Category: The Conversation – Global Perspectives

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Asher Kaufman, Professor of History and Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame

The latest U.S.-sponsored peace plan for the Middle East was unveiled at the White House on Sept. 29, 2025, and immediately accepted by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

The proposal, which U.S. President Donald Trump said marked a “historic” moment that was “very close” to ending the two-year-old war in Gaza, will now go to Hamas. The Palestinian group said it was reviewing the document, having had it delivered by Egyptian and Qatari mediators.

Should it be accepted, hostilities would end “immediately,” according to the plan. But given that all previous U.S.-backed attempts have to date failed, there is reason for skepticism. The Conversation turned to Asher Kaufman, an expert on the modern Middle East and professor of peace studies at the University of Notre Dame, to explain what is different about this plan – and how it might fare.

What are the main points of the new plan?

The plan outlined by Trump in the presence of Netanyahu consists of 20 points.

If accepted by Israel and Hamas, it would see the full withdrawal of Israel Defense Forces from the Gaza Strip in three stages.

The first stage would be dependent on the release of the remaining 48 hostages taken during the Oct. 7, 2023, attack in Israel by Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, 20 of whom are believed to be alive. At the same time, Israel would release 250 Palestinians serving life in prison, as well as 1,700 Gazans arrested after Oct. 7.

This stage would also see humanitarian aid flow immediately to the desperate population in Gaza.

Stage two would see Gaza governed by a temporary transitional body consisting of a technocratic, apolitical committee composed of Palestinians and international members.

The committee would be overseen by a “board of peace” headed by Trump and other heads of state, including former U.K Prime Minister Tony Blair. This board would also oversee the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip and its economic development.

Hamas’ members would be given amnesty if they laid down their arms, but would also have to agree – along with other members of militant Palestinian factions – to not have any role in the governance of Gaza.

A new military body to be called the International Stabilization Force would be established and deployed in the Gaza Strip. The plan calls for it to be composed of Arab and international partners.

Only then would the Israeli military withdraw completely from Gaza, at which point the post-war Gaza plan would turn to economic redevelopment.

How does this differ from past US-backed plans?

The portions of the plan that include Israeli withdrawal, the release of hostages in exchange for Palestinian prisoners, and the provision of mass humanitarian aid to Gaza are similar to past agreements, including the last one that collapsed after Israel violated its terms in March 2025.

But there are new parts. These include the creation of the board of peace and the International Stabilization Force.

The former gives concrete structure to Trump’s older ideas to develop the Gaza Strip as a real estate venture; the latter provides a framework for an international military force that would police the strip for the foreseeable future.

The plan also mentions a long-term horizon for self-determination and the establishment of a Palestinian state – a point not raised in previous proposals, which mainly focused on ending the war in Gaza but neglected to include a longer-term pathway to statehood.

What would post-Gaza look like under this plan?

Trump sees the Gaza Strip as a real estate development opportunity – he has said as much in the past, and again talked on Sept. 29 of the opportunities of the coastline of Gaza.

As such, his “vision of peace” is designed mainly through an economic-development lens.

The plan envisions a reconstructed strip supported principally by regional players that could stabilize the region and provide in the short term humanitarian relief and in the long term economic opportunities to Gazans.

The Trump administration and Israel hope to have not only a Hamas-free Gaza but a depoliticized Gazan population in its entirety.

With no role for Hamas, who will represent Palestinians in Gaza?

It is not clear from the plan who will represent Palestinians. But reading between the lines, one can see the possibility of a revamped version of the Palestinian Authority, the body that nominally governs parts of the West Bank, that could take the role of “Palestinian technocrats.” Point nine of the plan suggests that the Palestinian Authority could have a role in the future of Gaza after the Palestinian Authority “has completed its reform program,” but it does not say what this reform program entails.

The plan also suggests that Palestinian police forces would be trained and supervised by the International Stabilization Force and stationed in the Gaza Strip. That also hints to the possibility that the Palestinian Authority’s police – which has long been accused by Palestinians of working in concert with the Israelis to provide security in the West Bank – could take up this role.

Netanyahu has long resisted considering the Palestinian Authority as a viable body to govern Gaza in the “day after” the war.

So if this plan goes into effect, the question of who makes up the Palestinian technocratic administration might certainly be one of the main stumbling blocks.

What are the chances of the plan being accepted?

There are two main barriers.

In Israel, Netanyahu will need to get the approval of the far-right members of his government, who in the past have resisted anything short of a continuation of the war and the final takeover of the Gaza Strip by Israel. Netanyahu knows that his political future is dependent on keeping far-right members of his coalition on board – and that dynamic has undone past pushes for the end of the war.

For Hamas, if this agreement is realized, it would mean the end of its military and political presence in the Gaza Strip.

As such, the political and militant body – which has governed the territory since June 2007 – will need to be in a desperate situation to accept the terms. Or perhaps, Hamas may finally be attuned to the desperate plight of Gazans and respond to it.

The plan, as worded, gives them little to hold on to as an achievement after Hamas sparked two years of war on Oct. 7, 2023, with unbearable sacrifices for Palestinians.

It is not far-fetched to think that Netanyahu is supporting Trump’s plan knowing that chances of its realization are very slim. In the last two years, Netanyahu has demonstrated that he is mainly motivated by his own political survival and he will not take any step that would jeopardize it.

By accepting the plan, he demonstrates his alliance with the American president. It could also win Netanyahu valuable political capital in Israel: allowing him to present himself as willing to end the war, but safe in the knowledge that it will likely be rejected by Hamas.

Given the fact that the plan has no concrete timeline, particularly in relation to Israel’s staged withdrawal, it also buys him valuable political time. It could allow Netanyahu to place himself in a better position domestically, with national elections scheduled for October 2026. If Netanyahu sees that public opinion shifts in his favor he could even move forward with early elections, as he often did in the past, to capitalize on the moment.

Asher Kaufman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Trump’s Gaza peace plan: A bit of the old, a bit of the new – and the same stumbling blocks – https://theconversation.com/trumps-gaza-peace-plan-a-bit-of-the-old-a-bit-of-the-new-and-the-same-stumbling-blocks-266341

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Martin Jucker, Senior Lecturer in Atmospheric Science, Climate Change Research Centre, UNSW Sydney

Right now, cold air high above Antarctica is up to 35ºC warmer than normal. Normally, strong winds and the lack of sun would keep the temperature at around –55°C. But it’s risen sharply to around –20°C.

The sudden heating began in early September and is still taking place. Three separate pulses of heat have each pushed temperatures up by 25ºC or more. Temperatures spiked and fell back and spiked again.

It looks as if an unusual event known as sudden stratospheric warming is taking place – the unexpected warming of the stratosphere, 12 to 40 kilometres above ground.

In the middle of an Antarctic winter, this atmospheric layer is normally exceptionally cold, averaging around –80°C. By the end of September it would be roughly –50ºC. This month, atmospheric waves carrying heat from the surface have pushed up into this layer.

In the Northern Hemisphere, these events are very common, occurring once every two years. But in the south, sudden large-scale warming was long thought to be extremely rare. My research has shown they are more common than expected, if we group the very strong 2002 event with slightly weaker events such as in 2019 and 2024.

Sudden warming may sound ominous. But weather is messy. Many factors play into what happens down where we live.

A drier, warmer spring and summer for southeastern Australia usually follow these warming events. But at present, forecasters are predicting warmer than usual temperatures across Australia alongside a wetter spring in the east.

What’s happening in the skies over Antarctica?

High above both the Arctic and Antarctic is a large area of rotating winds called the stratospheric polar vortex. By definition, sudden stratospheric warming events affect these two systems.

Over Antarctica, these events are usually detected about 30 kilometres above the Southern Ocean, just to the north of Antarctica’s coastline.

The Antarctic winter runs from March to October. During this period, the continent and the atmosphere above it are dark and very cold, as the sun doesn’t rise until September.

The polar vortex traps intensely cold air and keeps it isolated from the warmer air at lower latitudes. But every now and then, this can change.

Just like the ocean, the atmosphere has waves. What’s happening at present is that large-scale atmospheric waves have spread from the surface up into the stratosphere above Antarctica, bringing heat energy with them. As these waves interact with the strong winds of the vortex, they transfer this heat.

This is only possible during the Antarctic winter, as the polar winds are only strong during these months.

While these events are called “sudden”, it’s not sudden in the sense we would commonly use. The warming takes place over days or weeks. But they are sudden in the sense they’re often unexpected, as they are difficult to predict.

What does this mean for us?

What happens in Antarctica doesn’t stay in Antarctica. When a sudden warming event arrives, it can have flow-on effects for the weather.

We would usually expect southeastern Australia to be drier and warmer after sudden stratospheric warming above Antarctica.

In 2019, sudden warming over Antarctica led to drier conditions in Australia. Research has shown this influenced the megafires over the Black Summer of 2019–2020. These events can create prime conditions for bushfires.

The opposite is also true: If the polar stratosphere is even colder than usual, we expect wetter and cooler conditions over southeastern Australia.

For instance, over the 2023-24 spring and summer, forecasters predicted a dry spell driven by an El Niño event in the Pacific. But this didn’t happen. Instead, the very cold polar stratosphere produced a rather cool and wet summer.

There’s another effect, too. When the stratosphere is warmer, less ozone is destroyed in the ozone layer and more ozone is carried from the equator towards the poles.

That’s good for humans, as it means more dangerous ultraviolet rays are blocked from reaching the ground. But changing ozone levels can also contribute to the arrival of unexpected weather systems caused by a warmer stratosphere.

How often does this happen?

Media coverage has suggested these events are rare. But that isn’t entirely correct.

These events were first discovered in the Northern Hemisphere, where they happen roughly every second year.

But the northern polar stratosphere is warmer and has weaker winds. This means it’s easier for atmospheric waves to disturb the vortex. In the Northern Hemisphere, sudden stratospheric warming is defined as a complete disappearance of the polar vortex.

When the same definition is used for the Southern Hemisphere, only the 2002 event would meet the criteria in our entire observational record. That’s because the intense stratospheric winds of up to 300kmh over Antarctica are extremely difficult for atmospheric waves to penetrate.

Using this narrow definition, these events in Antarctica are estimated to happen about once every 60 years – and are expected to become even rarer.

But if we define these southern events more broadly as a weakening of the polar vortex producing sudden warming, the frequency is more common. Using this definition, we estimated the frequency of events like the 2019 event to be once every 22 years.

At present, I am leading international work to find better ways of detecting these events in the Southern Hemisphere.

What will this event lead to?

Forecasting chaotic systems such as the weather is a hard job. The sudden warming of the stratosphere over Antarctica will have some influence over spring and summer weather in Australia and New Zealand. But the stratosphere is just one factor among many in shaping the weather as we experience it.

At present, the Australian Bureau of Meteorology is forecasting a warmer spring, and wetter in the southeast. This is because the sudden warming event is happening at the same time as ocean temperatures remain very warm, and hotter oceans lead to more evaporation and thus more rain.

But this could still change. Not all sudden stratospheric warming events end up influencing the weather near the surface. It’s worth keeping an eye on the seasonal forecasts this summer.

Martin Jucker receives funding from the NSW Bushfire and Natural Hazards Research Centre.

– ref. Air temperatures over Antarctica have soared 35ºC above average. What does this unusual event mean for Australia? – https://theconversation.com/air-temperatures-over-antarctica-have-soared-35-c-above-average-what-does-this-unusual-event-mean-for-australia-265079

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Brenton Griffin, Academic Status in the College of Humanities, Arts, and Social Sciences, Flinders University

Russell Marion Nelson Sr, prophet and leader of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, has died aged 101.

Nelson was married to Dantzel White from 1945 until her passing in 2005. As of his 100th birthday, he had ten children, 57 grandchildren, and more than 167 great-grandchildren.

Following Dantzel’s passing, Nelson married Wendy Watson in 2009. Wendy has survived her husband.

Early life and medicine

Nelson was born in Salt Lake City, Utah on September 9 1924, into a faithful family of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.

He received his medical degree from the University of Utah in 1947. He served in the United States Army Medical Corps during the Korean War, before completing a PhD at the University of Minnesota in 1954. In 1955, he became a faculty member at the University of Utah School of Medicine.

Nelson was attached to various medical societies throughout his successful career, including as President of the Society for Vascular Surgery in 1975. He also had a score of ecclesiastical positions within the Church, which ran parallel to his career.

In 1984, aged 59, he was called to be an apostle, after which he was involved with the church’s ministry full time. In Mormon cosmology, apostles are seen as being in direct communication with God, and are to guide the church until the second coming of Jesus Christ, as laid out in the Latter-day Saint scripture.

Nelson helped broaden the church’s global reach, supervising its expansion across Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe following the collapse of the Soviet Union.

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Read more:
Why the Mormon church is on an expansion project, with 2 secretive new temples planned for Australia

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In 2018, he was ordained as the prophet, seer and revelator of the church following the death of Thomas S. Monson. For Latter-day Saints, the prophet is the senior apostle who holds the “keys of the Kingdom of God on earth”. The prophet is the authority to bring salvation to those willing to accept the church’s doctrines and rituals.

Nelson remained in this position until his death.

A difficult legacy

Members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints will remember Nelson for his role in expanding the church globally, as he was responsible for the construction of various temples. These sacred sites are used exclusively by select, faithful Latter-day Saints – so more temples in more places means easier access for these church members.

Nelson repealed a series of controversial church doctrines. In 2019, he overturned a ban that prevented the children of LGBTQIA+ parents from getting a baptism, and the labelling of LGBTQIA+ Latter-day Saints as apostates.

It was also under Nelson the church released its so-called “Restoration Proclomation”, the sixth proclamation released in the church’s history.

Nelson read the proclamation at the church’s 2020 biannual conference, which coincided with the bicentennial anniversary of Mormonism founder Joseph Smith’s
First Vision, in which Smith claimed to have seen God and Jesus Christ as physical manifestations.

The Restoration Proclamation affirmed the importance of Smith in the “restoration” of the gospel, and promised the church “goes forward through continuing revelation”. It also invited “all to know” of the church’s “divinity and of its purpose to prepare the world for the promised second coming [of Christ]”.

At the same time, several controversies engulfed the church during Nelson’s leadership. These included accusations of the misuse of church finances, representations of historical church-sanctioned violence in popular culture, the naming of the church and church members in various government and media reports on alleged child sexual abuse, and criticism of the church’s aggressive real estate expansion (which included buying agricultural holdings throughout the US and Australia).

Topping all of this off is an increasingly loud ex-Mormon community.

Succession and schism in the church

Ever since the church was established in 1830, there has been a tension between its centralised ecclesiastical nature, and its more charismatic, individualistic undertones.

Mormonism emerged out of an anti-establishment fervour in early 19th-century America. This was also reflected in other restorationist movements such as Jehovah’s Witnesses and Christadelphians.

Part of the religion’s foundational ethos was that individuals can and must have personal relationships with God, and that religious authorities can be corrupted – even those connected to the church. This democratisation of spirituality, which was crucial for the church’s initial successes, has since led to numerous schisms among believers.

The largest of these came after the death of founder Joseph Smith in 1844. Thousands of Latter-day Saints claimed the prophethood should remain within the Smith family, and formed the Reorganised Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. They have since renamed themselves as the Community of Christ and are still active today.

Further splinters emerged in the late 19th and early 20th century, when scores of “fundamentalist” branches fractured from the church following the 1890 decision to end polygamy.

Warren Jeffs is the leader of the largest of these polygamous sects, called the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. Jeffs was found guilty of child sexual abuse in 2011 and is incarcerated for life.

Who will be the next prophet be?

Unlike other Christian religions, there is no discussion or casting of votes when it comes to choosing the next prophet of the church. The title will automatically go to the most “senior apostle”, who in this case is Dallin H. Oaks.

Before being called to apostleship, Oaks was a lawyer, legal educator, Utah Supreme Court Justice, and president of the church-owned Brigham Young University. He is 93 years old, and has been an apostle since 1984.

Oaks will be set apart as prophet by the Quorum of the Twelve Apostles, and sustained by the church’s membership at the next biannual General Conference.

Brenton Griffin was raised as a member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, but is no longer a practising member of the church. His current research is focused on the religion’s place in Australian and New Zealand popular culture, politics, and society from the nineteenth century to present.

– ref. Mormon leader Russell Nelson has died aged 101. What’s next for the church? – https://theconversation.com/mormon-leader-russell-nelson-has-died-aged-101-whats-next-for-the-church-263276

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Bryce Vissel, Cojoint Professor, School of Clinical Medicine, UNSW Sydney

Imagine knowing in your 20s or 30s that you carry a gene which will cause your mind and body to slowly unravel. Huntington’s disease is inherited, relentless and fatal, and there is no cure. Families live with the certainty of decline stretching across generations.

Now, a new treatment is being widely reported as a breakthrough.

Last week, gene therapy company uniQure announced that a one-time brain infusion appeared to slow the disease in a small clinical study.

If confirmed, this would not only be a landmark for Huntington’s disease but potentially the first time a gene therapy has shown promise in any adult-onset neurodegenerative disorder.

But the results, which were announced in a press release, are early, unreviewed and based on external comparisons. So, while these findings offer families hope after decades of failure, we need to remain cautious.

What is Huntington’s disease?

Huntington’s is a rare but devastating disease, affecting around five to ten people in 100,000 in Western countries. That means thousands in Australia and hundreds of thousands worldwide.

Symptoms usually start in mid-life. They include involuntary movements, depression, irritability and progressive decline in thinking and memory. People lose the ability to work, manage money, live independently and eventually care for themselves. Most die ten to 20 years after onset.

The disease is caused by an expanded stretch of certain DNA repeats (CAG) in the huntingtin gene. The number of repeats strongly influences when symptoms begin, with longer expansions usually linked to earlier onset.

Looking for a treatment

The gene that causes Huntington’s disease was identified in 1993, 32 years ago. Soon afterwards, mouse studies showed that switching off the mutant huntingtin protein even after symptoms had begun could reverse signs and improve behaviour.

This suggested lowering the toxic protein might slow or even partly reverse the disease. Yet for three decades, every attempt to develop a therapy for people has failed to show convincing clinical benefit. Trials of huntingtin-lowering drugs and other approaches did not slow progression.

What is the new treatment?

The one-time gene therapy, called AMT-130, involves brain surgery guided by MRI. Surgeons infuse an engineered virus directly into the caudate and putamen brain regions, which are heavily affected in Huntington’s.

The virus carries a short genetic “microRNA” designed to reduce production of the affected huntingtin protein.

By delivering it straight into the brain, the treatment bypasses the blood–brain barrier. This natural wall usually prevents medicines from entering the central nervous system. That barrier helps explain why so many brain-targeted drugs have failed.

What did they find?

Some 29 patients received treatment, with 12 in each group (one low-dose, and one high-dose) followed for three years. According to uniQure, those given the higher dose declined much slower than expected.

The study compared how much participants’ movement, thinking and daily function declined, compared to a matched external group from a global Huntington’s registry (meaning they weren’t part of the study). The company claimed those given the higher dose had a 75% slowing in their decline.

On a functional scale focused on independence, the company reported a 60% slowing in decline for the higher dose group.

Other tests of movement and thinking also favoured treatment. Nerve-cell damage in spinal fluid was lower for study participants than would be expected for untreated patients.

Why should we be cautious?

These findings are an early snapshot of results reported by the company, not yet peer-reviewed. The study compared treated patients to an external matched control group, not people randomised to placebo at the same time. This design can introduce bias. The numbers are also small – only 12 patients at the three-year mark – so we can’t draw solid conclusions.

The company reports the therapy was generally well tolerated, with no new serious adverse events related to the drug since late 2022. Most problems were related to the neurosurgical infusion itself, and resolved. But in a disease that already causes such severe symptoms, it is often hard to know what counts as a side effect.

The company uniQure has said it plans to seek regulatory approval in 2026 on the basis of this dataset.

Regulators will face difficult decisions: whether to allow access sooner before all the questions and uncertainties are addressed – based on the needs of a community with no effective options – and wait for further data while people are being treated, or to insist on larger trials that confirm results before approval.

What does it mean?

If upheld, these results represent the first convincing signs that a gene-targeted therapy can slow Huntington’s disease. They may also be the first evidence of benefit from a gene therapy in any adult-onset neurodegenerative disorder. That would be a milestone after decades of failure.

But these results do not prove success. Only larger, longer and fully peer-reviewed studies will show whether this treatment truly changes lives. Even if approved, a complex neurosurgical gene therapy may not be easily accessible to all patients.

The company has said the drug’s price would be similar to other gene therapies – which can cost over A$3 million per patient – and will have the added cost of brain surgery.

The takeaway

For families who carry this gene, the hope is profound. But caution is just as important.

We may be witnessing the first credible step toward slowing an inherited adult-onset neurodegenerative disease, or just an early signal that may not hold up.

Ultimately, only time and rigorous science will show whether this treatment delivers the benefits so urgently needed.

Bryce Vissel does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. A new treatment for Huntington’s disease is genuinely promising – but here’s why we still need caution – https://theconversation.com/a-new-treatment-for-huntingtons-disease-is-genuinely-promising-but-heres-why-we-still-need-caution-266062

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Martin Kear, Sessional Lecturer, Department of Government and International Relations, University of Sydney

When Australia, France, Britain, Canada and a handful of other Western countries recognised a Palestinian state at the United Nations last week, one of their key stipulations was the wholesale reform of the Palestinian Authority (PA).

After decades of accusations of corruption and misrule, however, this will not be easy.

What is the Palestinian Authority?

The PA was established under the Oslo Accords, negotiated between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and signed with much fanfare in 1993.

Western governments touted the accords as the path to peace in the Middle East through a two-state solution. This would see a Palestinian state consisting of the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem alongside the existing Israeli state.

Under the accords, Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza would be gradually given increased political autonomy under a newly established Palestinian Authority. The PA was tasked with administering these territories, with the power to raise taxes and hold elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council and presidency.

Crucially, Israel refused to allow the PA to exercise administrative responsibility over Palestinians in East Jerusalem. This was meant to occur after a five-year period when the so-called “final status” issues of Jerusalem, Israeli settlements, borders, refugees and security arrangements were to be negotiated.

Since its inception in 1994, the PA has been controlled exclusively by Fatah, the largest Palestinian political faction. Fatah’s chairman, Mahmoud Abbas, has led the PA as president since 2005, even though he was only elected to a four-year term. Fatah has only had control over the West Bank since 2007, after Hamas won elections and took power in Gaza.

Over the past 30 years, Fatah has integrated itself so extensively into the fabric of Palestinian life that some Middle East experts argue it could not survive as a political entity without the power it wields through the PA.

However, Fatah and Abbas are deeply unpopular among Palestinians, who accuse them of systemic corruption, nepotism, clientelism and bureaucratic malfeasance.

Fatah’s diplomatic efforts have been similarly unpopular due to its inability to effectively counter Israel’s occupation of the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem (known collectively as the Occupied Territories), which stymies any chance of Palestinian statehood.

This has created a legitimacy crisis for Fatah and Abbas. According to renowned Palestinian academic Khaled Hroub’s book about the founding of Hamas, many Palestinians will only consider a leader legitimate if they are willing to resist Israeli occupation and advance the cause of Palestinian statehood.

In a recent poll of Palestinians in both the West Bank and Gaza, for example, just 6% of respondents said they would vote for Abbas in a Palestinian election, compared to 41% who would support Marwan Barghouti, currently serving five life sentences in an Israeli jail. Fifteen percent said they would vote for any Hamas candidate.

Such is Abbas’s unpopularity that 85% of Palestinians surveyed want him to resign. The situation is no better for Fatah, which garnered just 18% support in the poll, compared to 29% for Hamas.

Differing expectations

There are two main reasons for this crisis. Both highlight the myriad intractable problems that Western governments face in pushing for a Palestinian state.

First, Palestinian expectations of the role of the PA are incompatible with the expectations of Israel and the international community.

For Palestinians, the PA is an umbrella institution meant to build the institutional capacity necessary for statehood, provide basic services to Palestinians, and continue resisting Israeli occupation.

For Israelis, the PA is expected to administer Palestinians under its occupation and provide the security to thwart any resistance.

To that end, Fatah received significant international funding when the PA was established to create security agencies to maintain law and order in the Occupied Territories. Later agreements between the PA and Israel centred on ensuring extensive “security cooperation” between the two sides.

Israel also demanded Fatah crush any resistance to its occupation before it would agree to negotiate further on Palestinian statehood. According to researcher Alaa Tartir, when Fatah first tried to reform its security services in 2007, Palestinians viewed this as being less about improving law and order and more about criminalising resistance.

For the international community, the PA is the notional Palestinian “government” and Fatah its preferred negotiating partner in the Middle East peace process purportedly aimed at advancing the two-state solution.

These conflicting expectations have adversely impacted the legitimacy of the PA and Fatah among Palestinians. They are largely seen as ineffective in their primary task of resisting Israeli occupation.

To maintain power in this environment, the PA has become increasingly authoritarian, cracking down on protests. Abbas’ decision in 2021 to postpone elections only further damaged his legitimacy.

Financial pressure

The PA has also been financially reliant on Israel’s continued occupation since its inception.

The Oslo Accords made Israel responsible for collecting taxes from Palestinians and then transferring the revenue to the PA monthly. Israel, however, has long been accused of arbitrarily diverting and withholding this tax revenue.

The PA is also the conduit for international aid to Palestinians. Neither the PA nor Fatah can survive without this aid. This has given the United States – the largest aid donor – significant sway over Palestinian politics, increasing the vulnerability of the PA and Fatah to financial coercion.

For example, in 2018–19, the first Trump administration cut off funding to Fatah’s security agencies and the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), which provides health and education services and infrastructure improvements in the Occupied Territories.

Critics say Trump did this to pressure Fatah to restart negotiations with Israel as part of its Middle East peace plan, despite it being deeply unpopular among Palestinians.

Fatah’s legitimacy and financial problems worsened after Hamas came to power in Gaza. The surprise election result seriously weakened Fatah’s credibility and made it more reliant on Israel and international donors to remain in power.

Can the PA reform itself?

The problem for Fatah is that reforming the PA as per the West’s stipulations means adopting good governance, financial accountability, and free, fair and open elections. This would require Fatah to give up its institutional power. And this, in turn, threatens its viability and identity.

Then there is the issue of Fatah’s leadership. Abbas is nearly 90 years old. With no obvious successor, the PA would likely face significant internal turmoil until a new leader is selected or anointed by Western leaders.

Without a reformed PA free from Fatah’s unilateral control and outside vested interests, any meaningful advancement towards statehood is extremely unlikely.

But after decades of diplomatic intransigence and complicity by Western governments, it’s highly debatable whether genuine reform is even possible.

Martin Kear does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. The Palestinian Authority is facing a legitimacy crisis. Can it be reformed to govern a Palestinian state? – https://theconversation.com/the-palestinian-authority-is-facing-a-legitimacy-crisis-can-it-be-reformed-to-govern-a-palestinian-state-263042

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Keith Brown, Professor of Politics and Global Studies, Arizona State University

In Serbia, there is a word for a form of stubbornness that sees someone act out of spite or defiance rather than yield to the will of others: “inat.”

It’s something Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić is showing remarkable levels of right now.

For almost a year, anti-government protests have roiled the Balkan nation. They intensified over summer 2025, culminating in angry clashes between students and police in August and September.

But Vučić has stood firm in the face of growing calls for his resignation. In fact, as scholars of politics and history in Southeast Europe, we have watched Vučić take Serbia even further down an authoritarian path. In so doing, he is drawing from the well-worn playbook of autocratic leaders past and present – not least his former boss Slobodan Milošević and Vladimir Putin, the Russian leader Vučić openly admires.

Yet, while Vučić can draw on support from Putin and fellow authoritarians overseas, he is losing legitimacy at home. Opposing him is a new generation of civic activists who have won the Serbian public’s backing by reclaiming “inat” as force for positive change.

Unmoved by a movement

The immediate trigger for the ongoing unrest came in November 2024 with the deadly collapse of a train station canopy in Novi Sad, a city in northern Serbia.

Renovated with funding from China’s Belt and Road Initiative, the canopy was one of many projects touted by Vučić’s government as evidence of its success in attracting foreign investment. The accident’s 16 deaths, however, served to sharpen questions about corruption, failures of oversight and government accountability.

Student protests gathered momentum through winter and into spring. One demonstration, on March 15, saw more than 300,000 people turn out in Belgrade. Activists have also employed civil disobedience tactics, like staging pop-up roadblocks in Serbian cities, to maintain pressure on the government.

But Vučić has remained obdurate. On Sept. 1, while large crowds gathered in Belgrade and other Serbian cities, Vučić joined Putin and other leaders critical of Western-style democracy at a large military parade in Beijing.

Then on Sept. 20, Vučić staged his own show of strength, with soldiers and tanks taking part in a military parade in Belgrade as Russian-bought MiG-29 fighter planes flew overhead.

From reform to repression

Vučić’s reaction to the protests and his cozying up to leaders of Russia and China reveal how the Serbian leader’s politics have changed.

He was once perceived as a pro-European reformer. Indeed, Vučić and his Serbian Progressive Party campaigned on a pro-European Union platform in the 2012 election that brought them to power.

First serving as deputy prime minister before becoming prime minister in 2014, Vučić won plaudits for seeking to resolve long-standing tensions over Kosovo’s status as a sovereign country. At that time, it was Vučić who led his country’s negotiations with the EU over a normalization of relations between Serbia and its former province.

Vučić also showed willingness to improve Serbia’s ties with neighboring Bosnia-Herzegovina. Whereas many Serbian citizens still felt primary affinity for the Serb-dominated Republika Srpska, whose armed forces committed genocide at Srebrenica in 1995, Vučić risked domestic censure when, in 2015, he labeled that massacre of Bosniak men and boys by Serbian paramilitaries a “monstrous crime.” Vučić also showed up at Srebrenica to pay his respects to the victims, despite local hostility.

Those diplomatic gestures, along with his success in attracting foreign investment, won Vučić international praise as an effective reformer. Serbian voters, likewise, acknowledged the economic stability and the country’s improved reputation.

Backtracking on record

Those assessments started to change in earnest, however, after Vučić secured election as president in 2017. Critics say that he has leveraged his position to amass power and influence, mimicking methods familiar to those living under authoritarian-leaning governments in Hungary and Russia.

Meanwhile, the U.K.’s Brexit vote in 2016, the election of Donald Trump in 2016 and then the global disruption of the COVID-19 pandemic all changed the dynamics of the international community, reducing outside pressure that had advanced democratic norms.

What followed in Serbia was backsliding on democracy. Serbia’s once-vibrant media now operates as government cheerleader. Independent journalism outlets have faced harassment, censorship and lawsuits as part of a state-sponsored campaign of censorship.

Meanwhile, on the diplomatic front, Vučić changed his tune on Kosovo. He now pledges to protect the interests of the breakaway province’s Serbs and portrays Kosovo’s Albanian leader, Albin Kurti, as the obstacle to any normalization deal.

On Bosnia-Herzegovina, Vučić has also backtracked, expressing support for long-time Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik – who has been barred from office by the country’s constitutional court, but defies that ruling.

To Serbian audiences, Vučiċ accuses the EU of duplicity and anti-Serbian prejudice. Meanwhile, he smears the student-led movement as a Western-led “color revolution” aimed at politically motivated regime change. Critics are “fascists” and “foreign mercenaries.”

Europe gets wise to Vučiċ

In all this, Vučiċ has drawn on Kremlin talking points and an authoritarian playbook to distract attention away from his government’s practices. He and his allies cast the current protests not as a movement built on grassroots mobilization, but as the result of meddling by foreign agents.

In taking this authoritarian turn, Vučić invites critics to see parallels with Milošević, under whom the current president served in the 1990s as minister of information. Milošević, who died while on trial for war crimes, did much to inflame Serbian nationalism in the early 1990s and presided over the bloody wars in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. After Milošević’s ouster in the Bulldozer Revolution of 2000, Vučić spent a decade in opposition before returning to government in 2012.

And while European diplomats were for many years eager to court Vučić, even tolerating hedging tactics that saw Serbia expand ties with Russia and China, that changed amid the president’s response to months of protest.

In March, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen noted on the social platform X that Serbia “needs to deliver on EU reforms, in particular to take decisive steps towards media freedom, the fight against corruption and the electoral reform.”

Marta Kos, European Commissioner for Enlargement, delivered blunter assessment six months later, noting in a European Parliament debate the “wave of violence and continuous use of force against protesters in Serbia.”

Such criticism has seen Vučić turn increasingly to China, Russia and also to the Trump administration, with Donald Trump Jr.’s visit to Serbia in March as emblematic of the warming ties between Washington and Belgrade.

The ‘inat’ of the Serbian people

Vučić has spent over a decade directing a political spectacle in which he presents himself as the one force capable of saving Serbia. And for the better part of the past year, he has attempted to paper over the cracks in his rule through a strategy of imposing increasingly authoritarian measures at home while seeking support from like-minded regimes abroad.

But the fact that this ploy has not extinguished the still ongoing anti-government protests suggests it may be a failing tactic.

And like Milošević in the late 1990s, Vučić seems to have underestimated the force of “inat” of the Serbian people. The Bulldozer Revolution that ousted Milošević was comprised of Serbs from a wide range of backgrounds, all determined to bring down an unpopular autocrat who put his own political survival above the needs of citizens.

They did so through grassroots mobilization and shared recognition that the true obstacle to prosperity was not foreign conspiracy, but Milošević himself. For all his individual stubbornness and spite, Milošević could not match the resilience and determination of Serbia’s citizens.

That same energy appears to be in the streets of Belgrade now, sustained by a new generation of citizens standing firm against the tactic of a different autocratic leader.

Keith Brown receives funding from the Finland Fulbright Foundation, and directs a Center that until recently has received funds from the US Department of State Title VIII program, the US Department of Education Title VI program, and the US Embassy in Yerevan, Armenia.

Hanna Begić does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Serbia’s Aleksandar Vučić clings to power – but protests highlight the danger of stubborn leadership – https://theconversation.com/serbias-aleksandar-vucic-clings-to-power-but-protests-highlight-the-danger-of-stubborn-leadership-245878

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Adam Daniel, Associate Lecturer in Communication, Western Sydney University

With Spinal Tap II: The End Continues hitting cinemas, now is the perfect moment to revisit its precursor, one of most influential and hilarious comedy films ever made, 1984’s This Is Spinal Tap.

Directed by Rob Reiner and co-written by Reiner and the stars of the film, Christopher Guest (as Nigel Tufnel), Michael McKean (David St. Hubbins) and Harry Shearer (Derek Smalls), the mockumentary film follows a fictional British heavy metal band on a disastrous tour of the United States.

As audiences dwindle, equipment fails and egos clash, the band’s decline satirises rock’n’roll excess and the absurdities of the music industry.

Widely acknowledged as a cult classic, the film codified the “straight-faced” style of mockumentary that became central to modern comedies such as The Office and Modern Family.

Its dry and absurdist tone, handheld camerawork, faux interview format and largely improvised dialogue were inspirational for many contemporary comedy creators, including Ben Stiller, Mike Schur and Ricky Gervais. It also established a tone and style Guest would return to throughout his filmmaking career, in movies such as Waiting For Guffman (1996), Best In Show (2000) and A Mighty Wind (2003).

The band which could exist

Beyond pure nostalgia and the legacy of the mockumentary style, This Is Spinal Tap remains a cult favourite because of the clever and farcical way it skewers and satirises rock excess.

As Roger Ebert stated, although the band does not exist,

the best thing about this film is that it could. The music, the staging, the special effects, the backstage feuding and the pseudo-profound philosophizing are right out of a hundred other rock groups and a dozen other documentaries about rock.

In the early 1980s, MTV was on the rise. Rock tour documentaries from bands like Led Zeppelin, Black Sabbath and The Band established new conventions of “rock reality” in films such as The Song Remains The Same (1976), Black and Blue (1980) and The Last Waltz (1978). The culture of excess surrounding some of these artists provided fertile ground for parody.

Ego clashes, overblown stage shows and catastrophic tours were commonplace. Spinal Tap’s deadpan mockumentary style was both a timely satire, and an authentic cultural commentary.

The brilliance of the film goes beyond its ribald satire. Of vital importance is the skilful musicianship of the cast. Even if they are a joke, Spinal Tap can play. The great rock riffs sustain the silliness of the lyrics in songs like Sex Farm and Big Bottom.

In addition, Guest and McKean slyly navigate a bromance at the heart of the film between their characters, Nigel and David.

When David’s girlfriend, Jeanine (June Chadwick) arrives to join the tour, things really go off the rails, leading to an acrimonious breakup between the bandmates.

Their reunion at the film’s conclusion reveals that the film is truly a love story between two vain yet endearing buffoons.

Going to 11

Moments such as Nigel boasting about his amplifier going “to 11”, Derek’s airport security incident, the band getting lost on the way to the stage, and the 18-inch (instead of 18-foot) Stonehenge stage prop have become iconic. But there are so many great gags on the periphery, layered through the largely improvised dialogue.

A personal favourite occurs during an early band interview. Reflecting on a series of strange deaths that have afflicted Spinal Tap’s drummers throughout the years, and acknowledging that their first drummer died in “a bizarre gardening accident”, Tufnel states “the authorities said best leave it unsolved really”.

There are also subtle visual jokes embedded through the film: the sudden emergence of cold sores for each band member in the early stages of the tour (at roughly the same time the band’s groupies enter the frame); the band being second billed behind an Amusement Park Puppet Show as the tour falls apart; Nigel needing to quickly tune the violin he’s using to augment an overblown guitar solo.

Online lists such as Cracked’s “50 funniest moments in This Is Spinal Tap” demonstrate the sheer volume of funny moments.

Modern audiences would no doubt recognise the film’s style being mimicked in contemporary works such as The Office, Parks and Recreation, Summer Heights High and What We Do in the Shadows.

Its influence has been directly acknowledged in the lead-up to the release of the sequel by creators who owe a debt to its clever format.

Spinal Tap II: The End Continues reunites Tufnel, St. Hubbins and Smalls, now estranged, 41 years after the original film.

They are reluctantly coming back together for one final concert they are legally bound to perform. Documentarian Marty Di Bergi (Reiner) returns to showcase their legacy, modern mishaps and the realities of being an ageing rocker.

It is an apt sequel in a world where legacy bands and artists such as The Rolling Stones, Springsteen and McCartney are still performing in their 70s and 80s.

The sequel is not just a reunion gig. It is a reminder of why the original remains one of the sharpest and most influential comedies ever made – and one well worth a revisit.

Adam Daniel does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Why This Is Spinal Tap remains the funniest rock satire ever made – https://theconversation.com/why-this-is-spinal-tap-remains-the-funniest-rock-satire-ever-made-264591

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Robert G. Patman, Professor of International Relations, University of Otago

There seems to be a mismatch between what a UN inquiry recently described as genocide in Gaza and New Zealand’s announcement at the United Nations on Saturday that it will not yet join 157 other countries in recognising a Palestinian state.

The government decision, relayed by Foreign Minister Winston Peters at the UN General Assembly, was welcomed by Israel’s ambassador to New Zealand, who claimed recognition of a Palestinian state legitimises Hamas – a designated terrorist organisation.

On the other hand, former Labour prime minister Helen Clark said, “New Zealand has placed itself very much on the wrong side of history”. She said the government’s position overall was “confusing”.

In practice, the stance of the National-led coalition has certainly been ambiguous. It has called for a lasting ceasefire in Gaza, reiterated its support for a two-state solution, and repeatedly said recognition of a Palestinian state is a question of “when not if”.

However, in January 2024, it also agreed to a small Defence Force deployment as part of a United States-led coalition against Houthi rebel attacks on shipping in the Red Sea, despite the US using its Security Council veto to prevent a ceasefire in Gaza.

Equally striking was the government’s relative silence on President Donald Trump’s proposal in February this year to extinguish the prospect of a two-state solution by taking ownership of Gaza and effectively evicting two million Palestinian residents from the territory.

It also had little to say about the US-Israeli venture to start the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation in late May, a controversial move that sidelined the UN in aid distribution and has led to the killing of more than 1,000 Palestinians while seeking food.

And then in June, along with the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada and Norway, the government imposed sanctions on two far-right Israeli government ministers, Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar ben Gvir for “inciting extremist violence” against Palestinians.

That decision was strongly criticised by the Trump administration, but it seemed to signal the New Zealand position (along with that of its close allies) was hardening.

In August, Prime Minister Christopher Luxon declared Israel’s military assault on Gaza City was “utterly unacceptable”, and said Israeli Prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu had “lost the plot”.

None of which, we now know, was enough to convince the government to follow other liberal democracies such as Australia, Canada, the UK, France and Portugal in recognising Palestinian statehood.

NZ’s reputation on the line

The political reasoning, according to Peters, is that while Hamas remains the de facto government of Gaza and “with a war raging”, there is no viable Palestinian state to recognise.

According to the prime minister, this was a “balanced” decision and consistent with an independent foreign policy. But it can also be argued the approach rests on some shaky assumptions.

While Israel has not been able to destroy Hamas, nor has Hamas been able to stop Gaza being reduced to piles of rubble. According to the Israeli Finance Minister Smotrich, such destruction has “no precedent globally. And the world isn’t stopping us.”

By presenting Hamas as an obstacle to the recognition process, the government also seems to be overlooking the governance role the internationally recognised Palestinian Authority in the West Bank could play in Gaza in a future Palestinian state.

Netanyahu has consistently opposed any such role for the Palestinian Authority, a position New Zealand now seems to tacitly accept.

Peters has described the situation in Gaza as “simply intolerable”. If that’s the case, it has been allowed to happen without New Zealand’s recognition of a Palestinian state. So, how does delaying recognition improve things?

After all, Netanyahu has opposed the concept of a two-state solution since the mid-1990s. And his far-right coalition government has pledged to take full control of Gaza and annex the West Bank – in complete violation of international law and numerous UN resolutions.

It is the belated realisation by a number of democracies that Netanyahu will never accept a Palestinian state that has prompted the latest flurry of statehood recognition, before Israel’s attempt to absorb the occupied territories is completed.

Those countries that have now recognised a Palestinian state will have also weighed up the factors for and against doing so. But they have clearly chosen to make a moral and legal stand – albeit symbolic – on the Palestinian right of political self-determination.

By not joining them, there is a real risk New Zealand will be seen as aligning with those states – Israel and the US – that bear significant responsibility for prolonging the catastrophic conflict in Gaza.

If this perception is widely shared, New Zealand’s hard-won reputation as a state that firmly upholds an international rules-based order could be dealt a major blow.

Robert G. Patman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. By not recognising a Palestinian state, NZ puts its own hard-won reputation on the line – https://theconversation.com/by-not-recognising-a-palestinian-state-nz-puts-its-own-hard-won-reputation-on-the-line-266224

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Daniel Thomas, Honorary Lecturer in Biological Sciences, University of Auckland, Waipapa Taumata Rau

Three million years ago, an extinct relative of todays’s great penguins – emperors and kings – lived in Aotearoa New Zealand.

We know this because our new study describes a spectacular fossilised skull of a great penguin found on the Taranaki coast.

Overall, it is 31% longer than the skull of an emperor penguin (Aptenodytes forsteri), which can be more than a metre tall and weigh upwards of 35 kilograms.

Compared to emperor penguins, however, the Taranaki great penguin had a much stronger and longer beak. It probably looked more like a king penguin (Aptenodytes patagonicus), only much bigger.

At the time, the world was warmer than today. But when the climate cooled, this penguin vanished.

We argue the cold wasn’t to blame because crested and little penguins in New Zealand weathered the same change and remained. Great penguins shifted south and today live in the frozen wastes of Antarctica. So what drove their ancient relative to extinction?

The sediments that now form beach-side cliffs in South Taranaki were deposited at a time when global temperatures were about 3°C above those of the pre-industrial era. Fossils from this period are transforming our understanding of how biodiversity might respond to rising temperatures.

For example, Aotearoa was home to box fish and monk seals, both of which are still (sub)tropical species today. In a strange contradiction, they coexisted with great penguins – now only found in much colder climates – in ancient New Zealand.

The northernmost breeding colonies of king penguins today are around latitude 46.1°S in the subantarctic Crozet Islands, where seawater temperatures reach 3-10°C. From there, it only gets colder towards the higher latitudes where emperor penguins live.

Three million years ago, Aotearoa’s great penguins extended as far north as 40.5°S, where South Taranaki was located then. They foraged in waters that were 20°C, much warmer than their relatives experience today.

This balmy existence ended with the Pleistocene ice ages around 2.58 million years ago. Ice extent and sea level shifted back and forward as temperatures fluctuated and ultimately ratcheted downwards. But why would such cooling eradicate giant penguins, which thrive under polar conditions today, from New Zealand?

Giant aerial predators

Fossil evidence for giant penguins in Aotearoa is limited and the exact reasons for their demise remain unclear. Even so, their sheer presence suggests they were less constrained by sea surface temperatures than previously thought. Another mechanism must be at play.

Up until about 500 years ago, Aotearoa was the hunting ground of the giant Haast’s eagle and the huge Forbes’ harrier. These were big raptors. They included large birds like moa in their diet. Their ancestors arrived from Australia inside the last three million years.

Based on what we see with living great penguins, the Taranaki great penguin almost certainly formed large exposed colonies along the coast. These could have been easy targets for a giant eagle or harrier hunting from the air.

By contrast, the smaller penguins still found in Aotearoa today have more cryptic breeding behaviour. They nest in burrows, natural crevices and dense vegetation, and tend to cross beaches at night, which may have helped them avoid aerial predators.

Predation on land is just one hypothesis, though, to help explain why these penguins became extinct in the region while others survived. Other possibilities include changes in the marine environment.

We know that reduced food availability can be devastating for penguins, but it is challenging to see why this would single out the great penguins.

Importantly, our study provides new insight into the habitat tolerances of great penguins. Both king and emperor penguins today can withstand temperatures up to 20°C higher than those they usually forage in.

Three million years ago, their relative experienced such warmth. As the world continues to warm, we need to remember that the geographic range of a species can change as circumstances change.

The marine ecosystem of Aotearoa will move into the habitable zone of many new species, making investigations of the last warm period more important than ever before.

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We would like to acknowledge our research co-author Dan Ksepka from The Bruce Museum, Kerr Sharpe-Young for discovering the fossil, and Ngāti Ruanui and Ngāruahine for supporting the collection and research of fossils from their rohe.

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Daniel Thomas has received funding from Massey University.

Alan Tennyson and Felix Georg Marx do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Close relatives of emperor penguins lived in NZ some 3 million years ago. What caused their extinction? – https://theconversation.com/close-relatives-of-emperor-penguins-lived-in-nz-some-3-million-years-ago-what-caused-their-extinction-265585

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Fred H. Lawson, Professor of Government Emeritus, Northeastern University

President Donald Trump chided the United Nations on Sept. 23, 2025, for failing to resolve dangerous international conflicts around the world. “All they seem to do,” he groused during his address to the General Assembly in New York, “is write a really strongly worded letter and then never follow that letter up. It’s empty words, and empty words don’t solve war.”

In contrast, Trump, by his own estimation, has ended a half-dozen serious international conflicts. Among them is the long-standing dispute over the Nile River waters that flared up when Ethiopia proposed to build a massive dam over the Blue Nile, threatening the water supply of Egypt and Sudan.

As an international relations scholar who has studied this dispute, however, I find it hard to see how Trump’s interventions have brought it any closer to a resolution. In fact, they most likely made things worse.

The source of the dispute

Nile River water is essential to agriculture and public sanitation in both Egypt and Sudan. Distribution of that water has been regulated by an agreement drawn up in 1959 guaranteeing Egypt and Sudan most of the output of the Nile River basin. A body of international law also enjoins upstream nations – such as Ethiopia – against manipulating the cross-border flow of rivers in ways that harm downstream countries.

Ethiopia nonetheless declared in 2011 that it had the right to exploit any water resources that originate inside its borders. It further insisted that constructing an electricity-generating dam across the Blue Nile would provide cheap power to both impoverished Ethiopians and neighboring countries.

Egypt and Sudan immediately protested on the grounds that the project would inflict severe damage on their populations and implored international organizations and external powers to intervene.

Ambiguous wording

Trump waded into the Nile dispute at the urging of Egypt. Cairo approached Washington to mediate in late October 2019, as Ethiopia was ramping up construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam that would restrict the flow of the Blue Nile. After speaking personally with Egypt President Abdel Fattah el-Sissi, Trump agreed to become directly involved.

He and then-Secretary of the Treasury Steven Mnuchin invited the foreign ministers of Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia to Washington for talks.

With the opening session of the ensuing November 2019 meeting still ongoing, Trump tweeted: “The meeting went well and discussions will continue during the day!”

The talks, however, ended with no progress being made. Instead, all four parties, along with representatives of the World Bank, agreed to confer a dozen more times over the next three months to hash out technical matters.

At these subsequent meetings, Egypt and Ethiopia haggled over definitions and measurement criteria concerning the dam’s possible impact. Mnuchin and his staff largely stood aside, although they reportedly expressed sympathy for Addis Ababa’s insistence that matters concerning the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam be kept separate from questions concerning water management in the Nile Basin as a whole.

More importantly, U.S. representatives allowed imprecise wording to slip into the
statement released at the close of the December 2019 meeting.

The statement mandated that “the implementation of these technical rules and guidelines for the filling and operation of the dam will be undertaken by Ethiopia, and may be adjusted by the three countries.”

Cairo interpreted this to mean that all regulations and procedures would be drawn up jointly; Addis Ababa believed that it enshrined Ethiopia’s right to make decisions entirely on its own.

Talks blow up

The final round of talks in January 2020 produced a prospective agreement that left Ethiopia free to start filling the huge reservoir behind the dam, and minimized the country’s obligations to assist Egypt and Sudan during drought periods.

Yet, Ethiopia dragged its feet in accepting the draft document, claiming that crucial points remained unsettled. Egypt and Sudan flatly refused to revisit problems they believed had already been addressed, but did accept an offer from U.S. Treasury officials to prepare a revised text.

In February 2020, the U.S. Treasury Department circulated an amended version, and Trump telephoned al-Sissi to express hope that “an agreement would be finalized soon.”

Ethiopia, feeling pressured by Egypt and the U.S. to endorse an incomplete text – and worried about the domestic political consequences of doing so – did not send a representative to Washington to accept the revision. Treasury officials then declared that a comprehensive settlement to the dispute had now been reached and publicly called on Addis Ababa to sign it.

Egypt’s foreign ministry issued a statement asserting that “President Trump affirmed the U.S. administration’s continued efforts” to reach an acceptable deal. But Ethiopia’s foreign minister described Washington’s abrupt declaration as “undiplomatic.”

Ethiopia stalled for another two months, then circulated a provisional agreement of its own, which Egypt and Sudan dismissed out of hand.

Washington responded with insinuations that it would withhold economic assistance from Ethiopia unless Addis Ababa signed the agreement the Treasury Department had drafted in February 2020. Meanwhile, construction on the dam proceeded, and in July Ethiopia blocked the flow of the Blue Nile to begin filling its huge reservoir.

In September 2020, then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo followed through on the U.S. threat and suspended US$130 million of aid to Ethiopia. However, the suspension had no impact on negotiations.

Incensed at the continuing impasse, Trump in October 2020 remarked during a telephone call with Sudanese and Israeli diplomats that Egypt “will end up blowing up the dam.”

Ethiopian officials condemned the outburst. The prime minister’s office complained that “these threats and affronts to Ethiopian sovereignty are misguided, unproductive and clear violations of international law.” Ethiopia installed anti-aircraft batteries around the dam and declared the airspace above it a no-fly zone.

Negotiations collapsed, and they remained dormant for the next three years.

Assessing the impact of US mediation

Analysts tend to agree that Trump’s initial involvement in the Nile River dispute made a bad situation worse. His admiration for authoritarian leaders prompted him to accommodate Egypt’s al-Sissi and put U.S. credibility on the line.

Meanwhile, Trump’s contempt for the professionals in the U.S. State Department led him to sideline the diplomatic corps and entrust a complicated assignment to Mnuchin, a former financier and movie producer. And his lack of patience and blunt language disrupted the negotiations, alienating Egypt and Ethiopia alike.

Addis Ababa continues to insist that it “has no obligation to request permission from anyone to fill the Renaissance Dam.” In September 2025, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed declared that work on the dam had finished and boasted of two other dams on the Blue Nile nearing completion.

Meanwhile, Egypt has opened a large naval base on the Red Sea coast and attached
its most advanced warships to a newly created Red Sea squadron. In July 2025, Egypt Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty issued a veiled threat to use military means to settle the Nile dispute.

Despite rising tensions, and his first administration’s failure to make progress on the issue, Trump continues to point to his 2019-2020 mediation as a success.

In July 2025, he told NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte that a resolution lay just around the corner. President al-Sissi once again applauded the president’s involvement and voiced hope that it would produce a “just agreement.”

Yet there is little indication that the current Trump administration is in any better position to solve the Nile River dispute than was the previous one. Since Trump’s second inauguration, experienced State Department officials have been fired or resigned, leaving sensitive diplomatic missions in the hands of private businesspeople with personal ties to the president, rather than diplomats skilled in the art of negotiating intractable disputes among sovereign states.

This development seems unlikely to budge Trump from the conviction that he has already solved the conflict over the Nile River waters – and can somehow do it again.

Fred H. Lawson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Trump’s dip into the Nile waters dispute didn’t settle the conflict – in fact, it may have caused more ripples – https://theconversation.com/trumps-dip-into-the-nile-waters-dispute-didnt-settle-the-conflict-in-fact-it-may-have-caused-more-ripples-263767