Category: MIL-OSI

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Giulio Lucarini, Senior Researcher, Institute of Heritage Science, National Research Council (CNR)

The Neolithic period began in southwest Asia around 12,000 years ago. It marked a major shift in human history as societies transitioned from hunting and gathering to farming. This sparked migrations across Europe and dramatically reshaped the continent’s gene pool.

For a long time, North Africa was seen as a passive participant in this transformation. The dominant narrative suggested that farming economies never fully took root there.

Some studies proposed that North African communities actively resisted agriculture, except perhaps in the Nile Delta and the western Maghreb (modern-day Morocco). They continued to rely on land snails, wild plants, and hunting for survival. Only later, they also began herding domesticated sheep, goats, and cattle, introduced from southwest Asia.

Genetic studies have only recently tested this reconstruction in North Africa. This has never been done in the eastern Maghreb (modern-day Tunisia and eastern Algeria) – until now.

As an Africanist archaeologist, I specialise in the study of ancient societies across Mediterranean Africa and the Sahara. My focus is on how humans adapted to their environments and the rise of food production in these regions. I recently conducted research in the eastern Maghreb alongside an international team of archaeologists, geneticists, and physical anthropologists to trace ancient population movements.

Our new study has just been published in Nature. We analysed the ancient genomes (complete DNA sequences) of nine individuals who lived in the eastern Maghreb between 15,000 and 6,000 years ago.

This may seem like a small sample. But, in the field of ancient DNA research, even a few well-preserved genomes can provide significant insights. They serve as reference points for tracing genetic lineages and identifying ancestral connections.

By adding genetic evidence to broader archaeological findings, we reconstructed patterns of population continuity, interaction and change over thousands of years.

Our results were striking. It’s clear from these genomes that some influence from farmers did reach north Africa from across the Mediterranean. But much of the genetic makeup of the eastern Maghreb populations remained rooted in their ancient foraging heritage.

This challenges the long-held narrative about migration into and out of north Africa before and during the Neolithic. It deepens our understanding of the past and highlights the incredible complexity of human movement and cultural exchange.

As we continue to unravel the genetic legacy of our ancestors, studies like this remind us of the complexity of human history. They show that the history of agriculture in the Mediterranean was not merely one of population replacement. Rather, it was a tale of cultural exchange, adaptation and continuity.

And researching these ancient human movements is more than just a matter of understanding history. It also provides insights into the patterns of migration and adaptation that can help us understand similar processes today.

Extraction and analysis

We worked with ancient genomes extracted from human skeletal remains housed in museum or heritage institution collections. They came from excavations at four sites Afalou Bou Rhummel, Djebba, Doukanet el Khoutifa and SHM-1 (Hergla), all in the eastern Maghreb.

We chose the specimens because they were well-preserved, which is not always the case with ancient DNA.

The analysis found that some of the sampled individuals possessed European farmer ancestry around 7,000 years ago. Europeans contributed some genes to the region – but no more than 20% per individual.

This is a modest genetic influence compared to ancient western Maghreb populations where, at some sites, European farmer ancestry can reach as high as 80%.

Our findings suggest that food-producing economies were introduced to the eastern Maghreb not by a large-scale replacement of the population (as seen in Europe) but more gradually. Change happened through sporadic migrations, mixing of cultures, and the spread of knowledge.

Across sea and land

One of the most intriguing discoveries was the genetic trace of European hunter-gatherers found in one individual from Djebba, Tunisia, dating to around 8,000 years ago. This suggests that early European and north African populations could interact via seafaring routes across the Strait of Sicily.

Researchers have long known that cultural exchange took place across the Mediterranean. We see this from the spread of technologies such as the so-called pressure technique – a method of shaping stone tools by carefully applying force with a pointed implement rather than striking the stone directly.

The discovery in Tunisia of obsidian (volcano glass) from Pantelleria, a small island in the Strait of Sicily, strengthens the link between the Mediterranean’s northern and southern shores.

Prehistoric wooden artefacts are seldom preserved over time. This may explain the absence of boat remains from this period in North Africa. However, dugout canoes from similar periods found in central Italy (Bracciano Lake) suggest that seafaring skills were well established around the Mediterranean. While there is no direct evidence linking these specific canoes to connections between Europe and North Africa, they support the idea that navigation was within the technological capabilities of the time.

Our study is the first time the connections suggested by this existing evidence have been substantiated genetically.

Read more:
Discovery of 5,000-year-old farming society in Morocco fills a major gap in history – north-west Africa was a central player in trade and culture

Another exciting aspect of our study is the identification of early Levantine (modern southwest Asia)-related ancestry in the eastern Maghreb. This was detected in human remains dated to around 6,800 years ago. It’s a genetic signature that postdates the arrival of European farmer ancestry by several centuries. It likely reflects the movement of people associated with early pastoralism, who introduced domesticated animals, such as sheep and goats, to the region.

Backing up archaeological evidence

It is especially rewarding to see the genetic evidence aligning with the archaeological record. This underscores the value of multidisciplinary research in uncovering past human dynamics.

What emerges overall is a region of strong genetic and cultural resilience, consistent with archaeological evidence.

Giulio Lucarini receives funding for this study from the National Research Council of Italy (CNR) and ISMEO – International Association for Mediterranean and Oriental Studies, Italy. He is affiliated with the National Research Council of Italy, Institute of Heritage Science (CNR-ISPC).

This study resulted from a collaboration between the following institutions: Harvard University, USA; the Max Planck Institute, Germany; the National Research Council of Italy (CNR); the Institut National du Patrimoine (INP), Tunisia; the Centre National de Recherche Préhistorique, Anthropologique et Historique (CNRPAH), Algeria; the Institut de Paléontologie Humaine (IPH), France; the University of Vienna, Austria; Sapienza University of Rome, Italy; and ISMEO – International Association for Mediterranean and Oriental Studies, Italy.

– ref. Ancient DNA reveals Maghreb communities preserved their culture and genes, even in a time of human migration – https://theconversation.com/ancient-dna-reveals-maghreb-communities-preserved-their-culture-and-genes-even-in-a-time-of-human-migration-248338

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Gourab Giri, Postdoctoral researcher, University of Pretoria

There is a supermassive black hole at the centre of nearly every big galaxy – including ours, the Milky Way (it’s called Sagittarius A*). Supermassive black holes are the densest objects in the universe, with masses reaching billions of times that of the Sun.

Sometimes a galaxy’s supermassive black hole “wakes up” due to a sudden influx of gas and dust, most likely supplied from a neighbouring galaxy. It begins eating up lots of nearby gas and dust. This isn’t a calm, slow or passive process. As the black hole pulls in material, the material gets superheated on a scale of millions of degrees, far hotter than the surface temperature of our Sun, and is ejected from the galaxy at near-light speeds. This creates powerful jets that look like fountains in the cosmos.

The accelerated high-speed plasma matter prompts these “fountains” to emit radio signals that can only be detected by very powerful radio telescopes. This gives them their name: radio galaxies. While black holes are common, radio galaxies are not. Only between 10% and 20% of all galaxies exhibit this phenomenon.

Giant radio galaxies are even less common. They account for only 5% of all radio galaxies and take their name from the fact that they reach enormous distances. Some radio galaxies’ jets reach nearly 16 million light-years. (That’s almost six times the distance between the Milky Way and the Andromeda galaxy.) The largest jet discovered spans nearly 22 million light-years across.

Read more:
South African telescope discovers a giant galaxy that’s 32 times bigger than Earth’s

But how do these structures cover such enormous distances? To find out, I led a study in which we used modern supercomputers to develop models that simulated behaviour of giant cosmic jets within a mock universe, constructed on the basis of fundamental physical laws governing the cosmos.

This allowed us to observe how radio jets propagate over hundreds of millions of years – a process impossible to track directly in the real universe. These sophisticated simulations provide deeper insights into the life cycle of radio galaxies, highlighting the differences between their early, compact stages and their later, expansive forms.

Understanding the evolution of radio galaxies helps us unravel the broader processes that shape the universe.

Supercomputing

Cutting-edge technology was key to this study.

Sensitive observations from world-class radio telescopes like South Africa’s MeerKAT and LOFAR in the Netherlands have recently led to several discoveries of cosmic fountains.

Read more:
MeerKAT: the South African radio telescope that’s transformed our understanding of the cosmos

However, modelling their origins has been challenging. Tracking events over millions of years is impossible in real-time.

That’s where supercomputers come in. These high-performance computing systems are designed to process massive amounts of data. They can perform complex simulations at incredible speeds. In this study, their power was crucial for modelling the evolution of giant radio jets over millions of years.

The necessary supercomputing power was provided by South Africa’s Inter-University Institute for Data Astronomy, a network comprising the University of Pretoria, the University of Cape Town and the University of the Western Cape.

Our universe is governed by fundamental forces like gravity, which can be described through mathematical formulas. These formulas, essentially numbers, are fed into supercomputers to create a simulated “mock universe” that follows the same physical laws as the real cosmos. This allows scientists to experiment with how jets from supermassive black holes evolve over time. With their immense processing power, supercomputers can simulate millions of years of cosmic jet evolution in just a month.

Key takeaways

Gravity is the dominant force in the universe, pulling heavier matter and dragging nearby lighter matter. If gravity were the only force at play, the universe might have collapsed by now. Yet we see galaxies, galaxy clusters and even life itself thriving. We suspect that these cosmic fountains play a key role in solving the mystery of how this happens.

By releasing thermal and mechanical energy, they heat up the surrounding collapsing gas, counteracting gravity and maintaining a balance that sustains cosmic structures.

Our models also shed light on why some radio galaxies’ jets bend sharply, forming an “X” shape in radio waves instead of following a straight trajectory, and revealed the conditions under which giant fountains can continue growing even in dense cosmic environments (that is, in a galaxy cluster).

The study also suggests that giant radio galaxies may be statistically more common than previously believed. There are potentially thousands of undiscovered giant cosmic fountains. Thanks to world-class telescopes like MeerKAT and LOFAR – and the power of supercomputers – there’s plenty more to explore as we try to understand our universe.

The research on which this article is based required extensive collaboration with an international team, including Jacinta Delhaize from the University of Cape Town, Joydeep Bagchi from Christ University, India, and DJ Saikia from the Inter-University Centre for Astronomy and Astrophysics in India. Essential contributions by Kshitij Thorat and Roger Deane from the University of Pretoria also played a crucial role in shaping the study.

Gourab Giri does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Black holes spew out powerful jets that span millions of light-years – we’re trying to understand their whole life cycle – https://theconversation.com/black-holes-spew-out-powerful-jets-that-span-millions-of-light-years-were-trying-to-understand-their-whole-life-cycle-250073

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Eric Lob, Associate Professor of Politics and International Relations, Florida International University

Ethiopia and Iran signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on 6 May 2025. Under it, their national police agencies will cooperate on security and intelligence. This will include combating cross-border crime, sharing intelligence and building capacity. They will also share experiences and training.

For Iran, the MOU marks a significant step towards strengthening relations with a regional power that’s strategically located in the Horn of Africa.

Tehran has been using its security apparatus and military capabilities to establish and expand political and economic ties with countries in Africa. This has included drone transfers to the Ethiopian government that helped it turned the tide of the Tigray war, a separatist struggle in the country’s north that took place from 2020 to 2022.

Iran has also supplied the Sudanese army with surveillance and combat drones. These have been used against the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces in Sudan’s ongoing civil war.

The agreement is important for Ethiopia for two reasons.

Firstly, it’s likely to enable the Ethiopian government in Addis Ababa to combat ethnic militias more effectively. It faces increasing internal instability, including tensions with hostile factions of the separatist Tigray People’s Liberation Front.

Secondly, the agreement comes after a meeting in Addis Ababa between the Ethiopian police chief, Demelash Gebremichael, and a delegation from Iran’s regional rival, the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The exchange concentrated on investigating and extraditing cross-border criminals.

Addis Ababa’s willingness to work with regional rivals in the Middle East shows its pragmatic approach to foreign relations. Ethiopia needs all the friends it can muster as an embattled and weakened state. Since the Tigray war, it has battled the rise of ethnic militias and confronted economic adversity. It is also facing renewed hostility with neighbouring Eritrea.

What Iran stands to gain

Since 2016, Ethiopia has been a gateway for Iran to gain a foothold in the Horn of Africa. That year, other countries in the region severed relations with Iran. This followed Tehran’s disengagement from sub-Saharan Africa under Hassan Rouhani, who served as president from 2013 to 2021, and his prioritisation of a nuclear deal with the US.

The severing of ties was also a byproduct of geopolitical pressure exerted by Saudi Arabia and the UAE on countries in the region. The Middle Eastern states wanted to reduce, if not eliminate, Iran’s presence in the Horn of Africa and Red Sea to limit its support for Houthi rebels in the ongoing Yemeni civil war.

Read more:
Iran’s intervention in Sudan’s civil war advances its geopolitical goals − but not without risks

Ethiopia was the first country in sub-Saharan Africa to establish relations with Iran during the 1960s. It was also one of its top trading partners on the continent before and after the 1979 Iranian Revolution.

Strategically and ideologically, this special relationship was based on the pro-western and anti-communist stances of their monarchs: the Shah of Iran Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who ruled from 1941 to 1979, and Emperor Haile Selassie, who was in power from 1930 to 1974.

After the revolution, Iran-Ethiopia relations revived under Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who served as Iranian president from 2005 to 2013. He pursued an active Africa policy to mitigate Iran’s international isolation and circumvent US sanctions.

After Rouhani initially downgraded these relations, they were renewed during his second term. This followed US withdrawal from the nuclear deal.

Relations firmed when Ebrahim Raisi, who served as Iranian president from 2021 to 2024, delivered military drones and other aid to Addis Ababa during the Tigray war.

What’s in it for Ethiopia

Ethiopia is facing increasing instability and uncertainty. The Tigray war has depleted the state’s resources. There is an economic crisis caused by rising inflation and unemployment.

Addis Ababa continues to confront ethnic tensions. Hostile factions of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front remain. It also faces tensions with the Amhara Fano militia, which initially fought alongside the government against Tigrayan forces. Forced disarmament policies and ongoing land disputes caused the militia to take up arms against the government.

Read more:
Somaliland-Ethiopia port deal: international opposition flags complex Red Sea politics

Ethiopian prime minister Abiy Ahmed also faces growing opposition and resistance from his own ethnic group, the majority Oromo, and their Oromo Liberation Army. The reason for their discontent is Abiy’s imposition of centralised rule on their regional state within a federal system.

The security and intelligence cooperation with Iran could allow Addis Ababa to combat ethnic militias more effectively.

It would also enable Ethiopia to prepare for another possible war against neighbouring Eritrea.

Ethiopia and Eritrea normalised relations and fought together against Tigrayan forces. However, tensions between the two countries have been brewing again. These have been triggered by two factors. First, the conditions of the 2022 Pretoria peace agreement caused Eritrea to maintain forces inside Ethiopia. Second are the ambitions of Addis Ababa to acquire a Red Sea port in Somaliland, a breakaway region of Somalia. Eritrea has supported Somalia’s opposition to the deal.

Regional power games

This isn’t the first time that Ethiopia has tried working with two regional rivals – Iran and the UAE. The UAE is also among its top trading partners, along with Saudi Arabia.

In 2016, Ethiopia was the only country in the Horn of Africa that didn’t cut ties with Iran, though it was under pressure from the UAE and Saudi Arabia to do so. The decision was taken by Abiy’s predecessor, Hailemariam Desalegn, whose term ran from 2012 to 2018.

During the Tigray war, Ethiopia received military drones and other assistance from Iran and the UAE, alongside Turkey.

The civil war in Sudan has presented an even more complicated story. Ethiopia has vacillated between engaging with the Rapid Support Forces and the Sudanese Armed Forces at different points in the conflict.

For its part, Iran has supported the Sudanese army. The UAE has backed the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces.

Ethiopia’s efforts to strengthen its security ties with Iran and the UAE show a unique case of convergence between regional rivals that have otherwise remained on opposite sides of conflicts in countries like Yemen and Sudan.

Eric Lob does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Iran and Ethiopia have a security deal – here’s why they signed it – https://theconversation.com/iran-and-ethiopia-have-a-security-deal-heres-why-they-signed-it-256486

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Douglas Lucas Kivoi, Principal Policy Analyst, Governance Department, The Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis (KIPPRA)

Protecting any president requires multiple layers of intelligence, physical security and rapid response security protocols. Exact operational details are classified, but there are global best practices in VIP protection.

The issue of presidential protection in Kenya has become particularly relevant following an incident in early May 2025 when someone in a crowd threw a shoe at President William Ruto during a public event, hitting his hand.

I have studied policing and security policies in Kenya for over 15 years, interacting closely with the country’s security protocols. In my view this incident exposed several critical security lapses around the elite officers tasked with protecting the president.

The security of the president is a critical issue in Kenya. The country is exposed to terror groups like the Somalia-based Al-Shabaab and other criminal networks in the region.

In 2021, a businessman embedded himself into the presidential motorcade and drove into then president Uhuru Kenyatta’s official residence. In 2017, an unidentified man who was said to have illegally accessed the highly protected state house grounds was shot dead by presidential guards.

There are multiple layers to Kenya’s protection protocols. They include National Intelligence Service officers, the Kenya Defence Force, Presidential Escort Police officers drawn from the highly trained General Service Unit, bomb disposal experts and regular police officers. Their deployment depends on the nature of the presidential engagement.

While the shoe incident may be passed off as simply embarrassing, it should serve as a wake-up call to tighten security protocols around the president without necessarily compromising his public engagement with citizens.

What’s in place

Prior to any presidential visit across the country, security teams conduct a thorough reconnaissance of the destination. This includes coordinating with local policing agencies, clearing airspace, mapping secure transport routes and identifying nearby medical facilities in case of emergencies.

Presidential motorcade routes are pre-planned and a dry run is made. This often includes mapping alternative routes to avoid predictability should there be assailants along a presidential route. It is common to see some roads temporarily closed and security officers conducting sweeps for any threats or explosives. In areas deemed high risk, counter security sniper teams are covertly deployed in strategic areas.

Cases of attacks on presidential motorcades are rare in Kenya. However, in 2002 during presidential campaigns, angry opposition supporters stoned then president Daniel Moi’s motorcade. In November 2021, an angry mob hurled rocks at then deputy president Ruto’s motorcade.

The National Intelligence Service and Presidential Escort Unit covertly scout locations in advance, assessing potential security vulnerabilities. Crowd sizes, and entry and exit points for the head of state are mapped out in advance.

In cases where meetings are held in town halls or huge tents, attendees are screened using metal detectors and/or physical searches. Uniformed and plainclothes security officers embed themselves in the crowd to monitor any threats.

The president and any dignitaries accompanying him have at least three layers of security.

The inner ring consists of close protection officers who are always within an arm’s length of the president to physically thwart any threats. The middle ring has armed security guards who watch for, among others, sudden movements and abnormal behaviour within the crowd. The outer ring consists of regular police and paramilitary units from the General Service Unit who secure the outside perimeter.

The presidential motorcade is a coordinated convoy of heavily armoured vehicles. It includes lead and chase cars, communication units and emergency response teams. Traffic is managed by local traffic police officers to ensure unobstructed movement. Routes are kept confidential until necessary.

The president’s security may opt to use a decoy vehicle if there is a security threat, to confuse and derail potential risk sources. In all these cases, there is a contingent of specialised General Service Unit officers, called the Recce unit, that always accompanies the president.

Kenya’s presidential security precautions follow standard VIP security protection like those for heads of state across the world. However, in some neighbouring countries, for instance, presidents move in heavily armed military convoys. This has not been seen in Kenya.

If a potential threat is detected, the president is immediately shielded and whisked away to a secure vehicle or evacuated by air in high-risk events. In such cases, the Kenya Defence Forces secures the president.

Despite stringent security measures, incidents can occur. For instance, in March 2025, a British tourist was fatally hit by a vehicle in Ruto’s motorcade. This prompted investigations and reviews on motorcade safety protocols.

Such events highlight the challenges of balancing presidential security with public safety, especially in densely populated urban areas.

Security failures

The shoe-throwing incident targeting Ruto highlighted five major failures in presidential protection protocols.

First, crowd screening and access control failures. The alleged assailant was very close to the president, suggesting an inadequate distance between the crowds and the president. The inner ring of security also failed to spot the perpetrator raising a shoe in the air to use as a projectile. This indicates weak front-row eye sweeps and scans by the president’s security.

Second, there was an apparent delay in security response. The elite officers around the president should have subdued the alleged attacker within seconds. It could mean most had their eyes on the president or cameras, as opposed to scanning the crowds for any sudden movements.

Third, security allowed the president to stand too close to a crowd that hadn’t been screened. Best practices require a no-go zone of three to five metres for individuals who have not been scanned or screened.

Fourth, there was an apparent gap in intelligence and threat assessment. Aggressive or agitated people next to the president should draw the attention of security officers. Plainclothes security officers are usually deployed to monitor crowd behaviour. It isn’t enough to rely on uniformed officers.

Undercover agents are critical for flagging pre-attack signals, such as nervousness or repeated adjustments of positions.

Fifth, there was no clear evacuation plan for the president. After the incident, the president continued speaking. In high-risk scenarios, protocols often demand instant relocation of the president to a secure vehicle or helicopter, where the military takes over and airlifts him to safety.

What should change

Kenya’s presidential security detail may be forced to:

• increase standoff distance between the president and crowds

• deploy more plainclothes officers to blend in and monitor crowds around the president

• mandate stricter screening of those in close proximity to the president

• conduct more frequent security risks drills for rapid neutralisation of potential threats.

The exact details of presidential security in Kenya are confidential. However, the overarching structure aims to provide comprehensive protection to the president while maintaining public safety and order during official engagements. No security protocol is 100% foolproof. But a balance needs to be struck between overly aggressive crowd control and accessibility.

Douglas Lucas Kivoi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Is Kenya’s president safe in a crowd? Security expert scans VIP protection checklist – https://theconversation.com/is-kenyas-president-safe-in-a-crowd-security-expert-scans-vip-protection-checklist-256268

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Aleksi Ylönen, Professor, United States International University

More than three decades after unilaterally declaring independence from Somalia, Somaliland still seeks international recognition as a sovereign state. Despite a lack of formal acknowledgement, the breakaway state has built a relatively stable system of governance. This has drawn increasing interest from global powers, including the United States. As regional dynamics shift and great-power competition intensifies, Somaliland’s bid for recognition is gaining new currency. Aleksi Ylönen has studied politics in the Horn of Africa and Somaliland’s quest for recognition. He unpacks what’s at play.

What legal and historical arguments does Somaliland use?

The Somali National Movement is one of the main clan-based insurgent movements responsible for the collapse of the central government in Somalia. It claims the territory of the former British protectorate of Somaliland. The UK had granted Somaliland sovereign status on 26 June 1960.

The Somali government tried to stomp out calls for secession. It orchestrated the brutal killing of hundreds of thousands of people in northern Somalia between 1987 and 1989.

But the Somali National Movement declared unilateral independence on 18 May 1991 and separated from Somalia.

With the collapse of the Somali regime in 1991, the movement’s main enemy was gone. This led to a violent power struggle between various militias.

This subsided only after the politician Mohamed Egal consolidated power. He was elected president of Somaliland in May 1993.

Egal made deals with merchants and businessmen, giving them tax and commercial incentives to accept his patronage. As a result, he obtained the economic means to consolidate political power and to pursue peace and state-building. It’s something his successors have kept up with since his death in 2002.

What has Somaliland done to push for recognition?

Successive Somaliland governments continue to engage in informal diplomacy. They have aligned with the west, particularly the US, which was the dominant power after the cold war, and the former colonial master, the UK. Both countries host significant Somaliland diaspora communities.

The US and the UK have for decades flirted with the idea of recognising Somaliland, which they consider a strategic partner. However, they have been repeatedly thrown back by their respective Somalia policies. These have favoured empowering the widely supported Mogadishu government to reassert its authority and control over Somali territories.

This Somalia policy has been increasingly questioned in recent years, in part due to Mogadishu’s security challenges. In contrast, the Hargeisa government of Somaliland has largely shown it can provide security and stability. It has held elections and survived as a state for the last three decades, though it has faced political resistance and armed opposition.

Read more:
Somaliland elections: what’s at stake for independence, stability and shifting power dynamics in the Horn of Africa

As new global powers rise, Somaliland administrations have pursued an increasingly diverse foreign policy, with one goal: international recognition.

Hargeisa hosts consulates and representative offices of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Taiwan, the UK and the European Union, among others.

The government has also engaged in informal foreign relations with the United Arab Emirates. The Middle Eastern monarchy serves as a business hub and a destination of livestock exports. Many Somalilanders migrate there.

Somaliland maintains representative offices in several countries. These include Canada, the US, Norway, Sweden, the UK, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Taiwan. Hargeisa has alienated China because it has collaborated with Taiwan since 2020. Taiwan is a self-ruled island claimed by China.

On 1 January 2024, Somaliland’s outgoing president Muse Bihi signed a memorandum of understanding with Ethiopian prime minister Abiy Ahmed for increased cooperation. Bihi implied that Ethiopia would be the first country to formally recognise Somaliland. The deal caused a sharp deterioration of relations between Addis Ababa and Mogadishu.

Abiy later moderated his position and, with Turkish mediation, reconciled with his Somalia counterpart, President Hassan Mohamud.

What’s behind US interest in Somaliland?

The US, like other great powers, has been interested in Somaliland because of its strategic location. It is on the African shores of the Gulf of Aden, across from the Arabian Peninsula. Its geographical position has gained currency recently as Yemeni Houthi rebels strike maritime traffic in the busy shipping lanes. Somaliland is also well located to curb piracy and smuggling on this global trade route.

The US Africa Command set up its main Horn of Africa base at Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti in 2002. This followed the 11 September 2001 attacks.

Read more:
Somaliland’s quest for recognition: UK debate offers hint of a sea change

In 2017, China, which had become the main foreign economic power in the Horn of Africa, set up a navy support facility in Djibouti. This encouraged closer collaboration between American and Somaliland authorities. The US played with the idea of establishing a base in Berbera, which hosts Somaliland’s largest port.

With Donald Trump winning the US presidential election in 2024, there were reports of an increased push for US recognition of Somaliland. This would allow the US to deepen its trade and security partnerships in the volatile Horn of Africa region.

Since March 2025, representatives of the Trump administration have engaged in talks with Somaliland officials to establish a US military base near Berbera. This would be in exchange for a formal but partial recognition of Somaliland.

What are the risks of US recognition of Somaliland?

Stronger US engagement with Somaliland risks neglecting Somalia.

Mogadishu depends on external military assistance in its battle against the advancing violent Islamist extremist group, Al-Shabaab. It also faces increasing defiance from two federal regions, Puntland and Jubaland.

US recognition would reward Hargeisa for its persistent effort to maintain stability and promote democracy. However, it could encourage other nations to recognise Somaliland. This would deliver a blow to Somali nationalists who want one state for all Somalis.

Aleksi Ylönen is affiliated with the Center for International Studies, Iscte-Instituto Universitário de Lisboa, and is an associate fellow at the HORN International Institute for Strategic Studies.

– ref. Somaliland’s 30-year quest for recognition: could US interests make the difference? – https://theconversation.com/somalilands-30-year-quest-for-recognition-could-us-interests-make-the-difference-255399