this decline in local media makes it harder for citizens to hold politicians accountable. There becomes less incentive for politicians to do their jobs ethically, and their policies may be less likely to reflect the will of the local electorate.

This is what we can see the beginnings of in Nottinghamshire. Where journalists face a battle to find out what’s going on at the council, residents will know less about their areas. Politicians can operate more in the shadows, only appearing to deliver prepared soundbites on their own channels.

These fraying connections in local public-life mean residents may soon discover the council is not following their wishes, whether on boundary changes or anything else. If Reform’s example becomes the new normal, everyone loses.

This article features references to books that have been included for editorial reasons, and may contain links to bookshop.org. If you click on one of the links and go on to buy something from bookshop.org The Conversation UK may earn a commission.

Richard Jones does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Reform v the Nottingham Post: why local media is crucial to democracy – https://theconversation.com/reform-v-the-nottingham-post-why-local-media-is-crucial-to-democracy-264218

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Soe Tjen Marching, Senior Lecturer in the Department of Languages, Cultures and Linguistics, SOAS, University of London

Indonesians have taken to the streets over the past week to protest against elite corruption. The demonstrations began peacefully on August 25 with protests outside parliament in the capital, Jakarta. They soon spread across the country.

The Indonesian People’s Revolution, a group at the centre of the demonstrations, is demanding an investigation into corruption allegations involving the family of former president Joko “Jokowi” Widodo. Jokowi has strongly rejected these accusations, painting them as a smear campaign.

Protesters are also calling for the dissolution of parliament and the impeachment of the current vice-president, Gibran Rakabuming Raka, who is Jokowi’s son.

Gibran’s path to the vice-presidency was controversial. In Indonesia, presidential and vice-presidential candidates must be at least 40 years old, yet he was only 36 during the 2024 election. The constitutional court – led by Gibran’s uncle, Anwar Usman – changed the rules to grant an exception for regional leaders. Usman was dismissed from his post by an ethics council less than a month later.

The group’s demands resonate with wider public anger over the gulf between privilege and poverty in Indonesia. Parliamentarians pocket high salaries, while millions of workers scrape by on some of the lowest minimum wages in the world. News in mid-August that MPs had secured another pay rise only added fuel to the fire.

The protests have now erupted into violence in several areas of the country. The trigger for this came on August 28, when an armoured police vehicle struck and killed a motorcycle taxi driver in Jakarta, before fleeing the scene. Listyo Sigit Prabowo, Indonesia’s national police chief, issued an apology to the victim’s family and has confirmed the case is being investigated.

Indonesia’s current president, Prabowo Subianto, initially denounced demonstrators as “traitors” and “terrorists”, vowing decisive action against them. But he has now backtracked, pledging on August 31 to heed public demands and even cut lawmakers’ allowances.

In the days leading up to this abrupt reversal, echoes of a darker chapter in the nation’s history resurfaced – one marked by state-led violence and intimidation, the mobilisation of Islamist groups, and the scapegoating of minorities.

Indonesia prides itself on bhinneka tunggal ika, unity in diversity. But Prabowo has long relied on conservative Islamist groups to strengthen his power, push through hardline policies and help silence dissent. This includes the Islamic Defenders Front, which the Jokowi government banned in 2020.

Back in 2014, when Jokowi and Prabowo contested presidential elections, Islamist hardliners perpetrated smear campaigns against Jokowi, accusing him of being a communist agent. They also orchestrated the mass mobilisation that toppled Jakarta’s ethnic Chinese Christian governor, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, in 2017.

The alliance cooled after Prabowo entered Jokowi’s coalition at the end of 2019, but has seemingly been revived amid the current protests. On August 30, the president summoned 16 Islamic organisations to his private residence, reportedly urging them to work with the government to “guard security and peace”.

Meanwhile, racist threats targeting Chinese Indonesian women have flooded online platforms. Popular content creator Elsa Novia Sena, among others, have received rape threats from an account named @endonesaatanpacinak (“Indonesia without Chinese”). I too received rape threats online after criticising the government on X.

For many in Indonesia’s Chinese minority, the atmosphere is chillingly reminiscent of May 1998. That month saw hundreds of women brutally raped – some with sharp tools – in riots characterised by widespread looting and killing. Human rights activists say the 1998 riots were orchestrated or exacerbated by the military to divert public attention from anti-government demonstrations.

Prabowo, an army general at the time, is suspected of being involved in human rights violations during the 1998 riots. He has rejected his alleged involvement in any acts of violence – but was discharged from the military over the allegations, and banned from entering the US for two decades.

Departure from the past

During the blackouts on August 31 in parts of Jakarta (which also occurred prior to the 1998 riots), looting broke out. Yet, in my opinion, something feels different this time. Protesters deliberately targeted the homes of four MPs accused of sneering at the public after securing a pay rise.

The house of Sri Mulyani, Indonesia’s finance minister, was also attacked. She is seen by many Indonesians as complicit in imposing draconian tax policies on ordinary people while sparing elite lawmakers. Sri has dismissed the accusation, stating that any laws are passed in an “open and transparent manner”.

No Chinese Indonesians have been attacked so far. A new slogan, “people looking after people”, has circulated on social media. Many insist the old trick of scapegoating Indonesia’s Chinese minority no longer works.

In May 1998, public anger against the then-president, Suharto, was driven by an economic crash. Indonesia’s ethnic Chinese population – seen as disproportionately successful in business – became convenient scapegoats. This time, however, many Indonesian people have turned against the army.

The protests are no longer only about economic grievances or corruption – they seem to be a stand against the authoritarian playbook of divide and rule. Many even suspect that some of the looters in the current demonstrations are soldiers in disguise.

In Surabaya, a city on the Indonesian island of Java, suspicions deepened when several police posts were torched. People online pointed out that the arsonist, caught in a viral photo, wore an outdated motorcycle taxi uniform paired with Adidas Terrex shoes worth millions of rupiah (hundreds of pounds). The caption asked: “Why would a taxi driver wear a uniform no longer in circulation and, if he really were one, how could he possibly afford such shoes?”

Prabowo may not have anticipated such a reaction from the Indonesian people, forcing him into a U-turn. But despite his gestures of appeasement, many remain unconvinced, dismissing his offers as merely cosmetic.

That scepticism appeared vindicated almost immediately. Late on September 1, the Islamic University of Bandung and Pasundan University came under attack as security forces fired tear gas and rubber bullets at student protesters.

The mass protests, which have spread to 32 provinces of Indonesia, are unlikely to subside soon. The question is whether the government can still weaponise fear and prejudice to cling to power – or whether ordinary Indonesians will stand firm and united against corruption and state violence in demanding justice.

Soe Tjen Marching does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Indonesia violence: state response to protests echoes darker times in country’s history – https://theconversation.com/indonesia-violence-state-response-to-protests-echoes-darker-times-in-countrys-history-264374