Category: The Conversation – Global Perspectives

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Suzanne Nielsen, Professor and Deputy Director, Monash Addiction Research Centre, Monash University

Medicinal cannabis use has increased rapidly in recent years in Australia. Since access pathways were expanded in 2016, more than 700,000 prescription approvals have been issued.

The vast majority of medicinal cannabis products on the market have not been registered on the Australian Register of Therapeutic Goods. But medical practitioners can apply to the Therapeutic Goods Administration (TGA) for approval to prescribe them to patients.

Data shows the three most common conditions for which scripts are approved are chronic pain, anxiety and sleep disorders.

Although many patients report benefits, professional bodies and regulators have raised concerns about whether prescribing is outpacing the evidence.

So what does the evidence actually say? Does medicinal cannabis work for the conditions for which it’s most commonly prescribed?

Medicinal cannabis for pain

Medicinal cannabis refers to cannabis products that are legally prescribed to treat a medical condition. This can be the plant itself, or natural compounds extracted from the plant. Some compounds similar to or the same as those found in cannabis (for example, dronabinol and nabilone) are made in a lab.

Two of the most common compounds in the plant are THC (tetrahydrocannabinol) and CBD (cannabidiol), known as cannabinoids.

These are commonly found at various concentrations in medicinal cannabis products which come in forms including oils, capsules, dried flower (used in a vaporiser), sprays and gummies.

Chronic pain is the most common reason for medicinal cannabis use. But as we’ve written in a previous article, research shows only modest benefits, with limited improvements in pain and physical functioning.

The TGA says there’s limited evidence medicinal cannabis provides clinically significant pain relief for many conditions, and should only be tried if other standard therapies haven’t helped.

Does medicinal cannabis work for anxiety?

Beside chronic pain, a growing number of people are now turning to medicinal cannabis for anxiety.

Multiple reviews have examined whether it works for this purpose and have come to similar conclusions. For THC-based products the evidence is mixed, with some patients finding relief, while others report their symptoms are worse.

There is emerging evidence for CBD, however it’s too soon to recommend medical cannabis as a first-line treatment for anxiety. So far, studies of CBD in anxiety have been small, only measured effects under experimental conditions designed to induce stress, had no comparison group, or only tested a one-off dose. Because of these limitations, the studies can’t tell us if CBD is effective for ongoing anxiety management.

A recent review found CBD had positive effects on anxiety, but these effects were seen in studies deemed to have problems with their methods, and not in studies that were more rigorously designed and conducted.

Similarly, a small Australian study (with no control group) demonstrated positive effects of CBD in young people with anxiety who had already tried other treatments. However, the authors stated more rigorous trials were still needed.

What’s more, there are recent case reports of acute psychosis arising from medicinal cannabis use. Taken together with the ambiguous evidence, the role for cannabinoids for anxiety remains far from clear.

How about sleep disorders?

The evidence for cannabis in the treatment of sleep disorders and insomnia is perhaps even more limited, with neither CBD or THC having shown clear benefits reducing the number of awakenings or time spent awake during the night, or improved sleep quality. That said, some people do report they have fewer symptoms of insomnia when using medicinal cannabis.

Similar to anxiety, many of the studies have major weaknesses in their study design which make it difficult to draw strong conclusions. There are also few studies that compare medicinal cannabis to proven treatments for sleep disorders and insomnia. This makes it hard to make recommendations for treatment based on the current research evidence.

THC can make you drowsy, and in the short term, may help people fall asleep, or feel like they’re getting more sleep. But there are some important downsides to consider, too.

For example, if you take medicinal cannabis regularly to fall asleep your body can get used to it, making it harder to fall asleep without it. In the long term, medicinal cannabis can also affect the amounts of light and deep sleep a person will have, which can result in poorer sleep quality.

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Read more:
Cannabinoid products may reduce total sleep time in adults with insomnia: new study

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There is good evidence for some conditions

Some of the strongest evidence for medicinal cannabis products are for rare forms of epilepsy that don’t respond to existing treatments, and for treating symptoms associated with multiple sclerosis.

The only TGA-approved medicinal cannabis products are for these conditions.

There’s also evidence medicinal cannabis can help with chemotherapy-induced nausea and vomiting. Though as newer medications with fewer side effects are now available, medicinal cannabis products are not considered first-line treatments.

Risks and side effects

Common side effects with THC in the short term include drowsiness, anxiety, dry mouth, nausea, vomiting and appetite changes. For some people, these effects reduce over time.

Some people with preexisting health conditions such as schizophrenia, psychosis or heart conditions may be more prone to experiencing side effects.

An estimated one in four people using medical cannabis meet the criteria for dependence (known as cannabis use disorder). In the longer term, dependence appears more common with medical use, particularly when combined with non-medical use.

If you are suffering with anxiety, sleep problems or chronic pain, and are wondering what treatments might be most effective for you, speak to your regular GP.

Suzanne Nielsen receives funding from the Australian National Health and Medical Research Council, and has previously received funding from Worksafe and the Therapeutic Goods Administration to provide independent evidence reviews on medical cannabis. She is the president-elect of the Australasian Society for Professionals on Alcohol and other Drugs.

Myfanwy Graham receives funding from the Australian National Health and Medical Research Council, alongside government and university institutes. Myfanwy has served as a consultant for the UNODC, WHO and NASEM. She is an appointed member of the Therapeutic Goods Administration’s Medicinal Cannabis Expert Working Group. This article does not represent the views of the TGA or the Expert Working Group.

– ref. Medicinal cannabis is most often prescribed for pain, anxiety and sleep. Here’s what the evidence says – https://theconversation.com/medicinal-cannabis-is-most-often-prescribed-for-pain-anxiety-and-sleep-heres-what-the-evidence-says-262429

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Maha Nassar, Associate Professor in the School of Middle Eastern and North African Studies, University of Arizona

Five journalists were among the 22 people killed on Aug. 25, 2025, in Israeli strikes on the Nasser Hospital in the Gaza Strip. Following global condemnation, the office of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu issued a statement saying Israel “values the work of journalists.” But the numbers tell a different story.

Those deaths bring the total number of journalists killed in Gaza in almost two years of war to 192. The Committee to Protect Journalists, which collates that data, accuses Israel of “engaging in the deadliest and most deliberate effort to kill and silence journalists” that the U.S.-based nonprofit has ever seen. “Palestinian journalists are being threatened, directly targeted and murdered by Israeli forces, and are arbitrarily detained and tortured in retaliation for their work,” the committee added.

As a scholar of modern Palestinian history, I see the current killing of reporters, photographers and other media professionals in Gaza as part of a longer history of Israeli attempts to silence Palestinian journalists. This history stretches back to at least 1967, when Israel militarily occupied the Palestinian territories of the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip following the Six-Day War.

Beyond the humanitarian toll, what makes matters even more drastic now is that, with Israeli restrictions on foreign media entering Gaza, local Palestinian journalists are the only people who can bear witness to the death and destruction taking place – and report it to a wider world. Indeed, nearly all of the nearly 200 journalists killed since Oct. 7, 2023, have been Palestinian.

A decades-long process in the making

From the first days of the occupation in 1967, Israel has tried to keep a tight grip on media reporting, building a legal and military architecture that aimed to control and censor Palestinian journalism.

In August 1967, the army issued Military Order 101, effectively criminalizing “political” assembly and “propagandistic” publications in the occupied territories.

Yet despite such restrictions, local journalism persisted and grew. By the early 1980s, Palestinians in the occupied territories were publishing three dailies, five weeklies and four magazines. The most popular publications circulated up to 15,000 copies.

But all Palestinian publications were subject to Israeli military censorship. Every night, editors were forced to submit two copies of everything they planned to print to Israeli censors. That included articles, photos, ads, weather reports and even crossword puzzles.

Anything the Israeli censor deemed to be “of political significance” had to be removed prior to publication. Editors who violated these terms, or who were accused of belonging to Palestinian political groups, could be detained or deported. These practices have echoes today with Israel often accusing the journalists it kills of being Hamas operatives.

Censorship regimes

Objecting to these and many other restrictions, Palestinians launched the first intifada, or uprising, against the Israeli occupation in December 1987. During the uprising’s first year, Israeli forces reportedly jailed 47 Palestinian reporters, temporarily banned eight local and regional newspapers, permanently revoked the licenses of two magazines and closed four press service offices.

While intended to be a show of force, most Palestinians saw the restrictions as evidence that Israel was afraid of Palestinians reporting on their own conditions.

Many people hoped that the Oslo Accords – a series of negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization that formally launched in 1993 – would lead to greater press freedoms. But it was not to be the case.

Israeli authorities continued to enforce military censorship on what they deemed to be “security topics.” They also revoked the press cards of reporters who did not stay in line and assaulted and harassed journalists reporting from the ground.

Meanwhile, the newly established Palestinian Authority, set up as part of the Oslo process to partially govern Palestinian territories on what was meant to be a temporary basis, built a censorship regime of its own. It, too, arrested, suspended and closed news outlets it deemed too critical of its actions.

Shootings and impunity

By the 2000s, Israel’s attacks on journalists in the West Bank and Gaza Strip grew deadlier. Israeli forces fatally shot Palestinian photographer Imad Abu Zahra in Jenin in the West Bank in 2002, British filmmaker James Miller in Rafah in 2003 and Reuters cameraman Fadel Shana in Gaza in 2008.

Since 2008, as battles between Israeli forces and Palestinian militant groups have grown fiercer, journalists have worked under even deadlier conditions. Yet even during unarmed demonstrations, journalists have faced deadly Israeli force. In 2018, during the mass unarmed protests in Gaza known as the Great March of Return, Israeli forces shot and killed Palestinian journalists Yaser Murtaja and Ahmed Abu Hussein. Both were wearing “PRESS” vests when they were shot. In addition, at least 115 journalists were wounded while covering the protests, which lasted six months.

The deadly force has not been limited to Palestinians in Gaza. In May 2022, Palestinian American journalist Shireen Abu Akleh was killed in the Jenin refugee camp. One of the most famous Palestinian reporters at the time, Abu Akleh’s death drew hundreds of thousands of mourners, while Israeli police beat pallbearers at her funeral service.

Legitimate military targets?

International humanitarian law makes clear that journalists are civilians and therefore cannot be targeted during combat. That includes war correspondents who are covering war while under the protection of an armed group.

For their part, Israeli officials argue that they do not target journalists. They say that their strikes are aimed at legitimate military objectives, often asserting that Hamas embeds itself in civilian buildings or that some of the journalists killed were militants.

But such allegations are often made without independently verifiable evidence. Israel alleged that Murtaja, the journalist killed in Gaza in 2018, was a militant, but provided no proof.

In the case of Abu Akleh, Israeli officials initially claimed that she may have been killed by Palestinian militants. They eventually admitted there was a “high possibility” that Israeli forces killed Abu Akleh, but claimed that the killing was accidental and therefore the government would not press charges. A recent documentary refutes that claim and identifies the Israeli soldier alleged to have killed Abu Akleh intentionally.

Culture of impunity

Even prior to the deadly Hamas-led attacks on Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, the picture emerging was that of impunity for Israeli forces who killed journalists – by accident or by design. A May 2023 report from the Committee to Protect Journalists concluded that Israel engaged in a “deadly pattern” of lethal force against journalists and failed to hold perpetrators accountable.

Since October 2023, journalists in Gaza have faced even deadlier conditions. Israel continues to ban international news agencies from reporting inside the Gaza Strip. As a result, local Palestinian journalists are often the only ones on the ground.

Aside from the deadly conditions, they contend with Israeli smears against their work and threats against their families.

Palestinian journalists there often run toward bombardments when others run away. As a result, they are sometimes killed in “double-tap” strikes, where Israeli air and drone strikes return to an area that has just been struck, killing rescue workers and the journalists covering them.

All this has led to an unbearable personal toll for those continuing to report from within Gaza. On Oct. 25, 2023, Al Jazeera’s Gaza bureau chief, Wael al-Dahdouh, was reporting live on air when he learned that an Israeli airstrike had killed his wife, two children and grandson. He returned on air the next day.

And the killing has not eased up. On Aug. 10, 2025, Israeli forces killed Anas al-Sharif in Gaza City, another prominent Al Jazeera correspondent who had stayed on the streets through months of bombardment. Five of his fellow journalists were also killed in the same airstrike.

The Aug. 25 strike on Nasser Hospital is just the latest in this deadly pattern.

Among the five journalists killed in that attack were freelancers working for Reuters and The Associated Press – two international media outlets frustrated by Israel’s refusal to allow its journalists into Gaza to document the war.

Despite the danger, global newsrooms have repeatedly urged Israel to open Gaza to independent media, and a coalition of 27 countries recently pressed for access in Gaza.

Israel continues to refuse these requests. As such, Palestinian journalists remain the primary witnesses of Israel’s relentless assault on Gaza. And they are increasingly killed as they do so. The question remains whether the international community will hold Israel to account.

Maha Nassar does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Israel’s killing of journalists follows a pattern of silencing Palestinian media that stretches back to 1967 – https://theconversation.com/israels-killing-of-journalists-follows-a-pattern-of-silencing-palestinian-media-that-stretches-back-to-1967-263891

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Bryce Barker, Professor in Archaeology, University of Southern Queensland

New research conducted at Walufeni Cave, an important archaeological site in Papua New Guinea, reveals new evidence of long-distance interactions between Oceania’s Indigenous societies, as far back as 3,200 years ago.

Our new study, published in the journal Australian Archaeology, is the first archaeological research undertaken on the Great Papuan Plateau. The findings continue to undermine the historical Eurocentric idea that early Indigenous societies in this region were static and unchanging.

Instead, we find further evidence for what Monash Professor of Indigenous Archaeology Ian J. McNiven calls the Coral Sea Cultural Interaction Sphere: a dynamic interchange of trade, ideas and movement over a vast region encompassing New Guinea, the Torres Strait, and north-eastern Australia.

Tracking movement across Sahul

The goal of the Great Papuan Plateau project was to determine whether the plateau may have been an eastern pathway for the movement of early people into north-eastern Australia, at a time when New Guinea and Australia were joined in the continent of Sahul.

The two countries as we know them separated about 8,000 years ago due to sea levels rising after the last glacial period.

Our research in Walufeni Cave, located near Mount Bosavi in New Guinea’s southern highlands province, identified occupation dating back more than 10,000 years. We also found a unique and as yet undated petroglyph rock art style.

Our analyses of cave deposits reveals significant changes in how the site was used starting from just over 3,000 years ago. This includes changes to the frequency of occupation, to plant and animal use, as well as the sudden appearance of coastal marine shell.

Specifically, we found 3,200-year-old evidence for the transport of marine shell 200km inland, which has previously been recorded as coming from the southern coast of the Gulf of Papua, and from as far away as Torres Strait.

This suggests the long-distance maritime trade and interaction networks between the societies of coastal southern New Guinea, Torres Strait and northern Australia extended far inland – and much further than previously known.

The significance of marine shells

Archaeologists and ethnographers have widely documented the use of culturally modified marine shells as important items of trade and prestige in New Guinea.

These shells were used as markers of status and prestige, for ritual purposes, as currency and wealth, as tools, and to facilitate long-distance social ties between groups.

Despite the coastal availability of a large variety of shellfish, only a relatively small selection are recorded as being commonly used in New Guinea.

The most prominent of these are dog whelks (Nassaridae), cowrie shells (Cypraeidae), cone shells (Conidae), baler shell (Volutidae), and pearl/kina shell (Pteriidae). Many of these are significant for ritual and symbolic functions across the Indo-Pacific and indeed, globally.

Dog whelks were the predominant species we found in Walufeni Cave, along with olive shells and cowrie shells. These come from very small “sea snails”, or gastropods.

All of the shells we found had been culturally modified, such as to allow stitching onto garments, or threading onto strings.

Gastropod shells continue to be used by today’s plateau societies. They may be sewn onto elaborate ceremonial costumes, or offered in long strings as trade items, or as bridal dowry.

Pottery and oral tradition

Further evidence for long-distance voyaging between the southern coast of Papua New Guinea and the Torres Strait and Northern Australia comes in the form of pottery.

Researchers have found Lapita pottery at two archaeological sites on the south coast of New Guinea (Caution Bay and Hopo). These have been dated to 2,900 and 2,600 years ago, respectively.

Lapita pottery is a distinctive feature of Austronesian long-distance voyagers with origins in modern-day Taiwan and the Philippines. Lapita peoples bought the first pottery to New Guinea about 3,300 years ago, providing the template for later localised pottery production.

In a separate finding, Aboriginal pottery dating back to 2,950 years ago was reported from Jiigurru (Lizard Island), off the coast of the Cape York Peninsula. While this pottery isn’t stylistically Lapita, the technology used to make it is.

Similar pottery dating back 2,600 years ago has been reported on the eastern Murray Islands of Torres Strait, and in the Mask Cave on Pulu Island, western Torres Strait. Analysis of the Murray Island pottery indicates the clay was derived from southern Papua New Guinea.

These studies suggest the Lapita peoples’ knowledge of how to make pottery spread to Torres Strait and northern Australia via the interaction sphere.

Furthermore, the cultural hero Sido/Souw, who is present in oral tradition on the Great Papuan Plateau, is also present in oral tradition from the Torres Strait and southern New Guinea. This demonstrates sociocultural connections across a vast area.

Our research builds on the continuing reevaluation of the capabilities of Indigenous societies, which were often characterised by early anthropologists as static and unchanging.

Bryce Barker receives funding from the Australian Research Council .

Tiina Manne receives funding from the Australian Research Council.

– ref. Ancient shells and pottery reveal the vast 3,200-years-old trade routes of Oceania’s Indigenous peoples – https://theconversation.com/ancient-shells-and-pottery-reveal-the-vast-3-200-years-old-trade-routes-of-oceanias-indigenous-peoples-261950

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Aleta Moriarty, PhD student, economic opportunities for people with autism, The University of Melbourne

Recent images of an emaciated Gazan child, Muhammad Zakariya Ayyoub al-Matouq, provoked global outrage. Some sought to minimise this harm, attributing it instead to pre-existing conditions or disability.

But framing starvation deaths in Gaza in terms of underlying disabilities or comorbidities is misleading. It is essential to recognise these conditions do not justify suffering or death.

Rather, the crisis in Gaza has intensified existing vulnerabilities for people with disabilities, who face extreme barriers to evacuation, aid and medical treatment.

So, what type of practical humanitarian response is needed right now for people with disabilities in Gaza?

For people with disabilities, conflict supercharges risk

Conflict and humanitarian crises intensify and compound vulnerabilities faced by people with disabilities.

Evidence shows that in armed conflicts and humanitarian crises, people with disabilities:

• have higher mortality rates
• are less likely to evacuate safely
• are less likely to access humanitarian assistance
• are often separated from supports and carers, and
• are more often left behind.

Women and children with disabilities face heightened risks of violence, neglect and exploitation, while also contending with stigma and discrimination.

A tragedy within a tragedy

International law is clear on this issue.

The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which Israel ratified in 2012, requires it to take

all necessary measures to ensure the protection and safety of persons with disabilities in situations of risk, including situations of armed conflict.

The UN Security Council has also recognised the disproportionate impact of conflict on people with disabilities.

There is significant evidence suggesting Israel has not upheld these obligations.

UN special rapporteurs have expressed alarm at what they describe as “harrowing conditions for Palestinians with disabilities trapped in Gaza”.

The UN estimates about 92% of homes in Gaza have been destroyed or damaged. More than than 90% of Gazans have now been displaced, some more than ten times.

People with disabilities are at particular risk. The UN has documented cases where evacuation orders were issued by Israel in inaccessible formats, leading to additional deaths. Piles of rubble and unexploded ordinance have made access impossible for many, with 81% of roads now damaged or destroyed.

More than 83% of people with disabilities in Gaza have lost their assistive devices (such as wheelchairs or hearing aids).

UN representatives report being shocked by the account of a 14-year-old girl with cerebral palsy. She had lost her assistive devices, including a wheelchair, and had to be carried by her parents as they fled from north to south Gaza.

Exhausted and exposed to danger along the way, the girl cried out in desperation, “Mama, it’s over. Leave me here, and you run away.”

Hospitals and rehabilitation facilities are necessary for many people with disabilities. However, only half of Gaza’s hospitals and about 39% of primary health care centres are partially functional.

A mass disabling event

Israel’s war in Gaza constitutes a mass disabling event.

A joint assessment by the World Bank, United Nations and European Union found in February that the prevalence of disabilities had doubled since October 2023.

Most recent data indicates that 151,442 people have sustained injuries in this conflict.

In 2024, the World Health Organisation estimated that around 25% of all those injured are likely to have acute and ongoing rehabilitation needs.

The NGO Humanity and Inclusion UK reports Gaza now has the highest rate of child amputees per capita in the world. According to UNICEF, more than ten children per day have lost one or both of their legs.

The substantial rise in the prevalence of disability means demand for rehabilitation services and accessibility has quickly outstripped supply.

UNICEF reports more than one million children also need mental health and psychosocial support.

With historical evidence suggesting Israeli forces have pursued deliberate disablement policies, this demands urgent investigation.

What’s needed now

An immediate, sustained ceasefire is essential.

Israel’s expanded assault on Gaza city significantly threatens people with disabilities and risks further deaths and disability.

Israel should also abandon its current flawed system of aid delivery via the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation. Principled aid delivery must be restored, ensuring safe access for people with disability.

To meet its obligations under international law, Israel should keep relief corridors open for the safe passage of humanitarian and medical personnel and goods. This includes assistive devices and the batteries needed to power them.

Forcible displacement must cease. Evacuations must comply with international law, be accessible, and keep families, carers and assistive devices together.

Protecting people with disabilities would mean ensuring shelters and wash facilities are accessible and equipped, and evacuation backlogs cleared.

Expanding rehabilitation, mental health support, access to assistive technology and tailored services is crucial. Civilian infrastructure and medical facilities must be protected, and rubble and ordnance cleared to ensure safe and accessible passage.

An equitable humanitarian response must be inclusive, centring the voices of persons with disabilities (especially women and children, who face heightened risks).

Without immediate action to end the violence, restore access and ensure disability inclusion, the most vulnerable will lose further dignity, safety and lives.

Aleta Moriarty previously worked for international organisations on the rights of people with disability.

– ref. Israel’s attacks on Gaza are putting people with disabilities at extreme risk – https://theconversation.com/israels-attacks-on-gaza-are-putting-people-with-disabilities-at-extreme-risk-263029

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Nial Wheate, Professor, School of Natural Sciences, Macquarie University

When your dog starts limping or your cat comes down with a sniffle, it’s natural to worry. For many families, pets are more than just animals – and we want them to have a standard of medical care similar to our own.

But it can still be surprising when the vet prescribes a medication that looks identical to something in your own bathroom cabinet.

Many human medicines are safe and effective for pets when used under veterinary guidance. But others can be harmful due to differences in how animals process drugs. So sometimes, pets need their own medicines.

So let’s examine the differences between drugs for humans and animals – and why you shouldn’t just give a pet your own medications.

Pet and human medicines explained

In Australia, the Therapeutic Goods Administration approves and regulates drugs for humans. The Australian Pesticides and Veterinary Medicines Authority APVMA does the same for pet drugs.

While both agencies consider efficacy and safety in deciding whether to approve a product, the APVMA also considers environmental impact. For example, medicines given to animals – especially when given at scale on farms – can leach into waterways, affecting aquatic life and water quality.

The market for animal medicines is smaller than that for humans, making them less cost-effective to develop. Sometimes, no medicine exists for an animal condition and vets may need to use a human medicine.

For certain diseases and conditions, vets are legally permitted to dispense human medicines for pets through a process called off-label prescribing.

There are also medicines approved for both humans and pets. They include classes of antibiotics, antidepressants, corticosteriods (anti-inflammatory drugs), antiparasitics and chemotherapy drugs.

For example, doxorubicin is a chemotherapy drug used in humans to treat cancers including those of the lungs and bone. In dogs, it is commonly used to treat lymphomas, melanomas and cancers of the bone, among others. In both humans and dogs, doxorubicin is used to treat mammary gland (breast) cancer.

Similarly, ivermectin can be used to treat parasite infections such as scabies in humans and animals.

Beware the safety issues

While many drugs are shared between humans and pets, not all are safe. In fact, some common household medications can badly harm or kill animals.

The painkillers ibuprofen and paracetamol are toxic to both dogs and cats. They can cause damage to the animal’s stomach and kidneys, and may kill them.

This is because dogs and cats break down medicines different to the human body. For example, the proteins in a cat’s liver are different from the human liver, so they can’t break down paracetamol. It can damage their red blood cells and reduce their body’s ability to carry oxygen.

And the situation can differ between animals. The flea and tick medication permethrin, for instance, is safe for dogs but highly toxic to cats – potentially causing tremors, seizures and death.

And pets are far more sensitive to drug dosages than humans, so even small quantities of the wrong medicine can be fatal.

Animal-only medicines

Pets may also be given medicines no longer used for humans, or one specifically developed for animals.

Carprofen is a non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drug previously used in humans but is now only prescribed for dogs. A vet might prescribe it for pain or inflammation.

We don’t use it in humans anymore because it’s expensive to manufacture. But it’s still used for dogs because it’s effective, and alternatives such as paracetamol and ibuprofen aren’t suitable for them.

Typically, medicines are developed for pets only when they address a condition specific to animals.

For example, humans don’t usually suffer from heartworm, but infection in pets is common. The arsenic-based drug melarsomine was designed specifically for animals and treats heartworm in adult dogs.

And of course, humans should not take medication prescribed for their pet.

While pet medicine may look similar to yours, there may be differences in formulation or dose that can cause side effects or toxicity in humans.

What to remember

If your pet is sick or injured, never give them a drug out of your own medicine cabinet – even if the vet has previously prescribed them the medication.

Take your animal to the vet. They will advise on the most appropriate treatment and dose, so you don’t do your pet further harm.

Nial Wheate in the past has received funding from the ACT Cancer Council, Tenovus Scotland, Medical Research Scotland, Scottish Crucible, and the Scottish Universities Life Sciences Alliance. He is a fellow of the Royal Australian Chemical Institute. Nial is the chief scientific officer of Vaihea Skincare LLC, a director of SetDose Pty Ltd (a medical device company) and was previously a Standards Australia panel member for sunscreen agents. He is a member of the Haleon Australia Pty Ltd Pain Advisory Board. Nial regularly consults to industry on issues to do with medicine risk assessments, manufacturing, design and testing.

– ref. Yes, vets sometimes prescribe human drugs to pets. But don’t try it at home – https://theconversation.com/yes-vets-sometimes-prescribe-human-drugs-to-pets-but-dont-try-it-at-home-259675

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Asher Kaufman, Professor of History and Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame

Israel’s conduct in Gaza increasingly risks turning the state into a pariah.

Whereas world leaders initially rallied around Israel after the Oct. 7, 2023, massacre by Hamas militants, the resulting destruction inside the Palestinian enclave has seen the country ever more isolated on the international stage.

In recent weeks, even long-standing allies such as Germany, the U.K. and Australia have distanced themselves from the Israeli government, notably by pushing for recognition of Palestinian statehood.

As an Israeli scholar of the Middle East working in the U.S., I have seen how these international currents are affecting Israel’s standing in the world. And while the government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has stood defiant and unmoved by the hardening stance against it, the blowback against its citizens is certainly being felt.

Images of starvation

The change in attitude toward Israel has been unfolding since soon after the start of the war. It has been driven by Israeli actions that are increasingly seen as disproportionate and indefensible. But it has reached new heights – or lows – in recent months given the increasingly desperate plight of Palestinians being broadcast around the globe.

Horrifying images of starving children and thousands of people skirmishing for scraps of food in what a U.N.-backed body has called famine are now regularly reported in media outlets around the world and in the U.S. Even conservative platforms such as Fox News that until recently were sympathetic to Israel’s response to Oct. 7 have dedicated airtime to reporting on the hunger crisis and questioning its motives.

Increasingly, Israel’s onslaught on Gaza – which to date has killed at least 62,000 people, around half of whom are women and children, and left 70% of the strip in ruins – is being viewed through a critical lens.

Nearly two years after the attack that sparked the Israeli operation, the war aims of Israel are understood more and more as politically motivated, with the purpose being the political survival of Netanyahu and his government.

There is increasing international condemnation and sanctioning of some of the government’s more prominent members who are accused of using genocidal language against the Palestinians in Gaza and elsewhere.

Australia recently barred the entrance of one far-right Israeli parliamentarian, citing his violent and inflammatory language against Palestinians. The U.K. has sanctioned two members of Netanyahu’s government, Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich, for similar reasons.

Moreover, international organizations and scholars are increasingly framing the actions of the Israeli government as a whole in Gaza as genocide – and recently two Israeli human rights organizations have joined them.

Israeli public opinion

But to what extent are Israeli citizens being conflated with the Netanyahu government in international criticism?

Israeli public opinion polls tell a complex story of views on the war in Gaza. On one hand, Netanyahu’s government remains deeply unpopular among 70% of Israeli citizens, and a growing number of Israelis now fully believe that the prime minister is prolonging the war for his own political interests.

Such sentiment has seen an uptick in protests over the war. On Aug. 17, the country practically shut down during a widespread strike and demonstration against the government. Hundreds of thousands of people gathered in Tel Aviv in an unprecedented mass rally, calling for the end of the war and a ceasefire deal that would bring all hostages back.

Yet polls also show that a majority of Israelis remain either indifferent to the suffering of Palestinians in Gaza or are in support of it, as dehumanization of Palestinians is widespread among large swaths of Israeli society.

It seems that only recently cracks in this wall of indifference have emerged.

Bans, booing and ostracism

The labeling of Israel as a pariah state internationally does not seem to bother the government.

Netanyahu insists that all the reporting about the humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza is fake news, orchestrated by Hamas and antisemitic forces around the world. Netanyahu has also responded to the moves by Western governments to recognize the Palestinian state by labeling their decisions as antisemitic.

But there are signs that international condemnation of the war in Gaza is affecting Israelis themselves – both at home and abroad.

Israelis and Israeli organizations from all walks of life are facing increased instances of anti-Israeli actions and sentiments.

The movement to boycott, divest and sanction Israel, known as BDS, has been in existence since 2005, but until the war in Gaza it had only limited success in generating wide support for its campaign. Now, 20 years after its establishment, the floodgates have seemingly been lifted and resulted in a deluge of boycotts and other actions that are slowly affecting almost every sector in Israel. To give one example, the British grocery chain Co-op earlier this year announced that it would stop sourcing Israeli produce at its 2,300 stores.

Israeli tourists in Greece have been targeted by pro-Palestinian demonstrations. And there are multiple reports of Israeli tourists being questioned or harassed elsewhere for their possible involvement in the war in Gaza.

There is pressure on FIFA to force Israel out of the global soccer organization, and matches involving Israeli teams in European capitals have been marred by violence by fans on both sides.

Meanwhile, a growing number of academics around the world are refusing to collaborate with their Israel peers. The EU is considering a move to block Israel from accessing its prestigious Horizon Europe research and innovation program. And Israeli artists are now regularly ostracized and disinvited from artistic events around the world, from music festivals to architecture exhibitions.

International cultural events that are scheduled to take place in Israel are now routinely modified or canceled, as just happened with the International Harp Competition, which had been scheduled for December 2025. Meanwhile, the popular Eurovision Song Contest has now been a site of anti-Israeli demonstrations for the second year in a row. This is despite Israeli fans of the event, hugely popular among the LGBTQ community, belonging predominantly to the progressive left-leaning camp in Israel – the very people most likely to be in opposition to the current government.

Israelis have responded to this challenge in multiple ways. Even prior to the mass demonstration on Aug. 17, tens of thousands of Israelis have protested the government for months on end, accusing Netanyahu and his far-right government for turning Israel into a pariah state. Artists and academics have issued petitions, acknowledging Israeli’s responsibility for the humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza and calling for the end of the war.

Abroad, Israelis, who are known for being avid international tourists, are now traveling more to sites that are deemed less hostile to Israel. Many prefer not to disclose their Israeli identify. Reservists and discharged soldiers are fearful of being arrested abroad after posting on social media about their military service in Gaza.

Claims of antisemitism

Yet Netanyahu, who is subject to an outstanding arrest warrant by the International Criminal Court, along with his far-right Cabinet, seem to be unmoved. The global isolation may even serve their narrow interests by putting Israel in this precarious situation and helping them mobilize their base around the argument that all anti-Israeli actions are motivated by antisemitism.

And while antisemitism is real and widespread, and some of it drives anti-Israeli actions, it is a far cry to argue that antisemitism – and not Israeli government policy – is the main reason for current global sentiments and actions against the country.

The government is particularly indifferent to areas that are considered “elitist” and that have been mainly affected by the global protest movement against Israel.

Members of the government and its supporters see Israeli academia or Israeli arts as fields filled with liberal leftists whose power should be curbed. It is telling that when the Weitzman Institute, one of Israel’s most distinguished academic centers, was hit by an Iranian missile during the 12-day war in June, a popular far-right radio and TV anchor and supporter of the government tweeted: “God 1; Weitzman Institute 0.” The suggestion was that God punished this globally renowned academic institution for its lack of support for the government.

The tweet was condemned by journalists and some members of the opposition but was endorsed and repeated on Channel 14, widely known as Netanyahu’s “house TV channel.” Government officials remained silent.

When this is the sentiment among the government and its supporters, why would they be bothered with the consequences to Israeli academia and indeed its citizens by Israel being increasingly seen as a pariah state?

Asher Kaufman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Netanyahu remains unmoved by Israel’s lurch toward pariah status − but at home and abroad, Israelis are suffering the consequences – https://theconversation.com/netanyahu-remains-unmoved-by-israels-lurch-toward-pariah-status-but-at-home-and-abroad-israelis-are-suffering-the-consequences-263154

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Natasha Lindstaedt, Professor in the Department of Government, University of Essex

In 1946, Winston Churchill announced an “iron curtain” had descended across Europe “from Stettin in the Baltic, to Trieste in the Adriatic”. This time it is the west that is building the barriers.

Every European nation bordering Russia and its ally Belarus is accelerating plans to construct hundreds of miles of fortified border to defend against possible Russian aggression.

The reasons are clear. The post-cold war European security framework – which relied on strengthening international institutions and trade, Nato expansion and US military guarantees – is being eroded.

Finland

Sharing an 832-mile border with Russia, Finland proposed building a wall in 2023 that would cover about 15% of its border, costing over US$400 million (£297 million) and with hopes that it will be completed by 2026.

Motivated in part by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, but also due to a rise of Russians fleeing to Finland to escape conscription. Finland’s government passed a law in July 2023 to build stronger and taller fences, as the previous wooden fences were designed only to prevent livestock from crossing. Eight border posts were erected (including north of the Arctic Circle) alongside greater obstacles in the southernmost strip of the country.

There are even defences being erected in remote areas of north-eastern Finland, where in the not-too-distant past, a steady flow of Russian and Finns would regularly come and go across the border to buy groceries.

Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland

And Finland is not the first. In August 2015, Estonia announced that it would build a fence along its eastern border with Russia, after Moscow’s 2014 annexation of Crimea.

In 2024, the Baltic states and Poland proposed to further fortify their borders with a defensive wall. It would cover 434 miles, costing over £2 billion. Plans and construction are now speeding up as leaders of the Baltic states worry that the prospects of a ceasefire between Ukraine and Russia could mean Moscow redirects its military towards them.

Latvia will invest about US$350 million over the next few years to reinforce its 240-mile border with Russia, while Lithuania is planning a 30-mile defence line against a possible Russian invasion. Poland has started building a permanent fence on its border with Belarus as part of its defence against Moscow’s potential allies.

These walls will also be accompanied by other physical barriers such as antitank ditches, 15-tonne concrete dragon’s teeth (which can stop Russian tanks advancing), massive concrete blocks and pyramids, roadblocks, massive metal gates, mined fields and blocked bridgeheads.

Lithuania is planning up to 30 miles of reclamation ditches, bridges prepared for bombing and trees designated to fall on roads when necessary.

The Baltic states are also building more than 1,000 bunkers, ammunition depots and supply shelters to further protect the 600 miles of territory that borders Russia. Bunkers are expected to be about 377 square feet, capable of housing up to ten soldiers and being able to withstand artillery strikes from Russia.

The Baltic nations plus Finland and Poland also all announced in 2025 that they would withdraw from the 1997 international treaty banning antipersonnel landmines, while Lithuania revoked its pledge to a cluster bomb treaty. Poland announced in June 2025 that it had added minefields to its “East Shield” border plans.

Building a drone wall

These border defences will be using the latest technology and early warning systems and artillery units. Lithuania Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Finland and Norway met in Riga in 2024 to begin plans to build a 1,850-mile “drone wall” to protect their borders.

This drone wall will have a sensor network, consisting of radars and electronic warfare tools to identify and destroy Russian drones. Within seconds of detecting a target crossing the border, there would be a system of close reconnaissance of drones.

This project will require a great deal of cooperation among participating states. Estonian companies are already designing drones that can both detect and neutralise threats along complex terrain in lakes, swamps and forests that blanket Russia’s border with the Baltic countries.

Historical parallels

Both cooperation from all countries that border Russia in Europe and an understanding of the terrain is critical to avoid the failures of the Maginot Line, part of a set of defensive barriers that France built along its borders in the 1930s, and which failed to prevent a German invasion in the second world war. In that case, it was assumed that the Germans could not pass through the Ardennes forest in Belgium.

While the Maginot Line fortifications did cause the Germans to rethink their plan of attack, Belgium was left vulnerable. Today, European nations are aware that they cannot fully prevent a Russian attack, but they can, possibly, shape the nature of a Russian invasion. The goal of these barriers is both deterrence and to try to control the location of any invasion.

If a ceasefire between Ukraine and Russia is announced, the leaders of the Baltic nations fear the Kremlin could redeploy troops to their borders.

Countries neighbouring Russia are trying to be as prepared as possible for whatever Vladimir Putin might do next.

Natasha Lindstaedt does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Why a new ‘iron curtain’ is being built across Europe. This time it’s to keep Russia out – https://theconversation.com/why-a-new-iron-curtain-is-being-built-across-europe-this-time-its-to-keep-russia-out-263652

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By David McMillan, Professor in Finance, University of Stirling

The price of gold reached a historic high in April and remains close to that value. Conventional investing wisdom puts gold as a “safe-haven” asset – one that investors move towards in times of crises as they desert higher-risk assets such as stocks. But in August, the S&P 500 stock index also hit a record high and, like gold, it too remains close to this value.

Historically, those who follow these markets would have expected gold and stock prices to move in opposite directions. This typically produced the “hedging” effect of gold – it would offset losses (and gains) from stocks.

But while “safe” gold and “risky” stocks rise at the same time, the value of gold as a more secure bet in times of strife could be diminishing.

Looking at the price of gold historically shows that it rose in response to the oil price shocks of the 1970s as the global economy fell towards recession. It fell during the late 1990s as stock markets boomed, and as the global economy recovered after 2009.

But since this point, it has shown a trajectory largely in common with stocks. New research I was involved in looked at several reasons these traditionally opposing forces have been converging – and causing gold’s safe-haven effect to fade.

Right now, the global economy is emerging from a period of high inflation and high interest rates. Central banks are reducing interest rates (with more cuts expected), which will encourage household spending and business investment.

Economic growth figures are generally trending upwards, as are corporate earnings. And there is positive sentiment within economies about the potential of AI and its role in growth and productivity. Together, these factors explain the rise in stock markets.

But geopolitical risks, especially involving Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and tensions in the Middle East (specifically Iran and attacks by Houthis in the Red Sea) are causing concern for stocks and the wider economy. Both can have significant effects on major international commodities (such as oil and food prices).

And there is risk too from US president Donald Trump’s trade policies. This is especially true given his unpredictability, with tariffs increased and then paused before being reinstated at different levels to those previously announced.

Both these hostilities and Trump’s trade policies create risk and uncertainty within the international economy. This would explain why investors might consider buying gold – making it more valuable.

But this does not fully explain why it is so much in demand and trading close to its all-time high. To understand this, we need to look a bit further back.

Rising demand

After the dotcom crash in the early 2000s, commodities like gold began to be treated (and traded) like other financial assets. Key in this was the development of exchange-traded funds (ETFs), with the first gold ETF launched in 2004. These allow investors to essentially buy a share in gold.

Since then, the number of gold ETFs has risen dramatically, especially after the global financial crisis. Now gold may be traded like any other asset and can become a staple of investment portfolios. Demand for these funds has been surging recently.

On top of this, the US dollar’s status as the world’s currency is under threat. Currently, it acts as a reserve currency for central banks and the vehicle for trade and international payments, including for major commodities. But some countries have increasingly questioned this status quo, considering whether they should trade commodities like oil in their own currencies.

Trump, and the uncertainty he causes, only makes these calls grow louder. As such, these doubts about the status of the dollar have led central banks to buy more gold as an alternative reserve asset.

Since the end of the global financial crisis in 2009 and especially for the past ten years, gold has broadly followed the same path as stocks. While there will always be deviations, this effectively means an end of gold as a safe-haven hedge against stock price falls.

Gold is now firmly established as another investment asset, along with stocks, bonds and other commodities. This means that these days, its investment role is as part of a diversified portfolio and not as a hedge.

But that’s not to say that gold has lost its appeal. Its limited supply and desirability for both jewellery and manufacturing are rare and valuable attributes. And with its intrinsic worth recognised all over the world, gold is likely to remain in demand.

David McMillan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Why gold may be losing its shine as a safe-haven investment – https://theconversation.com/why-gold-may-be-losing-its-shine-as-a-safe-haven-investment-263694

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Anna Batta, Associate Professor of International Security Studies, Air University

Donald Trump has raised the prospect of directs talks between Presidents Vladimir Putin of Russia and Volodymyr Zelenskyy of Ukraine, in what would be the first such encounter in more than three years of war between the two countries.

In a social media post on Aug. 18, 2025, the U.S. president announced that he had begun “the arrangements for a meeting, at a location to be determined.”

Whether the proposed meeting does go ahead given the animosity between the two men remains to be seen. Previous speculation earlier in 2025 that Putin and Zelenskyy might engage in face-to-face talks led nowhere.

But should Trump succeed in bringing Putin and Zelenkyy together, it would not be the first time they have met.

In Paris in 2019, the two men sat down together as part of what was known as the Normandy Format talks. As a scholar of international relations, I have interviewed people involved in the talks. Some five years on, the way the talks floundered and then failed can offer lessons about the challenges today’s would-be mediators now face.

Initial hopes

The Normandy Format talks started on the sidelines of events in June 2014 commemorating the 70th anniversary of the D-Day landings. The aim was to try to resolve the ongoing conflict between Ukrainian forces and pro-Russian separatist groups in the country’s Donbas region in the east. That conflict had recently escalated, with pro-Russian separatists seizing key towns in the Donetsk and Luhansk after Russia illegally annexed the peninsula of Crimea in February 2014.

The talks continued periodically until 2022, when Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Until that point, most of the discussion was framed by two deals, the Minsk accords of 2014 and 2015, which set out the terms for a ceasefire between Kyiv and the Moscow-armed rebel groups and the conditions for elections in Donetsk and Luhansk.

By the time of the sixth meeting in December 2019, the only time Zelenkyy and Putin have met in person, some still hoped that the Minsk accords could form a framework for peace.

Under discussion

Zelenskyy was only a few months into his presidency. He arrived in Paris with fresh energy and a desire to find peace.

His electoral campaign had centered on the promise of putting an end to the unrest in Donbas, which had been rumbling on for years. The increasing role of Russia in the conflict, through supporting rebels financially and with volunteer Russian soldiers, had complicated and escalated fighting, and many Ukrainians were weary of the impact of internally displaced people that it caused.

By all accounts, Zelenskyy went into Paris believing that he could make a deal with Putin.

“I want to return with concrete results,” Zelenskyy said just days before meeting Putin. By then, the Ukrainian president’s only contact with Putin had been over the phone. “I want to see the person and I want to bring from Normandy understanding and feeling that everybody really wants gradually to finish this tragic war,” Zelenskyy said, adding, “I can feel it for sure only at the table.”

One of Putin’s main concerns going into the talks was the lifting of Western sanctions imposed in response to the annexation of Crimea.

But the Russian president also wanted to keep Russia’s smaller neighbor under its influence. Ukraine gained independence after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. But in the early years of the new century, Russia began to exert increasing influence over the politics of its neighbor. This ended in 2014, when a popular revolution ousted pro-Russian Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych and ushered in a pro-Western government.

More than anything, Russia wanted to arrest this shift and keep Ukraine out of the European Union and NATO.

Those desires – Ukraine’s to end the war in Donbas, and Russia’s to curb the West’s involvement in Ukraine – formed the parameters for the Normandy talks.

And for some time, there appeared to be momentum to find compromise. French President Emmanuel Macron said that the 2019 Paris talks had broken years of stalemate and relaunched the peace process. Putin’s assessment was that the peace process was “developing in the right direction.” Zelenskyy’s view was a little less enthusisastic: “Let’s say for now it’s a draw.”

Talking past each other

Yet the Putin-Zelenskyy meeting in 2019 ultimately ended in failure. In retrospect, both sides were talking past each other and could not reach agreement on the sequencing of key parts of the peace plan.

Zelenskyy wanted the security provisions of the Minsk accords, including a lasting ceasefire and the securing of Ukraine’s border with Russia, in place before proceeding with regional elections on devolving autonomy to the regions. Putin was adamant that the elections come first.

The success of the Normandy talks were also hindered by Putin’s refusal to acknowledge that Russia was a party to the conflict. Rather, he framed the Donbas conflict as a civil war between the Ukrainian government and the rebels. Russia’s role was simply to push the rebels to the negotiating table in this take – a view that was greeted with skepticism by Ukraine and the West.

As a result, the Normandy talks stalled. And then in February 2022, Russian launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Way forward today?

So what are the chances of success should Trump secure a second face-to-face meeting between Putin and Zelenskyy?

Many of the same challenges remain. The talks still revolve around the issues of security, the status of Donetsk and Luhansk.

But there are major differences – not least, 3½ years of actual direct war. Russia can no longer deny that it is a party of the conflict, even if Moscow frames the war as a special military operation to “denazify” and demilitarize Ukraine.

And three years of war have changed how the questions of Crimea and the Donbas are framed.

In the Normandy talks, there was no talk of recognizing Russian control over any Ukrainian territory. But recent U.S. efforts to negotiate peace have included a “de-jure” U.S. recognition of Russian control in Crimea, plus “de-facto recognition” of Russia’s occupation of nearly all of Luhansk oblast and the occupied portions of Donetsk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia.

Another major difference between the negotiation process then and now is who is mediating.

The Normandy negotiations were led by European leaders – German Chancellor Angela Merkel and President Macron of France. Throughout the whole Normandy talks process, only Germany, France, Ukraine and Russia were involved as active participants.

Today, it is the United States taking the lead.

And this suits Putin. A constant issue for Putin of the Normandy talks was that Germany and France were never neutral mediators.

In President Donald Trump, Putin has found a U.S. leader who, at least at first, appeared eager to take on the mantle from Europe.

But like the Europeans involved in the Normandy talks, Trump may also encounter similar barriers to any meaningful progress.

Despite his recent high-profile summit with Putin and follow-up meeting with Zelenksyy, Trump has made little progress toward ending the conflict in Ukraine. And neither Zelenskyy nor Putin has shown any inclination to compromise on their goals: Zelenskyy has ruled out land swaps, while Putin insists that any peace deal address “root causes.”

Getting the leaders of Ukraine and Russia into the same room is already a massive challenge; getting them to agree to a lasting agreement may be as elusive now as it was when Putin and Zelenskyy met in 2019.

This is an updated version of an article that was first published in The Conversation on June 2, 2025.

The views expressed in this article represent the personal views of the author and are not necessarily the views of the Department of Defense or of the Department of the Air Force.

– ref. Even if Trump succeeds in bringing Putin and Zelenskyy together, don’t expect wonders − their only previous face-to-face encounter ended in failure – https://theconversation.com/even-if-trump-succeeds-in-bringing-putin-and-zelenskyy-together-dont-expect-wonders-their-only-previous-face-to-face-encounter-ended-in-failure-263509

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Ran Porat, Affiliate Researcher, The Australian Centre for Jewish Civilisation, Monash University

As the longest-serving Israeli prime minister (17 years), Benjamin Netanyahu is famous for his political wizardry and survival skills. But he is also a highly controversial figure with questionable moral standards and legacy.

His latest term in office, beginning in late 2022, has been particularly challenging, thanks to the far-right radical elements of his governing coalition and the unprecedented national disaster Israel experienced at the hands of Hamas on October 7 2023.

Yet, Netanyahu has managed to neutralise almost all immediate domestic threats to his power. At times, he has done this by manoeuvring rivals and partners into postponing moves that could topple his government. Other times, he has reshuffled his Likud Party ranks or realigned with bitter foes.

Netanyahu is also facing increased criticism from the Israeli public, with hundreds of thousands of people taking part in marches in support of a hostage deal, as well as from former senior politicians and ex-security officials.

And he has clashed with Eyal Zamir, the Israel Defence Force’s (IDF) chief of staff, who argued against the plan to expand the war into Gaza City. Zamir received clear messages to fold or resign, and chose to stay.

Yet, Netanyahu chooses to ignore all of this noise, sending his entourage and loyalists to attack anyone with dissenting views. This week’s spray at Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese is just one example.

As a long term political survivor, he does all of this with an eye on the next Israeli elections, due at the end of 2026.

Propping up his far-right coalition

Over the past two and a half years, Israel has faced unprecedented crises that have left society deeply divided.

Under Netanyahu’s leadership, the government introduced a highly controversial judicial reform plan in early 2023, clashing with the Supreme Court and attorney general. This resulted in mass street protests against it.

Then came the Hamas attack of October 7, 2023, which triggered an ongoing multi-front war with severe long-term social, economic and humanitarian consequences.

Netanyahu has claimed credit for successes during this time, such as the 12-day war against Iran in June, while deflecting responsibility for any failures.

Though stretched in many directions, Netanyahu is at his best in such conditions, pitting the conflicting sides around him against each other and playing them.

His coalition relies on hard-right partners, especially National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir and Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich. Despite the massive protests to agree to a hostage deal and international demands to end the war, Netanyahu has chosen to prioritise ensuring the stability of his coalition.

He has acceded to Ben Gvir and Smotrich’s demands to reject ceasefire agreements with Hamas, and instead ordered increased military action against the terrorist group to try to achieve what he has called a “total victory”.

Netanyahu has also indulged Ben Gvir and Smotrich’s talk of resettling Gaza and has enabled their moves to gradually expand Israeli settlements deeper into the West Bank and block any geographically feasible Palestinian state.

Proving Henry Kissinger’s famous observation that “Israel has no foreign policy, only domestic politics,” Netanyahu has also angrily rebuked the wave of Western countries recognising, or preparing to recognise, a Palestinian state.

His defiant letters to French President Emmanuel Macron and social media outbursts about Albanese are aimed less at diplomacy and more at cultivating his image as “a strong leader for Israel” among his base.

Supported by the Trump administration’s sanctions against the International Criminal Court (ICC), Netanayhu has also felt confident attacking it for issuing warrants against him.

Neutralising challenges from ultra-religious parties

The government’s biggest domestic challenge has been passing a draft law addressing the decades-long exemption of tens of thousands of ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) men from army service.

Following a Supreme Court ruling that the previous exemptions could not continue, religious parties in Netanyahu’s coalition demanded a bill to formally exempt the men from army service or they would bring down the government.

In response, Netanyahu enticed old rival Gideon Sa’ar from the opposition into joining his government, shoring up the coalition’s previously tiny majority.

Since then, he has bought time through broken promises, successfully persuading the ultra-Orthodox parties to wait until parliament’s return in October of this year. Meanwhile, he replaced Yuli Edelstein, the committee chair who had sought a strong bill with personal sanctions for draft evaders, with a more pliant loyalist, Boaz Bismuth.

Eyes on re-election

Now Netanyahu has his eye on the next general elections, officially set for late 2026 — though he would prefer they take place before the third anniversary of the October 7 attacks.

For two years, polls have consistently predicted his defeat. As such, he is working to reshape his image. He wants Israelis to forget his central role in the October 7 catastrophe, as well as the questions surrounding the war’s management.

He also hopes to continue diverting attention from his ongoing trial on bribery and breach of trust charges.

But Netanyahu faces a dramatic dilemma over the war. On the one hand, he may decide to sign a ceasefire deal with Hamas and secure the release of the hostages. This would win the cheers of most Israelis, but risk the loss of his government, given the far-right ministers’ threats to dissolve the coalition if he accepts any deal without fully conquering the strip.

On the other hand, he could proceed with the military operation in Gaza City, which may well result in the killing of the remaining hostages – either by Hamas or as a consequence of IDF attacks.

A third option would be to continue negotiations while escalating preparations for the attack, in the hope of achieving a better deal. We will soon know what direction he will take – and what it will mean for his political future.

Ran Porat is a research associate at The Australia/Israel & Jewish Affairs Council (AIJAC) and Research Fellow at the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, Reichman University, Herzliya, Israel. He is affiliated with Australian Centre for Jewish Civilization, Monash University. He is also a former IDF military intelligence officer.

– ref. With eyes on re-election, Netanyahu’s fights with world leaders aim to distract from his many political problems – https://theconversation.com/with-eyes-on-re-election-netanyahus-fights-with-world-leaders-aim-to-distract-from-his-many-political-problems-263523