Category: The Conversation – Canada

Source: – By Theodora Dame Adjin-Tettey, Senior Lecturer, Durban University of Technology/Research Associate, School of Journalism and Media Studies, Durban University of Technology

Many churches have been holding worship services online via live-streaming platforms in recent times. This is unsurprising since many congregants use digital technologies. The COVID-19 pandemic also pushed churches to swiftly embrace digital platforms. This allowed them to continue with religious activities when physical and mobility restrictions were in place.

Some churches invest heavily in audio-visual equipment, lighting systems and other gadgets to provide the right conditions for media production and to enhance the worship experience for congregants, online and in person.

Digital technologies and platforms have become core components of the outreach and evangelistic activities of churches. Some contemporary pastors have a strong online presence with a huge following, mostly in the millions. They actively engage their followers and share different forms of messages with them.

As the amount of online content generated by churches grows, questions of safety, security and privacy have come to the fore. It is important to look at how churches address these concerns as they rapidly deploy digital platforms to reach and maintain virtual church membership.

I am a media and communication studies academic and researcher. In a recent paper I worked with my student to examined the concerns of congregants of a church in Ghana over the security dangers that digital church engagement poses.

Christianity is the religion with the largest following in Ghana. During the COVID-19 pandemic, many churches turned to online services and have continued with them.

The research revealed that there were no established policies guiding the church’s virtual engagements. The media team relied primarily on their subjective judgement to address any potential ethical dilemmas.

Beside enhanced privacy measures and access control, we recommend ethical frameworks and guidelines to govern the management of congregants’ personal information in both physical and virtual environments. This must include the inputs of congregants and experts.

The research also found that word of mouth was still the primary means by which congregants came to learn about the church. This suggests churches cannot abandon the old ways of reaching out to people.

Digital technology and the church

Radio, TV and social media are all used to extend invitations to the public, promote and advertise churches, and generally facilitate church activities. The importance of having an online presence has compelled a significant number of churches to have dedicated media teams. They create and distribute content meant for digital platforms. The content includes photos and audiovisual testimonies of church members.

To ensure that members of online churches have a positive experience during live streaming, most media departments also invest creativity into their videography. On live streams, followers (virtual congregants) react to songs being sung and respond to what the preacher says with comments and the use of emojis and GIFs. This is synonymous with how they might react in the physical church environment.

But during the streaming of worship services, information about church members is not just shared in the physical church environment but also with a broader online audience. By the nature of live-streaming, there is no control over who has access to the content, how widely it is distributed, and for what and how the content is used by third parties.

The study and some of its key findings

Data collection for our study involved 170 survey respondents (congregants) and eight interview participants (videographers, video editors and social media managers from the church media department).

We asked the congregants how they had first learned about the church; factors influencing their participation in virtual church services; and what safety and security concerns they had around their virtual church engagements.

The interview participants were asked about the ethical considerations directing their work.

Our study found that congregants had a range of concerns. Based on the sense of safety, confidence and trust they have in the church, congregants participating in physical church services may divulge personal information. These include prayer requests, personal hardships, or testimonials about their accomplishments. They sometimes do this with the understanding that the information will remain inside the church’s walls.

Chief among the concerns were:

• the risk of identity theft

• the potential misuse of personal data for targeted advertising

• potential privacy invasion because of their interactions with the church’s digital platforms.

Some members of the media team admitted that congregants might have privacy and security concerns. However, in the absence of formal guidelines, any attempt to ensure the privacy and security of congregants might be an ad hoc measure. This was demonstrated in the study’s finding that the media team’s privacy and security adherence was largely based on their judgement and sometimes on prodding from congregants.

What can be done

Based on concerns raised by congregants, we argue that churches must ensure the privacy of those participating in services by instituting confidentiality and anonymity measures, particularly when sharing their personal or sensitive information.

In addition, participants in our research held the view that some sensitisation could be useful to cater to those concerns. This could take the form of regular sensitisation of congregants on how they can enhance their online safety and security.

We believe that because churches sometimes rely on photos, videos and testimonies of members to build their social media profiles, a rule-based system must be put in place. This could involve delayed broadcasting techniques to prevent the airing of sensitive information.

We suggest that steps be taken to protect sensitive information and content about members that is shared online. An example of how this can be done is being set by a non-denominational prayer movement that has taken over Ghana’s online sphere. To secure the privacy of members who share testimonies, their identities are kept anonymous and certain details, such as names and places, are also protected.

Finally, the right technology must be put in place to allow for delayed broadcasts. This means live-streamed content can be reviewed and, where necessary, edited so that sensitive content can be removed before the broadcast reaches a wide online audience.

Theodora Dame Adjin-Tettey received funding from the National Research Foundation of South Africa for her post doctoral fellowship.

– ref. Virtual churches are popular in Ghana. But what about online safety? – https://theconversation.com/virtual-churches-are-popular-in-ghana-but-what-about-online-safety-255627

Source: – By Fortunate Mafeta Phaka, Senior Postdoctoral Researcher of herptile-human interactions, North-West University

Naming all the creatures and plants in nature is no small task. Fortunate Phaka is a zoologist who has conducted the first comprehensive analysis of naming and classification of frogs and reptiles in nine South African cultures. The list includes 136 frog and 407 reptile species that have been scientifically described. He explains why it’s important to record all the species names that people use in their own languages.

Why did you study the indigenous names of frogs and reptiles?

I am interested in the interactions between wildlife and people. These interactions include, for example, how people use wildlife in figures of speech, harvesting of wildlife for consumption, and of course how animals are assigned names.

If everyone’s names for things are known and shared, the ideas behind the names can also be shared, appreciated and valued.

Conservation planning is improved by consideration of different wildlife perspectives, which is revealed partly by the names that different people give wildlife.

Knowing local names can provide assurance that people from different cultural backgrounds are talking about the same species.

In South Africa, for example, there are 11 official spoken languages and scientists use Latin names for species. Most people aren’t familiar with the scientific names.

That’s why we extended the list of scientific, Afrikaans and English names of South African frogs and reptiles to include names in the country’s other nine official languages.

How did you go about it, and what did you find?

The project started as a pilot study in 2016, carried out in the Zululand area of South Africa’s KwaZulu-Natal province, where frog biodiversity is high and Indigenous cultural practices are still part of everyday life. Results of the pilot were published as a book in 2017 and as a scientific publication in 2019.

Following the success of the pilot study, I collected responses from 287 South African Indigenous language speakers (aged between 25 and 57) using an online questionnaire and in-person interviews while on field trips, and reviewed 18 scientific articles, dissertations and books to study naming practices even further.

The study shed light on the way people group animals (folk taxonomy) and how that compares with the way scientists group them (scientific taxonomy).

It became clear that Indigenous language names were often assigned based on unique features of frogs or reptiles, such as the sound they make, how they move or where they are found. Most of these names group several species together based on their similarities. This meant most frog and reptile species did not have Indigenous language names that were unique to them. For example, zoologists have named eight different Reed Frog species from South Africa but these eight species were assigned one Indigenous name that groups them together.

The organised way of assigning Indigenous names to animals has some similarities to how scientists assign names that are unique to each species. For example, the Grass Frog species are grouped together under the scientific genus Ptychadena, and in IsiZulu the same species are grouped under the name Uvete. These similarities meant we could combine scientific naming practices with Indigenous naming practices to give each species a unique name in multiple languages.

To ensure the unique Indigenous names remained familiar to speakers of respective languages, we added descriptive terms to the existing general Indigenous names to make them specific, instead of coining an entirely new name. For example in IsiZulu the general name Umgqagqa (used for all Reed Frogs) became Umgqagqa opendiwe (specific name for the Painted Reed Frog). And several other descriptive terms were added to Umgqagqa to distinguish between the eight Reed Frog species of South Africa.

Why does it matter to record the Indigenous names of species?

Conservation hasn’t been doing a good job of being inclusive. Knowing Indigenous names and the local perspectives behind those names is a good way to start being aware of the multiple other perspectives. Conservation should ultimately be to everyone’s benefit.

For a long time wildlife guidebooks have had very few Indigenous language names in them. With increased recording of Indigenous names, any South African would be able to open a wildlife guide and read a name in any of our 11 official spoken languages. Hopefully one day we can have more books like the Bilingual Guide to the Frogs of Zululand (IsiZulu version: Isiqondiso Sasefilidini Esindimimbili Ngamaxoxo AkwelaKwaZulu) that make it possible for you to read about your favourite wildlife in your preferred language.

Has this been done for other groups of animals or plants?

Birds and plants are two groups that have received this kind of attention.

A recent scientific publication has worked on IsiZulu names for all South African birds and another publication studied the morphology of IsiZulu bird names. There has also been work on IsiXhosa insect names, and there has been a SeSotho animal word list published online. Indigenous names for African wildlife have received sporadic attention in the past, but with the recent increases in calls for consideration of Indigenous knowledge there has been increasing focus on understanding these names and using them.

Do you have some favourite names?

I have a lot of favourites but there are some names that stand out, like Senana (Sepedi general name for Rain Frogs) and Lebololo (Sepedi name for Puff adder). These names have the same root word or sound throughout most of the Indigenous South African languages and I am curious about how this happened. Rain Frogs are also called Senanatswidi in Sepedi and tswidi is an onomatopoeic reference to the whistling sound that Rain Frogs make.

Fortunate Mafeta Phaka receives funding from National Research Foundation/South African Institute for Aquatic Biodiversity.

– ref. South Africa’s frogs and reptiles get their own list of names in local languages – https://theconversation.com/south-africas-frogs-and-reptiles-get-their-own-list-of-names-in-local-languages-254643

Source: – By Sarah Gabbott, Professor of Palaeontology, University of Leicester

A fossilised creature found in a South African roadside quarry 25 years ago has finally got an official name. The small, segmented, crustacean-like creature, dated to 444 million years ago, can now be introduced as Keurbos susanae. It belongs to the arthropod group of animals, which accounts for about 84% of all known species that exist today, including insects, spiders and crabs.

Palaeontologist Sarah Gabbott explains what’s so unusual about her discovery, which she named as part of the process of describing it scientifically.

What can you tell us about this creature and the environment it lived in?

The fossil is about 50cm long and has 46 almost identical segments. Projecting from each is a delicate, gill-like structure. It would probably have looked like a bit like a horseshoe crab and the gills would have been for absorbing oxygen from the water it lived in. Its insides are exquisitely well-preserved, which is very unusual for fossils – normally only the hard, more decay-resistant external features would be preserved. You can see bundles of muscle fibres that would have powered the limbs, tendons and an internal scaffold structure that gave the animal rigidity.

We think it would have spent most of its life living on, or more likely just above, the seafloor, probably walking and swimming in an undulatory (waving) motion.

It lived in the immediate aftermath of the end Ordovician extinction event more than 440 million years ago, caused by glaciations (the spread of icy conditions) across vast swaths of the planet. This extinction wiped out about 85% of Earth’s species. The marine basin that Keurbos susanae inhabited was probably very cold and at times covered with sea ice.

It was a relatively hostile environment in other ways too. Our analyses of the chemistry of the shales – the sediments on the sea bed where this animal and others lived, now turned to rock – shows that they were deposited under anoxic conditions (that is, there was no oxygen circulating freely in the water). And at times free hydrogen sulfide occurred in the sediment porewaters (the water in tiny spaces between grains of sediment) and even above the seafloor. Not much could live in these conditions and this was critical to this fossil’s amazing preservation.

It meant the carcass was not scavenged by other animals after it died. Also, the chemistry was important in the process whereby the soft tissues, which should usually rot away rapidly, became mineralised quickly after death. This turned the animal’s anatomy to mineral which survived for hundreds of millions of years until it was discovered.

It is preserved “inside out”.

Keurbos susanae is a new genus and species which we are still trying to place among other early arthropods. The fact that its insides are better preserved than its outside makes it difficult to compare with other fossils that are preserved the “other way round”.

How did you find the fossil and what else has been found in that area?

The site is in the Cedarberg mountains, north of Cape Town. To collect fossils in this area you need a permit granted by the Council for Geoscience. Fossil-bearing rocks are protected by law because of their heritage and scientific value.

Fossil hunting in these rocks takes a lot of hard work and patience, splitting open the shales with a hammer and chisel. These shale rocks are what’s left of layers of silt that were once on the sea floor. The fossils here are super rare: you can dig and split shale for days and not find a single fossil! But we know there are some in there because of discoveries made previously.

I found two specimens. The first one is complete but the second one only has the middle part of the body preserved.

In the same rocks we have found some of the earliest vertebrate fossils with mineralised teeth, called conodonts. They were eel shaped and predatory. Also eurypterids (sea scorpions), arthropods with powerful swimming appendages, which would have cruised through the frigid waters. There are also orthocones – a type of chambered cephalopod – like the mollusc fossils called ammonites, which have been found in large numbers, but with a straight shell instead of coiled.

Why has it taken 25 years to describe Keurbos susanae scientifically?

Two reasons really.

First, because of the nature of preservation, where all the insides are perfectly preserved but the outside (the carapace or body covering) is absent, it is just difficult to interpret and compare to other fossils. And secondly because the specimen’s head and legs are missing and these are key characteristics that palaeontologists would use to help them to understand the evolutionary relationships of such fossils.

If more specimens were to be found, with their heads and legs, we could be more certain about where this fossil fitted in the scheme of life. But the site where I found it has been covered in a lot of rock from quarrying activity. So we decided to describe what we had in the meantime, and not wait for more examples.

The fossil’s name, Keurbos susanae, refers to the place where I found it and to my mother, Sue, who encouraged me to follow a career that made me happy, whatever that might be.

Sarah Gabbott receives funding from Natural Environmental Research Council; National Geographic. She is affiliated with Green Circle Nature Regeneration CIC a not for profit Environmental Community Interest Company in the UK

– ref. Marine fossil found in South Africa is one of a kind, thanks to unusual preservation – https://theconversation.com/marine-fossil-found-in-south-africa-is-one-of-a-kind-thanks-to-unusual-preservation-255256

Source: – By Olivier Walther, Associate Professor in Geography, University of Florida

What’s the connection between roads and conflict in west Africa? This may seem like an odd question. But a study we conducted shows a close relationship between the two.

We are researchers of transnational political violence. We analysed 58,000 violent events in west Africa between 2000 to 2024. Our focus was on identifying patterns of violence in relation to transport infrastructure.

Anecdotal evidence suggests that roads, bridges, pipelines and other transport systems are increasingly attacked across west Africa, but little is known about the factors that explain when, where and by whom.

Violence in west Africa involves a complex mix of political, economic and social factors. Weak governance, corruption, urban-rural inequalities and marginalised populations have been exploited by numerous armed groups, including transnational criminal networks and religious extremists.

West Africa has been one of the world’s most violent regions since the mid 2010s. In 2024 alone, the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data initiative recorded over 10,600 events of political violence in the region. These ranged from battles between armed groups, explosions and other forms of remote violence, to attacks on unarmed civilians. An estimated 25,600 people were killed. This has been the status quo in the region for nearly a decade.

The results of our study show that 65% of all the attacks, explosions, and violence against civilians recorded between 2000 and 2024 were located within one kilometre of a road.

Only 4% of all events were located further than 10km from a road. This pattern was consistent across all road types but most pronounced near highways and primary roads.

We think the reason for this pattern is that there is fierce competition between state and non-state actors for access to and use of roads.

Governments need well-developed road networks for a host of reasons, including the ability to govern, enabling economic activity, and security. Roads enable military mobility and reduce potential safe havens for insurgents in remote regions.

Insurgent groups also see transport networks as prime targets. They create opportunities to blockade cities, ambush convoys, kidnap travellers, employ landmines, and destroy key infrastructure.

Our research is part of a long line of work that explored the role of infrastructure in relation to security in west Africa. Our latest research reinforces earlier findings linking the two. Transport networks have become battlegrounds for extremist groups seeking to destabilise states, isolate communities and expand their influence.

The network

The west African road network is vast, estimated at over 709,000km of roads by the Global Roads Inventory Project. It compares unfavourably with other African regions. For example, paved roads remain relatively scarce in west Africa (17% of the regional network) when compared with north Africa (83%).

Poorly maintained roads impose costs on west African countries. They increase transport time of perishable goods, shorten the operational life of trucks, cause more accidents, and reduce social interactions between communities.

Still, significant variations in road quality are found across the region. The percentage of paved roads ranges from a high of 37% in Senegal to just over 7% in Mali. Nigeria has the largest road network in west Africa with an estimated 195,000km, but much of it has deteriorated because of poor maintenance.

Road-related violence is on the rise

We found that road-related attacks have been on the rise since jihadist groups emerged in the mid-2010s. Only 31 ambushes against convoys were reported in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali and Niger from 2000-2015, against 497 from 2016-2023.

Attacks frequently occur along the same road segments, such as around Boni in the Gourma Mounts, where Jama’at Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) conducted nine attacks against Malian forces and Wagner mercenaries between 2019 and 2024.

Violence was the most clustered near roads in 2011, with 87% of all violent events located within 1km of a road. Our analysis shows that, though still high, there’s been a decline post-2000: 59% in 2022 and 60% in 2024. This evolution reflects the ruralisation of conflict in west Africa. As jihadist insurgents target rural areas and small towns more and more, an increasing share of violent events also occurs far away from roads.

We’ve studied the root causes of west Africa’s violence for nearly a decade, documenting the ever-intensifying costs paid by its people. In the process, we’ve uncovered overlooked aspects of the turmoil, including the centrality of the road networks to an understanding of where the violence is happening.

The most dangerous roads of west Africa

Our findings show that violence against transport infrastructure is very unevenly distributed in west Africa and that specific road segments have been repeatedly targeted. This was particularly the case in the Central Sahel, Lake Chad basin, and western Cameroon.

For example, the 350km ring road linking Bamenda to Kumbo and Wum in Cameroon is the most violent road in west Africa, with 757 events since 2018, due to the conflict between the government and the Ambazonian separatists.

The longest segments of dangerous roads are in Nigeria, particularly those connecting Maiduguri in Borno State to Damaturu, Potiskum, Biu and Bama.

In the central Sahel, the road between Mopti/Sévaré and Gao is by far the most violent transport axis, with 433 events since the beginning of the civil war in Mali in 2012. South of Gao, National Road 17 leading to the Nigerien border, and National Road 20 heading east toward Ménaka have experienced 177 and 139 events respectively since the Islamic State – Sahel Province (ISSP) intensified its activities in the region in 2017.

In Burkina Faso, all the roads leading to Djibo near the border with Mali have experienced high levels of violence since the early 2020s.

Building transport infrastructure to promote peace

Roads are an important part of state counterinsurgency strategies and a strategic target for local militants. Yes, as our work highlights, transport infrastructure is largely ignored in debates that emphasise more state interventions as a means of combating insecurity. Sixty years after the independence of many west African countries, road accessibility remains elusive in the region.

Peripheral cities such as Bardaï, Bilma, Kidal and Timbuktu, where rebel movements have historically developed, are still not connected to the national network by tarmac roads.

The duality of the transport infrastructure, as both a facilitator and target of violence, has put government forces at a disadvantage. Regular forces are heavily constrained by the sparsity and poor conditions of the road network, which makes them vulnerable to attacks without necessarily allowing them to project their military power over long distances.

Rather than building transport infrastructure, states have focused on strengthening security by investing in military bases. The military coups in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have further reinforced this trend, with the creation of a joint force by the countries of the Alliance of Sahel States.

Strengthening security has taken precedence over developmental support for peripheral communities, who experience the worst of the violence.

Olivier Walther receives funding from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

Alexander John Thurston receives funding from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

Steven Radil receives funding from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

– ref. Highways to hell: west Africa’s road networks are the preferred battleground for terror groups – https://theconversation.com/highways-to-hell-west-africas-road-networks-are-the-preferred-battleground-for-terror-groups-258517

Source: – By Leonor Oliveira Toscano, PhD Candidate in Political Science, University of Oslo

Kenya has been praised as a “model for the world” when it comes to peacebuilding efforts to manage outbreaks of violence within its borders. The country has systematically put in place a peacebuilding architecture rooted in a history of local peace initiatives. These date back to the early 1990s.

Over this period, the Wajir Peace and Development Committee emerged in the country’s north-eastern region. The committee successfully addressed decades of inter-clan violence in Wajir, an arid county bordering Somalia. It also inspired the emergence of numerous local peace committees across the country.

These committees have been set up in some other African countries – like Ghana, South Africa, Sierra Leone and Burundi – and continue to contribute informally to local peacebuilding in these states.

Read more:
Training local leaders in mediation can reduce violence: positive results in Nigeria

In Kenya, the committees became institutionalised after post-election violence in 2007-08 and a mediation process led by former UN secretary general Kofi Annan. They now form part of the national peacebuilding architecture.

Violence triggered by the contested 2007 presidential election outcome resulted in the killing of more than 1,000 people. The mediation process led to a power-sharing agreement signed by the presidential contenders Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga.

The country’s peacebuilding architecture is now supported by several policies and frameworks. These include the constitution of 2010. The system that’s been built has the capacity to connect a wide variety of peacebuilding actors – both state and non-state, formal and informal – at all levels of society. This helps resolve conflict and build resilience.

The Kenyan government initiated a review of the peacebuilding architecture in 2023. It involved a lengthy consultation process and high levels of participation among Kenyans. The National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management led the way, assisted by an independent panel of 13 peacebuilding experts.

Released at the end of 2024, the review looked at the strengths and weaknesses of the architecture.

It offers a vision for building a robust peacebuilding system, along with an actionable roadmap. One lesson is that Kenya can use the capacities and unique approaches of different peacebuilding actors. At the local level, peace committees showed that they made contributions to early warning systems and building confidence in communities.

However, insufficient resources and a consistent focus on electoral violence prevent the system from addressing other drivers of conflict.

The strengths

Local peace committees, with membership typically drawn from ordinary citizens, religious groups or local civil society organisations, play a crucial role. They support dialogue around conflict issues. They promote trust and understanding, and can build a constructive environment for conflict resolution.

Their information gathering feeds into the regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development’s Conflict Early Warning and Response System (CEWARN) to prevent election violence. Local peace committees have contributed to negotiating local disputes. They have also helped de-polarise ethnic identities and facilitated local peace agreements. One example was the Modogashe Declaration. It sets ground rules to solve conflict and local disputes over pasture, water access and cattle rustling.

Read more:
Kenya violence: 5 key drivers of the decades-long conflict in the north and what to do about them

We are researchers in Norway on a project focusing on civilian agency, local peace and resilience building. Our own interviews with committee members in Nakuru – a county greatly affected by the violence in 2007-08 – found that peace committee members continued to work together and share conflict-sensitive information with local stakeholders. These include administration officers and religious leaders, and covered periods during and after the 2022 elections.

Further, local peace committees can offer women valuable opportunities for participation in conflict management. This contributes to their protection, for example from sexual violence.

The weaknesses

Despite these successes, Kenya’s peacebuilding architecture faces pressing challenges.

First, local peace committees aren’t perfect. They can be manipulated by politicians seeking to build local support. They can also compete with traditional actors such as elders in conflict resolution.

Kenya’s institutionalisation of local peacebuilding strengthened information flow across all levels. But it also threatens to undermine local peacebuilding agency and autonomy. Formalising local peace committees can spur an unhealthy monetisation of peacebuilding, with some members joining for financial gain. This threatens to erode the voluntary character of peacebuilding as a common good and undermine genuine priorities for peace.

Read more:
How women in Kenya mobilised for peace after surviving violence

Second, elite-level politics in Kenya creates the persistent risk of electoral violence. This diverts attention and resources away from other long-standing causes of conflict. The drivers of violence in Kenya are varied and region specific. They include disputes over access to land, and marginalisation of ethnic and religious communities. Climate change threatens to worsen competition and conflict between pastoralists and farming communities.

Our analysis of event data from Armed Conflict Location & Event Data shows that communal violence is the deadliest form of political violence in Kenya. For their part, fatalities related to election violence have decreased. This underscores the urgent need to consistently invest in prevention and local peacebuilding beyond narrow electoral periods.

Fatalities in Kenya by type of armed violence: 2010-2023

Electoral competition can escalate violence between pastoralists and farmers, but it’s the persistence of communal conflicts that represents a serious threat. Communal violence particularly affects Kenya’s arid and semi-arid areas in the Rift Valley, eastern and north-eastern regions.

What next

Our interviews with local peace committee members show that funding for their activities diminishes outside election years. This hampers their capacity to address conflict outside these periods.

Yet research has shown that local peacebuilding can build social resilience against recurrent communal violence. Peacebuilding interventions grounded in local realities are also vital for countering insurgent violence. This is especially important as counterterrorism operations by state forces often trigger cycles of violence rather than resolving underlying issues.

Read more:
Drivers of electoral violence in Kenya: red flags to watch out for

Our research finds that Kenyans place significant trust in local peacebuilders, such as community leaders, elders and women. The review of the country’s peacebuilding architecture proposes a 40% quota for women, youth and people with disabilities in local peace committees.

However, quotas alone may not be sufficient to address the political and cultural challenges that entrench inequality.

Ultimately, political elites need to transform Kenya’s “win at all costs” politics. This way, the country’s mediators and peacebuilders can address the deep social and economic grievances that underpin cycles of violence.

Leonor Toscano’s doctoral research is supported by the grant from the European Research Council’s Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Program (852816; PI: Jana Krause). Leonor Toscano conducted interviews with LPC members in Kenya.

Jana Krause received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme under grant number 852816 (ResilienceBuilding).

Marika Miner’s post-doctoral research is also supported by the grant from the European Research Council’s Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Program (852816; PI: Jana Krause).

– ref. Kenya’s peacebuilding efforts hold valuable lessons for the rest of the world, but gaps remain – https://theconversation.com/kenyas-peacebuilding-efforts-hold-valuable-lessons-for-the-rest-of-the-world-but-gaps-remain-257761

Source: – By Paa Kwesi Wolseley Prah, Postdoctoral Fellow, Dublin City University

Mali, a landlocked Sahelian nation of 25 million people, has faced significant instability since 2012, marked by terrorism, state neglect and armed conflicts.

That year a Tuareg rebellion started in northern Mali and President Amadou Toumani Touré was ousted in a military coup. Constitutional rule was suspended. Rebels in northern Mali went on to seize cities like Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal, declaring an independent Islamic State of Azawad and imposing sharia law.

They also destroyed cultural heritage sites, including 14 of Timbuktu’s 16 Unesco-listed mausoleums. The crisis prompted international intervention, including a UN authorised mission, which retook northern cities within weeks. Islamist rebels retreated into civilian populations and remote areas.

Despite these efforts, violence against civilians by extremist groups and community militias has continued. By 2023, 8.8 million Malians needed humanitarian assistance. Over 375,500 were internally displaced, primarily women and children.

Meanwhile, the former French colony had turned to China for military assistance. Between 2012 and 2013, China provided €5 million (about US$5.8 million) in logistical equipment to improve the Malian army’s mobility.

Read more:
China’s interests in Africa are being shaped by the race for renewable energy

In August 2013, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army gave the Malian army military supplies totalling 1.6 billion CFA francs (about US$2.8 million). China made similar donations between 2014 and 2023.

I am an international security and global governance researcher. My recent research explored the impact of China’s security sector assistance on Mali’s fragility.

China’s assistance to Mali aims to equip the country to address terrorism and insurgency. But I argue that it may have unintended consequences and cause further damage to the country.

The heavy reliance on Chinese supply exposes Mali to vulnerabilities, including supply disruptions, diminished bargaining power, and limited strategic flexibility. This could destabilise security even more should China face manufacturing issues or supply chain disruptions leading to delays or shortages in the production of weapons.

It also raises concerns about the potential influence of China on Mali’s defence policies and decision-making processes. In turn this could entrench the Malian military government’s position. China takes a hands-off approach to the governance structures of the countries it engages with. Hopes of democratisation in the country could be affected.

Read more:
US trade wars with China – and how they play out in Africa

Rich in resources

Mali has significant natural resources, including 800 tons of gold reserves (it’s Africa’s fourth-largest producer), iron ore, manganese, lithium, and potential uranium and hydrocarbon deposits.

In 2019, gold production generated US$734 million, or 9.7% of Mali’s GDP, supporting over 10% of the population.

Chinese firms, such as Ganfeng Lithium and China National Nuclear Corporation, have invested heavily in Mali’s mining sector. They are involved in a US$130 million lithium project and uranium exploration in the Kidal and Falea regions.

Despite security risks, including attacks on Chinese personnel in 2015 and 2021, China remains committed due to Mali’s resource potential.

Beyond mining, China has invested in Mali’s infrastructure. A US$2.7 billion railway modernisation project connects Bamako to Dakar, facilitating resource exports like iron ore and bauxite.

The total of Mali’s external debt to China is not explicitly stated. But the 2014 loan agreement of US$11 billion and the 2016 loan of US$2.7 billion alone suggest Mali’s debt to China could be at least US$13 billion. This is without including loans for projects like the Bamako-Ségou expressway, and bridges in Bamako.

This has often been criticised as “debt trap diplomacy”, increasing recipient countries’ dependence on Beijing. In Mali, I believe this risks entrenching economic vulnerability and giving China geopolitical leverage.

Read more:
China reaps most of the benefits of its relationship with Africa: what’s behind the imbalance

China’s security sector assistance to Mali

Historically, Mali relied on France. More recently, it’s used Russia’s expeditionary corps, formerly known as Wagner Group, for security support.

In 2011, China provided US$11.4 million in grants, US$8.1 million in zero-interest loans, and a US$100.8 million concessional loan to foster bilateral cooperation.

China’s participation in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali, starting in 2013 with 395 personnel, marked a shift in its security engagement.

Chinese peacekeepers, including engineers, medical personnel and security guards, repaired infrastructure, provided medical aid and supported Mali’s 2013 elections.

Their professionalism earned praise from the UN special envoy Albert Gerard Koenders for helping to ensure a smooth election.

China’s involvement in Mali challenged traditional European approaches to peacekeeping, particularly France’s military-heavy strategy.

Read more:
China-Africa relations: new priorities have driven major shifts over the last 24 years – 5 essential reads

How China’s assistance contributes to Mali’s fragility

In spite of the positives, China’s security sector assistance contributes to Mali’s fragility in several ways.

First, its no-strings-attached nature allows Mali’s military junta to consolidate power without making democratic or governance reforms.

This lack of accountability enables corrupt military factions to operate unchecked. Governance weaknesses and authoritarianism can continue.

Second, the heavy reliance on Chinese supply raises concerns about the potential influence of China on Mali’s defence decisions.

This over-reliance on military solutions risks escalating conflicts and could lead to human rights abuses by security forces, as seen in increased violence against civilians. It doesn’t address root causes of conflict like social cohesion or local governance.

Third, Mali’s growing dependence on Chinese aid — both military and economic — makes it vulnerable to disruptions from geopolitical tensions, supply chain issues, or changes in China’s foreign policy. This limits Mali’s ability to diversify its military capabilities or respond to evolving threats.

Finally, China’s infrastructure investments, such as the US$1.48 billion (750 billion CFA francs) Bamako-Dakar railway loan, creates “debt trap diplomacy”.

This pattern deepens economic dependence and reduces policy autonomy, further weakening state resilience.

Read more:
Maps showing China’s growing influence in Africa distort reality – but some risks are real

The way forward

To mitigate the risks of Chinese security sector assistance and promote sustainable stability, Mali must adopt a multifaceted strategy.

First, it should collaborate with China to align security sector assistance with civilian-led security approaches.

Second, Mali should diversify security and economic partnerships with donors like the US, the UK, and the EU.

Third, transparent guidelines, developed through consultation with stakeholders, should assess the impacts of assistance to avoid deepening dependence.

Fourth, engaging civil society and publishing regular reports on security sector assistance use and outcomes will foster public trust.

Finally, promoting regional economic integration and ties with global powers will bolster Mali’s economic resilience.

Paa Kwesi Wolseley Prah does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. China’s support for Mali’s military carries risks: researcher outlines what they are – https://theconversation.com/chinas-support-for-malis-military-carries-risks-researcher-outlines-what-they-are-257738

Source: – By Matthias Krönke, Lecturer, University of Reading

For the first time since the end of apartheid in 1994, the ruling African National Congress lost its parliamentary majority in 2024. After 30 years in power, it had to form a coalition with 10 other political parties to govern the country. The creation of the “government of national unity” marked a turning point in the country’s democracy.

This development appears to have rekindled hope and positive sentiment among South Africans about the country’s future and its democratic processes.

The period leading up to the 2024 elections was characterised by widespread pessimism. Years of economic stagnation, high unemployment, severe electricity shortages, and high-level corruption cases had taken their toll on public trust and satisfaction with the ANC’s governance. Previous analyses by Afrobarometer (a research network that conducts public attitude surveys) had consistently shown declining satisfaction with the country’s direction and the functioning of democracy.

We are political scientists who have worked with public opinion data in South Africa for almost a decade. We analysed data from a special Afrobarometer survey just before and after the country’s 2024 election. The results show a sharp turnaround in attitudes on three issues: the direction of the country, government performance, and views on democracy.

One of the most significant findings is the shift in citizens’ perceptions about the general direction of the country. Before the election, a mere 14% of South Africans believed the country was heading in the right direction. Post-election, this figure surged to 39%.

South Africans’ renewed optimism after the formation of the unity government underscores the importance of electoral processes in shaping citizen perceptions of democracy and governance. Whether these sentiments are sustained will depend on a few things, including the coalition government’s ability to meet citizen expectations and address their most pressing concerns.

The post-election optimism boost

Afrobarometer interviewed the same group of adult South Africans before (April/May 2024) and after (August/September 2024) the election. This allowed us to track which respondents changed their views and in which direction. Here, we focus on citizens’ views of the overall direction of the country (optimism), government performance, and views on democracy.

A surge in optimism: The data show that 35% of the population became more positive in their outlook after the election. This was consistent across gender, age, and education levels. At the same time, 4% of the population maintained their positive outlook on the country’s trajectory.

About half (48%) continued to say that South Africa was going in the wrong direction after the election. A further 10% moved towards a negative outlook.

Renewed faith in democratic processes: Beyond general optimism, there was a resurgence in pro-democratic attitudes. The proportion of South Africans who believe democracy is preferable to any other form of government increased from 45% before the election to 55% after. Satisfaction with the way democracy works in South Africa jumped from 36% to 59%. These levels of support for and satisfaction with democracy were the highest recorded by Afrobarometer in South Africa since 2018 and 2011, respectively.

We found that three in 10 (29%) respondents were newly in favour of democracy after the elections. About four in 10 (39%) shifted from dissatisfaction or a neutral opinion before the election to stating they were “fairly” or “very” satisfied with the country’s democracy afterwards.

Where are the sore losers?: In both the case of support for and satisfaction with democracy, we found that a greater proportion of poorer citizens shifted their opinions, compared to their wealthier counterparts. In contrast, there were no clear patterns of opinion change by respondents’ gender, age, level of education, or race.

When examining the same question by party affiliation, the outcome was interesting. The share of partisans who preferred democracy increased among supporters of the ANC, the Economic Freedom Fighters and the MK Party after the election. A majority of supporters from the four major parties were satisfied with how democracy worked in the country.

Even ANC supporters remained largely satisfied with democracy despite the party’s electoral losses. Collectively, these findings suggest a post-electoral vote of confidence in multiparty competition.

Expectations of the new government: Citizens also appeared more hopeful about the new coalition government’s ability to tackle some of the nation’s most pressing issues. Pre-election evaluations of government performance on key services were overwhelmingly negative. The post-election wave showed some modest increases in optimism.

Two-thirds (67%) of South Africans felt the government of national unity would be more effective in the critical area of electricity provision. There was also hope for progress in other areas; 42% expected the new government to be more effective in creating jobs. Another 41% believed it would be more successful in fighting corruption.

Over the past year, the government seems to have met citizens’ expectations. South Africa has not experienced prolonged periods of power cuts over the past 12 months. However, the unemployment rate has remained unchanged, at 32.9%.

Looking ahead

The 2024 elections in South Africa seem to have served as an inflection point. It is contributing to a revival of optimism and pro-democratic sentiment. The shift from pre-election pessimism to post-election hope was palpable. Maintaining renewed public confidence, however, relies on a government’s ability to meet citizens’ expectations and deliver tangible improvements on their concerns.

The ongoing skirmishes between the ANC and the Democratic Alliance illustrate the coalition government’s difficulty in translating agreement on a broad agenda into specific outcomes.

The coming months and years will tell whether the unity government’s infighting ultimately squanders citizens’ goodwill.

Matthias Krönke works for the University of Reading and consults for Afrobarometer.

Rorisang Lekalake is affiliated with Afrobarometer.

– ref. One year on: South Africa’s coalition government boosted optimism, but will it last? – https://theconversation.com/one-year-on-south-africas-coalition-government-boosted-optimism-but-will-it-last-258497

Source: – By Kamau Wairuri, Lecturer in criminology, Edinburgh Napier University

Days ahead of the first anniversary in Kenya of the Gen Z-led anti-government protests that resulted in at least 60 deaths and displays of police brutality, news broke that Albert Ojwang, a young Kenyan blogger, had died in police detention. Kamau Wairuri who has studied the politics of policing in Kenya, sets out why these events aren’t outliers, what efforts have been made to reform Kenya’s security forces, and what still needs to be done.

When did this all begin?

Recent events are part of a long history of police brutality in Kenya that can be traced back to colonial times.

Historians (colonial and post-colonial Kenya) such as David Anderson and Caroline Elkins present gruesome details of how state authorities brutalised indigenous Africans during colonial times.

The colonial origins of the police – largely modelled along the approaches of the Royal Ulster Constabulary known for its brutality in Ireland – partly explains why Kenya’s policing is the way it is. The police force was never designed for service. It was designed to safeguard the interests of the white minority ruling elite.

While there have been important changes in the architecture of policing since independence, subsequent post-colonial Kenyan regimes have adopted the same brutal approaches to stay in power. My previous work demonstrates this use of state security apparatuses to enhance the capacity of incumbents to crack down on opposition protests.

The brutal policing experienced under the current Kenya Kwanza regime falls within this broader historical trajectory.

The ruling elite see and use the police as their last line of defence against challenges to their misrule.

But police brutality goes beyond the policing of politics to everyday crime control. Police violence is a common occurrence, especially against poor young men.

What’s changed

Kenya’s history has been marked by strong agitation for justice and reform. Again, this goes back to colonial times.

There have been important legal and institutional changes since independence. The most important was the disbandment of the Special Branch in 1998, an intelligence unit of the police responsible for political repression. It was replaced by the National Security Intelligence Service. This then became the National Intelligence Service.

The most important changes came about through the constitutional reform of 2010. This saw a change in the architecture of the police, including:

• bringing the Kenya Police and Administration Police under a singular command

• the establishment of accountability mechanisms, including the Internal Affairs Unit, the National Police Service Commission and the Independent Policing Oversight Authority.

Internal Affairs, a unit within the police service, is supposed to investigate police misconduct. The policing oversight agency is a civilian-led institutions with a similar mandate. Ideally, the two institutions should work together in executing crucial investigations. Internal affairs should provide access to information from within the police service that would be difficult for outsiders to access.

The National Police Service Commission was set up to handle the management of personnel. It’s mandated to address the challenges of corruption, nepotism and negative ethnicity that have characterised recruitment into the police service.

But it’s clear from the continued police brutality that these institutions aren’t achieving the intended effect. This means that police officers can expect to continue acting with relative impunity despite the control measures in place.

What still needs to be done

Policing is often imagined as the investigation of crimes, arresting suspects, and presenting them to court for prosecution and punishment if guilty. In Kenya, the actions of the police often appear to substitute for the entire criminal justice system.

In many cases, officers go beyond the metaphor of judge, jury and executioner to also become the complainant, mortician and undertaker. For instance, Mbaraka Karanja died in police custody in 1987 and officers proceeded to incinerate his body.

In my view, the brutality won’t end until the following steps have been taken.

First, the National Police Service Commission needs to reclaim its mandate. It seems to have completely abdicated duty, transferring crucial responsibilities back to the inspector general of the police service. As the human resource unit of the police, the commission has an important role of professionalising the service and maintaining discipline. It’s presently not doing so.

Second, the Internal Affairs Unit needs to be strengthened and given more autonomy. So far, it has been difficult to assess the effectiveness the unit given the secrecy that characterises the police service. A better-resourced unit will enhance investigations of police misconduct. It would unearth obscure squads within the police service and reveal evidence to help identify perpetrators.

Third, the Independent Policing Oversight Authority needs to defend its independence and develop popular legitimacy. With its limited success in prosecuting police officers – despite the prevalence of police abuse – many Kenyans have lost confidence in it. Crucially, the authority has failed in it’s deterrence role.

Fourth, the independence of the National Police Service needs to be safeguarded. The police service leadership continues to serve at the pleasure of the prevailing regime. This in turn shapes the priorities of the service. Inspectors-general have been forced to resign. President William Ruto confessed to having fired the director of criminal investigations when he took power. Ruto had initially claimed that the director had resigned.

Crucially, and in fifth place, there needs to be a change in policing culture alongside broader governance culture in Kenya. Impunity is rampant across the public service. Kenya won’t have a highly accountable police force while other agencies and senior officials are operating with significant impunity.

Identifying the levers of cultural change isn’t easy. There are many proposals to alter policing culture. These include a complete redesign of Kenya’s Penal Code to dislodge its colonial roots, transforming the training of police officers, and strengthening the policing oversight authority’s capacity to investigate cases.

But, in my mind, a crucial starting point is citizen agitation and demand for accountability. The light that Gen Z protesters, the media and civil society organisations are shining on police abuses should be encouraged. A clear signal that Kenyans will no longer tolerate police abuse is crucial for culture change within the service and among the political elite.

However, this needs to be understood within the reality that many Kenyans support police violence, believing it to be the most effective way of dealing with crime as my earlier research demonstrates. In another study, I note how police abuse is endorsed by politicians and religious leaders as a way of responding to crime and punishing groups of people they don’t like.

Combined with ineffective accountability mechanisms, this popular support for police violence, both tacit and explicit, gives the police the belief that they are the thin blue line between order and chaos. That they have the popular mandate to use any means they consider necessary – often brutal violence – to keep society safe.

In other words, the conversation on police reform requires a fundamental reframing to kick start the journey towards democratic policing. At present, we’re not only way off the mark, we seem to be heading in the wrong direction.

Kamau Wairuri does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Kenya’s police still kill with impunity – what needs to be done to stop them – https://theconversation.com/kenyas-police-still-kill-with-impunity-what-needs-to-be-done-to-stop-them-259326

Source: – By Glenda Gray, Distinguished Professor, Infectious Disease and Oncology Research Institute, Faculty of Heath Sciences, University of the Witwatersrand, Executive Director Perinatal HIV Research Unit, Chief Scientific Officer, South African Medical Research Council

The Trump administration’s cuts to funding for scientific research have left many scientists reeling and very worried. At the National Institutes of Health in the US, which has an annual budget of US$47 billion to support medical research both in the US and around the world, nearly 800 grants have been terminated. The administration is considering cutting the overall budget of the National Institutes of Health by 40%.

In South Africa, where tensions are running high with the new Trump administration over land reform and other diplomatic fault lines, scientists have had research grants from the National Institutes of Health suspended. Glenda Gray, who has been at the forefront of HIV/Aids scientific research for decades, assesses the impact of these cuts.

How have the cuts affected your research? When did you start worrying?

There was subliminal fear that started to percolate at the end of January. I said to my team, we need to start looking at our grants. We need to start looking at our exposure.

The first institute to go under the Trump administration’s cuts was USAID. The multibillion-dollar agency that fought poverty and hunger around the world was the first to face the chop.

As a result, a USAID-funded US$46 million consortium on HIV vaccine discovery and experimental medicine to evaluate first in Africa or first in human HIV vaccines was terminated.

Then in mid-April, funding for a clinical trial in Soweto near Johannesburg in South Africa was marked as “pending”. The unit was involved in trials for HIV vaccines. On top of that,  four global research networks on HIV/Aids prevention and treatment strategies were told by the National Institutes of Health in the US that they could no longer spend any money in South Africa. The Soweto unit was affiliated with those networks.

So basically you can’t start new studies in South Africa?

There is a great deal of uncertainty. I’m sitting on many calls, working out how we survive in the next couple of months.

I’m going from bankrupt to absolutely bankrupt in terms of our ability to do work.

We’ve been doing scenario planning, looking at all our contingencies, but it’s very hard to know exactly what you’re doing until you have the relevant documentation in front of you.

To all intents and purposes for the next period, South Africa is eliminated from the National Institutes of Health networks and its scientific agenda.

How is the South African government responding?

The government doesn’t have the kind of money to replace the substantial amount of finances that we got through the National Institutes of Health competitive processes. However scientists have been working together with the Medical Research Council, Treasury and various government departments to plot the best way forward.

Everyone’s been writing grant proposals, speaking to the Gates Foundation, speaking to the Wellcome Trust, looking at public-private partnerships, talking to other philanthropists. But the bottom line is that funding is never going to be at the kind of level that will replace the research infrastructure that we’ve got.

To get money from the National Institutes of Health we had to compete with all scientists all over the world. This wasn’t just aid being doled out to us.

Where does this leave the future of research in South Africa for HIV vaccine trials?

South Africa has been able to contribute to global guidelines to improve care. The loss of research capability means that you lose the knowledge or the value of understanding HIV prevention, HIV vaccines or therapeutics.

We in South Africa have the infrastructure, we have the burden of disease, the sciences, the regulator and ethical environment and the ability to answer these questions. And so it’s going to take the world a lot longer to answer these questions without South Africa.

If we slow down research, we slow down HIV vaccine research, we slow down cures and we slow down other HIV prevention methodologies.

And so basically you slow down the process of knowledge generation.

What does it feel like to be a scientist right now in South Africa?

South African scientists are resilient. We’ve had to weather many storms, from the explosion of HIV to Aids denialism … watching people die, getting people onto treatment, having vaccine trials that have failed.

You have to be resilient to be a scientist in this field.

It’s going to be very hard to bring the fight against HIV/Aids back to the current level again.

It feels now like we are deer in the headlights because we don’t know how to pivot.

This is an edited transcript of an interview with Professor Gray aired in a podcast produced by The Conversation UK. You can listen to the full podcast here.

Glenda Gray receives funding from US-NIH which is currently being evaluated. .

– ref. US funding cuts have crippled our HIV work – what’s being lost – https://theconversation.com/us-funding-cuts-have-crippled-our-hiv-work-whats-being-lost-255645

Source: – By Obasanjo Bolarinwa, Senior lecturer, York St John University

Imagine feeling invisible simply because of your body. Now imagine that invisibility extends into how society treats your desires, your safety, and your rights.

That is the everyday reality for many women with disabilities in developing countries, where 80% of people with disabilities live. And it’s an issue the policymakers must address to promote inclusive policies that reach the most marginalised.

We are global health researchers and authors of a recent qualitative study that explores the sexual experiences of women with disabilities in Lagos, Nigeria.

Despite growing global interest in sexual and reproductive health, the voices of women with disabilities have remained largely unheard, especially in low- and middle-income countries such as Nigeria.

Our research aims to break this silence.

The women in our study told us they had sexual needs and desires like any other women, but they faced particular challenges such as societal stigma, inadequate access to reproductive health services, widespread misconceptions about contraception and sexual harassment. They suggested how more accessible health services and better legal protection could help them.

How we did our study

We spoke to 24 women in Lagos between the ages of 20 and 45. Sixty-seven percent of participants had physical disabilities, while 33% had visual impairments.

Participants were recruited through local networks and came from a range of educational, employment and marital backgrounds. They were asked open-ended questions in interviews conducted in English, Yoruba or Pidgin.

We focused on how disability influenced their sexual activity, autonomy, contraceptive use, engagement in risky sexual behaviours, and experiences of sexual violence.

What we learnt

Our research found that the women were mostly sexually active and understood their sexual rights.

However, they faced major barriers:

• physical limitations

• poor access to affordable contraceptives

• misinformation

• vulnerability to sexual violence, with limited support available

• widespread stigma that made it difficult for them to express their sexuality freely and safely.

‘We are not asexual’

Many participants rejected the stereotype that they were “asexual” or uninterested in sex. They emphasised they had sexual needs and desires just like any other woman.

Some participants expressed that being disabled made certain sex positions painful or physically impossible.

A woman who was in her thirties told us that her husband complained that she couldn’t “do different styles”.

Other women expressed sadness, frustration, or even guilt for not being able to satisfy their partners, leading to feelings of rejection and abandonment.

Accessing modern contraceptives was another major issue.

Some of the women said they were afraid of using contraceptives because of health myths – like the fear that birth control might worsen their disability or cause infertility.

Others struggled to go to pharmacies because of their limited mobility and obstacles such as being unable to use stairs.

Several women said they had experienced harassment, assault or rape, often linked to their vulnerability and social isolation.

One woman described her sexual assault.

If I were not disabled and nothing was wrong with me, the one that happened to me would not happen. Because of my leg, I didn’t have any energy to shout, and the people that were supposed to assist me did not show up. If I had legs and was complete, the thing that happened to me will not happen.

A visually impaired woman said she couldn’t defend herself or even recognise her attacker when she was abused.

Another said:

If I had legs, that thing would not have happened to me.

A number of women also spoke about the fear of being blamed or shamed about their sexual harassment experience. Others said people in their communities believed they had no right to complain.

It’s not all bad

Still, it wasn’t all despair. The women in the study had clear and actionable suggestions.

They called for accessible health facilities, better education for men about disability and sex, and more media campaigns to challenge stigma.

They wanted laws that specifically protected them against sexual harassment and health systems that included them in terms of physical accessibility and financial subsidy.

Some called for free or subsidised contraceptives or door-to-door services for those unable to travel.

One participant simply asked for a walking aid so she could visit the hospital when she needed to.

We are not invisible

The findings highlight the need for accessible, affordable sexual and reproductive health services tailored to women with disabilities.

This includes disability-friendly healthcare, public education to challenge stereotypes, stronger legal protections, and initiatives that empower women to assert their rights.

Society needs to stop pretending that women with disabilities are invisible.
They are here. They are sexually active. And they have a right to love, pleasure, safety and choice.

Obasanjo Bolarinwa works for York St. John University, United Kingdom.

Blessing Babalola works for Federal University Oye-Ekiti.

CLIFFORD O ODIMEGWU works for the University of the Witwatersrand.

Aliu Mohammed does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Sex and disability: Nigerian women share their stories – https://theconversation.com/sex-and-disability-nigerian-women-share-their-stories-254405