A matter of taste: did Neanderthals really like Sapiens women?

Source: The Conversation – France – By Ludovic Slimak, Archéologue et chercheur au CNRS, Auteurs historiques The Conversation France; Université de Toulouse

Going by the headlines, the matter seems to be settled. El País announces that Neanderthal men “chose” Sapiens women. Science journal speaks of a “partner preference.” National Geographic is already imagining the “Romeos” of prehistory. The Telegraph suggests that Neanderthals “had designs on” Sapiens women.

Within a few hours, a statistical analysis had been whipped up into a tale of desire. The “sex lives” of our ancestors were suddenly within clicking distance. This shift is not trivial. It turns an asymmetry in genetic transmission into a narrative based on feelings, attraction, and prehistoric romance.

A scene is staged in which the Neanderthal “Romeo” wins the heart of a Sapiens “Juliet.” The story of our origins becomes a tabloid romance.

Yet the study published in Science says nothing of the kind. The authors are investigating a well-known pattern: in present-day non-African modern humans, traces of Neanderthal DNA are not distributed evenly and are more frequent on the non-sex chromosomes than on the X chromosome, where they are strongly depleted.

To explain this contrast, the authors compare several hypotheses: natural selection, sex-biased demographic processes or partner preference. Their conclusion remains cautious: partner preference is one possible parsimonious mechanism, but it excludes neither demographic bias nor more complex scenarios.

The study therefore shows neither an observed attraction nor any directly lived preference. It proposes something much narrower: within the space of models it tests, certain scenarios make an asymmetry of the Neanderthal male/Sapiens female type more plausible. In such a scheme, Neanderthal DNA can be transmitted widely through the ordinary chromosomes, while the Neanderthal X chromosome circulates less easily, since a father passes it on only to his daughters. This is not trivial. But neither is it the direct observation of attraction between populations, and showing that a statistical model can produce a genetic pattern is not the same as proving that this model was historically true.

What the X chromosome does not tell us about social life

As soon as we move from genetic data to their historical and social implications, interpretations become fragile. Chromosomes do not carry a faithful memory of our ancestors’ social lives. The fact that Neanderthal DNA is rare on the X chromosome does not, in itself, allow us to reconstruct Palaeolithic social organisation or the sexual preferences of these populations.

When two closely related groups interbreed, the sex chromosomes do not behave like the others. They are often more sensitive to incompatibilities and to natural selection. Take the case of a Neanderthal father and a Sapiens mother. Their child does indeed receive Neanderthal DNA in many of its chromosomes. But the father’s X chromosome is not passed on to sons, only to daughters. It therefore circulates less easily from one generation to the next. In addition, in hybridizations between closely related groups, males are often biologically more fragile, with greater problems of survival or fertility. This is why the sex chromosomes, and the X chromosome in particular, can eliminate DNA from the other group more quickly. A depletion of Neanderthal DNA on the X chromosome may, therefore, reflect a classic biological phenomenon, not the lingering trace of an erotic choice.

The signal observed today may, therefore, have several causes. The authors themselves do not present “partner preference” as direct proof, but as the most parsimonious explanation within their statistical model. They make it clear that it excludes neither sex-biased demographic processes nor more complex scenarios in which natural selection, differential migrations, and
sex asymmetries may all have acted together.

Genetics detects transmissions. It does not reconstruct a society. It tells us neither whether these unions involved alliances, captures, asymmetrical exchanges, violence, or choice, nor who decided, nor under what constraints women and men circulated among groups.Between a chromosomal pattern and a scene of life, an entire world is still missing: the world of social constructions, rules on residence, hierarchies, conflicts and asymmetries between collectives.

For all their power, genes do not speak of past loves. They speak only of what survived.

What El Sidrón changes in the discussion

This is where archaeology and cultural anthropology become decisive again, because genes are not enough to reconstruct the social scene based on encounters between Neanderthals and Sapiens. We must, therefore, leave the Science article behind and rely on other kinds of evidence to get to grips with the structure of Neanderthal groups indirectly. In this respect, the site of El Sidrón, in northern Spain, provides a particularly strong basis which we can lean on.

Researchers identified bones there belonging to at least twelve Neanderthals. The most striking point concerns the adults. Three males shared the same mitochondrial lineage, whereas three females each had a different one. Yet mitochondrial DNA is transmitted only through mothers. From this, the researchers drew a simple interpretation with far-reaching implications: the males would have remained within their group, while the women would have circulated more between groups. In other words, El Sidrón is compatible with a patrilocal system.

The idea is decisive. Any human population needs exchanges with the outside world in order to reproduce itself over time. In a great many human societies, this circulation passes first through women, who leave their group of origin more often than men do. More generally, female dispersal and the tendency for males to remain in their natal group also constitute a predominant pattern among the great apes. To see in Neanderthals a signal compatible with greater female mobility therefore points to a deep behavioural tendency, one that runs from primates to human societies. Here, female mobility between groups is thus the most plausible explanation for the pattern observed. This therefore provides us, for once with a concrete foothold on Neanderthal social organisation.

And this deep tendency towards female dispersal changes a great deal. From that point on, an entire society becomes thinkable: exchanges of women between groups, asymmetrical integrations, reciprocal or non-reciprocal circulation, alliances, captures, or more brutal forms of intergroup relations. From then on, the question is no longer simply which chromosome survived, but in what kind of society these transmissions took place. This possibility alone is enough to skew the interpretation of the Science paper, because the genetic asymmetry observed may then reflect a social environment, yet to be explored, structured by rules on residence, circulation, and exchange.

‘Neanderthal, Sapiens: I love you… me neither’

Bringing the constraints of cultural anthropology back into biomolecular analysis allows other reversals to emerge. In Belgium, the site of Goyet yielded the remains of four Neanderthal females and two immature individuals. Clear-cut marks are present on five of them. The demographic profile of this assemblage is too singular to be explained by ordinary mortality. Isotopic signatures suggest a non-local geographic origin. The authors advance the hypothesis of conflict-related cannibalism, a form of predation targeting females from neighbouring groups. If this interpretation is correct, it tells us something brutal. Here, relations between Neanderthal groups belonged not to a sentimental world, but to one of capture, killing, and the consumption of the other.

The evidence can indeed be read in this way. But this case also calls for caution. The sample is small. The excavations are old. Spatial data are lacking. The identity of the local predatory group is not directly observed. Here again, the traces do not speak with a common voice.

At that point, another reversal becomes possible. If we step away for a moment from biomolecular reading alone and return to social analysis, a patrilocal society changes the entire meaning of the body and what it represents in a society. Women come from other groups, but in worlds where female mobility is a common pattern, from the great apes to human societies, interpreting this signal immediately becomes more subtle.

Evidence of cannibalism affecting women originating from neighbouring regions may, therefore, be read as simple predation upon outsiders. But another interpretation cannot be ruled out: that of an internal, perhaps ritualised, treatment of women who came from elsewhere but by then had been fully integrated into the group. Biology and genetics cannot tell us whether an individual born elsewhere remains a stranger to us or whether they become a full member of our own social environment.

Let us return, then, to the Science study. This is where we must be very precise about what it actually demonstrates. The sign of Sapiens ancestry as suggested by the authors refers to a very ancient episode, around 250,000 years ago. Their claim is therefore is not based on direct observation of an admixture event that left any traces on present-day humans. It assumes that the same genetic mechanism would still have been at work nearly 200,000 years later, at the time of the final contacts between Sapiens and Neanderthals.

If we take into account the very strong tendency towards female mobility, a paradox appears, one that places the extrapolation proposed by the Science article under deep tension. If Sapiens women had, in fact, regularly entered Neanderthal groups, we would expect to see a recent genetic signal of Sapiens ancestry persisting among the last Neanderthals. But this is not what the available evidence shows. Among the earliest ancient Sapiens in Eurasia, Neanderthal ancestry is constant. By contrast, the Neanderthal genomes available so far document no recent Sapiens contribution within the last Neanderthal populations. The genetic flow documented at the time they last came into contact therefore operates in only one direction, from Neanderthal to Sapiens.

Another anthropological hypothesis then becomes thinkable. In a patrilocal world, the circulation of women does not just organise reproduction; it also sets up alliances between groups. If exchange ceases to be reciprocal, the entire relationship changes. The following offer may seem harsh, but it captures the paradox well:

“I take your sister, but I won’t give you mine.”

This should not be read as a mechanical description of every individual encounter. But the offer enables us to formulate a possible structure: that of an unequal relationship between two human worlds, perhaps even a durable social asymmetry between the Neanderthal and Sapiens groups. It was this link between one-way genetic flow, patrilocality, and the non-reciprocity of exchange that led me, in Néandertal nu in 2022, to formulate the singular paradox: “Neanderthal, Sapiens: I love you… me neither.”

Placed back within this framework, the meaning of the molecular signatures shifts. The asymmetry no longer reads as a “fossil trace” indicating a preference, but as one possible effect of a structurally unequal relationship between human populations. Add to this the fact that sex chromosomes eliminate certain genetic contributions faster, and the picture changes again. What we thought we were reading as a “romance” may in fact be more deeply rooted in asymmetrical social structures.

What genes do not know about humans

Projecting our own narratives of desire, taste, and preference onto the very long history of humanity allows us to remain within our zone of comfort. But the reality of confrontation with alterity is always a harsher affair. Our values possess no spontaneous universality. They cannot serve as the foundation for imagining worlds vanished from existence. Nor can encounters between Neanderthals and Sapiens be reduced to past loves or wars merely transposed from our modern imagination. Researchers are trying to get closer to social structures, forms of exchange, boundaries between groups, the quality of alliances, ways of building a society.

But to do this, aligning chromosomes or isotopes is not enough. Palaeoanthropology must regain its glory as a science that’s not only about bones, but that’s an ethological, cultural, and social study of bygone human societies.

The difficulty, then, is not to choose between supposedly solid disciplines and supposedly fragile ones. It is to learn how to make different fields of knowledge speak to one another, each working in its own way to analyse traces of humanity that are incomplete.

Perhaps that is the real lesson. Chromosomes tell us far more than a mere love story between populations: they lead us to far larger questions. Who enters the group? Under what conditions? According to what rules of circulation? Under what reciprocity, or non-reciprocity?
Often within what violence? And above all, within what changes in people’s status?

The body, its skin, its bones, its genes, its isotopes will never tell us anything about the reality of the individual within the wider society.
The human being is a creature which cannot be reduced to its matter.

Among humans, who we consider a “stranger” firmly remains in the “eye of the beholder”.

So yes, it is indeed a matter of taste. But not necessarily in the sense understood by major media outlets. What newspapers have turned into a an affair of sentimental preference may, in reality, belong to something far deeper and, occasionally, regarding certain forms of cannibalism; far more literal.


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Ludovic Slimak ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.

ref. A matter of taste: did Neanderthals really like Sapiens women? – https://theconversation.com/a-matter-of-taste-did-neanderthals-really-like-sapiens-women-279905

Why Americans give: New research finds 5 distinct profiles for generosity

Source: The Conversation – USA (2) – By George E. Mitchell, Professor of Public and International Affairs, Baruch College, CUNY

About 82% of Americans said in response to a survey that they give to charity or to people in need. Overearth/iStock via Getty Images Plus

Given that fewer Americans are donating and volunteering and that people in the U.S. appear to be losing trust in one another, it may seem like generosity has eroded in the United States.

The nation’s political, social and economic divides might only strengthen that impression. But my recent research suggests that this belief would be misguided.

I’m a professor who teaches and conducts research about nonprofits and philanthropy. To understand the diversity of American generosity, I teamed up with Paige Rice and Veronica Selzler, two philanthropy consultants who contributed to the Generosity Commission’s report on U.S. generosity called “How and Why We Give.”

The Generosity Commission is a nonpartisan group of leaders from across the charitable sector. Its 2023 report shared the results of a national survey of 2,569 U.S. adults.

Multicolored hearts are scattered on a white background.
There are many ways to be generous.
MirageC/Getty Images

Drawing on data from that study, we sought to understand how different kinds of people may be motivated to act generously for different reasons and, as a result, express their generosity differently.

The study defined generosity broadly in terms of efforts or gifts made to support people in need, charitable causes or philanthropic organizations through actions like giving and volunteering. Our study was published in March 2026 in Nonprofit Management & Leadership, a peer-reviewed academic journal.

The overall propensity to give was about 82% based on responses to this question in the Generosity Commission’s survey: “On average, how much money do you donate each year to people in need, charitable causes, or philanthropic organizations?”

The survey also asked Americans about how they express their generosity.

We found that Americans’ generosity varies according to their aspirations, motivations and demographic characteristics. In other words, different kinds of Americans are generous in different ways.

Using a statistical modeling technique called latent profile analysis, which can find hidden groups of people based on observed data, we identified five segments of American society. They come from the general population, not just existing donors or volunteers.

Change-minded hopefuls, about 42% of the total, are mostly women and people with low incomes. They genuinely want to help people but are held back mainly by not having enough money.

Flexible moderates, roughly 35% of the survey’s respondents, are a middle-of-the-road group without strong political or religious motivations. They are open to helping out in a wide variety of ways when given the opportunity.

Values-driven skeptics, around 11% of those surveyed, are mostly older, conservative, religious and male. They are willing to give money but are worried that charities might not make good use of it.

Status seekers, approximately 9% of the participants in the survey, are the most generous group. Affluent, educated and religious, they are highly active in giving and volunteering and are motivated by social recognition and personal benefits.

Frustrated activists, only about 4% of the total, are passionate, liberal and financially strapped. They are often women and people of color. They care deeply about causes and prefer to take direct action rather than giving money.

Why it matters

Each of these groups is relatively generous. For example, the percentage of people in each one donating to people in need, charitable causes or philanthropic organizations ranged from a low of 77% – the frustrated activists – to a high of 93% among the status seekers. This shows that Americans with different mindsets exhibit a willingness to help others, even if their aspirations, motivations and demographic characteristics differ.

For nonprofits looking to attract more donors and volunteers, it may help to understand that different groups of people may have different motivations and concerns. By appealing to each group’s distinct qualities, nonprofits may be able to garner more support for their causes.

What other research is being done

Researchers with the Lilly School of Philanthropy at Indiana University and their partners are conducting numerous studies about American generosity.

For example, in a study published in 2019, those researchers found a sharp decrease in the percentage of Americans who gave to nonprofits following the Great Recession. And their ongoing research on global philanthropy tracks cross-border giving for 47 countries, including the U.S., to document global trends in generosity.

The Research Brief is a short take about interesting academic work.

The Conversation

George E. Mitchell is a member of the Association for Research on Nonprofit Organizations and Voluntary Action and the International Society for Third Sector Research. He serves on the editorial boards of Nonprofit Management & Leadership and the American Review of Public Administration.

ref. Why Americans give: New research finds 5 distinct profiles for generosity – https://theconversation.com/why-americans-give-new-research-finds-5-distinct-profiles-for-generosity-279429

Why the manosphere has an antisemitism problem

Source: The Conversation – USA (3) – By Miriam Eve Mora, Managing Director of the Raoul Wallenberg Institute, University of Michigan

Fitness content is big in the ‘manosphere,’ but extreme ideologies make appearances, too. ljubaphoto/E+ via Getty Images

Toward the end of Netflix’s “Into the Manosphere,” documentary filmmaker Louis Theroux chats in Marbella, Spain, with British influencer Ed Matthews.

“The people who run the world, they don’t have our best intentions,” says Matthews, speaking in the language of the manosphere – where some influencers and viewers believe they have tapped into a deeper truth about reality and power. When Theroux asked who controlled all of that, Matthews shrugged and answered this complex question very simply: “The Jews.”

It’s part of a three-minute digression from the film’s focus on masculinity, with multiple influencers making antisemitic claims about global conspiracies.

The manosphere is a catchall term for websites, forums, blogs and influencers promoting a particular kind of hypermasculinity, from the belief that women and feminism are the cause of men’s problems to calls to legalize rape. Groups within it – including pickup artists, men’s rights groups and “involuntary celibate” or “incel” communities – portray themselves as victims of modernity. In their eyes, the global economy is to blame for their unsatisfactory job prospects, feminism is to blame for their failures with women, minority rights are forcing them to relinquish their privilege as straight men, and so on.

And those digital spaces are rife with antisemitism. Some prominent influencers openly deny the Holocaust, call for violence against Jews and spread global conspiracy theories.

Louis Theroux’s documentary, which debuted in March 2026 on Netflix, follows online personalities shaping young men’s ideas of masculinity.

As a historian of Jewish gender and antisemitism, I know the connections between misogyny and antisemitism have deep roots. For centuries, a frequent tactic of antisemitism has been to attack Jewish men, deriding their masculinity.

Centuries-old tropes

Throughout the Middle Ages and into the 20th century, empires and nations across Europe established laws and practices that held Jewish men apart, not allowing them access to full citizenship. In many areas, Jews were not allowed to vote, to own land, to hold public office, to hold rank in the military or to duel with their peers.

A black-and-white photo of four men in dark coats, pants and hats sitting on a stoop outside a building.
Jewish men chat outside a shop in Krasilov, Ukraine, in the early 1900s.
History & Art Images via Getty Images

Antisemitic rhetoric often portrayed Jewish men as feminine or fragile, and inherently different. Those beliefs extended into the most severe antisemitic tropes and beliefs. For example, the blood libel, which falsely claims that Jews require the blood of gentile children to make their Passover matzo, was frequently linked to a lesser-known antisemitic claim: that Jewish men menstruated and therefore needed the blood of gentiles to replenish themselves. Other antisemitic beliefs claimed that Jews were too weak and cowardly to fight in the military, that they were dominated by Jewish women, or that circumcision made them more akin to women themselves.

The Austrian philosopher Otto Weininger would have fit in well on a manosphere podcast. He excoriated Jewish manhood along with his misogynistic views of women in his 1903 book “Sex and Character.” “Just as in reality there is no such thing as the ‘dignity of women,’ it is equally impossible to imagine a Jewish ‘gentleman,’” he wrote, allowing that even “the most superior woman is still infinitely inferior to the most inferior man.”

American soil

Immigrants to the United States, Jewish and non-Jewish alike, were shaped by these ideas and experiences.

The European Jews who settled in America in the 19th and 20th centuries largely made their way in commerce and trade and tended to settle in cities. At the time, however, the frontier – with its rugged cowboys, miners and railroad men – defined American manhood.

New Jewish arrivals, coming from European nations that had limited Jewish male participation in so many areas, had developed an alternative masculinity, focused on devotion to learning and on “eydlkayt” – a Yiddish word meaning gentleness and sensitivity. After arriving in the U.S., some Jews remained devoted to this form of manhood, but others fought to acculturate and access the more mainstream forms of masculinity they had been barred from in their or their parents’ countries of origin.

One of the earliest of American masculinity influencers was President Theodore Roosevelt, who touted his own transformation from a timid, effeminate man – local presses mocked him in his early career – to a rugged outdoorsman. “The great bulk of the Jewish population … are of weak physique,” he wrote in 1901. Though he blamed this on centuries of oppression, he saw it as a tangible difference discernible in the Jewish body and spirit. Roosevelt advocated a model of redemptive manhood through rugged outdoorsmanship and the strenuous life, and saw masculinity as a means to dominate and control races he deemed inferior.

Jews arguably enjoyed more rights in America than anywhere else in modern times, but they were still excluded from institutions of masculine camaraderie. Well into the 20th century, Jews were restricted from joining prestigious athletic clubs, fraternal societies, high military ranks and country clubs, though some responded by forming their own venues, like the City Athletic Club of New York. Most of these restrictions concluded with the end of Jewish quotas in U.S. higher education in the 1960s and 1970s.

A black-and-white photo shows two young men crouching on either side of an oversized football as another young man stands between them.
Jewish fraternity brothers, including the author’s great-grandfather, Ezra Sensibar, right, pose for a Northwestern homecoming celebration in Evanston, Ill., in 1923.
Sensibar Family Collection/Miriam Mora

Conspiracies today

Today’s manosphere not only builds on this legacy but also presents something new. Its embrace of antisemitic conspiracy theories allows men who see themselves as victims to explain multiple grievances at once without confronting their own shortcomings.

More than two decades ago, the Southern Poverty Law Center identified a conspiracy theory emerging on the American right: the belief that “cultural Marxists” were intent on destroying American culture. In particular, some proponents blamed Jews for planting progressive ideas and movements, including feminism and gender identity, as part of efforts to weaken white men’s dominance.

This is blatant in the manosphere rhetoric, when figures like Myron Gaines blame Jews for what they see as destructive forces to Western civilization, from feminism and communism to pornography.

Michael Broschowitz, a researcher at the Middlebury Institute’s Center for Terrorism, Extremism, and Counterterrorism, explains the manosphere’s tilt into antisemitism as the result of three driving forces. First, antisemitism serves as a one-size-fits-all answer, claiming to explain lots of problems at once. Second, algorithms designed to maximize engagement amplify extreme content. Lastly, global online communities can quickly remix antisemitic ideas to fit different cultures.

All three of these explanations are important. But I would argue that there is a crucial piece missing: Masculinity and antisemitism have been traversing the centuries hand in hand. The conspiratorial thinking that blossoms in the manosphere blames Jewish men for weakening masculinity. Because in the manosphere, failures of manhood are never your own.

The Conversation

Miriam Eve Mora does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Why the manosphere has an antisemitism problem – https://theconversation.com/why-the-manosphere-has-an-antisemitism-problem-279384

Supreme Court ruling on Colorado conversion therapy case is not a clear win for conservatives

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Kevin Cope, Professor of Law, University of Virginia

The U.S. Supreme Court found a Colorado law banning conversion therapy for gay and transgender minors likely violates free speech. Roberto Schmidt/Getty Images

In an 8-1 decision authored by Justice Neil Gorsuch, the Supreme Court held on March 31, 2026, that a Colorado law prohibiting licensed counselors from performing “conversion therapy” on minors was likely unconstitutional as applied to talk therapy. Justice Elena Kagan filed a separate concurrence, joined by Justice Sonia Sotomayor. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson dissented.

I am a law professor and political scientist who teaches and writes on free expression and discrimination. I see this holding as a potentially important decision at the intersection of free speech and health care.

Colorado’s law defines conversion therapy broadly. It bans practices that attempt not only to “change an individual’s sexual orientation or gender identity” but also to reduce same-sex attraction. The law allows therapists to provide “acceptance, support, and understanding” of gay or transgender identity. However, they may not help a client suppress those identities. Penalties include fines, probation and loss of license.

People hold signs outside a tall building under construction protesting conversion therapy.
Demonstrators with the Human Rights Campaign stand outside the United States Supreme Court during oral arguments in October 2025. The court released its decision on a free speech challenge to a ban on conversion therapy on March 31, 2026.
Jabin Botsford/The Washington Post via Getty Images

Kaley Chiles challenged the law as a violation of her First Amendment free speech rights. As a therapist who only offers talk therapy, Chiles’s objection was limited to her talk therapy. She didn’t contest the ban on what she called “long-abandoned, aversive” conversion practices. And – notably, considering she is an evangelical Christian – Chiles said she never set out to convert her clients. She says she respects her clients’ “fundamental right of self-determination” and determines her therapy approach only after a client identifies his or her own objectives. But she argued that some of her clients wish to “reduce or eliminate unwanted sexual attractions (or) change sexual behaviors,” and the law prevents her from expressing support for any of those goals.

Colorado’s failed ‘professional speech’ argument

Colorado faced a major obstacle in defending the Colorado conversion therapy law. The law was transparently driven by the government’s views about the well-documented inefficacy and harmful effects of conversion therapy. And outside of certain contexts, such as government grants, public employees, advertising and threats, courts have treated such viewpoint-based laws as constitutionally dead on arrival.

Colorado’s best hope in defending the law, then, was to argue that it wasn’t principally a restriction on speech at all. Rather, the state framed the law as a restriction on professional conduct — an area where states have broad regulatory latitude. That framing would mean the law burdened Chiles’ speech only incidentally.

A CBS News Colorado report on Coloradans’ conflicted feelings about the Supreme Court ruling.

In NIFLA v. Becerra, decided in 2018, the court rejected the argument that professional speech was a less-protected category. But it acknowledged that laws “regulating conduct in ways that incidentally sweep in speech” – particularly where they “fall within the traditional purview of state regulation of professional conduct” – might survive under a lower standard of scrutiny.

Colorado attempted to demonstrate such a tradition here, citing medical licensing laws, informed-consent requirements and malpractice liability.

A divided 10th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals had agreed with Colorado’s argument, as did Jackson in her dissent. But the Supreme Court majority rejected it. Gorsuch wrote that a government cannot evade First Amendment scrutiny by relabeling restricted speech as “conduct,” “treatment” or a “therapeutic modality.” Quoting the dissent of U.S. Circuit Judge Harris Hartz, he called Colorado’s argument a “labeling game.”

For Gorsuch, the key question is whether the law restricts speech in practice. And in Chiles’ case the answer was yes. Colorado was plainly restricting what she wished to tell her clients about their sex and gender issues.

Not just content but viewpoint discrimination

More than that, the majority noted, Colorado’s law doesn’t regulate therapists’ speech based on its content. The law discriminates based on viewpoint, permitting expressions of acceptance and support for a client’s self-identity while forbidding expressions that attempt to change it.

Under 1995’s Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, viewpoint discrimination is an “egregious form” of content regulation. Governments must “nearly always abstain” from it. The court remanded the Colorado case back to the 10th Circuit to resolve the case under this standard.

Jackson’s dissent: Medical treatment, not speech

Jackson’s solo dissent emphasizes that states have long enjoyed broad power to regulate how licensed medical professionals treat patients. To Jackson, the First Amendment should not interfere simply because a treatment is applied through words rather than instruments.

The court’s 2018 NIFLA decision, she argues, distinguished between speech restricted “as speech” and speech restricted “incidentally” as part of a medical treatment the state is otherwise entitled to regulate. According to Jackson, the majority arbitrarily collapses that distinction simply because the treatment is delivered orally. A talk therapy session and a drug infusion are both medical treatments, she argues, and the analysis should not turn on whether the provider uses a syringe or a sentence.

Jackson’s dissent also raises difficult line-drawing problems, such as the validity of less controversial potential prohibitions, such as those on encouraging a patient to smoke or to take their own life.

Implications are broader, narrower than most believe

First, only talk therapy is implicated.

The holding is narrow in this sense. It leaves room for policymakers still hoping to limit the practice of conversion therapy. Because Chiles challenged the statute only as applied to her, the majority’s analysis does not invalidate conversion therapy bans wholesale – neither Colorado’s nor those of more than 20 other states – but applies only to the extent they ban conversion talk therapy.

State legislatures can define conversion therapy a bit more narrowly, for example, by prohibiting the physical and more coercive techniques that initially gave rise to these bans. States can then leave the regulation of talk therapy to other legal and professional mechanisms, such as malpractice or enforcement of professional ethics.

Second, the standard of scrutiny that the lower court must now apply is not strict scrutiny; it is more demanding. Strict scrutiny is a legal test that validates a law if it is “narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest.” Contrary to what some legal commentators have implied, Gorsuch never directs the lower court to use strict scrutiny.

The opinion emphasizes that the law doesn’t just discriminate against certain types of content – a trigger for strict scrutiny; it discriminates based on viewpoint. The strict scrutiny standard is demanding, but laws sometimes survive it. Viewpoint discrimination, on the other hand, is subject to a near-absolute prohibition: Governments must “nearly always abstain” from it. This language is stronger and more categorical than that for strict scrutiny. The implication is that the law should certainly be invalidated as applied to talk therapy.

Not a clear win for conservatives

Finally, the holding is a double-edged sword for conservatives with traditional views of gender identity. And for those discouraged by the outcome, seeing it only as a victory for religious conservatives, the holding’s logic offers a silver lining.

Kagan’s concurrence makes explicit that a “mirror image” law – one barring talk therapy that affirms gender identity – would raise the same constitutional problems.

Dr. John Fryer revolutionized mental health care by speaking publicly about being gay at a 1972 conference of psychiatrists. This NBC News report covers Fryer’s legacy.

The majority makes a similar point. As late as the 1970s, the American Psychiatric Association still classified homosexuality as a mental disorder. Under Colorado’s position, a law from that era prohibiting counselors from affirming gay clients’ identities would have been constitutionally sound.

Today, more than 20 states have moved to restrict gender-affirming care, and the federal government is pressuring state medical boards to adopt skeptical positions on gender transition. It’s not implausible that a legislature would attempt to ban gender-affirming, talk-based therapies. If and when conservative policymakers attempt that move, Chiles will be a formidable obstacle.

Read more of our stories about Colorado.

The Conversation

Kevin Cope does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Supreme Court ruling on Colorado conversion therapy case is not a clear win for conservatives – https://theconversation.com/supreme-court-ruling-on-colorado-conversion-therapy-case-is-not-a-clear-win-for-conservatives-279820

The two lives of Chuck Norris

Source: The Conversation – USA (2) – By Ben Pettis, Assistant Professor of Rhetoric and Communication Studies, University of Richmond

Actor and martial artist Chuck Norris died on March 19, 2026, at the age of 86. Jean-Jacques Bernier/Gamma-Rapho via Getty Images

“Chuck Norris doesn’t do push-ups. He simply pushes the world down.”

“Chuck Norris counted to infinity – twice.”

“Chuck Norris once strangled someone – with a cordless phone”

In the late 2000s and early 2010s, Chuck Norris, the 1980s action star, became a tongue-in-cheek model of toughness and masculinity in viral internet memes known as “Chuck Norris Facts.”

Although these memes waned in popularity, they never fully fizzled out. One Facebook group has over 400,000 members, many of whom regularly contribute new jokes about the “Walker, Texas Ranger” star.

But when news of Norris’ death broke on March 19, 2026, those memes returned, and memories resurfaced of their glory days.

In fact, they almost overshadowed remembrances of the movie star’s life.

What does it mean that many memories of Norris are more connected to a meme than his actual life and career? What gets left behind when a person becomes a digital object that we send over the internet? And what can memes tell us about how everyday people relate to celebrities – and to one another?

In the case of Norris, the actor and martial artist’s death forced some people to reconcile the memes with the man.

Macho man

Memes aren’t just memes. They might seem like trivial jokes, but my research has shown that they can shape how people understand and debate bigger cultural questions.

For example, Chuck Norris memes gave people a way to critique over-the-top ideas of masculinity and the pressure to live up to them. Whether it was memes crowing about his ability to slam a revolving door or kill two stones with one bird, only Norris, who stood at the apex of manliness, could pull off such impossible feats.

Other times, Norris’ “memeified” macho persona was deployed to advance misogyny: “Chuck Norris told a woman to CALM DOWN, and she did.” (As internet scholar Whitney Phillips explains, memes and humor have always been close relatives of the more toxic parts of online culture.)

Of course, Norris is hardly the only celebrity to have become memeified, and other celebrity memes routinely tap into the cultural zeitgeist.

When pop star Miley Cyrus released the music video for her song “Wrecking Ball” in 2013, it was quickly parodied and become the subject of countless memes. Many parodied her overt sexuality by swapping her out for someone decidedly less sexy on the wrecking ball. Or they spoofed her performance by playing the song over videos of other forms of destruction.

The man, the myth, the legend

Missing from all the meme nostalgia: Who was the real Chuck Norris?

After Norris’ death, social media users pointed to his past homophobic comments, in which he condemned the Boy Scouts of America’s – now Scouting America – inclusion of gay youth and leaders. There were his right-wing politics, including his friendships with Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush and his 2017 endorsement of Alabama U.S. Senate candidate Roy Moore – who, as the state’s chief judge, had ordered Alabama probate judges not to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples even after same-sex marriage had been legalized nationwide.

If those views and actions conflict with your own values, can you still laugh at Chuck Norris memes?

I certainly think so. Memes are special because there isn’t ever one fixed definition of what they mean, and the humor of a Chuck Norris meme can land even if you know nothing about his real life and career.

At the same time, in life and in death, the meme of Norris will always be connected to the person. The past few weeks have certainly brought these two versions of Norris into contact with one another. It’s up to everyone else to decide which version they remember most.

Democratizing stardom

For me, one of the most interesting aspects of memes is that stardom can happen from the ground up. Regular people decide what a meme is. Fame is no longer largely determined by film studios and mainstream media outlets.

The “Numa Numa Guy” – Gary Brolsma – became a meme after his 2003 video went viral. The “Success Kid” – Sammy Griner – turned into a meme thanks to a photo of him as a toddler clenching his fist in a display of satisfaction.

Why did these people become memes, but countless other YouTubers or kids making funny poses failed to launch? That’s just the unpredictability of the internet and the messiness of online culture.

Memes of existing celebrities also reflect this broader shift in control. No matter how much a studio tries to manage a star’s image, a meme can be created that takes on a life of its own.

Take, for example, Keanu Reeves, who was memeified after a photo of the actor sullenly eating a sandwich went viral. The meme began as a paparazzi photo but took off when everyday people photoshopped Reeves into ridiculous scenarios.

But whether they’re everyday people or famous celebrities, there’s a darker side to reducing people to pixelated, repurposed images: Over time, it can be incredibly difficult to separate the real person from the meme.

Laina Morris, for instance, has tried to move on from the image of her grinning, bug-eyed face that became a popular meme portraying her as an overly protective and clingy girlfriend.

People magazine profiled Morris for an article headlined “Overly Attached Girlfriend Gets Honest About Becoming a Meme,” which explored what it’s like to be constantly recognized as “that girl from that meme.”

Yet the fact that the publication still used “Overly Attached Girlfriend” in its headline shows just how difficult – or even impossible – it is to sever oneself from internet fame.

Chuck Norris, perhaps more than anyone, knew that all too well.

The Conversation

Ben Pettis does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. The two lives of Chuck Norris – https://theconversation.com/the-two-lives-of-chuck-norris-279430

The costume maker who convinced Hersheypark to embrace candy mascots and ‘chocolatize’ their old-timey theme park

Source: The Conversation – USA (2) – By John Haddad, Professor of American Studies, Penn State

The park, with its name originally two words, Hershey Park, opened in the early 1900s when Milton Hershey built it for his chocolate factory workers and their families. Mitchell Layton/Getty Images

A theme park has to have an identity. If you want to know the two things that Hersheypark does especially well, just approach the entrance.

There you will meet a friendly candy mascot – perhaps a Hershey bar, Reese’s Cup or Jolly Rancher. Soon thereafter, you will encounter Candymonium, one of the park’s newest colossal roller coasters. These marvels of engineering elevate riders as high as 210 feet (64 meters), send them through dizzying loops and corkscrews and propel them at speeds as high as 76 mph (122 kilometers per hour).

If you were to reduce the park’s formula for success to basic math, it would look like this: candy theme + thrill rides = fun.

It wasn’t always like this. Hersheypark became a theme park in 1973. If you had visited that year, no 7-foot Hershey bar would have greeted you. Instead, you would have experienced England during the reign of Queen Elizabeth, petted farm animals and watched a blacksmith bend metal into a horseshoe inside a barn.

And the only major roller coaster back then, the wooden Comet, had made its debut way back in 1946 and was hardly a marvel of modern engineering.

As a professor of American studies at Penn State Harrisburg who recently wrote a book on Hersheypark, I was surprised to learn in my research that the park has undergone a complete transformation since the 1970s.

An amusement park in decline

Hershey Park dates back to the early 1900s, when company founder Milton Hershey built it as a recreational venue for his chocolate factory workers and their families. The name was changed to Hersheypark, one word, in 1973.

Over the years, it evolved into a major amusement park that thrived in the 1940s and 1950s. On summer days, residents of Hershey and nearby towns would flock to the park to enjoy a day of picnics, carnival rides, band concerts, swimming and dancing. Looking back with nostalgia, many later referred to those decades as the golden era.

It was in the 1960s that the park first encountered problems. The rides had become old and outdated, and there were acts of vandalism. Many families stopped coming. One Hershey executive called it “an iron park with a bunch of clanging rides.”

In 1971, Hershey Estates, which owned the park, faced a momentous decision: renovate the park or close it forever. It chose the former.

Black-and-white photo of girl and boy standing in front of whirling amusement ride
Kids wait their turn for the carousel at Hershey Park circa 1965.
David Strickler/FPG/Hulton Archive via Getty Images

Disney raises the bar

Renovating required more than minor touch-ups. That was because the amusement park industry was evolving, thanks to Walt Disney. Actually, “evolving” does not capture the speed and magnitude of the change.

In 1955, Disneyland exploded on the scene as the nation’s first theme park. Theme parks differ from the old amusement parks in several ways. Enclosed behind a barrier, a theme park is immaculately clean and features fancy landscaping and roving mascots who pose for photos and spread positive vibes. The price of admission grants visitors access to all rides and attractions, which are, of course, themed.

Disneyland’s massive popularity sparked a theme park-building craze across the country in the 1960s that put pressure on traditional amusement parks, like Hershey Park, which suddenly seemed old-fashioned and behind the times.

In 1971, Hershey Estates hired the top firm in theme park design, Randall Duell and Associates, to convert Hershey Park into a Disneyland of the Northeast. They enclosed the park in fencing, charged a single price for admission and themed the whole place.

But what theme would work best? The answer seems like a no-brainer: Hershey’s famous candy brands, of course. But the brands were the property of Hershey Foods, which was separate from Hershey Estates. Hershey Foods, viewing Hersheypark as new and untested, did not want to risk visitors associating its brands with what could be a failing theme park.

Designers opted instead for a historical theme.

Adults and children on and around an amusement ride called 'Mini Comet'
The Mini Comet kiddie roller coaster at Hersheypark circa 1976-1978.
Maryann Brunner, CC BY-SA

A quaint makeover

If you were to visit Hersheypark in the 1970s, you would be taken back in time to experience Tudor England, the German Rhineland from the 18th century, the agrarian culture of the Pennsylvania Dutch, small-town America of yesteryear and the coal mining districts of Pennsylvania’s past.

The strategy was twofold. The local population could relish seeing their own history recreated, from the early migrations from Europe to the present day. At the same time, tourists from New York, Philadelphia, Washington and Baltimore could enjoy escaping their hectic urban lifestyles by traveling back to what was portrayed as simpler times.

In 1974, the park added mascots. It took a page out of Disney’s playbook and introduced the Furry Tales, a trio of woodland animals: Dutch the bear, Chip the chipmunk and Violet the skunk. The Furry Tales were Hersheypark’s answer to Mickey and Minnie Mouse and Donald Duck.

The person hired to fabricate these cute animal costumes was Bill Scollon. One day, Scollon asked Bruce McKinney, a Hershey executive, if he had considered candy-themed characters. After McKinney explained the unfortunate roadblock with Hershey Foods, Scollon had a hunch. When he acted on it, he would change Hersheypark forever.

Man in blue T-shirt and sunglasses hugs a chocolate bar mascot
In the early 1970s, Hershey Park changed its name to Hersheypark and became a one-price admission theme park.
Najlah Feanny/Corbis via Getty Images

Chocolatizing the park

Scollon suspected that Hershey Foods had failed to recognize the magic of product characters because they could not see and touch one. So he constructed a Reese’s Peanut Butter Cup suit, which he showed to McKinney. Impressed, McKinney escorted Scollon, in costume, to places where Hershey Foods executives would be. They too were delighted, and their resistance promptly melted away.

Once product characters strolled into the park in 1974, the floodgates opened. “We started to chocolatize Hersheypark,” McKinney recalled. “We Hersheyized everything.”

Hersheypark now had chocolate theming, but not thrill rides. Randall Duell’s firm discouraged parks from investing in costly roller coasters that appealed to teenagers but not other age demographics. Hersheypark reversed course in 1976, and this time McKinney was the catalyst.

That year, he was flipping through an industry trade journal when he happened upon a photograph of the Revolution, the first looping roller coaster of the modern era, under construction in West Germany. Later that year, the Revolution attracted huge crowds when it opened in Magic Mountain, a California theme park.

“I harbored all of these feelings,” McKinney recalled, “of what it would be like to have that thing in Hershey.”

The price tag was steep: US$3 million, which was a staggering amount at the time. But McKinney secured his prize. Hersheypark commissioned the company responsible for the Revolution to design a similar looping coaster for Hershey. In 1977, visitors streamed into Hersheypark all summer to experience the sensational sooperdooperLooper – and many then purchased an “I survived” T-shirt.

This spectacular success kindled a desire in Hersheypark officials to invest heavily in thrill rides. Today, the skyline in Hershey is dominated by roller coasters

What happened to those 1970s attractions? The Furry Tales coexisted with candy characters for about a decade before quietly vanishing in the 1980s. As for the history-themed areas, the thrill rides effectively pushed them to the background. Though some have been torn down and replaced by new and more exciting attractions, others have survived. That is because Hersheypark makes a conscious effort to preserve its colorful past. So if you look carefully as you stroll about the park, you will still witness remnants of this bygone era.

Read more of our stories about Philadelphia and Pennsylvania, or sign up for our Philadelphia newsletter on Substack.

The Conversation

John Haddad does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. The costume maker who convinced Hersheypark to embrace candy mascots and ‘chocolatize’ their old-timey theme park – https://theconversation.com/the-costume-maker-who-convinced-hersheypark-to-embrace-candy-mascots-and-chocolatize-their-old-timey-theme-park-269780

Iran’s president appeals to Americans − but does his office still hold any real power?

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Roxane Razavi, Visiting scholar in contemporary Middle Eastern history, Princeton University

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian attends the Quds Day march in Tehran on March 13, 2026. Hassan Ghaedi/Anadolu via Getty Images

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian penned an open letter to “the people of the United States” on April 1, 2026, in which he implored Americans to “look beyond” misinformation that portrayed Iran as a threat to the world.

It was, perhaps, his most prominent intervention during the current conflict. Despite being the president of a country in the midst of crisis, Pezeshkian hasn’t had the highest of war profiles.

Criticized by conservatives at home for his conciliatory tone, the reformist politician has also been sidelined by Iran’s adversaries. Western media initially appeared more interested in the musings of Pezeshkian’s son, Yousef. President Donald Trump has barely mentioned Pezeshkian, other than in an oblique social media post on April 1 in which he claimed “Iran’s new regime president” had asked the U.S. for a ceasefire – something denied by Iran.

International attention has instead largely centered on the role of Iran’s supreme leader. First, it was about who would succeed Ali Khamenei after his killing in the first strikes of the war, and then what was known about his successor and son, Mojtaba Khamenei.

As a researcher of contemporary Iranian politics, I think this focus on the supreme leader over the president inadvertently confirms a trend in Iran that has been happening for years: the cementing of a political structure that increasingly resembles a centralized dictatorship.

A man clasps his hands while sat in front of a photo of three men.
Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian records a video message on March 20, 2026.
AA Video/Anadolu via Getty Images

An uneasy balance

The concentration of power around one figure sits uneasily with one of the founding impulses of the 1979 revolution that ushered in the Islamic Republic. A wide spectrum of revolutionary actors – Islamists, leftists and secular nationalists – were involved in the ousting of the shah. But they shared at least one principle: the rejection of monarchy.

The idea that one generation could not determine the political future of the next was precisely what many revolutionaries, despite their internal differences, had fought against.

As such, the system that initially emerged in 1979 was neither a pure theocracy nor a conventional republic. The supreme leader would exercise ultimate religious and political authority, and an elected president was to embody the republican dimension of the state. This second part gave institutional form to the revolutionary promise that people, through elections, would periodically renew political authority.

In the first decade after the revolution, this balance functioned, albeit in a fragile and conflictual manner.

The authority of Ruhollah Khomeini, the Islamic Republic’s first supreme leader, coexisted with the presidency – most notably during the brief presidency of Abolhassan Bani Sadr. Elected in 1980, Bani Sadr quickly came into conflict with clerical factions over the direction of the revolution and the conduct of the Iran-Iraq war.

Accused of political incompetence, Bani Sadr was impeached by parliament in 1981 and subsequently fled into exile.

A man in glasses stands behind microphones
Iran’s first post-revolution president, Abolhassan Bani Sadr, in exile in France in 1981.
Marc Bulka/Gamma-Rapho via Getty Images

The presidency of his successor, Ali Khamenei, marked a period of relative alignment with the supreme leader. Operating under Khomeini’s authority, Khamenei operated less as an autonomous political force than as an instrument embedded within a broader clerical and revolutionary consensus.

The dynamic between president and supreme leader was further redefined by the 1989 constitutional revision following Khomeini’s death and the elevation of Khamenei from president to supreme leader. The post of prime minister was abolished, consolidating executive authority in the presidency. At the same time, the institutional and political supremacy of the supreme leader was strengthened.

The weakening presidency

The presidency of Mohammad Khatami, who was elected in 1997, demonstrated that the office could still function as a significant locus of power. As Khatami’s tenure showed, presidents were still able to shape public discourse and policy agendas, particularly in areas such as cultural policy, foreign relations and economic management.

But a major turning point in the power of the office occurred in 2009 with the contested reelection of the hard-liner president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, amid widespread allegations of electoral fraud.

It led to mass demonstrations that became known as the “Green Movement.” The state responded with the repression of protesters, followed by a consolidation of the security apparatus – particularly the expanding influence of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps around the supreme leader.

At the same time, it marked the beginning of Ahmadinejad’s falling out of favor. His populist rhetoric and attempts to build an independent political base led to confrontations with clerical authorities in the early 2010s. It also exposed the regime’s intolerance for even a relatively autonomous presidency.

It contributed to a power struggle between Ahmadinejad and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei that became public in 2011 when the then-president sought to dismiss Intelligence Minister Heydar Moslehi – only to be overruled by Khamanei.

Ahmadinejad was subsequently excluded from the 2017 presidential race by the Guardian Council, a body handpicked by the supreme leader. In so doing, Khamenei made it clear that while the office of the presidency could remain, it would cease to function as an independent center of decision-making and power.

Since then, presidents have continued to be elected, but their capacity to reshape the political order has been diminished sharply.

Two women hold posters with a man's face on it.
Supporters of hard-line Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
Salah Malkawi/Getty Images

The presidency of Hassan Rouhani briefly appeared to be an exception. His election in 2013, and the subsequent negotiation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, generated both domestic expectations and significant international attention.

Yet the durability of the agreement remained contingent on decisions taken beyond the presidency, both internationally and domestically. Its eventual unraveling during the first Trump administration confirmed suspicions among Iranian hard-liners around the supreme leader that reform, an independent power center in the presidency and diplomacy with the U.S. had been a mistake.

With even the limited form of democratic expression as embodied through an elected president suppressed, political disengagement has followed. Although voter turnout remained significant in the years immediately following 2009, a longer-term trend has seen people give up faith in elective politics in Iran. In the last election, held in 2024, just 39.9% of Iranians turned out to vote.

Consolidation of power

This diminishing of the role of the presidency and political legitimacy forms the background to any questions of succession now. But by reducing the political future of the country to the identity of future supreme leaders, observers risk normalizing the transformation of what was historically a contested and hybrid political system into one defined by a single office.

The bloody suppression of the January 2026 protests, the constraints imposed by wartime conditions and the increasing marginalization of elective institutions have all contributed to weakening the presidency.

The fallout of the current war may, of course, see a reorganization of political institutions in Iran. But for now, when Pezeshkian seeks diplomacy with Americans, the pertinent question is: Does his office still matter?

The Conversation

Roxane Razavi receives funding from the EHESS (PhD funding).

ref. Iran’s president appeals to Americans − but does his office still hold any real power? – https://theconversation.com/irans-president-appeals-to-americans-but-does-his-office-still-hold-any-real-power-278705

An ancient oracle warned invading Persia would backfire – from Croesus to Trump, rulers have failed to listen

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Peter Edwell, Associate Professor in Ancient History, Macquarie University

Photo by Stefano Bianchetti/Corbis via Getty Images

Invasions of ancient Persia were always daunting tasks. They often led to disaster.

In the 6th and 5th centuries BCE, the Persian empire came to dominate a vast and varied geography with Iran at its heart.

Comprising modern Iran, Iraq, Turkey, the Persian Gulf and parts of other neighbouring countries, the Persian Empire was established and ruled by the Achaemenids. This powerful dynasty lasted all the way to about 330 BCE when Alexander the Great defeated its last ruler, Darius III.

But in the early days of this Achaemenid Persian expansion (546 BCE), the legendary King Croesus (from Lydia, in western Turkey) decided to challenge it.

Reputedly the richest man in the world, Croesus consulted the famed Oracle of Apollo at Delphi (in Greece). The oracle, according to ancient writer Herodotus, told Croesus:

that if he should send an army against the Persians he would destroy a great empire.

Croesus’ subsequent invasion and defeat by the Persian king, Cyrus, saw the destruction of his own empire. The oracle accurately foretold the outcome but not as Croesus had hoped.

Croesus wasn’t the last ruler to invade Persia and realise he’d bitten off more than he could chew.

From the 6th century BCE to the 4th century CE, Greeks and Romans invaded Persia multiple times. The risks were high, the logistics complicated.

In fact – as US President Donald Trump is now discovering – wars like these, in this part of the world, are a lot easier to start than they are to end.

Complex and high-risk

The vast resources and manpower of the Achaemenid empire, together with its varied geography, made any invasion of Persia complex and high-risk.

When Alexander the Great (also known as Alexander III of Macedon) invaded in 334 BCE, he led stunning military successes against the Persians over the next few years.

But by the time of his premature death in Babylon in 323 BCE, organisation of the vast territory he had conquered was a hodge-podge of short-term arrangements.

Over time, the memory of Alexander in the Iranian territories he conquered was one of contempt. The Persian territory he conquered couldn’t be held by his successors.

Around 70 years after Alexander’s death, a new dynasty emerged in Iran.

Known as the Arsacid Parthians, they would dominate much of the former Achaemenid territory for centuries.

The Arsacid Parthians became the key rivals of the Romans as they (the Romans) expanded further east from the 1st century BCE onwards.

The first invasion of the Parthian empire by the Romans ended in total disaster – for the Romans.

The Roman general Crassus invaded Parthian imperial territory in southern Turkey in 53 BCE. The Parthian army annihilated Crassus’ forces near the city of Carrhae. Around 20,000 Roman soldiers died (including Crassus and his son) and 10,000 were captured.

This disaster would live in the Roman memory for centuries.

‘A source of constant wars and great expense’

Even when Roman invasions of the Parthian empire in the 2nd century CE were successful, there was often a sting in the tail. The emperor Trajan invaded all the way to the Persian Gulf in 116/117 CE but couldn’t hold any of his gains.

Later in the 2nd century CE, Roman invasions of the Parthian empire did see territorial gains in Mesopotamia (southern Turkey).

But one contemporary Roman writer, Cassius Dio, thought these gains were more trouble than they were worth:

He [emperor Septimius Severus] used to declare that he had added a vast territory to the empire and had made it a bulwark of Syria. On the contrary, it is shown by the facts themselves that this conquest has been a source of constant wars and great expense to us.

From loss to ultimate humiliation

In the 3rd century CE, the Sasanian dynasty took control of Iran and Mesopotamia from the Parthians. The Sasanian Persians inflicted serious defeats on invading Roman armies in the centuries ahead.

The Roman emperor Gordian III died in battle against the Sasanians in 244 CE. He led a large-scale invasion of the Persian empire but died trying to attack the capital, Seleucia-Ctesiphon. His successor (Philip I) signed a humiliating peace treaty to ransom what was left of the army.

But the ultimate humiliations for Roman emperors were yet to come.

In 260 CE, the emperor Valerian was captured by the Persian king, Shapur I.

Legendary accounts claimed Valerian served as a footstool for Shapur when he mounted his horse.

Rock reliefs from the 3rd century depicting Valerian and Philip I in subjection to Shapur survive in Iran to this day.

Around a century later, the emperor Julian died while invading the Persian empire. Leading an army of 60,000 men, Julian suffered a heavy defeat and was killed north of the Persian capital, Seleucia-Ctesiphon.

The ensuing peace treaty saw Rome lose key territory and fortresses in northern Mesopotamia.

It would take more than a century for Rome to recover from this defeat.

Most ancient invasions of the Persian empire caused serious problems for those who prosecuted them.

The varied and sometimes harsh nature of the geography was an important factor. The national resolve and military preparedness were others.

While the current US-Israel war against Iran is different in many ways to ancient wars directed at Persia, the 3rd-century Sasanian rock reliefs are reminders of what can go wrong.

The Conversation

Peter Edwell receives funding from the Australian Research Council.

ref. An ancient oracle warned invading Persia would backfire – from Croesus to Trump, rulers have failed to listen – https://theconversation.com/an-ancient-oracle-warned-invading-persia-would-backfire-from-croesus-to-trump-rulers-have-failed-to-listen-279750

Where is transatlantic intelligence-sharing headed under the Trump administration?

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Hager Ben Jaffel, Docteure en relations internationales spécialisée dans la sociologie du renseignement et de la sécurité, Institut catholique de Lille (ICL)

Repeated threats to annex Greenland, controversial diplomatic statements, and, more broadly, the antagonistic stance of the American executive toward Europeans point to an unprecedented climate of distrust among transatlantic allies, of which the latest Davos forum provided a revealing example. But what about alliances between intelligence services?

Often perceived as domestic instruments of political power, intelligence services are, in fact, highly internationalised and enjoy significant autonomy in their dealings with foreign counterparts, though this can occasionally be disrupted by political interference.

A history of long-standing collaborations

Cooperation between intelligence services is not new. Some partnerships date back at least to the First World War and are often the result of agreements between services themselves rather than formal decisions by governments. Whether bilateral or multilateral, these alliances underpin a wide range of activities: liaison officers posted abroad, listening stations, participation in international conferences, and routine exchanges of information.

International cooperation built on common ground and trust

Research in the social sciences has shown how, over time, a dense network of relationships has developed around shared interests. Counterterrorism, nuclear non-proliferation and other perceived imminent threats have provided strong justification for cooperation, including the exchange of data on individuals, organizations or states considered “dangerous.” The widely held belief that sharing information helps prevent attacks has also encouraged the expansion of surveillance mechanisms – often at the expense of robust democratic oversight.

One example is the many partnerships between the National Security Agency (NSA) and several European counterparts. These collaborations have enabled the pooling of advanced technologies – such as artificial intelligence and algorithmic analysis – to collect and process large volumes of private communications. This work also depends on explicit alliances between intelligence agencies and major tech companies, which have become key intermediaries that, willingly or not, make their users’ data available to intelligence services.

The solidarity and trust on display should not obscure the fact that international cooperation remains a space marked by strong rivalries. Services compete to access information, shape priorities and secure an advantageous position in relationships where resources – financial, human, or technical – are unevenly distributed. In this context, espionage between services and other disloyal practices are also part of the game.

These dynamics suggest that intelligence alliances follow a logic of their own rather than unwavering loyalty to political authority. It is in this context that the Danish military intelligence service monitored the communications of several European political leaders on behalf of the NSA. Above all, because they possess in-depth knowledge of the threats facing the world, intelligence services are able to position themselves at the heart of security decision-making, making political leaders dependent on their expertise.

Continuity despite political interference

That said, these alliances are not immune to political pressures. Disputes between intelligence services and political leaders have always existed, but the openly hostile attitude of the “reactionary internationale” embodied by the Trump administration and its MAGA supporters has raised concerns about a possible breakdown – or at least a significant weakening of cooperation.

Faced with an unfavourable political context, they are often able to adjust and even turn the situation to their advantage.

Several European intelligence services have thus strengthened their cooperation, even raising the possibility of creating a European Five Eyes – in reference to the Anglosphere intelligence alliance linking Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States to countries in Europe and Asia.

Others have specifically developed units to better anticipate the unpredictability of the American executive, with tangible effects: staffing in the unit dealing with the United States within France’s DGSE has increased, and the budgets of several European intelligence services are set to rise, benefiting from broader increases in defence spending.

More broadly, history shows that ties between services remain strong even when governments hold divergent positions. In the early 2000s, exchanges between the DGSE and the CIA continued despite disagreements over the war in Iraq.

A more recent example is Brexit, which did not lead to any major rupture in relations between the British police and their European counterparts, who continue to facilitate the flow of intelligence.

As in any relationship, signs of caution, distrust, or even ambivalence can emerge. For example, the British and Danish intelligence services have indicated that they are limiting – but not completely halting – their exchanges with their American counterparts, concerned about the legal implications and, more broadly, the politicisation of US intelligence. Irritated by repeated provocations over Greenland, the Danish military intelligence service went so far as to designate the United States as a national security threat, alongside China and Russia.

Nonetheless, it would be incorrect to assume that, under more normal circumstances, intelligence sharing would happen without any restrictions. Services do not share all their secrets, all the time, with everyone. On the contrary, the restraint shown by some reflects a routine asymmetry in exchanges that persists and can even be heightened during periods of turbulence.

Signs of continuity are evident, underscoring a key reality: intelligence primarily falls under the purview of career professionals, not politicians. Earlier this year, the Davos forum hosted European and Anglo-American intelligence chiefs, including the CIA, in a key meeting to preserve ties with the “Old Continent”.

Trump and the ‘deep state:‘ a love-hate relationship

Concerns among European services are partly linked to Donald Trump’s stated desire to dismantle the “deep state.” While he did follow through on some threats by dismissing personnel within intelligence agencies, these institutions have neither disappeared nor ceased to function. In practice, the executive branch remains dependent on them.

The appointment of controversial figures to lead several agencies, instead of career officials, reflects an effort to align leadership more closely with political and ideological priorities. Current international developments show that intelligence services remain essential to the implementation of foreign policy. Long criticised, the CIA now appears to have returned to favour with the White House, taking advantage of the opportunities offered by the fight against drug trafficking and the conflict in Iran to reaffirm its relevance and legitimacy to political power.

Taken together, these developments highlight the complexity of the relationship between intelligence services and political power – one shaped by both distance and proximity.


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The Conversation

Hager Ben Jaffel ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.

ref. Where is transatlantic intelligence-sharing headed under the Trump administration? – https://theconversation.com/where-is-transatlantic-intelligence-sharing-headed-under-the-trump-administration-279135

Les médias français sont-ils racistes ?

Source: The Conversation – in French – By Pascale Colisson, chercheure en science de l’information et de la communication, IPJ, associée à la chaire management diversités et cohésion sociale, Université Paris Dauphine – PSL

Allusion au fait que l’« Homo Sapiens descend des singes », au « chef de tribu », au « mâle dominant » : sur la chaîne Cnews, Bally Bagayoko, nouveau maire de Saint-Denis, en Seine-Saint-Denis, a été victime de propos racistes. Ce dernier appelle à un grand « rassemblement citoyen » contre le racisme et les discriminations samedi 4 avril. Mais au-delà de ces attaques récentes, il est essentiel d’interroger les stéréotypes qui imprègnent la culture médiatique dominante.


Les propos tenus dans certains médias à l’encontre de maires noirs nouvellement élus provoquent réactions et indignations sélectives et interrogent la responsabilité des journalistes dans la perpétuation des stéréotypes racistes. Mais si certains propos véhiculés consciemment par une parole d’extrême droite cristallisent le débat, cela ne doit pas occulter le fait que ces biais racistes s’invitent depuis toujours, sous une forme plus ou moins consciente, dans les productions médiatiques.

Selon le sociologue Samuel Bouron, l’extrême droite diffuse ses idées en jouant sur la culture du buzz et la captation des affects, mais aussi sur les contraintes journalistiques en détournant leurs normes. Une stratégie portée par la recherche de l’audience fondée sur l’économie de l’attention et la surmédiatisation de certains faits, en particulier les faits divers contribuant à la fabrique de paniques morales, ce que le sociologue britannique Stanley Cohen définit par « une réaction collective disproportionnée à des pratiques culturelles ou personnelles en général minoritaires, considérées comme “déviantes” ou néfastes pour la société ».

Les stéréotypes, constante de la production médiatique

Nombreux sont les rapports, études et travaux de recherche qui montrent comment les stéréotypes liés à l’origine, la couleur de peau, la religion, se croisant parfois avec le lieu de résidence, en particulier les banlieues, imprègnent de façon plus ou moins consciente et conscientisée les pratiques professionnelles. La sociologie du journalisme montre ainsi comment les acteurs et actrices du métier partagent une identité aux contours flous, marquée par des représentations sociales très ancrées, très souvent stéréotypées, et assez peu conformes à la réalité.

Dès 2000, des travaux sur la représentation des minorités dites visibles à la télévision sont réalisés, lesquels pointent la minorisation et la disqualification de ces minorités. C’est d’ailleurs à partir de 2000 que le CSA, ancêtre de l’Arcom, modifie le cahier des charges des télévisions publiques et les conventions des chaînes privées pour leur imposer de « prendre en considération, dans la représentation à l’antenne, la diversité des origines et des cultures de la communauté nationale ».

Par ailleurs, les chaînes publiques comme les chaînes privées doivent rendre un bilan annuel sur « la représentation des minorités », obligation étendue aux radios en 2005.

Pourtant, le baromètre de la diversité, publié tous les ans par le CSA puis par l’Arcom depuis 2012, signale que, sur la période 2013-2023, les personnes non blanches sont représentées en moyenne à hauteur de 15 %, mais dans les programmes d’information/magazine/documentaire, elles apparaissent deux fois plus souvent parmi celles ayant une attitude négative que parmi celles ayant une attitude neutre. Cette attitude négative relève souvent d’activités décrites comme marginales ou illégales.

Si, sur cette période, les personnes perçues comme noires étaient représentées en moyenne 1,5 fois plus souvent parmi celles ayant une attitude négative que parmi celles ayant une attitude neutre, on observe une recrudescence de leur représentation négative puisque, en 2023, elles étaient 4 fois plus souvent représentées parmi les personnes ayant une attitude négative que parmi les personnes ayant une attitude neutre.

Les Noirs ont un corps, les Blancs ont un cerveau

Les nombreux travaux de recherche dans le domaine du sport montrent de façon significative une récurrence des renvois aux dispositions naturelles et une dimension « animale » voire « sauvage » pour les athlètes de couleur, des qualités de stratèges, de tacticiens et d’éthique pour les athlètes blancs.‬

Dans un autre cadre, des travaux ont mis en lumière le positionnement médiatique de l’origine des personnes au prisme de l’égalité des sexes. Nacira Guénif-Souilamas a ainsi analysé le stéréotype de la « beurette » qui porte une injonction à l’émancipation, et donc d’intégration, avec en sous-texte les valeurs républicaines contre le machisme présupposé inhérent au « garçon arabe », perçu comme naturellement violent et prédateur et supposément opposé à l’égalité femme-homme.

Les traitements médiatiques de l’origine, de l’immigration ou encore de l’islam se rejoignent souvent au sein d’un même territoire, celui que l’on réduit au terme de « banlieue », une désignation très réductrice au regard de la multiplicité des situations économiques et sociales de ces grands ensembles urbains. Les « banlieues » concentrent ainsi une forme d’intersectionnalité des stéréotypes négatifs. Une réalité mise en lumière en particulier par l’analyse de la couverture médiatique de la banlieue par le « 20 heures » de France 2 réalisée par le sociologue Jérôme Berthaut en 2013.

Cela commence par la conférence de rédaction, puissant lieu de prescription des priorités éditoriales et des bonnes façons de faire du journalisme. Cela se poursuit par l’action sur le terrain où les contraintes qui pèsent sur les reporters les encouragent à opter pour des procédés de raccourcis qui favorisent, dès la phase de la collecte de l’information, la mobilisation, sous un mode non réflexif et relevant de la routine, de stéréotypes récurrents sur « les banlieues ». Ceci se poursuit au moment du choix final, dans la sélection des sources, des images gardées au montage, les commentaires et la validation de la hiérarchie.

Les travaux de Julie Sedel complètent l’analyse en relevant la place prépondérante donnée aux faits divers violents lorsque les médias traitent des quartiers défavorisés de banlieue :

« La montée d’un traitement “fait-diversier” des “banlieues”, qui s’est opéré dans les années 1990 dans la presse, constitue bien le symptôme d’une dépolitisation dans la mesure où est évacuée la dimension “sociale”, c’est-à-dire aussi, politique, conflictuelle, au profit d’un fétichisme des “faits” et, en particulier, des faits de délinquance », écrit-elle.

La composition des rédactions en question

D’un point de vue qualitatif, j’ai mené un travail de recherche sur la diversité dans les médias fondé sur des entretiens avec 40 jeunes journalistes travaillant dans tous types de médias, pour tenter d’éclairer le débat sur trois dimensions : 1) Comment le fait de ne pas se reconnaître dans le groupe dominant affecte la façon dont on se positionne dans une rédaction, à la fois de façon personnelle et professionnelle ; 2) Quels sont les freins qui limitent les personnes, dites de la diversité, dans le fait d’être pleinement reconnues pour ce qu’elles sont, et pleinement légitimes à exercer le métier de journaliste ; 3) Quelles sont leurs marges de manœuvre en matière de transformation organisationnelle et de production de l’information.

Ces jeunes journalistes expriment toutes et tous le fait de vivre l’expérience minoritaire :

« Et comme d’habitude, je comptais en arrivant le nombre de personnes noires dans la rédaction, et j’étais toujours la seule, systématiquement la seule. »

Bien souvent, la prise en compte de la diversité ethno-raciale reste un impensé : il s’agit moins d’une volonté d’exclusion que d’une absence de prise en considération de la question soulevée :

« Bien sûr, on est ouverts, on est tous bienveillants, on n’est pas du tout racistes. Après les journalistes, ils sont tous blancs, les seuls Arabes, ils sont aux réseaux sociaux et les seuls Noirs, ils font le ménage. Mais on va t’expliquer que c’est parce qu’on n’a pas les profils et que, de toute façon, comme on ne voit pas les couleurs, quand on recrute, on ne fait pas attention. Bah oui, mais quand on ne voit pas les couleurs, on ne recrute que des gens blancs. »

Plusieurs témoignages évoquent des situations de racisme à la suite de certains faits d’actualité, en particulier ceux qui relèvent d’attentats, de terrorisme et d’islam. S’instaure un présupposé identitaire de leurs sympathies ou affinités, et un procès en militantisme récurrent dès qu’ils et elles tentent de proposer un autre récit médiatique.

Une différence d’appréciation qui se cristallise particulièrement sur certains sujets de société vus comme clivants, comme ceux de l’origine, de l’islam et du voile :

« Le directeur du web (d’une chaîne de télévision nationale) vient nous voir et nous dit : “Ah, super votre émission ! mais ce serait bien de montrer comment les femmes sont soumises, comment elles sont obligées de porter le voile.” Et on lui explique que notre sujet, c’était une petite femme de 1,60 m, voilée, qui prend des repris de justice pour les insérer socialement en leur faisant faire des maraudes, de l’aide humanitaire, etc. Et il fait comprendre un peu plus directement qu’il aimerait avoir ce sujet-là, sur les femmes voilées soumises, qui correspond à son imaginaire. »

Le choix médiatique de montrer à l’écran une femme portant le voile est si clivant qu’il peut générer une forme d’autocensure, anticipant sur les réactions présupposées de la hiérarchie :

« Pour le JT, moi, je n’ai jamais filmé une femme voilée. Je le savais, avec des collègues, qu’au montage, ça ne passait pas. Donc pourquoi aller filmer ? À part si tu fais un sujet sur l’islam. Mais, par exemple, un sujet sur l’informatique, une femme voilée qui est prof, tu ne peux pas aller la filmer. Ils ont tellement peur du téléspectateur ou de ce qu’ils projettent sur le téléspectateur, il y a un truc de l’ordre du : “On va se prendre 15 000 lettres, il va y avoir les tweets, machin, donc faisons simple.” »

Ces jeunes journalistes jouent de leur marge de manœuvre, même restreinte, pour semer des petites graines, en proposant un traitement de l’information, visant à sortir de l’assimilation de certaines personnes à certains sujets, qui relève souvent de stéréotypes très ancrés dans la profession :

« Pour le premier tour de l’élection présidentielle, j’ai recueilli des témoignages d’électeurs ou d’abstentionnistes et il y avait madame Martin, il y avait monsieur Sekou, éboueur à Pantin, qui a la nationalité française depuis quinze ans et pour qui le vote, c’est super important, il y avait une femme d’origine maghrébine, une jeune femme blanche. Mon objectif, c’est d’essayer d’aller vers des profils les plus différents possibles pour des sujets de monsieur et madame Tout-le-Monde. »

On voit à quel point la question du racisme et des stéréotypes dans les médias relève de causes multifactorielles, qui participent à la perpétuation d’un modèle dominant des récits. Le chemin est encore long et il commence par le fait de sortir d’une forme de déni, à tous les niveaux de l’organisation. Le mot de la fin sera celui d’un jeune journaliste :

« Je ne pense pas que le fait d’être d’autres origines ou d’avoir une histoire différente permette d’être un meilleur journaliste. Cela permet d’avoir un regard différent, une parole différente, ça oui. Je ne dis pas que quelqu’un qui a toujours vécu en milieu aisé, blanc, aseptisé, et d’une culture en particulier, ferait un moins bon journaliste, mais il aura un regard différent. En fait, je pense qu’il faut tous les regards et toutes les expériences pour raconter toutes les histoires qui composent une société, pour raconter le monde de la manière la plus fidèle possible. »

The Conversation

Pascale Colisson ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.

ref. Les médias français sont-ils racistes ? – https://theconversation.com/les-medias-francais-sont-ils-racistes-279934