Category: The Conversation – Global Perspectives

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Lauren Ball, Professor of Community Health and Wellbeing, The University of Queensland

“Cut out all dairy. Ditch gluten. Never touch sugar again.” More than 20 million people have watched TikTok videos listing these kinds of rules under the banner of “anti-inflammatory diets.”

The promise is simple: avoid entire food groups and you’ll lose weight, banish bloating and transform your health.

But while the idea of eating to reduce inflammation has a scientific foundation, the social media version strips out nuance and risks becoming unnecessarily restrictive.

Let’s check what’s going on.

What is inflammation?

People often think of inflammation as something to avoid at all costs, but it’s actually a healthy and normal process that helps the body heal and defend itself against infections, injuries, or diseases. Without it, we wouldn’t recover from even small injuries.

Inflammation and the immune system work together: when the body notices injury or infection, the immune system starts to trigger inflammation, which brings immune cells, nutrients and oxygen to the affected area. This helps with healing.

Inflammation can be short-term (acute) or long-term (chronic). Acute inflammation is helpful and part of normal healing. For example, a scraped knee becomes red, swollen and warm as the skin repairs, or a sore throat swells while fighting infection.

Chronic inflammation, on the other hand, can be harmful. It occurs at a low level over time and is often unnoticed, but is linked with many chronic diseases including heart disease, type 2 diabetes and cancer.

What causes chronic inflammation?

Factors such as age, smoking, sedentary behaviour, obesity, hormonal changes, stress and irregular sleep patterns have all been linked with chronic inflammation.

Diet also plays a key role. A typical Western diet, which is high in ultra-processed foods such as packaged baked goods, soft drinks, fast food, processed meats and confectionery, and low in fresh fruits and vegetables, has been strongly linked with higher levels of inflammation.

Can anti-inflammatory diets help?

Yes. What we eat can influence inflammation in the body. Diets rich in fruits, vegetables, wholegrains, legumes and healthy fats – and low in highly processed foods and added sugars – are associated with lower levels of inflammation.

The Mediterranean-style diet is the most researched example. It’s packed with vegetables, fruits, wholegrains, nuts, seeds and olive oil, with moderate amounts of fish, chicken, eggs and dairy, and minimal red or processed meat and added sugars.

In 2022, researchers reviewed the best available evidence and found people following a Mediterranean-type diet had lower levels of inflammatory markers in their blood, suggesting it can help reduce chronic inflammation.

Growing research also suggests diets high in processed foods and low in fibre can change the balance of bacteria in the gut, which may contribute to low-level, chronic inflammation.

Where TikTok gets it right… and wrong

Right: probiotics may help

Many TikTok videos recommend probiotic supplements to lower inflammation, and there is emerging science to support this. A 2020 review of randomised controlled trials (the strongest form of evidence) found probiotics may reduce some inflammatory blood markers in both healthy people and those living with a health condition.

But while promising, researchers caution more studies are needed to determine which strains and doses are most effective.

Wrong: ‘avoid lists’ (gluten, dairy) without a medical reason

TikTok advice to avoid dairy or gluten to reduce inflammation isn’t backed by strong science for most people.

Inflammation from dairy or gluten typically only occurs in those with allergies or coeliac disease, in which case, medical dietary restriction is necessary. Cutting them out without cause risks unnecessary nutrient gaps.

For the general population, systematic reviews show dairy products often have neutral or even protective effects on inflammation.

Plus, foods such as yogurt, kefir and certain cheeses are rich in probiotics, which are helpful in reducing inflammation.

Many people believe cutting out gluten will lower chronic inflammation and avoid it to help with gut issues or fatigue.

But there’s little scientific evidence to back this up. In fact, wholegrain consumption has been shown to positively affect health status by improving inflammation.

A Mediterranean-style diet already avoids most processed, gluten-heavy foods such as cakes, pastries, white bread, fast food and packaged snacks. If you feel sensitive to gluten, this way of eating naturally keeps your intake low, without the need to cut out nutritious wholegrains that can benefit your health.

Who might benefit from an anti-inflammatory diet?

For people with certain medical conditions, an anti-inflammatory eating pattern can play a useful role alongside conventional care.

Research suggests potential benefits for conditions such as polycystic ovary syndrome (PCOS), endometriosis, autoimmune conditions and arthritis, where chronic inflammation contributes to symptoms or disease progression.

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Read more:
Could changing your diet improve endometriosis pain? A recent study suggests it’s possible

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In these cases, dietary approaches should be guided by an accredited practising dietitian to ensure that changes are safe, balanced and tailored to individual needs.

The bottom line for healthy people

If you’re otherwise healthy, you don’t need to cut out entire food groups to reduce inflammation.

Instead, focus on balance, variety and minimally processed foods: essentially a Mediterranean-style eating pattern. Support your body’s natural defences with a colourful plate full of vegetables and fruit, enough fibre, healthy fats such as olive oil and nuts. No TikTok “avoid list” required.

Alongside a balanced diet, being physically active, getting good-quality sleep, drinking only minimal alcohol and not smoking all help the body keep inflammation in check. These healthy habits work together to strengthen the immune system and lower the risk of chronic disease.

Lauren Ball receives funding from the National Health and Medical Research Council, Health and Wellbeing Queensland, Heart Foundation, Gallipoli Medical Research and Mater Health, Springfield City Group. She is a Director of Dietitians Australia, a Director of the Darling Downs and West Moreton Primary Health Network and an Associate Member of the Australian Academy of Health and Medical Sciences.

Emily Burch does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Do TikTok ‘anti-inflammatory diets’ really work? – https://theconversation.com/do-tiktok-anti-inflammatory-diets-really-work-265089

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Chloe Hayes, Postdoctoral Researcher in Marine Ecology, University of Adelaide

Species across the planet are on the move. Climate change has already caused more than 12,000 species to shift their homes across land, freshwater and the sea. They move to escape unfavourable conditions or to explore ecosystems that were previously inaccessible.

In the ocean, some tropical fish are “packing their bags” and moving into temperate reefs to seek cooler waters. These migrations are already happening along the east coast of Australia, which is considered one of the fastest-warming marine regions on Earth. New coral and fish species are regularly arriving in Sydney’s oceans, and this is expected to increase with future climate change.

These newcomers are traditionally monitored through visual surveys by researchers or citizen scientists. But many of these early arrivals are small, rare, nocturnal or live in caves, which means they can be easily missed. As a result, we may be underestimating the true rate of species on the move.

That is where our new research, published in Diversity and Distributions, comes in. We took off our marine ecologist hats and became forensic scientists, searching the water for clues about species on the move. By analysing fragments of DNA drifting in the ocean, we set out to discover the hidden shifts in fish communities that traditional visual surveys can overlook.

Genetic fingerprints floating in the ocean

Every organism leaves behind traces of itself in the environment. Fish shed mucus, scales and waste – all of which contain DNA. By collecting and filtering samples of seawater, we can extract this environmental DNA – or eDNA, as it’s more commonly known – and identify the species that are there.

The technique works much like forensic science. Just as detectives solve crimes by analysing fingerprints or hair left at a scene, ecologists can build a picture of marine life from the genetic fingerprints floating invisibly in the ocean.

The idea of eDNA began in the 1980s when scientists discovered they could collect DNA directly from soil or water samples. At first it was used to study microbes. But by the early 2000s researchers realised it could also reveal larger animals and plants.

Today, eDNA is being used everywhere – from soil to rivers and oceans – to discover hidden or threatened species, track biodiversity, and even study ancient ecosystems preserved in sediments.

Surveying 2,000km of coastline

To test how well eDNA can reveal species on the move, we surveyed fish communities along 2,000 kilometres of Australia’s east coast. Our sites ranged from the tropical reefs of the Great Barrier Reef, through to subtropical waters, and down to the temperate kelp forests of New South Wales.

At each site, we conducted traditional visual surveys, swimming along defined rectangular areas known as transect belts and recording every fish we saw. These surveys remain the standard for monitoring marine biodiversity and have built decades of valuable data.

Alongside these surveys, we collected bottles of seawater for DNA analysis. A few litres of water might not look like much, but it holds invisible genetic fingerprints of hundreds of species.

Back in the lab, we filtered the samples to capture the DNA, then sequenced them to reveal a snapshot of which species were in the area.

Detecting tropical species in temperate ecosystems

When we compared traditional visual surveys with eDNA water samples, the results were interesting. Each method revealed a somewhat different fish community, but together they gave us a far more complete picture than either method could on its own.

The eDNA detected tropical species in temperate ecosystems that had never been recorded there before. These included herbivores such as the lined surgeonfish (Acanthurus lineatus), the striated surgeonfish (Ctenochaetus striatus), and the common parrotfish (Scarus psittacus), and cryptic species such as the black-blotched porcupinefish (Diodon liturosus), the silver sweeper (Pempheris schwenkii), and the speckled squirrelfish (Sargocentron punctatissimum) that hide in caves or only emerge at night.

These are exactly the kinds of fish divers are most likely to miss.

For temperate species, this pattern flipped. Divers were often better at detecting them than eDNA was. This showed us eDNA is not a replacement for traditional visual surveys, but a powerful complement. By combining the two, we can better track species on the move, giving us the clearest view yet of how climate change is reshaping our reefs.

These migrations are not unique to Australia. Around the world, species are shifting their ranges as climate change alters temperatures, ocean currents and habitats. While some species may thrive in their new homes, others may struggle to adapt, or be pushed out.

Tracking these shifts is crucial for understanding how climate change is transforming our oceans, and it means we need better ways to detect which species are on the move.

Ivan Nagelkerken receives funding from the Australian Research Council.

Angus Mitchell, Chloe Hayes, and David Booth do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Fish ‘fingerprints’ in the ocean reveal which species are moving homes due to climate change – https://theconversation.com/fish-fingerprints-in-the-ocean-reveal-which-species-are-moving-homes-due-to-climate-change-264683

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Maha Nassar, Associate Professor in the School of Middle Eastern and North African Studies, University of Arizona

Recognition of a Palestinian state is likely to dominate proceedings at the U.N. beginning Sept 23, 2025, when world leaders will gather for the annual general assembly.

Of the 193 existing U.N member states, some 152 now recognize a Palestinian state. Ahead of the U.N. gathering in New York, Australia, France, Canada and the United Kingdom became the latest to add their names. That number is expected to increase in the coming days, with several more countries expected to officially announce similar recognition.

That a host of Western nations are adding their names to the near-universal list of Global South countries that already recognize a Palestinian state is a major diplomatic win for the cause of an independent, sovereign and self-governed nation for Palestinians. Conversely, it is a massive diplomatic loss for Israel – especially coming just two years after the West stood shoulder to shoulder with Israel following the Oct. 7 attack by Palestinian militant group Hamas.

As a scholar of modern Palestinian history, I know that this diplomatic moment is decades in the making. But I am also aware that symbolic diplomatic breakthroughs on the issue of Palestinian statehood have occurred before, only to prove meaningless in the face of events that make statehood less likely.

The non-state reality

The fight for Palestinian statehood can be traced back to at least 1967. Over the course of a six-day war against a coalition of Arab states, Israel conquered and expanded its military control over the remainder of what was historic Palestine – a stretch of land that extends from the Jordan River in the east to the Mediterranean Sea in the west.

At the war’s conclusion, Israel had taken control of the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip.

Unlike after the 1948 war that led to its independence, Israel opted not to extend Israeli citizenship to Palestinians living in the newly conquered areas. Instead, the Israeli government began to rule over Palestinians in these occupied territories through a series of military orders.

These orders controlled nearly every aspect of Palestinian life – and many remain in effect today. For example, if a Palestinian farmer wants to harvest his olive trees near a Jewish settlement in the West Bank, they need a permit. Or
if a Gazan worker wants to work inside Israel, they need Israeli permission. Even praying in a mosque or church in East Jerusalem is dependent on obtaining a permit.

This permit system served as a constant reminder to Palestinians living in the occupied territories that they lacked control over their own daily lives. Meanwhile, Israeli authorities tried to squash the idea of Palestinian nationhood through policies such as outlawing public displays of the Palestinian flag. That, and other expressions of Palestinian national identity in the occupied territories, could result in up to 10 years in prison.

Such policies fit a belief, expressed in 1969 by then Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir, that there was “no such thing in this area as Palestinians.”

The rise of Palestinian nationalism

Around the same time that Meir made that comment, Palestinians started organizing around the idea of statehood.

Although the idea had been floated before, statehood was codified into official doctrine in a resolution in February 1969 in Egypt. It occurred during a session of the Palestine National Council, the legislative body of the Palestine Liberation Organization, which formed in 1964 as the official representative of Palestinians in the occupied territories.

That resolution called for a free, secular democratic state in Palestine – including all of the State of Israel – in which Muslims, Christians and Jews would all have equal rights.

From that moment on, the Palestinian struggle against Israeli occupation took twin paths: diplomatic pressure and armed resistance.

But events on the ground undermined the idea of a single state for all along the lines envisioned by the Cairo resolution.

The 1973 Arab-Israeli War’s inconclusive ending opened the door to greater diplomacy between Israel and the Arab states. Egypt and Israel decided that diplomacy would help them achieve their aims, culminating in the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty of 1979. But the treaty also left the Palestinians without unified Arab support.

Meanwhile, throughout the 1970s, the Israeli occupation deepened and entrenched with the building of Israeli settlements, especially in the West Bank.

The PLO responded in 1974 by issuing what became known as the 10-Point Plan, where they pivoted to seeking the establishment of a national authority in any part of historic Palestine that could be liberated.

It was, in effect, a way of threading the needle: It signaled to moderates that the PLO was adopting a more gradualist position, while also telling the group’s rejectionist front – which opposed peace negotiations with Israel – that they were not giving up completely on the idea of liberating all of Palestine.

Then in 1988 – a year into the first Palestinian intifada, or uprising – the PLO unilaterally declared Palestinian independence on the territories occupied in 1967.

The move was largely symbolic – the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem were still under occupation, and the PLO was then in exile in Tunisia.

But it was nonetheless significant. It represented the bringing together of Palestinians in exile – most of whom were from towns and villages that were now part of the State of Israel – with Palestinians in the occupied territories.

The declaration itself was written by Palestinian poet Mahmoud Darwish, who grew up inside Israel, and declared by Yasser Arafat, the PLO leader in exile.

It was also a moment of tremendous hope and possibility for Palestinians. What most Palestinians wanted was for the international community to recognize them as a national body, deserving of a seat at the table with other nation-states.

Compromise and rejection

Yet at the same time, many Palestinians saw the declaration as a huge compromise. The West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem comprise about 22% of historic Palestine. So the declaration effectively meant that Palestinians were giving up on the other 78% of what they saw as their land.

Reaction from the international community to the PLO’s declaration was split. Many formerly colonized countries of the Global South recognized Palestinian independence right away. By the end of the year, some 78 countries had issued statements recognizing Palestine as a state.

Israel rejected it outright, as did United States and most Western nations.

Such was Washington’s opposition that the U.S. denied Arafat a visa ahead of his planned address to the United Nations at its New York City headquarters. As a result, the December 1988 meeting had to be moved to Geneva.

While refusing to accept Palestinian statehood, the U.S. and Israel did begin to recognize the PLO as a representative body of the Palestinian people. This was part of the Oslo Accords – a diplomatic process that many believed would outline a road map for an eventual two-state solution.

While some Palestinians saw the Oslo Accords as a diplomatic breakthrough, others were more skeptical. Prominent Palestinians, including Darwish and Palestinian-American professor Edward Said, believed that Oslo was a poison pill: While framed as a step toward a two-state solution, the agreement said nothing about a Palestinian state in the interim. It only said that Israel would recognize the PLO as a representative of the Palestinian people.

In reality, the Oslo Accords have not lead to statehood. Rather, they created a system of fragmented autonomy under the newly created Palestinian Authority that, though meant to be interim, has in effect become permanent.

The Palestinian Authority was allowed only limited powers and deprived of real independence. While it had some say over schooling, health care and municipal services, Israel maintained control of Palestinian land, resources, borders and the economy. That remains true today.

Renewed push for statehood recognition

Disillusionment over the Oslo Accords contributed to the second, far more violent, intifada from 2000 to 2005.

Mahmoud Abbas, the leader of the Palestinian Authority after Arafat, responded by pushing again for international recognition for statehood.

And in 2012, the U.N. General Assembly voted to upgrade Palestine’s status, elevating it from a “nonmember observer” to a “nonmember observer state.”

In theory, this meant Palestinians now had access to international bodies, like the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice.

But any meaningful change in the status of Palestinian sovereignty would need to come through the U.N. Security Council, not the U.N. General Assembly.

The U.S. remains opposed to Palestinians gaining statehood independent of the Oslo process. So long as the U.S. has a veto on the Security Council, achieving a truly sovereign Palestinian state will likewise be off the table. And that remains the case, regardless of what individual members – even fellow Security Council members like France and the U.K – do.

In fact, many Palestinians and other critics of the status quo say Western nations are using the issue of Palestinian statehood to absolve them from the far more challenging diplomatic task of holding Israel accountable for what a U.N. body just described as a genocide in Gaza.

This article is based on a conversation between Maha Nassar and Gemma Ware for The Conversation Weekly podcast.

Maha Nassar does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. UK, France and other Western nations recognize Palestinian state ahead of UN meetings – but symbolic action won’t make statehood happen – https://theconversation.com/uk-france-and-other-western-nations-recognize-palestinian-state-ahead-of-un-meetings-but-symbolic-action-wont-make-statehood-happen-265534

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Maha Nassar, Associate Professor in the School of Middle Eastern and North African Studies, University of Arizona

Recognition of a Palestinian state is likely to dominate proceedings at the U.N. beginning Sept 23, 2025, when world leaders will gather for the annual general assembly.

Of the 193 existing U.N member states, some 152 now recognize a Palestinian state. Ahead of the U.N. gathering in New York, Australia, France, Canada and the United Kingdom became the latest to add their names. That number is expected to increase in the coming days, with several more countries expected to officially announce similar recognition.

That a host of Western nations are adding their names to the near-universal list of Global South countries that already recognize a Palestinian state is a major diplomatic win for the cause of an independent, sovereign and self-governed nation for Palestinians. Conversely, it is a massive diplomatic loss for Israel – especially coming just two years after the West stood shoulder to shoulder with Israel following the Oct. 7 attack by Palestinian militant group Hamas.

As a scholar of modern Palestinian history, I know that this diplomatic moment is decades in the making. But I am also aware that symbolic diplomatic breakthroughs on the issue of Palestinian statehood have occurred before, only to prove meaningless in the face of events that make statehood less likely.

The non-state reality

The fight for Palestinian statehood can be traced back to at least 1967. Over the course of a six-day war against a coalition of Arab states, Israel conquered and expanded its military control over the remainder of what was historic Palestine – a stretch of land that extends from the Jordan River in the east to the Mediterranean Sea in the west.

At the war’s conclusion, Israel had taken control of the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip.

Unlike after the 1948 war that led to its independence, Israel opted not to extend Israeli citizenship to Palestinians living in the newly conquered areas. Instead, the Israeli government began to rule over Palestinians in these occupied territories through a series of military orders.

These orders controlled nearly every aspect of Palestinian life – and many remain in effect today. For example, if a Palestinian farmer wants to harvest his olive trees near a Jewish settlement in the West Bank, they need a permit. Or
if a Gazan worker wants to work inside Israel, they need Israeli permission. Even praying in a mosque or church in East Jerusalem is dependent on obtaining a permit.

This permit system served as a constant reminder to Palestinians living in the occupied territories that they lacked control over their own daily lives. Meanwhile, Israeli authorities tried to squash the idea of Palestinian nationhood through policies such as outlawing public displays of the Palestinian flag. That, and other expressions of Palestinian national identity in the occupied territories, could result in up to 10 years in prison.

Such policies fit a belief, expressed in 1969 by then Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir, that there was “no such thing in this area as Palestinians.”

The rise of Palestinian nationalism

Around the same time that Meir made that comment, Palestinians started organizing around the idea of statehood.

Although the idea had been floated before, statehood was codified into official doctrine in a resolution in February 1969 in Egypt. It occurred during a session of the Palestine National Council, the legislative body of the Palestine Liberation Organization, which formed in 1964 as the official representative of Palestinians in the occupied territories.

That resolution called for a free, secular democratic state in Palestine – including all of the State of Israel – in which Muslims, Christians and Jews would all have equal rights.

From that moment on, the Palestinian struggle against Israeli occupation took twin paths: diplomatic pressure and armed resistance.

But events on the ground undermined the idea of a single state for all along the lines envisioned by the Cairo resolution.

The 1973 Arab-Israeli War’s inconclusive ending opened the door to greater diplomacy between Israel and the Arab states. Egypt and Israel decided that diplomacy would help them achieve their aims, culminating in the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty of 1979. But the treaty also left the Palestinians without unified Arab support.

Meanwhile, throughout the 1970s, the Israeli occupation deepened and entrenched with the building of Israeli settlements, especially in the West Bank.

The PLO responded in 1974 by issuing what became known as the 10-Point Plan, where they pivoted to seeking the establishment of a national authority in any part of historic Palestine that could be liberated.

It was, in effect, a way of threading the needle: It signaled to moderates that the PLO was adopting a more gradualist position, while also telling the group’s rejectionist front – which opposed peace negotiations with Israel – that they were not giving up completely on the idea of liberating all of Palestine.

Then in 1988 – a year into the first Palestinian intifada, or uprising – the PLO unilaterally declared Palestinian independence on the territories occupied in 1967.

The move was largely symbolic – the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem were still under occupation, and the PLO was then in exile in Tunisia.

But it was nonetheless significant. It represented the bringing together of Palestinians in exile – most of whom were from towns and villages that were now part of the State of Israel – with Palestinians in the occupied territories.

The declaration itself was written by Palestinian poet Mahmoud Darwish, who grew up inside Israel, and declared by Yasser Arafat, the PLO leader in exile.

It was also a moment of tremendous hope and possibility for Palestinians. What most Palestinians wanted was for the international community to recognize them as a national body, deserving of a seat at the table with other nation-states.

Compromise and rejection

Yet at the same time, many Palestinians saw the declaration as a huge compromise. The West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem comprise about 22% of historic Palestine. So the declaration effectively meant that Palestinians were giving up on the other 78% of what they saw as their land.

Reaction from the international community to the PLO’s declaration was split. Many formerly colonized countries of the Global South recognized Palestinian independence right away. By the end of the year, some 78 countries had issued statements recognizing Palestine as a state.

Israel rejected it outright, as did United States and most Western nations.

Such was Washington’s opposition that the U.S. denied Arafat a visa ahead of his planned address to the United Nations at its New York City headquarters. As a result, the December 1988 meeting had to be moved to Geneva.

While refusing to accept Palestinian statehood, the U.S. and Israel did begin to recognize the PLO as a representative body of the Palestinian people. This was part of the Oslo Accords – a diplomatic process that many believed would outline a road map for an eventual two-state solution.

While some Palestinians saw the Oslo Accords as a diplomatic breakthrough, others were more skeptical. Prominent Palestinians, including Darwish and Palestinian-American professor Edward Said, believed that Oslo was a poison pill: While framed as a step toward a two-state solution, the agreement said nothing about a Palestinian state in the interim. It only said that Israel would recognize the PLO as a representative of the Palestinian people.

In reality, the Oslo Accords have not lead to statehood. Rather, they created a system of fragmented autonomy under the newly created Palestinian Authority that, though meant to be interim, has in effect become permanent.

The Palestinian Authority was allowed only limited powers and deprived of real independence. While it had some say over schooling, health care and municipal services, Israel maintained control of Palestinian land, resources, borders and the economy. That remains true today.

Renewed push for statehood recognition

Disillusionment over the Oslo Accords contributed to the second, far more violent, intifada from 2000 to 2005.

Mahmoud Abbas, the leader of the Palestinian Authority after Arafat, responded by pushing again for international recognition for statehood.

And in 2012, the U.N. General Assembly voted to upgrade Palestine’s status, elevating it from a “nonmember observer” to a “nonmember observer state.”

In theory, this meant Palestinians now had access to international bodies, like the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice.

But any meaningful change in the status of Palestinian sovereignty would need to come through the U.N. Security Council, not the U.N. General Assembly.

The U.S. remains opposed to Palestinians gaining statehood independent of the Oslo process. So long as the U.S. has a veto on the Security Council, achieving a truly sovereign Palestinian state will likewise be off the table. And that remains the case, regardless of what individual members – even fellow Security Council members like France and the U.K – do.

In fact, many Palestinians and other critics of the status quo say Western nations are using the issue of Palestinian statehood to absolve them from the far more challenging diplomatic task of holding Israel accountable for what a U.N. body just described as a genocide in Gaza.

This article is based on a conversation between Maha Nassar and Gemma Ware for The Conversation Weekly podcast.

Maha Nassar does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Western nations recognize Palestinian state ahead of UN meetings – but symbolic action won’t make statehood happen – https://theconversation.com/western-nations-recognize-palestinian-state-ahead-of-un-meetings-but-symbolic-action-wont-make-statehood-happen-265534

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Michael James Walsh, Associate Dean and Associate Professor in Social Sciences, University of Canberra

Spotify has been subject to various lingering critiques. These range from criticism of its payment model, to the presence of “fake artists”, the Joe Rogan boycott saga, and controversies around AI-made music.

More recently, cofounder and chief executive Daniel Ek has come under fire for investing €600 million (more than A$1 billion) in the military AI company Helsing. The news prompted several artists to remove their music from the platform, including King Gizzard and the Lizard Wizard, Xiu Xiu, Deerhoof, Wu Lyf and, as of last week, Massive Attack.

To top it all off, Spotify has been steadily raising its prices for premium subscribers.

We’ve seen a spate of headlines targeting users who for one reason or another are considering, or determined to, tune out from the platform. For many, this may not be a hassle-free adjustment – but that doesn’t mean it can’t be done.

Users are picking up the tab

As of 2022, streaming accounted for 67% of the revenue generated by the music industry.

It’s estimated one in 12 people are regular Spotify users – putting the streaming giant well ahead of its nearest rivals YouTube Music (a Google subsidiary) and the China-domiciled Tencent Music.

While most users access Spotify for free, about 268 million of its 696 million monthly active users pay a premium for ad-free access.

For many years, Spotify kept prices fairly steady as it concentrated on growth. It did not make a profit until 2024. But chief business officer Alex Norström recently said price rises “were part of our toolbox now”.

Spotify has promised price rises will be accompanied by new features. Norström said the platform was developing a feature for “superfans” of popular artists, not to mention introducing (belatedly) “lossless” (higher-quality) sound.

Other music streaming services, such as Amazon Music, are also raising prices, to varying degrees of success.

Why Spotify dominates music streaming

There are several reasons for the dominance of streaming, and the broader dematerialisation of music media. As David Bowie foresaw in 2002: “music itself is going to become like running water or electricity”.

Streaming services such as Spotify avoid the stigmas associated with consuming pirated music recordings. They also remunerate artists (although many would say these payments are inadequate).

Ek made it clear a key aim of the company was to ensure no perceivable “latency” (annoying delays due to buffering) when songs were selected to play.

Spotify has also been at the forefront of leveraging the social dimensions of music streaming. It promotes user-created playlists and wayfinding functions that allow fans to feel like they own “their” music collection, despite not having the physical artefacts such as vinyl or CDs.

Users can interact with one another. They can share their listening activity on dating profiles, with peers, and through marketing initiatives such as Spotify Wrapped.

From the early days, Spotify sought to present itself in ways that resembled social media. More recently, it has released TikTok-inspired feeds, comments, polls, artist stories, collaborative playlists and a messaging feature.

Calling the tune through algorithms

A significant part of Spotify’s success stems from its continuous development of its interface and recommendation algorithms. These algorithms have become central to how users find, access and listen to music.

Importantly, Spotify caters to what scholars identify as a “lean-back” mentality. Users are encouraged to consume editorial playlists, rather than actively browse for tracks. This increases its power to influence the music with which listeners engage.

It aims to be an easy-to-use, always-convenient service, catering to any moment:

Spotify has a playlist to match your mood. Not only in the morning, but at every moment of your day.

Switching may be hard, but not impossible

The move away from streaming may now be hard to reverse, even as it becomes more expensive. Despite the resurgence of vinyl, many listeners have given up on physical music collections.

Spotify has also developed features to increase “stickiness” for subscribers. Users have created nearly nine billion playlists. As it’s difficult to transfer playlists to another streaming service, it makes users more likely to stick with Spotify.

It also has a reputation for having the most songs available. There is a large chance it will have the song you want to listen to.

Nonetheless, that doesn’t mean alternatives aren’t available. And most of them are cheaper than the A$15.99 per month Spotify charges in Australia.

Apple Music is an audio (and now video) streaming app developed by Apple, and launched in 2015. It promotes spatial and high-resolution music and integrates effectively with iOS devices.

Amazon Music is a music streaming platform included with an Amazon Prime subscription, offering access to songs, podcasts and playlists. It also integrates with Amazon’s Alexa virtual assistant devices.

YouTube Music is available to YouTube Premium subscribers. Succeeding Google Play Music, it offers various playlists and radio station features, with strong integration into YouTube’s video ecosystem.

Tidal is a music streaming service that positions itself as the leader in high-fidelity audio. Alongside Spotify, Tidal was one of the first platforms to allow users to follow selected Facebook friends and receive music recommendations from them.

Anghami, launched in 2012, is the leading music streaming service dedicated to music from the Middle East and North Africa.

There are also third-party apps (both paid and unpaid) you can use to transfer your old Spotify playlists to a new service, such as Free Your Music, Tune My Music, Soundiiz and SongShift (only for iOS).

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Read more:
‘I almost feel like stuck in a rut’: how streaming services changed the way we listen to music

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The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Criticisms against Spotify keep mounting. Luckily there are alternatives – https://theconversation.com/criticisms-against-spotify-keep-mounting-luckily-there-are-alternatives-264982

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Amin Saikal, Adjunct Professor of Social Sciences, The University of Western Australia, Victoria University, Australian National University

Much of the world is focused on a two-state solution in resolving the long-running Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu appears devoted to realising his vision of a “Greater Israel” instead.

Netanyahu appears to be halfway through achieving this goal, despite all the international condemnation of his war in Gaza and the increasing isolation of Israel.

The two-state solution now seems to be no more than a catchword for governments around the world that want to show their solidarity with the Palestinian cause at a time when Israel is hard at work to ensure the concept becomes totally defunct.

The prospects for creating an independent Palestinian state out of the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip to live side-by-side with Israel in peace and security have never been dimmer.

Israel maintains Trump’s unwavering support

In the wake of Israel’s attack on Hamas leaders in Qatar earlier this month, an emergency Arab-Muslim summit was convened by Qatar to provide a collective response.

The meeting proved to be very ineffective. The leaders issued a strong condemnation of the strike on Qatar, but no plan for how to prevent Israel from attacking its neighbours or halt what a United Nations commission has now called a genocide in Gaza.

Instead, the leaders offered a tepid statement, saying they would:

take all possible legal and effective measures to prevent Israel from continuing its actions against the Palestinian people.

Middle East leaders know the only power that can rein in Israel is its committed strategic partner, the United States.

Washington does not appear prepared to do that. While President Donald Trump has assured the region Israel will not repeat its attack on Qatar, his secretary of state, Marco Rubio, urgently flew to Israel to reconfirm America’s unshakeable alliance with the Jewish state.

In praying together with Netanyahu at the Western Wall with a kippah on his head, Rubio demonstrated the Trump administration would stand by the prime minister all the way.

And Netanyahu was quick to declare that Israel reserves the right to hit the “Hamas terrorists” anywhere. He has demanded Qatar expel Hamas officials or face Israel’s wrath again.

A vision for a ‘Greater Israel’

Based on the language used by the Israeli leader and his extremist ministers, the creation of “Greater Israel” appears to be a priority.

In recent weeks, Netanyahu has publicly alluded to this, saying he was “very” connected to the idea.

The “Greater Israel” phrase was used after the Six-Day War in 1967 to refer to the lands Israel had conquered: the West Bank, East Jerusalem, Gaza, the Golan Heights and the Sinai peninsula (which has since been returned to Egypt).

This concept was enshrined in 1977 in the founding charter of Netanyahu’s Likud Party, which said “between the [Mediterranean] Sea and the Jordan [River] there will only be Israeli sovereignty”.

Last year, Netanyahu affirmed that Israel must have “security control over the entire territory west of the Jordan River”. He added, “That collides with the idea of [Palestinian] sovereignty. What can we do?”

Netanyahu is now firmly in a position to annex the Gaza Strip, followed by formally extending Israeli jurisdiction over all the illegal Israeli settlements in the West Bank, where more than 700,000 settlers live under the protection of the Israel Defence Forces (IDF), and potentially annex the entire area.

In addition, Israel has made extraterritorial gains in both Lebanon and Syria after degrading Hezbollah and striking both southern Syria and Iran. He has said the IDF’s footprint in both countries will not be pulled back any time soon.

Arab and Muslim leaders have strongly condemned Netanyahu’s references to a “Greater Israel”. The US also has not publicly endorsed it, though the US ambassador to Israel, Mike Huckabee, has been a supporter of the idea.

What can the world do?

Netanyahu and his colleagues have weathered the international criticism over their catastrophic Gaza operations for nearly two years, with unwavering US security, economic and financial backing.

Equally, Netanyahu’s critics say he has shown little concern about the safety and freedom of the remaining Israeli hostages still in Hamas’s custody. He has brushed off the desires of a majority of Israelis for a ceasefire and release of the hostages.

For Netanyahu and his ruling clique, the end justifies the means. Given this, the expected recognition of the state of Palestine by many Western countries at the UN General Assembly this week will have little or no bearing on Israel or, for that matter, the US. They have both already rejected it as a meaningless and unworthy symbolic exercise.

This begs the question of what needs to be done to divert Israel from its path. The only means that could possibly work would be sanctioning Netanyahu and his government and severing all military, economic and trade ties with Israel.

Anything short of this will allow the Israeli leadership to continue its pursuit of a “Greater Israel”, if this is indeed their ultimate plan.

This would come at a terrible cost not only for the Palestinians and the region, but also for Israel’s global reputation. When Netanyahu eventually leaves office, he will leave behind a state in international disrepute. And it may not recover from this for a very long time.

Amin Saikal does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Is Benjamin Netanyahu on a mission to realise a Greater Israel? – https://theconversation.com/is-benjamin-netanyahu-on-a-mission-to-realise-a-greater-israel-265662

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Maha Nassar, Associate Professor in the School of Middle Eastern and North African Studies, University of Arizona

Recognition of a Palestinian state is likely to dominate proceedings at the U.N. beginning Sept 23, 2025, when world leaders will gather for the annual general assembly.

Of the 193 existing U.N member states, some 150 now recognize a Palestinian state. Ahead of the U.N. gathering in New York, Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom become the latest. And that number is expected to increase in the coming days, with several more countries expected to officially announce similar recognition.

That a host of Western nations are adding their names to the near-universal list of Global South countries that already recognize a Palestinian state is a major diplomatic win for the cause of an independent, sovereign and self-governed nation for Palestinians. Conversely, it is a massive diplomatic loss for Israel – especially coming just two years after the West stood shoulder to shoulder with Israel following the Oct. 7 attack by Palestinian militant group Hamas.

As a scholar of modern Palestinian history, I know that this diplomatic moment is decades in the making. But I am also aware that symbolic diplomatic breakthroughs on the issue of Palestinian statehood have occurred before, only to prove meaningless in the face of events that make statehood less likely.

The non-state reality

The fight for Palestinian statehood can be traced back to at least 1967. Over the course of a six-day war against a coalition of Arab states, Israel conquered and expanded its military control over the remainder of what was historic Palestine – a stretch of land that extends from the Jordan River in the east to the Mediterranean Sea in the west.

At the war’s conclusion, Israel had taken control of the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip.

Unlike after the 1948 war that led to its independence, Israel opted not to extend Israeli citizenship to Palestinians living in the newly conquered areas. Instead, the Israeli government began to rule over Palestinians in these occupied territories through a series of military orders.

These orders controlled nearly every aspect of Palestinian life – and many remain in effect today. For example, if a Palestinian farmer wants to harvest his olive trees near a Jewish settlement in the West Bank, they need a permit. Or
if a Gazan worker wants to work inside Israel, they need Israeli permission. Even praying in a mosque or church in East Jerusalem is dependent on obtaining a permit.

This permit system served as a constant reminder to Palestinians living in the occupied territories that they lacked control over their own daily lives. Meanwhile, Israeli authorities tried to squash the idea of Palestinian nationhood through policies such as outlawing public displays of the Palestinian flag. That, and other expressions of Palestinian national identity in the occupied territories, could result in up to 10 years in prison.

Such policies fit a belief, expressed in 1969 by then Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir, that there was “no such thing in this area as Palestinians.”

The rise of Palestinian nationalism

Around the same time that Meir made that comment, Palestinians started organizing around the idea of statehood.

Although the idea had been floated before, statehood was codified into official doctrine in a resolution in February 1969 in Egypt. It occurred during a session of the Palestine National Council, the legislative body of the Palestine Liberation Organization, which formed in 1964 as the official representative of Palestinians in the occupied territories.

That resolution called for a free, secular democratic state in Palestine – including all of the State of Israel – in which Muslims, Christians and Jews would all have equal rights.

From that moment on, the Palestinian struggle against Israeli occupation took twin paths: diplomatic pressure and armed resistance.

But events on the ground undermined the idea of a single state for all along the lines envisioned by the Cairo resolution.

The 1973 Arab-Israeli War’s inconclusive ending opened the door to greater diplomacy between Israel and the Arab states. Egypt and Israel decided that diplomacy would help them achieve their aims, culminating in the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty of 1979. But the treaty also left the Palestinians without unified Arab support.

Meanwhile, throughout the 1970s, the Israeli occupation deepened and entrenched with the building of Israeli settlements, especially in the West Bank.

The PLO responded in 1974 by issuing what became known as the 10-Point Plan, where they pivoted to seeking the establishment of a national authority in any part of historic Palestine that could be liberated.

It was, in effect, a way of threading the needle: It signaled to moderates that the PLO was adopting a more gradualist position, while also telling the group’s rejectionist front – which opposed peace negotiations with Israel – that they were not giving up completely on the idea of liberating all of Palestine.

Then in 1988 – a year into the first Palestinian intifada, or uprising – the PLO unilaterally declared Palestinian independence on the territories occupied in 1967.

The move was largely symbolic – the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem were still under occupation, and the PLO was then in exile in Tunisia.

But it was nonetheless significant. It represented the bringing together of Palestinians in exile – most of whom were from towns and villages that were now part of the State of Israel – with Palestinians in the occupied territories.

The declaration itself was written by Palestinian poet Mahmoud Darwish, who grew up inside Israel, and declared by Yasser Arafat, the PLO leader in exile.

It was also a moment of tremendous hope and possibility for Palestinians. What most Palestinians wanted was for the international community to recognize them as a national body, deserving of a seat at the table with other nation-states.

Compromise and rejection

Yet at the same time, many Palestinians saw the declaration as a huge compromise. The West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem comprise about 22% of historic Palestine. So the declaration effectively meant that Palestinians were giving up on the other 78% of what they saw as their land.

Reaction from the international community to the PLO’s declaration was split. Many formerly colonized countries of the Global South recognized Palestinian independence right away. By the end of the year, some 78 countries had issued statements recognizing Palestine as a state.

Israel rejected it outright, as did United States and most Western nations.

Such was Washington’s opposition that the U.S. denied Arafat a visa ahead of his planned address to the United Nations at its New York City headquarters. As a result, the December 1988 meeting had to be moved to Geneva.

While refusing to accept Palestinian statehood, the U.S. and Israel did begin to recognize the PLO as a representative body of the Palestinian people. This was part of the Oslo Accords – a diplomatic process that many believed would outline a road map for an eventual two-state solution.

While some Palestinians saw the Oslo Accords as a diplomatic breakthrough, others were more skeptical. Prominent Palestinians, including Darwish and Palestinian-American professor Edward Said, believed that Oslo was a poison pill: While framed as a step toward a two-state solution, the agreement said nothing about a Palestinian state in the interim. It only said that Israel would recognize the PLO as a representative of the Palestinian people.

In reality, the Oslo Accords have not lead to statehood. Rather, they created a system of fragmented autonomy under the newly created Palestinian Authority that, though meant to be interim, has in effect become permanent.

The Palestinian Authority was allowed only limited powers and deprived of real independence. While it had some say over schooling, health care and municipal services, Israel maintained control of Palestinian land, resources, borders and the economy. That remains true today.

Renewed push for statehood recognition

Disillusionment over the Oslo Accords contributed to the second, far more violent, intifada from 2000 to 2005.

Mahmoud Abbas, the leader of the Palestinian Authority after Arafat, responded by pushing again for international recognition for statehood.

And in 2012, the U.N. General Assembly voted to upgrade Palestine’s status, elevating it from a “nonmember observer” to a “nonmember observer state.”

In theory, this meant Palestinians now had access to international bodies, like the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice.

But any meaningful change in the status of Palestinian sovereignty would need to come through the U.N. Security Council, not the U.N. General Assembly.

The U.S. remains opposed to Palestinians gaining statehood independent of the Oslo process. So long as the U.S. has a veto on the Security Council, achieving a truly sovereign Palestinian state will likewise be off the table. And that remains the case, regardless of what individual members – even fellow Security Council members like France and the U.K – do.

In fact, many Palestinians and other critics of the status quo say Western nations are using the issue of Palestinian statehood to absolve them from the far more challenging diplomatic task of holding Israel accountable for what a U.N. body just described as a genocide in Gaza.

This article is based on a conversation between Maha Nassar and Gemma Ware for The Conversation Weekly podcast.

Maha Nassar does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. UK and other Western nations recognize Palestinian state ahead of UN meetings – but symbolic action won’t make statehood happen – https://theconversation.com/uk-and-other-western-nations-recognize-palestinian-state-ahead-of-un-meetings-but-symbolic-action-wont-make-statehood-happen-265534

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Maha Nassar, Associate Professor in the School of Middle Eastern and North African Studies, University of Arizona

Recognition of a Palestinian state is likely to dominate proceedings at the U.N. beginning Sept 23, 2025, when world leaders will gather for the annual general assembly.

Of the 193 existing U.N member states, some 150 now recognize a Palestinian state. Ahead of the U.N. gathering in New York, Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom become the latest. And that number is expected to increase in the coming days, with several more countries expected to officially announce similar recognition.

That a host of Western nations are adding their names to the near-universal list of Global South countries that already recognize a Palestinian state is a major diplomatic win for the cause of an independent, sovereign and self-governed nation for Palestinians. Conversely, it is a massive diplomatic loss for Israel – especially coming just two years after the West stood shoulder to shoulder with Israel following the Oct. 7 attack by Palestinian militant group Hamas.

As a scholar of modern Palestinian history, I know that this diplomatic moment is decades in the making. But I am also aware that symbolic diplomatic breakthroughs on the issue of Palestinian statehood have occurred before, only to prove meaningless in the face of events that make statehood less likely.

The non-state reality

The fight for Palestinian statehood can be traced back to at least 1967. Over the course of a six-day war against a coalition of Arab states, Israel conquered and expanded its military control over the remainder of what was historic Palestine – a stretch of land that extends from the Jordan River in the east to the Mediterranean Sea in the west.

At the war’s conclusion, Israel had taken control of the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip.

Unlike after the 1948 war that led to its independence, Israel opted not to extend Israeli citizenship to Palestinians living in the newly conquered areas. Instead, the Israeli government began to rule over Palestinians in these occupied territories through a series of military orders.

These orders controlled nearly every aspect of Palestinian life – and many remain in effect today. For example, if a Palestinian farmer wants to harvest his olive trees near a Jewish settlement in the West Bank, they need a permit. Or
if a Gazan worker wants to work inside Israel, they need Israeli permission. Even praying in a mosque or church in East Jerusalem is dependent on obtaining a permit.

This permit system served as a constant reminder to Palestinians living in the occupied territories that they lacked control over their own daily lives. Meanwhile, Israeli authorities tried to squash the idea of Palestinian nationhood through policies such as outlawing public displays of the Palestinian flag. That, and other expressions of Palestinian national identity in the occupied territories, could result in up to 10 years in prison.

Such policies fit a belief, expressed in 1969 by then Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir, that there was “no such thing in this area as Palestinians.”

The rise of Palestinian nationalism

Around the same time that Meir made that comment, Palestinians started organizing around the idea of statehood.

Although the idea had been floated before, statehood was codified into official doctrine in a resolution in February 1969 in Egypt. It occurred during a session of the Palestine National Council, the legislative body of the Palestine Liberation Organization, which formed in 1964 as the official representative of Palestinians in the occupied territories.

That resolution called for a free, secular democratic state in Palestine – including all of the State of Israel – in which Muslims, Christians and Jews would all have equal rights.

From that moment on, the Palestinian struggle against Israeli occupation took twin paths: diplomatic pressure and armed resistance.

But events on the ground undermined the idea of a single state for all along the lines envisioned by the Cairo resolution.

The 1973 Arab-Israeli War’s inconclusive ending opened the door to greater diplomacy between Israel and the Arab states. Egypt and Israel decided that diplomacy would help them achieve their aims, culminating in the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty of 1979. But the treaty also left the Palestinians without unified Arab support.

Meanwhile, throughout the 1970s, the Israeli occupation deepened and entrenched with the building of Israeli settlements, especially in the West Bank.

The PLO responded in 1974 by issuing what became known as the 10-Point Plan, where they pivoted to seeking the establishment of a national authority in any part of historic Palestine that could be liberated.

It was, in effect, a way of threading the needle: It signaled to moderates that the PLO was adopting a more gradualist position, while also telling the group’s rejectionist front – which opposed peace negotiations with Israel – that they were not giving up completely on the idea of liberating all of Palestine.

Then in 1988 – a year into the first Palestinian intifada, or uprising – the PLO unilaterally declared Palestinian independence on the territories occupied in 1967.

The move was largely symbolic – the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem were still under occupation, and the PLO was then in exile in Tunisia.

But it was nonetheless significant. It represented the bringing together of Palestinians in exile – most of whom were from towns and villages that were now part of the State of Israel – with Palestinians in the occupied territories.

The declaration itself was written by Palestinian poet Mahmoud Darwish, who grew up inside Israel, and declared by Yasser Arafat, the PLO leader in exile.

It was also a moment of tremendous hope and possibility for Palestinians. What most Palestinians wanted was for the international community to recognize them as a national body, deserving of a seat at the table with other nation-states.

Compromise and rejection

Yet at the same time, many Palestinians saw the declaration as a huge compromise. The West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem comprise about 22% of historic Palestine. So the declaration effectively meant that Palestinians were giving up on the other 78% of what they saw as their land.

Reaction from the international community to the PLO’s declaration was split. Many formerly colonized countries of the Global South recognized Palestinian independence right away. By the end of the year, some 78 countries had issued statements recognizing Palestine as a state.

Israel rejected it outright, as did United States and most Western nations.

Such was Washington’s opposition that the U.S. denied Arafat a visa ahead of his planned address to the United Nations at its New York City headquarters. As a result, the December 1988 meeting had to be moved to Geneva.

While refusing to accept Palestinian statehood, the U.S. and Israel did begin to recognize the PLO as a representative body of the Palestinian people. This was part of the Oslo Accords – a diplomatic process that many believed would outline a road map for an eventual two-state solution.

While some Palestinians saw the Oslo Accords as a diplomatic breakthrough, others were more skeptical. Prominent Palestinians, including Darwish and Palestinian-American professor Edward Said, believed that Oslo was a poison pill: While framed as a step toward a two-state solution, the agreement said nothing about a Palestinian state in the interim. It only said that Israel would recognize the PLO as a representative of the Palestinian people.

In reality, the Oslo Accords have not lead to statehood. Rather, they created a system of fragmented autonomy under the newly created Palestinian Authority that, though meant to be interim, has in effect become permanent.

The Palestinian Authority was allowed only limited powers and deprived of real independence. While it had some say over schooling, health care and municipal services, Israel maintained control of Palestinian land, resources, borders and the economy. That remains true today.

Renewed push for statehood recognition

Disillusionment over the Oslo Accords contributed to the second, far more violent, intifada from 2000 to 2005.

Mahmoud Abbas, the leader of the Palestinian Authority after Arafat, responded by pushing again for international recognition for statehood.

And in 2012, the U.N. General Assembly voted to upgrade Palestine’s status, elevating it from a “nonmember observer” to a “nonmember observer state.”

In theory, this meant Palestinians now had access to international bodies, like the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice.

But any meaningful change in the status of Palestinian sovereignty would need to come through the U.N. Security Council, not the U.N. General Assembly.

The U.S. remains opposed to Palestinians gaining statehood independent of the Oslo process. So long as the U.S. has a veto on the Security Council, achieving a truly sovereign Palestinian state will likewise be off the table. And that remains the case, regardless of what individual members – even fellow Security Council members like France and the U.K – do.

In fact, many Palestinians and other critics of the status quo say Western nations are using the issue of Palestinian statehood to absolve them from the far more challenging diplomatic task of holding Israel accountable for what a U.N. body just described as a genocide in Gaza.

This article is based on a conversation between Maha Nassar and Gemma Ware for The Conversation Weekly podcast.

Maha Nassar does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. UK and other Western states recognize Palestinian state ahead of UN meetings – but symbolic action won’t make statehood happen – https://theconversation.com/uk-and-other-western-states-recognize-palestinian-state-ahead-of-un-meetings-but-symbolic-action-wont-make-statehood-happen-265534

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Maha Nassar, Associate Professor in the School of Middle Eastern and North African Studies, University of Arizona

Recognition of a Palestinian state is likely to dominate proceedings at the U.N. beginning Sept 23, 2025, when world leaders will gather for the annual general assembly.

Of the 193 existing U.N member states, some 150 now recognize a Palestinian state. Ahead of the U.N. gathering in New York, Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom become the latest. And that number is expected to increase in the coming days, with several more countries expected to officially announce similar recognition.

That a host of Western nations are adding their names to the near-universal list of Global South countries that already recognize a Palestinian state is a major diplomatic win for the cause of an independent, sovereign and self-governed nation for Palestinians. Conversely, it is a massive diplomatic loss for Israel – especially coming just two years after the West stood shoulder to shoulder with Israel following the Oct. 7 attack by Palestinian militant group Hamas.

As a scholar of modern Palestinian history, I know that this diplomatic moment is decades in the making. But I am also aware that symbolic diplomatic breakthroughs on the issue of Palestinian statehood have occurred before, only to prove meaningless in the face of events that make statehood less likely.

The non-state reality

The fight for Palestinian statehood can be traced back to at least 1967. Over the course of a six-day war against a coalition of Arab states, Israel conquered and expanded its military control over the remainder of what was historic Palestine – a stretch of land that extends from the Jordan River in the east to the Mediterranean Sea in the west.

At the war’s conclusion, Israel had taken control of the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip.

Unlike after the 1948 war that led to its independence, Israel opted not to extend Israeli citizenship to Palestinians living in the newly conquered areas. Instead, the Israeli government began to rule over Palestinians in these occupied territories through a series of military orders.

These orders controlled nearly every aspect of Palestinian life – and many remain in effect today. For example, if a Palestinian farmer wants to harvest his olive trees near a Jewish settlement in the West Bank, they need a permit. Or
if a Gazan worker wants to work inside Israel, they need Israeli permission. Even praying in a mosque or church in East Jerusalem is dependent on obtaining a permit.

This permit system served as a constant reminder to Palestinians living in the occupied territories that they lacked control over their own daily lives. Meanwhile, Israeli authorities tried to squash the idea of Palestinian nationhood through policies such as outlawing public displays of the Palestinian flag. That, and other expressions of Palestinian national identity in the occupied territories, could result in up to 10 years in prison.

Such policies fit a belief, expressed in 1969 by then Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir, that there was “no such thing in this area as Palestinians.”

The rise of Palestinian nationalism

Around the same time that Meir made that comment, Palestinians started organizing around the idea of statehood.

Although the idea had been floated before, statehood was codified into official doctrine in a resolution in February 1969 in Egypt. It occurred during a session of the Palestine National Council, the legislative body of the Palestine Liberation Organization, which formed in 1964 as the official representative of Palestinians in the occupied territories.

That resolution called for a free, secular democratic state in Palestine – including all of the State of Israel – in which Muslims, Christians and Jews would all have equal rights.

From that moment on, the Palestinian struggle against Israeli occupation took twin paths: diplomatic pressure and armed resistance.

But events on the ground undermined the idea of a single state for all along the lines envisioned by the Cairo resolution.

The 1973 Arab-Israeli War’s inconclusive ending opened the door to greater diplomacy between Israel and the Arab states. Egypt and Israel decided that diplomacy would help them achieve their aims, culminating in the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty of 1979. But the treaty also left the Palestinians without unified Arab support.

Meanwhile, throughout the 1970s, the Israeli occupation deepened and entrenched with the building of Israeli settlements, especially in the West Bank.

The PLO responded in 1974 by issuing what became known as the 10-Point Plan, where they pivoted to seeking the establishment of a national authority in any part of historic Palestine that could be liberated.

It was, in effect, a way of threading the needle: It signaled to moderates that the PLO was adopting a more gradualist position, while also telling the group’s rejectionist front – which opposed peace negotiations with Israel – that they were not giving up completely on the idea of liberating all of Palestine.

Then in 1988 – a year into the first Palestinian intifada, or uprising – the PLO unilaterally declared Palestinian independence on the territories occupied in 1967.

The move was largely symbolic – the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem were still under occupation, and the PLO was then in exile in Tunisia.

But it was nonetheless significant. It represented the bringing together of Palestinians in exile – most of whom were from towns and villages that were now part of the State of Israel – with Palestinians in the occupied territories.

The declaration itself was written by Palestinian poet Mahmoud Darwish, who grew up inside Israel, and declared by Yasser Arafat, the PLO leader in exile.

It was also a moment of tremendous hope and possibility for Palestinians. What most Palestinians wanted was for the international community to recognize them as a national body, deserving of a seat at the table with other nation-states.

Compromise and rejection

Yet at the same time, many Palestinians saw the declaration as a huge compromise. The West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem comprise about 22% of historic Palestine. So the declaration effectively meant that Palestinians were giving up on the other 78% of what they saw as their land.

Reaction from the international community to the PLO’s declaration was split. Many formerly colonized countries of the Global South recognized Palestinian independence right away. By the end of the year, some 78 countries had issued statements recognizing Palestine as a state.

Israel rejected it outright, as did United States and most Western nations.

Such was Washington’s opposition that the U.S. denied Arafat a visa ahead of his planned address to the United Nations at its New York City headquarters. As a result, the December 1988 meeting had to be moved to Geneva.

While refusing to accept Palestinian statehood, the U.S. and Israel did begin to recognize the PLO as a representative body of the Palestinian people. This was part of the Oslo Accords – a diplomatic process that many believed would outline a road map for an eventual two-state solution.

While some Palestinians saw the Oslo Accords as a diplomatic breakthrough, others were more skeptical. Prominent Palestinians, including Darwish and Palestinian-American professor Edward Said, believed that Oslo was a poison pill: While framed as a step toward a two-state solution, the agreement said nothing about a Palestinian state in the interim. It only said that Israel would recognize the PLO as a representative of the Palestinian people.

In reality, the Oslo Accords have not lead to statehood. Rather, they created a system of fragmented autonomy under the newly created Palestinian Authority that, though meant to be interim, has in effect become permanent.

The Palestinian Authority was allowed only limited powers and deprived of real independence. While it had some say over schooling, health care and municipal services, Israel maintained control of Palestinian land, resources, borders and the economy. That remains true today.

Renewed push for statehood recognition

Disillusionment over the Oslo Accords contributed to the second, far more violent, intifada from 2000 to 2005.

Mahmoud Abbas, the leader of the Palestinian Authority after Arafat, responded by pushing again for international recognition for statehood.

And in 2012, the U.N. General Assembly voted to upgrade Palestine’s status, elevating it from a “nonmember observer” to a “nonmember observer state.”

In theory, this meant Palestinians now had access to international bodies, like the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice.

But any meaningful change in the status of Palestinian sovereignty would need to come through the U.N. Security Council, not the U.N. General Assembly.

The U.S. remains opposed to Palestinians gaining statehood independent of the Oslo process. So long as the U.S. has a veto on the Security Council, achieving a truly sovereign Palestinian state will likewise be off the table. And that remains the case, regardless of what individual members – even fellow Security Council members like France and the U.K – do.

In fact, many Palestinians and other critics of the status quo say Western nations are using the issue of Palestinian statehood to absolve them from the far more challenging diplomatic task of holding Israel accountable for what a U.N. body just described as a genocide in Gaza.

This article is based on a conversation between Maha Nassar and Gemma Ware for The Conversation Weekly podcast.

Maha Nassar does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. UK and other Western states recognize Palestinian state ahead of U.N. meeting – but symbolic action alone won’t make statehood happen – https://theconversation.com/uk-and-other-western-states-recognize-palestinian-state-ahead-of-u-n-meeting-but-symbolic-action-alone-wont-make-statehood-happen-265534

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Maha Nassar, Associate Professor in the School of Middle Eastern and North African Studies, University of Arizona

Recognition of a Palestinian state is likely to dominate proceedings at the U.N. beginning Sept 23. 2005, when world leaders will gather for the annual general assembly.

Of the 193 existing U.N member states, some 147 already recognize a Palestinian state. But that number is expected to swell in the coming days, with several more countries expected to officially announce such recognition. They include Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Portugal and the U.K. – although Britain says it won’t support statehood if Israel takes steps to alleviate the plight of Palestinians in Gaza.

That a host of Western nations are adding their names to the near-universal list of Global South countries that already recognize a Palestinian state is a major diplomatic win for the cause of an independent, sovereign and self-governed nation for Palestinians. Conversely, it is a massive diplomatic loss for Israel – especially coming just two years after the West stood shoulder to shoulder with Israel following the Oct. 7 attack by Palestinian militant group Hamas.

As a scholar of modern Palestinian history, I know that this diplomatic moment is decades in the making. But I am also aware that symbolic diplomatic breakthroughs on the issue of Palestinian statehood have occurred before, only to prove meaningless in the face of events that make statehood less likely.

The non-state reality

The fight for Palestinian statehood can be traced back to at least 1967. Over the course of a six-day war against a coalition of Arab states, Israel conquered and expanded its military control over the remainder of what was historic Palestine – a stretch of land that extends from the Jordan River in the east to the Mediterranean Sea in the west.

At the war’s conclusion, Israel had taken control of the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip.

Unlike after the 1948 war that led to its independence, Israel opted not to extend Israeli citizenship to Palestinians living in the newly conquered areas. Instead, the Israeli government began to rule over Palestinians in these occupied territories through a series of military orders.

These orders controlled nearly every aspect of Palestinian life – and many remain in effect today. For example, if a Palestinian farmer wants to harvest his olive trees near a Jewish settlement in the West Bank, they need a permit. Or
if a Gazan worker wants to work inside Israel, they need Israeli permission. Even praying in a mosque or church in East Jerusalem is dependent on obtaining a permit.

This permit system served as a constant reminder to Palestinians living in the occupied territories that they lacked control over their own daily lives. Meanwhile, Israeli authorities tried to squash the idea of Palestinian nationhood through policies such as outlawing public displays of the Palestinian flag. That, and other expressions of Palestinian national identity in the occupied territories, could result in up to 10 years in prison.

Such policies fit a belief, expressed in 1969 by then Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir, that there was “no such thing in this area as Palestinians.”

The rise of Palestinian nationalism

Around the same time that Meir made that comment, Palestinians started organizing around the idea of statehood.

Although the idea had been floated before, statehood was codified into official doctrine in a resolution in February 1969 in Egypt. It occurred during a session of the Palestine National Council, the legislative body of the Palestine Liberation Organization, which formed in 1964 as the official representative of Palestinians in the occupied territories.

That resolution called for a free, secular democratic state in Palestine – including all of the State of Israel – in which Muslims, Christians and Jews would all have equal rights.

From that moment on, the Palestinian struggle against Israeli occupation took twin paths: diplomatic pressure and armed resistance.

But events on the ground undermined the idea of a single state for all along the lines envisioned by the Cairo resolution.

The 1973 Arab-Israeli War’s inconclusive ending opened the door to greater diplomacy between Israel and the Arab states. Egypt and Israel decided that diplomacy would help them achieve their aims, culminating in the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty of 1979. But the treaty also left the Palestinians without unified Arab support.

Meanwhile, throughout the 1970s, the Israeli occupation deepened and entrenched with the building of Israeli settlements, especially in the West Bank.

The PLO responded in 1974 by issuing what became known as the 10-Point Plan, where they pivoted to seeking the establishment of a national authority in any part of historic Palestine that could be liberated.

It was, in effect, a way of threading the needle: It signaled to moderates that the PLO was adopting a more gradualist position, while also telling the group’s rejectionist front – which opposed peace negotiations with Israel – that they were not giving up completely on the idea of liberating all of Palestine.

Then in 1988 – a year into the first Palestinian intifada, or uprising – the PLO unilaterally declared Palestinian independence on the territories occupied in 1967.

The move was largely symbolic – the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem were still under occupation, and the PLO was then in exile in Tunisia.

But it was nonetheless significant. It represented the bringing together of Palestinians in exile – most of whom were from towns and villages that were now part of the State of Israel – with Palestinians in the occupied territories.

The declaration itself was written by Palestinian poet Mahmoud Darwish, who grew up inside Israel, and declared by Yasser Arafat, the PLO leader in exile.

It was also a moment of tremendous hope and possibility for Palestinians. What most Palestinians wanted was for the international community to recognize them as a national body, deserving of a seat at the table with other nation-states.

Compromise and rejection

Yet at the same time, many Palestinians saw the declaration as a huge compromise. The West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem comprise about 22% of historic Palestine. So the declaration effectively meant that Palestinians were giving up on the other 78% of what they saw as their land.

Reaction from the international community to the PLO’s declaration was split. Many formerly colonized countries of the Global South recognized Palestinian independence right away. By the end of the year, some 78 countries had issued statements recognizing Palestine as a state.

Israel rejected it outright, as did United States and most Western nations.

Such was Washington’s opposition that the U.S. denied Arafat a visa ahead of his planned address to the United Nations at its New York City headquarters. As a result, the December 1988 meeting had to be moved to Geneva.

While refusing to accept Palestinian statehood, the U.S. and Israel did begin to recognize the PLO as a representative body of the Palestinian people. This was part of the Oslo Accords – a diplomatic process that many believed would outline a road map for an eventual two-state solution.

While some Palestinians saw the Oslo Accords as a diplomatic breakthrough, others were more skeptical. Prominent Palestinians, including Darwish and Palestinian-American professor Edward Said, believed that Oslo was a poison pill: While framed as a step toward a two-state solution, the agreement said nothing about a Palestinian state in the interim. It only said that Israel would recognize the PLO as a representative of the Palestinian people.

In reality, the Oslo Accords have not lead to statehood. Rather, they created a system of fragmented autonomy under the newly created Palestinian Authority that, though meant to be interim, has in effect become permanent.

The Palestinian Authority was allowed only limited powers and deprived of real independence. While it had some say over schooling, health care and municipal services, Israel maintained control of Palestinian land, resources, borders and the economy. That remains true today.

Renewed push for statehood recognition

Disillusionment over the Oslo Accords contributed to the second, far more violent, intifada from 2000 to 2005.

Mahmoud Abbas, the leader of the Palestinian Authority after Arafat, responded by pushing again for international recognition for statehood.

And in 2012, the U.N. General Assembly voted to upgrade Palestine’s status, elevating it from a “nonmember observer” to a “nonmember observer state.”

In theory, this meant Palestinians now had access to international bodies, like the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice.

But any meaningful change in the status of Palestinian sovereignty would need to come through the U.N. Security Council, not the U.N. General Assembly.

The U.S. remains opposed to Palestinians gaining statehood independent of the Oslo process. So long as the U.S. has a veto on the Security Council, achieving a truly sovereign Palestinian state will likewise be off the table. And that remains the case, regardless of what individual members – even fellow Security Council members like France and the U.K – do.

In fact, many Palestinians and other critics of the status quo say Western nations are using the issue of Palestinian statehood to absolve them from the far more challenging diplomatic task of holding Israel accountable for what a U.N. body just described as a genocide in Gaza.

This article is based on a conversation between Maha Nassar and Gemma Ware for The Conversation Weekly podcast.

Maha Nassar does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Palestinian statehood is winning major new supporters at UN – but symbolic action won’t make it happen – https://theconversation.com/palestinian-statehood-is-winning-major-new-supporters-at-un-but-symbolic-action-wont-make-it-happen-265534