The Conversation – Canada – Page 83

July 5, 2025

Why Meta is in trouble in Nigeria and what this means for Facebook, Instagram and WhatsApp users

Source: – By Tolu Olarewaju, Economist and Lecturer in Management, Keele University

Meta, the parent company of Facebook, Instagram and WhatsApp, was recently hit with three fines totalling more than US$290 million in Nigeria. The fines were imposed by Nigeria’s Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Commission, Nigerian Data Protection Commission and the Advertising Regulatory Council of Nigeria. Meta was accused of invasive practices against data subjects and consumers in Nigeria. The company denied the allegations and has challenged the fines in court.

Entrepreneurship and international business researcher Tolu Olarewaju and professor of entrepreneurship Jagannadha Pawan Tamvada explain the implications of the fines.

What are the violations for which Meta got fined?

The trouble began on 4 January 2021 when WhatsApp updated its privacy policy to introduce mandatory data-sharing with Facebook (now Meta) and its subsidiaries. The main change allowed WhatsApp to share user business interaction data with Facebook for marketing and advertising purposes.

The updated policy did not include an opt-out provision. It was a “take it or leave it” policy. In other words, if users did not consent to the updated terms, they would no longer be able to use WhatsApp. This triggered a Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Commission investigation into Meta, conducted jointly with the Nigeria Data Protection Commission. The probe was conducted from May 2021 to December 2023.

Meta has allegedly not complied with the Nigeria Data Protection Commission, and failed to appoint a Data Protection Compliance Organisation. That’s an entity licensed to assist data controllers and processors in achieving compliance with Nigeria’s data protection regulations. And it has not submitted its mandatory Nigeria Data Protection Regulation reports for two consecutive years.

Nigeria is the most populous country on the continent, with about 236 million people. It has about 107 million active internet users. The most used social media platforms at the end of 2024 were WhatsApp, Facebook, TikTok, Instagram and Telegram.

Meta owns WhatsApp, Facebook and Instagram and has threatened to pull Facebook and Instagram services from the country.

The Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Commission has said quitting Nigeria won’t absolve Meta of its liability.

Facebook has about 51.2 million users in Nigeria, while Instagram has about 12.6 million.

What have regulators found against Meta?

The investigation uncovered several violations. These included:

Unauthorised data sharing: Meta was found to have shared Nigerian users’ personal data without their consent. This included cross-border transfers and storage, violating the Nigeria Data Protection Commission and the Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Act.

Discriminatory practices: Meta allegedly treated Nigerian users differently from those in other jurisdictions with similar regulations. Meta currently offers stronger privacy protections in the European Union due to the General Data Protection Regulation. Nigerian regulators have highlighted this double standard.

Denial of data self-determination: The company was accused of denying Nigerian users the right to control how their data is used, compelling them to accept exploitative privacy policies.

Abuse of market dominance: The Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Commission said the company abused its dominant market position to enforce unfair privacy policies.

(Tying and bundling): Meta was found to have engaged in tying and bundling practices, which are considered anti-competitive. Tying occurs when a company requires customers to buy a secondary product or service as a condition of buying a primary product or service. For example, if Meta required users to accept Facebook’s terms and automatically enrol in WhatsApp or Instagram services (or allow data sharing across them) to use Facebook, then that could be considered tying. This is because it can limit consumer choice, stifle competition, and force people to accept products or terms they don’t want.

Bundling occurs when a company sells multiple products or services together as a package, or makes it difficult to buy them separately. For example, Meta might bundle multiple services like Facebook, Instagram and Messenger in such a way that users must accept a single privacy policy that covers all, even if they only use one service. This can shut out smaller competitors and prevent users from choosing alternatives.

After remediation efforts failed, the Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Commission issued its final order in July 2024. It imposed a US$220 million fine along with penalties from other agencies, bringing the total to US$290 million.

In addition to the fine, the commission has ordered Meta to comply with Nigerian laws and cease practices it described as the “exploitation” of Nigerian consumers.

After completing its inquiry, the agency shared its findings with Meta. The company proposed a “remedy package”. But the commission rejected this as inadequate.

What made Meta vulnerable to such fines?

Meta has failed to localise its data practices. It appears dismissive of Nigerian sovereignty and regulatory authority. For example, Meta has been transferring Nigerian users’ data overseas without protecting them as required by Nigeria.

Meta’s estimated annual revenue in Nigeria is between US$200 million and US$300 million. However, many Nigerians in the diaspora use Facebook and Instagram to communicate with people inside the country. Revenue from those users is likely to raise the figure considerably.

The company has faced similar sanctions for data violations worldwide, including a US$1.4 billion fine in Texas and a US$1.3 billion fine in Europe.

It has also been penalised in India, South Korea and Australia.

What are the implications of the fines?

Meta now faces heightened scrutiny from Nigerian regulators. It will have to adhere more strictly to local data protection and consumer rights laws. This includes appointing a Data Protection Compliance Organisation and submitting mandatory audit reports as stipulated by the Nigerian Data Protection Regulation.

The three fines and regulatory measures may also compel Meta to reassess its operations in Nigeria. It might adjust its services to align with local laws.

Meta has also been ordered, by the courts, to reimburse the Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Commission US$35,000 for the cost of the investigation. And it has been told to take the following measures:

reinstate the rights of Nigerian users to determine the control and use of their data without losing functionality or deleting the application
set its privacy policy to comply with data protection laws in Nigeria
stop sharing WhatsApp users’ information with other Facebook companies and third parties until users have actively consented
revert to the data sharing practices adopted in 2016, including establishing an opt-in screen
terminate the tying and transfer of data without consent
add a visible link on its platforms for Nigerian users, leading to educational content about the risks of manipulative and unfair data practices. These videos will be developed in collaboration with approved NGOs and academic institutions.

Other social media entities operating in Nigeria will be watching closely to see what’s required.

How dependent is Nigeria on these social media platforms?

Many Nigerian businesses and entrepreneurs use Facebook and Instagram for marketing, customer engagement and sales. The platforms offer cost-effective advertising and direct communication channels with customers.

These platforms also provide valuable analytics on customer behaviour, content performance and demographics. Businesses use these services to refine their marketing strategies and make data-driven decisions.

Content creators in Nigeria use Facebook and Instagram to build audiences, monetise content and collaborate with brands. The African creator industry, valued at £2.4 billion in 2024, is expected to grow significantly.

Afrobeats has also gained popularity across Nigeria and globally with the assistance of these platforms.

Nigeria’s ecosystem of homegrown and African social media platforms is growing, offering local alternatives to global giants like Facebook and Instagram. While none match their scale, platforms like Crowwe, ChatAfrik and Nairaland are making strides in content sharing, chat, forums and business promotion.

The information and communications technology sector contributed about 20% to Nigeria’s real gross domestic product in the second quarter of 2024. The rapid expansion of the digital technology industry in recent years highlights its strong potential to stimulate economic growth.

Nigeria’s digital economy has also seen significant growth due to increased internet access and mobile usage.

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Why Meta is in trouble in Nigeria and what this means for Facebook, Instagram and WhatsApp users – https://theconversation.com/why-meta-is-in-trouble-in-nigeria-and-what-this-means-for-facebook-instagram-and-whatsapp-users-257048

July 5, 2025

Airbnb scams: new book explores thriving criminal activity on big tech platforms

Source: – By Julie Reid, Professor, University of South Africa

Big tech sharing economy platforms like Airbnb and Uber are marketed as trustworthy, but a new book by a South African media scholar argues that they are highly vulnerable to scammers who spread delusive speech (a form of disinformation, designed to deceive by criminal intent).

Julie Reid draws from first-hand accounts and over 600 cases from around the world of victims lured into scams or physical danger by fake Airbnb reviews and listings, providing a detailed case study. We asked her five questions about her book.

How do the scams work?

Airbnb is the world’s largest accommodation-sharing platform. It connects property owners who want to rent out their homes with travellers looking for alternatives to traditional hotels. The company recently expanded its offering and now facilitates the booking of other services like personal trainers or caterers along with accommodation rentals.

Airbnb scams happen in several ways. The most obvious is the phantom listing scam. The scammer constructs a fake but attractive listing on Airbnb and accepts payments from unsuspecting guests. It’s only when guests arrive at the address that they discover the property doesn’t exist. Scammers have also learnt to navigate around Airbnb’s review system. Fake positive reviews are produced by scam host networks, making them appear to be authentic.

Bait and switch scams are also common. Here the scam “host” contacts the guest on check-in day claiming the reserved property is suddenly unavailable. They offer alternative accommodation, which the guest later discovers is not as good as the original property they’ve paid for (which is often fictional). The guest pays for a premium rental but is forced to stay in a property that might be unsafe, unclean, or missing amenities.

Scam hosts use misleading, plagiarised, or AI-generated property images and fake descriptions along with fake personal profiles and aliases.

Delusive tactics also redirect guests away from the secure Airbnb payment portal to alternative payment methods. The scammer disappears with the money.

But the danger isn’t limited to financial crimes. The platform’s business model is premised on staying in a stranger’s private property, which can put guests’ personal safety at risk.

Criminal hosts can lure targets into dangerous environments. Once checked in, guests are isolated from public view, housed in a property to which the host has access.

I’ve assessed multiple cases where Airbnb guests were assaulted, robbed with no signs of forced entry, raped, murdered, made victims of sexploitation, extortion or human trafficking, or held hostage.

How does the disinformation work?

I consider delusive speech a subset of disinformation because it presents intentionally misleading content at scale. But it differs from disinformation in its intentions. It isn’t done to promote a particular cause or gain ideological, military, or political advantage. Delusive speech is motivated purely by criminal intent or nefarious financial gain.

Delusive speech works by hiding in plain sight on platforms we think we can trust, like Airbnb, Booking.com, Uber and others. Often, it’s indistinguishable from honest and genuine content. When users browse Airbnb listings for holiday accommodation, they’re presented with numerous options. A fake property listing looks, sounds and feels exactly the same as a genuine one.

This happens on a platform that has built its brand narrative around the concept of trust. Scammers exploit these digital contexts of pre-established trust. When users log on to popular e-commerce or sharing economy platforms, they’re already primed to pay for something. It becomes relatively easy for scammers to delude targets into parting with their money.

What can Airbnb do about it?

Airbnb already has several trust and safety mechanisms in place. They include rapid response teams, an expert Trust and Safety Advisory Coalition and travel insurance for guests. The company claims to be trying to stop fake listings with machine learning technology.

Sadly, none of these mechanisms work perfectly. While Airbnb promises to verify properties and host identities, my analysis exposes flaws in these systems. Scammers easily bypass verification tiers through aliases, forged documents and AI-generated material. Airbnb has admitted it needs to address the failures of its verification processes.

My analysis uncovered how scammed guests are routinely denied the opportunity to post reviews of problematic rentals. Opaque terms of service and content policies allow Airbnb customer service agents and executives to justify censoring negative but honest guest reviews.

This means dangerous and fraudulent activity goes publicly unreported and unreviewed, leaving future guests vulnerable. I argue that Airbnb’s review curation mechanisms should be revamped according to internationally recognised human rights frameworks that protect freedom of speech. This would allow for more honest accounts of guest experiences and create a safer online environment.

Perhaps the most common complaint I encountered was that Airbnb doesn’t remove offending listings from its platform, even after a scammed guest provides evidence that the listing was posted by a fraudster. Airbnb must develop an urgent protocol for swiftly removing offending listings when discovered, to protect future guests from falling victim to the same scam trap.

What can users do to protect themselves?

Travellers can protect themselves by being extra cautious. Ask around. Seek recommendations from people you know and trust, and who can verify that the property you are booking actually exists and that the host is trustworthy.

If that isn’t an option, consider an established hotel instead, but book directly with the hotel and not via third party sites like Booking.com where listings can easily be faked. Check on Google Street View to make sure the property is where it claims to be.

Either way, have a Plan B in case things go wrong. Prepare ahead of your trip by deciding what you will do if you find yourself in an unsafe situation. And always, always, buy travel insurance.

Is it part of a bigger problem?

I assessed several digitally initiated scam categories in this book. While my main case study focused on Airbnb, the problem of delusive speech online isn’t unique to this platform. Delusive speech is now carried by all major tech platforms integral to everyday life.

In the book, I also highlight how scammers operate in every corner of the internet, including dating apps like Grindr, Tinder and Hinge; ride-sharing services like Uber, Lyft and Bolt; travel sites like Booking.com and Hotels.com; and social media platforms like Facebook, Instagram and YouTube, among others.

I hope that these examples will boost awareness of the risks of using these apps and sites.

Julie Reid does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Airbnb scams: new book explores thriving criminal activity on big tech platforms – https://theconversation.com/airbnb-scams-new-book-explores-thriving-criminal-activity-on-big-tech-platforms-256806

July 5, 2025

5 benefits Africa’s new space agency can deliver

Source: – By Scott Firsing, Senior Research Associate, University of South Africa

The African Space Agency was officially inaugurated in Cairo’s Space City in April 2025. The event marked a milestone in a process that had been in the works since the early 2000s. Drawing inspiration from the European Space Agency, it unites African Union (AU) member states to harness space technology for development. This is in line with the AU’s Agenda 2063, aimed at advancing Africa into a prosperous future.

The agency’s goal is to:

coordinate and implement Africa’s space ambitions by promoting collaboration among the AU’s 55 member states
harness space technologies for sustainable development, climate resilience and socio-economic growth
oversee the African Space Policy and Strategy to enhance access to space-derived data
foster partnerships with international space agencies like the European Space Agency and others.

Over 20 African countries operate space programmes and more than 65 African satellites have been launched. It is my view as a global space diplomacy expert that the agency can help ensure that Africa isn’t a bystander in the space economy. This sector is projected to be worth US$1.8 trillion by 2035.

The space agency positions Africa to address pressing challenges and take advantage of opportunities in the global space economy. These include using satellite data, boosting connectivity, driving economic growth, fostering global partnerships and training future leaders.

Five benefits

Valuable eyes in the sky

Space assets, particularly Earth observation satellites, offer a number of advantages. The continent faces significant climate risks like droughts, fires and floods. This is particularly problematic as the agricultural sector is approximately 35% of Africa’s GDP and employs about half of its people across over 1 billion hectares of arable land.

Satellite data optimises crop yields, supports climate-resilient farming, and enhances sustainable fisheries and port modernisation. Nigeria’s National Space Research and Deveopment Agency, for example, has used satellites like the NigSat-2 to monitor crop health and predict yields.

Beyond agriculture, satellites assist in project planning in cities across Africa. Kenya uses a satellite to track urban development trends and enhance municipal urban planning capacities.

Satellites also keep an eye on Africa’s resource-abundant territories while tackling problems like armed conflict, deforestation, and illegal migration and mining.

The African Space Agency will help provide access to AI-enhanced satellite data. This will enable even nations with constrained resources to tackle local needs. For instance, Côte d’Ivoire’s first locally made satellite, launched in 2024, shows how African nations are building their own capabilities.

By making it easier to share data, the African Space Agency also positions the continent to generate revenue in the global space data market. That fuels innovation.

Enhancing connectivity and enabling cutting-edge technology

Africa’s digital divide is stark. Only 38% of its population was online in 2024, compared to the global average of 68%. The African Space Agency aims to bridge this gap through satellite-based communications. This technology can deliver broadband to remote regions where cell towers and undersea cables are impractical.

Connectivity enables education, e-commerce and telemedicine.

Satellite services, like those provided by SpaceX’s Starlink in 21 African countries, will drive digital inclusion. In turn this promises to reduce unemployment and help entrepreneurs.

The African Space Agency is also positioning Africa to embrace new space technologies. Examples include Japan’s 2025 demonstration of beaming solar power from space, following a US achievement in 2023.

This could revolutionise energy access. Space-based solar power captures solar energy in orbit via satellite and transmits it as microwaves to Earth. This offers a solution to Africa’s energy poverty. It could provide reliable power to remote areas without extensive grid infrastructure.

The African Space Agency’s role in coordinating satellite launches and data sharing will make these technologies more accessible and cost-effective.

Driving economic growth and innovation

Africa’s space sector, now worth over US$20 billion, is growing rapidly. The industry has seen an increase of private companies and investor support, moving beyond sole dependence on government funding. Investment is being fuelled by 327 NewSpace firms, a term used for the new emerging commercial space industry in nations such as Egypt, Nigeria, and South Africa. These firms often excel in satellite communication, Earth observation and component manufacturing.

But many African nations lack resources. The agency will lower barriers by fostering collaboration, coordinating national space programmes, and reducing duplication.For example, the African Space Agency’s efforts to streamline satellite development and launches will spur local manufacturing and tech hubs.

This means that smaller economies will be able to participate.

Strengthening regional and global connections

Africa’s space sector relies on partnerships with space agencies and commercial space companies based in the “space powers”. These include the US, Russia, China, France, India, Italy, Japan, Israel and the United Arab Emirates. These institutions provide launch services, satellite development and ground stations.

An example is Senegal’s GaindeSAT-1A, a CubeSat launched in 2024 via America’s SpaceX with French collaboration.

Meanwhile, countries like South Africa are exploring local rocket programmes to enhance the agency’s self-reliance. Africa’s space ground stations are already located across the continent, supporting the European Space Agency and commercial missions. They will soon host a deep space ground station for America’s National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

Funding remains a challenge. African nations allocated just US$426 million to space programmes in 2025. That’s less than 1% of global spending. The European Space Agency has an US$8 billion budget.

However, initiatives like the €100 million Africa-EU Space Partnership Programme (2025–2028) aim to boost Africa’s space sovereignty and innovation.

The agency’s vision extends beyond Earth, with an eye on the Moon. Some members, notably Angola, Nigeria and Rwanda, have already signed the US-led Artemis Accords for lunar exploration. For their part Egypt and South Africa are collaborating with China and Russia on the International Lunar Research Station.

Training the next generation

A skilled workforce is critical to Africa’s space industry. The Africa Space Agency Space City plans to host a training academy. It will build on Egypt’s programmes in space project management, satellite design, and orbital simulation.

Partnerships like the Africa-EU programme offer scholarships, while private initiatives, such as the Pathways to Space programme by Boeing and the Future African Space Explorers STEM Academy, engage students in 63 schools in Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Tanzania.

Scott Firsing does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. 5 benefits Africa’s new space agency can deliver – https://theconversation.com/5-benefits-africas-new-space-agency-can-deliver-258098

July 5, 2025

Stone tools from a cave on South Africa’s coast speak of life at the end of the Ice Age

Source: – By Sara Watson, Assistant Professor, Indiana State University

The Earth of the last Ice Age (about 26,000 to 19,000 years ago) was very different from today’s world.

In the northern hemisphere, ice sheets up to 8 kilometres tall covered much of Europe, Asia and North America, while much of the southern hemisphere became drier as water was drawn into the northern glaciers.

As more and more water was transformed into ice, global sea levels dropped as much as 125 metres from where they are now, exposing land that had been under the ocean.

In southernmost Africa, receding coastlines exposed an area of the continental shelf known as the Palaeo-Agulhas Plain. At its maximum extent, it covered an area of about 36,000km² along the south coast of what’s now South Africa.

This now – extinct ecosystem was a highly productive landscape with abundant grasslands, wetlands, permanent water drainage systems, and seasonal flood plains. The Palaeo-Agulhas Plain was likely most similar to the present day Serengeti in east Africa. It would likely have been able to support large herds of migratory animals and the people who hunted them.

We now know more about how these people lived thanks to data from a new archaeological site called Knysna Eastern Heads Cave 1.

The site sits 23 metres above sea level on the southern coast of South Africa overlooking the Indian Ocean. You can watch whales from the site today, but during the Ice Age the ocean was nowhere to be seen. Instead, the site looked out over the vast grasslands; the coast was 75 kilometres away.

Archaeological investigation of the cave began in 2014, led by Naomi Cleghorn of the University of Texas. This work shows that humans have been using the site for much of the last 48,000 years or more. Occupations bridge the Middle to Later Stone Age transition, which occurred sometime between about 40,000 and 25,000 years ago in southern Africa.

That transition is a time period where we see dramatic changes in the technologies people were using, including changes in raw materials selected for making tools and a shift towards smaller tools. These changes are poorly understood due to a lack of sites with occupations dating to this time. Knysna Eastern Heads Cave 1 is the first site on the southern coast that provides a continuous occupational record near the end of the Pleistocene (Ice Age) and documents how life changed for people living on the edge of the Palaeo-Agulhas Plain.

Before the Ice Age, people there collected marine resources like shellfish when the coastline was close to the site. As the climate began to cool and sea levels dropped, they shifted their focus to land-based resources and game animals.

I am one of the archaeologists who have been working here. In a new study, my colleagues and I analysed stone tools from the cave that date to about 19,000 to 18,000 years ago, and discussed how the techniques used to make them hint at the ways that prehistoric people travelled, interacted, and shared their craft.

Based on this analysis, we think the cave may have been used as a temporary camp rather than a primary residence. And the similarity of the tools with those from other sites suggests people were connected over a huge region and shared ideas with each other, much like people do today.

Robberg technology of southern Africa

In human history, tools were invented in a succession of styles (“technologies” or “industries”), which can indicate the time and place where they were made and what they were used for.

The Robberg is one of southern Africa’s most distinctive and widespread stone tool technologies. Robberg tools – which we found at the Knysna site – are thought to be replaceable components in composite tools, perhaps as barbs set into arrow shafts, used to hunt the migratory herds on the Palaeo-Agulhas Plain.

We see the first appearance of Robberg technology in southern Africa near the peak of the last Ice Age around 26,000 years ago, and people continued producing these tools until around 12,000 years ago, when climate conditions were warmer.

The particular methods and order of operations that people used to make their tools is something that is taught and learned. If we see specific methods of stone tool production at multiple sites, it indicates that people were sharing ideas with one another.

Robberg occupations at Knysna date to between 21,000 and 15,000 years ago, when sea levels were at their lowest and the coastline far away.

The Robberg tools we recovered were primarily made from rocks that were available close to the site. Most of the tools were made from quartz, which creates very sharp edges but can break unpredictably. Production focused on bladelets, or small elongated tools, which may have been replaceable components in hunting weapons.

Some of the tools were made from a raw material called silcrete. People in South Africa were heat treating this material to improve its quality for tool production as early as 164,000 years ago. The silcrete tools at Knysna were heat treated before being brought to the site. This is only the second documented instance of the use of heat treatment in Robberg technology.

Silcrete is not available near Knysna. Most of the accessible deposits in the area are in the Outeniqua mountains, at least 50 kilometres inland. We’re not sure yet whether people using the Knysna site were travelling to these raw material sources themselves or trading with other groups.

Archaeological sites containing Robberg tools are found in South Africa, Lesotho and Eswatini, indicating a widespread adoption by people across southern Africa. The tools from the Knysna site share many characteristics with those from other sites, which suggests people were sharing information through social networks that may have spanned the entire width of the continent.

Yet there are other aspects that are unique to the Knysna site. Fewer tools are found in the more recent layers than in deeper layers, suggesting that people were using the site less frequently than they had previously. This may suggest that during the Ice Age the cave was used as a temporary camp rather than as a primary residential site.

Left with questions

Stone tools can only tell us so much. Was Knysna Eastern Heads Cave 1 a temporary camp? If so, what were they coming to the cave for? We need to combine what we learned from the stone tools with other data from the site to answer these questions.

Something we can say with confidence is that we have a very long and rich history as a species, and our innovative and social natures go back a lot further in time than most people realise. Humans living during the last Ice Age had complex technologies to solve their problems, made art and music, connected with people in other communities, and in some places even had pet dogs.

Despite the dramatic differences in the world around us, these Ice Age people were not very different from people living today.

Sara Watson works for the FIeld Museum of Natural History and Indiana State University

– ref. Stone tools from a cave on South Africa’s coast speak of life at the end of the Ice Age – https://theconversation.com/stone-tools-from-a-cave-on-south-africas-coast-speak-of-life-at-the-end-of-the-ice-age-258317

July 5, 2025

AI-driven motion capture is transforming sports and exercise science

Source: – By Habib Noorbhai, Professor (Health & Sports Science), University of Johannesburg

In sport, the margin between success and failure is often measured in milliseconds. It could be a cricketer adjusting their foot positioning, a runner refining their sprint start or a footballer perfecting their passing.

This is where motion capture comes in – among the many approaches being used for athletic performance and movement analysis.

Conventional motion capture tracks a person’s movements by using sensors or reflective markers linked to cameras. This provides data that helps sport scientists analyse how to improve an athlete’s performance, personalise their training programme and prevent possible injury.

But for decades, motion capture in sport has been done using cumbersome suits and complex camera systems. These technologies offer high precision, but have remained out of reach for many because of their cost, technical demands and rigid laboratory constraints.

As sport evolves, so too must the technology that analyses it. The way we measure human movement is experiencing a major transformation. Markerless motion capture (enabled by artificial intelligence, computer vision, depth sensors and multiple-camera systems) is set to revolutionise sports performance analysis.

As a health and sports scientist with a focus on data, innovation and technology, I co-authored a study on markerless motion capture in sports and exercise. We reviewed and compared various motion capture options so that users can choose what system is best for their needs and budgets.

This matters because markerless motion capture provides a practical alternative that’s accessible, scalable and adaptable to real-world settings. It’s a shift that promises to transform how athletes train, how they move, how injuries are assessed and how coaches refine performance.

The problem with traditional motion capture

Marker-based motion capture has long been considered the gold standard for analysing movement. Various systems use optoelectronic (devices that emit or detect light) tracking. They’ve provided researchers and coaches with precise three-dimensional (3D) data on joint angles, movement efficiency and biomechanical load. But these systems come with challenges.

Firstly, the need for reflective markers placed on the body introduces variability. Even slight misplacements can compromise data accuracy.

Secondly, these systems are largely confined to laboratory environments. While they work well for controlled studies, they can’t always capture the dynamics of real-world sports performance.

Thirdly, the cost of such setups, often reaching tens of thousands of dollars, limits their use to elite teams and well-funded research labs. This financial barrier places the technology out of reach for grassroots sport, where talent development is crucial.

The rise of markerless motion capture

Markerless motion capture, driven by deep learning and computer vision, allows movement to be tracked directly from video footage, without requiring physical markers. Models such as OpenPose, TensorFlow Pose Estimate and MeTRAbs can now identify and analyse human joint positions in 3D, all from a single video feed.

This approach has profound implications. It means that coaches can capture real-time movement data from training sessions without interrupting the natural flow of play. Athletes can analyse their technique with nothing more than a smartphone camera. It opens the door for motion capture to move beyond the lab and onto the field, the court or the gym floor.

Where markerless motion capture works best

The ability to track movement in real-world environments makes markerless motion capture particularly valuable in high-speed and dynamic sports.

In football, tracking player movement during passing drills can inform tactical decisions. In sprinting, coaches can analyse stride length and ground contact time without disrupting training sessions. In baseball and cricket, batting mechanics can be assessed without requiring players to wear cumbersome tracking suits or markers.

Beyond performance analysis, the implications for injury management and rehabilitation are just as compelling.

By integrating markerless motion capture into injury rehabilitation programmes, physiotherapists can monitor movement deficiencies in real time. A player recovering from an anterior cruciate ligament injury, for example, can have their gait and knee valgus angles monitored remotely. This reduces the need for repeated clinic visits.

Barriers

Despite its potential, markerless motion capture is not without its challenges. While deep learning models are improving, they still struggle with occlusion: where body parts become temporarily hidden from view. Variations in lighting, camera angles and player body types can affect tracking accuracy too.

To improve robustness across diverse sports settings, these issues need ongoing refinement in pose estimation algorithms. (These are computer vision techniques used to locate and track key points of the body on a person in a video.)

Another key limitation is validation. Traditional motion capture systems have been extensively tested for accuracy, but markerless models are still undergoing further validation in sport-specific contexts.

Ensuring consistency and reliability will be crucial in convincing elite teams to transition away from marker-based setups.

A future without markers?

The question remains: will markerless motion capture completely disrupt and replace traditional systems? The reality is likely to be more nuanced.

While marker-based motion capture will retain its place in highly controlled research settings, markerless alternatives will dominate practical, field-based applications. The accessibility, ease of use and real-time capabilities of markerless systems make them a game-changer.

As AI models become more sophisticated and sensor technology advances, the precision of markerless systems will continue to improve. The future of motion capture lies not in replacing one method with another, but in integrating multiple approaches to create a seamless, scalable and accurate framework for movement analysis.

It’s no longer a question of whether markerless motion capture will take over, but when. And as the technology matures, the benefits for coaches, athletes and scientists alike will only continue to grow. It’s set to play an integral role in shaping the next generation of athletic performance and movement analysis.

Habib Noorbhai does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. AI-driven motion capture is transforming sports and exercise science – https://theconversation.com/ai-driven-motion-capture-is-transforming-sports-and-exercise-science-254646

July 5, 2025

Mozambique after 50 years of independence: what’s there to celebrate?

Source: – By Luca Bussotti, Professor at the PhD Course in Peace, Democracy, Social Movements and Human Development, Universidade Técnica de Moçambique (UDM)

Mozambique’s government, led by the Frelimo party, has long been planning celebrations for 2025. It is 50 years since independence, won after an anti-colonial war against Portugal led by the same party.

Something has gone wrong, however, especially in the past two years.

Since the country’s popular rapper Azagaia died in March 2023 and peaceful processions in his memory escalated into violent clashes with the police, space has opened up for the establishment of a social movement of young people. This has since turned into a political movement, taking on the name “Povo no Poder” (“People in Power”). At its head is a brilliant politician, Venâncio Mondlane.

Povo no Poder was also the name of Azagaia’s hit song, which had been the soundtrack to 2008 protests against rising energy costs.

Azagaia’s POVO NO PODER.

The demonstrations in March 2023 marked a turning point for Mozambique. It was as if all the energy and indignation about a highly corrupt and increasingly authoritarian country that Azagaia had expressed through his songs had been passed on to previously fearful young people. Now they dared to challenge the police and army in the open and without any weapons.

In late 2024 Mozambicans took to the streets to protest against elections they claimed were rigged. Over 300 people were killed in demonstrations.

Efforts have been made to redress this serious wound. In preparation for the 50 years of independence Frelimo has been recalling key places and symbols in the liberation war, harking back to a time when they represented justice.

But attempts to evoke past glory and ideals are not resonating with ordinary Mozambicans. The mood in the country is subdued.

As a specialist in the politics of lusophone Africa, in particular Mozambique, based on years of research, I find it difficult to envision a future of peace and prosperity for the next 50 years. There are divisive elements at play across the country. The post-election crisis has its roots in widespread discontent. Mozambicans are also rising against the cost of living crisis.

Attempts to rekindle the flame

The newly elected president, Daniel Chapo, opened the 50th anniversary celebrations on 7 April in Nangade, in Cabo Delgado province. This is one of the places where the armed struggle against the Portuguese began.

National symbolism has focused on the torch of national unity, travelling the length and breadth of Mozambique to arrive in Maputo at the historic Machava Stadium on 25 June, Independence Day, for a concluding public ceremony.

Not everyone has shared this attempt to patch up a country torn both politically and socio-economically.

Too much has been lost in the intervening decades.

In the initial period of independence Frelimo adopted socialist policies and attempted to promote free and universal social services, primarily healthcare and education. Back then, the ruling class, starting with the country’s first president, Samora Machel, didn’t enjoy any particular economic privileges.

The reality today is quite different.

Journalist and social activist Tomás Vieira Mário, one of the main critics of the current regime, has traced the stages of independent Mozambique’s history. He’s pointed out the contradiction between the initial thrust by many Mozambican common people towards the liberation movement and subsequent, authoritarian developments.

He concluded in an article that all that remained to unite Mozambicans was the

mere sharing of the same territorial space. And a lot of blood.

He was referring to the long war against Renamo from 1976 to 1992 and again from 2013 to 2019, ethnic questions that have never been resolved, and finally the armed attacks in Cabo Delgado of jihadist and ethnic nature.

For his part, renowned philosopher Severino Ngoenha has also underscored the importance of a justice system that is fair and inclusive, and not at the service of one political party.

The new opposition is coming not from Renamo or Frelimo but from the streets. Popular protests have taken place this year even in areas once considered Frelimo strongholds. In Gaza province, southern Mozambique, for example, there have been outbreaks of violence, demonstrating that the bipolar system that emerged from the 1992 peace accord now seems incapable of responding to the new demands of Mozambican society.

On the political level, efforts are being made to overcome the post-electoral crisis and its wounds through the establishment of an Inclusive Dialogue Commission. This is being chaired by jurist Edson Macuacua, who is a vice-minister in the Frelimo government.

The commission is made up of representatives from all major parties as well as three members of civil society. The eventual aim is radical reform of the state.

But there are serious doubts about the success of this ambitious project which I believe are legitimate. The big question, beyond any institutional and electoral reforms, is whether the Frelimo party-state will be able to change its political culture in the next elections, accepting any negative results and, therefore, the loss of power.

Efforts are being made on all fronts to obstruct Mondlane from gaining a political foothold. Mondlane wants to start a new party called the Anamalala (meaning “It will end”, or “Stop!”).

The name has been rejected by the Ministry of Justice because a Mozambican party cannot be named using a local language – in this case Emakhuwa.

On the judicial level, several trials are underway against Mondlane and his closest associates, which could result in convictions for inciting protesters to destroy public infrastructure during the post-election demonstrations. If convicted, he would be declared ineligible to run in elections scheduled for 2029.

Inequality and disparities

Mozambique is among the six most unequal countries in the world and one of the poorest. According to World Bank data, 500,000 young people enter the labour market each year, with an average absorption capacity of about 25,000 in the formal sector, and 36% of young people unemployed in Maputo.

Meanwhile, the number of very rich is growing. Mozambique ranks 16th among African countries in terms of the number of millionaires, with 18% growth over the past 10 years.

This inequality puts national unity at risk.

The economic disparities between the capital, Maputo, and the rest of the country are increasingly evident.

Entire ethnic groups and territories are marginalised. Socio-economic and cultural divisions have been replicated in the case of discoveries of large natural resources in the north of the country. Large investments have been made in gas (Total and ENI-Exxon) and rubies in Cabo Delgado.

A new threat has arisen too: extremism. Islamist-motivated attacks have been occurring in Cabo Delgado since 2017. There was an attack recently on a military base in Macomia.

Efforts to encourage unity are coming from many quarters: from the promotion of inclusive dialogue; from a civic consciousness that has grown since 2023-2024; and from the country’s economic potential.

But social inequality remains. So do doubts about Frelimo’s willingness to make Mozambique a country where the winner governs without manipulating election results.

Luca Bussotti does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Mozambique after 50 years of independence: what’s there to celebrate? – https://theconversation.com/mozambique-after-50-years-of-independence-whats-there-to-celebrate-259528

July 5, 2025

Turkey is stepping up its influence in west Africa – what’s behind its bid for soft power

Source: – By Issouf Binaté, enseignant-chercheur, Université Alassane Ouattara de Bouaké

Turkey is stepping up its influence in west Africa as the geopolitical and economic landscape in the region shifts. In Senegal, the state-owned Turkish Petroleum Corporation has entered a key partnership in the oil and gas sector. Meanwhile, Karpowership, a company providing electricity via floating power plants, now supplies energy to eight African countries. But Turkey’s not stopping there. As part of its soft power strategy, it is also winning hearts and minds through education and culture while deepening trade and security ties.

Historian Issouf Binaté, who has studied Turkey’s growing presence in west Africa, breaks down how Ankara is positioning itself as an alternative to both former colonial powers and newer global players competing for influence on the continent.

What drives Turkey’s growing influence in west Africa?

Turkey’s foreign policy in west Africa leans on two main pillars.

One is institutional power, driven by state-backed agencies (embassies, the religious affairs directorate Diyanet, and the economic cooperation agency (TIKA) .

The other is more grassroots, led by non-state actors such as religious foundations and NGOs.

These groups laid the groundwork for Turkey’s African expansion long before Ankara officially stepped in.

A key player in Turkey’s earlier outreach was the Gülen movement, named after preacher Fethullah Gülen (1941–2024). The Gülen movement pioneered Turkey’s soft power approach with “Turkish schools”, starting with the Yavuz Sultan Selim and Yavuz Selim-Bosphore high schools in Dakar in 1997.

Also at the end of the 1990s a network composed of Turkish business leaders and social activists under the Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists, which claimed over 100,000 member companies, expanded Turkey’s influence across Africa. At that time, Turkey had only three diplomatic representations for the whole of sub-Saharan Africa.

The more recent contact with Africa comes at a time when western hegemony faces growing criticism from a new generation of Africans engaged in decolonial movements. Gülen-affiliated institutions now number 113, alongside religious and secular schools run by other groups like Mahmud Hudayi Vakfi and Hayrat Vakfi. Since the 2016 political rift between Gülen and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, these schools were gradually transferred to Maarif Foundation, Turkey’s state-run overseas education arm.

Back in 2003, Turkey had only 12 diplomatic missions across Africa. Today, that number has grown to 44, bolstered by Turkish religious foundations (like Mahmud Hudayi Vakfi and Hayrat Vakfi), NGOs, and entrepreneurs who have filled the gap left by the Gülen movement.

Another powerful player in Turkey’s Africa strategy is Turkish Airlines, now one of the top carriers on the continent. It is now flying to 62 airports in 41 African countries.

What role do west African students trained in Turkey play?

By investing in education, Turkey didn’t just open its doors to African students. It also planted the seeds for a long-term influence strategy. These students, and more broadly young African migrants trained in Turkey, are now among the key messengers of “Turkishness” back home.

In doing so, Ankara is following a familiar path once used by colonial powers. They used student mobility as a powerful tool for their diplomacy.

This policy of openness took several forms. As early as 1960, it welcomed students from non-self-governing territories in accordance with UN General Assembly resolutions.

Then, in the 1990s, Turkey continued this effort through a scholarship programme for African students, supported by the Islamic Development Bank. During this period, Turkey launched the Büyük Öğrenci Projesi (Great Student Project), which provided scholarships to international students.

Starting in 2012, this programme was re-branded as YTB (Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Topluluklar Başkanlığı, or Directorate for Turks Abroad and Related Communities). It introduced reforms, including a digital application process for scholarships via an app on the YTB website. This shift caused a dramatic spike in interest. Applications soared from 10,000 to 155,000 between 2012 and 2020.

For non-scholarship students, Turkey simplified visa processes, reduced tuition fees, and offered other incentives. These measures contributed to a significant increase in the number of applicants to study in Turkey. As the number of universities in Turkey jumped from 76 to 193 between 2003 and 2015, the country became increasingly attractive.

By 2017, Turkey had become the 13th most popular destination for students from sub-Saharan Africa, according to Campus France (a platform that supports international students studying in France). By 2019, there were an estimated 61,000 African students studying in Turkey.

Now, nearly three decades into this strategy, many of these former students are stepping into new roles. They are taking over from Turkish entrepreneurs in fostering socioeconomic ties with Africa. They also act as bridges, promoting Turkish universities and supporting visitors in areas like medical and industrial tourism.

In Istanbul, some run cargo companies – some of them informal – that ship goods to Africa. Others are working to formalise these ventures and build long-term economic bridges. Groups like Bizim Afrika, a network of African Turkish-speakers, and the Federation of African Students in Turkey (founded in 2019), are playing key roles in shaping this next chapter of Turkey–Africa relations.

How is Turkey’s strategy in west Africa different from that of China or France?

In substance, Turkey’s strategy isn’t so different from that of France or China. It also carries traces of colonial thinking, even though its approach leans more on religious soft power like building mosques across Africa. Unlike France, which used force in its colonial past, Turkey is trying to gain influence through other means. It uses familiar tools: embassies, schools, cinema, security services, and development agencies.

However, Turkey has learned from the criticism faced by western powers at a pivotal moment in Africa’s global relations.

While access to Europe, the US and Canada has become more difficult due to stricter visa rules, Turkey has opened its doors. It eased visa procedures for African business people, expanded its universities, and promoted medical tourism.

Turkey has become a hub for several sectors. It’s a major centre for nose surgery (rhinoplasty), hair transplants, and textiles. Its textile industry now supplies traders at Makola Market in Accra, Adjamé’s Forum in Côte d’Ivoire, and the Grand Marché in Bamako.

Turkey has also capitalised on the security crisis in the Sahel, where France’s military presence has become controversial. It stepped in by selling Bayraktar TB2 drones and offering private security services to some governments.

Is this Turkish presence set to last?

Turkey’s presence in Africa is now visible in several symbolic ways. You can see it in Maarif schools, murals at Abidjan airport, the “Le Istanbul” restaurant in Niamey’s government district, or the National Mosque in Accra, modelled after Istanbul’s Blue Mosque.

Turkey’s engagement is a work in progress. But its outreach to Africa is already yielding results. Trade volume reached US$40.7 billion in 2022. The return of the first waves of African students trained in Turkey has shifted the dynamic. Cooperation no longer relies solely on Turkish business people and social entrepreneurs.

Even though African elites often speak English, French or Arabic, new voices are emerging. Young people trained in Turkey are beginning to find their place. Many work in import-export, construction, and even Islamic religious leadership. This trend points to promising prospects for long-term ties.

For Turkey, Africa represents a continent with major economic opportunities. Becoming a trusted partner is now a key goal. On the diplomatic level, Turkey gained observer status at the African Union in 2005 and has hosted Turkey-Africa summits in Istanbul since 2008.

This growing involvement suggests that Turkey’s role in Africa is likely to last. It will depend on the continent’s market needs, especially at a time when many African countries are rethinking their relationships with traditional western powers and international institutions.

Issouf Binaté does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Turkey is stepping up its influence in west Africa – what’s behind its bid for soft power – https://theconversation.com/turkey-is-stepping-up-its-influence-in-west-africa-whats-behind-its-bid-for-soft-power-256929

July 5, 2025

Kenya police brutality – it will take more than laws and public anger to change behaviour

Source: – By Oscar Gakuo Mwangi, Adjunct Associate Professor, Departnent of Social Sciences, Pwani University

Kenya has once again been reminded of brutality within its police force. Two events in mid-June 2025 pointed to the grave challenge that Kenya must confront to reform the service.

The first was the death in police custody of a teacher and blogger. A few days later a bystander at the scene of a protest in Nairobi was shot and severely injured by police.

The use of excessive force to disperse and arrest peaceful demonstrators has got worse since the nationwide protests by young Kenyans in June 2024. Police have also been behind disappearances and extrajudicial killings.

Excesses by the National Police Service have prompted action in the past. Repressive laws have been repealed and mechanisms are in place to identify, report and punish police excesses.

Wide-ranging policing reforms mandated by the 2010 constitution have also been carried out since 2013. As part of these reforms, the Independent Police Oversight Authority was set up to investigate police wrong-doing. The conviction and dismissal rates are low, however, because of defective prosecutions, poor investigations, witnesses fearing retribution or victimisation, lack of evidence, and lengthy court trials.

I am a political scientist with a focus on Kenya’s security sector. It is my view that the quest to change police behaviour in Kenya must go beyond the rule book, recriminations and repeated political proclamations of police reform.

In my view real change will come about only if the state, firstly, puts funds into the recurrent and development expenditures of the police. The aim should be to ensure these institutions are able to enforce compliance and accountability. Secondly, the state needs to strengthen its partnership with local-level civil society organisations affected by policy brutality. And lastly, it must set up digital channels that people can confidently use to lodge their complaints.

Funding gaps

The National Police Service is underfunded. This has constrained its ability to maintain law and order. It has:

inadequate and poorly maintained equipment and gear
insufficient monthly fuel allocations for patrols and other critical functions
poor training and operational physical facilities.

Added to these constraints are dehumanising working conditions and deplorable living conditions. This undermines their morale and ability to deliver quality services.

Another blow to police morale is the entrenched culture of corruption. Corrupt practices skew recruitment, transfers, deployments, promotions and procurement.

At the same time, the police service is expected to deal with a host of domestic and global security challenges. These include cybercrimes, cross-border security, violent extremism and terrorism.

Money needs to be allocated to improve facilities, equipment and gear. This should also enhance its logistical and technological capabilities, and provide affordable and decent housing and medical cover for its officers.

Providing adequate resources can also counter the culture of corruption, which is often driven by poor renumeration and working conditions.

Budget allocations should sustain police reforms. This should include:

expanding and supporting and active participation of stakeholders such as civil society organisations and social services entities
improving operational efficiency
increasing accountability
strengthening compliance with human rights obligations.

Partnerships with communities

Community policing in Kenya makes a significant contribution to local-level security. This form of policing is citizen-centred with an emphasis on addressing crime risk factors by encouraging citizen participation.

Also known by its Kiswahili name, Nyumba Kumi, meaning “Ten Households”, the key strategy is anchoring community policing at the household level. Despite several problems associated with formulation and implementation, community policing in Kenya has improved local-level police-community relations in some areas of the country.

The community policing strategy is aimed at addressing emerging security needs such as infiltration by terrorist groups. It serves the whole of Kenya in terms of local-level security and is viewed as one of the key areas of police reform and a shift to democratic policing.

Community involvement can address the lack of trust between citizens and police officers due to police bias or brutality. But this is a gradual process that happens through daily interactions between communities and the police.

Public participation channels

Public participation is enshrined in Kenya’s constitution as one of the principles and values of good governance. By establishing a complaints and redress mechanism, public participation can become an integral component of promoting effective handling of complaints.

The constitution has created different institutions to address public complaints. These include the Commission on Administrative Justice (Office of the Ombudsman), Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, and the Independent Police Oversight Authority. Some of these have digital public complaints systems, which provide more confidentiality and better access for people.

Other channels of handling complaints include civil society actors and the media. Civil society organisations provide civic education and mobilise citizens to take part in monitoring and evaluation government’s performance.

Making these channels more effective could help absorb public anger that could turn into violence.

Conclusion

Police brutality in Kenya has arisen through historical, social, economic and political factors. Mitigating it therefore requires a long-term, combined top-down and bottom-up approach.

Genuine political support from the country’s political leaders is essential to instil positive attitudes about Kenya’s political and security institutions. It also requires genuine support from local-level or grassroots communities. This, in turn, entails communities trusting each other and building social cohesion.

Oscar Gakuo Mwangi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Kenya police brutality – it will take more than laws and public anger to change behaviour – https://theconversation.com/kenya-police-brutality-it-will-take-more-than-laws-and-public-anger-to-change-behaviour-259327

July 5, 2025

Women trapped with abusers: South Africa’s COVID lockdowns exposed serious protection gaps

Source: – By Marinei Herselman, Lecturer, University of Fort Hare

The unintended consequences of measures introduced to limit the spread of the COVID-19 virus from 2020 to 2022 have been studied extensively. Research in South Africa shows that some of these measures added to social ills, such as unemployment and poverty.

Another impact of “lockdown” was on gender-based violence. The government’s Gender-Based Violence Command Centre reported over 120,000 cases within the first three weeks of lockdown.

In the year 2019-20, 53,293 sexual offences were reported, an average of 146 per day. This was up from 52,420 in 2018-19. Most of these were cases of rape. The police recorded 42,289 rapes in 2019-20, up from 41,583 in 2018-19, an average of 116 rapes each day. Further, a total of 2,695 women were murdered in South Africa in 2019-20. This means a woman is murdered every three hours.

The lockdown measures required people to remain indoors. Schools and non-essential establishments like restaurants were closed. Travelling internationally and between provinces was prohibited.

Research showed that the lockdown measures trapped many women and children in abusive environments. The gender-based violence incidents highlighted gaps in support services and underscored the critical role of social workers in crisis situations.

In a recent paper, we described our study of the impact the lockdown measures had on gender-based violence in Matatiele, a small town in South Africa’s Eastern Cape, one of the poorest regions in the country.

The study highlighted the need to integrate gender-based violence support services into emergency plans to ensure continuity of care in times of crisis. In addition, the challenges faced by social workers during the pandemic showed systemic weaknesses in the support infrastructure.

We recommend prioritising gender-based violence services, expanding the social work workforce, and ensuring accessible, effective support mechanisms to safeguard survivors. By engaging local and provincial partners through cross-sector collaboration, South Africa can build a more equitable society and empower survivors during future emergencies.

Interviewing survivors of violence

Our findings were based on interviews with 30 survivors of gender-based violence and five social workers at the Thuthuzela Care Centre in Matatiele, which provides support for rape survivors. Twenty-four of the survivors (80%) were women and six (20%) were males. The participants were aged 18-35.

We found that 63.3% of survivors experienced gender-based violence differently during the pandemic, primarily because access to support services was reduced. Key findings were that:

survivors found it difficult to reach police stations, hospitals and support centres
a lack of transport and staffing made access to services even more difficult than usual
survivors were often imprisoned with their abusers, making it nearly impossible to escape the abusive environment
the closure of schools and community centres destroyed additional refuges and support networks
social workers reported that remote counselling methods, such as telephone calls, were less effective
poor internet connection and the inability to meet in person limited the quality of psychosocial support provided
many perpetrators faced job losses and economic hardships; this led to increased stress and violence.

Our findings highlight how public health crises can worsen existing social vulnerabilities. The COVID-19 pandemic starkly illustrated the vulnerability of survivors during crises and the role of social workers in providing support.

Women’s experiences

As shown in the table, some participants said their experiences of abuse were the same before and during COVID-19. This might be because a participant was abused during the pandemic and had not been a victim before.

Most of the research participants said their experience of gender-based violence was different from how it had been before COVID-19. Asked to explain, most of them responded in similar ways.

One of the women said:

I have difficulty escaping my abuser.

Another said:

I struggled to sleep, and I was anxious for a long time. I accepted the situation and told myself that I will be fine. I was abused by a stranger, which made it difficult for me to get justice but I told myself that abuse is something that you cannot run away from.

Lack of sleep is a common challenge for many survivors of gender-based violence.

One of the male survivors in the study, a married man, spoke of the difficulty of dealing with societal norms which are rooted in patriarchy. There’s a local saying which captures the typical attitude: indoda yokwenyani ayikhali (“a real man does not cry”).

There appeared to be a general sense that gender-based violence would not change, so women and men just accepted and normalised it.

Next steps

An effective response to gender-based violence requires sufficient staffing of response facilities. There is also a need for robust communication tools and training to handle remote support scenarios as happened during COVID.

Gender-based violence is a serious problem that needs a multi-faceted response. Governments, and non-profit, non-governmental and
civil society organisations must work together. This will help in achieving UN Sustainable Development Goal 5 on gender equality. Gender equality is a fundamental human right. It is a foundation for a peaceful, prosperous and sustainable world. While some progress has been made in recent decades, the world is not on track to achieve gender equality by 2030.

To lessen the impact of future crises on survivors of gender-based violence, several steps are essential:

the government must recognise support services as critical in emergencies; social workers must be classified as essential personnel so that they can continue their work without restrictions
essential services such as safe shelters, mental health support and legal aid must be in place, and healthcare services must be fully available, well-equipped and well-staffed
the government must expand and train the social worker workforce, and provide specialised training for any crisis situation in the future
there is need to develop support channels, including online platforms, helplines and mobile outreach programmes
investing in reliable communication technologies and transportation can help people reach support services
long-term strategies should focus on reducing gender inequalities and challenging patriarchal norms.

Bongeka Zawani, a master’s student at the University of Fort Hare, carried out the study this article is based on.

Marinei Herselman and Bongeka Zwani received funding from the University of Fort Hare GMRDC for this study.

– ref. Women trapped with abusers: South Africa’s COVID lockdowns exposed serious protection gaps – https://theconversation.com/women-trapped-with-abusers-south-africas-covid-lockdowns-exposed-serious-protection-gaps-243198

July 5, 2025

Sudan: foreign interests are deepening a devastating war – only regional diplomacy can stop them

Source: – By John Mukum Mbaku, Professor, Weber State University

The war between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces has raged since April 2023. It’s turned Sudan into the site of one of the world’s most catastrophic humanitarian and displacement crises.

At least 150,000 people have been killed. More than 14 million have been displaced, with over 3 million fleeing to neighbouring countries like Chad, Ethiopia and South Sudan. Once a vibrant capital city, Khartoum is now a “burnt-out shell”.

This devastating war, rooted in long-standing ethnic, political and economic tensions, has been compounded by what international and regional actors have done and failed to do. As Amnesty International notes, the international response remains “woefully inadequate”.

The problem lies in the fact that external involvement has not been neutral. Instead of halting the conflict, many external players have complicated it. In some cases, international interventions have escalated it.

More than 10 countries across Africa, the Middle East and Asia have been drawn into Sudan’s war. This has turned it into a proxy conflict that reflects the interests of external actors, such as Egypt, Turkey and Saudi Arabia.

Several actors have taken sides.

Saudi Arabia, for instance, backs the Sudanese army. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is alleged to support the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces. Egypt, citing historical ties, backs the army. For their part, Ethiopia reportedly supports the paramilitary group, while Eritrea backs the army. Chad has been accused of facilitating arms shipments to the Rapid Support Forces via its eastern airports. Russia, Ukraine, Turkey and Iran have also been linked to diplomatic and military support to Sudan’s army.

These geopolitical entanglements have made peace nearly impossible, deepening the conflict instead of resolving it.

I have studied Africa’s governance failures for more than 30 years, from military elites and coups to state capture and political instability. Based on this, my view is that Sudan’s conflict cannot be resolved without serious international commitment to neutrality and peace.

The involvement of foreign actors on opposing sides must be reversed. International involvement must be premised on helping the Sudanese people develop the capacity to resolve governance problems themselves.

For this to happen, regional diplomacy must be stepped up. The African Union must assert its legitimacy and take the lead in addressing this challenging crisis. It can do this by putting pressure on member states to ensure that any ceasefire agreements are enforced.

The East African Community and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development can provide assistance in securing a peace agreement and ensuring it’s enforced. Members of these continental organisations can encourage external actors to limit their intervention in Sudan to activities that promote democratic governance and sustainable development.

The African Union

The African Union should play a central role in bringing peace to Sudan. But its absence has been conspicuous.

Despite adopting the “African solutions to African problems” mantra, the African Union has neither held Sudan’s warlords accountable nor put in place adequate civilian protection measures.

First, it could have worked closely with the UN to deploy a mission to Sudan with a mandate to protect civilians, monitor human rights (especially the rights of women and girls), assist in the return of all displaced persons and prevent any further attacks on civilians.

Second, the African Union could have sent an expert group to investigate human rights violations, especially sexual violence. The results could have been submitted to the union’s Peace and Security Council for further action.

Third, the African Union could have worked closely with regional and international actors, including the Arab League. This would ensure a unified approach to the conflict, based on the interests of Sudanese people for peace and development.

Finally, the AU could have addressed the root causes of Sudan’s conflicts, which include extreme poverty, inequality, political exclusion and economic marginalisation.

The African Union could also make use of the insights and knowledge gleaned by African leaders like Kenya’s William Ruto and Egypt’s Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, who have attempted to mediate, but have failed. The AU should also use the political expertise of elder statesmen, such as Thabo Mbeki, Moussa Faki and Olusegun Obasanjo, to help address the conflict and humanitarian crisis.

The United Arab Emirates

The UAE is alleged to back the paramilitary troops in the war. In recent years, the UAE has become increasingly involved in African conflicts. It has supported various factions to conflicts in the Horn of Africa, the Sahel region and Libya.

Its increased involvement in Africa is driven by several strategic interests. These include fighting terrorism, securing maritime routes, and expanding its trade and influence.

In 2009, the UAE helped Sudan mediate its border conflict with Chad. The UAE supported the ouster of Omar al-Bashir in April 2019, as well as Sudan’s transitional military council.

In 2021, the UAE signed a strategic partnership with Sudan to modernise its political institutions and return the country to the international community. The UAE has stated that it has taken a neutral position in the present conflict. However, on 6 March 2025, Sudan brought a case against the UAE to the International Court of Justice. It accused the UAE of complicity in genocide, alleging that the UAE “has been arming the RSF with the aim of wiping out the non-Arab Massalit population of West Darfur.”

The United States

During his first term, US president Donald Trump spearheaded the Abraham Accords. These agreements were aimed at normalising relations between Israel and several Arab countries, including Sudan. Subsequently, Sudan was removed from the US list of state sponsors of terrorism.

The accords appeared to have brought Khartoum closer to Washington. They provided avenues for the type of engagement that could have placed it in good stead when Trump returned to the White House in 2025.

However, Sudan’s internal political and economic instability, including the present civil war, has complicated the situation.

The Abraham Accords were a significant foreign policy achievement for Trump. A peaceful, democratically governed, and economically stable and prosperous Sudan could serve as the foundation for Trump’s “circle of peace” in the Middle East.

But Trump and his administration are preoccupied with other domestic and foreign policy priorities. During his May 2025 visit to Saudi Arabia, Trump did not officially address the conflict in Sudan. Instead, he placed emphasis on securing business deals and investments.

The European Union

The European Union has strongly condemned the violence and the atrocities committed during the war in Sudan, especially against children and women. The organisation has appealed for an immediate and lasting ceasefire while noting that Sudan faces the “most catastrophic humanitarian crisis of the 21st century”.

Unfortunately, member countries will remain preoccupied with helping Ukraine, especially given the growing uncertainty in Washington’s relationship with the authorities in Kyiv.

The preoccupation and focus of the EU and the US on Gaza, Ukraine and Iran may, however, be underestimating the geopolitical risks Sudan’s war is generating.

A peaceful and democratically governed Sudan can contribute to peace not just in the region, but also in many other parts of the world.

What now?

To end Sudan’s war and prevent future ones, international and African actors must do more than issue statements. They must act coherently, collectively and with genuine commitment to the Sudanese people’s right to peace, democratic governance and sustainable development.

Democracy and the rule of law are key to peaceful coexistence and sustainable development in Sudan. However, establishing and sustaining institutions that enhance and support democracy is the job of the Sudanese people. The external community can provide the financial support that Sudan is likely to need. It can also support the strengthening of electoral systems, civic education and citizen trust in public institutions.

John Mukum Mbaku does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Sudan: foreign interests are deepening a devastating war – only regional diplomacy can stop them – https://theconversation.com/sudan-foreign-interests-are-deepening-a-devastating-war-only-regional-diplomacy-can-stop-them-259824