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Baisse de l’aide à l’Afrique : la fin d’une priorité française

Source: The Conversation – in French – By Marc Raffinot, Economie du développement, Université Paris Dauphine – PSL

La France a récemment annoncé une baisse sensible de son aide publique au développement (APD), de l’ordre de plusieurs milliards d’euros sur les prochaines années. Cela a suscité un certain émoi parmi les acteurs de la solidarité internationale.

La loi de finances initiale pour 2026 consacre la poursuite de la baisse commencée en 2024 des moyens alloués à la mission « Aide publique au développement » qui regroupe la plus grosse part des crédits de l’aide. Si la loi est promulguée, ces moyens se réduiraient à 3 669 millions d’euros en crédits de paiement, soit une baisse de plus de 38 % par rapport à 2023 et de plus de 16 % par rapport à 2025.

Ils pourraient de surcroît, comme cela a été souvent le cas, faire l’objet d’une « régulation » en cours d’année.

Pour avoir étudié le financement du développement ainsi que l’aide publique au développement, nous constatons que l’aide publique au développement, que la loi de programmation de 2021 avait placée au rang des politiques publiques prioritaires, est désormais sacrifiée. Pourtant, l’annonce de cette baisse ne signifie pas automatiquement une diminution équivalente de l’aide effectivement reçue par les plus pauvres. La réalité est beaucoup plus complexe.

En premier lieu, parce que la définition de l’APD ne renvoie pas à ce qui est reçu directement par les citoyens des pays aidés mais à un ensemble de dépenses publiques conventionnellement agréées (les dépenses militaires sont exclues). Seulement 60 % environ de ce qui est comptabilisé comme APD en France arrive sur le terrain (essentiellement aux États, pas directement à des personnes).

Ainsi, dans l’APD, on comptabilise aussi les frais de scolarité et les bourses des élèves scolarisés en France venant de pays en développement (environ 10 % en 2023), la prise en charge en France des réfugiés (11,6 %), ainsi que le coût de gestion du système lui-même (6,8 %).

En second lieu, une baisse du budget de l’APD n’entraîne pas une baisse proportionnelle de l’APD. L’APD de la France a atteint 15,4 milliards de dollars US en 2024 (environ 14,2 milliards d’euros, pour des crédits budgétés de 5,8 milliards d’euros. En effet, l’APD ne comprend pas que des dons inscrits au budget mais aussi des prêts « concessionnels », c’est-à-dire bonifiés par une subvention (« élément-don »).

Si un euro de don coûte un euro de ressources budgétaires, un euro de prêt coûte beaucoup moins, en fonction du degré de bonification. Augmenter la part des prêts permet ainsi de limiter l’impact de la baisse des ressources budgétaires sur les montants décaissés.

En troisième lieu, la part de l’aide bilatérale française consacrée à l’Afrique subsaharienne a diminué, passant de 21,8 % en 2020 à 17 % en 2024. Cette aide se réoriente vers les pays émergents et africains les plus riches. En 2023, les pays qui reçoivent le plus d’APD de la part de la France sont dans l’ordre : Côte d’Ivoire, Maroc, Egypte, Sénégal, Indonésie, République dominicaine, Bolivie, Cameroun, Inde et Mexique. Un tiers de l’APD va à des pays à revenu intermédiaire, contre 18 % aux pays les moins avancés.

Les considérations géostratégiques

Entre le budget et le terrain se situe tout un ensemble d’organismes qui répartissent et gèrent ce budget (ce que l’on nomme parfois « l’industrie de l’aide »).73 % de l’APD (dite “bilatérale”) est octroyée par des instances françaises : le ministère des Finances (Trésor), le ministère des Affaires étrangères, le groupe de l’Agence française de développement (AFD), une constellation d’ONG (1,2 % du total en 2023). 37 % de l’APD (APD multilatérale) est allouée à des acteurs multilatéraux, comme l’UE, la Banque mondiale, le FMI, etc.

Enfin, la répartition obéit à de multiples objectifs qui relèvent de moins en moins de la solidarité internationale. La lutte contre l’émigration illégale, l’accès aux matières premières, les considérations géostratégiques et désormais avant tout le soutien aux exportations françaises sont déterminants.

Pour analyser les conséquences possibles sur l’Afrique subsaharienne de ces baisses de moyens, il faut avoir à l’esprit trois points :

Un mouvement général de baisse

L’évolution de l’aide française s’inscrit dans un mouvement général et sans doute, durable. La baisse concerne en effet l’ensemble des pays développés, au premier rang desquels les États-Unis. La première décision notable de la présidence Trump a été le démantèlement de l’USAID, agence bilatérale d’aide.

L’OCDE prévoit également une baisse de l’APD comprise entre 10 % et 18 % sur 2024-2027, les pays les moins développés et l’ Afrique étant les plus touchés. L’effondrement en cours de l’APD s’inscrit dans la reconfiguration internationale en gestation.



Read more:
Gel de l’aide américaine : une menace potentielle pour l’agriculture au Sénégal

La fonction politique de l’aide au service du partage de la prospérité pour éviter la guerre avait été mise en avant par le président américain Harry Truman en 1949. Or il est de moins en moins question de partage de prospérité dans le « capitalisme de la finitude » théorisé par l’économiste fiançais Arnaud Orain. La coopération s’efface peu à peu au bénéfice d’un mercantilisme assumé dans le cas des pays européens, et, dans le cas américain, du chantage et de la coercition revendiquée.

Dans le cas français, l’ambiguïté des motivations de l’aide se réduit en faveur de la promotion des exportations.

Une réduction progressive de la part de l’APD dans le financement du développement

L’APD est dépassée depuis 2010 dans sa contribution au financement global des économies africaines par les transferts de migrants, et souvent par les investissements directs étrangers (IDE). Les marchés financiers internationaux ont pris une importance croissante. Mais ces ressources sont inégalement réparties entre pays et secteurs.

L’APD a une importance très inégale dans le financement des différents pays. En 2023, elle représente une part majeure du budget malgache mais marginale de celui du Kenya, tandis que les transferts des migrants financent surtout la consommation et l’éducation, les IDE se concentrent sur l’énergie, la construction et les industries extractives. Les financements privés internationaux (eurobonds) ciblent une quinzaine de pays seulement..

Augmenter la part de prêts aide à maintenir le montant total, mais tous les pays ne peuvent pas s’endetter davantage. L’Afrique comprend de nombreux pays à risque élevé ou en situation de surendettement selon le FMI. Les prêts financent mieux les infrastructures que les secteurs sociaux comme l’éducation ou la santé, qui ne sont pas immédiatement rentables.

L’aide multilatérale française a été proportionnellement plus touchée que l’aide bilatérale. Cette situation réduira les contributions françaises aux mécanismes de financement de la Banque mondiale et de la Banque africaine de développement destinés aux pays les plus pauvres, ainsi qu’aux grands fonds internationaux consacrés à la santé, au climat et à l’éducation.

Au sein de l’aide bilatérale, les dons projet de l’Agence française de développement et l’aide humanitaire sont réduits proportionnellement plus que les bonifications d’intérêt permettant de faire des prêts.

À quoi peut-on s’attendre ?

Tenter d’isoler l’impact de la réduction de l’aide multilatérale française sur l’ Afrique subsaharienne ne fait guère de sens car l’impact final dépend du comportement des autres contributeurs.

La réduction des aides multilatérales sur ces deux thèmes vient ajouter ses effets délétères à la quasi-disparition de l’aide américaine, très orientée vers la santé et les actions d’urgence. La baisse des moyens des fonds d’urgence, tels que le Programme alimentaire mondial, a déjà un impact grave dans des pays ou des régions en crise (Madagascar, Mozambique, Nigeria, Sahel).

La France, deuxième contributeur historique du Fonds mondial de lutte contre le Sida, la tuberculose et le paludisme, réduit sa contribution de 58 % (11,3 milliards de dollars US) annoncés contre 18 attendus pour 2027-2029), ce qui menace le financement de la santé en Afrique, qui reçoit plus de 70 % de ces fonds.

L’APD bilatérale française, qui bénéficie directement aux États est concentrée sur les infrastructures économiques et les services (24 %), le gouvernement et la société civile (13 %), l’éducation (18 %) et la santé (6 %). La réduction du budget de l’APD et l’accent mis sur la promotion de l’offre française risquent de réduire l’aide aux pays les plus pauvres d’Afrique et aux secteurs sociaux (éducation et santé). Or les gouvernements africains, compte tenu de leurs priorités et de leurs moyens grevés par le paiement des dettes, ne devraient guère compenser cette baisse de l’aide aux secteurs sociaux, malgré les incitations du FMI. À la clé, un sous-financement des services de base et une poursuite de la privatisation, déjà très engagée en matière d’éducation.

Politiquement, la réduction de l’aide aura un impact limité, car elle est souvent perçue comme post-coloniale et déconnectée des priorités des gouvernements “bénéficiaires”. Le recentrage de l’aide française sur des infrastructures visibles sera apprécié par les pouvoirs, mais sa baisse sera perçue comme une nouvelle preuve du déclassement de l’Occident, qui incite à diversifier les partenariats, éventuellement vers la Russie qui investit le secteur de la sécurité.



Read more:
Russie en Afrique: Les raisons de l’offensive de charme

Les principales réactions à la baisse de l’APD sont d’ailleurs venues de l’ « industrie de l’aide », et en particulier des ONG, qui mettent en avant l’impact négatif (réel) sur leur activité, qui ne représente toutefois qu’une partie très marginale de l’APD française.

Enfin, l’aide n’étant efficace que si elle dispose de canaux de distribution opérationnels, l’impact des restrictions budgétaires sur la situation financière de l’AFD interroge. Ses moyens humains, immobiliers et financiers ont été dimensionnés pour une hausse de l’aide.

Que retenir ?

Sur le plan géographique, les pays africains les moins avancés et/ou les moins « endettables » devraient être les plus affectés par la baisse de l’aide française ; tandis qu’au plan sectoriel, la santé, l’éducation et le développement rural seront les plus atteints. Les plus pauvres en paieront le prix, à moins d’une baisse des gaspillages de l’“industrie de l’aide”, ou encore d’une bien improbable réallocation par Paris de l’aide vers les plus pauvres.

Les restrictions croissantes aux migrations renforcent toutes ces tendances négatives, tout en discréditant la notion même d’“aide au développement”.

Au-delà de la réduction de l’APD, le risque d’une impasse financière affectant l’ensemble de l’Afrique subsaharienne ne peut être écarté. Toutes les sources de financement sont aujourd’hui menacées à des degrés divers, notamment par la baisse des prêts chinois et le rationnement du crédit des marchés financiers internationaux en l’absence de traitement du surendettement de l’Afrique.

The Conversation

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Baisse de l’aide à l’Afrique : la fin d’une priorité française – https://theconversation.com/baisse-de-laide-a-lafrique-la-fin-dune-priorite-francaise-276075

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South Africa’s economy is picking up, but hasn’t reached a turning point yet – economist

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Andrew Robert Donaldson, Senior Research Associate, Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit, University of Cape Town

In presenting the 2026 national budget to South Africa’s parliament on 25 February, finance minister Enoch Godongwana characterised this as the turning point in South Africa’s public finances – heralding improved confidence, increased growth and rising infrastructure investment.

For over a decade, the size of the deficit and the rise in public debt have been central themes in the annual budget.

This year, analysts have welcomed the apparent turnaround in the budgetary outlook. Debt has peaked at just under 80% of GDP. And for the first time in a decade, the Treasury projects that interest on debt will increase more slowly than spending on education or health.

This is a transition that goes back to May 2025, when the rand began to strengthen against the US dollar in the turbulence that followed US president Donald Trump’s April tariff announcements. The South African Reserve Bank’s commitment to lower inflation and Parliament’s opposition to value added tax increases reinforced market sentiment that inflation would be kept in check. Around this time, the 10-year government bond yield began an extraordinary decline from its 11% peak to around 8% today.

These are the financial trends that account for the national treasury’s projected decline in debt service costs as a percentage of GDP. It expects these to fall from 5.4% this year to 5.2% in 2028/29.

But for the economic outlook to improve decisively, growth must rise. It is projected to increase, but not by much: 1.4% in 2025 and 1.6% in 2026, and then 2% by 2028. The recovery is still very fragile – gross fixed-capital formation, which should be upwards of 25% of GDP, is just 14%. Unemployment is still above 30% of the labour force. And the budget deficit for the year ahead (the difference between expenditure and revenue) is still uncomfortably high at 4% of GDP.

As an economist, I would argue that, if growth is the metric that counts, this is not yet the turning point that will deliver rising living standards and jobs for all.

Growth depends, in the Treasury’s analysis, on continued implementation of structural reforms, several of which form part of the Presidency’s Operation Vulindlela programme, launched in 2020. These include:

  • electricity sector restructuring

  • modernisation of state transport utility Transnet and logistics networks

  • investment in digital infrastructure and an e-visa system

  • boosting export competitiveness.

The Budget Review presents a summary of progress: 62% implementation of electricity reforms, 33% in transport, 11% in the water sector, 67% in telecommunications, 75% in reform of the visa system.

These initiatives will take time to shift the economic growth outlook.

What still needs to be done

Operation Vulindlela recognises that improvements in state capability are priorities of phase 2 of the presidency’s programme. There is a renewed focus on local government. This includes a proposed shift to a “utility model” for water and electricity services in which these functions will be run “like businesses”, to ensure proper infrastructure maintenance and accountability to the public.

Deterioration in local infrastructure is increasingly evident in water supply, roads and local services in many municipalities.

The Treasury also hopes that the implementation of the Public Service Amendment Bill will lead to improvements in professional standards in government, and particularly in municipalities.



Read more:
South African politicians, not bureaucrats, stand in the way of a professional civil service

Is state capability perhaps the key turnaround needed for an improved growth outlook?

The 2026 Budget Review signals a more robust, interventionist approach of the National Treasury to dysfunctional provincial departments and municipalities.

This will include centralised control of payroll and headcounts, enforcement of financial recovery plans, and stricter conditions attached to financial flows to provinces and municipalities.



Read more:
South Africa’s municipalities aren’t fixing roads, supplying clean water or keeping the lights on: new study explains why

It also includes technological reforms, such as the “smart meters grant programme”. Its aim is to improve billing accuracy and address leaks and illegal electricity connections.

But substantial improvements in state capability will not be achieved by top-down interventions and technology projects alone. Substantial reallocations of state resources are also needed. Simply put, resources must be redirected from unproductive to productive activities.

This is where the Treasury’s “targeted and responsible savings” initiative comes into play. Expenditure reviews have been under discussion for several years; in the 2025 medium term budget policy statement the savings programme was introduced to give this practical effect. The 2026 budget includes R4 billion (US$250 million) a year in identified savings.

That is not enough. It is less than 0.1% of GDP, and just 1.1% of the gap between government expenditure and revenue.

It’s not just that savings must be found if tax increases are to be avoided while lowering the budget deficit. The targeted and responsible savings initiative is also about shifting resources towards the investment, infrastructure maintenance, housing, police and court services that need to be strengthened. A bolder approach is needed. The goal should be R100 billion (US$6.3 billion) a year.

This means a targeted reconsideration of the “architecture” of the state.

What needs to be fixed

Here are some of the dysfunctionalities that must be addressed:

Two-tier local government: District municipalities serve no discernible democratic purpose. Where they provide cross-boundary services, these can be organised as utilities owned by and accountable to their component local municipalities.

Sector Education and Training Authorities (Setas) and the National Skills Fund: Once again, the Treasury has signalled its intent to “review” the skills funding system. Setas should be liquidated and the levy paid to them by employers abandoned. They are costly and inefficient intermediaries. The levy relief would be a benefit to businesses, allowing them to finance training as needed, not subject to one-size-fits-all rules and bureaucratic processes.

The Road Accident Fund: It is more than 20 years since reform proposals were set out for the Road Accident Fund. It has an unfunded liability of around R400 billion (US$25 billion) arising from road accident compensation claims that have yet to be settled. It should be restructured as a capped benefit scheme, with the balance of cover left to insurance providers.

Unemployment Insurance Fund expansion of mandate: The fund is planning to expand its administrative staff from 3,424 in 2024/25 to 11,424 next year. It also intends to expand its activities from payment of unemployment benefits to provision of skills audits, employment subsidies, and enterprise support. Its reported expenditure increased from R26.0 billion in 2024/25 to R48.8 billion in 2025/26. The Treasury should simply say No. It is absurd that public health and education programmes are subject to strict spending controls while a fund administered by the Department of Employment and Labour is allowed free rein.

Southern African Customs Union transfers: Review of the customs union agreement is long overdue. Its formula-based distribution of over R78 billion (US$4.9 billion) to neighbouring countries next year no longer rests on a defensible rationale from either a trade or regional development perspective.

More broadly, the budget reform that is needed is to extend Treasury’s expenditure planning and control systems to cover the 196 public entities that perform statutory functions and rely on fiscal revenue but fall outside the expenditure control limits of the budget process. Public entity boards and executive staff are often paid more than senior departmental officials, their programmes are not subject to Treasury review, and in many cases they hold funds that should properly be controlled by the Treasury.

Tighter expenditure control can in part be done through existing provisions of the Public Finance Management Act. More complete implementation might require fiscal responsibility legislation.



Read more:
South Africa’s debt has skyrocketed – new rules are needed to manage it

The Treasury’s plan for fiscal sustainability is to introduce a principles-based “fiscal anchor” that will require each new administration to table a medium-term plan to ensure that debt service costs do not erode service delivery capability. If the expenditure planning system is not extended to include public entities, this will be a toothless tiger.

A version of this article first appeared on the Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit (Saldru) website.

The Conversation

Andrew Robert Donaldson is a former National Treasury official.

– ref. South Africa’s economy is picking up, but hasn’t reached a turning point yet – economist – https://theconversation.com/south-africas-economy-is-picking-up-but-hasnt-reached-a-turning-point-yet-economist-277263

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Reinterpreting ‘awe’: why cross-cultural emotional intelligence needs to be handled with care

Source: The Conversation – France – By Craig L. Anderson, Professor, HEC Paris Business School

Awe has become a kind of emotional currency in Western wellness circles – revered for its ability to boost mental and physical health and even social interactions. There are findings linking awe to increased prosocial behaviour, curiosity, humility, wellbeing, lower post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and more adaptive physiological profiles. And yet across cultures, awe can provoke veneration and wonder or it can stimulate feelings of dread. What if awe does not travel?

That’s the question posed by a new set of cross-cultural studies that I co-authored with researchers from a wide range of academic institutions. The research offers direct evidence of how awe may not be a universal feel-good emotion.

Using daily emotion diaries and physiological data, we found evidence that while awe may be typically experienced as a positive emotion by people in the US in western contexts, in China, it can be experienced with some fear and tension by people in China.

Our findings challenge the assumption that awe always leads to connection or improved wellbeing – and raises big questions about how awe is used in mental health programmes, leadership training, and marketing around the world.

Awe can feel different across cultures

Psychologists and pioneers in the study of awe, Dacher Keltner and Jonathan Haidt define awe as:

“The feeling of being in the presence of something vast that transcends your current understanding of the world.”

Awe is an emotion we experience when we’re faced with something vast and mind-stretching. But this research shows that while the spark may be the same, how we actually feel can be very different depending on culture.

In two studies, we found awe took on a different emotional flavour, depending on where – and how – it was experienced. In the US, awe was more often accompanied by appreciation and amusement. In China, it came with more fear and signs of emotional pressure.

What is ‘awesome’ among student populations?

The first study was based on more than 2,500 diary entries recording moments of awe or joy among 166 university students in China and the US over a two-week period.

The pattern was clear: Chinese-born students studying in Beijing reported feeling more fear during moments of awe than students born and raised in the US.

But that difference did not show up for experiences of joy, suggesting this mixed emotional response was specific to awe.

Looking at the diary entries, we found that the US students felt more awe in response to nature, monuments, or architecture – 18% of the time, than students in China – just 10%. Chinese participants, on the other hand, were more likely to describe awe linked to other people, making up 59% of their entries versus 50% in the US.

Cultural psychology suggests that compared to the US, China’s culture tends to be more collective and more hierarchical. It is possible that feeling awe toward someone powerful may more often come with a feeling of being smaller or less in control, which could explain the higher number of diary entries relating threat-based awe among Chinese students.

Even shared experiences of awe trigger diverging reactions

To examine if these differences persisted in controlled laboratory settings, in a second laboratory-based study we showed American and Chinese participants the same nature video. The clip, taken from the film Planet Earth featured giant waterfalls and sweeping aerial shots of mountain ranges, all set to orchestral music with no narration. The Chinese students reported more fear than the US students – even though both found the video awe-inspiring. The US students, on the other hand, reported feeling more of the good stuff: appreciation, even a bit of amusement.

The physiological data we collected during the viewing backed up what the students reported. Both groups showed similar signs – such as sweating, which signals emotional arousal and steady breathing patterns. But heart rate told a different story: the US students’ heart rate showed a drop, a sign of calm, while the Chinese students’ heart rate showed a slight rise, suggesting tension or alertness.

Why awe’s emotional impact isn’t one-size-fits-all

These findings carry weighty implications. Awe is being used everywhere – in therapy, schools, and even marketing. From nature retreats to big-brand ads, there’s a whole industry built on the idea that awe makes us feel good. But if awe brings fear for some, its effects – on mental health, creativity, or team connection – might not be so straightforward.

An earlier study I co-authored in 2018 with fellow experts Maria Monroy, and Dacher Keltner, shows how awe can help ease post-traumatic stress disorder, especially for military veterans spending time in nature. But if the sense of awe comes with fear, the benefits could fade, or even flip.

This matters for business, too. Companies are using awe in ads, travel and brand events to wow people and build loyalty. But if awe feels unsettling in some cultures, those big emotional plays could fall flat or even push people away.

Our research is not saying awe doesn’t work – just that it does not feel the same for everyone. Culture shapes how we feel, even with emotions we may think are hardwired. The view of awe as purely uplifting might be the exception, not the norm. Knowing that is crucial for creating experiences that can actually work across cultures.

A weekly e-mail in English featuring expertise from scholars and researchers. It provides an introduction to the diversity of research coming out of the continent and considers some of the key issues facing European countries. Get the newsletter!

The Conversation

Craig L. Anderson ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.

– ref. Reinterpreting ‘awe’: why cross-cultural emotional intelligence needs to be handled with care – https://theconversation.com/reinterpreting-awe-why-cross-cultural-emotional-intelligence-needs-to-be-handled-with-care-274151

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Électrohypersensibilité : réconcilier les personnes qui souffrent et les scientifiques

Source: The Conversation – France in French (3) – By Jimmy Bordarie, Docteur, Maitre de conférences, Université de Tours

L’électrohypersensibilité, ou EHS, désigne un syndrome spécifique pour lequel les personnes concernées rapportent divers symptômes qu’elles attribuent aux champs électromagnétiques. De nombreux débats existent aujourd’hui, notamment sur la reconnaissance de l’EHS en tant que maladie, ce qui conduit parfois à des incompréhensions entre la communauté scientifique et les personnes en souffrance.

La perception de risques pour la santé en lien avec les nouvelles technologies est très répandue. Ce phénomène est appelé « préoccupations de santé modernes ». Il inclut des inquiétudes relatives aux champs électromagnétiques, aux polluants atmosphériques, à l’alimentation, aux antibiotiques ou encore au changement climatique. Ces préoccupations sont souvent citées en lien avec le report de symptômes non spécifiques.

Dans les syndromes dits médicalement inexpliqués, tels que la sensibilité chimique, l’intolérance au bruit ou encore le syndrome des bâtiments malsains, les patients se plaignent également de symptômes non spécifiques qu’ils attribuent à un agent environnemental, et ce, en l’absence d’une pathologie qui pourrait les expliquer. Ces syndromes liés à l’environnement, appelés intolérances environnementales idiopathiques sont polymorphes. L’acronyme SAEF (pour Symptoms Associated with Environmental Factors) vise à les rassembler sous un même terme.

Le cas de l’électrohypersensibilité : repérage et prévalence

L’électrohypersensibilité (EHS) est un syndrome pour lequel aucune affection médicale sous-jacente identifiée ne permet d’expliquer les symptômes associés. Elle est classée parmi les intolérances environnementales idiopathiques (IEI) par l’Organisation mondiale de la santé. On parle alors d’IEI-CEM (CEM pour champs électromagnétiques).

En France, dans un avis rendu par l’Agence nationale de sécurité sanitaire (Anses) en 2018, les IEI-CEM sont définis selon trois critères :

  1. la perception de divers symptômes (fatigue, maux de tête, difficultés de concentration, problèmes dermatologiques et digestifs, etc.) ;

  2. l’absence de troubles cliniquement identifiés susceptibles de les expliquer ;

  3. leur attribution aux champs électromagnétiques tels que les antennes de télécommunication, le Wi-Fi, les lignes électriques à haute tension, les téléphones mobiles et écrans d’ordinateur, etc. par les personnes concernées.

Difficile d’évaluer la prévalence de l’électrohypersensibilité. Selon les dernières études de prévalence au niveau international, autour de 5 % de la population se déclarerait électrohypersensible, soit, en France, plus de 3 millions de personnes. Une partie de la variabilité de ces estimations peut s’expliquer par l’absence de critères objectifs. En effet, initialement, l’évaluation reposait généralement sur une seule question dichotomique « oui/non » demandant si la personne était très sensible. Depuis, il est recommandé d’ajouter des questions supplémentaires, telles que l’apparition des symptômes et l’impact négatif sur la vie quotidienne.

Quelles conséquences pour la santé des personnes concernées ?

L’omniprésence des champs électromagnétiques anthropiques dans nos sociétés entraîne souvent ces personnes à adapter leur mode de vie. Les stratégies d’adaptation utilisées impliquent le plus souvent d’éviter l’exposition en prenant diverses mesures de protection.

Si certaines personnes rapportent alors une amélioration de leur qualité de vie, pour d’autres, cela conduit à une exclusion sociale, une incapacité de travail et des difficultés financières, souvent renforcées par un manque de compréhension de la part de leur famille et de leur entourage professionnel à l’égard des précautions qu’elles prennent.

En outre, la littérature scientifique confirme également que les personnes atteintes d’électrohypersensibilité ont tendance à se sentir inférieures aux autres et mal à l’aise dans leurs relations sociales. Elles rencontreraient également plus de difficultés à maintenir un certain niveau d’estime de soi, auraient une image de soi plus altérée et seraient plus vulnérables. Elles seraient plus sujettes aux troubles anxio-dépressifs, dont nous ne pouvons être assurés à ce jour qu’il s’agisse d’une cause ou d’une conséquence de l’électrohypersensibilité.

Les champs électromagnétiques en cause ?

Pour étudier le lien entre symptômes et champs électromagnétiques, les scientifiques s’appuient sur des méthodologies diverses :

  1. des études observationnelles ;

  2. des études d’évaluation écologique momentanée (une méthode qui consiste à recueillir, plusieurs fois par jour et en temps réel, des données, par exemple, sur les symptômes, les émotions ou les comportements d’une personne dans son environnement de vie habituel) ;

  3. des études d’intervention ;

  4. des études de provocation (une méthode dans laquelle des volontaires sont exposés de façon aléatoire et contrôlée, en double aveugle, à des champs électromagnétiques ou à une condition « fictive/simulée » sans champs électromagnétiques, afin d’observer d’éventuelles modifications de leurs symptômes ou de leur état physiologique).

À noter que, dans la lignée des recommandations de l’Anses, des protocoles de provocation innovants ont également été développés en collaboration avec les personnes concernées.

En dépit, parfois, de certaines limites méthodologiques, les résultats du corpus de littérature sur l’électrohypersensibilité (environ 350 études à ce jour) sont largement consensuels et convergent vers un rejet de l’existence de preuves cliniques ou biologiques valables permettant d’associer ces symptômes aux champs électromagnétiques.

D’autres explications possibles…

Une partie des études a permis de confirmer l’existence d’un effet nocebo ; effet qui se produit lorsqu’une personne s’attend (consciemment ou non) à des conséquences négatives de certains facteurs, comme les champs électromagnétiques, sur sa santé et/ou sa vie en général.

Le Comprehensive Model suggère que les personnes souffrant d’intolérances environnementales idiopathiques en général partageraient une croyance causale, qui conduirait à l’anticipation et à la survenue d’effets nocebo en relation avec l’exposition perçue tandis que les symptômes conduiraient à la validation de la croyance.

Cependant, cette hypothèse n’est pas pleinement satisfaisante, car elle ne peut s’appliquer qu’aux personnes qui considèrent a priori les champs électromagnétiques comme une source de risques pour la santé. Or, en s’intéressant aux trajectoires des personnes atteintes d’électrohypersensibilité, une autre partie de la littérature scientifique souligne la préexistence des symptômes dans certains cas, alors même qu’il n’y avait auparavant aucune crainte au regard des champs électromagnétiques.

Traits de personnalité en jeu

D’autres études s’intéressent au rôle de variables dispositionnelles, c’est-à-dire des variables telles que la personnalité, qui pourraient alors permettre de comprendre, soit l’apparition de ces symptômes, soit la tendance à les attribuer aux champs électromagnétiques. Par exemple, le mode de pensée holistique, c’est-à-dire la tendance à la spiritualité et aux croyances globales en matière de santé ainsi que la détresse liée aux symptômes somatiques seraient des facteurs importants dans les préoccupations de santé modernes.

Plus récemment, des études ont confirmé la relation entre l’électrohypersensibilité et l’hypersensibilité, aussi appelée sensibilité élevée du traitement sensoriel. Les personnes hautement sensibles ont des réactions plus fortes aux stimuli environnementaux, ce qui peut être vécu comme une source de stress et constitue une piste prometteuse pour proposer une prise en charge aux personnes souffrant d’électrohypersensibilité.

Les enjeux d’une collaboration nécessaire

Dans un certain nombre de cas, l’électrohypersensibilité (EHS) ne serait pas une hypersensibilité isolée, dans la mesure où plusieurs auteurs ont affirmé qu’une partie des personnes souffrant d’EHS signalent également d’autres sensibilités (par exemple, des sensibilités chimiques multiples). D’ailleurs, actuellement certains chercheurs étudient l’efficacité de traitements basés sur des thérapies cognitivo-comportementales pour réduire les symptômes associés aux facteurs environnementaux.

S’il existe un réel enjeu tant pour les personnes concernées que pour les scientifiques à comprendre les causes de ce syndrome et l’origine des symptômes, au-delà des convictions des personnes en souffrance, le rôle de la science vise à une amélioration des connaissances pour identifier les causes des troubles décrits. Aussi, ne pas converger vers la même explication ne suppose pas une opposition entre souffrants et scientifiques.

Il est donc plus qu’essentiel de continuer à travailler en collaboration pour comprendre les enjeux de ces préoccupations de santé modernes, leurs causes et leurs conséquences. Les scientifiques doivent intégrer les personnes en souffrance comme des partenaires dans leurs études. Ainsi, l’enjeu relève tout aussi bien de la prise en compte nécessaire des savoirs expérientiels des personnes concernées que du respect des critères assurant une production scientifique de qualité.

The Conversation

Certains travaux cités impliquent les auteurs de cet article et ont fait l’objet d’un financement :
– Agence Nationale de Sécurité Sanitaire de l’Alimentation, de l’Environnement et du Travail (Reference: PNREST‐EST/2017/2 RF/19)
– Direction Générale Opérationnelle de l’Agriculture, des Ressources Naturelles et de l’Environnement du Service Public de Wallonie.

Maryse Ledent est membre de The BioEM Society et de Belgian Association of Public Health (BAPH).
Dans le cadre des travaux liés à cet article, nous avons reçu deux soutiens financiers : de l’Agence nationale de sécurité sanitaire de l’alimentation, de l’environnement et du travail (Reference: PNREST‐EST/2017/2 RF/19) ainsi que de la Direction générale opérationnelle de l’agriculture, des ressources naturelles et de l’environnement du Service public de Wallonie.

– ref. Électrohypersensibilité : réconcilier les personnes qui souffrent et les scientifiques – https://theconversation.com/electrohypersensibilite-reconcilier-les-personnes-qui-souffrent-et-les-scientifiques-276239

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Iran’s targeting of airport, ports and hotels in reaction to US strikes has forced Gulf nations onto front lines of a war they want no part in

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Fellow for the Middle East at the Baker Institute, Rice University

A yacht sails past a plume of smoke rising from the port of Jebel Ali following a reported Iranian strike in Dubai on March 1, 2026. Fadel Senna/AFP via Getty Images

Washington’s allies in the Persian Gulf have found themselves in a position they have long sought to avoid: on the front line and bearing the brunt of a widening Middle East conflict.

Having been dragged into a war of choice by the U.S. – one which many around the world are calling a war of aggression – all six Gulf Cooperation Council nations have been struck by Iranian retaliatory attacks in response.

Military facilities in Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have all been hit. But the missiles and drones from Iran have been aimed at civilian infrastructure, too, including airport, ports and hotels in the opening days of U.S. and Israeli operations against Iran.

In scale and scope, the barrage marks a major departure from Iran’s previous response to being attacked by U.S. and Israeli airstrikes. In contrast, during a 12-day war in June 2025, Tehran only attacked one base in Qatar, and even then forewarned authorities in Doha.

Instead, what is occurring in the region is a scenario that planners in Persian Gulf capitals have long warned about: a deliberate attempt by Tehran to widen conflict and hit nations it sees as allied to the West.

As an expert on Gulf dynamics, I see the unfurling events as undoing years of work to de-risk the region and placing in jeopardy the unique selling point and business models that have underpinned the Gulf states’ global rise.

an entertainment building can be seen as a missile falls from the night sky, leaving a trail
An intercepted projectile falls into the sea near Dubai’s Palm Jumeirah archipelago on March 1, 2026.
Fadel Senna/AFP via Getty Images

A cornered regime fighting for survival

Ever since the Oct. 7, 2023, attacks by Hamas and other Palestinian militants on Israel, policymakers in the Gulf nations have sought to avoid the regionalization of conflict.

Qatar led the way in mediating between Israel and Hamas, while Oman has done the same with the U.S. and Iran. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia has maintained regular dialogue with Iran to de-escalate regional tensions.

Each of the successive escalations between Israel and Iran – in April and October 2024 and then in June 2025, with the joint U.S.-Israeli strikes – brought the region closer to, without tipping over into, all-out war.

But Iran’s actions in the opening days following what Washington has named “Operation Epic Fury” have signaled that the comparative restraint it showed during the 12-day war is firmly off the table.

The Islamic Republic is now a cornered regime fighting for its survival. As such, it is lashing out and seeking to spread the pain to regional neighbors. The logic in this approach is that Gulf nations could put pressure on the U.S., which may fear the cascading costs of a prolonged regional conflict.

Gulf nations are also obvious targets for Iran. With Iran lacking the capability to hit the U.S. mainland through conventional weapons, the American military bases that dot the Gulf region are within the reach of Tehran’s ballistic arsenal.

Psychological impact on Gulf nations

The scale of the Iranian attacks on targets in the Gulf nations in the opening two days of the current conflict underscores the extent to which Iran’s response now differs from that of June 2025: In the first two days of the conflict, Iran had fired at least 390 ballistic missiles and 830 drones at the Gulf states. By comparison, the Iranian strike on the Al-Udeid air base in Qatar last year involved 14 ballistic missiles and was a one-off attack on a single target.

Air defense systems in Gulf nations have neutralized most of the incoming Iranian missiles, to date, and actual damage and casualties have been limited to a handful of deaths and injuries in the dozens.

But it is the intangible and psychological impact on Gulf cities under attack that threatens to inflict profound damage on the reputation and image of cities such as Dubai, Abu Dhabi and Doha. In recent years, Gulf Cooperation Council nations have presented the Gulf as an oasis of stability and havens to live and work.

This is especially the case for Dubai, which has marketed itself strongly as a hub for business and tourism. But it is also applicable to other Gulf nations as well, such as Qatar, which relies heavily on a steady stream of large-scale meetings and events.

Iran’s attacks on civilian infrastructure and soft targets – airports in Bahrain, Dubai, Abu Dhabi and Kuwait, and hotels in Bahrain and Dubai – serve to puncture this image of safe and secure Gulf capitals.

This choice of targets by Iran likely reflects a calculation that leaders in the Gulf countries would immediately feel the full impact of the war and push Washington hard to find a resolution and quick.

The subsequent targeting by Tehran on oil and gas facilities, including Ras Laffan in Qatar and Ras Tanura in Saudi Arabia, serves as a further and highly consequential step. It has already triggered a forceful response from Qatar, which shot down two Iranian jets on March 2.

There is concern among Gulf nations that the next step in the ladder of escalation could involve targeting the desalination plants that are so vital to overcoming water scarcity in the region.

Vulnerable to escalation

As critical hubs in the global economy by virtue of their reserves of oil and gas and centrality to international shipping and aviation, the Gulf nations are uniquely vulnerable to further escalation by Iran.

Dubai, Abu Dhabi and Doha have invested heavily in creating airlines that function as “super-connectors” capable of linking any two destinations worldwide with a stop in the Gulf. A Feb. 28 drone strike on Dubai International Airport, the world’s busiest for international travel, illustrated the impact that Iran’s asymmetric responses could have on the global hub model that has come to dominate world air travel.

Already, closure of airspaces over Qatar and the UAE, as well as in Bahrain and Kuwait, has stranded tens of thousands of passengers and created the biggest disruption to global travel since the COVID-19 pandemic.

In addition, cargo operations essential to local supply chains have been heavily impacted, at the same time that seaborne trade through the Strait of Hormuz has been similarly interrupted.

Whereas initial spikes in oil prices and insurance premiums at the start of the 12-day war last year fell away as it became clear that energy infrastructure was not significantly targeted, the opposite has happened this time.

Peril and uncertainty

But the short-term shock to the global economy is not what will be of primary concern to the Gulf Cooperation Council members. Not since the Gulf crisis of 1990-91, with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and subsequent Gulf War, has the region faced so much peril and uncertainty.

And that is what Iran’s leaders are banking on. The attacks across the Gulf by Tehran are not, after all, without strategy. The intent is to expand the conflict, thereby significantly raising costs to the U.S. and its partners in the Gulf.

Tehran’s hope is that the economic impact will encourage Gulf leaders to press Trump for an endgame. But in attacking capitals across the region, Iran risks perhaps doing the opposite: rupturing any chance of bettering ties with rivals in the region and instead pushing them further back into Washington’s orbit after a period of drift.

The Conversation

Kristian Coates Ulrichsen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Iran’s targeting of airport, ports and hotels in reaction to US strikes has forced Gulf nations onto front lines of a war they want no part in – https://theconversation.com/irans-targeting-of-airport-ports-and-hotels-in-reaction-to-us-strikes-has-forced-gulf-nations-onto-front-lines-of-a-war-they-want-no-part-in-277208

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The strikes on Iran show why quitting oil is more important than ever

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Hussein Dia, Professor of Transport Technology and Sustainability, Swinburne University of Technology

Anton Petrus/Getty

As Israel and the United States strike Iran, global oil markets are on edge.

Oil prices have begun rising even before any disruption to supply. Oil traders are factoring in the possibility the Strait of Hormuz might close.

Roughly 20% of the world’s traded oil passes through this narrow waterway between Iran to the north and Oman and the United Arab Emirates to the south. One oil tanker has been bombed and traffic has all but halted. In global energy markets, the mere threat of interruption can push prices higher.

Oil isn’t like most commodities. Control of the energy-dense fuel shapes geopolitics. Three-quarters of the world’s population live in countries dependent on oil imports for cars, trucks and other uses. Controlling the flow of oil and, increasingly, gas, has long been used as leverage, from the oil shocks of the 1970s to Russia cutting European gas supplies in 2022.

Any serious disruption to tanker traffic in the Gulf would send shockwaves through global oil markets and threaten economic stability. Long queues have already been reported in Australia as motorists vie to fill up before possible price spikes.

As international tensions increase, nations from Cuba to Ukraine to Ethiopia are accelerating plans to reduce their oil dependence and boost energy security.

Half a century of oil leverage

The power of oil became obvious during the 1973 oil embargo, when major Middle East oil producers slashed supply in a bid to reshape US foreign policy. Prices quadrupled, economies stalled and energy security became a central political issue almost overnight. The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries have since coordinated supply to drive up prices.

Today, the mechanisms of control look different but the power created by oil dependence remains.

Even before US military action, sanctions on major producers such as Iran and Venezuela have cut supply and reshaped trade flows.

Current tensions near chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz introduce risk premiums into prices.

Oil markets are forward-looking, meaning prices reflect not only current supply and demand but expectations of what might happen next.

The strikes on Iran have seen prices of Brent crude – the global benchmark – trading around US$76 (A$107) per barrel, up from roughly US$68 (A$96) a few weeks earlier. Because prices are global, political instability anywhere can have economic consequences everywhere.

Who’s reducing dependence on oil?

In 2015, India blocked Nepal’s oil imports, triggering chaos. In response, authorities encouraged the very rapid growth of electric vehicles. Oil imports have begun to fall.

More recently, the Russia–Ukraine war and US strikes on Venezuela and Iran have brought new focus on reducing oil imports and bolstering domestic energy security.

In oil-dependent Cuba, US pressure has slashed the supply of oil. Blackouts are common and cars stay put. In response, authorities and businesses are importing 34 times as many Chinese solar panels as they did a year ago.

It’s not ideology driving this shift – it’s necessity. Electric vehicle imports, too, are soaring. “Cuba may experience the fastest energy transition in the world,” a Cuban economist told The Economist.

Why renewables change the equation

Unlike oil, solar panels and wind turbines can avoid being shipped through maritime chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz. Renewables are not traded in the same globally centralised way. Power is generated locally and increasingly across many smaller sites.

Russia has long targeted Ukraine’s energy infrastructure and power plants during the war. In response, Ukraine is ramping up renewables as fast as possible, as decentralised power generation is much harder to destroy. As a Ukrainian energy expert told Yale360, a single missile “could take out” a coal power station, while a wind farm would require 40 missiles.

Decentralised power is more resilient, meaning damage to one farm won’t collapse the grid.

Resilience through electric transport

Electrification of transport is a key plank of these new approaches to energy security.

Electric vehicles powered by locally-produced electricity reduce exposure to global oil markets. This thinking is visible in Ethiopia’s decision to ban new internal combustion cars.

China imports most of its oil – much of it from Iran. Beijing has been accelerating its rapid shift to electric vehicles. Last year, EVs made up 50% of new cars in China and 12% of the total fleet. China is increasingly using oil to make plastics, not for transport. Last year’s uptick in imports was due to stockpiling of huge volumes amid global uncertainty.

Australia’s exposure

Australia imports the vast majority of its refined fuels. We would have about a month’s worth of petrol before we ran out.

If wars drive up oil prices, pain at the petrol pump will flow through to freight costs, food prices and inflation.

While the EV shift is accelerating, Australia is slow by global standards. Even as electricity rapidly goes green, transport remains overwhelmingly dependent on foreign oil. That leaves Australia exposed.

Energy policy is security policy

Renewables do not eliminate geopolitical risk. Power grids face cyber threats. Critical mineral supply chains introduce new dependencies – and much of today’s solar panel, battery and EV manufacturing is concentrated in China.

But there is a clear structural difference. Decentralised systems are harder to manipulate through supply chokepoints. Solar panels, once installed, generate energy locally. The vulnerability shifts from ongoing fuel imports to upfront manufacturing dependence.

Oil has shaped global politics for decades because it’s transportable, globally traded and only a few countries have large reserves.

Reducing oil dependence is often framed as climate policy. But it is also vital to energy security and national security. Cutting oil use boosts resilience to shocks and reduces the leverage of other nations.

The Iran crisis may not lead to sustained price spikes. Supply may adjust. Markets may stabilise. But leaders will be rethinking the wisdom of exposure to globally traded oil in a volatile world.

The Conversation

Hussein Dia receives funding from the Australian Research Council, the iMOVE Australia Cooperative Research Centre, Transport for New South Wales, Queensland Department of Transport and Main Roads, Victorian Department of Transport and Planning, and Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications, Sport and the Arts.

– ref. The strikes on Iran show why quitting oil is more important than ever – https://theconversation.com/the-strikes-on-iran-show-why-quitting-oil-is-more-important-than-ever-277192

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Does international law still matter? The strike on the girls’ school in Iran shows why we need it

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Shannon Bosch, Associate Professor (Law), Edith Cowan University

As the US and Israel began their joint assault on Iran, reports emerged from Iran that a strike hit the Shajarah Tayyebeh girls’ elementary school in the southern city of Minab.

The school was reportedly packed with young pupils at the time. Iranian authorities say more than 150 people were killed, including children, and 60 more injured (these figures are yet to be independently verified).

Videos verified by international media show rescue workers digging through collapsed concrete, school bags being pulled from the debris, and scorch marks along the remaining walls.

Warning: this gallery contains graphic images.

The New York Times says it has verified videos that show the school next to a naval base belonging to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps, or IRGC, and a strike hitting that base.

Iranian representatives at the United Nations have characterised the strike as a deliberate targeting of civilian infrastructure and labelled it a war crime and a crime against humanity.

Neither the United States nor Israel have publicly confirmed hitting the school. The US military’s Central Command (Centcom) said:

We are aware of reports concerning civilian harm resulting from ongoing military operations. We take these reports seriously and are looking into them. The protection of civilians is of utmost importance, and we will continue to take all precautions available to minimize the risk of unintended harm.

At present, we do not have enough verified facts to reach a firm legal conclusion about what happened.

But given the questions about the legality of the US and Israeli strikes on Iran – and deeper questions about whether we’re witnessing the “death of international law” more broadly – incidents like this illustrate the continuing importance of the law, especially in times of conflict.

Which targets are protected under the law?

In armed conflict, international humanitarian law applies. International humanitarian law is built on foundational principles that must inform all decisions by armed forces concerning what they target:

  • distinction

  • proportionality

  • military necessity

And precautions must be taken to avoid incidental harm to civilians.

So what do these terms mean?

The principle of distinction requires parties to an armed conflict to always distinguish between civilian objects and military objects.

Attacks may only be directed against combatants and military objects. Civilians and civilian objects, such as schools, hospitals and public transport, are protected and may not be directly targeted.

If there is any doubt about whether a target is military or civilian in nature, it must be presumed to be civilian.

Schools are not merely buildings. They are protective spaces, and their destruction can cause immediate loss of life and long-term societal damage.

Children under 18 also enjoy special protection under international humanitarian law. They, too, may not be directly targeted.

This protection is not absolute, however. Any civilian object (including schools) can lose their protected status if they become military objectives. A school used as a military base, artillery position or command post could meet that definition.

So far, we have no evidence the school in Minab was being used for military purposes or that it was intentionally targeted.

Proportionality and precautions in attacks

What, then, if the school was not intentionally targeted, but was incidental collateral damage from an attack directed at the IRGC barracks nearby?

International humanitarian law recognises civilian objects may be affected by attacks on military objectives.

Incidental harm to civilians and civilian objects is only lawful if it satisfies the test of proportionality and military necessity under the law. All feasible precautions must also have been taken to minimise harm to civilians.

So, if a school near a military target is hit, the legality of that strike turns on whether the expected harm to children and the school was excessive compared to the military advantage gained by striking the target.

Also important: did the military commanders take all feasible precautions to assess the effect of the attack on nearby civilians or civilian infrastructure? This includes the specific weapons that are used and the timing of the attack.

Why international law matters

In recent years, we have witnessed a number of countries and their leaders openly flouting international law and the rules-based order. Yet, it would be a profound mistake to conclude that international law has ceased to matter. Even grave breaches do not negate the system itself.

As renowned American international law scholar Louis Henkin famously wrote in 1979:

Almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time.

Henkin’s point was not naïve optimism. Daily compliance of international law remains the norm in diplomacy, trade, aviation, maritime navigation, treaty compliance and peaceful dispute settlement.

Violations do occur – sometimes brazenly – but they are exceptions to an overwhelmingly compliant pattern of behaviour.

The fact that some states breach foundational rules such as the prohibition on the use of force in Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter does not render international law illusory.

Rather, it underscores the importance of naming breaches for what they are and defending the legal order that most states, most of the time, continue to respect.

If the strike on the Minab school is ultimately shown to have violated the principles of distinction, proportionality and military necessity, it would not prove Henkin wrong; it would prove his point.

International law matters precisely because departures from it can be identified, judged and condemned.

The rubble of a girls’ school is not evidence that the law is meaningless; it is a stark reminder of why the law exists, and why insisting on compliance remains essential.

The Conversation

Shannon Bosch does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Does international law still matter? The strike on the girls’ school in Iran shows why we need it – https://theconversation.com/does-international-law-still-matter-the-strike-on-the-girls-school-in-iran-shows-why-we-need-it-277196

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Booked to travel through the Middle East? Here’s why you shouldn’t cancel your flight

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Natasha Heap, Lecturer in Aviation, University of Southern Queensland

Travellers are being advised not to cancel their tickets for flights through the Middle East and check with their airlines, as airspace remains closed indefinitely.

If travellers cancel a ticket, they may lose some of their consumer rights and ability to claim refunds.

The US and Israeli bombing of Iran and the closure of airspace and airports is affecting all global airlines that fly through the region. The closures will have a flow-on effect, leading to significant disruption to the global airline industry that may take weeks to clear.

Tens of thousands of travellers affected

The Middle East is home to three of the world’s largest airlines: Emirates and Etihad, both in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Qatar Airways, based in Qatar.

Over the past 20 years, the region has become the global hub of international aviation. It is not only the three airlines that call the region home that are affected by the current conflict.

Emirates has issued a notice to all passengers advising it has suspended all operations to and from Dubai until 3pm UAE time on March 2.

Passengers booked to travel on or before March 5 have two options: rebook on an alternative flight or request a refund. Etihad has issued similar advice. Qatar is referring travellers to its app.

Other carriers that fly through the region, such as Lufthansa have also issued notices to their passengers.

Virgin Australia and Qantas’ operations are not directly affected by the airspace closure. However, some passengers may be affected if travelling on partner airlines. It is essential for people due to travel to check with their airline.

Travel insurance for cancellations is unlikely to be helpful, because acts of war that disrupt travel are explicitly excluded from coverage.

It could take weeks to clear the backlog of travellers just from the past weekend. US President Donald Trump has said the operations could last for “4 weeks or less”.

Tens of thousands of travellers are stranded in the Middle East waiting for the airspace to reopen so they can continue their journey.

The General Civil Aviation Authority in the UAE announced the UAE government will bear the cost of accommodating all stranded passengers in their country. There are around 20,000 people stranded in the UAE, and many more in other countries across the region.

Plans in place to keep passengers safe

Airlines have been watching the rising tensions in the region very closely. They’re used to dealing with unexpected operational disruptions.

With the major shutdown of Middle Eastern airspace in June 2025 still fresh in people’s minds, the airlines were quick to factor that experience into their decisions this time around.

The current situation is a little different to June 2025. Following US and Israeli bombing of targets in Iran at the weekend, Iran responded with missiles and drones that hit both civilian and military targets in several countries across the region.

Dubai International Airport and Abu Dhabi’s Zayed International Airport were both hit by drone attacks or debris. Both of these airports are for civil use. They are not military assets.

This is not the first time airports in the region have come under attack. In January 2022, Houthi forces in Yemen launched a drone attack on Abu Dhabi’s airport. Three people were killed.

The airline hubs have few alternatives

Some airlines affected by the airspace closure will be able to adjust their schedules and routes to avoid the area to try and lessen the impact both to their passengers and their business profitability.

However, the carriers that call the Middle East home have built their networks and highly profitable businesses using the hub and spoke model. They bring passengers into the hub, which is a transfer point to then fly them onward to their destinations. With the airspace closed, these airlines cannot bring passengers in or fly them out.

It would be nearly impossible for the main carriers in the Middle East to temporarily move their base of operations to another country.

They are large organisations. Emirates currently has a fleet of 261 passenger aircraft in service. Simply finding a place to park all the aeroplanes would be a significant challenge.

Complex systems within systems

Running an airline is like putting together a complex jigsaw puzzle with constantly moving pieces.

Beyond the aircraft, airlines need large teams of pilots and cabin crew, as well as extensive catering, cleaning, refuelling and maintenance operations. These systems are highly integrated and location-specific. This makes it extremely difficult to relocate or replicate them in another country at short notice.

Currently, the Middle Eastern carriers have large numbers of aircraft, crew and passengers stranded at the far reaches of their networks. For all airlines, the safety and security of their passengers and crew is their priority.

When the airspace reopens, airlines will face significant challenges to work through the backlog of stranded passengers. Extra flights and adjustments to schedules will likely be needed.

It remains unclear how long the airspace will be closed. But the airlines will already be working on plans to restore full operations quickly and safely when the time comes.

Will this latest airspace closure reduce demand for travel through the Middle East? It may in the short term. However, people will continue to travel. The Middle Eastern airline hubs are geographically located for global connectivity. The hope is the current military action and regional instability will be short-lived.

The Conversation

Natasha Heap does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Booked to travel through the Middle East? Here’s why you shouldn’t cancel your flight – https://theconversation.com/booked-to-travel-through-the-middle-east-heres-why-you-shouldnt-cancel-your-flight-277191

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Les frappes américano-israéliennes contre l’Iran pourraient être un succès militaire, mais à quel prix ?

Source: The Conversation – in French – By James Horncastle, Assistant Professor and Edward and Emily McWhinney Professor in International Relations, Simon Fraser University

Dans le cadre de l’opération Epic Fury, Israël et les États-Unis ont lancé des opérations militaires contre l’Iran. Cette campagne aérienne semble viser trois cibles : les bases militaires et la structure de commandement, les défenses aériennes et les sites de missiles stratégiques, ainsi que les dirigeants.

Les premières attaques ont permis de tuer le guide suprême iranien, Ali Khamenei, et plusieurs membres de son gouvernement.

D’un point de vue strictement militaire, les frappes devraient être couronnées de succès. Les forces israéliennes et américaines ont rapidement établi leur supériorité aérienne sur l’Iran et neutralisé ses capacités antiaériennes.

Ces attaques surviennent à un moment où l’Iran est affaibli, tant sur le plan intérieur qu’international.

Le régime iranien ne s’est pas encore remis des manifestations de décembre et janvier, qui ont représenté le plus grand défi pour le gouvernement depuis la révolution de 1979.

Sur le plan international, les membres de « l’anneau de feu » iranien, comme les Houthis au Yémen et le Hezbollah au Liban, se trouvent dans une position vulnérable. De plus, les troubles intérieurs ont incité des gens partout dans le monde à remettre en question la légitimité du gouvernement iranien.

Néanmoins, les États-Unis et Israël ont peu de chances d’atteindre leur objectif déclaré de provoquer un changement de régime. L’histoire montre que la puissance aérienne seule ne suffit pas. En outre, même s’ils parviennent à provoquer un changement à la tête du pays, cela risque d’engendrer une situation géopolitique encore plus instable.

Escalade des tensions

Les tensions entre les États-Unis–Israël et l’Iran ne datent pas d’hier. Elles remontent à la création de la République islamique.

Cependant, ces dernières années, elles se sont considérablement intensifiées. L’attaque du Hamas contre des civils israéliens, le 7 octobre 2023, ainsi que le soutien apporté par l’Iran au Hamas et à d’autres groupes paramilitaires opposés à l’État d’Israël ont incité ce dernier à lancer des frappes de grande envergure contre des cibles iraniennes dans la région.

Ces frappes ont culminé l’année dernière avec la guerre des Douze Jours entre l’Iran et Israël, au cours de laquelle les États-Unis ont joué un rôle de soutien. Les frappes américaines et israéliennes ont infligé d’importants dommages aux infrastructures iraniennes. Cependant, elles n’ont pas permis d’atteindre l’objectif américain d’éliminer le programme nucléaire iranien, contrairement aux affirmations du président Donald Trump.

Manifestations en Iran

Dans ce contexte de tensions croissantes dans le conflit américano-israélien-iranien, la situation économique s’est détériorée en Iran, entraînant une grève des commerçants et des marchands de Téhéran. Ces protestations ont servi de déclencheur à ce qui est devenu la plus grande manifestation publique contre le régime iranien depuis la création de la République islamique.

Ce soulèvement du peuple iranien a représenté une opportunité pour les États-Unis et Israël. Le premier ministre israélien, Benyamin Nétanyahou, n’a jamais renoncé à son objectif d’assister à un changement de régime en Iran. Trump a activement encouragé les manifestants à lutter pour un renversement du gouvernement.

Les manifestants avaient toutefois besoin d’un soutien matériel que seuls les États-Unis pouvaient leur fournir. Cependant, avec les forces militaires américaines déployées dans les Caraïbes dans le cadre d’une attaque contre le Venezuela, les effectifs disponibles étaient insuffisants.

En conséquence, les États-Unis n’ont pas pu intervenir et le régime iranien a réussi à étouffer les manifestations. Le nombre total de morts causées par la répression du gouvernement est estimé à plusieurs milliers.

Les États-Unis, après avoir manqué une occasion de renverser le régime en raison de leur obsession pour le Venezuela plus tôt dans l’année, ont néanmoins poursuivi leur objectif le 28 février.

Un dénouement incertain

Israël et les États-Unis sont désormais confrontés à deux principaux défis : l’objectif déclaré de changement de régime et la stabilité à long terme de l’Iran. Non seulement le changement de régime est incertain en raison des limites d’une campagne strictement aérienne, mais l’opération pourrait même conduire à l’accession au pouvoir de forces plus radicales.

En effet, si le régime iranien est souvent assimilé à des personnalités éminentes telles que l’ayatollah, il s’agit en réalité d’un système qui ne repose pas sur un seul individu.

Contrairement à d’autres pays autoritaires où le pouvoir est détenu par des personnalités ou des familles clés, l’Iran est un État complexe doté d’une structure de gouvernance qui l’est tout autant. Au cœur de celle-ci se trouve le Corps des gardiens de la révolution islamique (CGRI). Loin d’être une simple unité militaire ou une police secrète, le CGRI est une vaste institution intégrée à la sécurité, à l’économie et à la gouvernance de l’Iran.

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C’est là que réside la différence entre « changement de régime » et « mise en place d’un régime ». Renverser les principaux dirigeants peut certes déstabiliser l’Iran et mettre d’autres personnes au pouvoir, mais cela signifie probablement que le pouvoir sera repris par des individus déjà en place. Il ne s’agit pas de simples citoyens iraniens, que Trump a exhortés à se soulever, mais de l’infrastructure imposante du Corps des gardiens de la révolution islamique (CGRI).

Le conflit pourrait se propager

Ce scénario est d’autant plus probable que l’Iran traverse une période d’instabilité depuis plusieurs semaines. Si ce n’était pas le cas, les dirigeants politiques et militaires iraniens ne considéreraient pas les attaques actuelles comme une menace pour leur pouvoir. Mais dans un contexte d’instabilité, ces dirigeants sont susceptibles de réagir avec plus de force et d’ampleur, car ils estiment que leur avenir – ou leur vie – est en péril.

Il est peu probable que le CGRI se montre plus conciliant ou plus tolérant sur le plan idéologique. En réalité, c’est plutôt le contraire qui risque de se produire.

Confronté à la menace de nouvelles attaques américano-israéliennes, ainsi qu’au mécontentement dans le pays, le CGRI pourrait agir rapidement pour consolider son pouvoir en réagissant de manière agressive. En plus d’entraîner de nombreuses pertes humaines en Iran, cette lutte pour le pouvoir pourrait provoquer une expansion du conflit à l’ensemble du Moyen-Orient.

La Conversation Canada

Les auteurs ne travaillent pas, ne conseillent pas, ne possèdent pas de parts, ne reçoivent pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’ont déclaré aucune autre affiliation que leur organisme de recherche.

– ref. Les frappes américano-israéliennes contre l’Iran pourraient être un succès militaire, mais à quel prix ? – https://theconversation.com/les-frappes-americano-israeliennes-contre-liran-pourraient-etre-un-succes-militaire-mais-a-quel-prix-277323

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What treating Kashechewan evacuees reveals about Canada’s drinking water crisis: Policy failure is an Indigenous health issue

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Jamaica Cass, Director, Queen’s-Weeneebayko Health Education Partnership, Queen’s University, Ontario

When 200 people evacuated from Kashechewan First Nation arrived in Kingston, Ont. on a Sunday afternoon in January 2026 — many Elders, children and medically complex family members — the urgency was immediately clear. By the next afternoon, my colleagues from the Indigenous Interprofessional Primary Care Team and I had brought our mobile clinic to the evacuees’ hotel and were seeing patients who had been abruptly displaced by yet another failure of their community’s drinking water system.

At the same time, Kingston’s Indigenous friendship centre was organizing volunteers to lead cultural programming and create supports to help families maintain connection and dignity during displacement.

This matters because Kashechewan is not an exception. Research across Canada shows that unsafe drinking water continues to drive preventable illness, mental distress and evacuations in First Nations communities.

These events are often described as isolated emergencies or technical breakdowns. But decades of public health, engineering and Indigenous-led scholarship demonstrate that they are the predictable outcome of how water systems for First Nations have been governed, funded and maintained.

I am an Indigenous primary care physician who works with Indigenous communities, including those affected by long-standing water insecurity. What I see in Kingston closely reflects patterns documented in Canadian research.

A widespread problem in a water-rich country

Canada has one of the largest supplies of fresh water in the world, yet many First Nations communities have lived under “boil-water” or “do-not-consume” advisories for years — some for more than a decade. National analyses and community-based studies show that Indigenous households are far more likely than non-Indigenous households to lack reliable running water, particularly in remote or northern communities.

In many of these settings, water is delivered by truck and stored in household cisterns, drums or buckets. Studies led by Canadian researchers, including work in Manitoba First Nations, have shown that these systems are difficult to disinfect consistently and are far more vulnerable to bacterial contamination than piped, continuously supplied systems.

In plain terms, the way water is delivered and stored in many homes increases the risk that it becomes unsafe before it’s ever used.

What unsafe water looks like in the clinic

The health impacts of water insecurity are well documented. Reviews of Canadian studies consistently identify gastrointestinal illness — such as diarrhea and vomiting — as the most frequently reported outcome in communities with unsafe drinking water. Skin infections are also common when regular bathing and hand-washing are limited.

Research from First Nations communities in Manitoba has found that people living in homes without indoor plumbing are significantly more likely to report illness overall. That same body of work shows strong associations between indoor water access and mental health: households with reliable in-home water and sanitation report lower rates of depression and stress-related symptoms.

Mental health effects are increasingly recognized in the literature. Researchers describe “water anxiety” — the chronic stress of worrying about whether water is safe to drink, cook with or bathe in.

Qualitative and survey-based studies show this burden falls disproportionately on women, who are more likely to manage household water and caregiving responsibilities. Carrying water, hauling heavy bottles and cleaning storage containers have also been linked to back and shoulder injuries.

Among the evacuees I see in Kingston, these physical and mental health burdens are compounded by displacement itself: being far from home, separated from land and trying to manage chronic illness, educate their children and maintain professional responsibilities in crowded conditions in an unfamiliar environment.

Why these failures persist

If unsafe drinking water in First Nations communities has been so thoroughly studied, why does it continue?

One reason, consistently identified in Canadian policy and academic literature, is that water problems are framed primarily as technical failures rather than as governance failures. Responsibility for drinking water on reserves is fragmented across federal departments, leading to regulatory gaps, unclear accountability and slow responses.

Infrastructure design is another factor. Studies show that water systems in First Nations are often modelled on urban technologies that are poorly suited to remote or low-capacity settings. Even when new systems are built, chronic underfunding of operations, maintenance and operator training leaves communities vulnerable to repeated breakdowns.

Housing plays a critical role as well. Research clearly demonstrates that the absence of indoor plumbing — not just treatment plant performance — is strongly associated with illness. Yet housing and water infrastructure are frequently planned and funded separately, despite their intertwined health impacts.

Evacuation as a recurring health risk

When water systems fail, evacuation becomes the default response. For remote communities, this can involve flying hundreds of people to southern cities on short notice.

Canadian studies show that these disruptions affect schooling, employment, access to cultural practices, and family cohesion.

From a health perspective, evacuation trades one risk for another. While it may reduce immediate exposure to contaminated water, it introduces stress, disrupts continuity of care and worsens mental health outcomes, particularly for Elders, children and people with chronic disease.

What the evidence points to

Across disciplines, Canadian research converges on several findings. Long-term water safety improves when First Nations have meaningful authority over water governance and source-water protection.

Infrastructure is more reliable when systems are designed for local conditions and paired with stable funding for maintenance, training and housing upgrades, not just construction.

Importantly, Indigenous-led approaches that integrate community knowledge with engineering and public-health expertise have been shown to strengthen environmental protection and improve trust in water systems.

Back to that hotel clinic

The patients I see in Kingston are living with the downstream effects of problems that Canadian researchers and Indigenous leaders have been documenting for decades. Their illnesses were not random. They were shaped by unsafe distribution systems, chronic under-investment and governance structures that leave communities reacting to crises rather than preventing them.

Canada’s drinking water crisis reflects systemic design and governance failures, not a lack of fresh water. In a country with the capacity to ensure safe water for all, persistent water insecurity in Indigenous communities represents a preventable policy failure.

The evidence is clear: Chronic water insecurity is a manufactured driver of illness and displacement. Treating its consequences in a makeshift hotel clinic should not be routine. Ensuring safe, reliable, Indigenous-governed water should be.

The Conversation

Jamaica Cass works for Queen’s University. She receives funding from the National Circle on Indigenous Medical Education, the CPFC and the CMA. She is a board member of the Indigenous Physicians’ Association of Canada and the Medical Council of Canada.

– ref. What treating Kashechewan evacuees reveals about Canada’s drinking water crisis: Policy failure is an Indigenous health issue – https://theconversation.com/what-treating-kashechewan-evacuees-reveals-about-canadas-drinking-water-crisis-policy-failure-is-an-indigenous-health-issue-274402