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July 5, 2025

We set out to improve literacy among struggling readers in Kenya – what we learnt

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Fridah Gatwiri Kiambati, Post Doctoral research scientist, African Population and Health Research Center

Literacy – being able to read, write and understand written or spoken language – is a cornerstone of educational achievement. Yet, for millions of children worldwide, acquiring basic literacy skills is a significant challenge.

This is a result of systemic inequalities, poverty, conflict, displacement and gender disparities. A Unicef report on global literacy levels in 2023 found that 89% of 10-year-olds in sub-Saharan Africa were unable to read or comprehend a basic story.

In Kenya, the gap in foundational literacy is stark. A nationwide evaluation of over 44,000 children across 1,973 primary schools in 2023 found that three in 10 grade 6 learners aged 11 struggled to read grade 3-level (age 8) texts.

These numbers highlight the critical need to address reading difficulties in early grades to ensure that learners do not fall behind irretrievably.

When learners aren’t able to read, they are likely to fall behind in literacy and other learning areas. This is because foundational learning skills – which include literacy (reading) and numeracy (basic maths) – are the building blocks for learning in later years of schooling and for lifelong learning.

I am an inclusive education researcher. I was involved in the Developing Readers Study. It set out to design and pilot an intervention to improve literacy skills among grade 2 and 3 learners who are furthest behind in reading.

The study, implemented by the African Population and Health Research Center, was aimed at providing policy-relevant evidence on how support for struggling readers can be formally and systematically incorporated into school timetables and education systems.

In 13 weeks, more than a third of the learners had become fluent readers.

The study

The Developing Readers Study was implemented in 15 schools in Kiambu County, which neighbours the Kenyan capital Nairobi. This was strategic to design, test and refine the intervention before scaling up.

The intervention started with the preparation of instruction materials. These included a teachers’ guide and assessment booklet, as well as homework packets for the learners. Teachers were trained on how to deliver the structured intervention while accommodating individual learner needs.

Learners were assessed to identify those with reading difficulties. Out of 2,805 learners from 15 schools screened, 920 (33%) learners had reading difficulties.

They were then categorised into three groups as per their reading levels at baseline:

module 1 for non-readers, who numbered 410 (45%)
module 2 for beginning readers, who could read 1-9 correct words per minute (212 learners, or 23%)
module 3 for intermediate readers who could read 10-16 correct words per minute (298 learners, or 32%).

The learners were then taken through remedial lessons for English and Kiswahili for 13 weeks. Each lesson lasted 30 minutes. During the intervention period, teachers received support from curriculum support officers, and quality assurance and standards officers in Kiambu County.

In addition, these officers observed the lessons to identify the support needed. Cluster meetings were held to gather teacher feedback on the implementation process.

Parents were also engaged through homework packets. This encouraged a supportive home environment for learning.

The results

The study led to significant improvements in literacy outcomes among participating learners over the 13 weeks.

The proportion of non-readers who couldn’t read any correct word per minute reduced from 43.3% (following a few dropouts) to 18.9% at endline. This improvement highlights the power of targeted instruction to transform learning outcomes for struggling readers.
Both boys and girls benefited from the programme. However, girls consistently outperformed boys in tasks like syllable and oral passage reading. These insights highlight the importance of designing interventions that address gender-specific learning needs.
The programme equipped teachers with practical tools and strategies to give learners individual attention according to their needs. By the endline assessment, 92% of teachers were closely following the structured lesson guides, demonstrating increased confidence and competence.
Parents played a pivotal role in the programme’s success. Weekly homework packets provided opportunities for learners to practise reading at home.
Over a third of the learners (37%) advanced to emergent and fluent reading levels, meaning they no longer required remedial support. This progression was particularly notable among younger learners in grade 2, underscoring the value of early intervention.

The developing readers intervention stands out because it goes beyond addressing literacy challenges at the classroom level. It also brought in education officials, rigorous teacher training and contextualised learning materials.

Its findings demonstrate that structured, targeted interventions can effectively address foundational literacy gaps. This same model can be used elsewhere.

What next

The study provides a roadmap for addressing Kenya’s literacy crisis. Its positive outcomes demonstrate that early, targeted interventions can put struggling readers on the path to success.

Scaling up this programme offers an opportunity to ensure no child is left behind in acquiring foundational literacy skills.

To achieve this, policymakers must make sure remedial interventions take place at schools. They must also provide resources for teacher training and promote home-school collaboration.

With sustained investment and a commitment to evidence-based strategies, Kenya can bridge its literacy gap and pave the way for a brighter future for its learners.

Fridah Gatwiri Kiambati works for the African Population and Health Research Center. The Developing Readers Study, which this article is based was funded by the Gates foundation.

– ref. We set out to improve literacy among struggling readers in Kenya – what we learnt – https://theconversation.com/we-set-out-to-improve-literacy-among-struggling-readers-in-kenya-what-we-learnt-253252

July 5, 2025

AI can be a danger to students – 3 things universities must do

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Sioux McKenna, Professor of Higher Education, Rhodes University, South Africa, Rhodes University

Generative artificial intelligence (AI) is trained on enormous bodies of text, video and images to identify patterns. It then creates new texts, videos and images on the basis of this pattern identification. Thanks to machine learning, it improves its ability to do so every time it is used.

As AI becomes embedded in academic life, a troubling reality has emerged: students are extremely vulnerable to its use. They don’t know enough about what AI is to be alert to its shortcomings. And they don’t know enough about their subject content to make judgements on this anyway. Most importantly, they don’t know what they don’t know.

As two academics involved in higher education teaching, we argue that there are four key dangers facing students in today’s world of AI. They are:

blind trust in its abilities
using it to side-step actual learning
not knowing how it works
perpetuating the gap between expertise and uncritical yet confident noise.

Given our experiences as academics who have developed curricula for students and who research generative AI, we think there are three things universities can do. They should teach critical AI literacy, emphasise why developing knowledge is important, and teach students why being an expert matters if they’re going to engage meaningfully with AI.

The four dangers

Blind trust in AI’s false confidence. A recent Microsoft report showed that those who know the least about a topic are the most likely to accept AI outputs as correct. Generative AI programs like ChatGPT and Claude produce text with remarkable confidence. Students lacking domain expertise can’t identify when these systems are completely wrong.

Headlines already demonstrate the consequences of this in the workplace: lawyers submitting fabricated case citations generated by AI, and hospitals using AI transcription tools that invent statements never actually made.

Generative AI can get it wrong because it doesn’t understand anything in the human sense of the word. But it can identify and replicate patterns with remarkable sophistication. These patterns include not only words and ideas but also tone and style.

Missing the power of education. A core purpose of higher education is to give students a new way of understanding the world and their place in it. When students use AI in ways that sidestep intellectual challenges, they miss this essential transformation.

When students simply outsource their thinking to AI, they’re getting credentials without competence. They might graduate with degrees but without knowledge and expertise.

The false confidence trap. Even students who develop critical awareness about AI’s limitations face what Punya Mishra, a learning engineer professor at Arizona State University, calls “the false confidence trap”. They might recognise that AI can produce errors but lack sufficient subject knowledge to correct those errors.

As Mishra puts it:

It’s like having a generic BS detector but no way to separate truth from fiction.

This creates a dangerous half-measure where students recognise AI isn’t perfect but can’t effectively evaluate its outputs.

Perpetuating the knowledge gap. As AI becomes ubiquitous in workplaces, the gap between those with genuine expertise and those relying solely on AI will widen. Students who haven’t developed their own knowledge foundations will be increasingly marginalised in a world that paradoxically values human expertise more, not less, as AI advances.

Answers

There are three steps universities can take.

Integrate critical AI literacy. Students need to understand how generative AI works – how AI is trained on massive databases of human-created texts and images to identify patterns by which to craft new outputs.

It’s not enough to have an “Intro to AI” course. Every discipline needs to show students how AI intersects with their field and, most significantly, empower them to reflect on the ethical implications of its use. This includes engaging in questions around the use of copyrighted materials for the training of generative AI, the biases inherent in AI generated texts and images, and the enormous environmental cost of AI use.

Emphasise knowledge development. Higher education institutions must actively counter the view that university is merely about the provision of credentials. We need to help students see the value of acquiring domain expertise. This is not always self-evident to those students who understand higher education only as a means to a job, which encourages them to engage with knowledge in an instrumentalist way – and thus to use AI in ways that prevent engagement with complex ideas. It is a personal relationship with knowledge that will prepare them for a future where AI is everywhere. Advocating for the power of knowledge needs to be a central part of every academic’s job description.

Model dual expertise. Academics should model what Mishra calls “the dual expertise challenge” — combining domain knowledge with critical AI literacy. This means demonstrating to students how experts engage with AI: analysing its outputs against established knowledge, identifying biases or gaps, and using AI as a tool to enhance human expertise rather than replace it.

As AI becomes increasingly sophisticated, the value of human expertise only grows. Universities that prepare students to critically engage with AI while developing deep domain knowledge will graduate the experts that society needs in this rapidly evolving technological landscape.

We have our work cut out for us, but expertise remains highly valued.

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. AI can be a danger to students – 3 things universities must do – https://theconversation.com/ai-can-be-a-danger-to-students-3-things-universities-must-do-255652

July 5, 2025

10 years ago Kenya set out to fix gender gaps in education – what’s working and what still needs to be done

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Benta A. Abuya, Research Scientist, African Population and Health Research Center

The Kenyan government launched a big attempt in 2015 to promote gender equality in and through the education sector. This was guided by principles of equal participation and inclusion of women and men, and girls and boys in national development.

The Education and Training Sector Gender Policy aligned with national, regional and global commitments. This included the constitution, and Sustainable Development Goals 4 on quality education and 5 on gender equality.

Years later, however, it became clear that the government wasn’t achieving some policy’s objectives. Gaps remained in reducing gender inequalities in access, participation and achievement at all levels of education.

The government decided to review the causes of these challenges and what could be done differently.

This led to a two-year joint study in partnership with the African Population and Health Research Center. The study began in 2022. Its overall objective was to provide evidence for action on mainstreaming gender issues in basic education in Kenya. Gender mainstreaming generally refers to being sensitive to gender when developing policies and curricula, governing schools, teaching and using learning materials.

The study specifically aimed to:

examine how the teacher-training curriculum prepares teachers to implement gender mainstreaming strategies within the basic education sector
examine how gender mainstreaming is practised in classrooms during teaching and learning
assess the relationship between teaching practices and students’ attendance, choice of subjects and academic performance
evaluate the availability of institutional policies, practices and guidelines to mainstream gender issues and the extent to which they influence gender mainstreaming in education.

I’m a gender and education researcher and was part of the team from the African Population and Health Research Center that collected data for the policy review. This data came from 10 counties with high child poverty rates and urban informal settlements. These indicators highlight an inability to access one or more basic needs or services.

The study involved teacher trainers and trainees. We also spoke to education officials, and learners in primary and secondary schools. We carried out classroom observations, knowledge and attitude surveys, questionnaires, key informant interviews and focus group discussions.

The data showed gaps in teacher training, as well as institutional and teaching practices at the basic education level. Policy wasn’t being carried through in practice.

The gaps

Our study found that Kenya needs to review its teacher education curriculum to make it more gender responsive.

Teachers also need more training to follow practices that are gender responsive. These practices include extending positive reinforcement to girls and boys, maintaining eye contact and allowing learners to speak without interruption.

Deliberate steps should be taken to ensure that schools and teacher training colleges are gender inclusive in their practices, guidelines and programmes.

More specifically, our study found:

Teacher trainees had a relatively good understanding of gender-equitable teaching and learning practices. But there was a need to place greater importance on this in lesson planning and in supporting girls in science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM).
Gender mainstreaming is not built into the teacher training curriculum. It isn’t taught as a standalone unit. Teacher trainees learnt about it mainly from general courses, such as child development and psychology, or private training. And teacher trainees were unaware that they were being tested on this.
There were no significant gender differences in how teachers in pre-primary and primary school taught boys and girls. At the secondary level, however, teachers engaged boys more than girls during during literacy and STEM lessons.
At both primary and secondary levels, gender-equitable practices positively influenced learning outcomes in English and STEM subjects. These practices improved academic performances in English at the primary level. They led to improvements in biology, English, mathematics and physics at the secondary level.
The odds of school attendance increased if teachers treated boys and girls in equitable ways.
The odds of boys selecting chemistry and physics at the secondary level increased if the teacher of the subject was approachable and if the subject was considered applicable to future careers.
More than 40% of primary and secondary schools didn’t have guidelines on sexual harassment and gender-based violence for teachers and students. And most of the schools that said they had these guidelines couldn’t provide them to the research team. These guidelines help mainstream gender issues in schools and communities.

What next

To advance gender equality, Kenya must move beyond policy awareness. It must be more responsive to gender in teacher training, classroom practices and institutional leadership.

Our study recommends:

creating a positive and inclusive learning environment where both boys and girls feel valued, capable, and motivated to learn
teaching gender mainstreaming as a standalone unit, or integrating it into the teaching methodology
coaching, mentorship and modelling of best practices to trainee teachers
financial support for gender mainstreaming in all areas of teacher education
encouraging girls to pursue STEM subjects and careers at an early age through formal mentorship programmes
encouraging and empowering women teachers and parents to take up leadership positions in schools to provide role models for students.

Our findings offer a critical evidence base for the education ministry and other stakeholders. They should put accountability mechanisms in place.

Only through sustained, data-driven action can Kenya achieve a truly inclusive and equitable education system.

Benta A. Abuya does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. 10 years ago Kenya set out to fix gender gaps in education – what’s working and what still needs to be done – https://theconversation.com/10-years-ago-kenya-set-out-to-fix-gender-gaps-in-education-whats-working-and-what-still-needs-to-be-done-255400

July 5, 2025

Nigeria’s economy is growing but rural poverty is rising: 5 key policies to address the divide

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Stephen Onyeiwu, Professor of Economics & Business, Allegheny College

The Nigerian economy grew at a robust rate of 3.4% in 2024, the highest it has been since 2019 (except 2021 when the COVID rebound occurred).

This should have been cheering news, worthy of firecrackers and champagne-popping. Rather it came with a catch: the country’s poverty profile worsened.

In its annual review of the country, the World Bank applauded Nigeria for its economic reforms. These include the removal of fuel subsidies, liberalisation of the foreign exchange market and maintenance of a contractionary monetary policy. This is a policy of raising interest rates, reducing money supply and increasing borrowing costs to rein in inflation.

But the bank also drew attention to the fact that the country’s poverty profile has become grim. About 31% of Nigerians lived in poverty prior to the COVID-19 epidemic. Since then, an additional 42 million have become poor, increasing the poverty rate to about 46% in 2024.

Poverty is even worse in Nigeria’s rural communities: 75.5% live on US$2.15 or less per day (based on 2017 prices). The average poverty rate for sub-Saharan African countries was 36.5% in 2024 and 0.8% for East Asia and the Pacific.

Nigeria’s poverty rate would have been higher if the multidimensional poverty index had been used. In addition to income, the index considers access to education, health, decent housing, nutrition, sanitation, electricity and water. Access to these critical services has worsened for many Nigerians, despite improvements in macroeconomic stability.

A challenge for policy makers is how to translate impressive macroeconomic outcomes into high-paying jobs, lower poverty rates and access to health, good sanitation, education, electricity and affordable housing. The question is even more acute for people in rural areas.

As an economist who has studied the Nigerian economy for over four decades and lived in a rural community, I believe Nigeria needs a radical shift in its economic policy approach.

One major step should be a change in the country’s growth drivers. Oil, information and communications technology and finance are the major drivers of growth in Nigeria.

These sectors are not employment-intensive, and they require skills that most Nigerians don’t have. Because of the lack of employment opportunities in these sectors, most Nigerians gravitate towards the informal sector, which accounts for about 90% of employment in the country.

By continuing to urge Nigerians to be patient for economic reforms to have a positive impact on their living conditions, the Tinubu administration appears to assume that improvements in macroeconomic performance will eventually manifest in lower unemployment and poverty rates. This notion of “trickle-down economics” is misconceived and illusory.

The government needs to intentionally create transmission mechanisms through which economic growth and macroeconomic stability can raise living standards.

Fostering growth with development

Concerted efforts will be needed to target poverty in general, and rural poverty in particular.

Five key policies could get Nigeria closer to this goal:

Building productive capacities: People who live in rural areas in Nigeria are eager to work and full of creative ideas and entrepreneurial spirit. But they lack the resources and opportunity to fully unleash their potential.

Building their productive capacities would entail giving them access to basic education, technical and managerial skills, and other productive resources such as tools, equipment, finance and land. The government should identify the comparative advantage of different rural communities, and put in place policies that encourage those communities to use their comparative advantage and distinctive competencies.

Opportunity to diversify incomes: In developed countries, many people hold multiple jobs. Most rural dwellers in Nigeria, however, rely on agriculture as their only source of livelihood.

Because of limited access to inputs and modern technology, and outdated agricultural practices, their productivity is often very low. Their low income makes it difficult to save and invest in education, health and housing.

Non-agricultural activities, especially manufacturing, need to be located in rural communities, to give rural dwellers the opportunity to diversify their income sources.

Agriculture-led industrial strategy: This would involve the location of manufacturing plants close to the sources of agricultural raw materials.

Nigerian manufacturers locate their factories in urban areas. The result of urban-biased development strategy in Nigeria has been the lack of employment opportunities in rural communities, and a decline in the rural population, from about 85% in 1960 to 46% in 2023.

Moving manufacturing to rural areas would require massive investment in infrastructure such as electricity, water, roads and health services.

Ending patriarchy and male domination: Women disproportionately bear the burden of rural poverty in Nigeria. A study in rural south-east Nigeria found that the poverty rate among women was 98%, compared to 85% for men. Men are often given preference regarding access to land, education, skills acquisition and financial inclusion.

Women are also imbued with the responsibility of caring for children, the elderly and the sick, as well as household chores. This leaves them with little time for paid work or opportunities to acquire marketable skills.

Ability to absorb shocks and vulnerability: Rural poverty is often exacerbated by shocks and vulnerability such as extreme weather conditions, attacks by insurgents and other criminal groups, and illness. With no safety nets, and little or no saving, most rural dwellers are unable to withstand shocks.

The Tinubu administration plans to disburse N25,000 (about US$17) each to 60 million Nigerians. But these kinds of support are too small, non-pervasive, irregular and unpredictable.

What India and China have to teach

Nigeria could do well to borrow from the Indian model of an institutionalised safety net.

India issues “ration cards” to eligible households. The cards enable poor people to purchase essential food items such as grains, milk, eggs, cooking oil and bread at subsidised prices from designated stores.

Nigeria could finance this kind of programme with a special tax on oil companies and financial institutions, which frequently post huge after-tax profits.

China has had an impressive record of poverty reduction. Using the US$1.90 poverty line, China’s poverty rate decreased from 88.1% in 1981 to 0.3% in 2018.

The fall in rural poverty is even more dramatic, from 96% in 1980 to 1% in 2019.

This reduction was accomplished in stages, starting with an increase in agricultural productivity. It then shifted focus to the development of non-agricultural sectors of the economy, including manufacturing. These sectors were able to draw surplus labour from the agricultural sector, giving them skills that led to higher wages and poverty alleviation.

Next steps

The World Bank in its report noted that addressing pressing social and humanitarian challenges remains critical to ensuring inclusive and sustainable growth in Nigeria.

Cash transfers and social assistance programmes could provide temporary relief for the poor in rural communities. But a long-term solution is to build their productive capacities and transform rural communities in ways that provide opportunities for income diversification.

Stephen Onyeiwu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Nigeria’s economy is growing but rural poverty is rising: 5 key policies to address the divide – https://theconversation.com/nigerias-economy-is-growing-but-rural-poverty-is-rising-5-key-policies-to-address-the-divide-257152

July 5, 2025

Are Chinese investors grabbing Zambian land? Study finds that’s a myth

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Yuezhou Yang, Research Fellow, London School of Economics and Political Science

Media coverage of Chinese land investments in African agriculture often reinforces narratives of a “weak African state” and the “Chinese land grab”, highlighting power imbalances between the actors involved in these land deals.

Are Chinese actors grabbing land in Africa and jeopardising local people’s land rights and food security?

China’s “Agriculture Going Out” policy, launched in 2007 as part of its broader “Going Out” strategy, was reinforced by the Belt and Road Initiative from 2013. Backed by these policies, Chinese foreign direct investment in Africa rose from US$74.81 million in 2003 to US$4.99 billion in 2021. By 2020, US$1.67 billion was invested in African agriculture, with nearly two-thirds targeting cash crop cultivation. Zambia ranked among the top ten African countries receiving Chinese foreign direct investment and loans.

My research on Zambian agriculture finds that Chinese land grabbing is a myth. Instead, Chinese investors have preferred different investment models according to the specific rules of land access, transfer and control of three land tenure systems in Zambia.

What ties the three types of Chinese agricultural investments together is this: land institutions matter. Whether it’s central government rules or traditional authority, these systems shape how foreign investment happens and what impact it has.

Each of the three models raises new opportunities and challenges for rural development and land governance. These findings matter because they offer insights into the future of land rights, livelihoods and state-building in African countries.

Not all land is the same

After independence, all land in Zambia was vested in the president, held in trust for the people. Today, the country still operates under a dual land system, as outlined in the 1995 Lands Act. State land, managed by the central government, includes both private and government leaseholds. Customary land, on the other hand, remains under the authority of traditional chiefs. The exact proportion of state and customary land in Zambia is contested, with estimates of customary land ranging widely from 94% to 54%.

This tenure distinction is significant because each type of land is governed by different rules regarding foreign access and ownership, which shape how foreign investors choose their investment models.

Over four months of fieldwork in Zambia, I gathered data on 50 Chinese agricultural projects (41 remained active) through 96 qualitative interviews. These projects were spread across three types of land tenure: private leasehold (37), government leasehold (1), and customary land (3).

Model 1: Commercial farm on private land

My fieldwork data showed that the majority of Chinese agricultural investments in Zambia are located on private leasehold land, typically following the commercial farm model. This type of land functions much like private property, held under 99-year leases that can be bought, sold or transferred. Investors use it for large-scale farming operations, such as maize, soybean and wheat production.

Even in these seemingly privatised spaces, however, state power remains influential. When Zambia proposed a draft National Land Policy in 2017 aimed at tightening rules for foreign land ownership, Chinese investors responded strategically. Many began aligning their projects with Zambia’s development priorities, emphasising contributions to local food security, donating to charities, and promoting themselves as responsible corporate actors.

Model 2: Farm block on government land

In northern Zambia, for example, a Chinese company partnered with the government to develop a farm block on state-owned land that had been converted from customary tenure for national development. Unlike the commercial farm model, the government played a central role, selecting the investor, managing the land and negotiating the deal. The project promised infrastructure and jobs, enhancing the political standing of local officials.

But this kind of state-led development works only when the promises are delivered. In other areas where farm blocks failed to materialise, traditional chiefs reclaimed the land. In the northern case, actual physical infrastructure investment helped reinforce state authority.

Model 3: Contract farming on customary land

The third model is very different. For instance, a Chinese agribusiness company arranged contract farming deals with over 50,000 smallholders in Zambia’s Eastern Province. Instead of buying or leasing land, the company provided seeds and bought cotton from farmers after harvest. This let the company access land informally, without triggering the legal and political risks of converting customary land to leasehold.

Operating on customary land posed challenges for investors. When farmers defaulted on loans or engaged in side-selling, companies had limited legal recourse and often had to negotiate with chiefs and local communities rather than the state. In such contexts, traditional authorities – not the central government – wielded the decisive power over land and its governance.

Why this matters

In a world where land deals are often controversial, understanding how local rules shape global investment is crucial. It’s not just about who buys the land, but under what terms, and how those terms are enforced. African governments are not just passive bystanders; they’re active players who use land institutions to negotiate power and development.

This research urges us to look beyond the headlines about “land grabs” and instead focus on the everyday politics of land. If African states want to steer rural development on their own terms, understanding and strengthening land institutions – both statutory and customary – is key.

This research is developed from Yuezhou Yang’s MRes/PhD project, which is supported by funding from the China Scholarship Council 201708040015.

– ref. Are Chinese investors grabbing Zambian land? Study finds that’s a myth – https://theconversation.com/are-chinese-investors-grabbing-zambian-land-study-finds-thats-a-myth-257644

July 5, 2025

African finance ministers shouldn’t be making bond deals: how to hand over the job to experts

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Misheck Mutize, Post Doctoral Researcher, Graduate School of Business (GSB), University of Cape Town

Eurobonds, debts owed in a foreign currency, have become a quick and attractive way for African countries to borrow money. They are behind a sharp rise in commercial borrowing as a percentage of total external debt: it has nearly doubled from 27% in 2011 to 52% in 2020. This has increased the debt vulnerability of most African countries.

Recent developments, however, show that most of the bonds have not been structured properly. As a result, African countries are paying way over the odds relative to their sovereign risks.

Based on my bond price modelling expertise, it is my view that there are two major drivers of the mispricing of African government bonds. They are interlinked.

Firstly, a lack of expertise in debt management offices, whose job it is to negotiate the terms of any debt deals and to oversee their execution. This is a topic I explored in a recent article.

The second factor, which I address here, is that in many African countries, finance ministers have assumed primary responsibility for Eurobond issuance. They engage directly with investment bankers, legal advisors and credit rating agencies.

In my view they shouldn’t.

Finance ministers should stay away from debt negotiations because they are political appointees. They operate under incentives tied to electoral cycles, not fiscal sustainability. Their short tenures and desire to fund visible projects often conflict with the long-term nature of sovereign debt obligations.

They don’t have the necessary expertise to handle the technical complexity required to get the best possible deal, either.

Simply calling for ministers to step aside would ignore the institutional realities in most African countries. In particular, debt management offices have severe capacity constraints.

Nevertheless, as global financial conditions tighten and African countries seek to refinance maturing Eurobonds or issue new instruments, the risks of politicised borrowing must be minimised. Ministers should spend their energies on ensuring their debt management offices are well staffed with top quality teams. They should then leave it up to these technical staff to prepare and arrange the financing.

This would leave room for ministers to manage any disagreements between technical staff and the banks when necessary. And to close the final deal.

Ministers versus the experts

Eurobond issuance involves advanced financial engineering – pricing models, investor engagement, covenant structuring and legal compliance across jurisdictions. It takes a deep understanding of capital markets.

When debt management offices are operating at their best, they are filled with people who have this knowledge. They have a combination of financial market and public policy skills, including debt portfolio management, risk analysis and debt transaction processing.

In discussions with debt managers at the African Sovereign Debt Conference it’s become clear to me that debt managers are sidelined in the international bond issuance negotiations. They are also sidelined in the execution process, except for administrative support.

What happens instead is that finance ministers are usually key contacts of the investment bankers. By approaching a minister directly, investment bankers get to close their mandates faster.

But this minimises due diligence and bypasses internal safeguards. Ministers may not pay attention to complex legal clauses under foreign jurisdictions, details of investor negotiations and fee structures. They may accept unfavourable terms, ignore sustainability assessments and obscure fiscal vulnerabilities in pursuit of political wins and quick disbursements.

For example, in 2018, Ghana’s then finance minister was internationally lauded for financial stewardship. Ghana was the first African issuer of a longest tenure and a zero-coupon bond. A year later, the country defaulted, suggesting the bond terms weren’t great for the country. The minister nevertheless received several awards as the best and most prudent in Africa.

There is also the issue of conflicts of interest. When the same actor – in this case the finance minister – proposes, negotiates and approves a debt instrument, the system lacks accountability.

In many African countries, parliaments, audit institutions and civil society have limited understanding about the technical details of bond agreements. Ministers can easily sideline procurement rules and transparency mechanisms, resulting in non-competitive contracts and opaque fees paid to underwriters and advisors.

Investment bankers prefer this arrangement as it works in their favour.

Reforms that are needed

Before finance ministers can hand over control, debt management offices must be equipped. This requires targeted reforms, including:

Capacity building through strategic partnerships: African debt management offices should work with international issuing syndicates and development partners to gain first-hand exposure to structuring, pricing and marketing global bonds.
Human capital reforms: Governments must attract and retain highly skilled debt managers by offering competitive pay, professional development opportunities and protection from political interference.
Debt management offices must be staffed by dedicated quantitative analysts. They must also be equipped to use real-time market intelligence systems and formal investor relations programmes.
Gradual delegation: Authority can be shifted, starting with less complex debt instruments.

The role of the finance minister must evolve. Ministers should provide strategic leadership: approving borrowing strategies, ensuring alignment with macroeconomic goals, and engaging parliament and the public.

Their function should shift from operational to institutional oversight and accountability.

Structural reforms must embed the capacity, autonomy and transparency required for debt management offices to lead effectively.

In South Africa, for example, the assets and liabilities management division of the National Treasury department manages government’s annual funding programme.

Professionalising the debt issuance process is not just about avoiding technical mistakes. It’s also about creating resilient institutions that can withstand political turnover. That fosters credibility and long-term access to capital.

Ministers should remain accountable to the public, and debt management offices must do their work based on technical merit.

Misheck Mutize is affiliated with the African Union – African Peer Review Mechanism as a Lead Expert on credit ratings

– ref. African finance ministers shouldn’t be making bond deals: how to hand over the job to experts – https://theconversation.com/african-finance-ministers-shouldnt-be-making-bond-deals-how-to-hand-over-the-job-to-experts-259017

July 5, 2025

Migrants in South Africa’s economic powerhouse often go hungry: the drivers and what can be done about it

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Adrino Mazenda, Senior Researcher, Associate Professor Economic Management Sciences, University of Pretoria

About 281 million people globally have migrated from their country of origin to another country. This movement can be temporary or permanent and can occur for various reasons, including economic opportunities, family reunification and education. Then there are also millions who are escaping conflict and seeking refuge in another country.

Countries at different stages of development also experience large volumes of internal migration. Migration within a country can be temporary or permanent too, and reflect economic reasons or insecurity.

Both types of migrants sometimes experience food insecurity: the physical and financial inability to access nutritious, safe and sufficient food to fulfil a person’s dietary requirements.

There are an estimated 2.89 million documented foreign migrants in South Africa, accounting for about 5% of the country’s population. Most immigrants in South Africa come from the Southern African Development Community countries. South Africa also experiences a high annual internal migration rate. About 850,0000 people temporarily and permanently relocate from rural to urban areas.

Gauteng, the province which contributes more than a third of South Africa’s economic output, attracts a disproportionate share of internal and international migration.

As social scientists who have been studying migration and food security, we conducted research to explore the food security status of migrant households (international and internal) and native Gauteng households, and to understand their differences, if any.

The study used data from the 2020/21 Quality of Life survey. This is one of the largest social surveys in South Africa, and respondents include both internal and international migrants. It is conducted every two years by the Gauteng City Region Observatory. Quantitative research methods and statistical analysis were then applied to identify patterns and relationships between food insecurity and migration variables.

Food insecurity remains a pressing concern in South Africa’s major cities, particularly among migrant populations. Not all migrants experience food insecurity the same way, however. Internal and international migrants differ not only from native Gauteng residents but also from one another. There are different factors influencing their vulnerability.

The differences

One differentiating factor between the internal and foreign migrants is government social support services. They seem to play a key role in determining the well-being of internal migrants. International migrants don’t qualify for such services. But they sometimes fared better than internal migrants or natives, likely due to age, education, or resourcefulness (social support networks).

Internal migrants experienced their own set of challenges. For example, poor health service provision and lack of medical aid were strong predictors of food insecurity. This suggests that addressing food access requires improvements in health services, insurance, and broader social infrastructure.

Improved access to healthcare reduces the financial burden on households dealing with medical expenses, so they can spend more on food. Access to maternal and child health services enhances nutritional knowledge and practices. That in turn improves the way households use food. Health insurance and unemployment insurance protect households from income shocks that could otherwise lead to food insecurity.

A stronger social infrastructure improves food access by enhancing education, healthcare, and social protection systems. Education boosts income and nutritional knowledge. Preventive healthcare reduces illness and medical expenses, freeing up resources for food. Social protection measures help households withstand financial shocks, ensuring consistent access to food.

Of course all this support has a cost that needs to be funded from the public purse, but its benefits may well outweigh the cost.

Gender disparities

Immigrants contribute significantly to South Africa’s economy. Migration enhances labour market flexibility, promotes economic dynamism, and supports livelihoods in both urban and rural areas, making it essential for inclusive economic growth.
Internal migrants provide labour in sectors such as mining, construction and services, while also supporting rural households through remittances. They help stimulate urban informal economies.

International migrants bring valuable skills and resilience to various sectors, including agriculture, healthcare, manufacturing and construction. They contribute local income taxes. Some operate small and large formal businesses, which adds to job creation.

However, employment data reveals a pronounced gender disparity among international migrants and internal migrants.

In all population groups (native residents, internal migrants and international migrants), men are more likely to be employed than women. Among international migrants, over 1 million men were employed compared to 400,000 women. More women (281,553) than men (88,598) were classified as economically inactive – not available for work.

The primary reason for internal migration among both men and women was the search for paid employment. For men, the second most common reason was job transfers or accepting new employment.

In contrast, female migrants cited moving to live with or be closer to a spouse, family, or friends, often due to marriage, as their main motivation.

Way forward

Our study highlights the determinants of food insecurity among migrant populations. It also challenges harmful stereotypes and invites more inclusive thinking about social support and job creation.

The study’s findings can help inform the public about who needs more support and why. It shows that food aid and government support systems aren’t working as intended.

The main conclusions we reached from the study were that:

Rural health infrastructure is in dire need of public support.
Increased inequities in healthcare access are unjustified.
The medical and health bills of foreign citizens can be shared between home and host countries to reduce the strain on the host’s infrastructure through a combination of policy reforms, bilateral agreements and global cooperation mechanisms. Key to this is an inter-government billing system where host countries track migrants’ healthcare use and send bills to their home country governments or insurers.
It is desirable for migrants to hold valid health insurance as a condition of entry or residency.
Policies to promote agriculture and rural areas, particularly developing new rural housing schemes, appear to be a promising way to abate food insecurity.
Revitalising special economic zones, the designated areas offering incentives to attract investment, boost trade and create jobs, can help limit the concentration of migrants in Gauteng.

– ref. Migrants in South Africa’s economic powerhouse often go hungry: the drivers and what can be done about it – https://theconversation.com/migrants-in-south-africas-economic-powerhouse-often-go-hungry-the-drivers-and-what-can-be-done-about-it-256907

July 5, 2025

Africa’s development banks are being undermined: the continent will pay the price

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Danny Bradlow, Professor/Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Advancement of Scholarship, University of Pretoria

Ghana and Zambia’s official creditors are pressing them to default on loans to two African multilateral financial institutions: the African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank) and the Trade and Development Bank (TDB).

These creditors, in effect, are demanding that the two countries prioritise repayments to themselves over payments to these two banks.

As academics who have worked on the challenges of financing sustainable development in Africa, we believe this action is short-sighted.

The action by Ghana and Zambia’s official creditors has two significant implications.

First, they are demanding that the two countries treat Afreximbank and the Trade and Development Bank as commercial creditors. This would undermine the banks’ credit ratings and increase their borrowing costs. It would also reduce their capacity to finance sustainable development in Africa.

Second, pressing Ghana and Zambia to default, rather than supporting pragmatic restructuring aligned with their strong growth prospects, exacerbates Ghana and Zambia’s financial vulnerability. Either they would have to use scarce resources to pay these debts or default on their obligations, in which case, the banks might well sue them.

Quotes from Ghana and Zambia’s ministries of finance suggest the decision to default is their own. However, they faced intense pressure from their official creditors to treat the two African multilateral financial institutions differently from all their other multilateral creditors.

Why does this differential treatment matter?

Preferred creditor status

Multilateral financial institutions, including the World Bank and African Development Bank, have a preferred creditor status. This is in recognition of the special role they play. They are expected to provide relatively low-cost funding for public investment, economic stability and long-term sustainable development in low- and middle-income countries.

Their preferred creditor status ensures that, when countries experience debt distress, their development mandate is prioritised over the concerns of commercial creditors. Commercial creditors normally only fund commercially viable transactions. They charge high interest rates to compensate for the risk of default on these transactions.

Both Afreximbank and Trade and Development Bank were created to fill a gap in Africa’s access to critical development finance. They provide financing for projects and transactions that commercial institutions and other multilateral financial institutions cannot – or will not – provide, because of capital limits, regulations or perceptions of risk.

For example, Afreximbank’s charter notes that

the decline in African exports has impacted adversely on the economies of African states and hindered their ability to achieve a self-reliant development.

It further recognises that stimulating economic development

can best be achieved through the creation of a trade financing international institution whose principal purpose is to provide and mobilise the requisite financial resources.

Historically, it has enjoyed preferred creditor status to support its role in meeting this purpose.

Why preferred creditor status is being challenged

The two countries’ official creditor committees, the rating agency Fitch and other commentators are challenging the preferred creditor status of the two African institutions. They argue that the two banks are different from multilateral financial institutions like the World Bank and the African Development Bank that only have states as shareholders. They suggest that the private shareholders in the two African banks should not benefit from preferred creditor status. Instead, they should receive the same status as commercial creditors.

This view ignores the reason that Afreximbank’s and the Trade and Development Bank’s member states authorised them to have private shareholders. It was a deliberate, pragmatic measure designed to fill a gap in Africa’s access to affordable development finance.

The idea was to create new multilateral institutions that could raise capital flexibly and quickly on terms that the individual African states could not match on their own. Several other regional development banks have this hybrid model, including CAF, a highly rated development bank in Latin America.

It is perverse that this creative and pragmatic approach to filling a gap in the global financial system is now being used against the two African banks.

The consequences

The cost of capital for the two African financial institutions will increase if they are treated like commercial creditors. This will reduce their capacity to lend and their financing will become more expensive. It will also deepen inequality in the global financial system. Lastly, it will increase the risk of future African sovereign debt defaults.

In other words, downgrading their status risks undermining the very stability that official creditors claim to safeguard. It will also create another obstacle to Africa’s efforts to access stable, predictable and affordable flows of development finance.

The eventual outcome of the official creditors’ action will ultimately depend on negotiations between Ghana and Zambia and their creditors. This will include the two African institutions. It will also be influenced by how these different groups of creditors behave in other African sovereign debt restructurings.

However, the international community can seek to influence the outcome by taking actions in appropriate international settings.

Global leaders are searching for ways to scale up and strengthen the capacity of regional and subregional development banks like Afreximbank and the Trade and Development Bank. This requires respecting their preferred creditor status and increasing their access to affordable capital.

This is precisely the opposite of what is unfolding.

There is still time for the creditor governments to change course by demonstrating their support for African multilateral financial institutions.

Danny Bradlow, in addition to his position at University of Pretoria, is Senior G20 Advisor to the South African Institute of International Affairs and co-chair of the T20 sask force on sustainable financing.

Lisa Sachs does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Africa’s development banks are being undermined: the continent will pay the price – https://theconversation.com/africas-development-banks-are-being-undermined-the-continent-will-pay-the-price-259404

July 5, 2025

Which African countries are flourishing? Scientists have a new way of measuring well-being

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Victor Counted, Associate Professor of Psychology, Regent University

What does it mean to live a good life? Psychologists and social scientists have been focusing on a new idea called flourishing – a sense of well-being that goes beyond just happiness or success. It’s about your whole life being good, including how you interact with other people and your community. So then, how do Africans fare when it comes to flourishing?

Victor Counted is a psychological scientist whose research across 40 African countries offers a data-rich rethinking of flourishing on the continent. His findings challenge the dominant narrative that Africa is “lagging behind” in development by showing a more nuanced picture of what it means to live a good life. We asked him more.

What is flourishing?

Flourishing is more than economic growth or individual happiness. It’s a multidimensional state of being that reflects how people feel about their lives and how well their lives are actually going. So it also measures people’s values within their community.

The idea of well-being often carries a Eurocentric emphasis on the individual – personal satisfaction, autonomy, achievement. Flourishing accounts for how whole a person is in relation to their environment.

It includes the social, spiritual and ecological contexts in which one lives. So, it’s not just about how one feels, but how one lives – fully, meaningfully and in a satisfying relationship with the world around us.

What’s the Global Flourishing Study?

The Global Flourishing Study tries to measure global patterns of human flourishing. It’s an ongoing five-year longitudinal study in over 200,000 participants across 22 countries.

I was one of the team of global scholars brought together to examine the trends on what it means to live well across cultures and life circumstances.

The study identifies six key dimensions of flourishing:

Happiness and life satisfaction
Mental and physical health
Meaning and purpose
Character and virtue
Close social relationships
Financial and material stability

Participants rate how they’re doing in each of these areas on a scale from 0 to 10. Further questions capture experiences related to trust, loneliness, hope, resilience, and other related well-being variables.

Of the 22 nations, five were African: Nigeria, Kenya, South Africa, Tanzania and Egypt.

While these countries didn’t top the global rankings (Indonesia and Mexico did), Nigeria, Kenya and Egypt all reported relatively high flourishing scores, especially when well-being was considered apart from financial status.

Nigeria, for example, ranked 5th globally in flourishing scores that excluded financial indicators – ahead of many wealthier nations. Nigerians indicated strengths in social relationships, character and virtues (like forgiveness or helping others). But potential areas of growth included financial well-being, housing, ethnic discrimination and education.

Overall, this suggests that while material resources matter, they’re not the only thing that determines well-being. Kenya ranked 7th, Egypt 10th, Tanzania 11th and South Africa 13th. Each showed unique strengths in areas like meaning, social connection or mental health.

You did a separate study on flourishing in Africa. What did you find?

In a 2024 study we analysed data from the Gallup World Poll (2020–2022) to explore 38 indicators of well-being across 40 African countries.

This study offered a more detailed and culture-sensitive picture of how Africans experience and prioritise flourishing. The dimensions explored were derived from both local and universal sources, allowing for regionally relevant insights.

We found that African populations often score high in meaning, character and social relationships – despite economic hardship. This offers an important corrective to western assumptions about well-being.

Some of our key findings were:

● There is significant diversity between and within African countries. Mauritius consistently ranked highest in life evaluations (overall satisfaction with their lives), while countries like Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe scored lowest.

● East African countries such as Rwanda and Ethiopia showed strong performance in social well-being indicators (like feeling respected or learning new things daily) even when economic indicators were low.

● Countries in West Africa, such as Senegal and Ghana, scored high in emotional well-being, with many people reporting positive daily emotions like enjoyment and laughter.

● Southern African nations, despite challenges like income inequality, displayed resilience through strong community ties and cultural practices rooted in the philosophy of ubuntu.

The results reinforced that flourishing in Africa cannot only be reduced to gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (a measure of the average economic output per person in a country) – nor to western norms of success.

What can African countries focus on to flourish?

In my view, the path to greater flourishing lies in embracing local knowledge and investing in culturally relevant development priorities. Instead of following western pathways – centred on individual advancement – Africa can model alternative flourishing pathways that reflect what matters most to African people.

1. Prioritise local knowledge systems

African ideas about a connected society – like ubuntu (southern Africa), ujamaa (east Africa), teranga or wazobia (west Africa), and al-musawat wal tarahum (north Africa) teach people to care for each other and live in peace. These values help people live meaningful lives and can inform leadership and legislation.

2. Redefine development metrics

Western development models focus on individual achievement, economic output and material consumption. GDP per capita fails to capture the everyday realities and aspirations of African communities. We should also measure things like how happy people are, how hopeful they feel about the future, how strong and resilient their communities are, and how clean, safe and dignifying their living environments are.

This is not a new idea – for years development scholars have called for a shift away from narrow economic indicators toward a focus on human dignity, agency, and the real opportunities people have to pursue the lives they value. What’s new is the growing availability of data and the momentum to take these alternative metrics seriously in shaping national policies and priorities.

3. Invest in education for character development

Quality education is essential to unlocking the continent’s potential to flourish. But Africa needs more than just academic skills and workforce readiness – it needs a strategy for intentional development of values and habits that shape how a person thinks, feels, and acts with integrity.

Part of the problem lies in how the humanities – fields like history, literature, philosophy, and religious studies – are often undervalued or underfunded in education systems. But it is precisely these disciplines that nurture moral imagination, critical reflection, and civic responsibility. We need educational models that form not just workers, but whole persons – people who can think ethically, act responsibly, and lead with character in their communities.

What does Africa offer the world in terms of flourishing?

Africa is not waiting to be saved. Across the continent, people are building communities of care, cultivating joy amid hardship, and passing on values of unity, faith, and compassion. This is what development looks like when rooted in human dignity.

Africa flourishing goals offer an alternative vision for development – one that starts with what Africa already has, not what it lacks. These are locally emic aspirations for well-being. They are shaped by Africa’s indigenous knowledge systems, cultural values, and religious/spiritual traditions. Pursuing these goals means prioritising wholeness over wealth, community over consumption, and resilience over rescue.

The continent has so much to offer the world: wisdom, strong community values, and ways of staying resilient and living fully even in hard times. But many of these local insights are missing in the global science of well-being.

Victor Counted consults for Africa Flourishing Initiative

– ref. Which African countries are flourishing? Scientists have a new way of measuring well-being – https://theconversation.com/which-african-countries-are-flourishing-scientists-have-a-new-way-of-measuring-well-being-257458

July 5, 2025

Netflix gives African film a platform – but the cultural price is high

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Wunpini Fatimata Mohammed, Assistant Professor of Communication, Cornell University

Netflix began its Africa operations in South Africa in 2016. When the US streaming giant announced it was setting up shop in Nigeria in 2020, many west African film-makers, writers, artists and media audiences were jubilant.

Finally, west Africa’s creativity and brilliance would be formally recognised on the world stage. Netflix Naija’s purpose was to produce local content for Netflix just like Netflix South Africa and later Netflix Kenya.

Some film-makers have been wary of US cultural imperialism happening through the market dominance of Netflix and other US streamers. Others have rushed to the streamer to sign deals that will gain their films and TV shows a global audience.

Netflix’s interest in African stories comes with a colonial power dynamic that research and scholarship has not fully explored. As a scholar of media and communication, I recently examined the effect US streamers are having on the stories being told in films in Nigeria and Ghana.

In my study, I argue that despite the growing global interest in African pop culture, African creative workers need to be careful about interest from global conglomerates. We can’t talk about African cinemas going global without paying attention to how Hollywood’s colonial relationship with Africa has shaped and influenced what African filmmakers believe will sell globally.

What price is being paid to appeal to global audiences? Film-makers might focus so much on the western gaze that they lose focus on telling African stories authentically and respectfully.

In my study, I analyse various films including the Ghanaian film Azali and the Nigerian movie Lionheart to argue that that’s exactly what’s happening.

Dancing to the tune of the west

Despite the existence of thriving African film and TV industries before the advent of streaming technologies, we are seeing a replication of what I call the everydayness of colonialism in the area of media representations of the continent.

Here, African filmmakers and producers find themselves jumping through hoops to tell stories that are “fit” to be streamed to Netflix’s millions of American, European and global subscribers. Global cosmopolitan audiences are prioritised over African audiences.

African audiences at home and in the diaspora are the reason we have vibrant film industries such as Nollywood to begin with.

This displacement of African audiences happens both in representation and in access.

Most African movie audiences do not have access to Netflix and other streaming platforms due to the digital divide and the cost of subscribing. So the target audience shifts to the elite, both African and global, who can afford to stream.

Azali and Lionheart

Ghana and Nigeria’s film industries were developed by artists who wanted to reflect their societies to their communities. I found that with Netflix’s arrival, there is a danger of disrupting and undoing this important work.

The intervention of US streamers has led to the development of glossier versions of Africa. They are universal enough to be consumed by anyone, anywhere in the world, even if it means sacrificing the integrity of stories to achieve this global appeal.

In Azali, for example, I found that the film sacrificed authentic language and geographical accuracy to tell a story for a western audience.

Azali explores the themes of child marriage, child-trafficking and rural-urban migration in Ghana. Here, a film about the Dagbamba was set in the town of Zebilla, where Dagbanli is not the dominant language. The film cast non-Dagbanli speakers in major roles to speak a language they neither understood nor had any proficiency in. If Dagbamba had been centred as the primary audience of the movie, this cultural indignity might not have happened.

Lionheart, though star-studded, departed from traditional Nollywood narrative conventions. The film tells the story of a wealthy Nigerian family and the quest of a young woman to take control of the family business. The movie had high production values and told a story that would be considered universally relatable. However, it was disqualified in its bid for an Oscar nomination in the Best International Feature Film category because of its majority English dialogue. Despite appealing to Netflix in the area of production quality and storyline, African film-makers were still punished by the Academy.

Nigeria and Ghana’s film industries have traditionally told a wide variety of African stories. Netflix’s arrival is reducing African stories to narratives about the elite and for the global cosmopolitan elite.

Stories about the majority of Africans are being erased. Africa becomes a backdrop to tell stories about the elite class.

In my study, I argue that narrative construction is an important part of identity and that when external factors begin to determine how African stories are told, it distorts the image of Africa for Africans and raises questions of cultural sovereignty.

Moving forward

It is refreshing to see African cultures appreciated on a global scale. But this shouldn’t erase narratives about the African masses and working communities.

There are film-makers that are resisting the Netflix canon. Nigerian actress and producer Funke Akindele shows that this is possible in A Tribe Called Judah. Her film set a new box office record in Nigeria by avoiding direct to Netflix/streamer distribution and staying true to African audiences. The film tells the story of how a single mother and her five sons navigate poverty in Lagos. It was later licensed to stream on Amazon Prime Video after it made history at the box office in Nigeria.

Other film-makers like Omoni Oboli, whose approach centres the Nigerian masses, has turned to YouTube. She tells Nigerian stories while resisting the exploitation that can often come with signing a Netflix deal.

These projects offer an alternative. As Netflix expands, African creative workers and cultural policymakers must protect the narrative integrity of African stories and resist the economic exploitation of African film-makers. Productions can capture the nuances of African stories while representing African languages and cultures with respect and dignity – without selling out to western values.

Wunpini Fatimata Mohammed does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Netflix gives African film a platform – but the cultural price is high – https://theconversation.com/netflix-gives-african-film-a-platform-but-the-cultural-price-is-high-259252