Category: The Conversation – USA

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Tinashe Mushakavanhu, Research Associate, University of Oxford

In southern Africa townships were built as segregated urban zones for black people. They were created under colonial and white minority rule policies that controlled movement, confined opportunity, and kept people apart.

I grew up in a different historic black township in Zimbabwe, but Mbare was the first of its kind. It holds a unique place in the nation’s imagination.

Mbare was originally named Harare. But in 1982 that name was reassigned to the capital city that houses it. In its storied past, it was once the heartbeat of black urban life. At its centre is Rufaro Stadium, where Bob Marley and the Wailers famously performed at Zimbabwe’s independence celebrations.

The township was a hub of cultural energy, sports, and political activism, and the community beer hall served as a vital gathering point. Today, many of these beer halls stand derelict.

These once-thriving communal spaces reflect a broader neglect of civic infrastructure in post-independence Zimbabwe. Yet out of these ruins, new life is taking shape.

One of the most influential figures in Zimbabwe’s artist-run spaces movement, Moffat Takadiwa, has transformed one of these former beer halls into the Mbare Art Space. The dynamic arts hub reclaims the building’s original spirit of gathering, creativity and public engagement.

Operating under a long lease from the Harare City Council, this nonprofit initiative is part of a wider urban renewal and adaptive reuse project aimed at reimagining the city’s cultural infrastructure.

My ongoing work in archival research includes mapping and visiting historical and cultural spaces like this. Here Takadiwa saw the potential for not just studios and an exhibition venue, but also for dialogue and community regeneration.

Transforming spaces

Beer halls were established by British colonial authorities in Zimbabwe (then Rhodesia) as part of a strategy of social control over the African urban population. They were designed to regulate leisure, restrict political organising and generate revenue through the sale of alcohol. By centralising drinking in state-run facilities, colonial administrators aimed to monitor and contain African social life while profiting from it.

Situated in a repurposed colonial-era beer garden, Mbare Art Space turns a former site of segregation into a vibrant centre of artistic and communal revival. It redefines a legacy of constraint and control as one of creative freedom and empowerment. The place is now an artists’ haven with studios, office space, an exhibition hall and a digital hub.

Takadiwa’s vision is informed by global precedents, notably inspired by US artist Theaster Gates, whose work includes the transformation of a derelict bank on Chicago’s South Side. It became the Stony Island Arts Bank – a hybrid space for art, archives and community engagement.

Takadiwa opened Mbare Art Space in 2019 with a vision to support emerging artists through mentorship and access to resources. True to his artistic philosophy – resurrecting abandoned, often overlooked materials suffering the effects of urban decay – he revitalised a neglected site. Most of the artists working from this space follow his lead, upcycling and recycling found materials into compelling visual forms that speak to both history and possibility.

When I arrive, Takadiwa is on his way out, but offers me a quick tour of his studio, where works in progress for his upcoming participation in the São Paulo Biennale are taking shape.

Known for his lush, densely layered sculptures and tapestry-like works made from found objects – computer keyboards, bottle tops, toothbrushes, and toothpaste tubes – Takadiwa has garnered international acclaim. His works are collected by US rapper Jay-Z and major institutions like the Centre National d’Art Plastique in Paris, the European Parliament’s art collection in Brussels, and the National Gallery of Zimbabwe in Harare.

Collaboration

What Takadiwa is building is not just an arts centre – it’s a new model space rooted in history and responsive to the present. The site itself becomes an ongoing installation, activated by the artists, curators and community members who inhabit it.

Tafadzwa Chimbumu, the operations manager, takes over the tour, guiding me through the rest of the precinct. The site retains the bones of its beer hall architecture, but it bursts with new life. Colourful murals adorn the walls. Tents draped over smaller buildings animate the exposed brickwork.

Plans are underway to establish a library here, a resource where researchers and artists can engage with Zimbabwe’s under-documented art history. Much of this history is scattered across archives and unpublished dissertations, rather than in widely available books. The aim is to bring these materials together and make them more accessible to the public.

Mbare Art Space is also becoming an exciting hub for collaboration and education. Community workshops, for example, are led by resident artists. Local schools take part in art education initiatives. Through community outreach and educational programming, the centre is extending its impact beyond its immediate geography.

As it looks to the future, Mbare Art Space is focused on expanding its artist-in-residence programme, inviting both local and international artists to immerse themselves in the context of Mbare and Zimbabwe.

Ultimately, what the space offers is something intangible – a feeling, a memory, a vision of what is possible when history and imagination meet in a shared place.

Tinashe Mushakavanhu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Mbare Art Space: a colonial beer hall in Zimbabwe has become a vibrant arts centre – https://theconversation.com/mbare-art-space-a-colonial-beer-hall-in-zimbabwe-has-become-a-vibrant-arts-centre-256528

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Anette Hoffmann, Senior Researcher at the Institute for African Studies and Egyptology, University of Cologne

During the first world war (1914-1918) thousands of African men enlisted to fight for France and Britain were captured and held as prisoners in Germany. Their stories and songs were recorded and archived by German linguists, who often didn’t understand a thing they were saying.

Now a recent book called Knowing by Ear listens to these recordings alongside written sources, photographs and artworks to reveal the lives and political views of these colonised Africans from present-day Senegal, Somalia, Togo and Congo.

Anette Hoffmann is a historian whose research and curatorial work engages with historical sound archives. We asked her about her book.

How did these men come to be recorded?

About 450 recordings with African speakers were made with linguists of the so-called Royal Prussian Phonographic Commission. Their project was opportunistic. They made use of the presence of prisoners of war to further their research.

In many cases these researchers didn’t understand what was being said. The recordings were archived as language samples, yet most were never used, translated, or even listened to for decades.

The many wonderful translators I have worked with over the years are often the first listeners who actually understood what was being said by these men a century before.

What did they talk about?

The European prisoners the linguists recorded were often asked to tell the same Bible story (the parable of the prodigal son). But because of language barriers, African prisoners were often simply asked to speak, tell a story or sing a song.

We can hear some men repeating monotonous word lists or counting, but mostly they spoke of the war, of imprisonment and of the families they hadn’t seen for years.

In the process we hear speakers offer commentary. Senegalese prisoner Abdoulaye Niang, for example, calls Europe’s battlefields an abattoir for the soldiers from Africa. Others sang of the war of the whites, or speak of other forms of colonial exploitation.

When I began working on colonial-era sound archives about 20 years ago, I was stunned by what I heard from African speakers, especially the critique and the alternative versions of colonial history. Often aired during times of duress, such accounts seldom surface in written sources.

Clearly, many speakers felt safe to say things because they knew that researchers couldn’t understand them. The words and songs have travelled decades through time yet still sound fresh and provocative.

Can you highlight some of their stories?

The book is arranged around the speakers. Many of them fought in the French army in Europe after being conscripted or recruited in former French colonies, like Abdoulaye Niang. Other African men got caught up in the war and were interned as civilian prisoners, like Mohamed Nur from Somalia, who had lived in Germany from 1911. Joseph Ntwanumbi from South Africa was a stoker on a ship that had docked in Hamburg soon after the war started.

In chapter one Niang sings a song about the French army’s recruitment campaign in Dakar and also informs the linguists that the inmates of the camp in Wünsdorf, near Berlin, do not wish to be deported to another camp.

An archive search reveals he was later deported and also that Austrian anthropologists measured his body for racial studies.

His recorded voice speaking in Wolof travelled back home in 2024, as a sound installation I created for the Théodore Monod African Art Museum in Dakar.

Chapter two listens to Mohamed Nur from Somalia. In 1910 he went to Germany to work as a teacher to the children of performers in a so-called Völkerschau (an ethnic show; sometimes called a human zoo, where “primitive” cultures were displayed).

After refusing to perform on stage, he found himself stranded in Germany without a passport or money. He worked as a model for a German artist and later as a teacher of Somali at the University of Hamburg. Nur left a rich audio-visual trace in Germany, which speaks of the exploitation of men of colour in German academia as well as by artists. One of his songs comments on the poor treatment of travellers and gives a plea for more hospitality to strangers.

Stephan Bischoff, who grew up in a German mission station in Togo and was working in a shoe shop in Berlin when the war began, appears in the third chapter. His recordings criticise the practices of the Christian colonial evangelising mission. He recalls the destruction of an indigenous shrine in Ghana by German military in 1913.

Also in chapter three is Albert Kudjabo, who fought in the Belgian army before he was imprisoned in Germany. He mainly recorded drum language, a drummed code based on a tonal language from the Democratic Republic of Congo that German linguists were keen to study. He speaks of the massive socio-cultural changes that mining brought to his home region, which may have caused him to migrate.

Together these songs, stories and accounts speak of a practice of extracting knowledge in prisoner of war camps. But they offer insights and commentary far beyond the “example sentences” that the recordings were meant to be.

Why do these sound archives matter?

As sources of colonial history, the majority of the collections in European sound archives are still untapped, despite the growing scholarly and artistic interest in them in the last decade. This interest is led by decolonial approaches to archives and knowledge production.

Sound collections diversify what’s available as historical texts, they increase the variety of languages and genres that speak of the histories of colonisation. They present alternative accounts and interpretations of history to offer a more balanced view of the past.

Anette Hoffmann does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. African prisoners made sound recordings in German camps in WW1: this is what they had to say – https://theconversation.com/african-prisoners-made-sound-recordings-in-german-camps-in-ww1-this-is-what-they-had-to-say-254127

Source: – By Gaston Adoyo, Lecturer and researcher, Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology

Coconut trees are iconic plants found across the world’s tropical regions. They’re called “nature’s supermarket” or the “tree of life” in several cultures because every part of the coconut tree is used. Its leaves can be used to thatch homes, its heart can be eaten and its roots have medicinal uses.

The refreshing liquid found within a young green coconut is a highly prized component of the coconut palm. Coconuts are unique in the world of fruits because they have a large internal cavity filled with water. Other fruits typically store water within individual cells or pulp.

I’m a food scientist who has carried out research on the properties of coconuts.

All coconut palms produce water, though some, like tall varieties, will produce more than others, like dwarf varieties. The water is sourced from the trees’ immature, green coconuts. As the coconut matures, the developing white flesh absorbs the water, resulting in less liquid in a fully ripe brown coconut.

So, how is this water reservoir created, and what factors influence it?

A coconut’s structure

To better understand how coconut water is formed, it is essential to grasp its anatomical structure. The coconut fruit is classified as a drupe, meaning it has three layers: the exocarp (the smooth, green outer layer seen in unripe coconuts), the mesocarp (a fibrous husk beneath the exocarp), and the endocarp (the hard, woody inner shell that protects the white flesh inside).

Within the endocarp, there are two components: the flesh (endosperm, a soft, jelly-like material in immature coconut that hardens as it matures) and the clear coconut water that fills the cavity. This water is a nutritive fluid nourishing the developing seed and is formed naturally during the development of the coconut fruit.

The water is a filtered sap that’s drawn up from the roots and transported through the tree’s vascular system (its water and nutrient transport system), specifically the xylem tissue.

The coconut tree’s extensive root system, ranging from 1 to 5 metres deep, absorbs groundwater – with dissolved nutrients – from the surrounding soil. The absorbed water is then transported upwards through the trunk and branches and finally to the fruit.

The fruit retains this water, stored in the cavity of the coconut. The accumulated water, with its rich nutrients, provides food to the developing endosperm (white flesh).

Therefore, coconut water is neither rainwater nor seawater stored inside, but carefully filtered and nutrient-rich clear liquid formed by the tree itself.

What is coconut water made of?

About 95% of coconut water is simply water, making it an excellent hydrating fluid.

The rest of the water is made up of various components, which are useful for us too.

Minerals (like sodium, potassium, magnesium and calcium) nourish human nerves and muscles; proteins (amino acids and enzymes) can help in metabolism in both the tree and humans; sugars (fructose and glucose) are responsible for the light sweetness and there are trace amounts of vitamins (vitamin C and B vitamins).

Read more:
Is coconut water good for you? We asked five experts

Coconut water levels

Many factors can influence the amount and quality of water in a coconut.

The age of the coconut is a critical determining factor. Immature, green coconuts (six to eight months) are usually full of water: between 300 millilitres and 1 litre. Mature coconuts (12 months and older) have low water levels as the liquid is partially absorbed by the endosperm.

High rainfall encourages greater accumulation of water, while drought conditions reduce the amount of water that can be transported to the fruit.

Healthy soils packed with minerals lead to high-quality and nutrient-rich coconut water. Poor or salty soils, lacking in minerals that can travel up the coconut tree to the fruit, will lead to low quality water.

Finally, unhealthy or diseased trees produce smaller-sized coconuts with little water.

Protecting coconuts

Coconut trees and coconut water are important to tropical economies across south-east Asia, the Pacific, and the Caribbean Sea territories, as well as the coastlines of central America and Africa.

Conserving the trees and their environment is therefore essential.

Sustainable farming practices, like soil management – including soil testing and organic composting – should be implemented to maintain the proper nutrient profile, which results in high-quality coconut water.

Read more:
The end of coconut water? The world’s trendiest nut is under threat of species collapse

Additionally, protecting freshwater aquifers from saltwater intrusion along coastlines where coconuts grow is crucial for preserving the quality of this refreshing fluid. Drip irrigation and mulching can help maintain soil moisture for the required coconut water production.

Pest and disease management techniques (like intercropping coconuts with bananas or legumes), as well as integrated pest management, can contribute to healthy trees that produce large coconuts with ample water.

Gaston Adoyo does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. How do coconuts get their water? – https://theconversation.com/how-do-coconuts-get-their-water-252673

Source: – By Suleman Lazarus, Visiting Fellow, Mannheim Centre for Criminology, London School of Economics and Political Science

When people discuss online fraud, the focus is often on those who directly deceive victims. Little attention is given to those who enable these crimes by providing the digital infrastructure necessary for deception.

This digital infrastructure includes reliable access to electricity and the internet, as well as digital tools such as proxy servers, spoofing software, phishing kits and virtual private networks. Those involved must possess technical competencies in areas like web development, social engineering and systems maintenance, skills that are critical for sustaining fraudulent operations behind the scenes.

Research on cybercrime is expanding in west Africa, particularly studies of Nigeria and Ghana. But Cameroon is understudied. This gap in research has obscured a pervasive problem in Cameroon: website developers who create digital storefronts for fraudsters.

Pet scams are a particularly common type of online fraud perpetrated by Cameroonian fraudsters. This is a form of non-delivery fraud in which victims are tricked into paying for animals that do not exist. Typically, these fake pet websites target prospective pet buyers in countries like the US, Canada and Australia by advertising nonexistent pedigree puppies and kittens as well as exotic animals such as parrots, macaws and tortoises.

Rather than focusing on the fraudsters themselves, our study examined the infrastructure that enables this fraud to happen and the hidden networks of actors who make deception possible. Our research sheds light on a little-known group of enablers: website developers in anglophone Cameroon who knowingly build fake shopping websites.

Through interviews with 14 website developers engaged in this illicit trade, we explored the socio-economic and political forces that drive their participation.

Our findings showed that a mix of economic hardship, social norms and cultural beliefs drive fraud enablement in Cameroon. Our study highlights the need for a more nuanced understanding of cybercrime. The website developers in Cameroon do not fit the typical profile of a fraudster. They see themselves as skilled workers navigating a complex socio-political landscape where survival often comes before morality, given that Cameroon, under Paul Biya’s presidency of more than 40 years, has experienced widespread poverty, instability and an uncertain succession struggle.

To address fraud effectively, interventions must go beyond simply punishing offenders. Instead, efforts should focus on dismantling the structures that allow fraud to thrive, starting with those who enable it.

Why fraudsters choose this activity

A central theme emerging from our interviews was the impact of the Ambazonian Crisis, an ongoing separatist conflict in Cameroon’s anglophone regions. The crisis began as peaceful demonstrations in 2016 when trade unionists and lawyers protested against the mandatory use of the French language in schools and law courts. By 2017, these protests had turned violent as armed separatist groups emerged within the anglophone regions, engaging in sporadic conflict with government forces. The separatists called for the secession of the two anglophone regions, referring to them as Ambazonia. The conflict has since escalated. Reports estimate that the violence has led to approximately 6,000 civilian deaths, the displacement of 600,000 people within Cameroon, and the forced migration of over 77,000 people into Nigeria as refugees.

The website developers we interviewed described how daily gunfire, displacement and political instability had made it difficult to secure stable employment and find clients.

Interviewees cited frequent power outages and internet blackouts as barriers to working with legitimate clients.

As one developer put it:

There are times when we go without electricity or network for days. I might have a legitimate client, but if the power goes out, I lose the job. Fraudsters, on the other hand, don’t care about delays. They are always there with another request.

Ghost-town protests, where separatists enforce economic shutdowns and force people to stay in their homes, further limit opportunities for legitimate business. In this unstable environment, undertaking website development for fraudsters became one of the few steady income streams.

A second theme was spiritual beliefs. We found that spiritual beliefs had an impact on decision-making. Developers rationalised their work by distinguishing between fraud and fraud enablement. Directly perpetrating fraud against victims, they believed, carried spiritual consequences, while simply building websites for fraudsters did not. Some fraudsters in west Africa visit a so-called “juju priest”, who may demand animal sacrifice and even murder in return for their blessing. The website developers we spoke to did not want to get involved in this.

One of the developers shared his fears about spiritual repercussions:

Scammers who do rituals for money, they don’t last. Most of the time, you see them dying at the age of 20 or 30. I don’t want to be involved in that. But making websites? That’s different. I’m not the one taking the money.

A third theme in our findings was the Big Boy culture, a subculture that glorifies online fraud as a symbol of success. In some west African communities, fraudsters who display their wealth through expensive cars, clothes and lifestyles are seen as role models rather than criminals.

Vanesa, a developer, explained:

Everybody wants to chill with the Big Boys. Fraudsters want to be seen as superstars, and that means spending money like celebrities.

The normalisation of internet fraud in some circles has created a perception that financial success justifies the means by which it is achieved. While some developers disapproved of fraudsters’ extravagant lifestyles, others saw it as a model of economic survival to aspire to.

Rethinking fraud prevention

These findings challenge the simplistic notion that the internet inherently enables fraud. Instead, fraud thrives within a complex ecosystem that includes not just the perpetrators but also the enablers who facilitate deception for economic, political, and cultural reasons.

A more effective fraud prevention strategy should address the enablers of cybercrime, not just the scammers.

This means:

• providing alternative economic opportunities for tech-savvy youth

• investing in reliable infrastructure to support legitimate business development

• understanding cultural attitudes to create more effective awareness campaigns

• recognising the role of spiritual beliefs in shaping perceptions of crime and morality.

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Fake online shops rely on tech skills: what drives Cameroon’s web developers to assist online fraudsters – https://theconversation.com/fake-online-shops-rely-on-tech-skills-what-drives-cameroons-web-developers-to-assist-online-fraudsters-252429

Source: – By Relebohiseng Matubatuba, Lecturer in Marketing, University of the Witwatersrand

The shortage of blood for medical use is a global challenge. South Africa is not exempt. Blood collection organisations such as the South African National Blood Service struggle to meet the demand for blood products, because of insufficient blood donations and the scarcity of loyal blood donors.

Blood collection organisations rely on the goodwill of a few individuals who voluntarily donate blood. To maintain a sustainable supply of blood, the World Health Organization (WHO) has recommended that at least 1% of a country’s population donate blood. In South Africa the donation rate is below this.

There are two blood collection organisations in South Africa – the Western Cape Blood Service operates exclusively in the Western Cape province while the South African National Blood Service, operates in the other eight provinces of the country.

To increase the numbers, the country’s blood donation organisations have focused on the recruitment of new donors and awareness initiatives, using research findings that look at what motivates, and what deters, people from donating blood. But little focus has been put on the behaviour of those who already donate.

Read more:
Blood donation saves lives but few South Africans are regular donors

I have conducted research in a bid to fill this gap. In a recent paper I examined factors influencing consumers’ intention to donate blood. In addition, in my recently completed PhD, I looked at the retention of existing blood donors and what drives their donation behaviour.

The research suggests that blood collection organisations need to shift focus from acquiring new blood donors to building relationships with existing blood donors. Existing donors are an important cohort because they are reliable, and have higher donation eligibility and lower recruitment costs.

The aim should be to drive loyalty.

I considered the use of technology to encourage people to donate blood regularly. I concluded from my findings that blood collection organisations should customise appeals to various types of donors. They need to appeal to people in a personalised way if they want to drive loyalty.

The drivers

To understand what drives donor loyalty, it was important to understand why people donate blood.

As part of my research, 658 blood donors completed the survey and I conducted interviews with 18 blood donors. The interviews revealed various reasons for donating blood. These included:

• Awareness of the importance of donating blood

As one participant in my research put it:

I’ve been in and out of hospital for my kids and for my wife when she was pregnant. If I don’t donate, where are they going to get that blood from?

• Contribution to society – saving or changing someone’s life

This was articulated by one person:

I’m past the point of only going for a reward, but I actually want to go, because I want to save someone’s life and do good in the community.

• Moral responsibility

As one participant put it:

When I don’t donate blood, I feel bad because, as a universal donor, I could potentially be saving lives as my blood is not limited, as opposed to other groups.

• Health-related benefits, like free health checks and the requirement to live a healthy lifestyle

• Incentives

The gifts make me feel appreciated. It makes me want to donate more and more.

Beyond just donating blood, some donors also expressed that they shared their blood donation experiences with their friends, family, co-workers and on their social media platforms to encourage others to donate.

The use of technology

Findings from my PhD show that donors would like personalised communication from the blood collection organisations. This should include:

• sharing information about blood donation achievements specific to them (the donor)

• checking up on the donors who are not donating as they used to or may have stopped donating

• following up on deferred donors to encourage them to return for a checkup and subsequent donation. Deferred donors are those who were unable to donate during a donation drive because they didn’t meet the donation requirements (for example they had low iron levels).

• reminding donors of their upcoming donations.

Others shared that they would like more interactive communication beyond being told that they have saved three lives after donating blood. This could include sharing specific information about the impact of the donors donation – “your donation helped a cancer patient recover” – and stories to make their contribution more tangible.

What needs to be done

Research has shown that digital technologies have been used successfully to foster customer engagement, enhance customer experiences and satisfaction, facilitate communication and information-sharing, and offer opportunities to shape and influence behaviour. To achieve this, donor organisations have large amounts of donor data and other data (big data) which they can use to gain insights that can be used in the following ways.

Firstly, they should analyse donor data to identify patterns and segment donors based on factors such as how long an individual has been donating, donation frequency, blood type, location, and preferred communication channels.

This information can be used to tailor communication and engagement strategies to specific donor groups. Donors follow different donor paths over time and cannot be viewed as a single segment.

Secondly, organisations should monitor donation trends over time. This will help to understand seasonal fluctuations, identify peak donation periods, and anticipate potential donor needs. These insights can be used to plan targeted recruitment campaigns and allocate resources.

Read more:
Explainer: what are blood groups and why do they matter?

Thirdly, organisations should consider personalised communication. This could include:

• Targeted nudging: timely and relevant communication, like reminders for upcoming donation appointments, personalised thank-you messages, information about the donation they have made or invitations to special donor events.

• Multi-channel engagement: reaching donors through their preferred communication channels, such as email, SMS, or social media.

• Loyalty programmes: rewarding frequent donors with exclusive merchandise, discounts or special recognition, based on individual donor preferences and donation history.

• Gamification: using game-like elements to make communication and the donation process more engaging and fun, using challenges, leaderboards and badges to motivate donors and foster a sense of community.

• Predictive analytics: using data history and past events to establish donor patterns and predicts future outcomes. This data can be used to identify donors who might lapse and reach out to them with personalised communication.

Relebohiseng Matubatuba does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. South Africans don’t donate enough blood – technology can help drive the numbers – https://theconversation.com/south-africans-dont-donate-enough-blood-technology-can-help-drive-the-numbers-251827

Source: – By Thompson Gyedu Kwarkye, Postdoctoral Researcher, University College Dublin

Artificial intelligence (AI) is increasing productivity and pushing the boundaries of what’s possible. It powers self-driving cars, social media feeds, fraud detection and medical diagnoses. Touted as a game changer, it is projected to add nearly US$15.7 trillion to the global economy by the end of the decade.

Africa is positioned to use this technology in several sectors. In Ghana, Kenya and South Africa, AI-led digital tools in use include drones for farm management, X-ray screening for tuberculosis diagnosis, and real-time tracking systems for packages and shipments. All these are helping to fill gaps in accessibility, efficiency and decision-making.

However, it also introduces risks. These include biased algorithms, resource and labour exploitation, and e-waste disposal. The lack of a robust regulatory framework in many parts of the continent increases these challenges, leaving vulnerable populations exposed to exploitation. Limited public awareness and infrastructure further complicate the continent’s ability to harness AI responsibly.

What are African countries doing about it?
To answer this, my research mapped out what Ghana and Rwanda had in place as AI policies and investigated how these policies were developed. I looked for shared principles and differences in approach to governance and implementation.

The research shows that AI policy development is not a neutral or technical process but a profoundly political one. Power dynamics, institutional interests and competing visions of technological futures shape AI regulation.

I conclude from my findings that AI’s potential to bring great change in Africa is undeniable. But its benefits are not automatic. Rwanda and Ghana show that effective policy-making requires balancing innovation with equity, global standards with local needs, and state oversight with public trust.

The question is not whether Africa can harness AI, but how and on whose terms.

How they did it

Rwanda’s National AI Policy emerged from consultations with local and global actors. These included the Ministry of ICT and Innovation, the Rwandan Space Agency, and NGOs like the Future Society, and the GIZ FAIR Forward. The resulting policy framework is in line with Rwanda’s goals for digital transformation, economic diversification and social development. It includes international best practices such as ethical AI, data protection, and inclusive AI adoption.

Ghana’s Ministry of Communication, Digital Technology and Innovations conducted multi-stakeholder workshops to develop a national strategy for digital transformation and innovation. Start-ups, academics, telecom companies and public-sector institutions came together and the result is Ghana’s National Artificial Intelligence Strategy 2023–2033.

Both countries have set up or plan to set up Responsible AI offices. This aligns with global best practices for ethical AI. Rwanda focuses on local capacity building and data sovereignty. This reflects the country’s post-genocide emphasis on national control and social cohesion. Similarly, Ghana’s proposed office focuses on accountability, though its structure is still under legislative review.

Ghana and Rwanda have adopted globally recognised ethical principles like privacy protection, bias mitigation and human rights safeguards. Rwanda’s policy reflects Unesco’s AI ethics recommendations and Ghana emphasises “trustworthy AI”.

Both policies frame AI as a way to reach the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals. Rwanda’s policy targets applications in healthcare, agriculture, poverty reduction and rural service delivery. Similarly, Ghana’s strategy highlights the potential to advance economic growth, environmental sustainability and inclusive digital transformation.

Key policy differences

Rwanda’s policy ties data control to national security. This is rooted in its traumatic history of identity-based violence. Ghana, by contrast, frames AI as a tool for attracting foreign investment rather than a safeguard against state fragility.

The policies also differ in how they manage foreign influence. Rwanda has a “defensive” stance towards global tech powers; Ghana’s is “accommodative”. Rwanda works with partners that allow it to follow its own policy. Ghana, on the other hand, embraces partnerships, viewing them as the start of innovation.

While Rwanda’s approach is targeted and problem-solving, Ghana’s strategy is expansive, aiming for large-scale modernisation and private-sector growth. Through state-led efforts, Rwanda focuses on using AI to solve immediate challenges such as rural healthcare access and food security. In contrast, Ghana looks at using AI more widely – in finance, transport, education and governance – to become a regional tech hub.

Constraints and solutions

The effectiveness of these AI policies is held back by broader systemic challenges. The US and China dominate in setting global standards, so local priorities get sidelined. For example, while Rwanda and Ghana advocate for ethical AI, it’s hard for them to hold multinational corporations accountable for breaches.

Energy shortages further complicate large-scale AI adoption. Training models require reliable electricity – a scarce resource in many parts of the continent.

To address these gaps, I propose the following:

Investments in digital infrastructure, education and local start-ups to reduce dependency on foreign tech giants.

African countries must shape international AI governance forums. They must ensure policies reflect continental realities, not just western or Chinese ones. This will include using collective bargaining power through the African Union to bring Africa’s development needs to the fore. It could also help with digital sovereignty issues and equitable access to AI technologies.

Finally, AI policies must embed African ethical principles. These should include communal rights and post-colonial sensitivities.

Thompson Gyedu Kwarkye does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. AI policies in Africa: lessons from Ghana and Rwanda – https://theconversation.com/ai-policies-in-africa-lessons-from-ghana-and-rwanda-253642

Source: – By Charles Helm, Research Associate, African Centre for Coastal Palaeoscience, Nelson Mandela University

A team of scientists who study vertebrate fossil tracks and traces on South Africa’s southern Cape coast have identified the world’s first fossil pangolin trackway, with the help of Indigenous Master Trackers from Namibia. Ichnologists Charles Helm, Clive Thompson and Jan De Vynck tell the story.

What did you find?

A fossil trackway east of Still Bay in South Africa’s Western Cape province was found in 2018 by a colleague and was brought to our attention. It was found on the surface of a loose block of aeolianite rock (formed from hardened sand) that had come to rest near the high-tide mark in a private nature reserve.

We studied it but our cautious approach required that we could not confidently pin down what had made the track. It remained enigmatic.

How did you eventually identify it?

In 2023, we were working with two Ju/’hoansi San colleagues from north-eastern Namibia, #oma Daqm and /uce Nǂamce, who have been interpreting tracks in the Kalahari all their lives. They are certified as Indigenous Master Trackers and we consider them to be among the finest trackers in the world today. We’d called on their expertise to help us understand more about the fossil tracks on the Cape south coast. One example of the insights they provided was of hyena tracks, and we have published on this together.

Read more:
First fossil hyena tracks found in South Africa – how expert animal trackers helped

We showed them the intriguing trackway, which consisted of eight tracks and two scuff marks made, apparently, by the animal’s tail. They examined the track-bearing surface at length, conversed with one another for some time, and then made their pronouncement: the trackway had been registered by a pangolin.

This was an astonishing claim, as no fossilised pangolin tracks had previously been recorded anywhere in the world.

It also confirms that pangolins were once distributed across a larger range than they are now.

We then created three-dimensional digital models of the trackway, using a technique called photogrammetry.

We shared these images with other tracking and pangolin experts in southern Africa (like CyberTracker, Tracker Academy, the African Pangolin Working Group, wildlife guides and a pangolin researcher at the Tswalu Foundation). There were no dissenting voices: not surprisingly, it was agreed that our San colleagues were highly likely correct in their interpretation.

There is something really special about a fossil trackway, compared with fossil bones – it seems alive, as if the animal could have registered the tracks yesterday, rather than so long ago.

What are the characteristics of pangolin tracks?

Pangolins are mostly bipedal (walking on two legs), with a distinctive, relatively ponderous gait. Track size and shape, the distance between the tracks, and the width of the trackway all provide useful clues, as do the tail scuff marks and the absence of obvious digit impressions. A pangolin hindfoot track, in the words of our Master Tracker colleagues, looks as if “a round stick had been poked into the ground”. And being slightly wider at the front end, it has a slightly triangular shape.

Our Master Tracker colleagues are familiar with the tracks of Temminck’s pangolin (Smutsia temminckii) in the Kalahari, which was the probable species that registered the tracks that are now evident in stone on the Cape coast. Other trackmaker candidates, such as a serval with its slim straddle, were considered, but could be excluded or regarded as far less likely.

How old is the fossil track and how do you know?

The surface would have consisted of loose dune sand when the pangolin walked on it. Now it’s cemented into rock. We work with a colleague, Andrew Carr, at the University of Leicester in the UK. He uses a technique known as optically stimulated luminescence to obtain the age of rocks in the area.

The results he provided for the region suggest that these tracks were made between 90,000 and 140,000 years ago, during the “Ice Ages”. For much of this time the coastline might have been as much as 100km south of its present location.

What’s important about this find?

Firstly, this demonstrates what you can uncover when you bring together different kinds of knowledge: our western scientific approach combined with the remarkable skill sets of the Master Trackers, which have been inculcated in them from a very young age.

Without them, the trackway would have remained enigmatic, and would have deteriorated in quality due to erosion without the trackmaker ever being identified.

Read more:
Fossil treasure chest: how to preserve the geoheritage of South Africa’s Cape coast

Secondly, we hope it brings attention to the plight of the pangolin in modern times. There are eight extant pangolin species in the world today, and all are considered to be threatened with extinction. Pangolin meat is regarded as a delicacy, pangolin scales are used in traditional medicines, and pangolins are among the most trafficked wild animals on earth. Large numbers in Africa are hunted for their meat every year.

What does the future hold?

Our San Indigenous Master Tracker colleagues have just completed their third visit to the southern Cape coast, thanks to funding from the Discovery Wilderness Trust.

The results have once again been both unexpected and stupendous, and their tracking skills have again been demonstrated to be unparalleled. Many more publications will undoubtedly ensue, bringing their expertise to the attention of the wider scientific community and anyone interested in our fossil heritage or in ancient hunter-gatherer traditions.

We hope that our partnership continues to lead to our mutual benefit as we probe the secrets of the Pleistocene epoch by following the spoor of ancient animals.

Clive Thompson is a trustee of the Discovery Wilderness Trust, a non-profit organization that supports environmental conservation and the fostering of tracking skills.

Charles Helm and Jan Carlo De Vynck do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. First fossil pangolin tracks discovered in South Africa – https://theconversation.com/first-fossil-pangolin-tracks-discovered-in-south-africa-253383

Source: – By Douglas Lucas Kivoi, Principal Policy Analyst, Governance Department, The Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis (KIPPRA)

The recent killing in Kenya of a young man in police detention highlights a string of systemic failures to hold the country’s security officers accountable for their actions. Despite public outrage and protests, Kenyan police officers continue to use inhumane, brutal and sometimes fatal methods with little consequence. Douglas Lucas Kivoi, who has studied policing and police reform in Kenya, unpacks the situation.

Why is the Kenyan police service given to brutality?

First, Kenya’s police institution was established as a colonial instrument of oppression. Police reforms since independence in 1963 have had little impact in changing this. Instead, successive governments have used the police to suppress dissent. This has cemented a culture of violence and police impunity. This was seen during former president Daniel arap Moi’s repressive regime, the post-2007 election violence and recent crackdowns on public protests protected under the constitution.

The reaction to mass mobilisation in June 2024 was violent. This was because the state sees public demonstrations as a threat to its authority.

Second, police brutality thrives in environments where wrongdoing goes unpunished. Kenya’s police force lacks good internal control mechanisms. A culture of silence and solidarity – the “blue code” – deters whistleblowing. Advancements and rewards are sometimes determined by political allegiances rather than professionalism.

Read more:
Kenyan police use excessive force because they’re serving political elites, not the public – policy analyst

Third, many police officers work in toxic conditions marked by poor pay, limited resources and long shifts. These contribute to feelings of frustration and aggression. The situation is worsened by institutionalised corruption where police officers extort money from citizens and demand bribes. This has contributed to diminished ethical standards.

What’s in place to punish police excesses?

Kenya has several formal avenues for holding police accountable. But all are deeply flawed.

Independent Policing Oversight Authority: This was established in 2011 in light of the post-election violence of 2007-08. Its job was to independently investigate police misconduct. However, underfunding and understaffing has led to delayed investigations.

There has also been a lack of cooperation from the police. They often fail to provide evidence or deliberately provide misleading information to impede investigations.

The authority also has limited enforcement power. It has recommended thousands of prosecutions of rogue officers. However, it has seen low conviction rates given the slow processes at the judiciary and Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions.

Internal Affairs Unit: This is a critical oversight body. It’s mandated to provide accountability and professional discipline within the police service. It’s tasked with investigating public complaints and complaints from within the police service against police officers.

The unit can recommend to the National Police Service Commission disciplinary action – such as prosecution or dismissal – against officers it finds guilty. It also monitors police officers to ensure that ethical conduct and professional standards are maintained.

However, the unit faces perceptions of a lack of independence and as an internal cover-up tool. In many instances, cases of police misconduct are simply punished by a transfer to another station.

Judiciary and Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions: Cases take years to move through the judicial system. Convictions are rare. The public prosecutions office has faced accusations of bias, which it exhibits through its reluctance to prosecute high-profile police killings.

The time it takes to conclude police misconduct cases allows impunity to thrive. Deliberately poor investigations carried out by the police (who are also suspects) have led to collapsed cases.

National Police Service Commission: This was established by the 2010 Kenyan constitution. The commission recruits and appoints police officers (except the inspector-general of police, who is appointed by the president with parliamentary approval). It also promotes, transfers and disciplines police officers.

However, the commission has faced claims of being unduly influenced by the inspector-general’s office in recruitment and promotions. This undermines its independence.

Read more:
How Nairobi police failures let people get away with murder

Civil society and the media: Organisations like Amnesty International Kenya and the Kenya Human Rights Commission document police abuses. But their reports rarely, if ever, lead to any real action being taken. The media’s attention and reporting of cases may exert temporary pressure but this doesn’t seem to have any long-term impact.

Why haven’t these mechanisms worked?

Firstly, there’s an institutional resistance to reform. Powerful factions in the police and government benefit from the current system. Whenever there is an attempt at enforcing accountability, these senior officials take advantage of bureaucratic delays, and harass investigators and whistleblowers.

In extreme cases, they enforce the disappearance of witnesses.

Secondly, a lack of political will creates a favourable environment to circumvent constitutional frameworks. This ultimately weakens any chances of accountability. At best, police in Kenya are used to defend political interests and suppress dissent.

This emboldens powerful political players who want the police to be controllable. This dissuades them from instituting actual reforms and establishing a humane policing service.

What will change things?

Until those in leadership positions genuinely prioritise independent institutions and justice over transient political gains, significant police reform is unlikely to be realised.

Elements of such reform would include steps to:

Strengthen police oversight and guarantee independence

The Independent Policing Oversight Authority Act needs to be amended to enhance autonomy. The current system is easy for the president to manipulate because he gets to appoint the authority’s commissioners.

There’s also a need to provide the authority with equipment. This includes ballistics analysis, digital forensics and crime scene reconstruction capabilities to combat police cover-ups.

The Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions must also be required to respond to the authority’s recommendations within 30 days. Currently, cases can take years to complete. There have been instances when rogue police have used this window to eliminate witnesses or tamper with evidence.

Overhaul police training and culture

There must be a move away from paramilitary-style drills and procedures in training. Instead, officers need to practise de-escalation, communication and problem-solving tactics with the public. What exists within Kenya now is a paramilitary service not a police service.

Additionally, the police service commission needs to reward professionalism and not cronyism.

Judicial and prosecutorial reforms

Ending police impunity in Kenya requires a multi-pronged approach. This involves judicial independence, vigorous prosecution, meaningful oversight, legislative changes and public engagement.

But this requires meaningful political will.

Political accountability

Continued police impunity has eroded public confidence in Kenya’s policing and justice systems. The policing oversight authority needs sufficient funding – free of political interference – to investigate and prosecute police misconduct. Senior officers should be held accountable for not disciplining rogue officers under their charge. The presidency and interior ministry must have a zero-tolerance policy toward police brutality.

If Kenya doesn’t grapple with police impunity, then the anniversary of the June 2024 protests will be just another date in history when the state brutally attacked, maimed and killed its own citizenry. And still managed to silence them.

Douglas Lucas Kivoi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Kenya’s brutal police have been exposed again – why the system fails people – https://theconversation.com/kenyas-brutal-police-have-been-exposed-again-why-the-system-fails-people-258843

Source: – By Jonathan Beloff, Postdoctoral Research Associate, King’s College London

The foreign ministers of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) signed a new peace agreement on 27 June 2025 under the auspices of the US.

The agreement aims to foster long-term peace, and increased economic trade and security. The DRC is one of Africa’s largest nations, with over 110 million people. Rwanda has a population of 14 million.

After three decades of war and tensions between the two neighbours since the aftermath of the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, the hope is that this agreement will establish the foundations for progress that benefits both nations.

It was the Donald Trump administration’s moment to illustrate the effectiveness of its “transactional” foreign policy, focused on exchanges and short-term benefits for each actor.

Most of the agreement’s details remained undisclosed until its signing. One aspect that’s surfaced was the claim that the DRC abandoned its demand for the removal of Rwandan soldiers from its territory. The Congolese government, research groups and the UN have accused Rwanda of supplying military aid, including soldiers, to the March 23 Movement (M23), which has been at war with the government in Kinshasa since 2021. The Rwandan government denies any active involvement but has some sympathies for the Congolese rebel group.

Under the June 2025 agreement, each side provided concessions and demands that are perhaps easier said than done. Both countries also want to show the Trump administration their willingness to negotiate and make a deal. This is in the hopes of future deals with the US, which Trump has remained vague on.

The DRC has immense mineral wealth, including gold, diamonds, tungsten, coltan, tin and lithium. These latter minerals are used in computer chips, batteries and other technologies.

Read more:
Rwandan-backed M23 rebel group seeks local power in DRC, not just control over mining operations

The question is whether this latest agreement will lead to peace in the DRC. The likely answer is no, based on research on instability in the eastern DRC, Rwandan foreign policy and the security and political dynamics between Rwanda and the DRC for over 15 years.

This is mainly because

• key players involved in the crisis were left out of negotiations

• no provisions are made for enforcement

• the opportunities for US companies remain questionable given the lack of security in the mining regions.

The roots of the crisis

After the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, former genocide perpetrators used the DRC’s vast size as cover to plan attacks on Rwanda. They intended to return to Rwanda to finish the genocide. The consequences led to the First Congo War (1996-1997) and the Second Congo War (1998-2003).

It was during the bloody second war that the DRC was carved up by multiple rebel groups aligned with various nations and political actors. The UN accuses Rwanda and Uganda of carrying out a massive illegal mineral trade. Both nations deny this.

The consequences of the conflict are still felt over 20 years later. Despite multiple peace agreements, and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes, an estimated 120 rebel groups remain active in the Congo.

One of them, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), aims to return Rwanda to ethnic division and the genocide. The Rwandan government fears the group’s genocide and hate ideology.

Additionally, the FDLR and other extremist actors such as Wazalendo target the Banyarwanda. This ethnic group, residing primarily in eastern DRC, is historically related to Rwanda. It has been the target of attacks, which have forced tens of thousands of people to flee into Rwanda.

Read more:
The Banyamulenge: how a minority ethnic group in the DRC became the target of rebels – and its own government

These attacks led to the resurrection of the M23. Despite its failures in 2013, the M23 scored major advances in late 2021 in response to attacks on the Banyarwanda. The rebel group led a successful military campaign that occupied large swathes of territory in eastern DRC.

Their success is largely attributed to the Rwandan Defence Forces, despite Kigali denying this claim.

Concessions from each nation

The latest peace agreement addresses the security, political and economic interests of both nations.

The specifics are still unavailable. However, several assumptions based on the framework and leaked reports can be made.

The first is that both nations must respect each other’s territorial sovereignty and stop aiding rebel forces. This will include joint security coordination, and working with the existing UN peacekeeping mission. Additionally, Congolese refugees who fled eastern DRC – estimated to be over 80,000 – will be allowed to return. Finally, the two nations will establish mechanisms to foster greater economic integration.

The DRC has also signalled its willingness to attract American investors. DRC’s vast mineral wealth remains largely underdeveloped. American investment could develop mining that’s safer and extracts larger amounts of minerals than current methods. Kinshasa has also agreed to combat corruption and simplify the tax system.

While most of these incentives would be aimed at mineral extraction companies, they also include private security firms. The Congolese military’s inability to defeat the M23 highlights a problematic security environment that some in the DRC believe can be addressed through foreign intervention. However, these security guarantees are still relatively unknown and face complications that could affect the success of any agreement.

The weaknesses

There are a number of reasons this latest agreement is unlikely to lead to peace.

First, the M23 did not participate in the negotiations. Given that they are the primary military actor in eastern DRC, their commitment to a peace process cannot be guaranteed.

Second, other rebel forces in different parts of the country will feel left out too. They could see this agreement as an opportunity to press for greater concessions from the Congolese government.

Third, there are few mechanisms to enforce the agreement. Since the Second Congo War, there have been multiple treaties, agreements and disarmament programmes with little success. The Pretoria Accord between Rwanda and the DRC in 2002 did not lead to long-term peace. The M23’s name is a nod to their anger over a failed 2009 agreement. In 2024, Rwanda and Congo nearly reached an agreement under Angola’s mediation, but Angola stepped down. The process was then taken over by Qatar and later the US.

Lastly, American investors may be deterred by the security, regulatory and corruption issues that plague the DRC. Even if the Congolese government promises to address these issues, it lacks the necessary capabilities to fulfil its commitment.

Jonathan Beloff received funding from the Arts and Humanities Research Council (AH/W001217/1).

– ref. DRC and Rwanda sign a US-brokered peace deal: what are the chances of its success? – https://theconversation.com/drc-and-rwanda-sign-a-us-brokered-peace-deal-what-are-the-chances-of-its-success-260066

Source: – By Jan Pospisil, Associate Professor at the Centre for Peace and Security, Coventry University

The civil war in Sudan between the Sudanese army and paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, which began in April 2023, has had an impact on its neighbours. One of the most keenly affected countries is South Sudan, which became an independent state in 2011 and went on to endure its own civil war. This ended in 2018 with a tenuous peace agreement.

The impact of the Sudanese war on South Sudan, however, isn’t a straightforward spillover catastrophe. The picture is more nuanced, and this is most clearly seen in South Sudan’s oil economy. Jan Pospisil, who has studied the dynamics in Sudan and South Sudan, explains.

What is the current status of oil exports from South Sudan through Sudan?

Landlocked South Sudan is reliant on its neighbour to the north to transport oil from its fields to the international market. Crude oil is transported via pipeline to Port Sudan on the Red Sea.

However, recent drone strikes on Port Sudan carried out by the Rapid Support Forces targeted power plants that supply electricity to pumping stations along Sudan’s critical oil pipelines.

Soon after, the Sudanese army formally notified South Sudan that it would have to halt exports. Following hectic negotiations, the South Sudanese government released a statement that the stoppage could be prevented.

This back and forth has reopened the pressing question of the impact of Sudan’s war on South Sudan’s economy and, in particular, the role of crude oil.

Assessments of the impact of Sudan’s war on South Sudan suggest the worst: oil revenues would account for 80% of South Sudan’s budget and 90% of its fiscal revenue.

This informs the International Monetary Fund’s warnings of looming economic collapse in case of a breakdown of oil exports. The predominant view is that a shutdown of the oil pipeline through Sudan would lead to a collapse of dollar inflows to South Sudan, triggering a severe economic crisis.

However, South Sudan’s 2024-25 budget suggests a high reliance on non-oil revenue.

In fact, government oil revenues for 2024-25 are based on a volume of only around 16,000 barrels per day. This is the share of total production of about 130,000 barrels per day controlled by South Sudan. Attempts to increase production to pre-war levels of up to 400,000 barrels failed. The substantial drop in production is explained by a decline in the quality of South Sudan’s oil wells, especially in Paloch in the north-east’s Upper Nile State, and Unity State in the north-central region.

South Sudan additionally lacks the operational capacity to extract the oil it has in the ground.

The 2024-25 budget projects a hefty fiscal deficit. The revenues projected will cover only about half of total planned state spending. Oil and non-oil revenues – which mainly include tax income from international NGOs and businesses – each account for about half of the revenue that’s expected to come in.

Oil income has to account for debt (capital and interest) repayments on loans, as well as pipeline transport fees paid to Sudan. This means that even the optimistically assessed net contributions of oil revenue would only pay for 16% of planned government spending. South Sudan remains with a hefty deficit.

What are the challenges South Sudan is facing in growing oil revenues?

First, Petronas, a Malaysian multinational oil and gas company, withdrew from South Sudan in August 2024 after three decades.

It left behind substantial challenges, including an arbitration process worth more US$1 billion. This followed the government preventing Petronas from selling its shares to the British-Nigerian group Savannah Energy.

As a short-term solution, South Sudan de facto nationalised Petronas’ shares. It did this by transferring the shares to the state’s oil and gas company, Nile Petroleum Corporation (NilePet). This was perhaps in the hope of increasing revenue in the short term.

However, NilePet hasn’t been able to replace Petronas’ production logistics. This has resulted in huge challenges in restoring production to levels before the 2024 pipeline disruptions.

A second factor is the sale of oil forward. The then finance minister said in 2022 that most of the oil production had been sold in advance until 2027. He later retracted the statement, saying instead that some oil advances were merely “spread up to 2027”. While this walk-back attempted to soften the political fallout, it reinforced wider uncertainty about how much control NilePet actually retains over the revenues formally under its authority.

Given the limited relevance of oil revenues for the official South Sudanese budget, why the major concern about disruptions?

There are three reasons.

First, NilePet plays a structural role in South Sudan’s informal and often dubious hard currency circulation, which international observers would call large-scale corruption. NilePet’s accounts rarely appear in any official financial accounts and are often channelled off-budget. NilePet functions as a black box within the public finance system where real money flows can only rarely be traced. Recent intentions by the president to structurally reform the company might implicitly confirm this.

Second, there are indirect oil revenues that are important to the country’s security apparatus. This includes protection rents which come from protecting South Sudanese oil fields. This revenue never hits the budget. It pays the National Security Service either directly as salaries, or is reinvested in the considerable conglomerate of companies owned by the security service to multiply profits. Losing this revenue could destabilise the country because the funds are used to pay the salaries of the best-trained and best-equipped security service in the country.

Third, South Sudan’s ability to attract new loans depends on the repayment of existing ones. These repayments largely depend on oil production. As the 2024-24 budget shows, South Sudan desperately needs new loans to keep even core state functions operational. Yet, funding from multilateral agencies has dwindled to small-scale loans from the African Development Bank. The International Monetary Fund has currently ended all its funding programmes.

This is not a result of the war in Sudan. It is due to persistent concerns over insufficient financial governance in South Sudan and the state’s performance. Negotiations with Qatar and the United Arab Emirates for new loans appear to have stalled, not least because of a default in repayments to Qatar.

These factors show that the flow of oil to Port Sudan is significant to the availability of hard currency in South Sudan’s economy. But this is in more indirect ways than the outdated claim of an 80% budgetary dependency would suggest.

The war in Sudan has a significant yet multifaceted impact on South Sudan’s economic health. But Juba’s biggest challenges are internal.

South Sudan’s economy over the last six years has been mainly dependent on international loans coming in – a flow which has now dried up, resulting in a severe economic crisis unprecedented in the young country’s history.

Jan Pospisil receives funding from the Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform (PeaceRep), funded by UK International Development from the UK government. However, the views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the UK government’s official policies. Any use of this work should acknowledge the authors and the Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform.

– ref. Is Sudan’s war the reason for South Sudan’s economic crisis? What’s really going on with oil revenue – https://theconversation.com/is-sudans-war-the-reason-for-south-sudans-economic-crisis-whats-really-going-on-with-oil-revenue-257375