Category: The Conversation – Global Perspectives

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Peter Draper, Professor, and Executive Director: Institute for International Trade, and Director of the Jean Monnet Centre of Trade and Environment, Adelaide University

The “mother of all deals”: that’s how European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen described the new free trade agreement between the European Union and India, announced on Tuesday after about two decades of negotiations.

The deal will affect a combined population of 2 billion people across economies representing about a quarter of global GDP.

Speaking in New Delhi, von der Leyen characterised the agreement as a “tale of two giants” who “choose partnership, in a true win-win fashion”.

So, what have both sides agreed to – and why does it matter so much for global trade?

What has been agreed

Under this agreement, tariffs on 96.6% of EU goods exported to India will be eliminated or reduced. This will reportedly mean savings of approximately €4 billion (about A$6.8 billion) annually in customs duties on European products.

The automotive sector is the big winner. European carmakers – including Volkswagen, BMW, Mercedes-Benz and Renault – will see tariffs on their vehicles gradually reduced from the current punitive rate of 110% to as little as 10%.

The reduced tariffs will apply to an annual quota of 250,000 vehicles, which is six times larger than the quota the UK received in its deal with India.

To protect India’s domestic manufacturers, European cars priced below €15,000 (A$25,500) will face higher tariffs, while electric vehicles get a five-year grace period.

India will almost entirely eliminate tariffs on machinery (which previously faced rates up to 44%), chemicals (22%) and pharmaceuticals (11%).

Wine is particularly notable – tariffs are being slashed from 150% to between 20–30% for medium and premium varieties. Spirits face cuts from 150% to 40%.

In return, the EU is also opening up its market. It will reduce tariffs on 99.5% of goods imported from India. EU tariffs on Indian marine products (such as shrimp), leather goods, textiles, handicrafts, gems and jewellery, plastics and toys will be eliminated.

These are labour-intensive sectors where India has genuine competitive advantage. Indian exporters in marine products, textiles and gems have faced tough conditions in recent years, partly due to US tariff pressures. That makes this EU access particularly valuable.

What’s been left out

This deal, while ambitious by India standards, has limits. It explicitly excludes deeper policy harmonisation on several fronts. Perhaps most significantly, the deal doesn’t include comprehensive provisions on labour rights, environmental standards or climate commitments.

While there are references to carbon border adjustment mechanisms (by which the EU imposes its domestic carbon price on imports into their common market), these likely fall short of enforceable environmental standards increasingly common in EU deals.

And the deal keeps protections for sensitive sectors in Europe: the EU maintains tariffs on beef, chicken, dairy, rice and sugar. Consumers in Delhi might enjoy cheaper European cars, while Europe’s farmers are protected from competition.

Why now?

Three forces converged to make this deal happen. First, a growing need to diversify from traditional partners amid economic uncertainty.

Second, the Donald Trump factor. Both the EU and India currently face significant US tariffs: India faces a 50% tariff on goods, while the EU faces headline tariffs of 15% (and recently avoided more in Trump’s threats over Greenland). This deal provides an alternative market for both sides.

And third, there’s what economists call “trade diversion” – notably, when Chinese products are diverted to other markets after the US closes its doors to them.

Both the EU and India want to avoid becoming dumping grounds for products that would normally go to the American market.

A dealmaking spree

The EU has been on something of a dealmaking spree recently. Earlier this month, it signed an agreement with Mercosur, a South American trade bloc.

That deal, however, has hit complications. On January 21, the European Parliament voted to refer it to the EU Court of Justice for legal review, which could delay ratification.

This creates a cautionary tale for the India deal. The legal uncertainty around Mercosur shows how well-intentioned trade deals can face obstacles.

The EU also finalised negotiations with Indonesia in September; EU–Indonesia trade was valued at €27 billion in 2024 (about A$46 billion).

For India, this deal with the EU is considerably bigger than recent agreements with New Zealand, Oman and the UK. It positions India as a diversified trading nation pursuing multiple partnerships.

However, the EU–India trade deal should be understood not as a purely commercial breakthrough, but also as a strategic signal — aimed primarily at the US.

In effect, it communicates that even close allies will actively seek alternative economic partners when faced with the threat of economic coercion or politicised trade pressure.

This interpretation is reinforced by both the deal’s timing and how it was announced. The announcement came even though key details still need to be negotiated and there remains some distance to go before final ratification.

That suggests the immediate objective was to deliver a message: the EU has options, and it will use them.

What does this mean for Australia and India?

For Australians, this deal matters more than you might think. Australia already has the Australia-India Economic Cooperation and Trade Agreement, which came into force in late 2022.

Australia has eliminated tariffs on all Indian exports, while India has removed duties on 90% of Australian goods by value, rising from an original commitment of 85%.

This EU-India deal should provide impetus for Australia and India to finalise their more comprehensive Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement, under negotiation since 2023.

The 11th round of negotiations took place in August, covering goods, services, digital trade, rules of origin, and – importantly – labour and environmental standards.

The EU deal suggests India is willing to engage seriously on tariff liberalisation. However, it remains to be seen whether that appetite will transfer to the newer issues increasingly central to global trade, notably those Australia is now trying to secure with Indian negotiators.

Chasing an Australia-EU deal

Australia should take heart from the EU’s success in building alternative trading relationships.

This should encourage negotiators still pursuing an EU–Australia free trade agreement, negotiations for which were renewed last June after collapsing in 2023.

These deals signal something important about the global trading system: countries are adapting to American protectionism not by becoming protectionist themselves, but by deepening partnerships with each other.

The world’s democracies are saying they want to trade, invest, and cooperate on rules-based terms.

Nathan Howard Gray receives funding from Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

Mandar Oak and Peter Draper do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. What the ‘mother of all deals’ between India and the EU means for global trade – https://theconversation.com/what-the-mother-of-all-deals-between-india-and-the-eu-means-for-global-trade-274515

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Garritt C. Van Dyk, Senior Lecturer in History, University of Waikato

Donald Trump took time out this week from dramatic events at home and abroad to reveal three new design concepts for his proposed “Independence Arch” in Washington DC.

All three renderings resemble the famous Arc de Triomphe in Paris, although one features gilded livery not unlike Trump’s chosen adornments to the Oval Office in the White House.

Commissioned in preparation for the 250th anniversary of the signing of the Declaration of Independence on July 4, the triumphal arch draws on a long history of celebrating military conquest, from Roman emperors to Napoleon Bonaparte.

As such, it aligns seamlessly with Trump’s foreign policy and his stated mission for the United States to control the western hemisphere – as he has dubbed it, the “Donroe Doctrine”.

But as many have been asking, while the design is a copy of an iconic monument, is a personal tribute necessarily the best way to mark the anniversary of America’s break with absolute rule and the British monarchy?

The ‘Arc de Trump’

When Trump first displayed models of the proposed arch last October, a reporter asked him who it was for. Trump replied “Me. It’s going to be beautiful.”

In a December update, the president said the new arch “will be like the one in Paris, but to be honest with you, it blows it away. It blows it away in every way.”

There was one exception, he noted: “The only thing they have is history […] I always say [it’s] the one thing you can’t compete with, but eventually we’ll have that history too.”

The president clearly believes his arch will be part of creating that history. “It’s the only city in the world that’s of great importance that doesn’t have a triumphal arch,” he said of Washington DC.

Set to be located near Arlington National Cemetery and the Lincoln Memorial, the site would put the new structure in a visual conversation with many of the most famous landmarks in the national capital.

This also aligns with other projects that will leave Trump’s mark on the physical fabric of Washington: changes to the White House last year that included paving over the famous Rose Garden, decorating the Oval Office in rococo gold, and demolishing the East Wing for a US$400 million ballroom extension.

The “Arc de Trump” (as it has been branded) is now the “top priority” for Vince Haley, the director of the Domestic Policy Council for the White House.

Triumph and design

The Arc de Triomphe in Paris, located at the top of the Champs-Élysées, was commissioned by Napoleon Bonaparte in 1806 to honour the French imperial army following his victory at the Battle of Austerlitz. It was not finished until 1836, under the reign of King Louis Philippe I.

Architects for the project, Jean-François Thérèse Chalgrin and Jean-Arnaud Raymond, drew on classical arches for inspiration, with Rome’s Arch of Titus (circa 85 CE) as the main source. It was built by Emperor Domitian (51–96 CE), a cruel and ostentatious tyrant who was popular with the people but battled with the Senate and limited its power to make laws.

Domitian commissioned the arch to commemorate the deification of his brother Titus, and his military victory crushing the rebellion in Judea.

Given its inspiration, Trump’s proposed arch doesn’t reference any uniquely American design features. But the neoclassical style recalls earlier monuments that also reference antiquity.

The Washington Monument, for example, is built in the form of an Egyptian obelisk. A four-sided pillar, it tapers as it rises and is topped with a pyramid, a tribute to the sun god Ra.

But it also incorporated an element that was meant to symbolise American technological advancement and innovation – a pyramid cap made of aluminium.

When the obelisk was completed in 1884, aluminium was rare because the process for refining it had not been perfected. The top of the monument was the largest piece of cast aluminium on the planet at that time.

‘Truth and sanity’

Trump’s triumphal arch is likely destined to join a long debate about the merits of public monuments and what they represent.

During the Black Lives Matter movement, many statues of historical figures were removed from public display because they were seen as celebrations of racism and imperialism.

Trump has since restored at least one Confederate statue toppled during that time, and his desire to add a new monument to himself should come as little surprise.

During the Jim Crow era of racial segregation and throughout the civil rights movement, there was a sharp spike in the number of monuments erected to Confederate soldiers and generals.

Just as tearing down those statues was a statement, so is the creation of a new memorial to promote Trump’s positive interpretation of the nation’s past. It is also consistent with his administration’s declared mission of “restoring truth and sanity to American history”.

Maybe the more immediate question is whether the Independence Arch can even be built by Independence Day on July 4, a tall order even for this president. As for its reception, history will have to be the judge.

Garritt C. Van Dyk has received funding from the Getty Research Institute.

– ref. Monumental ambitions: the history behind Trump’s triumphal arch – https://theconversation.com/monumental-ambitions-the-history-behind-trumps-triumphal-arch-273567

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Amy McAuliffe, Visiting Distinguished Professor of the Practice, University of Notre Dame

With Russian ground troops bogged down in a grinding war of attrition, Moscow is striving to press home its advantage in the skies – through an ever-evolving army of drones, courtesy of Iran.

In early January, wreckage of a drone found in Ukraine hinted at a new high-speed model of drone being deployed by Russia in the conflict. It prompted Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to air fears over failing to keep pace. “We produce (drones) at about 1,000 a day. We really produce them, but it’s not enough. It’s still not enough,” he told an audience of political business leaders at the World Economic Forum on Jan. 22, 2026.

Ukrainian intelligence suggests that Moscow, too, will also soon be pumping out 1,000 drone units a day, in large part thanks to the support and technical assistance of Iran. A central concern for Ukraine is Russia’s increasing production of long-range attack drones that it has used in mass attacks to strike targets in Ukraine.

Tehran’s role in supplying Russia with hundreds of long-range, kamikaze-style drones is long known. But what has gone largely unnoticed outside Ukraine is Iran’s central role in teaching Russia to produce these drones itself.

As an expert on weapons technology and former assistant director of the CIA for weapons and counterproliferation, I believe use of Iranian technology has helped Russia develop a fleet of sophisticated drones able to erode Ukrainian air defenses and strain the country’s resolve. By doing so, Moscow is able to preserve more expensive missiles for long-range precision strikes.

Designed in Iran, produced in Russia

Both Ukraine and Russia have ramped up drone production since the beginning of the current conflict in February 2022.

Russia was initially unable to produce large numbers of kamikaze drones, and the country’s military seemingly did not at first understand the decisive role long-range strike drones could play. Instead, Moscow invested in traditional battlefield weapons, such as missiles. It mainly thought of drones as carrying out the roles of intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance.

Tehran had the expertise Russia needed. It also had an existing defense relationship with Russia. Moreover, faced with a cash-strapped economy due to yearslong sanctions, Iran needed money.

Since probably about early 2022, Tehran has been providing drones and drone technology to Russia for use in Ukraine. Later that year, Russia and Iran signed the agreement to set up a production plant in Russia for Iranian-designed attack drones.

With Iranian blueprints and technology, a production plant in Tatarstan in western Russia now produces large numbers of drones originally designed by Iran. At this factory, Russia manufactures the Geran-2, Moscow’s name for the Iranian Shahed-136 strike drone.

Easily identifiable by its delta-wing shape, the drone has optimized certain design features, such as range, endurance and weight capacity. It can carry an estimated 90 to 110 pounds of explosives hundreds of miles.

Meanwhile, the delta-wing design optimizes precision diving, helps prevent stalling at low speeds, and increases the drone’s stability during the attack phase.

These features enable targeting of strategic infrastructure at much less cost than long-range missiles.

Russia can now produce hundreds of one-way Geran-2 attack drones a day. It may soon be able to launch thousands in salvos.

Russia is also modifying and enhancing the drones with features such as precise navigation, heavier warheads and new engines.

Some reports claim Russia is testing telemetry and video links to fly drones remotely, a significant improvement over its current preprogrammed design that would improve accuracy and range. Iran also supplied Russia with technology to build a jet-powered drone variant based on the Shahed-238 that can fly faster.

Called the Geran-3, Russia has produced and used fewer of these drones, whose jet power makes them more challenging for Ukrainian air defense to detect and intercept. New generations of the drone – Geran-4s and Geran-5s – have since been rolled out and apparently deployed in the war with Ukraine.

Sanctions-busting procurement

Even with the blueprints and Iranian assistance, Russia is still reliant on Western and Chinese suppliers for some drone components, many of them commercial, off-the-shelf technology. These include the engine, fuel pump, GPS and navigation systems, semiconductors and components for antennas.

To assist Russia, Iran exploits its networks of brokers and companies in acquiring Western components to evade international sanctions.

A procurement network headed by the Iranian company Sahara Thunder used shipping firms in the UAE and India to sell Russia the original Iranian drones and components and to negotiate the deal for the production plant.

The U.S. Treasury Department has sanctioned this firm and others involved in the drone sales, but Iran set up new companies to help Moscow acquire components. Multiple studies and reports documenting the inclusion of foreign components in downed Geran-2s show Moscow’s continued acquisition of these parts, almost certainly with Iranian assistance.

A weapon of terror

Russia uses the Geran and other longer-range Iranian and Russian models to purposefully target civilians and civilian infrastructure in Ukraine, including residential housing in Ukrainian cities. Russia has even targeted first responders and humanitarian distribution points, according to a United Nations account.

In fact, the U.N. concluded in October 2025 that Russia’s use of short-range, unmanned aerial vehicles against civilians in southern Ukraine constituted a crime against humanity and a war crime.

A two-day attack in May 2025 on the Ukrainian cities of Kharkiv in the northeast and Odessa in the south highlights the destructive power and human cost of the drone attacks. According to accounts in the Kyiv Post, Russia launched over 100 drones. In Kharkiv, three blocks were burned down, including 90 shops, and two people were injured. In Odessa, the drones killed one person and damaged residential buildings.

Beyond psychologically tormenting the Ukrainian population, these drones have a profound effect on the battlefield.

Ukraine has responded to Russia’s battlefield success with the Iranian-designed drones by diversifying the types of drones it manufactures, attacking Russian infrastructure for manufacturing drones and developing counter-drone technologies.

A mutually beneficial arrangement

Iran also benefits from this terror campaign. Reeling from the economic impact of sanctions, Iran will make an estimated US$1 billion to $1.75 billion from the deal for drones and the production facility. Russia is reportedly paying Iran a portion of the bill in gold.

Iran is unlikely to stop its assistance anytime soon, given its own economic problems. Helping Moscow obtain drone components and even modify new versions of the Geran-2 will also benefit Iran militarily as it, too, learns to make the new drones and use them itself.

But the main beneficiary of this relationship is Moscow. Without Iranian support, Russia would face more difficult trade-offs on the battlefield. The lower-cost drones allow Russia to preserve its expensive advanced missiles for the most significant targets in Ukraine and to employ large swarms of drones to target Ukrainian infrastructure.

And with the ground offensive yielding little progress of late for Moscow, that could be crucial as the war enters its fifth year.

Amy McAuliffe does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Russia’s drone pipeline: How Iran helps Moscow produce an ever-evolving unmanned fleet – https://theconversation.com/russias-drone-pipeline-how-iran-helps-moscow-produce-an-ever-evolving-unmanned-fleet-272016

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By David S G Goodman, Director, China Studies Centre, Professor of Chinese Politics, University of Sydney

Last weekend, China’s Ministry of National Defence announced that the country’s two most senior generals – Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli – would be removed from office and placed under investigation for serious disciplinary violations.

Zhang had been the People’s Liberation Army’s most senior general since October 2022. He was the highest ranking military member of the Politburo of the Communist Party of China (CCP), the party-state’s 24-member executive policy-making body.

Zhang was also the senior vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, which controls the armed forces.

Liu was the former commander of the PLA’s Ground Force and had most recently been in charge of the Central Military Commission’s Joint Staff Department.

The reaction to these developments outside China has led to dramatic headlines. A BBC headline initially focused on a “military in crisis”, while the Australian Broadcasting Corporation called it an “astonishing” purge that leaves Chinese leader Xi Jinping almost alone at the top of the world’s biggest army.

Certainly, the moves were surprising. But so little is known about the internal workings of the CCP’s leadership, including Xi’s relations with his colleagues in the Politburo, that interpreting these developments is difficult, if not impossible.

What we know

For historical and political reasons, the PLA is an organisation of the CCP. Both fall under the direct purview of Xi, who is chair of the Central Military Commission, general secretary of the CCP and president of the country.

The removal of Zhang and Liu at least temporarily leaves military leadership under just Xi and General Zhang Shengmin. Three other members of the Central Military Commission have lost their positions since 2024 and not been replaced.

Though the Chinese leadership is notoriously opaque, it is clear there have been disciplinary problems within the military in the last few years, particularly related to corruption and procurement in the more technically advanced departments of the PLA. Some two dozen senior military figures have been dismissed or investigated since 2022.

Zhang and Liu were fairly recent appointments to even more senior positions. Both were also seen as personal supporters of Xi. The fathers of Xi and Zhang had a close relationship dating back to the early days of the CCP in the 1930s before the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949.

Moreover, the removals of Zhang and Liu happened more quickly than other senior military dismissals of recent years – and there were fewer warning signs. Both men had appeared in public as recently as a month ago.

Perhaps of even greater surprise, the Wall Street Journal reported that Zhang is accused of providing the United States with information about China’s nuclear weapons program, alongside allegations of accepting bribes and forming “political cliques”.

So, how to read the tea leaves?

Past practice suggests without a doubt that once a senior figure loses their status or is dismissed – for whatever reason – their downfall results in accusations of a litany of crimes.

The Politburo has also seen its share of intense internal politics in the past, though the precise circumstances of such conflicts usually take years to surface. A good example is the mysterious death of Lin Biao in 1971, another former PLA commander who at the time was Mao Zedong’s designated successor.

Given the broader context at play here with the management of the military and the development of government programs in recent years, as well as the claims Zhang and Liu violated “discipline and the law”, there are two possible explanations for their dismissals.

Both may have had direct involvement in corruption, taking bribes to appoint officials or ensure contracts for suppliers. It is equally likely they are being held responsible for corruption that has undoubtedly occurred in military procurement under their watch.

Then there is the possibility of a difference of opinion within the Central Military Commission and the Politburo on how to deal with corruption, particularly within the military.

Xi has repeatedly stressed the importance of the fight against corruption since he became general secretary of the CCP in 2012.

In recent weeks, he has made this an even more important crusade in the context of the about-to-be-announced 15th Five-year Plan for Economic and Social Development. On January 12, he designated the issue of corruption as a “major struggle” in a speech to China’s top anti-corruption agency:

Currently, the situation in the fight against corruption remains grave and complex […] We must maintain a high-pressure stance without wavering, resolutely punishing corruption wherever it exists, eliminating all forms of graft, and leaving no place for corrupt elements to hide.

To meet China’s developmental goals, he added, the CCP “must deploy cadres who are truly loyal, reliable, consistent and responsible”.

It is difficult to see Zhang and Liu or indeed anyone else currently willing or able to challenge Xi. Or, indeed, that Xi might feel immediately threatened by Zhang, Liu or others.

To that extent, Xi’s personal position is neither strengthened nor weakened by these dismissals.

Other analysts have suggested that the disruptions caused by the dismissals could lower Xi’s confidence in his military. Some have even said the potential for an invasion of Taiwan has now been lowered.

The removal of so many leaders may indicate the PLA is now expected to undergo culture change. At the same time, it would be drawing a very long bow to suggest its military capacity generally or in relation to Taiwan has either been strengthened or weakened.

David S G Goodman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Xi Jinping has dismissed two of China’s most senior generals. What does this mean? – https://theconversation.com/xi-jinping-has-dismissed-two-of-chinas-most-senior-generals-what-does-this-mean-274425

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Ali Mamouri, Research Fellow, Middle East Studies, Deakin University

Renewed fighting in Syria in recent weeks between government-aligned forces and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) isn’t just a local issue. It has serious implications for the stability of the rest of the Middle East.

Syrian government forces launched an offensive in early January into areas of northeastern Syria controlled by Kurdish forces. The operation enabled the government to gain control of key oil and gas fields and major border crossings with Iraq and Turkey.

Of particular concern to Syria’s neighbours, though, is the thousands of former Islamic State (IS) fighters who have been held in prisons run by the SDF in the region. One camp, al-Hol, reportedly held about 24,000 detainees, primarily women and children. There were also diehard IS supporters from around the world at the camp.

Amid concerns the prisoners would escape with the SDF retreat, the US military began moving detainees from Syria to other facilities in Iraq last week. Some prisoners, however, were able to escape.

Though both sides agreed to a ceasefire that would see the SDF forces incorporated into the Syrian armed forces, it remains shaky.

The government’s offensive has also resulted in mass displacement, mistreatment of civilians and what the SDF claims are Islamic State-style killings of its forces and civilians.

And there are concerns the Islamic State will take advantage of the chaos to regroup and try to destabilise the region once again.

A pattern of violence

The fighting has followed a pattern disturbingly similar to other violent episodes following the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s government to forces led by now-President Ahmed al-Sharaa in late 2024.

Al-Sharaa has pledged to protect minorities in the new Syria he is building, but religious and ethnic minorities have specifically been targeted. This includes the Druze in southern Syria and Alawite communities in the west.

There have been credible reports of summary executions, arbitrary killings and kidnappings.

When the Islamic State controlled large portions of Syria around 2014, its violent actions against civilians – in particular, minorities such as the Yazidis and Kurds – were widely condemned as potential war crimes and crimes against humanity.

In al-Sharaa’s Syria, the violence has allegedly been carried out by government security forces, as well as armed factions affiliated with the government, including foreign fighters.

And al-Sharaa’s government has been supported – or at least tolerated – by international actors, most notably the United States. US President Donald Trump praised al-Sharaa earlier this month for his “tremendous progress”, adding, “I think he’s going to put it all together.”

Trump even met al-Sharaa during a visit to Saudi Arabia in May at the behest of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.

As a result, violent actions that once triggered airstrikes and global outrage are now met largely with silence, caution or political justification.

This shift is most stark in the treatment of Kurdish forces, particularly the Syrian Democratic Forces. These forces have been among the US government’s most effective local partners in the fight against Islamic State for years.

Despite this record, violence against Kurdish civilians has elicited little meaningful reaction. Instead, US policy has focused on supporting the Syrian government structure and urging Kurdish leaders to accept the new political order and fully integrate into state institutions.

For Kurdish communities, this demand carries profound risks. The experiences of the Druze and Alawites offer little assurance that disarmament and territorial concessions will be met with protection or political inclusion.

Many Kurds fear laying down arms without security guarantees could expose them to similar attacks.

A return of Islamic State

Another destabilising consequence of the fighting in eastern Syria has been the collapse of the detention network built to prevent the return of IS.

The US has said up to 7,000 detainees could be transferred from Syria to detention facilities in Iraq in its operations.

While framed as a logistical and security necessity, the announcement immediately triggered alarm across Iraq, where memories of the 2014 Islamic State invasion remain vivid. That was fuelled, in part, by prison breaks from poorly secured detention facilities in Iraq and Syria.

In response to these concerns, Iraqi security forces have deployed in large numbers along the Syrian border to prevent escaped IS detainees from infiltrating the country.

US and Turkish agendas

At the centre of this unfolding crisis is the US, which favours a centralised Syrian state under a single trusted authority. This is easier to manage diplomatically and militarily than a fragmented country with competing armed factions.

This approach also aligns with Trump’s broader regional ambitions, including expanding the Abraham Accords by persuading more regional countries to normalise ties with Israel.

Turkey, a NATO member and key US ally, also has a vested interest in the future of Syria. Ankara, a key backer of al-Sharaa, has long viewed any form of Kurdish autonomy in Syria as an existential threat, fearing it would embolden Kurdish demands inside Turkey.

Together, these overlapping agendas reveal why the international response to the fighting in eastern Syria has been so muted. Concerns over civilian protection or the potential regrouping of the Islamic State have been trumped by the strategic realignment taking place with a post-Assad Syria.

Kurdish forces, once indispensable partners, now find themselves caught between shifting alliances and competing regional interests — another casualty of a new international order defined by convenience rather than principle.

Ali Mamouri does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. As Syria’s new government consolidates its power, the Kurdish minority fears for its future – https://theconversation.com/as-syrias-new-government-consolidates-its-power-the-kurdish-minority-fears-for-its-future-274110

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Emily Hunt, PhD Candidate, School of Life and Environmental Sciences, University of Sydney

A great white shark is a masterwork of evolutionary engineering. These beautiful predators glide effortlessly through the water, each slow, deliberate sweep of the powerful tail driving a body specialised for stealth, speed and efficiency. From above, its dark back blends into the deep blue water, while from below its pale belly disappears into the sunlit surface.

In an instant, the calm glide explodes into an attack, accelerating to more than 60 kilometres per hour, the sleek torpedo-like form cutting through the water with little resistance. Then its most iconic feature is revealed: rows of razor-sharp teeth, expertly honed for a life at the top of the food chain.

Scientists have long been fascinated by white shark teeth. Fossilised specimens have been collected for centuries, and the broad serrated tooth structure is easily recognisable in jaws and bite marks of contemporary sharks.

But until now, surprisingly little was known about one of the most fascinating aspects of these immaculately shaped structures: how they change across the jaw and to match the changing demands throughout the animal’s lifetime. Our new research, published in Ecology and Evolution, set out to answer this.

From needle-like teeth to serrated blades

Different shark species have evolved teeth to suit their dietary needs, such as needle-like teeth for grasping slippery squid; broad, flattened molars for crushing shellfish; and serrated blades for slicing flesh and marine mammal blubber.

Shark teeth are also disposable – they are constantly replaced throughout their lives, like a conveyor belt pushing a new tooth forward roughly every few weeks.

White sharks are best known for their large, triangular, serrated teeth, which are ideal for capturing and eating marine mammals like seals, dolphins and whales. But most juveniles don’t start life hunting seals. In fact, they feed mostly on fish and squid, and don’t usually start incorporating mammals into their diet until they are roughly 3 metres long.

This raises a fascinating question: do teeth coming off the conveyor belt change to meet specific challenges of diets at different developmental stages, just as evolution produces teeth to match the diets of different species?

Previous studies tended to focus on a small number of teeth or single life stages. What was missing was a full, jaw-wide view of how tooth shape changes – not just from the upper and lower jaw, but from the front of the mouth to the back, and from juvenile to adult.

Teeth change over a lifetime

When we examined teeth from nearly 100 white sharks, clear patterns emerged.

First, tooth shape changes dramatically across the jaw. The first six teeth on each side are relatively symmetrical and triangular, well suited for grasping, impaling, or cutting into prey.

Beyond the sixth tooth, however, the shape shifts. Teeth become more blade-like, better adapted for tearing and shearing flesh. This transition marks a functional division within the jaw where different teeth play different roles during feeding, much like how we as humans have incisors at the front and molars at the back of our mouths.

Even more striking were the changes that occur as sharks grow. At around 3m in body length, white sharks undergo a major dental transformation. Juvenile teeth are slimmer and often feature small side projections at the base of the tooth, called cusplets, which help to grip small slippery prey such as fish and squid.

As sharks approach 3m, these cusplets disappear and the teeth become broader, thicker, and serrated.

In many ways, this shift mirrors an ecological turning point. Young sharks rely on fish and small prey that require precision and an ability to grasp the smaller bodies. Larger sharks increasingly target marine mammals: big, fast-moving animals that demand cutting power rather than grip.

Once great whites reach this size, they develop an entirely new style of tooth capable of slicing through dense flesh and even bone.

Some teeth stand out even more. The first two teeth on either side of the jaw, the four central teeth, are significantly thicker at the base. These appear to be the primary “impact” teeth, taking the force of the initial bite.

Meanwhile, the third and fourth upper teeth are slightly shorter and angled, suggesting a specialised role in holding onto struggling prey. Their size and position may also be influenced by the underlying skull structure and the placement of key sensory tissues involved in smelling.

We also found consistent differences between the upper and lower jaws. Lower teeth are shaped for grabbing and holding prey, while upper teeth are designed for slicing and dismembering – a coordinated system that turns the white shark’s bite into a highly efficient feeding tool.

A lifestory in teeth

Together, these findings tell a compelling story.

The teeth of white sharks are not static weapons but living records of a shark’s changing lifestyle. Continuous replacement compensates for teeth lost and damaged, but at least equally important, enables design updates that track diet changes through development.

This research helps us better understand how white sharks succeed as apex predators and how their feeding system is finely tuned across their lifetime.

It also highlights the importance of studying animals as dynamic organisms, shaped by both biology and behaviour. In the end, a white shark’s teeth don’t just reveal how it feeds – they reveal who it is, at every stage of its life.

This research has received in kind support for collection of specimens from the New South Wales Department of Primary Industries and Regional Development through the Shark Management Program. David Raubenheimer has no other relevant relationships or funding to declare.

Ziggy Marzinelli is an Associate Professor at The University of Sydney and receives funding from the Australian Research Council, the Ian Potter Foundation and the NSW Environmental Trust.

Emily Hunt does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Great white sharks grow a whole new kind of tooth for slicing bone as they age – https://theconversation.com/great-white-sharks-grow-a-whole-new-kind-of-tooth-for-slicing-bone-as-they-age-272805

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Adam Simpson, Senior Lecturer in International Studies in the School of Society and Culture, Adelaide University

Five years ago, on February 1 2021, Myanmar’s top generals decapitated the elected government. Democratic leaders were arrested, pushed underground or forced into exile.

Since then, the economy has spluttered and foreign investors have headed for the exit. The only growth industries – mostly scam centres, drugs and other criminal activities – enrich those already well-fed.

The military junta has kept its stranglehold via draconian curbs on civil and political liberties. It has bolstered its fighting forces through ruthless conscription, including of child soldiers. They now face rebellions in almost every corner of the ethnically diverse country.

It helps that the military brass can still depend on international support from Russia. China, meanwhile, is playing a careful game to ensure its interests – including prized access to the Indian Ocean for oil and gas – are secured.

And US President Donald Trump’s second term in office has introduced newly unpredictable and detrimental elements to great power politics.

The US government last year cited “notable progress in governance and stability [and] plans for free and fair elections” as justification for removing the Temporary Protected Status designation for immigrants from Myanmar. Although a federal judge blocked this decision a few days ago, this may eventually force previously protected Myanmar citizens to return home.

However, far from being free and fair, the month-long elections that just concluded in Myanmar have been devoid of meaningful democratic practice.

They will entrench the junta and provide little more than a patina of legitimacy that anti-democratic major powers will use to further normalise relations with Myanmar’s military leaders.

Myanmar’s deeply flawed election

The multi-stage elections were being held in only a fraction of the country currently under the military’s authority. Elections were not held in opposition-held territory, so many otherwise eligible voters were disenfranchised.

As such, there is no serious opposition to the military’s proxy, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). Civil and political space is also heavily restricted, with criticism of the election itself being a criminal offence.

The main opposition would be the National League for Democracy (NLD) party, which has won by a landslide in every national election it has participated in since 1990. But it has been banned, along with dozens of other opposition political parties. Its senior leaders, including Aung San Suu Kyi, have been imprisoned.

Citizens have been coerced into taking part in an election with only electronic-voting machines. This is against a background of expanded surveillance and pervasive fear.

Break up of Myanmar?

Despite recent military gains by the junta, supported by Russian military technology and Chinese government pressure, the lines of control may be starting to solidify into an eventual Balkanisation, or break up, of Myanmar into hostile statelets.

The prospects for a future federalised democratic Myanmar seem increasingly remote.

Since the coup there are many areas now under full opposition control. Take, for instance, a recent declaration of independence by a breakaway ethnic Karen armed group. While they represent only one part of the Karen community in eastern Myanmar, this could well precipitate a flood of similar announcements by other ethnic minorities.

Other groups might declare themselves autonomous and seek backing from governments and commercial and security interests in neighbouring countries such as China, Thailand, India and Bangladesh.

Most neighbouring countries will be uneasy about any further fracturing of Myanmar’s territorial integrity. Some, however, see potential benefits. China, for example, supports some ethnic armed groups to protect its strategic economic assets and maintain stability and influence along its borders.

Will international rulings have any impact?

While the conflict continues at home, Myanmar’s military leadership is defending itself at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague. It faces claims it committed genocide against the Muslim Rohingya ethnic minority, particularly during the massacres of 2017.

During the three-week hearings, the junta has argued its “clearance operations” were merely counterterrorism activities, despite the 700,000 refugees it created.

Given the disdain for international law shown by Russia, China and the Trump administration in the US, any finding against the junta will have limited practical impact anyway.

What next?

Meanwhile, some countries in the the ASEAN bloc appear to be softening their opposition to the junta.

Recently, the Philippines foreign secretary met with Myanmar’s senior military leadership in the country’s first month chairing the bloc. This highlights the conundrum faced by regional leaders.

In the years immediately after the coup, ASEAN sought to keep Myanmar’s junta at arm’s length. But a number of key ASEAN players, particularly the more authoritarian regimes in Southeast Asia, would prefer to find a way to normalise engagement with the generals.

From that perspective, the flawed elections are a chance to embrace superficial democratisation and renewal.

This leaves the Myanmar people – millions of whom have fought hard against the coup and its negative consequences – with invidious choices about how to best pursue their independence and freedom.

There is little positive economic news on the horizon. The IMF projects inflation in Myanmar will stay above 30% in 2026 with a real GDP fall of 2.7%. This would compound an almost 20% contraction since the coup. The currency is worth around one quarter of what it was five years ago at the time of the coup.

In practice, this means many Myanmar families have gone backwards dramatically. An untold number are now entangled in illicit and often highly exploitative businesses.

The military’s proxy, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), will undoubtedly form government after the elections. But unlike the USDP-led government that formed after the similarly flawed 2010 election, this new administration is unlikely to pursue political and economic liberalisation sufficient to entice opposition forces to play along.

The people of Myanmar have now been betrayed and brutalised by the military far too often to believe their easy promises.

As a pro vice-chancellor at the University of Tasmania, Nicholas Farrelly engages with a wide range of organisations and stakeholders on educational, cultural and political issues, including at the ASEAN-Australia interface. He has previously received funding from the Australian government for Southeast Asia-related projects and from the Australian Research Council. Nicholas is on the advisory board of the ASEAN-Australia Centre, which is an Australian government body established in 2024, and also Deputy Chair of the board of NAATI, Australia’s government-owned accreditation authority for translators and interpreters. He writes in his personal capacity.

Adam Simpson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. 5 years on from the junta’s coup, Myanmar’s flawed elections can’t unite a country at risk of breaking apart – https://theconversation.com/5-years-on-from-the-juntas-coup-myanmars-flawed-elections-cant-unite-a-country-at-risk-of-breaking-apart-272894

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By David Blair, Emeritus Professor, ARC Centre of Excellence for Gravitational Wave Discovery, OzGrav, The University of Western Australia

Last year, astronomers were fascinated by a runaway asteroid passing through our Solar System from somewhere far beyond. It was moving at around 68 kilometres per second, just over double Earth’s speed around the Sun.

Imagine if it had been something much bigger and faster: a black hole travelling at more like 3,000km per second. We wouldn’t see it coming until its intense gravitational forces started knocking around the orbits of the outer planets.

This may sound a bit ridiculous – but in the past year several lines of evidence have come together to show such a visitor is not impossible. Astronomers have seen clear signs of runaway supermassive black holes tearing through other galaxies, and have uncovered evidence that smaller, undetectable runaways are probably out there too.

Runaway black holes: the theory

The story begins in the 1960s, when New Zealand mathematician Roy Kerr found a solution of Einstein’s general relativity equations that described spinning black holes. This led to two crucial discoveries about black holes.

First, the “no-hair theorem”, which tells us black holes can be distinguished only by three properties: their mass, their spin and their electric charge.

For the second we need to think about Einstein’s famous formula E = mc ² which says that energy has mass. In the case of a black hole, Kerr’s solution tells us that as much as 29% of a black hole’s mass can be in the form of rotational energy.

English physicist Roger Penrose deduced 50 years ago that this rotational energy of black holes can be released. A spinning black hole is like a battery capable of releasing vast amounts of spin energy.

A black hole can contain about 100 times more extractable energy than a star of the same mass. If a pair of black holes coalesce into one, much of that vast energy can be released in a few seconds.

It took two decades of painstaking supercomputer calculations to understand what happens when two spinning black holes collide and coalesce, creating gravitational waves. Depending on how the black holes are spinning, the gravitational wave energy can be released much more strongly in one direction than others – which sends the black holes shooting like a rocket in the opposite direction.

If the spins of the two colliding black holes are aligned the right way, the final black hole can be rocket-powered to speeds of thousands of kilometres per second.

Learning from real black holes

All that was theory, until the LIGO and Virgo gravitational wave observatories began detecting the whoops and chirps of gravitational waves given off by pairs of colliding black holes in 2015.

One of the most exciting discoveries was of black hole “ringdowns”: a tuning fork-like ringing of newly formed black holes that tells us about their spin. The faster they spin, the longer they ring.

Better and better observations of coalescing black holes revealed that some pairs of black holes had randomly oriented spin axes, and that many of them had very large spin energy.

All this suggested runaway black holes were a real possibility. Moving at 1% of light speed, their trajectories through space would not follow the curved orbits of stars in galaxies, but rather would be almost straight.

Runaway black holes spotted in the wild

This brings us to the final step in our sequence: the actual discovery of runaway black holes.

It is difficult to search for relatively small runaway black holes. But a runaway black hole of a million or billion solar masses will create huge disruptions to the stars and gas around it as it travels through a galaxy.

They are predicted to leave contrails of stars in their wake, forming from interstellar gas in the same way contrails of cloud form in the wake of a jet plane. Stars form from collapsing gas and dust attracted to the passing black hole. It’s a process that would last for tens of millions of years as the runaway black hole crosses a galaxy.

In 2025, several papers showed images of surprisingly straight streaks of stars within galaxies such as the image below. These seem to be convincing evidence for runaway black holes.

One paper, led by Yale astronomer Pieter van Dokkum, describes a very distant galaxy imaged by the James Webb telescope with a surprisingly bright contrail 200,000 light years long. The contrail showed the pressure effects expected from the gravitational compression of gas as a black hole passes: in this case it suggests a black hole with a mass 10 million times the Sun’s, travelling at almost 1,000km/s.

Another describes a long straight contrail cutting across a galaxy called NGC3627. This one is likely caused by a black hole of about 2 million times the mass of the Sun, travelling at 300km/s. Its contrail is about 25,000 light years long.

If these extremely massive runaways exist, so too should their smaller cousins because gravitational wave observations suggest that some of them come together with the opposing spins needed to create powerful kicks. The speeds are easily fast enough for them to travel between galaxies.

So runaway black holes tearing through and between galaxies are a new ingredient of our remarkable universe. It’s not impossible that one could turn up in our Solar System, with potentially catastrophic results.

We should not lose sleep over this discovery. The odds are minuscule. It is just another way that the story of our universe has become a little bit richer and a bit more exciting than it was before.

David Blair receives funding from the Australian Research Council. He is a member of the ARC Centre of Excellence for Gravitational Wave Discovery and is director of the Einstein-First education project that is developing a modern physics curriculum for primary and middle school science education.

– ref. New fear unlocked: runaway black holes – https://theconversation.com/new-fear-unlocked-runaway-black-holes-272429

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Mark Shanahan, Associate Professor of Political Engagement, University of Surrey

Federal immigration agents in the city of Minneapolis are accused of having wrestled a 37-year-old intensive care nurse called Alex Pretti to the ground and then shooting him dead. The killing took place just over a mile from where another American citizen, Renee Good, was allegedly fatally shot by federal agents weeks earlier.

The latest incident prompted angry protests from people in Minneapolis who want the immigration enforcement operation in their city to end. We spoke to Mark Shanahan, an associate professor of political engagement at the University of Surrey, to address several key issues.

Why has sending in federal immigration agents caused such trouble in Minnesota?

Since returning to the White House in January 2025, the national guard has been deployed to several US cities to quell what have generally been Donald Trump-inflated crises, with illegal migration among the most prominent. However, in December, the Supreme Court ruled that Trump did not have authority for such deployments.

So, since then we have seen federal agents with US Customs and Border Protection and Immigration and Customs Enforcement taking the battle largely to minorities in cities with Democratic party leadership as part of the president’s violent attack on illegal immigration, a situation he has described as “the greatest invasion in history”.

Minneapolis is a Democrat-run city in a Democrat-led state. The governor is Tim Walz who ran for vice-president on the Kamala Harris ticket against Trump in the 2024 election. Walz has faced allegations, which he denies, of overlooking alleged widespread fraud in the financing of public safety net programmes, supposedly involving segments of the Somali-American community.

While most of these allegations have been refuted, they gave Trump reason to send in federal agents. This has ramped up tensions between state officials and the administration, causing brutal and unnecessary deaths in the community and pitting ordinary Minnesotans against federal government officials.

How does the situation in Minnesota reflect the second amendment right to bear arms?

It’s a reversal of virtually all of the second amendment debates that have been seen in recent years. The second amendment was introduced to the US constitution in 1791 through the Bill of Rights due to a deep mistrust of centralised military power and a desire to ensure that the newly formed federal government could not disarm the populace.

The founding fathers envisaged a “natural right of resistance and self-preservation”. Trump’s actions in sending in armed federal agents to conduct enforcement operations in various states appear to fulfil the founding fathers’ concerns.

The agents are trampling all over not only citizens’ second amendment right to bear arms (officials seemingly connected Pretti’s killing to him carrying a weapon) but also their first amendment right to freedom of assembly.

---

Read more:
Shooting of Alex Pretti in Minneapolis has put America’s gun lobby at odds with the White House

---

How have the fatal shootings affected Trump’s popularity?

Trump’s popularity is on the decline. His failure to deliver on the economic promises outlined in his election campaign, scatter-gun approach to international relations and the widening gulf between rhetoric and achievement have all damaged his standing in the polls.

In a CNN poll published on January 16, almost six in ten respondents described Trump’s first year back in office as a failure with the president focused on the wrong priorities.

And what support he does have is ebbing rapidly as federal immigration agents appear out of control, targeting many more documented citizens than illegal migrants, spreading fear and operating as if they are above the law.

With what looks like high levels of gaslighting coming from Homeland Security officials, voters are turning against the increasing autocracy of this administration, believing in the evidence widespread across the media rather than highly contentious statements from Trump’s lieutenants.

Is it unusual for former presidents to speak out the way Barack Obama and Bill Clinton have?

It certainly is. There is a longstanding tradition in the US of, and implicit agreement among, former presidents to avoid public criticism of the incumbent. Such reticence to speak is generally a sign of respect for the office and an acknowledgement of the unique and difficult challenges of the presidency.

But Trump 2.0 is no normal presidency. The 47th president’s style is both combative and retributive, and there seems to be an increasing feeling of it being out of step with the desires and best interest of the country he leads.

Trump’s march to autocracy creates crises where he regards himself as the hero the country needs to overcome its ills. His predecessors take a different view.

Whether it’s Obama calling out the assault on core American values or Clinton’s condemnation of the “horrible scenes” in Minneapolis as “unacceptable” and avoidable, Democrat past presidents have not held back. Notably, the only living previous Republican president, George W. Bush, has so far kept his own counsel.

What can be done to prevent further violence?

Most simply, Trump could end the deployment of federal immigration agents to Minneapolis and refrain from similar actions in the future. He is clearly looking for an off-ramp and sending his “border czar”, Tom Homan, to Minneapolis to direct operations could be the first step to de-escalation. But Trump abhors being called out as wrong and, at least beyond Minneapolis, is far more likely to double down on the immigration enforcement activities.

Realistically, the most likely de-escalator is Congress showing some teeth and refusing to fund further federal immigration enforcement activity. Democrats could force another government shutdown over the issue, and need just a handful of Republicans to flip in order to refuse to sanction a 2026 budget for the Department of Homeland Security.

At a public level, the greater the scrutiny of immigration enforcement agencies, the closer the fact-checking of official statements and the more cohesive the opposition to Trump’s deportation policy, the greater the chance of effectively opposing it.

It is midterm year – and the greater the public pressure, the more likely Republican legislators are to cleave away from the Trump line. While he currently controls the levers of power, that control remains fragile. Even Trump may soon realise that overt, violent, coercive autocracy is not a vote winner.

Mark Shanahan has a new edited collection, Trump Unbound, coming out in October 2026 to be published by Palgrave Macmillan.

– ref. Why the shooting of Alex Pretti in Minneapolis is so significant – expert Q&A – https://theconversation.com/why-the-shooting-of-alex-pretti-in-minneapolis-is-so-significant-expert-qanda-274318

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Andrew Latham, Professor of Political Science, Macalester College

Tariffs are on, until they are not. Military force is an option … and then it’s off the table.

Erratic behavior and unpredictability is having a moment in foreign policy circles. In the White House and elsewhere, it is seemingly being viewed as a strategic asset rather than a weakness.

But it is far from a new strategy. Wild threats, sudden policy reversals and intentionally confusing language have long been used to keep adversaries off balance and gain leverage.

In fact, the concept has its own name in international relations: “madman theory.” As outlined by Cold War strategists Daniel Ellsberg and Thomas Schelling, it holds that projecting a readiness to take extreme action can shape an opponent’s calculations by heightening fears of escalation.

While the theory was meant to be explanatory, in the sense that observers used it to explain apparently irrational behavior, it has sometimes been used in a prescriptive way, as an approach consciously adopted by leaders.

The 3 conditions for madman success

The madman theory has historical roots going back to Machiavelli, but it is most closely associated with Richard Nixon, who, as incoming president, reportedly used the term to explain his approach to trying to force North Vietnam’s surrender in the Vietnam War.

Historians see evidence of the theory’s limited applicability in episodes such as Nixon’s 1969 placing of the U.S. military on nuclear alert, which appeared to have reinforced Soviet caution even if it did not bring about an end of the Vietnam War.

The theory was more applicable in Nixon’s era because of three background conditions that were in place.

The first was information scarcity. During the Cold War, signals traveled more slowly than they do today and through narrow channels. Messages were filtered by professional diplomats, intelligence analysts and military officers.

Ambiguity could be sustained. A country’s leader could appear possibly unhinged without being instantly decoded, contextualized or publicly dissected. “Madman” signaling depended on this controlled opacity.

The second condition was a stable adversary with a shared notion of risk. Nixon’s gambit worked, when it worked at all, because Soviet leaders were deeply conservative risk managers operating inside a rigid hierarchy. They feared miscalculation because they believed it could lead to the Soviet Union’s fall — or at least their fall within it.

The third condition was credibility built through restraint elsewhere. The madman pose only works if it is exceptional. Nixon appeared dangerous to adversaries precisely because the American system normally appeared controlled. His apparent erratic behavior was exceptional in a context of bureaucratic orderliness.

But the world of those three conditions is gone.

Threats today are tweeted, clipped, reframed, leaked, mocked and talked about in real time. Unpredictability doesn’t have time to breathe public fear into existence. Rather, it can devolve into noise.

And nations such as Iran, Russia and China operate in a world they already regard as unstable and unjust. Volatility does not frighten them; it is the environment they expect. In such conditions, apparent irrationality can invite probing, hedging or reciprocal escalation.

Meanwhile, erratic behavior is no longer exceptional or unexpected.

Many a madman would struggle today

Unpredictability only works if it’s strategic rather than designed on the fly. Trump has blustered, contradicted himself publicly, ramped-up rhetorically and then backed down, mostly without receiving obvious concessions.

The more this happens, the more predictability he creates about unpredictability.

And once unpredictability becomes expected, it loses its coercive force.

This dynamic is evident in Trump’s handling of both Iran and Greenland. In the Iranian case, pressure — including military strikes — has been applied without clearly defining where escalation would end.

With Greenland, coercive threats aimed at an ally only strained NATO without producing compliance.

In neither instance did unpredictability translate into durable leverage. Instead, it generated uncertainty about objectives and limits.

A bigger problem for any leader wishing to adopt a madman strategy is that today’s international order and media ecosystem are more inured to volatility. Threats no longer freeze opponents into caution.

Friendly nations hedge their bets. For example, faced with U.S. threats over tariffs, India strengthened ties with China.

Meanwhile, enemies test boundaries. Russia, for example, has treated Trump’s ambiguous signaling on Ukraine as little more than a green-light for it to continue its campaign to conquer the Donbas region.

Does the madman have a future?

There are still limited circumstances in which ambiguity can serve a strategic purpose.

Limited uncertainty about specific responses can reinforce deterrence by keeping adversaries cautious. U.S. strategic ambiguity toward Taiwan, for example, leaves it unclear whether Washington would intervene militarily in the case of an attack by Beijing, discouraging the locking of any side into automatic escalation.

That part of the madman approach remains effective. But what no longer works is volatility untethered from clear objectives and visible limits.

The madman theory was built for a rigid, rule-bound world. It is least effective precisely where today’s politics feels most chaotic.

This article is part of a series explaining foreign policy terms commonly used but rarely explained.

Andrew Latham does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Rebirth of the madman theory? Unpredictability isn’t what it was when it comes to foreign policy – https://theconversation.com/rebirth-of-the-madman-theory-unpredictability-isnt-what-it-was-when-it-comes-to-foreign-policy-274098