Category: The Conversation – Global Perspectives

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Fellow for the Middle East at the Baker Institute, Rice University

The U.S.-Israeli military campaign against Iran took a dangerous turn on March 18, 2026, with tit-for-tat strikes on critical energy infrastructure that amount to the most serious regional escalation since the conflict began.

First, an Israeli drone strike targeted facilities at Iran’s Asaluyeh complex, damaging four plants that treat gas from the offshore South Pars field, which straddles the maritime boundary between Iran and Qatar.

Tehran vowed to retaliate by hitting five key energy targets in Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. Hours later, Iranian missiles caused “extensive damage” to Ras Laffan, the heart of Qatar’s energy sector. Qatar’s state-owned petroleum company said additional attacks on March 19 had targeted liquefied natural gas facilities.

Separate suspected Iranian aerial attacks also caused damage to oil refineries in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and led to the closure of gas facilities in the United Arab Emirates.

Much attention has been focused on the seemingly unanticipated consequences of the U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iran and the de facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz to international shipping. But as a scholar of the Gulf, I believe that the targeting of energy facilities is close to a worst-case outcome for regional states. Export revenues from oil and, in Qatar’s case, natural gas have transformed the Gulf states into regional powers with global reach over the past three decades, and that is now at risk.

Energy becomes a battlefield

The offshore gas field that lies on both sides of the maritime boundary between Qatar and Iran is the world’s largest reserve of so-called nonassociated gas. This means that the gas is not connected to the production of crude oil and is unaffected by decisions to raise or lower output according to, for example, OPEC quotas.

The field, known as the North Field on the Qatari side and South Pars on the Iranian side, was discovered in 1971. Development of its massive resources began in earnest in the 1980s. Largely because of the field, Iran and Qatar have the second- and third-largest proven gas reserves in the world, respectively.

While Israel attacked gas facilities in southern Iran on the second day of the 12-day war in June 2025, oil and gas infrastructure was largely spared during that earlier conflict. The opening two weeks of the current fighting, however, have seen a significant loosening of the restraints on targeting critical infrastructure.

On March 8, Israel struck oil storage facilities in Tehran, starting large fires and blanketing the capital in plumes of smoke and toxic, so-called black rain. For their part, Iranian officials signaled that energy facilities were on the table as swarms of its drones targeted the Shaybah oil field in Saudi Arabia, the Shah gas field southwest of Abu Dhabi and oil facilities in Fujairah.

One of the seven emirates of the United Arab Emirates along with Abu Dhabi, Fujairah is strategically located on the Gulf of Oman, outside the Strait of Hormuz, with direct access to the Indian Ocean. For this reason, it has grown into an important oil-loading and ship fuel-supplying hub and is the terminus for the Abu Dhabi crude oil pipeline.

Opened in 2012, that pipeline has a capacity of 1.5 million barrels per day, covering more than half of the UAE’s oil exports. Its repeated targeting during the war signifies Iranian intent to disrupt one of the two pipelines that bypass Hormuz. Thus far, the other pipeline, the East-West pipeline from the eastern Saudi oil fields to the Red Sea port of Yanbu, has not been targeted.

But that could quickly change, as early on March 19 Saudi authorities reported that a drone had struck a refinery at Yanbu, while a ballistic missile that targeted the port had been intercepted.

Cascading risks of further energy attacks

On at least four occasions over the past decade, most recently in 2022, Houthi forces in Yemen – who are allied with Iran– struck targets around the East-West pipeline.

And in 2024 and 2025, in defiance of U.S. and Israeli policy in the region, the Houthis led a campaign against shipping in the Red Sea.

So far, the Houthis have refrained from joining the latest war, but they have threatened to do so. Any such actions would cause enormous additional disruption to oil markets.

However, the attack on Ras Laffan in Qatar and the wider threats to other energy infrastructure in the Gulf have the potential on their own to be catastrophic for a number of reasons.

Developed in the 1990s, the industrial city of Ras Laffan is the most critical cog in Qatar’s economic and energy landscape and the epicenter of the largest facility for the production and export of LNG in the world. Fourteen giant LNG “trains” process the gas from the North Field, which is then transported by vessels from the accompanying port to destinations worldwide.

Ras Laffan also houses gas-to-liquids facilities – these convert natural gas into liquid petroleum products – along with a refinery and water and power plants that produce desalinated water and generate electricity. Ras Laffan is quite simply the engine that has powered Qatar’s meteoric growth and rise as a global power broker.

Early reports suggest that the world’s largest gas-to-liquids plant, Pearl GTL, which is operated by Shell, was damaged during the first attack on Ras Laffan, and that the second attack damaged 17% of Qatar’s LNG capacity, with repairs projected to take three to five years. A three-phased expansion to the LNG facilities, which would add a further six LNG trains by 2027, is also likely to be delayed.

The burning Gulf state dilemma

What is clear is that Iranian officials view the Israeli — or American — targeting of facilities in their territorial waters in the South Pars field as sufficient to justify hitting facilities on the Qatari side. That’s even though Qatar forcefully condemned the Israeli strike on Asaluyeh as a dangerous escalation, for reasons that have become all too real.

There lies the nub of the dilemma for Qatar and the five other Gulf states facing the brunt of the backlash from a war they tried to avert through diplomacy.

On my visits to the region in fall 2025, it became clear that many officials in the Gulf viewed the ceasefire that ended the 12-day war as, at best, a temporary cessation of hostilities and feared that the next round of fighting would be far more damaging, for Iran and for the region.

This has now come to pass. An embattled government in Tehran that sees itself in an existential fight for survival has spread the cost of war as far and as wide as it can.

Officials statements from Gulf capitals that have consistently – and correctly – emphasized their direct noninvolvement in the U.S.-Israeli military campaign have fallen on deaf ears in Tehran.

An incident on March 2 that saw Qatar down two Iranian Soviet-era fighters was a defensive measure. The jets had entered Qatari airspace with the apparent intent to strike Al Udeid, the air base that houses the forward headquarters of U.S. Central Command.

However, the scope of Iran’s attacks has gone far beyond military facilities used by U.S. forces and have hit the sectors – travel, tourism and sporting events – that put the region so firmly on the global map.

Nowhere is this more the case than the energy sector that has underwritten and made possible the transformation of the Gulf states over the past half-century, and whose health remains vital to the global economy and supply chains in oil, gas and many derivative products.

If that sector remains firmly in the crosshairs, there’s no telling how intense the regional and global consequences of the ongoing war in Iran may prove to be.

Kristian Coates Ulrichsen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Targeting of energy facilities turned Iran war into worst-case scenario for Gulf states – https://theconversation.com/targeting-of-energy-facilities-turned-iran-war-into-worst-case-scenario-for-gulf-states-278730

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Rabia Akhtar, Associate of Managing the Atom, Belfer Center, Harvard Kennedy School; University of Lahore

A weekslong war between Pakistan and Afghanistan was paused on March 18, 2026, to mark the Muslim holiday of Eid al-Fitr. But that does not mean the conflict is over.

Neither side showed any indication that the planned five-day cessation of operations would be anything other than temporary, and they warned that any violation would be met with reciprocal strikes.

Already the conflict has seen hundreds killed, with a blast at a drug rehabilitation center in Kabul on March 16, 2026, killing more than 400 people, according to Afghanistan’s Taliban government.

The conflict has been largely kept off the front pages by the war in Iran. But as an expert on Pakistan’s foreign policy and security, I believe the fighting has the potential to further destabilize the region.

Why are Pakistan and Afghanistan fighting now?

The current conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan is not a sudden rupture of relations between the two countries, which share a 1,640-mile (2,640 km) border called the Durand Line.

Rather, the flare-up is a result of an intensification of long-simmering, historical security concerns along the Durand Line. The immediate trigger lies in Pakistan’s growing concern over cross-border militant activity, particularly from groups such as the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, which Islamabad believes operate from sanctuaries inside Afghanistan.

After the Taliban’s return to power in Kabul in 2021, Pakistan had anticipated a more cooperative security environment, based on earlier experiences in the 1990s.

However, that did not materialize. Instead, there was a perceptible rise in militant attacks within Pakistan, accompanied by Kabul’s reluctance or inability to decisively act against Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan.

Complicating this landscape further is the evolving character of the threat environment for Pakistan. In 2025, Pakistan was involved in a short war with historical rival India – the most intense fighting between the two countries for nearly 30 years.

The use of suspected Indian-made drones by the Afghan Taliban in recent attacks inside Pakistani territory adds an additional regional element to the fighting – Islamabad will be wary of any Indian interference in Afghanistan.

In response, Pakistan has reportedly undertaken countermeasures, including airstrikes targeting drone infrastructure linked to militant networks inside Afghanistan.

All this points to a widening battlespace, where new technologies make it easier to escalate in indirect and deniable ways.

This is not merely a bilateral border crisis but a layered security contest shaped by cross-border militancy, emerging technologies and competing threat narratives.

The convergence of Pakistan’s growing willingness to respond with physical force, the Afghan Taliban’s assertion of sovereignty and the absence of a mutually agreed framework for border management continues to drive episodic escalation rooted in structural mistrust.

What is the broader history of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations?

Historically, Pakistan-Afghanistan relations have often oscillated between uneasy cooperation and strategic suspicion toward each other – all shaped by unresolved territorial, ideological and geopolitical dynamics.

At the heart of it lies a dispute over the Durand Line, which Afghanistan has never formally recognized as an international border. This has resulted in a sustained and persistent tension in their bilateral relations since Pakistan’s independence in 1947.

During the Cold War, these tensions were overlaid by competing alignments. Pakistan was embedded in the U.S.-led security framework, while Afghanistan maintained closer ties with the Soviet Union at various points.

However, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 marked a critical turning point. Pakistan became a front-line state supporting the Afghan jihad against invading Soviet forces.

This entrenched cross-border militant networks and blurred the boundary between state policy and nonstate actors, resulting in dynamics that continue to shape the region.

The post-2001 period was marked by fraught relationships between Pakistan and successive U.S.-backed Afghan governments, particularly over allegations of Pakistan’s alleged proxy support for Islamist groups in Afghanistan.

Many thought the Afghan Taliban’s return to power in 2021 would resolve this tension. But instead, it reconfigured it.

While ideological affinities continue to exist between the two nations, they have not translated into any sort of strategic alignment – especially on questions of militancy and border control.

What are the implications of the conflict for the region?

The implications of Pakistan-Afghanistan tensions are significant and extend well beyond bilateral frictions. They intersect with broader questions of regional stability, militancy and great power competition.

I believe there are four direct implications:

• First, the persistence of ungoverned or contested spaces along the Pakistan-Afghan border risks creating an enabling environment for transnational militant groups. This has real implications not only for Pakistan’s internal security but also for regional actors concerned about spillover effects.

• Second, instability along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border complicates regional connectivity and economic integration initiatives, including projects linked to broader Central and South Asia. A volatile western frontier constrains Pakistan’s ability to act as a regional stabilizer and a safe conduit for regional trade and energy corridors.

• Third, for outside interested parties like the U.S., the situation underscores the limits of disengagement from Afghanistan. While Washington’s military withdrawal marked the end of direct involvement, the persistence of militancy and the risk of regional destabilization ensure that Afghanistan remains strategically relevant not only for the U.S. but for other major powers as well.

• Finally, I see these tensions as highlighting a broader pattern: The post-2021 Afghanistan remains internally consolidated but externally contested. Its relationships with neighbors, particularly Pakistan, will be central in determining whether the region moves toward managed stability or recurring cycles of escalation.

Rabia Akhtar does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Pakistan-Afghanistan conflict is rooted in local border dispute – but the risks extend across the region – https://theconversation.com/pakistan-afghanistan-conflict-is-rooted-in-local-border-dispute-but-the-risks-extend-across-the-region-278740

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Sara Webb, Course Director, Centre for Astrophysics and Supercomputing, Swinburne University of Technology

As an astrophysicist, my world revolves around the wonders of space and the mysteries of the universe. This means I can be a tough critic of science fiction books and films that explore these topics.

But when I walked out of a recent preview screening of the film adaptation of Andy Weir’s 2021 science fiction novel Project Hail Mary, I had tears of joy in my eyes. The filmmakers had done justice not just to the original story, but also to the science at the heart of it.

The story revolves around Ryland Grace, played by Ryan Gosling, who awakes from a coma with no memory and no idea why he’s on a space ship 11.9 light years away from Earth. As his memories slowly start to return, the truth becomes clear. The Sun is dying, and he is our only saving grace.

So here are the science facts – as well as the science fiction – of the film, which is in cinemas in Australia and New Zealand from today.

A dying sun

In Project Hail Mary the Sun is dying due to an alien organism that has spread around our part of the Milky Way.

Firstly, could an organism spread from one solar system to another? According to some scientists, yes. It’s a theory called panspermia.

We have no hard evidence to prove it right now. But the theory isn’t completely wild. We know material from solar systems can be transported great distances – we ourselves have witnessed as least three interstellar visitors enter and fly through our Solar System.

If life forms could survive the harshness of space and live on such rocky bodies, it’s possible this is how life could spread. But that life would likely be basic organisms.

As for the organism at the centre of this movie, astrophage, its mechanics and behaviour sit rightly in the wonderful world of science fiction.

The size of space

The idea of humans travelling between stars feels like an almost impossible challenge.

In our galaxy alone there are more than 400 billion stars, but only roughly 100 of them are within 20 light years of Earth.

Project Hail Mary focuses it’s attention on one of those systems, known as Tau Ceti, sitting 11.9 light years away.

If we were to travel to this star with the fastest spacecraft humans have ever flown in, the Apollo 10 module, travelling at more than 39,900 kilometres per hour, it would take us 320,000 years. In a story where the Sun is dying now, there is no time for that. So how does Project Hail Mary overcome this problem?

Enter special relativity.

Special relativity is one of the most paradigm-shifting theories of modern history. Developed by Albert Einstein in 1905, it equated mass and energy as one and the same. It best known by the famous E = mc² formula.

What Einstein was able to work our mathematically, and we’ve later proved observationally, is that the closer to the speed of light something travels, the slower the time it experiences in its reference frame.

It’s called a Lorentz transformation – and it allows us to determine the time experienced in a reference frame different to our own, say travelling close to the speed of light.

The movie doesn’t give a full physics lesson on this, but rather uses visual cues, including correct mathematics worked out by Grace on a whiteboard to demonstrate this time change.

What Grace determines is that he’s only been in a coma for four years due to the effects of time dilation on a ship travelling that fast. Which is scientifically spot on.

We have to talk about the aliens

While on the mission to save our world, Grace meets another being trying to do the same – Rocky.

We (us astronomers at least) do believe aliens exist somewhere in the universe. This belief isn’t based on crop circles or UFOs; it’s based on statistical chances.

In the Milky Way alone we estimate there are at least 100 billion planets. If life was able to form, evolve and thrive on Earth, there are many reasons why astronomers believe that could be true in other systems.

A lot of our confidence relates to the essential building blocks of life as we know it. All life on Earth is carbon based. But if we break down our existence even more, we find one thing: amino acids. These organic compounds are the foundation of our DNA.

What’s most exciting is that we’ve identified these in space. Samples from asteroids and fallen meteorites have confirmed many of the amino acids needed for life on Earth also exist on other objects in our Solar System.

Alien earths beyond our own

The film allows audiences to see what other planets might look like.

When Andy Weir originally wrote this novel, it was scientific consensus that alien worlds likely existed around Tau Ceti and the home planet of our new friend Rocky, 40 Eridani A.

But in recent years science has progressed and new data suggests both of these systems appear to have had false detections of planets.

So at least for now, Rocky’s home doesn’t exist – but thousands of others do. As of March 2026 astronomers have confirmed 6,100 exoplanets. These are worlds that exist beyond our own solar system, around distant stars, and can be either rocky or gaseous.

One place Grace and Rocky need to explore on their adventure to save the stars is a theoretical planet orbiting Tau Ceti. Here we see stunning hues of green and red, and distinctive swirls of gases mixing in the atmosphere.

It’s reminiscent of the gas giant of our own Solar System, Jupiter.

Project Hail Mary is more than just an epic adventure film with beautiful visuals. It’s a story that reminds us how important our world is – and how vital science is to our continued existence on it.

Sara Webb does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Project Hail Mary is packed with hard science. An astrophysicist breaks it down – https://theconversation.com/project-hail-mary-is-packed-with-hard-science-an-astrophysicist-breaks-it-down-278428

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Darius Sepehri, Doctoral Candidate, Comparative Literature, Religion and History of Philosophy, University of Sydney

Nowruz (meaning “new day” in the Persian language) is the Iranian, or Persian, festival celebrating the coming of spring – and the regeneration it brings. It is the first day of the year in the Iranian solar calendar (which began in 1079), marking the exact moment of the spring equinox. The date varies, between March 19 and 21 – this year, it’s March 21.

Within Iran, this year’s Nowruz will be especially emotionally charged, as its cities are under bombardment by Israel and the United States, leaving nearly 1,500 dead since February 28. By celebrating, Iranians will be reaffirming their unique identity and deep-rootedness in their homeland.

Rooted in the Middle East and Central Asia, Nowruz is celebrated in countries that were once part of Iranian empires: including Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, India, Pakistan and the Caucasus region, particularly Azerbaijan.

Iranian culture was absorbed and integrated into local cultures during the pre-modern period – and it often remained as these territories were gradually lost. This wider sphere of Iranian influence is called Iranzamin or “Greater Iran”.

When Nowruz was first established, during the early period of the pre-Islamic Sassanian dynasty (224–651 CE), it was celebrated throughout the Persian Empire.

In Iran, the span of Nowruz is two weeks, with a four-day national holiday. Happily for students, schools are closed. In some other countries that celebrate the festival, government and retail sectors are closed, and public ceremonies and gatherings are common.

Today, it is part of UNESCO’s list of intangible cultural heritage.

Origins, rituals and symbols

The origins of Nowruz are tied to the practices of Zoroastrianism, the religion of the ancient Persian world – and one of the world’s oldest living ones. It is based on the teachings of the prophet Zoroaster, believed to have lived around the 6th century BCE.

In the lead-up to the festival, people embark on vigorous spring cleaning (khaneh tekaani – literally, “shaking of the house”), participating symbolically in clearing, or sweeping away, the old – and any lingering negativity.

New clothes are often bought, and decorative dresses are prepared for the Nowruz festivities to come.

The last Wednesday of the year before Nowruz is Chaharshanbeh Soori, literally “Scarlet Wednesday”. Fire is a sacred element within Zoroastrianism. Chaharshanbeh Soori is an improvised ritual centred on purification by proximity to it. Small fires are lit in public places, fireworks are let off and decorative lights adorn the streets.

Special foods are prepared: rich soups, pastries and servings of dried nuts and fruits. Sometimes, young children go through the streets banging on pots and pans to drive out the “unlucky” Wednesday.

At the centre of Nowruz rituals is a decorative setting (sofreh), artfully arrayed on household tables – which are placed with the haft seen: seven items beginning with the letter s, or “seen” in Persian.

The seven items most often placed are: seeb (apple), sabzeh (shoots from wheat or lentils), serkeh (vinegar), samanou (a pudding made with wheat), senjed (a berry), sekkeh (a coin), and seer (garlic). Each item symbolises some aspect of living systems: birth, growth, health, beauty and wisdom.

The sabzeh grass, representing new growth, is grown in a flat dish, then placed outdoors on the 13th day of the New Year.

The central books of Irano–Islamic culture also feature. Readings are made from the Qur’an, and the collected poems (or The Divan) of beloved 14th-century Persian poet Hafez.

The first few days of the Nowruz festival are spent visiting family and friends. Presents are exchanged, with older family members giving small gifts of cash to younger ones. In Central Asia, athletic competitions may take place, such as traditional equestrian games in Kyrgyzstan. Public gatherings in town squares featuring treats and festive foods are common in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

Sizdah Bedar, also known as Nature Day, brings the Nowruz period to an end, 13 days after the equinox. People gather outdoors in a park or green space for a picnic lunch, to bring good luck for the year.

Politics, revolution and nationalism

Iranian monarchies used Nowruz to reinforce prestige for centuries: from the Safavid dynasty (1501–1736), which birthed the modern Iranian state, through the Qajar dynasty (1789–1925) and the Pahlavi dynasty – which ruled from 1925 and was ousted in the 1979 Islamic Revolution.

The Shia Muslim clergy have long been a powerful faction within Iran. The Iranian monarchy embraced Nowruz and its non-Islamic roots to counterbalance the clergy’s power.

After the revolution, some Iranian authorities attempted to downplay Nowruz due to its non-Islamic character. But unsurprisingly, given the deep-rootedness of the festival, they failed. Today, Nowruz co-exists with Islamic festivals, highlighting the synthetic and dual nature of Iran’s culture.

The Soviet Union went much further than Iran: it outright banned the festival in Central Asian nations with Nowruz traditions. These traditions weren’t officially revived until post-Soviet independence in 1991.

Nowruz was a minor part of the Ottoman world, but it began to be revived at the end of World War I by the Turkish state, as part of Turkish political nationalism. At the same time, Kurds within Turkey embraced Nowruz more publicly, to promote the cause of Kurdish identity.

Nowruz in Iran in 2026

For many years, the US president has traditionally given a Nowruz message. But Donald Trump’s war against Iran and constant use of ultra-violent rhetoric against Iranians would sour any message he might give during this year’s Nowruz.

Similarly, this week Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu mentioned Nowruz while praising the destruction Israeli forces were carrying out in Iran. “Our aircraft are hitting the terror operatives on the grounds, in the crossroads, in the city squares,” he stated. “This is meant to enable the brave people of Iran to celebrate the Festival of Fire.” He ended with the threat: “We’re watching from above.”

This is all happening in the wake of attacks on Iran’s schools and hospitals, bombings of oil depots in Tehran releasing toxic elements into the atmosphere, and damage to dozens of Iran’s cultural heritage sites.

This year, Iranians’ Nowruz celebrations will signal their intent to stay together in the face of threats demanding, in Trump’s words, “unconditional surrender”.

The Nowruz focus on regrowth and regeneration will allow celebrants to look to something beyond destruction. To wish for new birth, health and flourishing of life.

“Nowruz Khosh Amad”: Welcome Nowruz, Nowruz has come joyously.

Darius Sepehri does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. What is Nowruz, the Iranian new year? – https://theconversation.com/what-is-nowruz-the-iranian-new-year-278779

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Lauren C. Hall, PhD Candidate in Psychology, University of Tasmania

As countries around the world look to follow Australia’s lead and implement a social media ban for kids, many are also considering fines as an enforcement mechanism.

This is part of the playbook when it comes to regulating big tech. For example, last month the United Kingdom’s data watchdog fined Reddit £14 million (A$26 million) for unlawfully using children’s data.

In April 2025, the European Commission fined Apple and Meta €500 million (A$820 million) and €200 million (A$329 million) respectively for breaching the Digital Markets Act. And in September, the commission fined Google nearly €3 billion (A$4.9 billion) for abusive practices in online advertising technology.

But fines don’t always work to encourage companies to follow the law. For some companies, “illegal with a fine” is interpreted as “legal for a price”. So what are some other, more effective methods to encourage good corporate behaviour?

Fines can backfire

If fines are not consistent, immediate, and severe, they can backfire. If they do, bad behaviour may increase.

For example, a 2000 study examined the effect of childcare centres in Israel introducing fines for parents who regularly picked their children up late. But instead, these fines actually increased late pick-ups by parents.

Even after fines were stopped, the number of late pick-ups stayed higher than before.

Why? Because when there were fines, they were small (not severe), and parents could wait a month to pay (not immediate). However, parents got the immediate benefit of longer childcare.

Similarly, technology companies may decide a fine is cheaper than the costs to make changes, or any loss in money from fewer users and ad sales. And this could lead to them continuing with business-as-usual.

Corporate fines often fail because it may be unclear who in the company is directly responsible. Fines can also sometimes be too small to stop bad behaviour by large companies.

For these reasons, corporate re-offending is frequent, even if companies have been fined in the past.

A fine equals forgiveness

After introducing fines, behaviours previously considered socially or morally unacceptable may also be seen as “forgiven” by payment. This can increase bad behaviour.

The importance of unwanted behaviours may also be judged by the size of the fine.

If fines are seen as “small”, violations may also be seen as small, and bad behaviours may rise. Corporations may also see “small” fines as just a cost-of-doing-business.

Importantly, fine size is closely linked to a company’s financial size. For a small company, a fine could seem huge. The same sized fine may seem tiny to a large company. If similarly sized fines are given to companies making different revenue amounts, the companies may respond differently.

Changing company practices can also cost more for some companies than others. This too may affect how they respond to fines.

Furthermore, companies outside a legislative jurisdiction, or that have refused regulators’ demands in the past, may ignore fines altogether.

For example, 4Chan refused to pay fines issued under the UK’s Online Safety Act, and X decided to legally challenge instead of pay a €120 million (A$197 million) fine issued by the European Commission.

Given the borderless nature of some digital harms such as child sexual exploitation and abuse, coordinated changes to corporate laws, and international cooperation are needed.

Pulling multiple levers at once

So if fines alone don’t stop big tech and other businesses behaving badly, what will?

Research shows monitoring companies, and better resourcing regulators, are more effective than fines alone. Consistent regulator inspections combined with education also work well.

A 2025 paper suggests making “stand-alone consumer tech safety research centres” focused on reducing digital harms. This may require technology companies making data and algorithms available to these centres for inspection.

Then, regulators can look at if companies are using important and best practice safety features. For example, checking the images on sites to make sure users do not see harmful content online.

Regulators can also share knowledge with companies about laws and digital safety measures to improve consumer protections.

This cooperative model has been shown to be more effective than fines alone.

A 2016 study about what works when it comes to corporate deterrence found using multiple levers at the same time, such as monitoring, accountability, auditing, and punitive action were the most effective at stopping bad corporate behaviour.

Unfortunately, understanding the scope of digital harms, and best responses, have been limited by not enough resources, or access to data.

A 2025 paper highlights that increased data transparency from corporations will also improve evidence-informed decisions, ensuring regulation is fit-for-purpose.

As companies continue to prioritise rapid rollouts, with problems found after launch, fines may continue to be ineffective.

To tackle this problem, online regulators must ensure fines are complemented with other policy levers – and that the punishment for bad corporate behaviour is consistent, immediate and severe.

Lauren C. Hall is a recipient of an Australian Government Research Training Program Scholarship to support Higher Degree Research training.

James Sauer has received funding from the Australian Institute of Criminology and the Internet Watch Foundation for projects looking to mitigate online harms,

María Yanotti receives grant funding from Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute (AHURI). She is a member of the tax gap advisory group for the Australian Taxation Office (ATO). She is the Tasmanian Chair for the Women in Economics Network (WEN) and a committee member for the Economic Society of Australia (ESA) Tasmanian Branch. Maria is an associate editor for the Australian Economic Papers.

Christine Padgett does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Fines alone won’t stop big tech behaving badly. Here’s what might work – https://theconversation.com/fines-alone-wont-stop-big-tech-behaving-badly-heres-what-might-work-276969

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Peter Edwell, Associate Professor in Ancient History, Macquarie University

Is it any wonder ancient people thought lightning came from the gods? Even today a close lightning strike feels like a terrifying brush with the supernatural.

Some ancient thinkers, however, suspected the gods had nothing to do with it.

They wondered, centuries ahead of their time, if lightning was related somehow to the movement of air and clouds.

A reminder of power and wrath

In the mythology of ancient Greece and Rome, thunder and lightning strikes were the prime weapon of Zeus (the king of the gods, known to the Romans as Jupiter). Reminders of his power and wrath via lightning strikes were everywhere.

The ancient Greek poet Hesiod (who was writing around 700 BCE, about the same time as Homer) described Zeus hurling bolts of lightning and thunder at his divine enemies. Zeus also struck humans such as the mythical King Salmoneus as punishment for demanding his subjects worship him as a god.

Surviving Greek and Roman statues depict Zeus hurling lightning bolts as his chief weapon of power.

For the Romans, Jupiter and the gods more generally intervened dramatically in human affairs via lightning strikes. They were often a clear indication of divine displeasure.

The father of Pompey, one of Rome’s most powerful Republican generals, was killed in 87 BCE by lightning (according to one version of the story). He was conducting a military campaign in the middle of a civil war. According to the Roman writer Plutarch, Pompey’s father was one of Rome’s most hated generals. For many at the time, the gods had dispensed justice.

In about 125 CE, the well-travelled emperor Hadrian climbed Mount Casius in Syria to view the sunrise. When he offered a sacrifice to Zeus/Jupiter, to whom the mountain was sacred, a lightning bolt killed both the attendant and sacrificial victim. Hadrian himself was spared.

In 283 CE, the Roman emperor Carus wasn’t so lucky. He was struck and killed by lightning while on campaign against the Persians. One ancient account claimed Carus was killed because he campaigned further than the gods allowed.

In the fourth century CE, the Greek writer Libanius was struck by lightning while reading a play of Aristophanes. He would suffer from debilitating headaches and other afflictions for the rest of his life.

Complex rituals and a gift from the gods

Occasionally, lightning was sent by the gods to aid an emperor in battle. When Marcus Aurelius campaigned against a tribal group in the 160s CE, lightning bolts scattered the enemy.

According to the church historian, Eusebius, the legion accompanying him was, from then on, known as the thundering legion (Fulminata).

Roman religious practice ordered complex rituals surrounding the ground struck by lightning. In what was known as the Bidental Ritual, priests purified the affected spot. It was then sealed off and forbidden to be walked on or even looked at.

Even the emperor Constantine, a supporter of Christianity from early in his reign, ordered the performance of traditional pagan rites when public buildings were struck by lightning in 320 CE.

‘That’s not Zeus up there’

While many believed fervently that lightning was an instrument of angry gods, not all were convinced.

In The Clouds, an ancient Greek play by Aristophanes (who lived around 448 to 380 BCE), the philosopher Socrates exclaimed in the middle of a thunderstorm

That’s not Zeus up there – it’s a vortex of air.

The first century CE Roman philosopher Seneca believed

clouds that encounter each other with little force cause flashes of lightning; if impelled by greater violence, thunderbolts.

He didn’t see a role for the gods in producing either phenomenon.

One in a million

Of course, many other ancient cultures believed lightning (and thunder) had religious significance.

In Zoroastrianism, a key religion of ancient Persia, lightning produced the fastest fire of 16 different types of fire.

Fire was central to the worship of Ahura Mazda, the supreme god of Zoroastrianism.

For the Kunwinjku people of Arnhem Land in northern Australia, the ancestral being Namarrkon embodied lightning and thunder. He used stone axes to split the clouds and bolts of lightning as weapons.

The United States Centre for Disease Control estimates that around 40 million lightning strikes hit the ground in the US each year. But the chances of being struck in any one year are incredibly rare at less than one in a million.

Very few of us would still see lightning as a weapon of the gods. But when lightning strikes today, it might still evoke a sense of supernatural power and foreboding.

Peter Edwell receives funding from the Australian Research Council.

– ref. Where did the ancient Greeks and Romans think lightning came from? Hint: not just the gods – https://theconversation.com/where-did-the-ancient-greeks-and-romans-think-lightning-came-from-hint-not-just-the-gods-270797

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Natalie Klein, Professor, Faculty of Law, UNSW Sydney

The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow body of water adjacent to Iran and Oman, which connects the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman.

While it is a shared body of water between Iran and Oman, Iran functionally exercises a greater amount of control over it.

The strait is a vital conduit for the shipment of oil, gas and other exports (notably fertiliser) from the Persian Gulf to the rest of the world. At its narrowest point, it is just 21 nautical miles (24 miles or 39 kilometres) wide.

With the ongoing conflict between Iran, Israel and the United States, Iran has restricted the movement of ships through this waterway, causing global repercussions for oil supply and trade in other important commodities.

Can Iran do this under international law? And can the US lawfully send military convoys through the strait to protect international shipping?

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As war raises oil prices, households pay while energy companies profit

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What is its legal status during times of peace?

The Strait of Hormuz is used for international navigation between two high seas areas. As such, it is defined as an international strait under international law.

Even though these waters are subject to the sovereignty of the adjacent states, all other states’ ships have navigational rights through the strait.

So as long as those ships pass through the strait continuously and expeditiously, the coastal states should not take any steps to prevent their passage.

What about during war?

Once there are armed hostilities between two (or more) states, the law of armed conflict – or international humanitarian law – applies.

The law of naval warfare is part of the law of armed conflict.

Some laws of naval warfare can be traced back to the Hague Conventions adopted at the start of the 20th century.

Most commonly, states will rely on the 1994 San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea.

Under the law of naval warfare, states are generally divided between belligerents (those engaged in armed hostilities) and neutrals (those not involved in the war).

The line between belligerents and neutrals is not always an easy one to draw. In the Middle East, at a minimum, Iran, Israel and the US could be classified as belligerents.

According to the San Remo Manual, ships flagged to neutral states, including their warships, may exercise their navigational rights under general international law through a belligerent’s strait.

It is recommended that neutral warships give notice of their passage as a precautionary measure. A belligerent must not target neutral ships – they are not considered military objectives and must not be fired upon.

During this conflict, Iran’s territorial sea (which includes the waters within the Strait of Hormuz) counts as an area of naval warfare. The belligerent states are legally required to have due regard for the legitimate rights and duties of neutral states in an international strait.

But legal protection for neutral commerce is weak. Many ships have avoided the strait – and will continue to do so – during this conflict.

Can Iran close the strait during times of war?

In line with the San Remo Manual, straits under the sovereignty of neutral states must remain open for transit passage for both neutral and belligerent shipping.

However, belligerent states are not similarly required to keep their straits open.

Can convoys lawfully be used to protect commercial shipping?

Convoys typically involve warships travelling with a fleet of merchant ships to deter and protect against attacks from belligerents during passage.

They have been used previously in the Strait of Hormuz and in the Persian Gulf.

But merchant vessels may become military objectives and subject to attack by belligerents if they travel in a convoy with belligerent warships. So any cargo vessel being escorted by a US warship places itself in danger, as it may be lawfully attacked by Iran.

If warships belonging to neutral states escort cargo ships that are also flagged to neutral countries, these merchant vessels are not military objectives, in accordance with the San Remo Manual.

A belligerent warship would, however, have a right to visit and search these ships to ensure they are not carrying contraband to the enemy.

To minimise this risk, neutral states would need to provide Iran with information as to what each ship is carrying.

What about Australian ships?

Iran may question Australia’s status as a neutral state in light of its offer to assist the United Arab Emirates as a measure of collective self-defence against Iranian attacks.

If Australia’s actions render it a “party to the conflict” under the law of armed conflict, it is no longer a neutral state – it is now a belligerent.

Its warships, along with any private vessels escorted in the strait, could then potentially be subject to lawful attack by Iran.

Natalie Klein has previously received funding from the Australian Research Council for research on maritime security and international law.

– ref. How the law of naval warfare applies to the Strait of Hormuz – https://theconversation.com/how-the-law-of-naval-warfare-applies-to-the-strait-of-hormuz-278653

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Joshua Thorburn, PhD Candidate, School of Social Sciences, Monash University

Louis Theroux’s recent documentary Inside the Manosphere, alongside Netflix’s 2025 hit drama Adolescence, has driven a spike in public discussion about the “manosphere”. The term refers to a loose ecosystem of anti-feminist online communities and influencers that promote male dominance and hostility toward women.

Much of the public conversation about the manosphere focuses on how boys and young men fall into these spaces. A new study by the Australian Institute of Criminology asks a different question: how do some men manage to leave?

Real-world dangers

Concern about this online culture has grown in recent years. Increasing attention has been paid to adolescent boys and young men going down toxic online rabbit holes, moving from the misogynistic worldview of manosphere influencers toward more extreme spaces.

This includes “incel” (involuntary celibate) forums. These frame women as enemies standing in the way of men’s perceived entitlement to sex. Violent revenge against women is sometimes openly encouraged.

These concerns are warranted. Earlier anxieties largely focused on incidents of lone-offender violence in North America perpetrated by men linked to the misogynistic incel movement. It’s a threat Australia’s security agency ASIO has also flagged.

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Read more:
How boys get sucked into the manosphere

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More recently, researchers and educators have raised alarms about the broader cultural impact of manosphere ideas. This includes their influence on young men’s attitudes toward women and relationships, resulting in growing rates of hostile sexism in Australian schools.

Understandably, much of the attention focuses on radicalisation into these communities. However, far less attention has been paid to what happens when some men begin to disengage from them.

‘An unhealthy loop of depression’

The Australian Institute of Criminology study provides rare insight into this process. Drawing on surveys and interviews with former participants in incel communities, the research explores how men become disillusioned with these spaces and eventually step away.

The findings add to a growing body of evidence suggesting many men first encounter these communities during periods of insecurity or loneliness.

Participants frequently described anxieties about their physical appearance, social status, sexual experience or financial success. Incel and manosphere forums claim to offer explanations and solidarity for these frustrations.

As one former incel in the institute’s study recalled, he initially felt “some togetherness with others” in the forums.

Yet the same environment often becomes corrosive. Another respondent described how the community functioned as an “echo chamber […] fulfilling their own prophecy”, fuelling what he called “an unhealthy loop of depression”.

Over time, some participants begin to notice the gap between the ideology promoted in these spaces and their everyday experiences. Positive interactions with women, supportive friendships, or simply observing that relationships in the real world do not follow the rigid rules promoted online can begin to undermine the worldview.

One participant in the study described the moment it “clicked that all of it was really wrong” when his peers, “regardless of gender”, treated him with kindness and respect.

In another study of people leaving the manosphere, a former participant reflected that the movement’s claims about women collapsed when he realised he still had a happy relationship with his wife despite being “unfit and definitely not wealthy”.

Research consistently shows leaving these spaces is a challenging experience. Disengagement is usually gradual and uneven. It often involves the slow rebuilding of identity, relationships and belonging outside the forums that once defined participants’ worldview.

Finding the pathways out

The perspectives of people who have left the manosphere deserve greater attention in public discussions. For people currently within the manosphere (and for those vulnerable to falling into it) amplifying such stories can reveal how these communities ultimately harm many of the people who believe in them.

These stories matter because public discussion about the manosphere often focuses almost exclusively on its harms. Those harms are real and serious.

But we need to be hopeful the scale of the problem can be arrested and that the men who fall into these spaces are not permanently lost to them.

Schools, policymakers and families all need these first-hand perspectives. They offer more than just insight into why boys and young men fall down the rabbit hole: they provide a crucial road map for how we might help pull them out. This is essential to violence prevention work focused on how to promote “positive masculinity”.

Maintaining that cautiously hopeful perspective is important. Without it, we risk treating radicalisation as inevitable and disengagement as impossible.

The growing body of research on men leaving these communities suggests something different. While the harms of the manosphere are real, understanding the pathways out may offer some of the most important clues for how to respond.

Joshua Thorburn completed his PhD with support from the Australian Government Research Training Program Scholarship.

Steven Roberts receives funding from the Australian Research Council and the Australian Government. He is a Board Director at Respect Victoria, but this article is written wholly separately from that role.

– ref. Men can get out of the manosphere. Here’s what former incels say about why they left – https://theconversation.com/men-can-get-out-of-the-manosphere-heres-what-former-incels-say-about-why-they-left-278312

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Amy McAuliffe, Visiting Distinguished Professor of the Practice, University of Notre Dame

Canadians are openly discussing the merits and risks of pursuing a nuclear weapon. Europeans are similarly considering a nuclear deterrent for the bloc. In South Korea, public support for a nuclear weapon is at its highest level on record, and even in Japan some politicians are talking about the once-taboo subject.

Until just a few years ago, few experts would have predicted that these nations – all allies of Washington – might one day join the nuclear club. Since 2006, that club has consisted of just nine countries: the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel, with its undeclared program.

The hope of nonproliferation advocates was that nine would be the maximum. But over the past few years, more and more nations are seriously exploring “going nuclear.”

As an expert on weapons technology and former assistant director of the CIA for weapons and counterproliferation, I have watched these developments with alarm.

Perceived national security threats still shape U.S. allies’ views of developing nuclear weapons – with North Korea a key driver for South Korea, China paramount for Japan, and Iran key for Saudi Arabia.

But what has changed demonstrably for many U.S. allies is a newfound skepticism over the credibility of the so-called U.S. nuclear umbrella, which for decades has offered allies an easy way of declining to pursue nuclear weapons. Concerned about the Trump administration’s foreign policy, some nations are considering developing domestic nuclear weapons programs or seeking new deterrence assurances.

New nuclear aspirants across the Atlantic

The U.S. deployed the first atomic bombs in Japan in 1945, with the Soviet Union conducting its own successful nuclear test four years later. The U.K. was next to get the bomb in 1952, followed by France in 1960 and China in 1964. Experts believe that Israel first tested a bomb in the late 1960s, while the last entrants into the nuclear club were India in 1972, Pakistan in 1998 and North Korea in 2006.

Experts have long wondered which country might be next. Often, speculation has included U.S. allies such as Egypt, Japan, Saudi Arabia, South Korea and Turkey.

For years, such nations were assumed to be under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, a tacit understanding that Washington will defend its nonnuclear allies, including by using U.S. nuclear weapons. Doubts about the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella have existed for years and precede the Trump administration. However, current U.S. officials’ criticisms of NATO, focus on burden sharing, and policy positions on Ukraine have brought into stark relief for allies the need to consider other nuclear options. And with allies now focused on the limits of U.S. security guarantees, the list of possible nuclear aspirants has suddenly grown.

European leaders have crafted their public comments on the issue carefully, focusing on concerns about U.S. reliability in general versus the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella.

Rasmus Jarlov, the chair of the Danish parliament’s defense committee, perhaps best reflected the views of many U.S allies in Europe, telling The Associated Press: “If things got really serious, I very much doubt that Trump would risk American cities to protect European cities. We don’t know, but it seems very risky to rely on the American protection.”

In Europe, most public discussion has focused on the concept of a common nuclear deterrent for the bloc under the protection of French nuclear forces. In a major speech in March, French President Emmanuel Macron called for “forward deterrence” involving the temporary deployment of French nuclear-armed aircraft to nine other European countries, including Germany and Poland.

Meanwhile, the Swedish prime minister has had talks with Britain and France about deploying the two countries’ nuclear forces to Sweden during wartime.

But the French pledge does not extend a guarantee to defend allies with French nuclear weapons. Instead, France will use nuclear deterrence to defend French “vital interests,” a purposefully vague phrase. Only time will tell whether Macron’s offer will satisfy European partners – or prevent them from deciding to take matters into their own hands.

There has been growing speculation over whether Poland and Germany might be considering developing their own nuclear weapons. While German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has explicitly ruled it out, Polish leaders’ comments leave the option open.

In early March, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk told the Polish parliament that Poland “must reach for the most modern solutions related to nuclear weapons,” seeming to reflect personal support for Warsaw’s long-term pursuit of a weapon and near-term conversations with the French about a nuclear umbrella.

In Canada, meanwhile, the former chief of the country’s defense staff said in February that Canada should not rule out acquiring nuclear weapons. While the comments drew opposition from the current Canadian defense minister, the discussion of whether Canada would consider “going nuclear” did not seem out of line in today’s global security environment.

Heightened discussions in Asia

Similar discussions among current and former government officials have been percolating across Asia.

For Japan, such talks mark a significant development. Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, largely drafted by U.S. occupation authorities after World War II, renounces war. And in 1967 Japan further pledged not to produce, possess or host nuclear weapons in its territory — the “Three Non-Nuclear Principles.”

But the issue is no longer taboo. In late 2025, an unnamed official in the new administration of Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi expressed his personal opinion that Japan should begin discussions about developing nuclear weapons.

These remarks drew an official rebuke from Takaichi. Moreover, Japanese nuclear weapons are unlikely to be in the cards anytime soon, particularly given the sensitivity surrounding Japan’s status as the only nation to directly experience the consequences of nuclear weapons. Nonetheless, Takaichi’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party is reconsidering its position on Tokyo’s nonnuclear principles to discuss allowing U.S. nuclear weapons to enter Japanese territory.

South Korea is a different story. Last year, the foreign minister in the former conservative Yoon administration argued that an independent nuclear deterrent for Seoul “was not off the table,” given the unpredictability of the Trump administration. Left unsaid, but clearly in the background, were concerns about the U.S. nuclear umbrella.

South Korea’s previous nuclear weapons program and public support for reviving it could make a future South Korean nuclear weapon a real possibility, even though the current center-left administration stresses Seoul’s nonnuclear stance.

Yet the public mood has also shifted. A total of 76% of respondents now support an indigenous nuclear weapon, according to a March 2025 poll by the Asian Institute for Policy Studies. That was an increase of 5 percentage points since 2024 and the highest level of public support for Seoul pursuing a nuclear weapons capability since the poll originated in 2010.

Saudi Arabia’s focus on the fuel cycle

In the Middle East, the Washington ally most likely to pursue a nuclear weapon remains Saudi Arabia. In Sept. 2023, de facto ruler Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman reiterated his public stance that Riyadh would acquire a nuclear weapon if Iran did.

Perhaps more likely is Ryadh’s pursuit of a “latent” nuclear weapons capability, meaning that Saudi Arabia would develop relevant technology and expertise to be able to produce a weapon quickly if it made the political decision to do so. An indigenous capability to enrich uranium would be key.

Indeed, the crown prince has demonstrated an enduring interest in developing a Saudi nuclear fuel cycle. He continues to pursue domestic uranium enrichment, regardless of the state of Iran’s nuclear program.

In November 2025, members of the U.S. Congress wrote a letter to Secretary of State Marco Rubio expressing concern that “the administration has revived talks with Saudi Arabia to give it access to U.S. technology and to potentially allow it to enrich uranium.”

The willingness of the Biden and Trump administrations to pursue nuclear deals for civilian power reactors with allies that permit uranium enrichment could assist Saudi Arabia and South Korea in pursuing nuclear weapons. The “gold standard” U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement, called a 123 agreement, prohibits enrichment and reprocessing.

In September 2025, the Pakistani defense minister announced that Pakistan would extend its nuclear umbrella to Saudi Arabia, if needed, perhaps reducing Riyadh’s focus on obtaining formal U.S. security assurances. If genuine, this commitment provides Prince Mohammed the time and protection to develop Saudi nuclear weapons or a latent nuclear capability.

All of these developments suggest that despite decades of nonproliferation experts warning about the expansion of the nuclear club, new entrants are a very real possibility for the first time in decades.

The article solely reflects the views of the author and not those of the United States Government.

– ref. Going nuclear? Why a growing number of Washington’s allies are eyeing an alternative to US umbrella – https://theconversation.com/going-nuclear-why-a-growing-number-of-washingtons-allies-are-eyeing-an-alternative-to-us-umbrella-275389

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Ranaivo Rasolofoson, Assistant Professor, School of the Environment, University of Toronto

Madagascar is one of the world’s biodiversity hotspots. The island country is well known for its diverse and endangered range of wildlife. This includes over 100 species of lemurs and six species of majestic baobab trees found nowhere else.

The country is also among the world’s poorest. About 80% of its population live below the international poverty line of US$2.15 a day.

Attracting tourist visits to protected areas, such as Analamazaotra-Mantadia National Park, has long been one of Madagascar’s policy priorities. The aim is to channel tourist income towards conserving these areas. Tourist revenue is also supposed to reduce poverty through foreign currency revenue, job creation, and infrastructure development.

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Madagascar’s ancient baobab forests are being restored by communities – with a little help from AI

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Globally, tourism is a powerful way of generating income. In 2024, travel and tourism represented 10% of the global economy (US$10.9 trillion). In Madagascar, tourism revenue makes up nearly 16.6% of the country’s economy.

We are a group of socio-environmental researchers who investigated the effects of tourist visits on the forests of 40 protected areas across Madagascar. The country’s natural forests shelter its rich, unique and endangered terrestrial biodiversity. An estimated 88% of Madagascar’s biodiversity is dependent on forests. But after decades of high deforestation rates, only 10%-15% of Madagascar’s land is still covered with natural forests.

For our research, we used 20 years of satellite data to study changes in the forests. We combined this with tourism visit counts from each protected area.

We ran statistical tests to see whether tourist numbers had any effect on deforestation in and outside protected areas. We also took into account other factors that could influence forest loss and tourism, like rainfall and population growth.

Before our study, no research had measured across the whole country how tourism in protected areas affects deforestation.

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Climate change is threatening Madagascar’s famous forests – our study shows how serious it is

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Madagascar’s protected areas have a three kilometre buffer around them. Our research found that increased tourist visitors have not reduced forests within the protected areas, but have resulted in deforestation in the buffer zones.

There could be two reasons for this. Firstly, some agricultural and pastoral activities, fishing, and other types of activities are allowed within the buffer zone forest. Local people who used to harvest wood or clear forest for agricultural land from the protected area could be shifting this activity to the buffer zone outside. (Firewood and charcoal remain the primary energy source for most communities in Madagascar.)

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Forest conservation approaches must recognise the rights of local people

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Secondly, villages outside protected areas might be clearing forests to accommodate tourists and tourism workers. Maps of forest cover showed that when tourism increased, deforestation increased in the buffer zones and near the entrances to the protected areas (where hotels and restaurants are set up).

We therefore recommend that buffer zones of protected areas be prioritised in Madagascar’s national reforestation programme.

Tourism only shifts deforestation

Madagascar currently has 127 protected areas – about 10% of the country’s land area. The majority were established after the 2003 International Union for Conservation of Nature World Parks Congress. There, the government of Madagascar pledged to increase its protected areas to 10% of the country’s land area.

Major threats to protected areas include land clearing for agriculture, mining, illegal logging, and production of firewood and charcoal. Our study focused on 40 protected areas established before 2003 and managed by Madagascar National Parks. This is because these are the only protected areas for which annual visitor numbers are available.

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In protected areas, a portion of tourist entrance fees are shared with local communities. But it is difficult to know if this is enough money for communities to pay for their needs instead of relying on the forest. Tourist fee income is also not necessarily distributed to people most reliant on forest extraction.

Shifting deforestation to the buffer zone of protected areas is not necessarily a negative outcome for conservation, because it still leaves the protected area intact. Forests within buffer zones are also often intended to support local livelihoods. They are sometimes even of lower conservation value (less biodiverse) than protected forests.

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However, increased deforestation there must be considered in conservation planning. This is because if the buffer area forests are gone, local people may enter the protected area to extract resources. This would endanger biodiversity and the critical ecological services they provide to local people.

What needs to happen next

Madagascar has a national reforestation programme. The country should also restore the forest in the buffer zone areas so that local communities’ needs for forest products can still be met.

We recommend that sustainable management of buffer zone forests include:

• reforestation

• planning where and when specific activities like wood extraction and farming can be done

• sustainable agricultural practices and regenerative agriculture

• promotion of alternative livelihoods

• developing and enforcing environmental sustainability regulations for hotels and restaurants.

Strategies to protect buffer zone forests must include local communities in the designing, planning, setting up and monitoring stages. The aim should be to make sure that the plans are suitable for the local area, that they empower local people and that they’ll be sustainable for the future.

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Burkina Faso’s nature reserves are worth protecting – but people have to be part of the plan

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Tourism entrance fees should continue to be shared between protected areas. This will support the operating costs of protected areas with few tourists.

If Madagascar wants to keep the forests in its protected areas, it must sustainably manage forests in buffer areas to provide for local communities’ needs.

Camille DeSisto has received funding from Duke University, Rice University, Phipps Conservatory, Explorers Club, Primate Conservation Inc., P.E.O. Foundation, and Garden Club of America.

Tristan Frappier-Brinton has received funding from Duke University, Re:wild, Primate Conservation Inc, and the National Science Foundation.

Ranaivo Rasolofoson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Tourist visits to Madagascar help conserve some forests, but others suffer: study suggests what to do – https://theconversation.com/tourist-visits-to-madagascar-help-conserve-some-forests-but-others-suffer-study-suggests-what-to-do-275824