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July 5, 2025

How to tell if a photo’s fake? You probably can’t. That’s why new rules are needed

Source: – By Martin Bekker, Computational Social Scientist, University of the Witwatersrand

The problem is simple: it’s hard to know whether a photo’s real or not anymore. Photo manipulation tools are so good, so common and easy to use, that a picture’s truthfulness is no longer guaranteed.

The situation got trickier with the uptake of generative artificial intelligence. Anyone with an internet connection can cook up just about any image, plausible or fantasy, with photorealistic quality, and present it as real. This affects our ability to discern truth in a world increasingly influenced by images.

I teach and research the ethics of artificial intelligence (AI), including how we use and understand digital images.

Many people ask how we can tell if an image has been changed, but that’s fast becoming too difficult. Instead, here I suggest a system where creators and users of images openly state what changes they’ve made. Any similar system will do, but new rules are needed if AI images are to be deployed ethically – at least among those who want to be trusted, especially media.

Doing nothing isn’t an option, because what we believe about media affects how much we trust each other and our institutions. There are several ways forward. Clear labelling of photos is one of them.

Deepfakes and fake news

Photo manipulation was once the preserve of government propaganda teams, and later, expert users of Photoshop, the popular software for editing, altering or creating digital images.

Today, digital photos are automatically subjected to colour-correcting filters on phones and cameras. Some social media tools automatically “prettify” users’ pictures of faces. Is a photo taken of oneself by oneself even real anymore?

The basis of shared social understanding and consensus – trust regarding what one sees – is being eroded. This is accompanied by the apparent rise of untrustworthy (and often malicious) news reporting. We have new language for the situation: fake news (false reporting in general) and deepfakes (deliberately manipulated images, whether for waging war or garnering more social media followers).

Misinformation campaigns using manipulated images can sway elections, deepen divisions, even incite violence. Scepticism towards trustworthy media has untethered ordinary people from fact-based accounting of events, and has fuelled conspiracy theories and fringe groups.

Ethical questions

A further problem for producers of images (personal or professional) is the difficulty of knowing what’s permissable. In a world of doctored images, is it acceptable to prettify yourself? How about editing an ex-partner out of a picture and posting it online?

Would it matter if a well-respected western newspaper published a photo of Russian president Vladimir Putin pulling his face in disgust (an expression that he surely has made at some point, but of which no actual image has been captured, say) using AI?

The ethical boundaries blur further in highly charged contexts. Does it matter if opposition political ads against then-presidential candidate Barack Obama in the US deliberately darkened his skin?

Would generated images of dead bodies in Gaza be more palatable, perhaps more moral, than actual photographs of dead humans? Is a magazine cover showing a model digitally altered to unattainable beauty standards, while not declaring the level of photo manipulation, unethical?

A fix

Part of the solution to this social problem demands two simple and clear actions. First, declare that photo manipulation has taken place. Second, disclose what kind of photo manipulation was carried out.

The first step is straightforward: in the same way pictures are published with author credits, a clear and unobtrusive “enhancement acknowledgement” or EA should be added to caption lines.

The second is about how an image has been altered. Here I call for five “categories of manipulation” (not unlike a film rating). Accountability and clarity create an ethical foundation.

The five categories could be:

C – Corrected

Edits that preserve the essence of the original photo while refining its overall clarity or aesthetic appeal – like colour balance (such as contrast) or lens distortion. Such corrections are often automated (for instance by smartphone cameras) but can be performed manually.

E – Enhanced

Alterations that are mainly about colour or tone adjustments. This extends to slight cosmetic retouching, like the removal of minor blemishes (such as acne) or the artificial addition of makeup, provided the edits don’t reshape physical features or objects. This includes all filters involving colour changes.

B – Body manipulated

This is flagged when a physical feature is altered. Changes in body shape, like slimming arms or enlarging shoulders, or the altering of skin or hair colour, fall under this category.

O – Object manipulated

This declares that the physical position of an object has been changed. A finger or limb moved, a vase added, a person edited out, a background element added or removed.

G – Generated

Entirely fabricated yet photorealistic depictions, such as a scene that never existed, must be flagged here. So, all images created digitally, including by generative AI, but limited to photographic depictions. (An AI-generated cartoon of the pope would be excluded, but a photo-like picture of the pontiff in a puffer jacket is rated G.)

The suggested categories are value-blind: they are (or ought to be) triggered simply by the occurrence of any manipulation. So, colour filters applied to an image of a politician trigger an E category, whether the alteration makes the person appear friendlier or scarier. A critical feature for accepting a rating system like this is that it is transparent and unbiased.

The CEBOG categories above aren’t fixed, there may be overlap: B (Body manipulated) might often imply E (Enhanced), for example.

Feasibility

Responsible photo manipulation software may automatically indicate to users the class of photo manipulation carried out. If needed it could watermark it, or it could simply capture it in the picture’s metadata (as with data about the source, owner or photographer). Automation could very well ensure ease of use, and perhaps reduce human error, encouraging consistent application across platforms.

Of course, displaying the rating will ultimately be an editorial decision, and good users, like good editors, will do this responsibly, hopefully maintaining or improving the reputation of their images and publications. While one would hope that social media would buy into this kind of editorial ideal and encourage labelled images, much room for ambiguity and deception remains.

The success of an initiative like this hinges on technology developers, media organisations and policymakers collaborating to create a shared commitment to transparency in digital media.

Martin Bekker receives funding from the National Research Foundation in South Africa.

– ref. How to tell if a photo’s fake? You probably can’t. That’s why new rules are needed – https://theconversation.com/how-to-tell-if-a-photos-fake-you-probably-cant-thats-why-new-rules-are-needed-252645

July 5, 2025

Marine fossil found in South Africa is one of a kind, thanks to unusual preservation

Source: – By Sarah Gabbott, Professor of Palaeontology, University of Leicester

A fossilised creature found in a South African roadside quarry 25 years ago has finally got an official name. The small, segmented, crustacean-like creature, dated to 444 million years ago, can now be introduced as Keurbos susanae. It belongs to the arthropod group of animals, which accounts for about 84% of all known species that exist today, including insects, spiders and crabs.

Palaeontologist Sarah Gabbott explains what’s so unusual about her discovery, which she named as part of the process of describing it scientifically.

What can you tell us about this creature and the environment it lived in?

The fossil is about 50cm long and has 46 almost identical segments. Projecting from each is a delicate, gill-like structure. It would probably have looked like a bit like a horseshoe crab and the gills would have been for absorbing oxygen from the water it lived in. Its insides are exquisitely well-preserved, which is very unusual for fossils – normally only the hard, more decay-resistant external features would be preserved. You can see bundles of muscle fibres that would have powered the limbs, tendons and an internal scaffold structure that gave the animal rigidity.

We think it would have spent most of its life living on, or more likely just above, the seafloor, probably walking and swimming in an undulatory (waving) motion.

It lived in the immediate aftermath of the end Ordovician extinction event more than 440 million years ago, caused by glaciations (the spread of icy conditions) across vast swaths of the planet. This extinction wiped out about 85% of Earth’s species. The marine basin that Keurbos susanae inhabited was probably very cold and at times covered with sea ice.

It was a relatively hostile environment in other ways too. Our analyses of the chemistry of the shales – the sediments on the sea bed where this animal and others lived, now turned to rock – shows that they were deposited under anoxic conditions (that is, there was no oxygen circulating freely in the water). And at times free hydrogen sulfide occurred in the sediment porewaters (the water in tiny spaces between grains of sediment) and even above the seafloor. Not much could live in these conditions and this was critical to this fossil’s amazing preservation.

It meant the carcass was not scavenged by other animals after it died. Also, the chemistry was important in the process whereby the soft tissues, which should usually rot away rapidly, became mineralised quickly after death. This turned the animal’s anatomy to mineral which survived for hundreds of millions of years until it was discovered.

It is preserved “inside out”.

Keurbos susanae is a new genus and species which we are still trying to place among other early arthropods. The fact that its insides are better preserved than its outside makes it difficult to compare with other fossils that are preserved the “other way round”.

How did you find the fossil and what else has been found in that area?

The site is in the Cedarberg mountains, north of Cape Town. To collect fossils in this area you need a permit granted by the Council for Geoscience. Fossil-bearing rocks are protected by law because of their heritage and scientific value.

Fossil hunting in these rocks takes a lot of hard work and patience, splitting open the shales with a hammer and chisel. These shale rocks are what’s left of layers of silt that were once on the sea floor. The fossils here are super rare: you can dig and split shale for days and not find a single fossil! But we know there are some in there because of discoveries made previously.

I found two specimens. The first one is complete but the second one only has the middle part of the body preserved.

In the same rocks we have found some of the earliest vertebrate fossils with mineralised teeth, called conodonts. They were eel shaped and predatory. Also eurypterids (sea scorpions), arthropods with powerful swimming appendages, which would have cruised through the frigid waters. There are also orthocones – a type of chambered cephalopod – like the mollusc fossils called ammonites, which have been found in large numbers, but with a straight shell instead of coiled.

Why has it taken 25 years to describe Keurbos susanae scientifically?

Two reasons really.

First, because of the nature of preservation, where all the insides are perfectly preserved but the outside (the carapace or body covering) is absent, it is just difficult to interpret and compare to other fossils. And secondly because the specimen’s head and legs are missing and these are key characteristics that palaeontologists would use to help them to understand the evolutionary relationships of such fossils.

If more specimens were to be found, with their heads and legs, we could be more certain about where this fossil fitted in the scheme of life. But the site where I found it has been covered in a lot of rock from quarrying activity. So we decided to describe what we had in the meantime, and not wait for more examples.

The fossil’s name, Keurbos susanae, refers to the place where I found it and to my mother, Sue, who encouraged me to follow a career that made me happy, whatever that might be.

Sarah Gabbott receives funding from Natural Environmental Research Council; National Geographic. She is affiliated with Green Circle Nature Regeneration CIC a not for profit Environmental Community Interest Company in the UK

– ref. Marine fossil found in South Africa is one of a kind, thanks to unusual preservation – https://theconversation.com/marine-fossil-found-in-south-africa-is-one-of-a-kind-thanks-to-unusual-preservation-255256

July 5, 2025

South Africa’s frogs and reptiles get their own list of names in local languages

Source: – By Fortunate Mafeta Phaka, Senior Postdoctoral Researcher of herptile-human interactions, North-West University

Naming all the creatures and plants in nature is no small task. Fortunate Phaka is a zoologist who has conducted the first comprehensive analysis of naming and classification of frogs and reptiles in nine South African cultures. The list includes 136 frog and 407 reptile species that have been scientifically described. He explains why it’s important to record all the species names that people use in their own languages.

Why did you study the indigenous names of frogs and reptiles?

I am interested in the interactions between wildlife and people. These interactions include, for example, how people use wildlife in figures of speech, harvesting of wildlife for consumption, and of course how animals are assigned names.

If everyone’s names for things are known and shared, the ideas behind the names can also be shared, appreciated and valued.

Conservation planning is improved by consideration of different wildlife perspectives, which is revealed partly by the names that different people give wildlife.

Knowing local names can provide assurance that people from different cultural backgrounds are talking about the same species.

In South Africa, for example, there are 11 official spoken languages and scientists use Latin names for species. Most people aren’t familiar with the scientific names.

That’s why we extended the list of scientific, Afrikaans and English names of South African frogs and reptiles to include names in the country’s other nine official languages.

How did you go about it, and what did you find?

The project started as a pilot study in 2016, carried out in the Zululand area of South Africa’s KwaZulu-Natal province, where frog biodiversity is high and Indigenous cultural practices are still part of everyday life. Results of the pilot were published as a book in 2017 and as a scientific publication in 2019.

Following the success of the pilot study, I collected responses from 287 South African Indigenous language speakers (aged between 25 and 57) using an online questionnaire and in-person interviews while on field trips, and reviewed 18 scientific articles, dissertations and books to study naming practices even further.

The study shed light on the way people group animals (folk taxonomy) and how that compares with the way scientists group them (scientific taxonomy).

It became clear that Indigenous language names were often assigned based on unique features of frogs or reptiles, such as the sound they make, how they move or where they are found. Most of these names group several species together based on their similarities. This meant most frog and reptile species did not have Indigenous language names that were unique to them. For example, zoologists have named eight different Reed Frog species from South Africa but these eight species were assigned one Indigenous name that groups them together.

Male Painted Reed Frog (Umgqagqa opendiwe in IsiZulu) calling.
Fortunate Phaka, Author provided (no reuse)918 KB (download)

The organised way of assigning Indigenous names to animals has some similarities to how scientists assign names that are unique to each species. For example, the Grass Frog species are grouped together under the scientific genus Ptychadena, and in IsiZulu the same species are grouped under the name Uvete. These similarities meant we could combine scientific naming practices with Indigenous naming practices to give each species a unique name in multiple languages.

To ensure the unique Indigenous names remained familiar to speakers of respective languages, we added descriptive terms to the existing general Indigenous names to make them specific, instead of coining an entirely new name. For example in IsiZulu the general name Umgqagqa (used for all Reed Frogs) became Umgqagqa opendiwe (specific name for the Painted Reed Frog). And several other descriptive terms were added to Umgqagqa to distinguish between the eight Reed Frog species of South Africa.

Why does it matter to record the Indigenous names of species?

Conservation hasn’t been doing a good job of being inclusive. Knowing Indigenous names and the local perspectives behind those names is a good way to start being aware of the multiple other perspectives. Conservation should ultimately be to everyone’s benefit.

For a long time wildlife guidebooks have had very few Indigenous language names in them. With increased recording of Indigenous names, any South African would be able to open a wildlife guide and read a name in any of our 11 official spoken languages. Hopefully one day we can have more books like the Bilingual Guide to the Frogs of Zululand (IsiZulu version: Isiqondiso Sasefilidini Esindimimbili Ngamaxoxo AkwelaKwaZulu) that make it possible for you to read about your favourite wildlife in your preferred language.

Has this been done for other groups of animals or plants?

Birds and plants are two groups that have received this kind of attention.

A recent scientific publication has worked on IsiZulu names for all South African birds and another publication studied the morphology of IsiZulu bird names. There has also been work on IsiXhosa insect names, and there has been a SeSotho animal word list published online. Indigenous names for African wildlife have received sporadic attention in the past, but with the recent increases in calls for consideration of Indigenous knowledge there has been increasing focus on understanding these names and using them.

Do you have some favourite names?

I have a lot of favourites but there are some names that stand out, like Senana (Sepedi general name for Rain Frogs) and Lebololo (Sepedi name for Puff adder). These names have the same root word or sound throughout most of the Indigenous South African languages and I am curious about how this happened. Rain Frogs are also called Senanatswidi in Sepedi and tswidi is an onomatopoeic reference to the whistling sound that Rain Frogs make.

Fortunate Mafeta Phaka receives funding from National Research Foundation/South African Institute for Aquatic Biodiversity.

– ref. South Africa’s frogs and reptiles get their own list of names in local languages – https://theconversation.com/south-africas-frogs-and-reptiles-get-their-own-list-of-names-in-local-languages-254643

July 5, 2025

Kenya’s police still kill with impunity – what needs to be done to stop them

Source: – By Kamau Wairuri, Lecturer in criminology, Edinburgh Napier University

Days ahead of the first anniversary in Kenya of the Gen Z-led anti-government protests that resulted in at least 60 deaths and displays of police brutality, news broke that Albert Ojwang, a young Kenyan blogger, had died in police detention. Kamau Wairuri who has studied the politics of policing in Kenya, sets out why these events aren’t outliers, what efforts have been made to reform Kenya’s security forces, and what still needs to be done.

When did this all begin?

Recent events are part of a long history of police brutality in Kenya that can be traced back to colonial times.

Historians (colonial and post-colonial Kenya) such as David Anderson and Caroline Elkins present gruesome details of how state authorities brutalised indigenous Africans during colonial times.

The colonial origins of the police – largely modelled along the approaches of the Royal Ulster Constabulary known for its brutality in Ireland – partly explains why Kenya’s policing is the way it is. The police force was never designed for service. It was designed to safeguard the interests of the white minority ruling elite.

While there have been important changes in the architecture of policing since independence, subsequent post-colonial Kenyan regimes have adopted the same brutal approaches to stay in power. My previous work demonstrates this use of state security apparatuses to enhance the capacity of incumbents to crack down on opposition protests.

The brutal policing experienced under the current Kenya Kwanza regime falls within this broader historical trajectory.

The ruling elite see and use the police as their last line of defence against challenges to their misrule.

But police brutality goes beyond the policing of politics to everyday crime control. Police violence is a common occurrence, especially against poor young men.

What’s changed

Kenya’s history has been marked by strong agitation for justice and reform. Again, this goes back to colonial times.

There have been important legal and institutional changes since independence. The most important was the disbandment of the Special Branch in 1998, an intelligence unit of the police responsible for political repression. It was replaced by the National Security Intelligence Service. This then became the National Intelligence Service.

The most important changes came about through the constitutional reform of 2010. This saw a change in the architecture of the police, including:

bringing the Kenya Police and Administration Police under a singular command
the establishment of accountability mechanisms, including the Internal Affairs Unit, the National Police Service Commission and the Independent Policing Oversight Authority.

Internal Affairs, a unit within the police service, is supposed to investigate police misconduct. The policing oversight agency is a civilian-led institutions with a similar mandate. Ideally, the two institutions should work together in executing crucial investigations. Internal affairs should provide access to information from within the police service that would be difficult for outsiders to access.

The National Police Service Commission was set up to handle the management of personnel. It’s mandated to address the challenges of corruption, nepotism and negative ethnicity that have characterised recruitment into the police service.

But it’s clear from the continued police brutality that these institutions aren’t achieving the intended effect. This means that police officers can expect to continue acting with relative impunity despite the control measures in place.

What still needs to be done

Policing is often imagined as the investigation of crimes, arresting suspects, and presenting them to court for prosecution and punishment if guilty. In Kenya, the actions of the police often appear to substitute for the entire criminal justice system.

In many cases, officers go beyond the metaphor of judge, jury and executioner to also become the complainant, mortician and undertaker. For instance, Mbaraka Karanja died in police custody in 1987 and officers proceeded to incinerate his body.

In my view, the brutality won’t end until the following steps have been taken.

First, the National Police Service Commission needs to reclaim its mandate. It seems to have completely abdicated duty, transferring crucial responsibilities back to the inspector general of the police service. As the human resource unit of the police, the commission has an important role of professionalising the service and maintaining discipline. It’s presently not doing so.

Second, the Internal Affairs Unit needs to be strengthened and given more autonomy. So far, it has been difficult to assess the effectiveness the unit given the secrecy that characterises the police service. A better-resourced unit will enhance investigations of police misconduct. It would unearth obscure squads within the police service and reveal evidence to help identify perpetrators.

Third, the Independent Policing Oversight Authority needs to defend its independence and develop popular legitimacy. With its limited success in prosecuting police officers – despite the prevalence of police abuse – many Kenyans have lost confidence in it. Crucially, the authority has failed in it’s deterrence role.

Fourth, the independence of the National Police Service needs to be safeguarded. The police service leadership continues to serve at the pleasure of the prevailing regime. This in turn shapes the priorities of the service. Inspectors-general have been forced to resign. President William Ruto confessed to having fired the director of criminal investigations when he took power. Ruto had initially claimed that the director had resigned.

Crucially, and in fifth place, there needs to be a change in policing culture alongside broader governance culture in Kenya. Impunity is rampant across the public service. Kenya won’t have a highly accountable police force while other agencies and senior officials are operating with significant impunity.

Identifying the levers of cultural change isn’t easy. There are many proposals to alter policing culture. These include a complete redesign of Kenya’s Penal Code to dislodge its colonial roots, transforming the training of police officers, and strengthening the policing oversight authority’s capacity to investigate cases.

But, in my mind, a crucial starting point is citizen agitation and demand for accountability. The light that Gen Z protesters, the media and civil society organisations are shining on police abuses should be encouraged. A clear signal that Kenyans will no longer tolerate police abuse is crucial for culture change within the service and among the political elite.

However, this needs to be understood within the reality that many Kenyans support police violence, believing it to be the most effective way of dealing with crime as my earlier research demonstrates. In another study, I note how police abuse is endorsed by politicians and religious leaders as a way of responding to crime and punishing groups of people they don’t like.

Combined with ineffective accountability mechanisms, this popular support for police violence, both tacit and explicit, gives the police the belief that they are the thin blue line between order and chaos. That they have the popular mandate to use any means they consider necessary – often brutal violence – to keep society safe.

In other words, the conversation on police reform requires a fundamental reframing to kick start the journey towards democratic policing. At present, we’re not only way off the mark, we seem to be heading in the wrong direction.

Kamau Wairuri does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Kenya’s police still kill with impunity – what needs to be done to stop them – https://theconversation.com/kenyas-police-still-kill-with-impunity-what-needs-to-be-done-to-stop-them-259326

July 5, 2025

One year on: South Africa’s coalition government boosted optimism, but will it last?

Source: – By Matthias Krönke, Lecturer, University of Reading

For the first time since the end of apartheid in 1994, the ruling African National Congress lost its parliamentary majority in 2024. After 30 years in power, it had to form a coalition with 10 other political parties to govern the country. The creation of the “government of national unity” marked a turning point in the country’s democracy.

This development appears to have rekindled hope and positive sentiment among South Africans about the country’s future and its democratic processes.

The period leading up to the 2024 elections was characterised by widespread pessimism. Years of economic stagnation, high unemployment, severe electricity shortages, and high-level corruption cases had taken their toll on public trust and satisfaction with the ANC’s governance. Previous analyses by Afrobarometer (a research network that conducts public attitude surveys) had consistently shown declining satisfaction with the country’s direction and the functioning of democracy.

We are political scientists who have worked with public opinion data in South Africa for almost a decade. We analysed data from a special Afrobarometer survey just before and after the country’s 2024 election. The results show a sharp turnaround in attitudes on three issues: the direction of the country, government performance, and views on democracy.

One of the most significant findings is the shift in citizens’ perceptions about the general direction of the country. Before the election, a mere 14% of South Africans believed the country was heading in the right direction. Post-election, this figure surged to 39%.

South Africans’ renewed optimism after the formation of the unity government underscores the importance of electoral processes in shaping citizen perceptions of democracy and governance. Whether these sentiments are sustained will depend on a few things, including the coalition government’s ability to meet citizen expectations and address their most pressing concerns.

The post-election optimism boost

Afrobarometer interviewed the same group of adult South Africans before (April/May 2024) and after (August/September 2024) the election. This allowed us to track which respondents changed their views and in which direction. Here, we focus on citizens’ views of the overall direction of the country (optimism), government performance, and views on democracy.

A surge in optimism: The data show that 35% of the population became more positive in their outlook after the election. This was consistent across gender, age, and education levels. At the same time, 4% of the population maintained their positive outlook on the country’s trajectory.

About half (48%) continued to say that South Africa was going in the wrong direction after the election. A further 10% moved towards a negative outlook.

Renewed faith in democratic processes: Beyond general optimism, there was a resurgence in pro-democratic attitudes. The proportion of South Africans who believe democracy is preferable to any other form of government increased from 45% before the election to 55% after. Satisfaction with the way democracy works in South Africa jumped from 36% to 59%. These levels of support for and satisfaction with democracy were the highest recorded by Afrobarometer in South Africa since 2018 and 2011, respectively.

We found that three in 10 (29%) respondents were newly in favour of democracy after the elections. About four in 10 (39%) shifted from dissatisfaction or a neutral opinion before the election to stating they were “fairly” or “very” satisfied with the country’s democracy afterwards.

Where are the sore losers?: In both the case of support for and satisfaction with democracy, we found that a greater proportion of poorer citizens shifted their opinions, compared to their wealthier counterparts. In contrast, there were no clear patterns of opinion change by respondents’ gender, age, level of education, or race.

When examining the same question by party affiliation, the outcome was interesting. The share of partisans who preferred democracy increased among supporters of the ANC, the Economic Freedom Fighters and the MK Party after the election. A majority of supporters from the four major parties were satisfied with how democracy worked in the country.

Even ANC supporters remained largely satisfied with democracy despite the party’s electoral losses. Collectively, these findings suggest a post-electoral vote of confidence in multiparty competition.

Expectations of the new government: Citizens also appeared more hopeful about the new coalition government’s ability to tackle some of the nation’s most pressing issues. Pre-election evaluations of government performance on key services were overwhelmingly negative. The post-election wave showed some modest increases in optimism.

Two-thirds (67%) of South Africans felt the government of national unity would be more effective in the critical area of electricity provision. There was also hope for progress in other areas; 42% expected the new government to be more effective in creating jobs. Another 41% believed it would be more successful in fighting corruption.

Over the past year, the government seems to have met citizens’ expectations. South Africa has not experienced prolonged periods of power cuts over the past 12 months. However, the unemployment rate has remained unchanged, at 32.9%.

Looking ahead

The 2024 elections in South Africa seem to have served as an inflection point. It is contributing to a revival of optimism and pro-democratic sentiment. The shift from pre-election pessimism to post-election hope was palpable. Maintaining renewed public confidence, however, relies on a government’s ability to meet citizens’ expectations and deliver tangible improvements on their concerns.

The ongoing skirmishes between the ANC and the Democratic Alliance illustrate the coalition government’s difficulty in translating agreement on a broad agenda into specific outcomes.

The coming months and years will tell whether the unity government’s infighting ultimately squanders citizens’ goodwill.

Matthias Krönke works for the University of Reading and consults for Afrobarometer.

Rorisang Lekalake is affiliated with Afrobarometer.

– ref. One year on: South Africa’s coalition government boosted optimism, but will it last? – https://theconversation.com/one-year-on-south-africas-coalition-government-boosted-optimism-but-will-it-last-258497

July 5, 2025

China’s support for Mali’s military carries risks: researcher outlines what they are

Source: – By Paa Kwesi Wolseley Prah, Postdoctoral Fellow, Dublin City University

Mali, a landlocked Sahelian nation of 25 million people, has faced significant instability since 2012, marked by terrorism, state neglect and armed conflicts.

That year a Tuareg rebellion started in northern Mali and President Amadou Toumani Touré was ousted in a military coup. Constitutional rule was suspended. Rebels in northern Mali went on to seize cities like Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal, declaring an independent Islamic State of Azawad and imposing sharia law.

They also destroyed cultural heritage sites, including 14 of Timbuktu’s 16 Unesco-listed mausoleums. The crisis prompted international intervention, including a UN authorised mission, which retook northern cities within weeks. Islamist rebels retreated into civilian populations and remote areas.

Despite these efforts, violence against civilians by extremist groups and community militias has continued. By 2023, 8.8 million Malians needed humanitarian assistance. Over 375,500 were internally displaced, primarily women and children.

Meanwhile, the former French colony had turned to China for military assistance. Between 2012 and 2013, China provided €5 million (about US$5.8 million) in logistical equipment to improve the Malian army’s mobility.

In August 2013, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army gave the Malian army military supplies totalling 1.6 billion CFA francs (about US$2.8 million). China made similar donations between 2014 and 2023.

I am an international security and global governance researcher. My recent research explored the impact of China’s security sector assistance on Mali’s fragility.

China’s assistance to Mali aims to equip the country to address terrorism and insurgency. But I argue that it may have unintended consequences and cause further damage to the country.

The heavy reliance on Chinese supply exposes Mali to vulnerabilities, including supply disruptions, diminished bargaining power, and limited strategic flexibility. This could destabilise security even more should China face manufacturing issues or supply chain disruptions leading to delays or shortages in the production of weapons.

It also raises concerns about the potential influence of China on Mali’s defence policies and decision-making processes. In turn this could entrench the Malian military government’s position. China takes a hands-off approach to the governance structures of the countries it engages with. Hopes of democratisation in the country could be affected.

Rich in resources

Mali has significant natural resources, including 800 tons of gold reserves (it’s Africa’s fourth-largest producer), iron ore, manganese, lithium, and potential uranium and hydrocarbon deposits.

In 2019, gold production generated US$734 million, or 9.7% of Mali’s GDP, supporting over 10% of the population.

Chinese firms, such as Ganfeng Lithium and China National Nuclear Corporation, have invested heavily in Mali’s mining sector. They are involved in a US$130 million lithium project and uranium exploration in the Kidal and Falea regions.

Despite security risks, including attacks on Chinese personnel in 2015 and 2021, China remains committed due to Mali’s resource potential.

Beyond mining, China has invested in Mali’s infrastructure. A US$2.7 billion railway modernisation project connects Bamako to Dakar, facilitating resource exports like iron ore and bauxite.

The total of Mali’s external debt to China is not explicitly stated. But the 2014 loan agreement of US$11 billion and the 2016 loan of US$2.7 billion alone suggest Mali’s debt to China could be at least US$13 billion. This is without including loans for projects like the Bamako-Ségou expressway, and bridges in Bamako.

This has often been criticised as “debt trap diplomacy”, increasing recipient countries’ dependence on Beijing. In Mali, I believe this risks entrenching economic vulnerability and giving China geopolitical leverage.

China’s security sector assistance to Mali

Historically, Mali relied on France. More recently, it’s used Russia’s expeditionary corps, formerly known as Wagner Group, for security support.

In 2011, China provided US$11.4 million in grants, US$8.1 million in zero-interest loans, and a US$100.8 million concessional loan to foster bilateral cooperation.

China’s participation in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali, starting in 2013 with 395 personnel, marked a shift in its security engagement.

Chinese peacekeepers, including engineers, medical personnel and security guards, repaired infrastructure, provided medical aid and supported Mali’s 2013 elections.

Their professionalism earned praise from the UN special envoy Albert Gerard Koenders for helping to ensure a smooth election.

China’s involvement in Mali challenged traditional European approaches to peacekeeping, particularly France’s military-heavy strategy.

How China’s assistance contributes to Mali’s fragility

In spite of the positives, China’s security sector assistance contributes to Mali’s fragility in several ways.

First, its no-strings-attached nature allows Mali’s military junta to consolidate power without making democratic or governance reforms.

This lack of accountability enables corrupt military factions to operate unchecked. Governance weaknesses and authoritarianism can continue.

Second, the heavy reliance on Chinese supply raises concerns about the potential influence of China on Mali’s defence decisions.

This over-reliance on military solutions risks escalating conflicts and could lead to human rights abuses by security forces, as seen in increased violence against civilians. It doesn’t address root causes of conflict like social cohesion or local governance.

Third, Mali’s growing dependence on Chinese aid — both military and economic — makes it vulnerable to disruptions from geopolitical tensions, supply chain issues, or changes in China’s foreign policy. This limits Mali’s ability to diversify its military capabilities or respond to evolving threats.

Finally, China’s infrastructure investments, such as the US$1.48 billion (750 billion CFA francs) Bamako-Dakar railway loan, creates “debt trap diplomacy”.

This pattern deepens economic dependence and reduces policy autonomy, further weakening state resilience.

The way forward

To mitigate the risks of Chinese security sector assistance and promote sustainable stability, Mali must adopt a multifaceted strategy.

First, it should collaborate with China to align security sector assistance with civilian-led security approaches.

Second, Mali should diversify security and economic partnerships with donors like the US, the UK, and the EU.

Third, transparent guidelines, developed through consultation with stakeholders, should assess the impacts of assistance to avoid deepening dependence.

Fourth, engaging civil society and publishing regular reports on security sector assistance use and outcomes will foster public trust.

Finally, promoting regional economic integration and ties with global powers will bolster Mali’s economic resilience.

Paa Kwesi Wolseley Prah does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. China’s support for Mali’s military carries risks: researcher outlines what they are – https://theconversation.com/chinas-support-for-malis-military-carries-risks-researcher-outlines-what-they-are-257738

July 5, 2025

Kenya’s peacebuilding efforts hold valuable lessons for the rest of the world, but gaps remain

Source: – By Leonor Oliveira Toscano, PhD Candidate in Political Science, University of Oslo

Kenya has been praised as a “model for the world” when it comes to peacebuilding efforts to manage outbreaks of violence within its borders. The country has systematically put in place a peacebuilding architecture rooted in a history of local peace initiatives. These date back to the early 1990s.

Over this period, the Wajir Peace and Development Committee emerged in the country’s north-eastern region. The committee successfully addressed decades of inter-clan violence in Wajir, an arid county bordering Somalia. It also inspired the emergence of numerous local peace committees across the country.

These committees have been set up in some other African countries – like Ghana, South Africa, Sierra Leone and Burundi – and continue to contribute informally to local peacebuilding in these states.

In Kenya, the committees became institutionalised after post-election violence in 2007-08 and a mediation process led by former UN secretary general Kofi Annan. They now form part of the national peacebuilding architecture.

Violence triggered by the contested 2007 presidential election outcome resulted in the killing of more than 1,000 people. The mediation process led to a power-sharing agreement signed by the presidential contenders Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga.

The country’s peacebuilding architecture is now supported by several policies and frameworks. These include the constitution of 2010. The system that’s been built has the capacity to connect a wide variety of peacebuilding actors – both state and non-state, formal and informal – at all levels of society. This helps resolve conflict and build resilience.

The Kenyan government initiated a review of the peacebuilding architecture in 2023. It involved a lengthy consultation process and high levels of participation among Kenyans. The National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management led the way, assisted by an independent panel of 13 peacebuilding experts.

Released at the end of 2024, the review looked at the strengths and weaknesses of the architecture.

It offers a vision for building a robust peacebuilding system, along with an actionable roadmap. One lesson is that Kenya can use the capacities and unique approaches of different peacebuilding actors. At the local level, peace committees showed that they made contributions to early warning systems and building confidence in communities.

However, insufficient resources and a consistent focus on electoral violence prevent the system from addressing other drivers of conflict.

The strengths

Local peace committees, with membership typically drawn from ordinary citizens, religious groups or local civil society organisations, play a crucial role. They support dialogue around conflict issues. They promote trust and understanding, and can build a constructive environment for conflict resolution.

Their information gathering feeds into the regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development’s Conflict Early Warning and Response System (CEWARN) to prevent election violence. Local peace committees have contributed to negotiating local disputes. They have also helped de-polarise ethnic identities and facilitated local peace agreements. One example was the Modogashe Declaration. It sets ground rules to solve conflict and local disputes over pasture, water access and cattle rustling.

We are researchers in Norway on a project focusing on civilian agency, local peace and resilience building. Our own interviews with committee members in Nakuru – a county greatly affected by the violence in 2007-08 – found that peace committee members continued to work together and share conflict-sensitive information with local stakeholders. These include administration officers and religious leaders, and covered periods during and after the 2022 elections.

Further, local peace committees can offer women valuable opportunities for participation in conflict management. This contributes to their protection, for example from sexual violence.

The weaknesses

Despite these successes, Kenya’s peacebuilding architecture faces pressing challenges.

First, local peace committees aren’t perfect. They can be manipulated by politicians seeking to build local support. They can also compete with traditional actors such as elders in conflict resolution.

Kenya’s institutionalisation of local peacebuilding strengthened information flow across all levels. But it also threatens to undermine local peacebuilding agency and autonomy. Formalising local peace committees can spur an unhealthy monetisation of peacebuilding, with some members joining for financial gain. This threatens to erode the voluntary character of peacebuilding as a common good and undermine genuine priorities for peace.

Second, elite-level politics in Kenya creates the persistent risk of electoral violence. This diverts attention and resources away from other long-standing causes of conflict. The drivers of violence in Kenya are varied and region specific. They include disputes over access to land, and marginalisation of ethnic and religious communities. Climate change threatens to worsen competition and conflict between pastoralists and farming communities.

Our analysis of event data from Armed Conflict Location & Event Data shows that communal violence is the deadliest form of political violence in Kenya. For their part, fatalities related to election violence have decreased. This underscores the urgent need to consistently invest in prevention and local peacebuilding beyond narrow electoral periods.

Fatalities in Kenya by type of armed violence: 2010-2023

Electoral competition can escalate violence between pastoralists and farmers, but it’s the persistence of communal conflicts that represents a serious threat. Communal violence particularly affects Kenya’s arid and semi-arid areas in the Rift Valley, eastern and north-eastern regions.

What next

Our interviews with local peace committee members show that funding for their activities diminishes outside election years. This hampers their capacity to address conflict outside these periods.

Yet research has shown that local peacebuilding can build social resilience against recurrent communal violence. Peacebuilding interventions grounded in local realities are also vital for countering insurgent violence. This is especially important as counterterrorism operations by state forces often trigger cycles of violence rather than resolving underlying issues.

Our research finds that Kenyans place significant trust in local peacebuilders, such as community leaders, elders and women. The review of the country’s peacebuilding architecture proposes a 40% quota for women, youth and people with disabilities in local peace committees.

However, quotas alone may not be sufficient to address the political and cultural challenges that entrench inequality.

Ultimately, political elites need to transform Kenya’s “win at all costs” politics. This way, the country’s mediators and peacebuilders can address the deep social and economic grievances that underpin cycles of violence.

Leonor Toscano’s doctoral research is supported by the grant from the European Research Council’s Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Program (852816; PI: Jana Krause). Leonor Toscano conducted interviews with LPC members in Kenya.

Jana Krause received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme under grant number 852816 (ResilienceBuilding).

Marika Miner’s post-doctoral research is also supported by the grant from the European Research Council’s Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Program (852816; PI: Jana Krause).

– ref. Kenya’s peacebuilding efforts hold valuable lessons for the rest of the world, but gaps remain – https://theconversation.com/kenyas-peacebuilding-efforts-hold-valuable-lessons-for-the-rest-of-the-world-but-gaps-remain-257761

July 5, 2025

Highways to hell: west Africa’s road networks are the preferred battleground for terror groups

Source: – By Olivier Walther, Associate Professor in Geography, University of Florida

What’s the connection between roads and conflict in west Africa? This may seem like an odd question. But a study we conducted shows a close relationship between the two.

We are researchers of transnational political violence. We analysed 58,000 violent events in west Africa between 2000 to 2024. Our focus was on identifying patterns of violence in relation to transport infrastructure.

Anecdotal evidence suggests that roads, bridges, pipelines and other transport systems are increasingly attacked across west Africa, but little is known about the factors that explain when, where and by whom.

Violence in west Africa involves a complex mix of political, economic and social factors. Weak governance, corruption, urban-rural inequalities and marginalised populations have been exploited by numerous armed groups, including transnational criminal networks and religious extremists.

West Africa has been one of the world’s most violent regions since the mid 2010s. In 2024 alone, the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data initiative recorded over 10,600 events of political violence in the region. These ranged from battles between armed groups, explosions and other forms of remote violence, to attacks on unarmed civilians. An estimated 25,600 people were killed. This has been the status quo in the region for nearly a decade.

The results of our study show that 65% of all the attacks, explosions, and violence against civilians recorded between 2000 and 2024 were located within one kilometre of a road.

Only 4% of all events were located further than 10km from a road. This pattern was consistent across all road types but most pronounced near highways and primary roads.

We think the reason for this pattern is that there is fierce competition between state and non-state actors for access to and use of roads.

Governments need well-developed road networks for a host of reasons, including the ability to govern, enabling economic activity, and security. Roads enable military mobility and reduce potential safe havens for insurgents in remote regions.

Insurgent groups also see transport networks as prime targets. They create opportunities to blockade cities, ambush convoys, kidnap travellers, employ landmines, and destroy key infrastructure.

Our research is part of a long line of work that explored the role of infrastructure in relation to security in west Africa. Our latest research reinforces earlier findings linking the two. Transport networks have become battlegrounds for extremist groups seeking to destabilise states, isolate communities and expand their influence.

The network

The west African road network is vast, estimated at over 709,000km of roads by the Global Roads Inventory Project. It compares unfavourably with other African regions. For example, paved roads remain relatively scarce in west Africa (17% of the regional network) when compared with north Africa (83%).

Poorly maintained roads impose costs on west African countries. They increase transport time of perishable goods, shorten the operational life of trucks, cause more accidents, and reduce social interactions between communities.

Still, significant variations in road quality are found across the region. The percentage of paved roads ranges from a high of 37% in Senegal to just over 7% in Mali. Nigeria has the largest road network in west Africa with an estimated 195,000km, but much of it has deteriorated because of poor maintenance.

Road-related violence is on the rise

We found that road-related attacks have been on the rise since jihadist groups emerged in the mid-2010s. Only 31 ambushes against convoys were reported in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali and Niger from 2000-2015, against 497 from 2016-2023.

Attacks frequently occur along the same road segments, such as around Boni in the Gourma Mounts, where Jama’at Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) conducted nine attacks against Malian forces and Wagner mercenaries between 2019 and 2024.

Violence was the most clustered near roads in 2011, with 87% of all violent events located within 1km of a road. Our analysis shows that, though still high, there’s been a decline post-2000: 59% in 2022 and 60% in 2024. This evolution reflects the ruralisation of conflict in west Africa. As jihadist insurgents target rural areas and small towns more and more, an increasing share of violent events also occurs far away from roads.

We’ve studied the root causes of west Africa’s violence for nearly a decade, documenting the ever-intensifying costs paid by its people. In the process, we’ve uncovered overlooked aspects of the turmoil, including the centrality of the road networks to an understanding of where the violence is happening.

The most dangerous roads of west Africa

Our findings show that violence against transport infrastructure is very unevenly distributed in west Africa and that specific road segments have been repeatedly targeted. This was particularly the case in the Central Sahel, Lake Chad basin, and western Cameroon.

For example, the 350km ring road linking Bamenda to Kumbo and Wum in Cameroon is the most violent road in west Africa, with 757 events since 2018, due to the conflict between the government and the Ambazonian separatists.

The longest segments of dangerous roads are in Nigeria, particularly those connecting Maiduguri in Borno State to Damaturu, Potiskum, Biu and Bama.

In the central Sahel, the road between Mopti/Sévaré and Gao is by far the most violent transport axis, with 433 events since the beginning of the civil war in Mali in 2012. South of Gao, National Road 17 leading to the Nigerien border, and National Road 20 heading east toward Ménaka have experienced 177 and 139 events respectively since the Islamic State – Sahel Province (ISSP) intensified its activities in the region in 2017.

In Burkina Faso, all the roads leading to Djibo near the border with Mali have experienced high levels of violence since the early 2020s.

Building transport infrastructure to promote peace

Roads are an important part of state counterinsurgency strategies and a strategic target for local militants. Yes, as our work highlights, transport infrastructure is largely ignored in debates that emphasise more state interventions as a means of combating insecurity. Sixty years after the independence of many west African countries, road accessibility remains elusive in the region.

Peripheral cities such as Bardaï, Bilma, Kidal and Timbuktu, where rebel movements have historically developed, are still not connected to the national network by tarmac roads.

The duality of the transport infrastructure, as both a facilitator and target of violence, has put government forces at a disadvantage. Regular forces are heavily constrained by the sparsity and poor conditions of the road network, which makes them vulnerable to attacks without necessarily allowing them to project their military power over long distances.

Rather than building transport infrastructure, states have focused on strengthening security by investing in military bases. The military coups in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have further reinforced this trend, with the creation of a joint force by the countries of the Alliance of Sahel States.

Strengthening security has taken precedence over developmental support for peripheral communities, who experience the worst of the violence.

Olivier Walther receives funding from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

Alexander John Thurston receives funding from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

Steven Radil receives funding from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

– ref. Highways to hell: west Africa’s road networks are the preferred battleground for terror groups – https://theconversation.com/highways-to-hell-west-africas-road-networks-are-the-preferred-battleground-for-terror-groups-258517

July 5, 2025

Vaccines: why these young Africans are hesitant about them and what might change their minds

Source: – By Oluwaseyi Dolapo Somefun, Research associate, University of the Western Cape

Vaccines have proved to be one of the most effective tools in fighting infectious diseases, but convincing people to get vaccinated can be tough. Especially young people.

During the global COVID-19 pandemic, declared by the World Health Organization on 11 March 2020, many countries reported high levels of vaccine hesitancy among younger population groups. Negative healthcare experiences and general distrust of government have cultivated vaccine hesitancy across Africa. Misleading information about vaccine side-effects on social media adds to this challenge.

This hesitancy continues today. A 2024 study on adolescents and young adults (aged 10 to 35) in sub-Saharan Africa found a vaccine acceptance rate of just 38.7%.

These concerns were echoed in a recent study we carried out among 165 young adults in Nigeria, South Africa and Zambia, looking at attitudes towards the COVID-19 vaccine. We wanted to know what could be done to help improve future vaccine acceptance, inform campaigns and prepare for future public health responses.

Participants were hesitant to be vaccinated, for various reasons, and suggested what policymakers could do to improve vaccine uptake.

Understanding young people’s perspectives on vaccine hesitancy and what can be done to address this is crucial for improving vaccine acceptance in the future.

What young adults told us

Our research gathered data through focus groups and interviews.

The participants described a fear of injections, uncertainty about side effects, distrust in healthcare systems and rude healthcare workers.

Some participants were worried about the safety of the COVID-19 vaccine, particularly how it might affect those with pre-existing health conditions.

Many believed that the vaccine was developed too quickly without sufficient testing and a lack of accessible information.

Many expressed a strong fear of needles. A young South African woman aged 19 commented:

I am afraid of injections, so for me, it would be better if there was something that could be taken orally, something you can drink.

Getting over the hurdle

We found young people often felt left out of vaccine conversations. They wanted to be part of the solution and make informed choices but needed the right tools and support to do so.

Participants suggested practical ideas to help boost vaccine acceptance among their peers.

Several highlighted the importance of assessing individual health status before administering vaccines, to avoid adverse interactions with existing medical conditions and treatments. They believed that situations where vaccines were mistakenly blamed for pre-existing illnesses or ongoing treatments could be avoided.

Participants suggested innovative strategies to make vaccines more accessibile. Mobile vaccination sites and community-based outreach programmes were some of the suggestions.

They must introduce mobile clinics, so that people don’t find themselves having to travel long distances to vaccinate. – 18-year-old male, South Africa

Young people also suggested household visits to people who were immobile because of age, illness or disability.

Many advocated for non-injectable vaccine options, such as oral medications or microneedle patches, which could improve accessibility and reduce anxiety.

The oral polio vaccine, which has been widely used in global polio eradication efforts, is an example of a non-injectable vaccine.

COVID-19 microneedle patch prototypes are being explored for clinical testing.

The youth urged public figures, including politicians, celebrities and influencers, to publicly endorse the vaccine.

It would be nice if the president could be shown on television receiving a vaccine so that we can see for ourselves whether he is given the same thing that everyone else receives. – 20-year-old male, South Africa

More engaging videos, interactive interviews and testimonials from vaccinated individuals could be shared across social media platforms.

The young people also emphasised the importance of comprehensive training for healthcare providers. They highlighted the need for healthcare professionals to provide respectful and empathetic care. They suggested that, by fostering respectful communication, healthcare providers could create a more welcoming and comfortable environment for their clients.

In addition, providing vaccine education in schools could educate pupils so that they could make decisions on their own.

Way forward

Engaging young people as active participants in shaping public health strategies can help increase vaccine acceptance and ensure a healthier future for all.

We believe that our findings can be applied in two ways.

First, to inform the design of tailored interventions that better resonate with young people’s desires and needs, paving the way for increased vaccine uptake and acceptability.

Second, to highlight areas where young people may need further information and engagement, to better understand some of the broader issues and why some of their recommendations might not be feasible in the short or longer term.

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Vaccines: why these young Africans are hesitant about them and what might change their minds – https://theconversation.com/vaccines-why-these-young-africans-are-hesitant-about-them-and-what-might-change-their-minds-249629

July 5, 2025

Is this bad for my health? Kenyan study tests three types of warning labels on food

Source: – By Shukri F. Mohamed, Research Scientist, African Population and Health Research Center

Diet-related health conditions, such as diabetes, hypertension and obesity, are on the rise in Kenya, putting immense strain on already over-stretched public health systems. These conditions are often driven by high intake of sugars, salts and unhealthy fats. So it’s more critical than ever for consumers to understand what’s in the foods they’re buying.

But making sense of nutrition information isn’t always straightforward, especially with the small, complex labels on the back of most packages.

Our recent study examined whether front-of-pack food labels could help Kenyan consumers make better choices. We tested three types of label designs to see which one was most effective at helping people identify nutrients of concern and make healthier purchase decisions.

Front-of-pack labels are simplified labels on the front of food packaging, designed to help consumers quickly assess healthiness through symbols, colours, or ratings. Examples include providing a “high in sugar” warning. In contrast, back-of-pack labels provide mandatory, detailed information such as full ingredient lists, nutrition facts and expiry dates typically in a standardised, text-heavy format on the back or side. Front-of-pack labels aren’t mandatory in all countries but back-of-pack labels are.

Many countries, including Chile, Mexico and Israel, have already introduced mandatory warning labels. Research shows that there has been a positive impact on public health.

Kenya is planning to take a major step in promoting public health by introducing a front-of-label system that will rank packed foods and non-alcoholic beverages based on their nutritional quality. Currently, packaged foods in Kenya are required to list ingredients, but this information can be hard to interpret. Front-of-pack labels will simplify this by highlighting key nutritional facts at a glance.

The new system will also guide policies like restricting marketing of unhealthy foods to children and other measures to improve Kenya’s food environment. With rising obesity and diet-related diseases driven by a shift from traditional foods to processed options, changes are urgently needed.

We have been involved in food environment policies research for the last five years. Our study emphasises the potential of front-of-pack food labels to affect consumers’ choices. Presenting clear information about a product’s nutritional content on the front of packaging could shift consumer behaviour towards healthier choices. In turn, this could lead to better public health outcomes.

Testing three label types

The study randomly assigned participants to different label types to compare the results fairly.

The study involved 2,198 adults from four counties: the capital, Nairobi; Mombasa, the second largest city; Kisumu, which is home to the third largest city; and Garissa in north-eastern Kenya. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three label types: red and green octagon label (RG), red and green octagon with icons (RGI), and black octagon warning label (WL).

Each label had a unique approach to highlighting sugars, fats and salts, which are the nutrients linked to diet-related diseases.

The Red-Green (RG) label used the colours red and green to show if a product had high or within-threshold levels of salt, sugar, fat, or saturated fat. Red meant the nutrients were above the set threshold, making that food unhealthy, while green meant it was below the set threshold levels.
The Red-Green with Icons (RGI) label worked like the RG label and it also included icons (like a spoon for sugar, a salt shaker for salt) and abbreviations (F for fat, SF for saturated fat) to make it easier to understand.
The black octagon Warning Label (WL) only appeared on products high in salt, sugar or fats, with a clear “high in” warning message to alert consumers.

Each participant was asked to evaluate a sample of food products based on the label type they were shown. They were also asked about their purchase intentions and perceptions of the products’ healthiness.

First, the study participants were shown images of packaged foods without any labels, and they were asked to answer questions about them. Then, study participants were shown the same images, but this time with a front-of-pack label added to the images. They were then asked the same questions again to see if the labels influenced their responses.

Our results showed that warning labels were the most effective in helping consumers identify foods high in sugars, salts and fats. Participants who saw the warning labels were more likely to recognise unhealthy packaged food products and less likely to choose them, compared to those who used the Red and Green labels.

In the same study we asked consumers about awareness and use of labels and we found that approximately two thirds (64.3%) reported being aware of food labels, while 55.0% reported reading nutrition information before purchasing products.

Next steps

Our research provides a strong evidence base to support policymakers in adopting mandatory front-of-pack labelling.

Moving forward, establishing a clear regulatory framework that mandates simple, effective and standardised labelling systems is essential in reducing diet-related diseases. Ensuring these labels are easily understandable and prominently displayed on all packaged foods will empower consumers to make healthier choices, particularly those in low- and middle-income communities, who are at higher risk of poor dietary outcomes.

Several law-making processes are in place that Kenya could use to implement mandatory labelling. But efforts are needed to identify and pursue the most effective route to effective legal change.

Shukri F. Mohamed receives funding from the International Development Research Center.

– ref. Is this bad for my health? Kenyan study tests three types of warning labels on food – https://theconversation.com/is-this-bad-for-my-health-kenyan-study-tests-three-types-of-warning-labels-on-food-253657