Category: The Conversation – Global Perspectives

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Anjum Naweed, Professor of Human Factors, CQUniversity Australia

This article contains spoilers!

I once leapt out of a train carriage because two strangers were loudly discussing the ending of the last Harry Potter book. Okay – I didn’t leap, but I did plug my ears and flee to another carriage.

Recently, I found myself in a similar predicament, trapped on a bus, entirely at the mercy of two passengers dissecting the Severance season two finale.

But not everyone shares my spoiler anxiety. I have friends who flip to the last page of a book before they’ve read the first one, or who look up the ending before hitting play. According to them, they simply need to know.

So why do some of us crave surprise and suspense, while others find comfort in instant resolution?

What’s in a spoiler?

Spoilers have become a cultural flashpoint in the age of streaming, social media and shared fandoms.

Researchers define “spoiler” as undesired information about how a narrative’s arc will conclude. I often hear “spoilers!” interjected mid-sentence, a desperate protest to protect narrative ignorance.

Hitchcock’s twist-heavy Psycho elevated spoiler sensitivity. Its release came with an anti-spoilers policy including strict viewing times, lobby warnings recorded by the auteur himself, and even real policemen urging “total enjoyment”. A bold ad campaign implored audiences against “cheating yourselves”.

The twists were fiercely protected.

Even the Star Wars cast didn’t know Darth Vader’s paternity twist until premiere night. Avenger’s Endgame filmed multiple endings and used fake scripting to mislead its stars. And Andrew Garfield flat-out lied about his return to Spider-Man: No Way Home – a performance worthy of an Oscar – all for the sake of fan surprise and enjoyment.

But do spoilers actually ruin the fun, or just shift how we experience it?

The satisfaction of a good ending

In 2014, a Dutch study found that viewers of unspoiled stories experienced greater emotional arousal and enjoyment. Spoilers may complete our “mental models” of the plot, making us less driven to engage, process events, or savour the unfolding story.

But we are also likely to overestimate the negative effect of a spoiler on our enjoyment. In 2016, a series of studies involving short stories, mystery fiction and films found that spoiled participants still reported high levels of enjoyment – because once we’re immersed, emotional connection tends to eclipse what we already know.

But suspense and enjoyment are complex bedfellows.

American media psychology trailblazer Dolf Zillmann said that suspense builds tension and excitement, but we only enjoy that tension once the ending lands well.

The thrill isn’t fun while we’re hanging in uncertainty – it’s the satisfying resolution that retroactively makes it feel good.

That could be why we scramble for an “ending explained” when a film or show drops the ball on closure. We’re trying to resolve uncertainty and settle our emotions.

Spoilers can also take the pressure off. A 2009 study of Lost fans found those who looked up how an episode would end actually enjoyed it more. The researchers found it reduced cognitive pressure, and gave them more room to reflect and soak in the story.

Spoilers put the audience back in the driver’s seat – even if filmmakers would rather keep hold of the wheel. People may seek spoilers out of curiosity or impatience, but sometimes it’s a quiet rebellion: a way to push back against the control creators hold over when and how things unfold.

That’s why spoilers are fertile ground for power dynamics. Ethicists even liken being spoiled to kind of moral trespass: how dare someone else make that decision for me?!

But whether you avoid spoilers or seek them out, the motive is often the same: a need to feel in control.

Shaping your emotions

Spoiler avoiders crave affect: they want emotional transportation.

When suspense is part of the pleasure, control means choosing when and how that knowledge lands. There’s a mental challenge to be had in riding the story as it unfolds, and a joy in seeing it click into place.

That’s why people get protective, and even chatter about long-aired shows can spark outrage. It’s an attempt to police the commentary and preserve the experience for those still waiting to be transported.

Spoiler seekers want control too, just a different kind. They’re not avoiding emotion, they’re just managing it. A spoiler affords control over our negative emotions, but also softens the blow, and inoculates us against anxiety.

Psychologists dub this a “non-cognitive desensitisation strategy” to manage surprise, a kind of “emotional spoiler shield” to protect our attachments to shows and characters, and remind us that TV, film and book narratives are not real when storylines hit close to home.

Knowing what happens turns into a subtle form of self-regulation.

So, what did I do when Severance spoilers floated by? Did I get off the bus? Nope, I stayed put and faced the beast. As I tried to make sense of the unfamiliar plot points (The macrodata means what? Mark stays where?), I found the unexpected chance to dive deeper.

Maybe surprise is not the sum of what makes something entertaining and worth engaging with. Spoiler alert! It’s good to have an end to journey towards, but it’s the journey that matters, in the end.

Anjum Naweed does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. ‘Don’t tell me!’ Why some people love spoilers – and others will run a mile – https://theconversation.com/dont-tell-me-why-some-people-love-spoilers-and-others-will-run-a-mile-256803

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Heike Schanzel, Professor of Social Sustainability in Tourism, Auckland University of Technology

Tourists in Kathmandu are tempted everywhere by advertisements for trekking expeditions to Everest Base Camp. If you didn’t know better, you might think it’s just a nice hike in the Nepalese countryside.

Typically the lower staging post for attempts on the summit, the camp is still 5,364 metres above sea level and a destination in its own right. Travel agencies say no prior experience is required, and all equipment will be provided. Social media, too, is filled with posts enticing potential trekkers to make the iconic journey.

But there is a real risk of creating a false sense of security. An exciting adventure can quickly turn into a struggle for survival, especially for novice mountaineers.

Nevertheless, Sagarmatha National Park is deservedly popular for its natural beauty and the allure of the world’s highest peak, Chomolungma (Mount Everest). It is also home to the ethnically distinctive Sherpa community.

Consequently, the routes to Everest Base Camp are among the busiest in the Himalayas, with nearly 60,000 tourists visiting the area each year. There are two distinct trekking seasons: spring (March to May) and autumn (September to October).

High mountains require everyone to be properly prepared. Events which under normal conditions might be a minor inconvenience can be magnified in such an environment and pose a serious risk.

Even at the start of the trek in Lukla (2,860m), one is exposed to factors that can directly or indirectly affect one’s health, especially altitude mountain sickness or unfamiliar bacteria.

We interviewed 24 trekkers in May this year, as well as 60 residents and business owners in May 2023, to explore some of the safety issues anyone considering heading to base camp should be aware of.

Life at high altitude

First, it’s vital to choose goals within one’s technical and physical capabilities. While the human body can adapt to altitudes of up to 5,300m, the potential risk of altitude mountain sickness can occur at only 2,500m – lower than Lukla.

Proper acclimatisation above 3,000m means ascending no more than 500m a day and resting every two to three days at the same altitude. The optimal (though rarely followed) approach is the “saw tooth system” of climbing during the day but descending to sleep at a lower level.

Residents of the Khumbu region (on the Nepalese side of Everest) are familiar with the problem of tourists not acclimatising, or not paying attention to their surroundings. As one hotel owner said, pointing to a trekker setting out:

He’s going uphill and it’s already late. It’s going to get dark and cold soon. He won’t make it to the next settlement. We have to report this to the authorities or go after him ourselves.

Inexperienced trekkers should hire a local guide. Several we interviewed had needed medical evacuation, including a woman in her mid-20s who had to leave base camp after one night. She found her guides – not locals – online. But they never checked her vital signs during the trek:

[The doctors] said that I had high-altitude pulmonary edema […] it was just really important to come down the elevation. And if I had tried to go higher, it probably would have been really bad.

Health checks throughout the trek are imperative. This includes assessing the four main symptoms of altitude mountain sickness: headache, nausea, dizziness and fatigue. If they appear, the trekker shouldn’t go higher and might even need to descend.

Take time to adapt

Using a reputable local trekking agency might be more expensive, but it will help ensure safety and also familiarise the visitor with the local culture, helping avoid negative impacts on the host community.

Too often, the primary goal of trekkers is a photo on the famous rock at base camp. Once obtained, many simply take a helicopter back to Kathmandu. As a helicopter tour agency owner said:

They don’t want to get back on their feet. The goal, after all, has been achieved. In general, tourists used to be much better prepared. Now they know they can return by helicopter.

Helicopter travel can be dangerous on its own, of course. But this tendency to view the trek as a one-way trip also affects host-guest relations and can irritate local communities.

It’s also important to monitor your food and drink intake and watch for signs of food poisoning. Diarrhoea at high altitudes is particularly dangerous because it leads to rapid dehydration – hard to combat in mountain conditions.

Low air pressure and reduced oxygen exacerbate the condition, weakening the body’s ability to recover. Also, the symptoms of dehydration can resemble altitude mountain sickness.

When travelling in other climate zones or countries with different sanitary standards, there is inevitable contact with strains of bacteria not present in one’s natural microbiome.

A good solution is to spend a few days naturally adapting to bacterial flora at a lower altitude in Nepal before heading to the mountains. Also, try to eat the local food, such as daal bhat, Nepal’s national dish. According to one hotel owner in Pangboche:

Tourists demand strange food from us – pizza, spaghetti, Caesar salad – and then are angry that it doesn’t taste the way they want. This is not our food. You should probably eat local food.

Most of the trekkers we interviewed during this spring season reported experiencing gastrointestinal issues, often for several days.

Overall, diarrhoea-related infections are the leading cause of illness among travellers, including base camp trekkers. Studies conducted in the Himalayas show as many as 14% of mountain tourists contract gastroenteritis, accounting for about 10% of all helicopter evacuations.

In the end, the commonest cause of failure or accident in the mountains is overestimating one’s abilities – what has been called “bad judgement syndrome” – when the route is too hard, the pace too fast, or there’s been too little time spent acclimatising.

A simple solution: walk slowly and enjoy the views.

Michal Apollo receives funding from the National Science Centre NCN Poland, the small-scale project awarded by the Institute of Earth Sciences, and the Research Excellence Initiative of the University of Silesia in Katowice. He is affiliated with the Global Justice Program, Yale University, and Academics Stand Against Poverty.

Heike Schanzel does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Thinking of trekking to Everest Base Camp? Don’t leave home without this expert advice – https://theconversation.com/thinking-of-trekking-to-everest-base-camp-dont-leave-home-without-this-expert-advice-260497

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Amelia Scott, Honorary Affiliate and Clinical Psychologist at the Woolcock Institute of Medical Research, and Macquarie University Research Fellow, Macquarie University

If you spend any time in the wellness corners of TikTok or Instagram, you’ll see claims women need one to two hours more sleep than men.

But what does the research actually say? And how does this relate to what’s going on in real life?

As we’ll see, who gets to sleep, and for how long, is a complex mix of biology, psychology and societal expectations. It also depends on how you measure sleep.

What does the evidence say?

Researchers usually measure sleep in two ways:

• by asking people how much they sleep (known as self-reporting). But people are surprisingly inaccurate at estimating how much sleep they get

• using objective tools, such as research-grade, wearable sleep trackers or the gold-standard polysomnography, which records brain waves, breathing and movement while you sleep during a sleep study in a lab or clinic.

Looking at the objective data, well-conducted studies usually show women sleep about 20 minutes more than men.

One global study of nearly 70,000 people who wore wearable sleep trackers found a consistent, small difference between men and women across age groups. For example, the sleep difference between men and women aged 40–44 was about 23–29 minutes.

Another large study using polysomnography found women slept about 19 minutes longer than men. In this study, women also spent more time in deep sleep: about 23% of the night compared to about 14% for men. The study also found only men’s quality of sleep declined with age.

The key caveat to these findings is that our individual sleep needs vary considerably. Women may sleep slightly more on average, just as they are slightly shorter on average. But there is no one-size-fits-all sleep duration, just as there is no universal height.

Suggesting every woman needs 20 extra minutes (let alone two hours) misses the point. It’s the same as insisting all women should be shorter than all men.

Even though women tend to sleep a little longer and deeper, they consistently report poorer sleep quality. They’re also about 40% more likely to be diagnosed with insomnia.

This mismatch between lab findings and the real world is a well-known puzzle in sleep research, and there are many reasons for it.

For instance, many research studies don’t consider mental health problems, medications, alcohol use and hormonal fluctuations. This filters out the very factors that shape sleep in the real world.

This mismatch between the lab and the bedroom also reminds us sleep doesn’t happen in a vacuum. Women’s sleep is shaped by a complex mix of biological, psychological and social factors, and this complexity is hard to capture in individual studies.

Let’s start with biology

Sleep problems begin to diverge between the sexes around puberty. They spike again during pregnancy, after birth and during perimenopause.

Fluctuating levels of ovarian hormones, particularly oestrogen and progesterone, seem to explain some of these sex differences in sleep.

For example, many girls and women report poorer sleep during the premenstrual phase just before their periods, when oestrogen and progesterone begin to fall.

Perhaps the most well-documented hormonal influence on our sleep is the decline in oestrogen during perimenopause. This is linked to increased sleep disturbances, particularly waking at 3am and struggling to get back to sleep.

Some health conditions also play a part in women’s sleep health. Thyroid disorders and iron deficiency, for instance, are more common in women and are closely linked to fatigue and disrupted sleep.

How about psychology?

Women are at much higher risk of depression, anxiety and trauma-related disorders. These very often accompany sleep problems and fatigue. Cognitive patterns, such as worry and rumination, are also more common in women and known to affect sleep.

Women are also prescribed antidepressants more often than men, and these medications tend to affect sleep.

Society also plays a role

Caregiving and emotional labour still fall disproportionately on women. Government data released this year suggests Australian women perform an average nine more hours of unpaid care and work each week than men.

While many women manage to put enough time aside for sleep, their opportunities for daytime rest are often scarce. This puts a lot of pressure on sleep to deliver all the restoration women need.

In my work with patients, we often untangle the threads woven into their experience of fatigue. While poor sleep is the obvious culprit, fatigue can also signal something deeper, such as underlying health issues, emotional strain, or too-high expectations of themselves. Sleep is certainly part of the picture, but it’s rarely the whole story.

For instance, rates of iron deficiency (which we know is more common in women and linked to sleep problems) are also higher in the reproductive years. This is just as many women are raising children and grappling with the “juggle” and the “mental load”.

Women in perimenopause are often navigating full-time work, teenagers, ageing parents and 3am hot flashes. These women may have adequate or even high-quality sleep (according to objective measures), but that doesn’t mean they wake feeling restored.

Most existing research also ignores gender-diverse populations. This limits our understanding of how sleep is shaped not just by biology, but by things such as identity and social context.

So where does this leave us?

While women sleep longer and better in the lab, they face more barriers to feeling rested in everyday life.

So, do women need more sleep than men? On average, yes, a little. But more importantly, women need more support and opportunity to recharge and recover across the day, and at night.

Amelia Scott is a member of the psychology education subcommittee of the Australasian Sleep Association. She receives funding from Macquarie University.

– ref. Do women really need more sleep than men? A sleep psychologist explains – https://theconversation.com/do-women-really-need-more-sleep-than-men-a-sleep-psychologist-explains-259985

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Pintu Kumar Mahla, Research Associate at the Water Resources Research Institute, University of Arizona

With the future of a crucial water-sharing treaty between India and Pakistan up in the air, one outside party is looking on with keen interest: China.

For 65 years, the Indus Waters Treaty has seen the two South Asian rivals share access and use of the Indus Basin, a vast area covered by the Indus River and its tributaries that also stretches into Afghanistan and China.

For much of that history, there has been widespread praise for the agreement as a successful demonstration of cooperation between adversarial states over a key shared resource. But experts have noted the treaty has long held the potential for conflict. Drafters failed to factor in the effects of climate change, and the Himalayan glaciers that feed the rivers are now melting at record rates, ultimately putting at risk the long-term sustainability of water supply. Meanwhile, the ongoing conflict over Kashmir, where much of the basin is situated, puts cooperation at risk.

With treaty on ice, China steps in

That latest provocation threatening the treaty was a terrorist attack in the Indian union territory of Jammu and Kashmir on April 22, 2025. In response to that attack, which India blamed on Pakistan and precipitated a four-day confrontation, New Delhi temporarily suspended the treaty.

But even before that attack, India and Pakistan had been locked in negotiation over the future of the treaty – the status of which has been in the hands of international arbitrators since 2016. In the latest development, on June 27, 2025, the Permanent Court of Arbitration issued a supplementary award in favor of Pakistan, arguing that India’s holding of the treaty in abeyance did not affect its jurisdiction over the case. Moreover, the treaty does not allow for either party to unilaterally suspend the treaty, the ruling suggested.

Amid the wrangling over the treaty’s future, Pakistan has turned to China for diplomatic and strategic support. Such support was evident during the conflict that took place following April’s terrorist attack, during which Pakistan employed Chinese-made fighter jets and other military equipment against its neighbor.

Meanwhile, in an apparent move to counter India’s suspension of the treaty, China and Pakistan have ramped up construction of a major dam project that would provide water supply and electricity to parts of Pakistan.

So, why is China getting involved? In part, it reflects the strong relationship between Pakistan and China, developed over six decades.

But as an expert in hydro politics, I believe Beijing’s involvement raises concerns: China is not a neutral observer in the dispute. Rather, Beijing has long harbored a desire to increase its influence in the region and to counter an India long seen as a rival. Given the at-times fraught relationship between China and India – the two countries went to war in 1962 and continue to engage in sporadic border skirmishes – there are concerns in New Delhi that Beijing may respond by disrupting the flow of rivers in its territory that feed into India.

In short, any intervention by Beijing over the Indus Waters Treaty risks stirring up regional tensions.

Wrangling over waters

The Indus Waters Treaty has already endured three armed conflicts between Pakistan and India, and until recently it served as an exemplar of how to forge a successful bilateral agreement between two rival neighbors.

Under the initial terms of the treaty, which each country signed in 1960, India was granted control over three eastern rivers the countries share – Ravi, Beas and Satluj – with an average annual flow of 40.4 billion cubic meters. Meanwhile, Pakistan was given access to almost 167.2 billion cubic meters of water from the western rivers – Indus, Jhelum and Chenab.

In India, the relatively smaller distribution has long been the source of contention, with many believing the treaty’s terms are overly generous to Pakistan. India’s initial demand was for 25% of the Indus waters.

For Pakistan, the terms of the division of the Indus Waters Treaty are painful because they concretized unresolved land disputes tied to the partition of India in 1947. In particular, the division of the rivers is framed within the broader political context of Kashmir. The three major rivers – Indus, Jhelum and Chenab – flow through Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir before entering the Pakistan-controlled western part of the Kashmir region.

But the instability of the Kashmir region – disputes around the Line of Control separating the Indian- and Pakistan-controlled areas are common – underscores Pakistan’s water vulnerability.

Nearly 65% of Pakistanis live in the Indus Basin region, compared with 14% for India. It is therefore not surprising that Pakistan has warned that any attempt to cut off the water supply, as India has threatened, would be considered an act of war.

It also helps to explain Pakistan’s desire to develop hydropower on the rivers it controls. One-fifth of Pakistan’s electricity comes from hydropower, and nearly 21 hydroelectric power plants are located in the Indus Basin region.

Since Pakistan’s economy relies heavily on agriculture and the water needed to maintain agricultural land, the fate of the Indus Waters Treaty is of the utmost importance to Pakistan’s leaders.

Such conditions have driven Islamabad to be a willing partner with China in a bid to shore up its water supply.

China provides technical expertise and financial support to Pakistan for numerous hydropower projects in Pakistan, including the Diamer Bhasha Dam and Kohala Hydropower Project. These projects play a significant role in addressing Pakistan’s energy requirements and have been a key aspect of the transboundary water relationship between the two nations.

Using water as a weapon?

With it’s rivalry with India and its desire to simultaneously work with Pakistan on numerous issues, China increasingly sees itself as a stakeholder in the Indus Waters Treaty, too. Chinese media narratives have framed India as the aggressor in the dispute, warning of the danger of using “water as a weapon” and noting that the source of the Indus River lies in China’s Western Tibet region.

Doing so fits Beijing’ s greater strategic presence in South Asian politics. After the terrorist attack, China Foreign Minister Wang Yi reaffirmed China’s support for Pakistan, showcasing the relationship as an “all-weather strategic” partnership and referring to Pakistan as an “ironclad friend.”

And in response to India’s suspension of the treaty, China announced it was to accelerate work on the significant Mohmand hydropower project on the tributary of the Indus River in Pakistan.

Chinese investment in Pakistan’s hydropower sector presents substantial opportunities for both countries in regards to energy security and promoting economic growth.

The Indus cascade project under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor initiative, for example, promises to provide cumulative hydropower generation capacity of around 22,000 megawatts. Yet the fact that project broke ground in Gilgit-Baltistan, a disputed area in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir, underscores the delicacy of the situation.

Beijing’s backing of Pakistan is largely motivated by a mix of economic and geopolitical interests, particularly in legitimizing the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. But it comes at the cost of stirring up regional tensions.

As such, the alignment of Chinese and Pakistani interests in developing hydro projects can pose a further challenge to the stability of South Asia’s water-sharing agreements, especially in the Indus Basin. Recently, the chief minister of the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, which borders China, warned that Beijing’s hydro projects in the Western Tibet region amount to a ticking “water bomb.”

To diffuse such tensions – and to get the Indus Waters Treaty back on track – it behooves India, China and Pakistan to engage in diplomacy and dialogue. Such engagement is, I believe, essential in addressing the ongoing water-related challenges in South Asia.

Pintu Kumar Mahla is affiliated with the Water Resources Research Center, the University of Arizona. He is also a member of the International Association of Water Law (AIDA).

Pintu Kumar Mahla has not received funding related to this article.

– ref. China’s insertion into India-Pakistan waters dispute adds a further ripple in South Asia – https://theconversation.com/chinas-insertion-into-india-pakistan-waters-dispute-adds-a-further-ripple-in-south-asia-258891

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Ali Mamouri, Research Fellow, Middle East Studies, Deakin University

Conflict in Syria has escalated with Israel launching bombing raids against its northern neighbour.

It follows months of fluctuating tensions in southern Syria between the Druze minority and forces aligned with the new government in Damascus. Clashes erupted in the last few days, prompting Israeli airstrikes in defence of the Druze by targeting government bases, tanks, and heavy weaponry.

Israel Minister Amichai Chikli has called the Syrian president Ahmed al-Sharaa –

a terrorist, a barbaric murderer who should be eliminated without delay.

Despite the incendiary language, a ceasefire has been reached, halting the fighting – for now.

Syrian forces have begun withdrawing heavy military equipment from the region, while Druze fighters have agreed to suspend armed resistance, allowing government troops to regain control of the main Druze city of Suwayda.

What do the Druze want?

The Druze are a small religious minority estimated at over one million people, primarily concentrated in the mountainous regions of Lebanon, Syria, Israel, and Jordan.

In Syria, their population is estimated at around 700,000 (of around 23 million total Syrian population), with the majority residing in the southern As-Suwayda Governorate – or province – which serves as their traditional stronghold.

Since the 2011 uprising against the Assad regime, the Druze have maintained a degree of autonomy, successfully defending their territory from various threats, including ISIS and other jihadist groups.

Following Assad’s fall late last year, the Druze — along with other minority groups such as the Kurds in the east and Alawites in the west — have called for the country to be federalized.

They advocate for a decentralised model that would grant greater autonomy to regional communities.

However, the transitional government in Damascus is pushing for a centralised state and seeking to reassert full control over the entire Syrian territory. This fundamental disagreement has led to periodic clashes between Druze forces and government-aligned troops.

Despite the temporary ceasefire, tensions remain high. Given the core political dispute remains unresolved, many expect renewed conflict to erupt in the near future.

Why is Israel involved?

The ousting of the Assad regime created a strategic opening for Israel to expand its influence in southern Syria. Israel’s involvement is driven by two primary concerns:

1. Securing its northern border

Israel views the power vacuum in Syria’s south as a potential threat, particularly the risk of anti-Israeli militias establishing a foothold near its northern border.

During the recent clashes, the Israeli military declared

The Israeli Defence Forces will not allow a military threat to exist in southern Syria and will act against it.

Likewise, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who has stated he will not allow Syrian forces south of Damascus:

We are acting to prevent the Syrian regime from harming them [the Druze] and to ensure the demilitarisation of the area adjacent to our border with Syria.

In line with these warnings, the Israeli Air Force has conducted extensive strikes against Syrian military infrastructure, targeting bases, aircraft, tanks, and heavy weaponry.

These operations are intended to prevent any future buildup of military capacity that could be used against Israel from the Syrian side of the border.

2. Supporting a federated Syria

Israel is backing the two prominent allied minorities in Syria — the Kurds in the northeast and the Druze in the south — in their push for a federal governance model.

A fragmented Syria, divided along ethnic and religious lines, is seen by some Israeli policymakers as a way to maintain Israeli domination in the region.

This vision is part of what some Israeli officials have referred to as a “New Middle East” — one where regional stability and normalisation emerge through reshaped borders and alliances.

Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar recently echoed this strategy, stating:

A single Syrian state with effective control and sovereignty over all its territory is unrealistic.

For Israel, the logical path forward is autonomy for the various minorities in Syria within a federal structure.

The United States’ role?

According to unconfirmed reports, Washington has privately urged Israel to scale back its military strikes on Syria in order to prevent further escalation and preserve regional stability.

The US is promoting increased support for Syria’s new regime in an effort to help it reassert control and stabilise the country.

There are also indications the US and its allies are encouraging the Syrian government to move toward normalisation with Israel. Reports suggest Tel Aviv has held talks with the new Sharaa-led regime about the possibility of Syria joining the Abraham Accords (diplomatic agreements between Israel and several Arab states), which the regime in Damascus appears open to.

US Special Envoy Tom Barrack has described the recent clashes as “worrisome”, calling for de-escalation and emphasising the need for

a peaceful, inclusive outcome for all stakeholders – including the Druze, Bedouin tribes, the Syrian government, and Israeli forces.

Given the deep-rooted political divisions, competing regional agendas, and unresolved demands from minority groups, the unrest in southern Syria is unlikely to end soon.

Despite another temporary ceasefire, underlying tensions remain. Further clashes are not only possible but highly probable.

Ali Mamouri does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Why is Israel bombing Syria? – https://theconversation.com/why-is-israel-bombing-syria-261259

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Andrew Latham, Professor of Political Science, Macalester College

Many column inches have been dedicated to dissecting the “great power rivalry” currently playing out between China and the U.S.

But what makes a power “great” in the realm of international relations?

Unlike other states, great powers possess a capacity to shape not only their immediate surroundings but the global order itself – defining the rules, norms and structures that govern international politics. Historically, they have been seen as the architects of world systems, exercising influence far beyond their neighborhoods.

The notion of great powers came about to distinguish between the most and least powerful states. The concept gained currency after the 1648 Peace of Westphalia and the Congress of Vienna in 1815 – events in Europe that helped establish the notion of sovereign states and the international laws governing them.

Whereas the great powers of the previous eras – for example, the Roman Empire – sought to expand their territory at almost every turn and relied on military power to do so, the modern great power utilizes a complex tapestry of diplomatic pressure, economic leverage and the assertions of international law. The order emerging out of Westphalia enshrined the principles of national sovereignty and territorial integrity, which allowed these powers to pursue a balance of power as codified by the Congress of Vienna based on negotiation as opposed to domination.

This transformation represented a momentous development in world politics: At least some portion of the legitimacy of a state’s control was now realized through its relationships and capacity to keep the peace, rather than resting solely on its ability to use force.

From great to ‘super’

Using their material capabilities – economic strength, military might and political influence – great powers have been able to project power across multiple regions and dictate the terms of international order.

In the 19th-century Concert of Europe, the great powers – Britain, France, Austria, Prussia and Russia – collectively managed European politics, balancing power to maintain stability. Their influence extended globally through imperial expansion, trade and the establishment of norms that reflected their priorities.

During the 20th century, the Cold War brought a stark distinction between great powers and other states. The U.S. and the Soviet Union, as the era’s two “superpowers,” dominated the international system, shaping it through a rivalry that encompassed military alliances, ideological competition and economic systems. Great powers in this context were not merely powerful states but the central actors defining the structure of global politics.

Toward a multipolar world

The post-Cold War period briefly ushered in a unipolar moment, with the U.S. as the sole great power capable of shaping the international system on a global scale.

This era was marked by the expansion of liberal internationalism, economic globalization and U.S.-led-and-constructed multilateralism.

However, the emergence of new centers of power, particularly China and to a lesser extent Russia, has brought the unipolar era to a close, ushering in a multipolar world where the distinctive nature of great powers is once again reshaped.

In this system, great powers are states with the material capabilities and strategic ambition to influence the global order as a whole.

And here they differ from regional powers, whose influence is largely confined to specific areas. Nations such as Turkey, India, Australia, Brazil and Japan are influential within their neighborhoods. But they lack the global reach of the U.S. or China to fundamentally alter the international system.

Instead, the roles of these regional powers is often defined by stabilizing their regions, addressing local challenges or acting as intermediaries in great power competition.

Challenging greatness

Yet the multipolar world presents unique challenges for today’s great powers. The diffusion of power means that no single great power can dominate the system as the U.S. did in the post-Cold War unipolar era.

Instead, today’s great powers must navigate complex dynamics, balancing competition with cooperation. For instance, the rivalry between Washington and Beijing is now a defining feature of global politics, spanning trade, technology, military strategy and ideological influence. Meanwhile, Russia’s efforts to maintain its great power status have resulted in more assertive, though regionally focused, actions that nonetheless have global implications.

Great powers must also contend with the constraints of interdependence. The interconnected nature of the global economy, the proliferation of advanced technologies and the rise of transnational challenges such as climate change and pandemics limit the ability of any one great power to unilaterally dictate outcomes. This reality forces great powers to prioritize their core interests while finding ways to manage global issues through cooperation, even amid intense competition.

As the world continues to adjust to multiple centers of power, the defining feature of great powers remains an unmatched capacity to project influence globally and define the parameters of the international order.

Whether through competition, cooperation or conflict, the actions of great powers will, I believe, continue to shape the trajectory of the global system, making their distinctiveness as central players in international relations more relevant than ever.

This article is part of a series explaining foreign policy terms commonly used but rarely explained.

Andrew Latham does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. What makes ‘great powers’ great? And how will they adapt to a multipolar world? – https://theconversation.com/what-makes-great-powers-great-and-how-will-they-adapt-to-a-multipolar-world-260969

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Garret Martin, Hurst Senior Professorial Lecturer, Co-Director Transatlantic Policy Center, American University School of International Service

The U.S. bombing of three Iranian nuclear facilities on June 22, 2025, sent shock waves around the world. It marked a dramatic reversal for the Trump administration, which had just initiated negotiations with Tehran over its nuclear program. Dispensing with diplomacy, the U.S. opted for the first time for direct military involvement in the then-ongoing Israeli-Iranian conflict.

European governments have long pushed for a diplomatic solution to Tehran’s nuclear ambitions. Yet, the reaction in the capitals of Europe to the U.S. bombing of the nuclear facilities was surprisingly subdued.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen noted Israel’s “right to defend itself and protect its people.” German Chancellor Friedrich Merz was equally supportive, arguing that “this is dirty work that Israel is doing for all of us.” And a joint statement by the E3 – France, the U.K. and Germany – tacitly justified the U.S. bombing as necessary to prevent the possibility of Iran developing nuclear weapons.

Europe’s responses to the Israeli and American strikes were noteworthy because of how little they discussed the legality of the attacks. There was no such hesitation when Russia targeted civilian nuclear energy infrastructure in Ukraine in 2022.

But the timid reaction also underscored Europe’s bystander role, contrasting with its past approach on that topic. Iran’s nuclear program had been a key focal point of European diplomacy for years. The E3 nations initiated negotiations with Tehran back in 2003. They also helped to facilitate the signing of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, which also included Russia, the European Union, China, the U.S. and Iran. And the Europeans sought to preserve the agreement, even after the unilateral U.S. withdrawal in 2018 during President Donald Trump’s first term.

As a scholar of transatlantic relations and security, I believe Europe faces long odds to once again play an impactful role in strengthening the cause of nuclear nonproliferation with Iran. Indeed, contributing to a new nuclear agreement with Iran would require Europe to fix a major rift with Tehran, overcome its internal divisions over the Middle East and manage a Trump administration that seems less intent on being a reliable ally for Europe.

Growing rift between Iran and Europe

For European diplomats, the 2015 deal was built on very pragmatic assumptions. It only covered the nuclear dossier, as opposed to including other areas of contention such as human rights or Iran’s ballistic missile program. And it offered a clear bargain: In exchange for greater restrictions on its nuclear program, Iran could expect the lifting of some existing sanctions and a reintegration into the world economy.

As a result, the U.S. withdrawal from the deal in 2018 posed a fundamental challenge to the status quo. Besides exiting, the Trump White House reimposed heavy secondary sanctions on Iran, which effectively forced foreign companies to choose between investing in the U.S. and Iranian markets. European efforts to mitigate the impact of these U.S. sanctions failed, thus undermining the key benefit of the deal for Iran: helping its battered economy. It also weakened Tehran’s faith in the value of Europe as a partner, as it revealed an inability to carve real independence from the U.S.

After 2018, relations between Europe and Iran deteriorated significantly. Evidence of Iranian state-sponsored terrorism and Iran-linked plots on European soil hardly helped. Moreover, Europeans strongly objected to Iran supplying Russia with drones in support of Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine – and later on, ballistic missiles as well. On the flip side, Iran deeply objected to European support for Israel’s war in the Gaza Strip in the aftermath of the Oct. 7, 2023, attacks.

These deep tensions remain a significant impediment to constructive negotiations on the nuclear front. Neither side currently has much to offer to the other, nor can Europe count on any meaningful leverage to influence Iran. And Europe’s wider challenges in its Middle East policy only compound this problem.

Internal divisions

In 2015, Europe could present a united front on the Iranian nuclear deal in part because of its limited nature. But with the nonproliferation regime now in tatters amid Trump’s unilateral actions and the spread of war across the region, it is now far harder for European diplomats to put the genie back in the bottle. That is particularly true given the present fissures over increasingly divisive Middle East policy questions and the nature of EU diplomacy.

Europe remains very concerned about stability in the Middle East, including how conflicts might launch new migratory waves like in 2015-16, when hundreds of thousands of Syrians fled to mainland Europe. The EU also remains very active economically in the region and is the largest funder of the Palestinian Authority. But it has been more of a “payer than player” in the region, struggling to translate economic investment into political influence.

In part, this follows from the longer-term tendency to rely on U.S. leadership in the region, letting Washington take the lead in trying to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. But it also reflects the deeper divisions between EU member nations.

With foreign policy decisions requiring unanimity, EU members have often struggled to speak with one voice on the Middle East. Most recently, the debates over whether to suspend the economic association agreement with Israel over its actions in Gaza or whether to recognize a Palestinian state clearly underscored the existing EU internal disagreements.

Unless Europe can develop a common approach toward the Middle East, it is hard to see it having enough regional influence to matter in future negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program. This, in turn, would also affect how it manages its crucial, but thorny, relations with the U.S.

Europe in the shadow of Trump

The EU was particularly proud of the 2015 nuclear deal because it represented a strong symbol of multilateral diplomacy. It brought together great powers in the spirit of bolstering the cause of nuclear nonproliferation.

Ten years on, the prospects of replicating such international cooperation seem rather remote. Europe’s relations with China and Russia – two key signers of the original nuclear deal – have soured dramatically in recent years. And ties with the United States under Trump have also been particularly challenging.

Dealing with Washington, in the context of the Iran nuclear program, presents a very sharp dilemma for Europe.

Trying to carve a distinct path may be appealing, but it lacks credibility at this stage. Recent direct talks with Iranian negotiators produced little, and Europe is not in a position to give Iran guarantees that it would not face new strikes from Israel.

And pursuing an independent path could easily provoke the ire of Trump, which Europeans are keen to avoid. There has already been a long list of transatlantic disputes, whether over trade, Ukraine or defense spending. European policymakers would be understandably reticent to invest time and resources in any deal that Trump could again scuttle at a moment’s notice.

Trump, too, is scornful of what European diplomacy could achieve, declaring recently that Iran doesn’t want to talk to Europe. He has instead prioritized bilateral negotiations with Tehran. Alignment with the U.S., therefore, may not translate into any great influence. Trump’s decision to bomb Iran, after all, happened without forewarning for his allies.

Thus, Europe will continue to pay close attention to Iran’s nuclear program. But, constrained by poor relations with Tehran and its internal divisions on the Middle East, it is unlikely that it will carve out a major role on the nuclear dossier as long as Trump is in office.

Garret Martin receives funding from the European Union for the organization, the Transatlantic Policy Center, that he co-directs.

– ref. Europe is stuck in a bystander role over Iran’s nuclear program after US, Israeli bombs establish facts on the ground – https://theconversation.com/europe-is-stuck-in-a-bystander-role-over-irans-nuclear-program-after-us-israeli-bombs-establish-facts-on-the-ground-260740

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Kester Onor, Senior Research Fellow, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs

Nigeria’s former president, Muhammadu Buhari, who died in London on 13 July aged 82, was one of two former military heads of state who were later elected as civilian presidents. Buhari was the military head of state of Nigeria from 31 December 1983 to 27 August 1985 and president from 2015 to 2023.

The other Nigerian politician to have been in both roles is former president Olusegun Obasanjo . He was a military ruler between 1976 and 1979 and elected president between 1999 and 2007.

Buhari led Nigeria cumulatively for nearly a decade. His time as military head of state was marked with a war against corruption but he couldn’t do as much during his time as president under democratic rule.

As a political scientist who once served in the Nigerian Army, I believe that former president Buhari’s government’s war on terrorism was largely underwhelming, despite promises and early gains.

In his elected role, Buhari maintained a modest personal lifestyle and upheld electoral transitions. Nevertheless his presidency was marred by economic mismanagement, a failure to implement bold structural reforms, ethnic favouritism, and an unfulfilled promise of change.

He did leave tangible infrastructural footprints, a focus on agriculture, and foundational efforts in transparency and anti-corruption.

So his mark on Nigeria’s development trajectory was mixed.

Early years

Buhari was born on 17 December 1942, to Adamu and Zulaiha Buhari in Daura, Katsina State, north-west Nigeria. He was four years old when his father died. He attended Quranic school in Katsina. He was a Fulani, one of the major ethnic nationalities in Nigeria.

After completing his schooling, Buhari joined the army in 1961. He had military training in the UK, India and the United States as well as Nigeria.

In 1975 he was appointed military governor of North Eastern State (now Borno State), after being involved in ousting Yakubu Gowon in a coup that same year. He served as governor for a year.

Buhari later became federal commissioner for petroleum resources, overseeing Nigeria’s petroleum industry under Obasanjo. Obasanjo had become head of state in 1976 when Gowon’s successor, Murtala Muhammed, was assassinated in a failed coup that year.

In September 1979, he returned to regular army duties and commanded the 3rd Armoured division based in Jos, Plateau State, north central. Nigeria’s Second Republic commenced that year after the election of Shehu Shagari as president.

The coup that truncated the Shagari government on 31 December 1983 saw the emergence of Buhari as Nigeria’s head of state.

Buhari’s junta years

Buhari headed the military government for just under two years. He was ousted in another coup on 27 August 1985.

While at the helm he vowed that the government would not tolerate kick-backs, inflation of contracts and over-invoicing of imports. Nor would it condone forgery, fraud, embezzlement, misuse and abuse of office and illegal dealings in foreign exchange and smuggling.

Eighteen state governors were tried by military tribunals. Some of the accused received lengthy prison sentences, while others were acquitted or had their sentences commuted.

His government also enacted the notorious Decree 4 under which two journalists, Nduka Irabor and Dele Thompson, were jailed. The charges stemmed from three articles published on the reorganisation of Nigeria’s diplomatic service.

Buhari also instituted austerity measures and started a “War Against Indiscipline” which sought to promote positive values in the country. Authoritarian methods were sometimes used in its implementation. Soldiers forced Nigerians to queue, to be punctual and to obey traffic laws.

He also instituted restrictions on press and political freedoms. Labour unions were not spared either. Mass retrenchment of Nigerians in the public service was carried out with impunity.

While citizens initially welcomed some of these measures, growing discontent on the economic front made things tougher for the regime.

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Read more:
Why Buhari won even though he had little to show for first term

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Buhari, the democrat

Buhari’s dream to lead Nigeria again through the ballot box failed in 2003, 2007 and 2011. To his credit, he didn’t give up. An alliance of opposition parties succeeded in getting him elected in 2015.

The legacy he left is mixed.

Buhari’s government deepened national disunity.

His appointments, often skewed in favour of the northern region and his Fulani kinsmen, fuelled accusations of tribalism and marginalisation. His perceived affinity with Fulani herdsmen, despite widespread violence linked to some of them, further eroded public trust in his leadership.

His anti-corruption mantra largely did not succeed. While some high-profile recoveries were made, critics argue that his anti-corruption war was selective and heavily politicised.

Currently, his Central Bank governor is on trial for corruption charges.

The performance of the economy was also dismal under his tenure. Not all these problems could be laid at his feet. Nevertheless his inability to tackle the country’s underlying problems, such as insecurity, inflation and rising unemployment, all contributed. He presided over two recessions, rising unemployment, inflation, and a weakened naira.

He did, however, succeed on some fronts.

He tried with infrastructure. The Lagos-Ibadan expressway, a major road, was almost completed and he got the railways working again, completing the Abuja-Kaduna and Lagos-Ibadan lines. He also completed the Second Niger Bridge.

There was an airport revitalisation programme which led to improvements in Lagos, Abuja and Port Harcourt airports.

Buhari signed the Petroleum Industry Act after nearly 20 years’ delay. This is now attracting more investments into the oil industry.

He also initiated some social investment schemes like N-Power, N-Teach and a school feeding programme. They provided temporary jobs for some and gave some poor people more money in their pockets. N-Power is a youth empowerment programme designed to combat unemployment, improve social development and provide people with relevant skills.

These programmes later became mired in corruption which only became known after he left office.

There was also an Anchor Borrowers Scheme to make the country more sufficient in rice production. Again, it got enmeshed in corruption and some of its officials are currently standing trial.

In the fight against corruption, the Buhari administration made some progress through the Treasury Single Account, which improved financial transparency in public institutions. The Whistle Blower Policy also led to the recovery of looted funds.

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Read more:
Why Buhari’s government is losing the anti-corruption war

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Security failures

Buhari oversaw a deterioration of Nigeria’s security landscape. Banditry, farmer-herder clashes, kidnapping and separatist agitations escalated.

In 2015 Buhari campaigned on a promise to defeat Boko Haram and restore territorial integrity in the north-east. Initially, his administration made some progress. Boko Haram was driven out of several local government areas it once controlled, and major military operations such as Operation Lafiya Dole were launched to reclaim territory.

However, these initial successes were not sustained. Boko Haram splintered, giving rise to more brutal factions like the Islamic State West Africa Province. This group continued to launch deadly attacks.

Buhari’s counter-terrorism strategy was often reactive, lacking a clear long-term doctrine. The military was overstretched and under-equipped. Morale issues and allegations of corruption in the defence sector undermined operations.

Intelligence coordination remained poor, while civil-military relations suffered due to frequent human rights abuses by security forces. Community trust in the government’s ability to provide security dwindled.

Buhari’s second coming as Nigeria’s leader carried high expectations, but he under-delivered.

Kester Onor does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Muhammadu Buhari: Nigeria’s military leader turned democratic president leaves a mixed legacy – https://theconversation.com/muhammadu-buhari-nigerias-military-leader-turned-democratic-president-leaves-a-mixed-legacy-261079

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Rachel Hughes, Associate Professor of Geography, The University of Melbourne

A series of atrocity sites of the Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia have been formally entered onto the World Heritage list, as part of the 47th session of the World Heritage Committee.

This is not only important for Cambodia, but also raises important questions for atrocity sites in Australia.

Before this, the World Heritage list only recognised seven “sites of memory” associated with recent conflicts, which UNESCO defines as “events having occurred from the turn of the 20th century” under its criterion vi. These sat within a broader list of more than 950 cultural sites.

In recent years, experts have intensely debated the question of whether a site associated with recent conflict could, or should, be nominated and evaluated for World Heritage status. Some argue such listings would contradict the objectives of UNESCO and its spirit of peace, which was part of the specialised agency’s mandate after the destruction of two world wars.

Sites associated with recent conflicts can be divisive. For instance, when Japan nominated the Hiroshima Peace Memorial, both China and the United States objected and eventually disassociated from the decision. The US argued the nomination lacked “historical perspective” on the events that led to the bomb’s use. Meanwhile, China argued listing the property would not be conducive for peace as other Asian countries and peoples had suffered at the hands of the Japanese during WWII.

Heritage inscriptions risk reinforcing societal divisions if they conserve a particular memory in a one-sided way.

Nonetheless, the World Heritage Committee decided in 2023 to no longer preclude such sites for inscription. This was done partly in recognition of how these sites may “serve the peace-building mission of UNESCO”.

Shortly after, three listing were added: the ESMA Museum and Site of Memory, a former clandestine centre for detention, torture and extermination in Argentina; memorial sites of the Rwandan genocide at Nyamata, Murambi, Gisozi and Bisesero; and funerary and memory sites of the first world war in Belgium and France.

A number of legacy sites associated with Nelson Mandela’s human rights struggle in South Africa were also added last year.

Atrocities of the Khmer Rouge

The recently inscribed Cambodian Memorial Sites include prisons S-21 (now known as Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum) and M-13, as well as the execution site Choeung Ek.

These sites were nominated for their value in showing the development of extreme mass violence in relation to the security system of the Khmer Rouge in 1975–79. They also have value as places of memorialisation, peace and learning.

The Khmer Rouge developed its methods of disappearance, incarceration and torture of suspected “enemies” during the civil conflict of 1970–75. It established a system of local-level security centres in so-called “liberated” areas.

One of these centres was known as M-13, a small, well-hidden prison in the country’s rural southwest. A man named Kaing Guek Eav – also called Duch – was responsible for prisoners at M-13.

Shortly after the entire country fell to the Khmer Rouge in April 1975, Duch was assigned to lead the headquarters of the regime’s security system: a large detention and torture centre known as S-21.

Under his instruction, tens of thousands of people were detained in inhumane conditions, tortured and interrogated. Many detainees were later taken to the outskirts of the city to be brutally killed and buried in pits at a place called Choeung Ek.

The sites operated until early 1979, when the Khmer Rouge was forced from power.

The S-21 facility and the mass graves at Choeung Ek have long been memorialised as the Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum and the Choeung Ek Genocidal Centre.

However, the former M-13 site shows few visual clues to its prior use, and has only recently been investigated by an international team led by Cambodian archaeologist and museum director Hang Nisay. The site is on an island in a small river that forms the boundary between the Kampong Chhnang and Kampong Speu provinces.

Further research, site protection and memorialisation activities will now be supported, with help from locals.

From repression to reflection

The Cambodian memorial sites have been recognised as holding “outstanding universal value” for the way they evidence one of the 20th century’s worst atrocities, and are now places of memory.

In its nomination dossier for these sites, Cambodia drew on findings from the Khmer Rouge Tribunal to verify and link the conflict and the sites.

In 2010, the tribunal found Duch guilty of crimes against humanity and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. Duch was sentenced to 30 years in prison (which eventually turned into life imprisonment). He died in 2020.

While courts such as the International Criminal Court have previously examined the destruction of heritage as an international crime, drawing on legal findings to assert heritage status is an unusual inverse. It raises important questions about the legacies of former UN-supported tribunals and the ongoing implications of their findings.

The recent listings also raise questions for Australia, which has many sites of documented mass killing associated with colonisation and the frontier wars that lasted into the 20th century.

Might Australia nominate any of these atrocity sites in the future? And could other processes such as truth-telling, reparation and redress support (or be supported by) such nominations?

Rachel Hughes has consulted to UNESCO Cambodia.

Maria Elander does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. UNESCO grants World Heritage status to Khmer Rouge atrocity sites – paving the way for other sites of conflict – https://theconversation.com/unesco-grants-world-heritage-status-to-khmer-rouge-atrocity-sites-paving-the-way-for-other-sites-of-conflict-260923

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Kyle Morrison, PhD Candidate in Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, UNSW Sydney

Scientists have detected pesticides in rivers, lakes and oceans worldwide. So what are these pesticides doing to the fish?

Long before pesticides reach lethal doses, they can disrupt hormones, impair brain function and change fish behaviour. Many of these behaviours are essential for healthy ecosystems.

In a new study, my colleagues and I found that pesticides affect many different behaviours in fish. Overall, the chemical pesticides make fish less sociable and interactive. They spend less time gathering in groups, become less protective of their territory, and make fewer attempts to mate.

Imagine the ocean without the vibrant schools of fish we’ve come to love – only isolated swimmers drifting about. Quietly, ecosystems begin to unravel, long before mass die-offs hit the news.

Fish are living and dying in polluted water

Australia is a major producer and user of pesticides, with more than 11,000 approved chemical products routinely used in agricultural and domestic settings. Remarkably, some of these chemicals remain approved in Australia despite being banned in other regions such as the European Union due to safety concerns.

When a tractor or plane sprays pesticides onto crops, it creates a mist of chemicals in the air to kill crop pests. After heavy rain, these chemicals can flow into roadside drains, filter through soil, and slowly move into rivers, lakes and oceans.

Fish swim in this diluted chemical mixture. They can absorb pesticides through their gills or eat contaminated prey.

At high concentrations, mass fish deaths can result, such as those repeatedly observed in the Menindee Lakes. However, doses in the wild often aren’t lethal and more subtle effects can occur. Scientists call these “sub-lethal” effects.

One commonly investigated sub-lethal effect is a change in behaviour – in other words, a change in the way a fish interacts with its surrounding environment.

Our previous research has found most experiments have looked at the impacts on fish in isolation, measuring things such as how far or how fast they swim when pesticides are present.

But fish aren’t solitary — they form groups, defend territory and find mates. These behaviours keep aquatic ecosystems stable. So this time we studied how pesticides affect these crucial social behaviours.

Pesticide exposure makes fish less social

Our study extracted and analysed data from 37 experiments conducted around the world. Together, these tested the impacts of 31 different pesticides on the social behaviour of 11 different fish species.

The evidence suggests pesticides make fish less social, and this finding is consistent across species. Courtship was the most severely impacted behaviour – the process fish use to find and attract mates. This is particularly alarming because successful courtship is essential for healthy fish populations and ecosystem stability.

Next, we found pesticides such as the herbicide glyphosate, which can disrupt brain function and hormone levels had the strongest impacts on fish social behaviours. This raises important questions about how brain function and hormones drive fish social behaviour, which could be tested by scientists in the future.

For example, scientists could test how much a change in testosterone relates to a change in territory defence. Looking at these relationships between what’s going on inside the body mechanisms and outward behaviour will help us better understand the complex impacts of pesticides.

We also identified gaps in the current studies. Most existing studies focus on a limited number of easy-to-study “model species” such as zebrafish, medaka and guppies. They also often use pesticide dosages and durations that may not reflect real-world realities.

Addressing these gaps by including a range of species and environmentally relevant dosages is crucial to understanding how pesticides affect fish in the wild.

Behaviour is a blind spot in regulation

Regulatory authorities should begin to recognise behaviour as a reliable and important indicator of pesticide safety. This can help them catch pesticide pollution early, before mass deaths occur.

Scientists play a crucial role too. By following the same methods, scientists can produce comparable results. A standardised method then provides regulators the evidence needed to confidently assess pesticide risks.

Together, regulatory authorities and scientists can find a way to use behavioural studies to help inform policy decisions. This will help to prevent mass deaths and catch pesticide impacts early on.

Leave no stone unturned in restoring our waters

Rivers, lakes, oceans and reefs are bearing the brunt of an ever-growing human footprint.

So far, much of the spotlight has focused on reducing carbon emissions and managing overfishing — and rightly so. But there’s another, quieter threat drifting beneath the surface: the chemicals we use.

Pesticides used on farms and in gardens are being detected everywhere, even iconic ecosystems such as the Great Barrier Reef. As we have shown, these pesticides can have disturbing effects even at low concentrations.

Now is the time to cut pesticide use and reduce runoff. Through switching to less toxic chemicals and introducing better regulations, we can reduce the damage. If we act with urgency, we can limit the impacts pesticides have on our planet.

Kyle Morrison does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Many fish are social, but pesticides are pushing them apart – https://theconversation.com/many-fish-are-social-but-pesticides-are-pushing-them-apart-256230