Category: The Conversation – USA

Source: The Conversation – USA (2) – By Nancy Forster-Holt, Clinical Associate Professor of Innovation and Entrepreneurship, University of Rhode Island

By now, Americans know the strange math of minting: Each penny costs about 4 cents to make. Chances are you have some in a jar, or scattered among pockets, purses and car ashtrays.

As small as it is, the penny punches above its weight culturally. If it ever disappeared, so too might the simple kindness of “take a penny, leave a penny,” alongside timeless classics like penny loafers and the tradition of tossing a penny in a fountain.

But the penny’s days are indeed numbered. The U.S. Mint pressed the last 1-cent coin on Nov. 12, 2025, following a directive from the White House. While pennies will remain legal tender, old ones will gradually be taken out of circulation.

The impact of this change will reach beyond coin jars. Its ripples will be felt as small, cash-reliant Main Street merchants face another test of adaptability in a system that increasingly favors scale, technology and plastic. It will also be felt by people who rely on cash – often people without bank accounts who have the least room to absorb even tiny shifts in price.

My interest comes from my former lives as the chief financial officer of a large credit union and as a small-business owner. Now, I bridge theory and practice as a professor – or “prac-ademic,” as I like to say – studying the challenges facing Main Street businesses.

When the penny goes away, some will win, some will lose – and for some, it’ll be a coin toss.

Heads, they win

The first and most obvious winner is the U.S. government, which will save tens of millions of dollars each year by no longer minting a coin that costs more to make than it’s worth. Ending production seems like an easy call for efficiency’s sake.

Banks and credit unions will likely benefit too. Pennies are disproportionately expensive to handle: Every bag of pennies gets counted, sorted, rolled, verified and shipped back to the Federal Reserve, generating labor and equipment costs that far exceed the coin’s value. Removing the smallest denomination strips out an entire layer of cost and friction from bank operations – savings that scale immediately across thousands of branches.

Another beneficiary, this one hiding in plain sight, is who transports the cash: the armored-carrier industry. For companies such as Loomis and Brink’s, pennies are heavy, low-value cargo, and a logistical money-loser. Removing penny pickups eliminates one of their most inefficient services, reducing fuel use, labor hours and truck wear.

Large retailers will likely also win. Size and scale make it easier to undertake preparations both big and small, such as reprogramming cash registers and stockpiling pennies to hedge against shortages. Larger companies also have the talent and bandwidth to figure out the true costs and benefits of accepting cash or noncash payments. If most of their transactions are already digital, they could be relatively indifferent to the end of the penny.

Large retailers also negotiate lower card processing rates, which are the fees merchants must pay to the card companies every time a customer uses a credit or debit card. These rates aren’t uniform: Large chains get discounted pricing based on sales volume, while small businesses face higher costs for identical transactions. It follows that any policy change leading to more people paying with plastic will disproportionately benefit larger retailers.

To be sure, some banks, credit unions and large retailers have expressed concern and surprise at the pace of the change and the lack of guidance from the federal government. But for most, the penny’s end is a minor operational footnote. Online-only businesses operate in this frictionless world as well – no coins, no counting, no issue.

Tails, they lose

For small, Main Street businesses, the penny’s disappearance highlights the structural disadvantages they already face – and I think it will force a reckoning about what types of payments benefit their bottom lines.

As pennies phase out, local businesses are likely to round cash transactions to the nearest 5 cents, resulting in what economists call a “rounding tax.” Rounding to the nearest nickel could cost businesses and consumers about $6 million annually, according to researchers with the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.

And it wouldn’t offer much relief if more shoppers turn to plastic and other noncash payments. That’s because most small merchants lack the negotiating power to lower their card-processing fees.

Card acceptance comes with a layered stack of costs for merchants: interchange fees, network assessments, processor markups, gateway fees, chargeback penalties, terminal rentals and more. Together, these average 2.5% to 3.5% per sale for many small businesses. Also, there are expenses related to adopting the latest, greatest payment methods, and then keeping them updated.

Consider a quick-service restaurant where a typical customer spends $14. If that customer pays with a credit card and the business pays an average processing fee of 2.2% plus 10 cents per transaction, each sale incurs about 41 cents in fees. Even low-cost debit cards include fixed per-transaction charges that disproportionately affect businesses when the per-sale average is small. When the average sale is $10 or less, it barely covers the cost to process it as a card transaction.

That said, handling cash also comes at a cost, and it’s not always easy to know what’s best for business. One analysis found that accepting cash costs 53 cents per $100 of sales, compared with $1.12 for accepting debit payments using a signature and 81 cents for PIN-based debit. Of course, businesses also should keep in mind that different customers will have different payment preferences.

And speaking of customers, those who are most likely to feel the pinch from the end of the penny are people who still rely on cash: older adults, lower-income households, people without credit cards or bank accounts – either unbanked or under-banked – and people who budget in cash because it provides firmer spending discipline.

A few cents added to a grocery total or a convenience store purchase may not matter to someone tapping a rewards credit card, but cash-dependent consumers experience those small increases directly, with no offsetting points, perks or end-of-month cash back. And yes, prices often end in 99 cents, which get rounded up, not down. So the burden falls disproportionately on those least equipped to absorb even small, cumulative increases.

For some, it’s a coin toss

Digital-first consumers may barely notice the penny’s disappearance. They tap phones, scan QR codes and use payment apps that will still settle to the exact amount.

While businesses haven’t received final guidance on how to handle payments in the post-penny era, one option is to price electronic transactions to the cent and round cash transactions to the nearest nickel. If that were widely adopted, digital payments alone would remain precise.

Consumers who use cashless payments may believe their choice doesn’t affect how they shop, but behavioral research says otherwise. Credit cards reduce the “pain of paying,” leading people to spend more – often 10% to 20% more than with cash. Credit card rewards programs further incentivize card use. In one last nod to the cost of noncash payments, those rewards are funded by higher merchant fees that ultimately translate into higher retail prices.

Killing the penny makes economic sense for the government and some businesses, yet it also highlights a deeper truth: Efficiency tends to reward the already efficient. For many, however, even when the change is small, every cent still counts.

Nancy Forster-Holt does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Who wins and who loses as the US retires the penny – https://theconversation.com/who-wins-and-who-loses-as-the-us-retires-the-penny-267380

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Kate Price, Associate Research Scientist at the Wellesley Centers for Women, Wellesley College

Congress on Nov. 18, 2025, passed legislation that calls on the Justice Department to release records related to Jeffrey Epstein, the late convicted sex offender. Those records on the federal investigation of Epstein and his accomplice, Ghislaine Maxwell, have brought renewed attention to sex trafficking. Alfonso Serrano, a politics editor at The Conversation, spoke with Kate Price, an associate research scientist at the Wellesley Centers for Women at Wellesley College, where she studies child sexual exploitation and child sex trafficking policy.

What is child sex trafficking and how does it differ from other kinds of trafficking?

It is a child being traded for sex via force, fraud or coercion. These are children who are under the age of 18. Often what happens, in terms of victim blaming, if a child is, say, 15, 16, 17, there’s this level of blame from perpetrators, the media, relatives, law enforcement, jurors: “She knew what she was doing.” I recently heard this with the Epstein files back in the news: “He wasn’t into like 8-year-olds. … There’s a difference between a 15-year-old and a 5-year-old.” That’s not true. Children cannot make decisions that adults can. Neuroscience shows that children’s brains are not developed until their mid 20s. Children do not have the same decision-making capacity. That very vulnerability is what is preyed upon by perpetrators.

Why do we not use terms like “child prostitution” anymore, and why does language matter?

In the late 1990s and early aughts, at the beginning of the anti-human trafficking movement, people did use the term child prostitution. In fact, I used it in a white paper that I did, and I’m a survivor. But once we really adopted and embraced the terminology of force, fraud and coercion of human trafficking, that gave us a new frame to think of the power dynamics that are involved in the commercial sexual exploitation of children. This phrasing captures the true essence of what is happening within child sex trafficking.

This is not a child somehow deciding that they’re going to go out and trade sex for money, heat, food, anything of value. This is a case of perpetrators, whether they are family members or nonfamily traffickers, who are preying on the vulnerability of children who have often been sexually abused prior to their commercial sexual exploitation. This prior abuse adds another layer of vulnerability.

How do Epstein’s actions fit into the paradigm of trafficking – is he a classic case or an unusual one?

Jeffrey Epstein is not unique. This is absolutely a classic case, for four primary reasons. Child sex trafficking perpetrators are primarily white men, with wealth and power. Epstein was, granted, among the uber rich and really powerful men. But power is relative to whatever context in which a child is being exploited. The most powerful person in a small town may not be a billionaire like Epstein, but they have disposable income and high socioeconomic status for the area, or they may hold a prominent position in government, church or a civic organization.

The Epstein case is also not unique in that victims are often dehumanized, by perpetrators and in the media. They are blamed, even though they are children who are developmentally incapable of making adult choices. There are transcripts of Maxwell calling the girls “trash.” These are seen as disposable children, not worthy of protections. And they have already been dehumanized within our culture prior to exploitation, whether it be through poverty, lack of educational or employment opportunities, or prior sexual violence. That makes them even more vulnerable to perpetrators such as Epstein and Maxwell, who are looking to prey upon those vulnerabilities.

Third, traffickers often insulate themselves from detection and trafficking charges by having others, such as women or girls, recruiting victims for them, which is exactly what Epstein did. Lastly, traffickers and buyers often plea down their trafficking charges. That results in low trafficking prosecution rates. They plea down from a charge like trafficking of a minor to assault, so this does not count toward trafficking prosecution rates. Epstein did exactly this in 2008 when he accepted prosecutor Alex Acosta’s nonprosecution agreement to plead guilty to two lesser Florida state-level prostitution charges rather than facing the multiple federal child sex trafficking charges for which Epstein was being investigated. This ability to use their wealth and power hides the truth of what is happening.

What systems allow sex trafficking to happen, and how can we change those systems?

Law enforcement often looks the other way. In the Epstein case, one of the victims had reached out to the FBI decades ago and nothing happened. It’s really been the persistence of the survivors, saying people really need to look at this.

Child sex trafficking is not a political issue. It’s one of the few bipartisan issues in our country that is so culturally divided. Yet Americans need to acknowledge that perpetrators comes from all political affiliations, they come from all races, socioeconomic status. As a culture, we really need to not blame victims and survivors. These are children who are being manipulated and violated. So recognizing the truth of power differences between perpetrators and victims is something that we as a culture very much need to do. By supporting victims, we can use our power – as relatives, jurors, constituents, elected officials – to hold traffickers and buyers to account. Victim-blaming creates a diversion that cements perpetrators’ ability to exploit and abuse children without fear of detection.

In terms of legislation, most states in the country still retain the right to criminalize sexually exploited minors, either through arrests or prosecution. These are laws that all states have considered since 2007, when New York was the first state to introduce a Safe Harbor law.

In Massachusetts, where I live, law enforcement retains the right to arrest or prosecute a minor for prostitution. That often doesn’t happen. But the reason law enforcement says it needs to have these laws is because it encourages children to get services. It’s a leverage point.

But oftentimes children do not trust law enforcement. And often for good reason. Some law enforcement are perpretrators. Other times, law enforcement tells sex-trafficked minors, “We’re doing this for your protection, we’re going to lock you up.” Both instances are deeply traumatizing and lead to mistrust of the police. That being said, so many extraordinary law enforcement agents are committed to supporting child sex trafficking victims and holding perpetrators to account.

Much of this retraumatization happens because local and state governments do not have the money for social services, trauma-informed, child sex trafficking-specific services, and housing opportunities for children to be able to heal. What we have is a robust criminal legal system. So, until we have a robust system that can support children who have been trafficked, sex trafficking is going to continue, in my experience.

Any last thoughts?

We need to acknowledge low prosecution rates of child sexual abuse cases, that 14% of all reported – just reported – child sexual abuse perpetrators are convicted or plead guilty. Similarly, in terms of adult rape charges, 1% of cases end in a conviction or guilty plea. So much of this lack of perpetrator accountability comes through this employment of plea deals and dehumanizing and retraumatizing victims during legal proceedings.

So we need to acknowledge when our criminal-legal system is not doing justice to victims whatsoever, and they’re allowing perpetrators to walk free. In the Epstein case, we’re focused on a few people, while hundreds of perpetrators continue to walk free. By employing these tactics, predators will continue to use the societal silence and misperceptions to their advantage. If it takes a village to raise a child, it also takes a village to sexually exploit a child.

Kate Price does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. ‘Jeffrey Epstein is not unique’: What his case reveals about the realities of child sex trafficking – https://theconversation.com/jeffrey-epstein-is-not-unique-what-his-case-reveals-about-the-realities-of-child-sex-trafficking-270127

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Jodie Childers, Assistant Professor of English, University of Virginia

As the United States faces increasing incidents of book banning and threats of governmental intervention – as seen in the temporary suspension of TV host Jimmy Kimmel – the common reflex for many who want to safeguard free expression is to turn to the First Amendment and its free speech protections.

Yet, the First Amendment has not always been potent enough to protect the right to speak. The Cold War presented one such moment in American history, when the freedom of political expression collided with paranoia over communist infiltration.

In 1947, the House Un-American Activities Committee subpoenaed 10 screenwriters and directors to testify about their union membership and alleged communist associations. Labeled the Hollywood Ten, the defiant witnesses – Alvah Bessie, Herbert Biberman, Lester Cole, Edward Dmytryk, Ring Lardner Jr., John Howard Lawson, Albert Maltz, Samuel Ornitz, Adrian Scott and Dalton Trumbo – refused to answer questions on First Amendment grounds. During his dramatic testimony, Lawson proclaimed his intent “to fight for the Bill of Rights,” which he argued the committee “was trying to destroy.”

They were all cited for contempt of Congress. Eight were sentenced to a year in federal prison, and two received six-month terms. Upon their release, they faced blacklisting in the industry. Some, like writer Dalton Trumbo, temporarily left the country.

As a researcher focused on the cultural cold war, I have examined the role the First Amendment played in the anti-communist hearings during the 1940s and ’50s.

The conviction and incarceration of the Hollywood Ten left a chilling effect on subsequent witnesses called to appear before congressional committees. It also established a period of repression historians now refer to as the Second Red Scare.

Although the freedom of speech is enshrined in the Constitution and prized by Americans, the story of the Second Red Scare shows that this freedom is even more fragile than it may now seem.

The Fifth Amendment communists

After the 1947 hearings, the term “unfriendly” became a label applied by the House Un-American Activities Committee and the press to the Hollywood Ten and any witnesses who refused to cooperate with the committee. These witnesses, who wanted to avoid the fate of the Hollywood Ten, began to shift away from the First Amendment as a legal strategy.

They chose instead to plead the Fifth Amendment, which grants people the right to protect themselves from self-incrimination. Many prominent artists during the 1950s, including playwright Lillian Hellman and singer and activist Paul Robeson, opted to invoke the Fifth when called before the committee and asked about their political affiliations.

The Fifth Amendment shielded hundreds of “unfriendly” witnesses from imprisonment, including artists, teachers and federal workers. However, it did not save them from job loss and blacklisting.

While they could avoid contempt citations by pleading the Fifth, they could not erase the stain of perceived guilt. This legal approach became so widespread that U.S. Sen. Joseph McCarthy, the country’s leading anti-communist crusader, disparaged these witnesses as “Fifth Amendment Communists” and boasted of purging their ranks from the federal government.

From Fifth back to First

In 1953, the physicist Albert Einstein became instrumental in revitalizing the force of the First Amendment as a rhetorical and legal tactic in the congressional hearings. Having fled Germany after the Nazis came to power, Einstein took a position at Princeton in 1933 and became an important voice in American politics.

Einstein’s philosophical battle against McCarthyism began with a letter to a Brooklyn high school teacher named William Frauenglass.

In April of that year, Frauenglass was subpoenaed to appear before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, “the Senate counterpart” of the House Un-American Activities Committee, to testify about his involvement in an intercultural education seminar. After the hearing, in which Frauenglass declined to speak about his political affiliations, he risked potential termination from his position and wrote to Einstein seeking support.

In his response, Einstein urged Frauenglass and all intellectuals to enact a “revolutionary” form of complete “noncooperation” with the committee.

While Einstein advised noncompliance, he also acknowledged the potential risk: “Every intellectual who is called before one of the committees ought to refuse to testify, i.e., he must be prepared for jail and economic ruin, in short, for the sacrifice of his personal welfare in the interest of the cultural welfare of his country.”

Frauenglass shared his story with the press, and Einstein’s letter was published in full in The New York Times on June 12, 1953. It was also quoted in local papers around the country.

One week later, Frauenglass was fired from his job.

After learning about Einstein’s public position, McCarthy labeled the Nobel laureate “an enemy of America.” That didn’t stop Einstein’s campaign for freedom of expression. He continued to encourage witnesses to rely on the First Amendment.

When the engineer Albert Shadowitz received a subpoena in 1953 to appear before McCarthy’s Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, to answer questions about alleged ties to the Communist Party, he traveled to Einstein’s home to seek out the physicist’s advice. After consulting with Einstein, Shadowitz opted for the First Amendment over the Fifth Amendment.

On Dec. 16, 1953, Shadowitz informed the committee that he had received counsel from Einstein. He then voiced his opposition to the hearing on the grounds of the First Amendment: “I will refuse to answer any question which invades my rights to think as I please or which violates my guarantees of free speech and association.”

He was cited for contempt in August 1954 and indicted that November, facing a potential year in prison and US$1,000 fine. As an indicator of McCarthy’s diminishing power, the charge was thrown out in July 1955 by a federal judge.

The triumph of dissent

Well-known public figures also began to turn away from the Fifth Amendment as a legal tactic and to draw on the First Amendment.

In August 1955, when the folk musician Pete Seeger testified before the House Un-American Activities Committee, he voiced his rejection of the Fifth Amendment defense during the hearing. Seeger asserted that he wanted to use his testimony to call into question the nature of the inquiry altogether.

Pleading the protection of the First Amendment, Seeger refused “to answer any questions” related to his “political beliefs” and instead interrogated the committee’s right to ask such questions “under such compulsion as this.”

When the playwright Arthur Miller was subpoenaed by the committee in 1956, he also refused to invoke the Fifth. Both were cited for contempt. Seeger was sentenced to a year in prison. Miller was given the option to pay a $500 dollar fine or spend 30 days in jail.

As Seeger and Miller fought their appeals in court, McCarthy’s popularity continued to wane, and public sentiment began to shift.

Prompted by Einstein, the noncompliant witnesses in the 1950s reshaped the public discussion, refocusing the conversation on the importance of freedom of expression rather than the fears of imagined communist infiltration.

Although the First Amendment failed to keep the Hollywood Ten out of prison, it ultimately prevailed. Unlike the Hollywood Ten, both Miller and Seeger won their appeals. Miller spent no time in prison and Seeger only one day in jail. Miller’s conviction was reversed in 1958, Seeger’s in 1962. The Second Red Scare was over.

As the Second Red Scare shows, when free speech is under attack, strategic compliance may be useful for individuals. However, bold and courageous acts of dissent are critical for protecting First Amendment rights for everyone.

I met Pete Seeger personally while directing a documentary film about his environmental legacy.

– ref. First Amendment in flux: When free speech protections came up against the Red Scare – https://theconversation.com/first-amendment-in-flux-when-free-speech-protections-came-up-against-the-red-scare-267809

Source: The Conversation – USA (2) – By Kee Hyun Park, Assistant Professor of International Political Economy, Nanyang Technological University; Institute for Humane Studies

Few political alliances in recent American history have seemed as solid as the one between Donald Trump and the country’s farmers. Through three elections, farmers stood by Trump even as tariffs, trade wars and labor shortages squeezed profits.

But Trump’s second term may be different.

A new round of administration policies now cuts deeper into farmers’ livelihoods – not just squeezing profits but reshaping how farms survive – through renewed tariffs on agricultural products, visa restrictions on farm workers, reduced farm subsidies and open favoritism toward South American agricultural competitors.

In the past, farmers’ loyalty to Trump has overridden economics. In our study of the 2018–19 trade war between the U.S. and China, we found that farmers in Trump-voting counties kept planting soybeans even though the trade war’s effects were clear: Their costs would rise and their profits would fall. Farmers in Democratic-leaning counties, by contrast, shifted acreage toward alternatives such as corn or wheat that were likely to be more profitable. For many pro-Trump farmers, political belief outweighed market logic – at least in the short term.

Today, the economic effects of policies affecting farmers are broader and deeper – and the resolve that carried farmers’ support for Trump through the first trade war may no longer be enough.

Tariffs: The familiar pain returns

The revived U.S.-China trade conflict has again placed soybeans at its center. In March 2025, Beijing suspended import licenses for several major U.S. soybean exporters following new U.S. tariffs on Chinese goods. Trump countered with a new round of reciprocal tariffs, broadening the list of Chinese imports hit and raising rates on already targeted goods.

An October 2025 deal promised China would buy 25 million metric tons of U.S. soybeans a year, but relief has proved mostly symbolic.

Before the 2018-19 trade war, China regularly imported 30 million to 36 million metric tons of U.S. soybeans annually — more than one-third of all American soybean exports. Now, Beijing has signed long-term contracts with Brazil and Argentina, leaving U.S. producers with shrinking overseas demand for their crops.

Prices remain roughly 40% to 50% below pre-2018 levels, and farmers are storing record volumes of unsold soybeans.

In 2019, the federal government cushioned those losses with over $23 billion in bailout payments to farmers. This time, Republican leaders show little appetite for another bailout. Meanwhile, the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s funds for farm relief are running low, leaving farmers with lower prices and less support.

Labor: Fewer hands, higher costs

Farms are also short of workers. Roughly 42% of U.S. crop workers lack legal status, according to the National Agricultural Workers Survey. Tougher immigration enforcement and slower visa processing have thinned the labor pool just as production costs are surging. Hired-labor expenses rose 14.4% from 2021 to 2022 and another 15.2% the following year, and costs such as fertilizer, equipment and parts climbed sharply.

Many growers are turning to the H-2A guest worker program – a legal pipeline for seasonal foreign labor that has quadrupled in size over the past decade. But it is expensive: Farms must pay the adverse effect wage rate, a federally set pay rate that is more than twice the regular federal minimum wage. And farms must provide every H-2A worker with free housing and free transportation to and from the U.S., as well as from their housing to the worksite. Large agribusinesses can absorb those costs; small family farms often cannot.

As exports collapsed in late September 2025, the head of the American Soybean Association wrote a public letter to the White House begging for help, saying, “We’ve had your back. We need you to have ours now.” The hard-line immigration policy approach that rallies rural voters is also pushing smaller farms to the brink – forcing them to ask what their loyalty still buys.

Subsidies and symbolism: The Argentina shock

The question of the value of farmers’ loyalty sharpened in the fall of 2025 when the U.S. Treasury approved a $20 billion currency-swap deal with Argentina – supporting the country’s president, Javier Milei, a political ally of Trump, while the country remains a direct agricultural competitor.

U.S. farmers, already frustrated by low prices and visa delays, took it as an insult. Argentina is among the world’s largest soybean exporters, and U.S. farm groups asked why the federal government would underwrite a competitor while trimming support for American producers at home.

The tension deepened when Trump floated the idea of buying Argentinian beef for U.S. markets – a remark one Kansas rancher called “an absolute betrayal.” The plan may be economically minor, but symbolically it pierced the “America First” narrative that had helped hold the farm vote together.

Clean energy: The new rural subsidy under threat

For decades, the farm vote relied on federally funded support programs – crop insurance, price guarantees and disaster assistance – which account for a significant share of net farm income. Over the past five years, a quieter lifeline has emerged: renewable energy.

Wind and solar projects have brought jobs, tax revenue and steady lease payments to rural counties that have been losing both population and farm income for decades. Iowa now gets about 63% of its electricity from wind, while Texas, Oklahoma and Kansas have seen significant growth.

That momentum has stalled. In August 2025, a U.S. Treasury Department policy change froze billions in rural investment in renewable energy projects. Industry trackers report that prolonged uncertainty has pushed many Midwestern renewable projects into limbo.

For farmers, this isn’t an abstract climate debate — it’s a lost income stream. Leasing land for turbines or solar panels brought in tens of thousands of dollars a year and kept many family farms afloat.

The freeze wipes out one of the few growth engines in rural America and highlights an irony at the heart of Trump’s message: The administration that promises to protect the heartland is dismantling the clean energy investments that were finally helping it diversify.

Politics: How deep does loyalty run?

As our research found, during the first trade war, Trump-voting counties absorbed heavy financial losses without changing course. That loyalty was propped up by subsidies – and by hope. This time, neither cushion is secure.

Many farmers still share Trump’s skepticism of Washington and global elites. But shrinking federal backing, tighter labor and a competitor’s bailout cut close to home. The question now is whether cultural identity can keep outweighing material loss – or whether the second trade war will signal a deeper political shift.

No sudden collapse of rural support for Trump is likely; cultural loyalty doesn’t fade overnight. But strain is visible. Farm groups are quietly pressing for pragmatic trade policy and visa reform, and several Republican governors now lobby for labor flexibility rather than tougher enforcement.

If the first Trump trade war tested farmers’ wallets, this one tests their faith – and faith, once shaken, is far harder to restore.

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Farmers – long Trump backers – bear the costs of new tariffs, restricted immigration and slashed renewable energy subsidies – https://theconversation.com/farmers-long-trump-backers-bear-the-costs-of-new-tariffs-restricted-immigration-and-slashed-renewable-energy-subsidies-269221

Source: The Conversation – USA (2) – By Shelley Mitchell, Senior Extension Specialist in Horticulture and Landscape Architecture, Oklahoma State University

Pecans have a storied history in the United States. Today, American trees produce hundreds of million of pounds of pecans – 80% of the world’s pecan crop. Most of that crop stays here. Pecans are used to produce pecan milk, butter and oil, but many of the nuts end up in pecan pies.

Throughout history, pecans have been overlooked, poached, cultivated and improved. As they have spread throughout the United States, they have been eaten raw and in recipes. Pecans have grown more popular over the decades, and you will probably encounter them in some form this holiday season.

I’m an extension specialist in Oklahoma, a state consistently ranked fifth in pecan production, behind Georgia, New Mexico, Arizona and Texas. I’ll admit that I am not a fan of the taste of pecans, which leaves more for the squirrels, crows and enthusiastic pecan lovers.

The spread of pecans

The pecan is a nut related to the hickory. Actually, though we call them nuts, pecans are actually a type of fruit called a drupe. Drupes have pits, like the peach and cherry.

The pecan nuts that look like little brown footballs are actually the seed that starts inside the pecan fruit – until the fruit ripens and splits open to release the pecan. They are usually the size of your thumb, and you may need a nutcracker to open them. You can eat them raw or as part of a cooked dish.

The pecan derives its name from the Algonquin “pakani,” which means “a nut too hard to crack by hand.” Rich in fat and easy to transport, pecans traveled with Native Americans throughout what is now the southern United States. They were used for food, medicine and trade as early as 8,000 years ago.

Pecans are native to the southern United States, and while they had previously spread along travel and trade routes, the first documented purposeful planting of a pecan tree was in New York in 1722. Three years later, George Washington’s estate, Mount Vernon, had some planted pecans. Washington loved pecans, and Revolutionary War soldiers said he was constantly eating them.

Meanwhile, no one needed to plant pecans in the South, since they naturally grew along riverbanks and in groves. Pecan trees are alternate bearing: They will have a very large crop one year, followed by one or two very small crops. But because they naturally produced a harvest with no input from farmers, people did not need to actively cultivate them. Locals would harvest nuts for themselves but otherwise ignored the self-sufficient trees.

It wasn’t until the late 1800s that people in the pecan’s native range realized the pecan’s potential worth for income and trade. Harvesting pecans became competitive, and young boys would climb onto precarious tree branches. One girl was lifted by a hot air balloon so she could beat on the upper branches of trees and let them fall to collectors below. Pecan poaching was a problem in natural groves on private property.

Pecan cultivation begins

Even with so obvious a demand, cultivated orchards in the South were still rare into the 1900s. Pecan trees don’t produce nuts for several years after planting, so their future quality is unknown.

To guarantee quality nuts, farmers began using a technique called grafting; they’d join branches from quality trees to another pecan tree’s trunk. The first attempt at grafting pecans was in 1822, but the attempts weren’t very successful.

Grafting pecans became popular after an enslaved man named Antoine who lived on a Louisiana plantation successfully produced large pecans with tender shells by grafting, around 1846. His pecans became the first widely available improved pecan variety.

The variety was named Centennial because it was introduced to the public 30 years later at the Philadelphia Centennial Expedition in 1876, alongside the telephone, Heinz ketchup and the right arm of the Statue of Liberty.

This technique also sped up the production process. To keep pecan quality up and produce consistent annual harvests, today’s pecan growers shake the trees while the nuts are still growing, until about half of the pecans fall off. This reduces the number of nuts so that the tree can put more energy into fewer pecans, which leads to better quality. Shaking also evens out the yield, so that the alternate-bearing characteristic doesn’t create a boom-bust cycle.

US pecan consumption

The French brought praline dessert with them when they immigrated to Louisiana in the early 1700s. A praline is a flat, creamy candy made with nuts, sugar, butter and cream. Their original recipe used almonds, but at the time, the only nut available in America was the pecan, so pecan pralines were born.

During the Civil War and world wars, Americans consumed pecans in large quantities because they were a protein-packed alternative when meat was expensive and scarce. One ounce of pecans has the same amount of protein as 2 ounces of meat.

After the wars, pecan demand declined, resulting in millions of excess pounds at harvest. One effort to increase demand was a national pecan recipe contest in 1924. Over 21,000 submissions came from over 5,000 cooks, with 800 of them published in a book.

Pecan consumption went up with the inclusion of pecans in commercially prepared foods and the start of the mail-order industry in the 1870s, as pecans can be shipped and stored at room temperature. That characteristic also put them on some Apollo missions. Small amounts of pecans contain many vitamins and minerals. They became commonplace in cereals, which touted their health benefits.

In 1938, the federal government published the pamphlet Nuts and How to Use Them, which touted pecans’ nutritional value and came with recipes. Food writers suggested using pecans as shortening because they are composed mostly of fat.

The government even put a price ceiling on pecans to encourage consumption, but consumers weren’t buying them. The government ended up buying the surplus pecans and integrating them into the National School Lunch Program.

While you are sitting around the Thanksgiving table this year, you can discuss one of the biggest controversies in the pecan industry: Are they PEE-cans or puh-KAHNS?

Shelley Mitchell does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. How pecans went from ignored trees to a holiday staple – the 8,000-year history of America’s only native major nut crop – https://theconversation.com/how-pecans-went-from-ignored-trees-to-a-holiday-staple-the-8-000-year-history-of-americas-only-native-major-nut-crop-268976

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Alex Hinton, Distinguished Professor of Anthropology; Director, Center for the Study of Genocide and Human Rights, Rutgers University – Newark

With the latest shift by President Donald Trump on releasing the Epstein files held by the U.S. Department of Justice – he’s now for it after being against it after being for it – the MAGA base may finally get to view the documents it’s long wanted to see. On the afternoon of Nov. 18, 2025, the House voted overwhelmingly to seek release of the files, with only one Republican voting against the measure. The Senate later in the day agreed unanimously to pass the measure and send it on to the president for his signature. The Conversation’s politics editor, Naomi Schalit, talked with scholar Alex Hinton, who has studied MAGA for years, about Make America Great Again Republicans’ sustained interest in the case of accused child sex trafficker Jeffrey Epstein. Hinton explains how MAGA’s interest in the case fits into what he knows about the group of die-hard Trump supporters.

You are an expert on MAGA. How do you learn what you know about MAGA?

I’m a cultural anthropologist, and what we do is field work. We go where the people we’re studying live, act, talk. We observe and sort of hang out and see what happens. We listen and then we unpack themes. We try and understand the meaning systems that undergird whatever group we’re studying. And then, of course, there’s interviewing.

It appears that MAGA, Trump’s core supporters, are very concerned about various aspects of the Epstein story, including the release of documents that are in the possession of the U.S. government. Are they, in fact, concerned about this?

The answer is yes, but there’s also a sort of “no” implicit, too. We need to back up and think, first of all, what is MAGA.

I think of it as what we call in anthropology a nativist movement, a foregrounding of the people in the land. And this is where you get America First discourse. It’s also xenophobic, meaning that there’s a fear of outsiders, invaders coming in. It’s populist, so it’s something that’s sort of for the people.

Tucker Carlson interviewed Marjorie Taylor Greene, and he said, “I’m going to go over the five pillars of MAGA.” Those were America First, this is absolutely central. Borders was the second. You’ve got to secure the borders. The third was globalist antipathy, or a recognition that globalization has failed. Another one was free speech, and another one he mentioned was no more foreign wars. And I would add into that an emphasis on “we the people” versus elites.

Each of those is interwoven with a key dynamic to MAGA, which is conspiracy theory. And those conspiracy theories are usually anti-elite, going back to we the people.

If you look at Epstein, he’s where many of the conspiracy theories converge: Stop the Steal, The Big Lie, lawfare, deep state, replacement theory. Epstein kind of hits all of these, that there’s this elite cabal that’s orchestrating things that ultimately are against the interests of we the people, with a sort of antisemitic strain to this. And in particular, if we go back to Pizzagate in 2016, this conspiracy theory that there were these Democratic elitists who were, you know, demonic forces who were sex trafficking, and lo and behold, here’s Epstein doing precisely that.

There’s kind of a bucket of these things, and Epstein is more in it than not in it?

He’s all over it. He’s been there, you know, from the beginning, because he’s elite and they believe he’s doing sex trafficking. And then there’s a suspicion of the deep state, of the government, and this means cover-ups. What was MAGA promised? Trump said, we’re going to give you the goods, right? Kash Patel, Pam Bondi, everyone said we’re going to tell you this stuff. And it sure smacks of a cover-up, if you just look at it.

But the bottom line is there’s a realization among many people in MAGA that you’ve got to stay with Trump. It’s too much to say there is no MAGA without Trump. There’s certainly no Trumpism without Trump, but MAGA without Trump would be like the tea party. It’ll just sort of fade away without Trump.

People in MAGA are supporting Trump more than more mainstream Republicans on this. So I don’t think there’s going to be a break over this, but it certainly adds strain. And you can see in the current moment that Trump is under some strain.

The break that we are seeing is Trump breaking with one of his leading MAGA supporters, Marjorie Taylor Greene, not the MAGA supporter breaking with Trump.

With Greene, sometimes it’s like a yo-yo in a relationship with Trump. You fall apart, you have tension, and then you sort of get back. Elon Musk was a little bit like that. You have this breakup, and now she’s sort of backtracking like Elon Musk did. I don’t think what is happening is indicative of a larger fracturing that’s going to take place with MAGA.

It seems that Trump did his about-face on releasing the documents so that MAGA doesn’t have to break with him.

It’s absolutely true. He’s incredible at taking any story and turning it in his direction. He’s sort of like a chess player, unless he blurts something out. He’s a couple of moves ahead of wherever, whatever’s running, and so in a way we’re always behind, and he knows where we are. It’s incredible that he’s able to do this.

There’s one other thing about MAGA. I think of it as “don’t cross the boss.” It’s this sort of overzealous love of Trump that has to be expressed, and literally no one ever crosses the boss in these contexts. You toe the line, and if you go against the line, you know what happened to Marjorie Taylor Greene, there’s the threat Trump is going to disown you. You’re going to get primaried.

Trump has probably made a brilliant strategic move, which is suddenly to say, “I’m all for releasing it. It’s actually the Democrats who are these evil elites, and now we’re going to investigate Bill Clinton and all these other Democrats.” He takes over the narrative, he knows how to do it, and it’s intentional. Whoever says Trump is not charismatic, he doesn’t make sense – Trump is highly charismatic. He can move a crowd. He knows what he’s doing. Never underestimate him.

Does MAGA care about girls who were sexually abused?

There is concern, you know, especially among the devout Christians in MAGA, for whom sex trafficking is a huge issue.

I think if you look at sort of notions of Christian morality, it also goes to notions of sort of innocence, being afflicted by demonic forces. And it’s an attack on we the people by those elites; it’s a violation of rights. I mean, who isn’t horrified by the idea of sex trafficking? But again, especially in the Christian circles, this is a huge issue.

Alex Hinton receives funding from the Rutgers-Newark Sheila Y. Oliver Center for Politics and Race in America, Rutgers Research Council, and Henry Frank Guggenheim Foundation.

– ref. Why MAGA is so concerned with Epstein − and why the files are unlikely to dent loyalty to Trump – https://theconversation.com/why-maga-is-so-concerned-with-epstein-and-why-the-files-are-unlikely-to-dent-loyalty-to-trump-270109

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Morgan Underwood, Ph.D. Candidate in Earth, Environmental and Planetary Sciences, Rice University

When astronomers search for planets that could host liquid water on their surface, they start by looking at a star’s habitable zone. Water is a key ingredient for life, and on a planet too close to its star, water on its surface may “boil”; too far, and it could freeze. This zone marks the region in between.

But being in this sweet spot doesn’t automatically mean a planet is hospitable to life. Other factors, like whether a planet is geologically active or has processes that regulate gases in its atmosphere, play a role.

The habitable zone provides a useful guide to search for signs of life on exoplanets – planets outside our solar system orbiting other stars. But what’s in these planets’ atmospheres holds the next clue about whether liquid water — and possibly life — exists beyond Earth.

On Earth, the greenhouse effect, caused by gases like carbon dioxide and water vapor, keeps the planet warm enough for liquid water and life as we know it. Without an atmosphere, Earth’s surface temperature would average around zero degrees Fahrenheit (minus 18 degrees Celsius), far below the freezing point of water.

The boundaries of the habitable zone are defined by how much of a “greenhouse effect” is necessary to maintain the surface temperatures that allow for liquid water to persist. It’s a balance between sunlight and atmospheric warming.

Many planetary scientists, including me, are seeking to understand if the processes responsible for regulating Earth’s climate are operating on other habitable zone worlds. We use what we know about Earth’s geology and climate to predict how these processes might appear elsewhere, which is where my geoscience expertise comes in.

Why the habitable zone?

The habitable zone is a simple and powerful idea, and for good reason. It provides a starting point, directing astronomers to where they might expect to find planets with liquid water, without needing to know every detail about the planet’s atmosphere or history.

Its definition is partially informed by what scientists know about Earth’s rocky neighbors. Mars, which lies just outside the outer edge of the habitable zone, shows clear evidence of ancient rivers and lakes where liquid water once flowed.

Similarly, Venus is currently too close to the Sun to be within the habitable zone. Yet, some geochemical evidence and modeling studies suggest Venus may have had water in its past, though how much and for how long remains uncertain.

These examples show that while the habitable zone is not a perfect predictor of habitability, it provides a useful starting point.

Planetary processes can inform habitability

What the habitable zone doesn’t do is determine whether a planet can sustain habitable conditions over long periods of time. On Earth, a stable climate allowed life to emerge and persist. Liquid water could remain on the surface, giving slow chemical reactions enough time to build the molecules of life and let early ecosystems develop resilience to change, which reinforced habitability.

Life emerged on Earth, but continued to reshape the environments it evolved in, making them more conducive to life.

This stability likely unfolded over hundreds of millions of years, as the planet’s surface, oceans and atmosphere worked together as part of a slow but powerful system to regulate Earth’s temperature.

A key part of this system is how Earth recycles inorganic carbon between the atmosphere, surface and oceans over the course of millions of years. Inorganic carbon refers to carbon bound in atmospheric gases, dissolved in seawater or locked in minerals, rather than biological material. This part of the carbon cycle acts like a natural thermostat. When volcanoes release carbon dioxide into the atmosphere, the carbon dioxide molecules trap heat and warm the planet. As temperatures rise, rain and weathering draw carbon out of the air and store it in rocks and oceans.

If the planet cools, this process slows down, allowing carbon dioxide, a warming greenhouse gas, to build up in the atmosphere again. This part of the carbon cycle has helped Earth recover from past ice ages and avoid runaway warming.

Even as the Sun has gradually brightened, this cycle has contributed to keeping temperatures on Earth within a range where liquid water and life can persist for long spans of time.

Now, scientists are asking whether similar geological processes might operate on other planets, and if so, how they might detect them. For example, if researchers could observe enough rocky planets in their stars’ habitable zones, they could look for a pattern connecting the amount of sunlight a planet receives and how much carbon dioxide is in its atmosphere. Finding such a pattern may hint that the same kind of carbon-cycling process could be operating elsewhere.

The mix of gases in a planet’s atmosphere is shaped by what’s happening on or below its surface. One study shows that measuring atmospheric carbon dioxide in a number of rocky planets could reveal whether their surfaces are broken into a number of moving plates, like Earth’s, or if their crusts are more rigid. On Earth, these shifting plates drive volcanism and rock weathering, which are key to carbon cycling.

Keeping an eye on distant atmospheres

The next step will be toward gaining a population-level perspective of planets in their stars’ habitable zones. By analyzing atmospheric data from many rocky planets, researchers can look for trends that reveal the influence of underlying planetary processes, such as the carbon cycle.

Scientists could then compare these patterns with a planet’s position in the habitable zone. Doing so would allow them to test whether the zone accurately predicts where habitable conditions are possible, or whether some planets maintain conditions suitable for liquid water beyond the zone’s edges.

This kind of approach is especially important given the diversity of exoplanets. Many exoplanets fall into categories that don’t exist in our solar system — such as super Earths and mini Neptunes. Others orbit stars smaller and cooler than the Sun.

The datasets needed to explore and understand this diversity are just on the horizon. NASA’s upcoming Habitable Worlds Observatory will be the first space telescope designed specifically to search for signs of habitability and life on planets orbiting other stars. It will directly image Earth-sized planets around Sun-like stars to study their atmospheres in detail.

Instruments on the observatory will analyze starlight passing through these atmospheres to detect gases like carbon dioxide, methane, water vapor and oxygen. As starlight filters through a planet’s atmosphere, different molecules absorb specific wavelengths of light, leaving behind a chemical fingerprint that reveals which gases are present. These compounds offer insight into the processes shaping these worlds.

The Habitable Worlds Observatory is under active scientific and engineering development, with a potential launch targeted for the 2040s. Combined with today’s telescopes, which are increasingly capable of observing atmospheres of Earth-sized worlds, scientists may soon be able to determine whether the same planetary processes that regulate Earth’s climate are common throughout the galaxy, or uniquely our own.

Morgan Underwood receives funding from NASA-funded CLEVER Planets (Cycles of Life-Essential Volatile Elements in Rocky Planets) research project.

– ref. Beyond the habitable zone: Exoplanet atmospheres are the next clue to finding life on planets orbiting distant stars – https://theconversation.com/beyond-the-habitable-zone-exoplanet-atmospheres-are-the-next-clue-to-finding-life-on-planets-orbiting-distant-stars-267498

Source: The Conversation – USA (2) – By Shannon Gibson, Professor of Environmental Studies, Political Science and International Relations, USC Dornsife College of Letters, Arts and Sciences

When Hurricane Melissa tore through the Caribbean in October 2025, it left a trail of destruction. The Category 5 storm damaged buildings in Jamaica, Haiti and Cuba, snapped power lines and cut off entire neighborhoods from hospitals and aid.

Jamaica’s regional tourism, fishing and agriculture industries – still recovering from Hurricane Beryl a year earlier – were crippled.

Melissa’s damage has been estimated at US$6 billion to $7 billion in Jamaica alone, about 30% of the island nation’s gross domestic product. While the country has a disaster risk plan designed to help it quickly raise several hundred million dollars, the damage from Melissa far exceeds that amount.

Whether Caribbean nations can recover from Melissa’s destruction and adapt to future climate change risks without taking on debilitating debt will depend in part on a big global promise: climate finance.

Developed countries that grew wealthy from burning fossil fuels, the leading driver of climate change, have pledged billions of dollars a year to help ecologically vulnerable nations like Jamaica, Haiti and Cuba adapt to rising seas and stronger storms and rebuild after disasters worsened by climate change.

In 2024, they committed to boost climate finance from $100 billion a year to at least $300 billion a year by 2035, and to work toward $1.3 trillion annually from a wide spectrum of public and private sources.

But if the world is pouring billions into climate finance, why are developing countries still struggling with recovery costs?

I study the dynamics of global environmental and climate politics, including the United Nations climate negotiations, and my lab has been following the climate money.

Governments at the U.N. climate conference in Brazil have been negotiating a plan to get closer to $1.3 trillion by 2035 and make it easier for developing countries to access funds. But the world’s climate finance so far has rested on a shaky foundation of fuzzy accounting, one where funding for airports, hotels and even ice cream stores is being counted as climate finance.

Cooking the climate finance books

Wealthy nations first promised in 2009 to raise $100 billion a year in climate finance for developing countries by 2020. Whether they hit that target in 2022, as claimed, is up for debate.

Researchers have found many cases where the reported numbers were inflated, largely due to relabeling of general aid that was already being provided and calling it “climate aid.”

The United Kingdom, for example, claims it is on track to meet its £11.6 billion (about $15.2 billion) pledge, but it is doing so in part by reclassifying existing humanitarian and development aid as “climate finance.”

This practice undermines the principle of additionality – the idea that climate finance should represent “new and additional” resources beyond traditional aid, and not simply be a new label on funds already planned for other purposes.

An analysis by the climate news site Carbon Brief suggests that to truly meet its target, the U.K. would need to provide 78% more than it currently does.

The U.K.’s “creative accounting” is not a one-off.

The Center for Global Development estimates that at least one-third of the new public climate funds in 2022 actually came from existing aid budgets. In some cases, the money had been shifted to climate adaptation projects, but often development projects were relabeled as “climate finance.”

What’s counted as climate finance comes from a mix of sources and is predominantly provided through loans and grants. Some funding is bilateral, flowing directly from one country to another. Some is multilateral and distributed through organizations such as the World Bank or the Green Climate Fund that are funded by the world’s governments. Money from private investors and corporations can also count in this growing but fragmented system.

Countries providing the assistance have been able to stretch the definition of climate finance so they can count almost any project, including some that have little to do with reducing emissions or helping communities adapt.

Fossil fuels, hotels and ice cream stores

When it comes to climate finance, the devil is in the project details.

Take Japan, for example. In 2020, its state-backed Japan Bank for International Cooperation used an environmental fund to finance a 1,200-megawatt coal plant in central Vietnam. That power plant will emit far more air pollution than Japan would allow for a power plant within its own borders.

The same bank labeled an airport expansion in Egypt as “eco-friendly” because it included solar panels and LED lights.

In some cases, these projects increase greenhouse gas emissions, rather than lowering them.

For instance, Japan funded an airport expansion in Papua New Guinea that it labeled as climate finance because it was expected to reduce fuel use. However, an analysis by the International Council on Clean Transportation, used in Reuters’ analysis, found that if the airport meets passenger targets in its first three years, emissions from outbound flights will rise by an estimated 90% over 2013 levels.

Similarly, Italy claimed $4.7 million as climate finance for helping a chocolate and ice cream company expand into Asia by saying that the project had a “climate component.” And the U.S. counted a $19.5 million Marriott Hotel development in Haiti as “climate finance” because the hotel project included stormwater control and hurricane protection measures.

These are not isolated examples. Reuters reviewed climate finance documents it received from 27 countries and found that at least $3 billion labeled as climate finance went to projects that had little or nothing to do with fighting or recovering from climate change. That included movie financing, coal plant construction and crime prevention programs.

For many of these projects, the money comes in the form of loans, which means the developed country that provided the loan will make money off the interest.

Why fixing climate finance matters

A central test for the success of international climate talks will be whether governments can finally agree on a shared definition of “climate finance,” one that protects the interests of vulnerable countries and avoids creating long-term debt.

Without that clear definition, donor countries can continue to count marginal or loosely related investments as climate finance.

There are plenty of examples that show how targeted climate finance can help vulnerable countries cut emissions, adapt to rising risks and recover from climate-driven disasters. It has helped saved lives in Bangladesh with early warning systems and storm shelters, and improved crop resistance to worsening drought in Kenya, among other projects.

But when governments and banks count existing development projects and fossil fuel upgrades as “climate investments,” the result is an illusion of progress while developing countries face worsening climate risks. At the same time, wealthy countries are still spending hundreds of billions of dollars on fossil fuel subsidies, which further drive climate change.

For countries from Jamaica and Bangladesh to the Maldives, the threats from climate change are existential. Every misreported or “creatively counted” climate finance dollar means slower recovery, lost livelihoods and longer waits for clean water and electricity after the next storm.

University of Southern California environmental science students Nickole Aguilar Cortes and Brandon Kim contributed to this article.

Shannon Gibson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. How climate finance to help poor countries became a global shell game – donors have counted fossil fuel projects, airports and even ice cream shops – https://theconversation.com/how-climate-finance-to-help-poor-countries-became-a-global-shell-game-donors-have-counted-fossil-fuel-projects-airports-and-even-ice-cream-shops-268764

Source: The Conversation – USA (2) – By Shiri Melumad, Assistant Professor of Marketing, University of Pennsylvania

Since the release of ChatGPT in late 2022, millions of people have started using large language models to access knowledge. And it’s easy to understand their appeal: Ask a question, get a polished synthesis and move on – it feels like effortless learning.

However, a new paper I co-authored offers experimental evidence that this ease may come at a cost: When people rely on large language models to summarize information on a topic for them, they tend to develop shallower knowledge about it compared to learning through a standard Google search.

Co-author Jin Ho Yun and I, both professors of marketing, reported this finding in a paper based on seven studies with more than 10,000 participants. Most of the studies used the same basic paradigm: Participants were asked to learn about a topic – such as how to grow a vegetable garden – and were randomly assigned to do so by using either an LLM like ChatGPT or the “old-fashioned way,” by navigating links using a standard Google search.

No restrictions were put on how they used the tools; they could search on Google as long as they wanted and could continue to prompt ChatGPT if they felt they wanted more information. Once they completed their research, they were then asked to write advice to a friend on the topic based on what they learned.

The data revealed a consistent pattern: People who learned about a topic through an LLM versus web search felt that they learned less, invested less effort in subsequently writing their advice, and ultimately wrote advice that was shorter, less factual and more generic. In turn, when this advice was presented to an independent sample of readers, who were unaware of which tool had been used to learn about the topic, they found the advice to be less informative, less helpful, and they were less likely to adopt it.

We found these differences to be robust across a variety of contexts. For example, one possible reason LLM users wrote briefer and more generic advice is simply that the LLM results exposed users to less eclectic information than the Google results. To control for this possibility, we conducted an experiment where participants were exposed to an identical set of facts in the results of their Google and ChatGPT searches. Likewise, in another experiment we held constant the search platform – Google – and varied whether participants learned from standard Google results or Google’s AI Overview feature.

The findings confirmed that, even when holding the facts and platform constant, learning from synthesized LLM responses led to shallower knowledge compared to gathering, interpreting and synthesizing information for oneself via standard web links.

Why it matters

Why did the use of LLMs appear to diminish learning? One of the most fundamental principles of skill development is that people learn best when they are actively engaged with the material they are trying to learn.

When we learn about a topic through Google search, we face much more “friction”: We must navigate different web links, read informational sources, and interpret and synthesize them ourselves.

While more challenging, this friction leads to the development of a deeper, more original mental representation of the topic at hand. But with LLMs, this entire process is done on the user’s behalf, transforming learning from a more active to passive process.

What’s next?

To be clear, we do not believe the solution to these issues is to avoid using LLMs, especially given the undeniable benefits they offer in many contexts. Rather, our message is that people simply need to become smarter or more strategic users of LLMs – which starts by understanding the domains wherein LLMs are beneficial versus harmful to their goals.

Need a quick, factual answer to a question? Feel free to use your favorite AI co-pilot. But if your aim is to develop deep and generalizable knowledge in an area, relying on LLM syntheses alone will be less helpful.

As part of my research on the psychology of new technology and new media, I am also interested in whether it’s possible to make LLM learning a more active process. In another experiment we tested this by having participants engage with a specialized GPT model that offered real-time web links alongside its synthesized responses. There, however, we found that once participants received an LLM summary, they weren’t motivated to dig deeper into the original sources. The result was that the participants still developed shallower knowledge compared to those who used standard Google.

Building on this, in my future research I plan to study generative AI tools that impose healthy frictions for learning tasks – specifically, examining which types of guardrails or speed bumps most successfully motivate users to actively learn more beyond easy, synthesized answers. Such tools would seem particularly critical in secondary education, where a major challenge for educators is how best to equip students to develop foundational reading, writing and math skills while also preparing for a real world where LLMs are likely to be an integral part of their daily lives.

The Research Brief is a short take on interesting academic work.

Shiri Melumad does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Learning with AI falls short compared to old-fashioned web search – https://theconversation.com/learning-with-ai-falls-short-compared-to-old-fashioned-web-search-269760

Source: The Conversation – USA (3) – By Stephen Neely, Associate Professor of Public Affairs, University of South Florida

Over 40 million American adults – approximately 19% – live with an anxiety disorder, according to the National Institutes of Health.

Studies show this anxiety is most prevalent in young people. In recent years, social psychologists such as Jonathan Haidt have started to draw connections between tech use and anxiety. They argue that the ubiquity of smartphones and social media may affect not only the habits and emotions of young people but also key aspects of their brain development during adolescence.

Maintaining a constant online presence can result in excessive social comparison, disrupted sleep, fragmented attention and increased exposure to cyberbullying – all of which can increase the prevalence of anxiety.

We’re public health and policy researchers with an interest in mental health. We understand that this problem goes well beyond youthful angst. Evidence increasingly links this type of prolonged anxiety to a number of detrimental health issues, including weakened immune function, increased cardiovascular risk and impaired cognitive performance. Over time, these effects can increase the risk of chronic illness and other negative health outcomes.

So, in May 2025 we conducted our own survey to measure the prevalence of anxiety in the state where we live, Florida, and explore whether it is, in fact, related to age and social media use.

What our survey asked

We surveyed 500 adults, and we designed our research to ensure that our survey group matched the state’s population in terms of age, race, gender, political affiliation and geographic distribution.

We used a questionnaire called the GAD-7, which was developed by mental health professionals to assess symptoms of generalized anxiety disorder. The GAD-7 asks participants to identify how bothered they were about seven items during the past two weeks. They answered on a four-point scale, from “not at all” to “nearly everyday.” These seven items included questions on worrying, irritability, restlessness and feeling afraid or on edge.

A score under 10 indicates minimal (0-4) or mild (5-9) anxiety. Those who score between 10 and 14 exhibit moderate anxiety, while a score of 15 or higher is indicative of a severe anxiety disorder.

The difference between moderate and severe generalized anxiety corresponds to how often the participant experiences any of the seven items. For example, someone with severe generalized anxiety might experience all seven items nearly every day, while someone with moderate generalized anxiety might have experienced some of the items several days in the past two weeks.

We also asked participants about how much time they spend on social media platforms, such as Facebook, Instagram and TikTok, and how they feel while using these platforms.

What we found

Our survey found that roughly 1 in 5 Floridians are struggling with moderate to severe anxiety, which is consistent with national statistics.

While the average GAD-7 score was 4.74 – this would indicate that the “average” Floridian doesn’t have an anxiety disorder – 18.6% of participants reported symptoms of at least moderate anxiety, with nearly half of them rising to the level of severe.

This result tells us that nearly 3.5 million Floridians may suffer from clinically significant anxiety.

Members of Generation Z, ages 18 to 27 in our sample, reported the highest rates of anxiety by a significant margin. In fact, the average GAD-7 score for this group was 8.17 – just below the threshold for moderate anxiety – compared with an average of 6.50 for millennials, 5.32 for Gen Xers and 3.04 for baby boomers.

These averages track with previous nationwide studies, which have found that the portion of the U.S. adult population that suffers the most anxiety are members of Gen Z. According to a study conducted in 2020, 30.9% of adults ages 18 to 23 reported generalized anxiety disorder symptoms, compared to only 27.9% of millennials, 17.2% of Gen Xers and 8.1% of baby boomers.

Social media and anxiety in Gen Z

In order to understand whether social media use might help explain the higher rates of anxiety we observed among younger Floridians, we examined the relationship between time spent on social media and anxiety.

In general, those who didn’t use social media at all reported lower levels of anxiety, with an average GAD-7 score of 3.56. In comparison, the average GAD-7 score for those who use social media less than one hour per week was 3.74, and it rose consistently as social media use increased, climbing to an average of 6.10 among those who spent seven to nine hours a week on social media, and 7.08 for those who were logged on for 10 hours or more.

While time spent was important, the reasons why Floridians use social media also made a big difference in whether they experienced anxiety. Anxiety was lowest among those who use social media primarily to stay connected with family and friends. But it rose significantly among those who use social media to stay up to date with current trends and pop culture or to learn about health, fitness and beauty trends.

We also asked respondents whether they “sometimes feel like they’re missing out when they see what others post on social media.” Among those who agreed that they sometimes get social media FOMO, average anxiety scores ranged between 7.26 and 9.00. But among those who disagreed, average scores were significantly lower – 4.16 or less.

Time spent on social media matters for young people

In this data, we see a clear correlation between social media use and heightened anxiety, and we also see a greater tendency for Gen Zers and millennials to report higher levels of anxiety. This makes sense, given that younger people generally spend more time on social media.

But one important question remained to be answered: Can reducing social media use lead to lower rates of anxiety for the youngest adults?

In order to answer this question, we reexamined the relationship between average weekly social media use and anxiety. But this time, we restricted the analysis to only those respondents who were members of the Gen Z and millennial groups.

Even when the study was restricted to just these two groups, we found a clear and decisive link between social media use and anxiety. Those who reported spending less than one hour on social media each week had average GAD-7 scores of 2.89. Those scores rose consistently as time on social media increased, reaching a high of 8.73 among those who use social media 10 hours or more per week.

Moderating intake to bring down anxiety

The results of our survey appear to confirm the suspicions of social psychologists and techno-critics – namely, that the high rates of anxiety observed among younger Americans appear to be connected to their time online. This is particularly true for those spending time in digital spaces that facilitate social comparison and information overload.

We cannot be sure from just this survey that social media alone is to blame for increased generalized anxiety. Other factors may be involved, such as digital information overload and a decline in person-to-person contact. But the amount of time spent on social media does appear to be affecting the mental health of young people in Florida.

One potential solution may be to moderate intake. Some emerging research has suggested setting up automated daily reminders to limit social media use to 30 minutes a day. Another suggestion includes occasionally taking a monthlong break from social media.

Those who feel they need more support taking time off social media may benefit from seeking professional help, such as talking with a licensed therapist.

Read more stories from The Conversation about Florida.

Stephen Neely receives funding from the Florida Center for Cybersecurity for this study

Kaila Witkowski receives funding from the Florida Center for Cybersecurity for this study.

– ref. Florida residents’ anxiety is linked to social media use and varies with age, new study shows – https://theconversation.com/florida-residents-anxiety-is-linked-to-social-media-use-and-varies-with-age-new-study-shows-263010