Category: The Conversation – Global Perspectives

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Wesley Morgan, Research Associate, Institute for Climate Risk and Response, UNSW Sydney

Almost 60 countries, representing about a third of the global economy, met in the Colombian port city of Santa Marta last week for the first international summit on the transition away from fossil fuels.

It was hailed as a bold step to shift global dependence on hydrocarbons into an era of clean energy. The group of 57 countries, including Australia, Canada, Norway and Brazil, launched a new international process to coordinate the global phase out of coal, oil and gas. This historic shift brings us closer to the end of fossil fuels.

Irene Vélez Torres, Colombia’s environment minister and chair of the talks, said: “We decided that the transition away from fossil fuels could no longer remain a slogan but must become a concrete, political and collective endeavour.”

Here are five key developments from Santa Marta.

1. Moving beyond negotiating deadlocks

This meeting was a successful complement to the UN’s annual climate summits, not a replacement for them.

Decisions at UN climate meetings are made by consensus. Outcomes such as the 2015 Paris Agreement have huge legitimacy because they are agreed by nearly 200 countries. But the consensus rules also allow a handful of fossil fuel producers such as Saudi Arabia and Russia to block progress.

Holding a summit outside these formal UN talks brought much-needed fresh air to global climate diplomacy. Without petrostates blocking the way, willing countries were able to have pragmatic discussions about the legal, fiscal and economic measures needed for a coordinated wind down of fossil fuels.

These discussions will now feed back into the next UN climate talks, to be held in Turkey in November. They will, for example, raise expectations that countries include timelines to end fossil fuel use in national climate plans.

2. Paths away from coal, oil and gas

Working groups were established in Santa Marta to help countries develop national and regional plans to move away from fossil fuels, with targets and timelines to end the use of coal, oil and gas.

France launched its national roadmap at the summit, pledging to end the use of coal by 2030, oil by 2045 and gas by 2050. Europe’s second-largest economy plans to close its last coal-fired power plant next year, while replacing oil with electricity for transport and switching from gas to heat pumps for home heating. France wants two out of three new cars to be electric by 2030 and will ban the installation of gas boilers in new homes this year.

The ongoing US-Iran war has only added momentum for a shift to clean energy, as nations grapple with their dependence on imported fossil fuels amid the worst energy crisis in history.

Other nations are now expected to create plans to move away from fossil fuels and bring them to future summits.

3. A science panel to guide the transition

A new scientific panel launched in Santa Marta brings together experts in climate, economics, technology and law to advise policymakers as they draft plans to shift away from fossil fuels.

The panel will map out the most promising policies, regulations and financial arrangements to support the shift to clean energy. It is spearheaded by Professor Johan Rockstrom from the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research.

Ahead of Santa Marta, a global group of researchers released a report listing 12 high-level actions nations can take to support a fossil-fuel phaseout.

4. Tuvalu to host next summit, with Irish support

Tuvalu will host the next meeting on ending fossil fuels in 2027. As a low-lying island nation, Tuvalu’s future is threatened by sea-level rise. The Pacific nation has led global climate diplomacy for decades.

“If we are to address the climate change issue, we have to address the root cause, and the root cause is the fossil fuel industry,” said Maina Talia, Tuvalu’s climate change minister.

That there are plans for a second summit is meaningful in itself. A single conference could be a flash in the pan. But a series marks the birth of a new international process with buy in from both wealthy nations and developing countries. This year’s summit was co-hosted with the Netherlands and next year will be co-hosted with Ireland.

5. Toward a fossil fuel treaty

Today, fossil fuel producers plan to dig up more than double the amount of coal, oil and gas in 2030 than would be consistent with meeting shared climate goals.

Tuvalu is part of a growing bloc of countries, including 11 Pacific nations, that wants a new treaty to phase out fossil fuel production. Such a treaty would have three elements: ending fossil fuel expansion; phasing down existing production; and supporting a just transition to clean energy.

It would be similar to global agreements to phase out weapons, harmful substances or hazardous waste.

Climate diplomacy now runs at two speeds

We will only appreciate the full significance of the Santa Marta summit in history’s rear-view mirror.

But what is clear is that climate diplomacy now has two operating speeds. André Corrêa do Lago, who headed last year’s UN COP30 climate talks in Brazil, calls this “two-tier multilateralism”.

The first speed is that of the UN climate talks, which are slower and anchored in consensus. They ensure legitimacy, universality and collective direction.

But what the Santa Marta conference shows is the existence of a second, much faster speed available to any country wanting to rapidly move to end the use of fossil fuels, once and for all.

Wesley Morgan is a Fellow with the Climate Council of Australia.

– ref. ‘Much-needed fresh air’: 5 outcomes from the world’s first summit on ending fossil fuels – https://theconversation.com/much-needed-fresh-air-5-outcomes-from-the-worlds-first-summit-on-ending-fossil-fuels-282061

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Manuel Esperon-Rodriguez, Researcher in Urban Transformation, Western Sydney University

Cities and towns are usually 1–3°C hotter than the surrounding countryside, because asphalt, concrete and brick absorb heat from the sun and radiate it slowly. Some cities can be as much as 7°C hotter. This effect is known as the urban heat island.

This can be dangerous, especially in hot countries. In very hot conditions, dehydration and heat exhaustion become real risks. If it gets too hot, it can be lethal.

There’s one simple antidote: urban trees. Authorities around the world have planted more trees to counteract the heat.

But how effective is this? How much hotter would our cities be without trees?

To find out, we analysed data from nearly 9,000 cities around the world, home to about 3.6 billion people. As our new research shows, trees almost halve how much heat is trapped by the urban heat island effect.

This cooling is welcome. But it is far from even. Wealthier, suburban and humid cities have more trees on average.

Why focus on trees?

Trees act like natural air conditioners. They shade the ground and stop asphalt and buildings from heating up in the first place. They also cool the air by releasing water vapour from their leaves in a process called transpiration, lowering surrounding temperatures. They can make a noticeable temperature difference, especially on sizzling summer days.

Trees offer a simple way to counteract urban heat. This matters. More than half the world’s population (55%) now live in urban areas according to the United Nations. By 2050, that figure is expected to rise to 68%. Cities are facing a hotter future, as climate change drives more intense and more frequent heatwaves. The urban heat island effect makes cities hotter still.

What did we do?

We wanted to know the answer to a simple question: how much hotter would cities be without trees?

To find out, we analysed global datasets of air temperature and fine-scale tree cover across almost 9,000 cities. Then we modelled a “what if” scenario, where all tree cover was removed, and compared it to current conditions.

This allowed us to estimate the real-world cooling effect trees provide for air temperature, which is the main way we perceive heat.

Most previous global studies have used surface temperatures, often from satellite data. But surfaces like roads and rooftops can become much hotter than the surrounding air above them, especially in direct sunlight. That can give an overestimate of how much cooling trees provide. Air temperature, by contrast, better reflects what people actually feel, making it a more reliable measure of heat.

So what effect do trees really have?

The effect was much larger than we had anticipated.

Globally, trees cut the urban heat island effect by almost 50%. Since the average urban heat island effect typically adds around 1–3°C, this translates into cooling of roughly 0.5–1.5°C in many cities.

For more than 200 million people, trees reduce local air temperatures by at least 0.5°C, enough to make a meaningful difference during extreme heat.

Cooling can vary a lot from place to place.

In hot, dry cities such as Phoenix in the United States, differences in tree cover can create clear differences in air temperatures. In more temperate cities like Lisbon in Portugal or Gothenburg in Sweden, the overall cooling is still significant, but generally smaller and more consistent across the city.

Trees are not evenly distributed

A city’s trees are not spread evenly. They’re often concentrated in wealthier neighbourhoods and suburban areas. Cities in cooler or more humid climates tend to have more.

Trees are scarcer in lower-income cities or in rapidly growing regions. This inequality is also visible in many cities. Leafy suburbs are usually several degrees cooler than nearby neighbourhoods with little vegetation.

There’s a strong link with wealth. In the United States, lower-income areas average 15% fewer trees than wealthier areas – and are 1.5°C hotter. This means the people who need free cooling from trees the most are often the least likely to receive it.

Planting more trees isn’t enough

Planting trees is often promoted as a simple solution to city heat. Trees are visible, relatively low cost and come with other benefits such as cleaner air and better mental health.

It’s no wonder authorities look to urban trees as a way to counteract the heat from escalating climate change. When you stand under a tree on a sweltering day, the cooling feels immediate and powerful.

But our study shows their effect is more limited in the face of climate change. The world’s current urban trees would, we estimate, offset just 10% of the extra heat expected by mid-century under moderate climate change scenarios. With ambitious planting, this could rise to around 20%.

While important, it’s not enough. A large majority of the extra heat will go unaddressed.

What else can be done?

If the world’s cities are to cope with rising temperatures, trees have to be seen as part of a broader strategy – not the whole answer.

Clever urban design can cut heat by using reflective materials, increasing green spaces and improving airflow between buildings. Green roofs and shaded streets can also make a difference.

New tree plantings should target hotter neighbourhoods with less existing tree canopy, as these will deliver the greatest benefits.

Of course, these measures don’t replace the need to tackle climate change directly by cutting greenhouse gas emissions.

Using trees wisely

Billions of trees grow in the world’s cities. They are hugely valuable, acting to cool cities, support biodiversity and making urban areas more liveable.

The challenge for city residents and authorities is to use trees wisely. Plant them where they’re needed most and combine them with other methods of reducing heat. Trees are remarkable. But they can’t do it all.

Rob McDonald works for The Nature Conservancy, an environmental nonprofit.

Tirthankar Chakraborty has received funding from DOE, NASA, and NIH to study urban environments, including impacts of vegetation on urban heat.

Manuel Esperon-Rodriguez does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Urban trees cool the world’s cities more than we thought – but we can’t rely on them alone – https://theconversation.com/urban-trees-cool-the-worlds-cities-more-than-we-thought-but-we-cant-rely-on-them-alone-281866

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Vivek Krishnamurthy, Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado Boulder

More than two months into the war in Iran, navigation through the Strait of Hormuz – the key waterway through which more than a third of the international trade in oil and gas passes – remains perilous and uncertain. Underscoring the uncertainty, on May 3, 2026, the Trump administration launched Project Freedom to help stranded ships through the strait. Yet the next day, at least two ships came under fire from Iran.

Iran began blocking the strait to navigation on Feb. 28, after the United States and Israel launched a military campaign against the country. By mid-March, Tehran was demanding tolls of up to US$2 million per vessel. In response, the U.S. imposed what President Donald Trump declared to be a “complete” maritime blockade on Iran and subsequently threatened punishing economic sanctions on any entity that pays Iran’s tolls.

Following Iran’s lead, other nations are now contemplating using their own leverage over crucial choke points closer to their shores. Indonesia floated a proposal to charge tolls on vessels transiting the Strait of Malacca, before walking it back. China has also issued warnings against foreign military vessels transiting the Taiwan Strait.

These events have prompted commentators to warn of the end of a golden era of navigational freedom that the U.S. has underwritten for more than a century. But as an expert on international law, I know that attempts by nations to weaponize their leverage over crucial geographic choke points at sea and on land are nothing new. In fact, they go back at least six centuries.

The Danish roots of sea tolls

From the early 15th century until 1857, Denmark required ships passing through the narrow straits connecting the North Sea to the Baltic Sea to stop at the port city of Helsingør — or Elsinore, as Shakespeare styled it in “Hamlet” — and pay a toll before proceeding.

At their peak, these Sound Dues generated nearly 10% of Danish national revenues. The Sound Dues rankled the maritime powers of the day, but Denmark could easily enforce them thanks to the narrowness of the Øresund Strait, which is less than 3 miles wide at Helsingør.

Ultimately, they were ended not through war but through diplomacy, led in large part by a rising maritime power with a strong interest in open sea-lanes: the United States.

Seeking to increase its trade with Prussia, in 1843 the administration of President John Tyler advised Denmark of the United States’ refusal to pay the Sound Dues because they lacked any basis in international law. Rumors swirled that the U.S. was willing to back up its refusal to pay with force.

After years of uncertainty, the fate of the Sound Dues was resolved by the Copenhagen Convention of 1857. Denmark agreed to abolish the tolls forever in exchange for a one-time, lump-sum payment from the major trading nations. The principle of free navigation of the world’s oceans has largely prevailed since then, in part as a result of subsequent U.S. efforts to exercise these freedoms against those who would restrict them.

How the law developed

The Danish settlement reflected a broader body of law – the law of transit – that had been evolving alongside an international system of sovereign states for centuries.

Its core principle is that when convenience dictates or necessity requires, a country must allow the people, goods and vessels of other nations to pass through its territory for a journey that begins and ends elsewhere. The principle has deep roots in American and international legal history: Thomas Jefferson invoked it when negotiating with Spain, which then controlled Louisiana, to secure the United States’ right to navigate the Mississippi River.

Free transit guarantees have been a feature of every major international order since the Congress of Vienna ended the Napoleonic wars in 1815. Yet in each case, those guarantees have come under pressure as the order that produced them weakened.

Before World War I, restrictions on transit rights multiplied across Europe. The League of Nations, a precursor to today’s United Nations, made strengthening transit rights its first priority in the 1920s. But these arrangements fell apart as fascism rose across Europe and Asia and regimes from Nazi Germany to Imperial Japan denounced their international legal obligations.

The post-World War II order reaffirmed transit rights – through the law of the sea, trade agreements and the laws governing civil aviation – and for decades they held.

The International Court of Justice clarified the governing legal principle for international straits in its very first case, decided in 1949: Any body of water useful to international navigation between two open seas is open to the vessels of all nations.

The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, concluded in 1982, reaffirmed this rule in holding that countries may not charge tolls on vessels passing through straits within their waters. Although neither Iran nor the U.S. has ratified the convention, the U.S. accepts its provisions on navigational freedom as binding on all countries.

Iran’s levying of tolls in the Strait of Hormuz violates the core legal principle that nations may not exploit advantages of geography to bilk foreigners who need to traverse their land or maritime territory. Yet the American and Israeli military campaign that provoked Iran’s response likewise violates the U.N. Charter’s rules on the use of force.

Such issues are not just limited to the Strait of Hormuz. Indeed, trade law, security commitments and the norms against the unilateral redrawing of borders are all under strain.

Seen in this larger context, China’s warnings against military passage through the Taiwan Strait and Indonesia’s trial balloon over the Malacca Strait are not isolated provocations. They are symptoms of the same underlying condition: an international order losing the shared commitment that has often made its rules enforceable.

In January 2026, Trump told The New York Times that he did not need international law and that his own moral judgment was the only constraint on American foreign policy. Around the same time, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney warned that the American-led international order was “fading.”

The Strait of Hormuz is where those trend lines are now colliding – to the detriment of billions of people around the world, and to the idea of an international order based on law rather than the naked exercise of power.

Vivek Krishnamurthy does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. The method in Iran’s madness? Closure of Strait of Hormuz echoes a centuries-old Danish play − and is a tragedy for the world order – https://theconversation.com/the-method-in-irans-madness-closure-of-strait-of-hormuz-echoes-a-centuries-old-danish-play-and-is-a-tragedy-for-the-world-order-281961

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Amin Saikal, Emeritus Professor of Middle Eastern Studies, Australian National University; The University of Western Australia; Victoria University

US President Donald Trump’s threats against Iran since the war began have targeted not just the country’s military capabilities, but its entire civilisation.

In recent days, he has threatened that Iran would be “blown off the face of the earth” if it attacks US ships trying to reopen the Strait of Hormuz.

He’s previously pledged to send Iran back to the “Stone Age”, and warned that “a whole civilisation will die tonight, never to be brought back again”.

These statements show not only extreme belligerence, but Trump’s complete lack of understanding of Iran’s long, resilient culture and civilisation and the fortitude of its people.

Iran has been subjected to much internal strife and foreign power intervention, but it has never been colonised or subjugated. At every difficult moment in their history, Iranians have fought to preserve what is theirs.

Persian influence in ancient Greece and Rome

Since the Greco-Persian Wars (499 BCE), Persia has served as the West’s ultimate “other”: a dark and despotic oriental villain menacing an enlightened West.

This is despite Persia’s return of exiled Jews in Babylon to Jerusalem to rebuild their temple in 538 BCE, and its tolerance of diversity in the world’s first truly multicultural empire.

The victories of a coalition of Greek city-states over the Achaemenid Persian imperial forces at Salamis (480 BCE) and Marathon (490 BCE) are considered pivotal moments in the history of Western civilisation.

Yet this was just a minor setback for Persia. In fact, Persia continued to play a decisive role in Greek affairs. Persian gold helped Sparta defeat Athens in the Peloponnesian War (431–404 BCE), and Persia was often the most important mediator in Greek affairs.

The Parthian and Sasanian Empires that followed the Achaemenids in Persia then challenged the Romans.

In 260 CE, Sasanian Emperor Shapur I captured Roman Emperor Valerian in battle – an unprecedented act. A century later, Shapur II’s army fought off an attempted invasion by Emperor Julian, killing him in the process.

Western triumphal narratives tend to forget that Persia repeatedly humbled the greatest Western empire in ancient times.

Surviving invasions from the east and west

Alexander the Great conquered Persia militarily. However, he embraced Persian culture, which outlasted Greek influence in the region.

The advent of Islam did not extinguish Persia’s civilisation or resilience, either. Islamic leaders preserved Persian language and culture, kept pre-Islamic festivals such as Nowruz (the 3,000-year-old Persian New Year), and adapted Zoroastrian concepts into Shiite Islam’s emphasis on resistance to tyranny.

The Mongols’ multiple invasions (between 1219 and 1258) devastated Iran, yet core elements of Persian civilisation survived. Persian power flourished again, especially under the Safavid dynasty (1501–1736).

During the Qajar dynasty (1789–1925), Persia was squeezed by the Anglo-Russian rivalry of Great Game era, but was not subdued.

During the second world war, Iran was occupied by the British in the oil-rich south and the Soviets in the north. However, both powers pledged, along with the United States, to respect Iran’s sovereignty and withdraw at the end of the war.

A turbulent 20th century

This episode rejuvenated Iranian nationalism and prompted a movement to free Iran from traditional major power rivalries and gain control over its own resources. This especially pertained to oil, since the British had controlled Iran’s oil reserves through the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) from the early 19th century.

In 1951, a long-time nationalist-reformist, Mohammad Mossadegh, was elected prime minister and promptly nationalised the AIOC, sparking a major dispute with London.

Mossadegh also sought to limit the power of Iran’s monarchy in favour of democratic reforms, causing a conflict with the young, pro-Western Mohammad Reza Shah, who was still the country’s reigning monarch.

The shah was forced into exile in 1953, only to be returned to the throne days later when Mossadegh was overthrown in a covert operation by the US Central Intelligence Agency, with MI6’s help. (Fifty years later, US President Barack Obama acknowledged the CIA’s role in the coup.)

The US backed the shah as a pillar of American hegemony in the Middle East. In return, US oil companies received a 40% share of Iran’s oil industry.

Yet the shah was able to transform his dependent relationship with the US into one of interdependence. Iran became a pivotal player in the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and in the region.

In the wake of the 1973–74 energy crisis, then-US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger warned the United States would react with force if it was “strangled” by a cut in oil deliveries – a veiled message to the shah.

The Iranian revolution of 1978–79 then toppled the shah and enabled his chief religious and political opponent, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, to assume power. Khomeini declared Iran an Islamic Republic with an anti-US and anti-Israel posture.

He essentially based his rule in the historic pride Iranians held as a people in charge of their destiny.

Khomeini and his successor, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei sought to entrench Shia political Islamism as the ideological guide and legitimate foundation of the state. But they sought to blend this with the Iranians’ sense of civilisational, cultural and nationalist identity, especially in the face of outside aggression.

‘Iran is my land’

The celebrated Persian-speaking poet Abul-Qasim Ferdowsi (940–1020 CE) once said:

Iran is my land, and the whole world is under my feet. The people of this land are the possessors of virtue, art and bravery. They have no fear of roaring lions.

As Iran’s standoff with the US continues, it appears the regime is prepared for the long haul against yet another military foe.

But there is no military solution to the conflict. Diplomacy within the framework of mutual respect and trust is the best way forward. Otherwise, the region and the world may remain captive to an energy and economic crisis that could have been resolved through negotiations, rather than war.

As for the future of the Islamic government, that needs to be determined by the Iranian people.

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. ‘No fear of roaring lions’: Iran has a long history of standing firm against outside aggressors – https://theconversation.com/no-fear-of-roaring-lions-iran-has-a-long-history-of-standing-firm-against-outside-aggressors-281645

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Firmesk Rahim, PhD Student, UMass Boston

Arab Gulf countries, battered economically and physically by the war with Iran, were keen to put on a united front at a key regional meeting on April 28, 2026.

Gathering in the Saudi city Jeddah, representatives of the Gulf Cooperation Council warned the Iranian government in Tehran that an attack on any one of its six members would be taken as an attack on all. Rejecting Iran’s claims to control of the Strait of Hormuz, Qatari Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani later described the summit as embodying “the unified Gulf stance” over the conflict.

The show of togetherness may seem at odds with other recent developments that have seen members of the GCC split over policy and vision for the region – not least the United Arab Emirate’s decision to quit the oil cartel OPEC.

But to followers of Gulf politics, like myself, the scene felt familiar. Time and again, Iran has accomplished what no outside mediator could: It has pushed divided Gulf Arab states together. When tensions rise, the monarchies of the GCC – Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Oman – tend to stand united, at least publicly.

From revolution to coordination

The modern Gulf security environment was profoundly shaped by the 1979 Iranian Revolution.

Iran shares a narrow and strategically vital waterway with the Gulf states but has long differed in identity and outlook. Specifically, Iran’s Shiite revolutionary model contrasts with the Sunni-led monarchies across the region.

Before 1979, when Iran was ruled by Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi Iran and Saudi Arabia, the largest of the Sunni Arab Gulf states, were regarded by Washington as “twin pillars,” protecting American interests in the Middle East. Their relationship was cooperative, but not close.

Then the emergence of the Islamic Republic after the revolution in 1979 introduced a new kind of regional actor – one defined not only by state power but also by Shiite ideological ambition.

Gulf monarchies’ concern over both external security and internal stability was reinforced by the 1979 Grand Mosque seizure in Saudi Arabia, when Islamist militants seized Islam’s holiest site. The event, alongside Iran’s revolution, exposed the vulnerability of Gulf regimes to religiously driven upheaval.

In response to this revolution ideology, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE established the GCC in 1981. Although officially framed as a platform for economic and political cooperation, the organization also reflected shared security concerns and Arab identity.

But unity had limits. Member states did not all view threats to their respective regimes in the same way.

Saudi Arabia worried about U.S. pressure for reforms; Kuwait feared neighboring Iraq; Bahrain was concerned about Iran’s influence over its own Shiite population; and the UAE worried about both Iran and its own large foreign workforce. Meanwhile, Oman and Qatar followed a more independent or balanced approach.

These differences would shape the trajectory of the GCC, and Arab Gulf states’ relationship with Tehran.

The eight-year Iran–Iraq War, which began in 1980, brought to the fore fears of Iran’s influence across the region. While Oman declared neutrality, other GCC states supported Iraq by funneling billions of dollars to the regime of Saddam Hussein.

This revealed an early pattern: Gulf states could coordinate politically, but avoided acting as a single strategic bloc. The GCC broadly favored Iraq as a counterweight to Iran, but there was no unified strategy or formal policy.

Security dependence

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 reshaped the region’s security structure again. In early 1991, the move prompted a U.S.-led coalition, including Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, to expel Iraqi forces. Saudi Arabia’s role was especially significant: It not only hosted coalition forces but also actively participated militarily – marking one of the first major episodes in which a GCC state was directly involved in the defense of another member.

During – and especially after – the Gulf War, GCC states deepened their reliance on the United States, agreeing to host U.S. military bases and expanding long-term defense cooperation.

This external security umbrella provided a measure of stability, but it also introduced new differences. While Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE and Bahrain aligned more closely with Washington’s strategic framework, others – notably Oman and Qatar – maintained a more flexible approach. As a result, the appearance of unity coexisted with growing variation in national strategies.

This pattern has continued in recent years, significantly through diplomatic moves to normalize ties with Israel under the Abraham Accords. While the UAE and Bahrain moved quickly to formalize ties with Israel, others remained more cautious.

The effort to contain Iran

When it comes to combating Iranian influence, GCC states have long played different roles.

Oman has consistently acted as a mediator, maintaining open channels with Tehran and facilitating quiet diplomacy — including back-channel talks between Iran and Western states.

Qatar also kept communication open, partly because of shared economic interests with Iran – particularly the management of the North Field/South Pars gas reserve.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE, by contrast, have generally taken a more cautious and at times confrontational stance toward Iran. Both view Iran as a regional competitor and a source of security concerns, particularly due to Tehran’s missile program and its support for ideologically opposed non-state actors.

This contrasting approach to Iran across the GCC allows different states to engage Tehran through multiple channels, but it also makes it harder to form a consistent, unified GCC strategy.

A changing regional balance

The 2003 Iraq War marked a turning point in the GCC-Iran dynamic. The removal of Iraq as a regional counterweight allowed Iran to expand its influence.

And this development sharpened divisions within the GCC.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE increasingly viewed Iran as a direct strategic threat requiring containment. Qatar and Oman, however, emphasized dialogue and mediation.

These differences became more visible during the Qatar diplomatic crisis of 2017. The dispute centered around Qatar’s support for Islamist political groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, considered a terrorist organization by the UAE and Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain severed diplomatic ties with Qatar and imposed a full air, land and sea blockade in June 2017. The three nations accused Qatar of supporting extremist groups and maintaining close ties with Iran. Isolated, Qatar relied on Iran for airspace, trade routes and supplies, strengthening the relationship between the countries. The blockade eventually ended in January 2021, when the parties signed a declaration restoring diplomatic and trade relations at a GCC summit in Saudi Arabia.

GCC under attack

The series of events that began with the Oct. 7, 2023, attack by Iranian-backed Hamas in Israel shook up GCC relations with Tehran.

In June 2025, in response to the U.S.-Israeli attack on Iran, Tehran struck a U.S. base in Qatar – the first such attack on a GCC state by Tehran.

At an extraordinary meeting in Doha, Qatar’s capital, GCC members pledged full solidarity with Qatar and strongly condemned the Iranian attack.

But it was not enough to prevent Iran from attacking all six GCC states in response to the ongoing conflict begun in February 2026 by U.S. and Israel.

The subsequent closure of the Strait of Hormuz, affecting 20% of global oil supplies, has sparked what many see as the biggest crisis in the Gulf since the inception of the GCC.

The GCC responded by emphasizing collective security and unity. But yet again, the public show of togetherness masks divergent views on how to respond. When the war ends, each state will likely return to its own strategic and foreign policy approach.

Understanding the pattern

Since 1979, Tehran’s actions in the Gulf region have exposed two parallel developments. On the surface, there are shared concerns among GCC members and public shows of unity. But underneath this facade of unity, each state has continued to develop its own national priorities and risk tolerance.

The combination of these two factors helps explain why the GCC often appears unified during crises, while remaining internally divided over how to respond to them.

Rather than viewing the GCC as a fully cohesive bloc, it may be more accurate to see it as a framework where cooperation and disagreement coexist.

Firmesk Rahim does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Gulf state cooperation has long been shaped by the threat of Iran − but shows of unity belie division – https://theconversation.com/gulf-state-cooperation-has-long-been-shaped-by-the-threat-of-iran-but-shows-of-unity-belie-division-280692

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Martin Kear, Lecturer, Department of Government and International Relations, University of Sydney

Israel and Lebanon agreed to a ceasefire three weeks ago. The violence, however, hasn’t stopped.

In recent days, Israeli airstrikes have killed at least 40 people and the military has issued evacuation orders for residents of ten villages and towns in southern Lebanon, where it has established a security buffer zone.

According to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, this zone is needed to protect Israel from future attacks by the Hezbollah militant group. He said it is “much stronger, more intense, more continuous, and more solid than we had previously”.

Critics, however, contend Israel is adopting the “Gaza playbook” in this buffer zone, mirroring its actions in Gaza after a fragile ceasefire was agreed to last October.

Militarily, Israel is hitting an already-weakened Hezbollah as hard as it can to deplete its capabilities and force it out of its southern Lebanon stronghold.

Israel calls this strategy “mowing the grass”. It has long viewed this strategy as the best way to establish a level of deterrence against Hamas and Hezbollah, which cannot be defeated through conventional military means.

Like it did in Gaza, Israel is also aiming to make the buffer zone uninhabitable for residents. In late March, Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz declared:

All houses in villages near the Lebanese border will be destroyed, in accordance with the model used in Rafah and Beit Hanoun in Gaza, in order to permanently remove the threats near the border to northern residents.

As part of this, Israel has destroyed all the bridges across the Litani River, effectively isolating southern Lebanon from the rest of the country. It is also systematically destroying or severely damaging towns, villages and infrastructure in the region.

This “Gaza playbook” has come with a significant human cost. Since this latest conflict with Hezbollah began in early March, Israel’s attacks have killed more than 2,600 Lebanese and displaced another 1.2 million from their homes.

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Read more:
Israeli threats to occupy or annex south Lebanon dust off a decades-old playbook

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Netanyahu is becoming trapped

Yet, despite achieving many successes against Hezbollah, Netanyahu is in danger of overreaching in his claims to be able to defeat one of Israel’s nemeses.

For decades, successive Israeli governments, particularly those headed by Netanyahu, have convinced the Israeli public that Israel and Hezbollah are engaged in an existential struggle.

Many Israelis now expect Netanyahu to deliver on his promise and finally rid them of this threat forever.

In a recent poll conducted by the Israel Democracy Institute, 80% of respondents supported continuing the fight against Hezbollah irrespective of any possible peace deal between the US and Iran, and even if this created tensions with the Trump administration.

This poses a political threat to Netanyahu as he faces becoming trapped between two opposing realities.

Delivering on a false promise

The first centres on the “mowing the grass” strategy. This strategy has long served as good propaganda and as an exemplar of the government protecting its people. But it was never intended to completely defeat the threats posed by Hezbollah or Hamas.
When it comes to Hezbollah, Israel’s military simply cannot completely defeat a resistance movement that is so embedded in the social, political and cultural fabric of Lebanon. This would require not just a military victory, but the subjugation of its supporters and the delegitimisation of its ideology.

The intention of the “mowing the grass” strategy is to manage the threats posed by Hezbollah and Hamas, not destroy them.

If Israel is able to cause substantial damage to their political and military capabilities – in addition to destroying local infrastructure – the groups are then forced to focus on survival and revival, rather than on threatening Israel.

From Israel’s perspective, this provides some breathing room until the threat reemerges and it is time to “mow the grass” again.

From a political perspective, this strategy also allows Israel to justify its continuous military operations. This has been the cornerstone of Netanyahu’s political revival since the Hamas attacks of 2023, allowing him to maintain a constant sense of crisis that requires ever-increasing levels of violence.

But Netanyahu has changed the narrative, shifting from just “managing” Israel’s conflict with both Hezbollah and Hamas, to “dismantling” the groups and “finishing the job”.

It is clear the Israeli public wants Netanyahu to deliver on this promise.

Trump forcing his hand

The second reality facing Netanyahu is the potential that US President Donald Trump will agree to a permanent ceasefire with Iran that forces Israel to cease its hostilities against Hezbollah.

Since the tentative ceasefire between the US and Iran, Netanyahu has been trying to separate Israel’s conflicts with Iran and Hezbollah. This would allow him to continue the military’s operations against Hezbollah and claim a key strategic victory.

But Iran is demanding that any ceasefire it reaches with the US include Hezbollah.

This places Netanyahu in a bind. If he does agree to a permanent peace deal, this would leave a severely wounded but not-yet-destroyed Hezbollah in place. With Hamas and the Iranian regime also still intact (albeit severely wounded), this would represent a triple disaster for Netanyahu.

The backlash is already starting. Last month, Israeli opposition leader Yair Golan accused Netanyahu of lying:

He promised a historic victory and security for generations, and in practice, we got one of the most severe strategic failures Israel has ever known.

Criticism like this could have a huge effect on the Israeli elections, due before the end of this year.

Netanyahu is desperate to win these elections to forestall his long-running corruption trial. As such, he would be loath to risk breaking with the Israeli public on his promise to finish Hezbollah. However, that may mean breaking with the US and its essential military, political and diplomatic support.

While the “mowing the grass” strategy gave Netanyahu new political life after Hamas’s October 7 attacks, his failure to match his rhetoric to actual results may now prove to be his Achilles’ heel.

Martin Kear does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Netanyahu has pledged to ‘finish the job’ against Hezbollah. It’s a promise he can’t deliver on – https://theconversation.com/netanyahu-has-pledged-to-finish-the-job-against-hezbollah-its-a-promise-he-cant-deliver-on-280468

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Thomas Jeffries, Senior Lecturer in Microbiology, Western Sydney University

Three people have died after a suspected outbreak of hantavirus on a cruise ship in the middle of the Atlantic ocean. At least one other passenger is in intensive care in South Africa.

The World Health Organization announced the deaths in a social media statement on Monday, along with one confirmed case of the rare disease. Authorities are investigating another five suspected cases among passengers travelling on the MV Hondius.

So, what is hantavirus? And why can it be so deadly?

As the investigation unfolds, here’s what we know.

What is hantavirus?

Hantavirus is a rare but severe respiratory illness that can cause severe bleeding, fever and even death.

The virus is spread by rodents, such as mice and rats, mainly through the urine and droppings of infected animals.

Hantavirus does not typically spread from person to person. However, in rare cases it may spread between people.

Globally, there are an estimated 150,000 to 200,000 cases of hantavirus each year.

It is less contagious than airborne viruses such as COVID and influenza, as it typically does not spread from person to person.

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Read more:
What is a virus? How do they spread? How do they make us sick?

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What makes it so deadly?

There are two main types of hantavirus, each with different symptoms.

Hantavirus pulmonary syndrome, which affects the lungs, is mainly found in the United States. If a person becomes infected with this type of hantavirus, within days they will likely experience coughing and shortness of breath.

As the illness progresses, they can develop symptoms such as fatigue, fever and muscle aches. They may also get headaches, dizziness, nausea, vomiting and abdominal pain. This is the most deadly kind of hantavirus. Tragically, about 38% of people who develop these symptoms die from the disease.

Hemorrhagic fever with renal syndrome is mainly found in Europe and Asia, but the strain known as the Seoul virus has spread around the world. This form of hantavirus mainly affects the kidneys.

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5 virus families that could cause the next pandemic, according to the experts

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People usually develop symptoms within two weeks of being exposed to this virus. Early symptoms include severe headaches, abdominal pain, nausea and blurred vision. More advanced symptoms include low blood pressure, internal bleeding and even acute kidney failure. This disease can be caused by different viruses and some are more deadly than others, meaning between 1% and 15% of cases can be fatal.

Unfortunately, there is no specific treatment or cure for either type of hantavirus. However, early medical treatment may increase a person’s chance of survival. This can include using respirators, oxygen therapy and dialysis.

Authorities are still investigating which type of hantavirus the passengers were exposed to.

How did it get on a cruise ship?

In a closed environment such as a cruise ship, there are two possible ways passengers could have contracted hantavirus.

One is being exposed to the virus while on a shore excursion.

The other possibility is that rodents may have entered the ship on cargo, and then spread the disease to passengers through their infected urine or droppings. Other factors such as hygiene standards and food storage practices may have caused the infection to spread more quickly.

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Read more:
How do viruses mutate and jump species? And why are ‘spillovers’ becoming more common?

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To contain this suspected outbreak, authorities must first ensure any rodents are safely contained and removed from the ship. They should then monitor all passengers for hantavirus symptoms. The virus is diagnosed with a PCR test, similar to those used to diagnose viruses such as COVID.

Given there is no specific treatment for the disease, authorities must help any infected passengers manage their symptoms. This involves checking that they are breathing normally and their kidneys are functioning properly.

So, how worried should we be?

Although alarming, cases of hantavirus remain are extremely rare. But it can look similar to other respiratory illness, so you should always get symptoms checked. If you’ve been in regions where the virus is found and experience shortness of breath, fever or any other flu-like symptoms, see your GP.

Thomas Jeffries does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. What is hantavirus, the disease that has killed 3 cruise ship passengers? – https://theconversation.com/what-is-hantavirus-the-disease-that-has-killed-3-cruise-ship-passengers-282044

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Roger Fernandez-Urbano, Ramón y Cajal Research Fellow (Tenure-Track) Department of Sociology, Universitat de Barcelona

As social media becomes a central part of young people’s lives, concerns are growing about its impact on their mental health. Yet public debates and measures tend to treat adolescents as one homogeneous group. We frequently ignore the fact that social media use does not affect all young people in the same way – nor does it have the same impacts on their wellbeing.

In a recent chapter of the World Happiness Report 2026, published by the UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network in partnership with the University of Oxford, we have examined how problematic social media use relates to the wellbeing of adolescents from different socioeconomic backgrounds.

We looked at 43 countries spanning six broad regions – Anglo-Celtic, Caucasus-Black Sea, Central-Eastern Europe, Mediterranean, Nordic, and Western Europe – covering mainly European countries and their immediate neighbouring areas.

Using data from over 330,000 young people, we found a clear and consistent pattern: higher levels of problematic social media use – that is, compulsive or uncontrolled engagement with social media – are associated with poorer wellbeing.

Teenagers who report more problematic use tend to experience more psychological complaints, such as feeling low, nervous, irritable, or having difficulty sleeping. They also have lower life satisfaction, a measure of how positively they evaluate their lives as a whole.

This pattern appears across all countries in our study, but its strength varies from one country to another. It is particularly pronounced in Anglo-Celtic countries such as the UK and Ireland, while it is comparatively weaker in the Caucasus-Black Sea region.

Socioeconomic background matters

The story does not end with geography. Globally, teenagers from less advantaged backgrounds tend to be more vulnerable to the negative consequences of problematic social media use than their more advantaged peers.

This means socioeconomic status – the material and social resources available to a household, such as income and living conditions – actively shapes the risks and opportunities that young people experience as a result of online environments.

Interestingly, these inequalities are especially visible when we look at life satisfaction. Differences between socioeconomic groups are smaller when it comes to psychological complaints, but much clearer and more consistent for how adolescents evaluate their lives overall.

One likely reason is that life satisfaction is more sensitive to social comparisons. Social media exposes young people to constant benchmarks – what others have, do, and achieve – which can amplify differences in perceived opportunities and resources.

At the same time, these patterns are not identical everywhere. For instance, socioeconomic differences in psychological complaints tend to be modest in most regions including continental European countries such as France, Austria or Belgium, but are more clearly observed in Anglo-Celtic countries such as Scotland and Wales.

In contrast, socioeconomic gaps in life satisfaction appear across most regions, although they tend to be weaker in Mediterranean countries such as Italy, Cyprus and Greece.

A growing problem

We also examined how these patterns have evolved over time. Between 2018 and 2022, the link between problematic social media use and poor adolescent wellbeing became stronger.

This suggests that the risks linked to problematic use may have intensified in recent years, possibly reflecting the growing role of digital technologies in young people’s daily lives, particularly during and after the Covid-19 pandemic.

Importantly, this intensification has affected teenagers across socioeconomic groups in broadly similar ways in most regions. In other words, while inequalities remain they have not widened over this period.

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Social media addiction disrupts the sleep, moods and social activities of teens and young adults

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No one-size-fits-all solution

While public debates about social media and mental health often treat adolescents as a single demographic group, our results show a more complex reality. Problematic social media use is linked to poorer wellbeing across countries, but its effects are shaped by social realities. They vary depending on where young people live and what resources are available to them.

Not all teenagers experience the digital world in the same way, and not all are equally equipped to cope with its pressures. Recognising this is essential for designing policies that are not only effective, but also equitable, ensuring that interventions reach those adolescents who are most vulnerable to digital risks.

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A weekly e-mail in English featuring expertise from scholars and researchers. It provides an introduction to the diversity of research coming out of the continent and considers some of the key issues facing European countries. Get the newsletter!

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Roger Fernandez-Urbano receives funding from the Spanish Government’s Ministry of Science, Innovation and Universities and the State Research Agency through Ramón y Cajal (RYC) grant. Roger is a member of the International Society for Quality-of-Life Studies (ISQOLS).

Maria Rubio-Cabañez’s involvement in this research was supported by the DIGINEQ (Digital Time Use, Adolescent Well-Being and Social Inequalities) project (Grant agreement ID: 101089233), funded by the European Research Council Consolidator Grant.

Pablo Gracia’s involvement in this research was supported by the DIGINEQ (Digital Time Use, Adolescent Well-Being and Social Inequalities) project (Grant agreement ID: 101089233), funded by the European Research Council Consolidator Grant.

– ref. Our study looked at teens’ social media behaviour in 43 countries – those from disadvantaged backgrounds face greater harms – https://theconversation.com/our-study-looked-at-teens-social-media-behaviour-in-43-countries-those-from-disadvantaged-backgrounds-face-greater-harms-279985

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Alberto Filgueiras, Senior Lecturer in Psychology, CQUniversity Australia

Arsenal is still on the top of the English Premier League ladder, but as in previous years, the Gunners might be crumbling just when a first title since 2003–04 is within touching distance.

In early April, Arsenal had a commanding grip on the title – nine points ahead of nearest rivals Manchester City. Now it’s just three (and City has played one less game).

This isn’t the first time Arsenal has lapsed at late stages in recent years: last season they finished second behind Liverpool. In 2023–4 they finished runners-up behind Manchester City. They were second again the year before.

Arsenal fans are no doubt expecting another dose of late-season heartbreak – it’s likely players and club staff are feeling similarly jittery. However, there are psychological strategies that could help them keep fighting until the final whistle.

Oh no, not again

The team led by Mikel Arteta recently eked out a 1-0 win against Newcastle United but before that had suffered two consecutive defeats: first against Bournemouth at home and then to Manchester City.

Looking closely at these two matches, they had a similar dynamic: Arsenal conceded the first goal in the first half, scored the equaliser a few minutes later, and suffered defeat in the second half.

This looks like a symptom. If you concede a goal earlier in a match, you need to put extra energy in to find an equaliser. At halftime, players should reset but the emotional cost of chasing an equaliser may impair their shift into a winning mindset.

This is choking under pressure: when fear of losing is bigger than the willingness to win.

Arsenal’s players have a team of sport psychologists and mindset coaches at their disposal.

Here are the four key psychological tools they will probably use to improve consistency in these final rounds of the season.

1. Work out your routines

Consistency is crucial for athletes, and predictability creates the space for players to become consistent.

The basic assumption behind the concept is: if you keep doing the same things, you can expect the same results. Regardless of the level of competitive pressure, sport performance tends to become more stable when pre-performance routines are applied.

These routines can take many forms: some athletes might prefer to take a shower, or pray, visualise or meditate before a match.

During games, many prefer to take a deep breath before a penalty (such as Cristiano Ronaldo) whereas others might fix their gaze on a single spot on the ball before shooting.

The key is, sport psychologists should help athletes tailor their pre-game or pre-shot routines to enhance performance.

2. Practise mindfulness

Mental distress can have a crushing impact on athletes.

When an athlete is emotionally stressed, the body tends to increase its levels of cortisol (the stress hormone), which leads to muscle rigidness. This can impact performance.

To counter this, leading stress education expert Jon Kabat-Zinn developed mindfulness-based stress reduction – a set of techniques that includes breathing meditation, deliberate focus on the present moment, and yoga-like body movements to improve emotional regulation.

When empirically tested in athletes, mindfulness meditation showed significant effectiveness to improve attentional control (the ability to focus attention on a task while avoiding distractions).

Applying mindfulness techniques alone or in combination can boost performance and may help Arsenal achieve the consistency needed in these final rounds.

3. Be positive with self-talk

Self-confidence and fear of mistakes can freeze athletes in high-stakes moments. This impacts decision-making and slows down execution.

For example, a full-back gets the ball on the defensive flank and scans for options. He can either play a penetrating pass to break the opposition’s defensive lines or pass backwards to his centre-back.

This a split-second decision – if he hesitates, the forward pass can be intercepted and the backward pass may come under pressure, leading to a costly mistake.

To tackle self-doubt, sport psychologists teach athletes to reframe their thoughts and create more effective task-oriented inner dialogues.

Research shows instructional self-talk can help athletes improve their performance.

So in the example above, what our full-back needs to do is, instead of thinking about the potential consequences of his actions, just tell himself to execute the pass.

If done properly, instructional self-talk can help Arsenal’s players choose the best options and execute them.

4. Get used to dealing with pressure

Matches are high-stakes, but training sessions tend to be focused on technical and tactical skills under lower pressure.

However, research shows embedding mild anxiety into training sessions helps athletes cope better under pressure.

Athletes who train under pressure often perform better than those who do not.

So Arsenal’s coaches should be looking to ramp up pressure in training sessions while ensuring the players can work with sport psychologists and mindset coaches.

A race in two

After the recent win against Newcastle, Arteta said:

I don’t expect after 22 years not winning it that it is going to be a path of roses and beautiful music around it. It is going to be like this and we are ready for it.

Whether they are ready for it remains to be seen. But if the Gunners are to finally taste the ultimate success in this season’s Premier League, a combination of these techniques might help them cope under pressure, avoid choking, and finally lift the trophy.

Assuming, of course, Manchester City allows it.

Alberto Filgueiras does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Arsenal might be choking again in England’s Premier League. Here are 4 psychological fixes – https://theconversation.com/arsenal-might-be-choking-again-in-englands-premier-league-here-are-4-psychological-fixes-281224

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Guilherme Casarões, Associate Professor of Brazilian Studies, Florida International University

On May 31st, Colombian voters will go to the polls with Abelardo de la Espriella – criminal lawyer, self-styled outsider, and self-described “Tiger” – securing his place in the runoff against left-wing Iván Cepeda. In Brazil, Senator Flávio Bolsonaro – the son of incarcerated former President Jair Bolsonaro – is also busy, touring Washington, Dallas, and El Salvador, burnishing a “Bolsonaro 2.0” brand ahead of October elections.

The two men have never appeared on the same stage, but they are running similar campaigns, reading from similar scripts, and looking toward the same set of foreign role models. In a familiar recipe, their platforms combine free-market economics, conservative values, and a tough approach to crime.

De la Espriella proposes reducing the size of the state by up to 40%, eliminating hundreds of thousands of public contracts and positions, and slashing taxes. He considers himself a major political admirer of Argentina’s President Javier Milei, someone who, in his eyes, has charted the solution to the hemisphere’s economic problems.

Flávio Bolsonaro has presented his pre-candidacy as a direct continuation of the legacy of his father, who was arrested last year for attempting a coup d’état following his defeat in the 2022 elections. Bolsonaro’s oldest son describes his project as the return to a market-oriented, Pro-Washington, and nationalistic platform.

Economy, security, and foreign policy

Although the language varies at times, the ideology that drives both campaigns does not. Both Bolsonaro’s son and De la Espriella embrace a combination of right-wing conservative security stances and the same neoliberal economic doctrine that was tried across Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s, showcasing a repacking of old views to try and solve old problems.

On security, both candidates have vowed to follow the steps of El Savador’s strongman president Nayib Bukele. Flávio Bolsonaro, after visiting El Salvador’s notorious CECOT mega-prison in person, called Bukele’s approach a “radical transformation” and demanded the construction of “many, many prisons” in Brazil to address a deficit he estimates at 500,000 beds.

De la Espriella is even more explicit: “Against the narcoterrorism that Petro has coddled, an iron fist like Bukele’s,” he has declared, promising to bomb guerrilla encampments and build high-security mega-prisons modeled on El Salvador’s CECOT. He also proposes a new prison corps staffed by military reservists and veterans, administered privately, removing the current penal institute which he describes as “a cancer for Colombia.”

On foreign policy, De la Espriella has declared that any relationship Colombia has with Venezuela must be conducted “through the United States”, essentially ignoring the Venezuelan Government. This is a remarkable formulation that would break tradition with previous Colombian foreign policy towards Caracas, which was marked by acting mostly in an independent fashion of its allies in the region. He wants to strengthen the military alliance with Washington and Tel Aviv, and has called on the Trump Administration to prosecute and extradite incumbent President Gustavo Petro over supposed drug charges.

Flávio Bolsonaro, meanwhile, appeared at CPAC in Dallas, supporting the alliance with President Trump. He openly positioned Brazil as a bulwark in Washington’s geopolitical strategy to reduce Chinese influence in the hemisphere and offered up his country’s strategic resources to this end. Trump’s own political adviser, Jason Miller, declared Flávio the “next president” of Brazil from the conference stage.

What is striking about all of this is not just the content of these proposals but their explicitly transnational character. As they aim for the Presidency, De la Espriella and Flávio Bolsonaro are aiming for membership in a global conservative movement, constructing their political identities by association with leaders like Trump, Bukele, and Milei.

How far can their promises go?

This transnational strategy, however, has already shown some limits. When Eduardo Bolsonaro lobbied Washington to impose tariffs and sanctions on Brazil’s government and economy, 57% of Brazilians disapproved of what he was doing to their country. Instead of strengthening the Bolsonaro brand, this episode handed left-wing president Lula Da Silva a nationalist narrative that the right had monopolized for years. All while presidents Lula and Trump would go on to partially reconcile not that long after.

“Bukelizing” security can also be problematic. Importing the Salvadoran model to much bigger countries, whose public security issues are complex and widespread, would be an invitation to the kind of arbitrary State power that Colombian and Brazilian democracies spent decades trying to contain. By tapping into Bukele’s youthful appeal and increasing popularity, Bolsonaro and De la Espriella vow to promote potentially authoritarian solutions under a veil of efficiency.

There is a real frustration at the root of these candidacies, and it would be a mistake to dismiss it. Colombia and Brazil are countries where insecurity is existential for millions of people, where inequality persists despite decades of formal progress, where institutional corruption has eroded confidence in the political class.

Even though De la Espriella and Flávio Bolsonaro are tapping into genuine concerns, the solutions they offer are not new responses to old problems. Economic shock therapy in largely unequal societies, militarized crackdowns in countries with a long history of institutional violence, and a lack of inherent agency in terms of foreign policy are just old responses to old problems. This time, retooled with new aesthetics and a new international support network.

Os autores não prestam consultoria, trabalham, possuem ações ou recebem financiamento de qualquer empresa ou organização que se beneficiaria deste artigo e não revelaram qualquer vínculo relevante além de seus cargos acadêmicos.

– ref. In Colombia and Brazil, presidential candidates offer old solutions to old problems – https://theconversation.com/in-colombia-and-brazil-presidential-candidates-offer-old-solutions-to-old-problems-281854