Category: MIL-OSI

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Je t’aime moi non plus ! Notre lien complexe à la fiscalité

Source: The Conversation – in French – By Cecile Bazart, Maîtresse de conférences, Centre d’Economie de l’Environnement de Montpellier (CEE-M), Université de Montpellier

Accroître la visibilité de ce que l’impôt finance contribuerait à en revaloriser sa perception symbolique. Pierre Laborde/Shutterstock

« Trop d’impôt tue l’impôt », dit la célèbre phrase de l’économiste états-unien Arthur Laffer. Et si pour la France, c’était plus compliqué que cela ? N’y a-t-il pas d’autres considérations sociales, affectives ou morales ?

À l’heure des déficits publics récurrents, nombreuses sont les solutions axées sur la lutte contre la fraude fiscale dans le débat public. La médiatisation de ce face-à-face entre riches contribuables et l’administration fiscale recourt le plus souvent à un vocabulaire guerrier qui fait la part belle à la détection et à la sanction des fraudeurs pour le bien de tous.

Le projet de loi présenté en novembre 2025 s’inscrit dans cette ligne d’action avec un triple objectif affiché de « mieux prévenir et détecter, mieux lutter et sanctionner, mieux recouvrer ». Le discours politique pour restaurer la légitimité de l’impôt s’arc-boute sur une nécessaire répression de comportements qualifiés de criminels.

Si l’impôt est historiquement l’outil financier permettant de prélever des ressources nécessaires au fonctionnement de l’État, il n’en est pas moins un fait social complexe. C’est ce que nos recherches mettaient en exergue. Car à côté du gain pécuniaire, de nombreuses autres considérations sociales, affectives ou morales expliquent notre rapport complexe à la fiscalité.

La courbe de Laffer tend a démontré que l’accroissement des taux d’imposition se traduit, au-delà d’un certain seuil, par un amoindrissement des recettes fiscales.
Wikimedia

Seuls 14 % des contribuables payent leur impôt par peur d’un contrôle

Il est évident que le contrôle seul ne décourage pas la fraude. D’autres motivations expliquent le choix de payer ou de frauder.

Dans notre enquête menée en 2015 avec Thierry Blayac auprès de 1 094 contribuables, nous montrions que la motivation première à payer ses impôts est le sens civique. C’est ce que déclaraient 45 % des enquêtés ; 25 % d’entre eux tiraient la motivation à acquitter leurs impôts de la fourniture de biens et services publics ; approximativement 10 % payaient du fait de considérations morales plus générales. Au final, seules 14 % des personnes interrogées déclaraient payer des impôts par peur du contrôle fiscal et de ses conséquences.

Ces résultats sur la diversité des motivations à payer ses impôts élargissent la réflexion sur son acceptation. Il en ressort que donner plus de visibilité sur ce que l’impôt finance améliore la manière dont le prélèvement est perçu. En effet, 11 % des contribuables sondés pointaient le manque de transparence sur l’utilisation des fonds comme motif de rejet de la fiscalité. L’impôt sera davantage perçu comme un échange que comme une ponction.

Notre travail souligne également que la complexité grève la bonne compréhension de la fiscalité et augmente la fraude. Pour 21 % des contribuables interviewés, la complexité de la législation fiscale pose problème, alors que 13,5 % estiment que la fréquence de réformes est jugée trop élevée et 10,5 % que les démarches administratives sont trop complexes.

Système fiscal français jugé injuste

L’impôt est un fait social. Il s’appuie sur une vision des rapports entre individus et de la solidarité au sein de la société. Il lie les contribuables entre eux, puisque la fraude des uns est un surcoût pour les autres. Cette interdépendance entre citoyens est à la base d’une opposition entre ceux qui paient leurs impôts et ceux qui fraudent. Elle alimente l’idée d’une injustice fiscale, dont l’effet est puissant. Notre étude souligne que le système fiscal français est globalement perçu comme injuste avec un score de 4,11 sur 10.

Dans une série d’articles expérimentaux, nous démontrions avec Aurélie Bonein, que la comparaison sociale peut faire accroître la fraude. L’information sur les délits des uns augmente la fraude des autres. Plus précisément, dans ces travaux, nous testions deux types d’injustice en matière fiscale :

  • Liée à un différentiel de taux d’imposition avec l’application des taux d’impôts différents à des individus fiscalement identiques, sans plus de justification.

  • Liée à la pratique de la fraude fiscale – certains fraudent alors que d’autres pas.

Nous démontrons qu e si les deux types d’injustice alimentent la fraude, l’effet de la comparaison sociale est plus fort que celui de l’injustice liée au niveau des taux d’imposition. On peut imaginer jouer de cette réciprocité fiscale pour créer une dynamique sociale qui stimule l’honnêteté, notamment si l’on émet un signal que la fraude mène à la réprobation sociale.

Mauvaise connaissance fiscale

Comme l’impôt est un fait social, il est aussi très dépendant de l’histoire fiscale du pays et de la compréhension et des perceptions des gens sur l’impôt. Dans le travail d’enquête suscité, nous avons également testé la compréhension de la fiscalité par nos enquêtés.

Il apparaît que les perceptions des contribuables sont en décalage par rapport à leurs connaissances, établi à 33,44 %, à partir de quelques questions basiques. Ce niveau de compréhension du prélèvement très bas ne va pas dans le sens d’une perception d’injustice fondée. Au contraire, ce biais laisse une large place à la subjectivité et à l’émotion. Il questionne les sous-jacents actuels de la perte de légitimité du prélèvement fiscal.

Au final, la fraude fiscale relève-t-elle d’une réelle remise en cause de l’impôt ou bien est-elle le fruit d’incompréhensions et d’émotions associées au ras le bol fiscal ?

The Conversation

Les auteurs ne travaillent pas, ne conseillent pas, ne possèdent pas de parts, ne reçoivent pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’ont déclaré aucune autre affiliation que leur organisme de recherche.

– ref. Je t’aime moi non plus ! Notre lien complexe à la fiscalité – https://theconversation.com/je-taime-moi-non-plus-notre-lien-complexe-a-la-fiscalite-267044

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Burn-out : pourquoi le milieu de carrière est la zone la plus à risque

Source: The Conversation – in French – By Katie Green, Senior Lecturer in Leadership and Leadership Development, Manchester Metropolitan University

Après la pandémie, les taux de burn-out ont augmenté dans tous les secteurs. Les recherches montrent que le climat de travail, la reconnaissance et la qualité du leadership pèsent davantage que le simple nombre d’heures travaillées. Elnur/Shutterstock

On suppose souvent que l’expérience protège du burn-out. En réalité, au milieu de la carrière, la surcharge, le manque de formation managériale et la pression constante exposent particulièrement les professionnels — notamment les femmes — à l’épuisement.

Tout le monde connaît ce cliché du cadre supérieur senior stressé, toujours au bord de la rupture. Pourtant, c’est en réalité le milieu de carrière qui constitue l’une des périodes les plus vulnérables au burn-out et au stress dans la vie professionnelle. À ce stade, beaucoup cumulent des responsabilités supplémentaires en dehors du travail, au moment même où leur employeur accroît ses exigences en matière de performance, de disponibilité et de leadership.

Le milieu de carrière est souvent le moment où cette double charge augmente le risque de burn-out. Des recherches ont montré que ces professionnels présentent des niveaux de burn-out particulièrement élevés, travaillent davantage d’heures et déclarent une satisfaction au travail plus faible que les autres classes d’âge. L’un des principaux facteurs explicatifs réside dans la tension persistante entre les exigences professionnelles et le maintien d’un équilibre entre vie professionnelle et vie personnelle.

Il est important de souligner que le burn-out est désormais largement reconnu non pas comme une défaillance individuelle, mais comme un problème lié au travail. Il se caractérise par un épuisement émotionnel, du cynisme et une baisse de productivité, des recherches montrant qu’il est avant tout façonné par les structures organisationnelles, les cultures d’entreprise et les pratiques de leadership, plutôt que par une faiblesse personnelle ou un manque de capacités d’adaptation.

Le burn-out ne touche pas tous les groupes de la même manière. Les femmes, par exemple, déclarent des niveaux plus élevés de burn-out, qu’il soit personnel ou lié au travail, en particulier au milieu de leur carrière. Cela peut refléter une prise en charge plus importante des responsabilités familiales, ainsi que des attentes accrues concernant leur disponibilité et l’investissement émotionnel qu’elles sont censées assumer.

La pandémie de COVID a intensifié ces dynamiques. De nombreux professionnels en milieu de carrière ont alors dû jongler entre responsabilités professionnelles et familiales, alors même que leurs interactions sociales étaient réduites et que leur charge de travail ainsi que leurs horaires s’allongeaient. Depuis le pic de la pandémie, tous les secteurs et toutes les fonctions ont enregistré une hausse des taux de burn-out, les organisations de santé et du secteur social étant particulièrement touchées.

Absorber la pression

Le stress et le burn-out ont un coût pour les employeurs : journées de travail perdues, l’absentéisme et le « leavism » (le fait de travailler pendant ses congés). Les professionnels en milieu de carrière sont particulièrement exposés, car on attend souvent d’eux qu’ils absorbent la pression sans laisser paraître de signes de fragilité. Il peut s’agir, par exemple, de piloter une équipe en pleine réorganisation tout en atteignant ses propres objectifs de performance et en épaulant les collaborateurs plus juniors.

Dans de nombreuses organisations, la surcharge chronique et l’hyperactivité permanente sont normalisées, voire valorisées. La disponibilité constante devient un marqueur de compétence plutôt qu’un signal d’alerte.

Malgré cela, persiste l’idée que les professionnels en milieu de carrière seraient, par nature, plus résistants. Or une exposition prolongée à des niveaux élevés de stress peut justement éroder cette résilience. L’expérience ne protège pas nécessairement du burn-out ; dans bien des cas, elle ne fait que le masquer.

Des symptômes tels que la fatigue, l’insomnie ou l’anxiété sont souvent minimisés, voire ignorés, jusqu’à ce que le stress atteigne un point de rupture. Ceux qui sont réputés pour leur capacité à « tenir le coup » ont tendance à étouffer les signaux d’alerte afin de préserver leur image professionnelle. Ces travailleurs retardent fréquemment le moment de demander de l’aide, en partie parce que des facteurs couramment associés au burn-out — longues journées, disponibilité permanente, surcharge chronique — sont largement banalisés.

Si le stress à court terme peut parfois améliorer la performance, ce que l’on appelle alors le « bon stress » reste en réalité proche du point de rupture. Lorsque la pression devient chronique et que les temps de récupération sont réduits, voire inexistants, le stress devient une voie directe vers le burn-out.

Mes travaux sur les managers de proximité mettent en lumière ces risques. Les cadres intermédiaires et les professionnels en milieu de carrière y sont régulièrement décrits comme surchargés et insuffisamment formés à leurs responsabilités managériales. Beaucoup ont accédé à des fonctions de direction avec peu, voire aucune, préparation formelle, et ont dû apprendre à encadrer des équipes « sur le tas ».

Les promotions s’accompagnent souvent d’une forte augmentation des responsabilités, sans investissement équivalent dans la formation. Et lorsqu’il existe des possibilités d’accompagnement, elles sont en principe ponctuelles et peu structurées. Cette combinaison alimente l’anxiété et le sentiment d’illégitimité — des facteurs bien connus qui précèdent le burn-out.

Dans le cadre de notre projet, nous avons interrogé plus de 150 managers de proximité issus des secteurs public et privé. Nos résultats montrent clairement que le burn-out est façonné par les systèmes, les normes et les attentes propres au monde du travail. Les pratiques et les processus organisationnels, tout comme la culture d’entreprise et les styles de leadership, jouent un rôle déterminant. Des objectifs irréalistes, un contrôle excessif et une culture des longues journées de travail exacerbent le stress. Quant aux pratiques managériales qui privilégient une pression permanente sur la performance, elles accroissent directement le risque de burn-out.

Le climat de travail compte davantage que le seul volume horaire : parmi les facteurs de risque figurent le harcèlement, le harcèlement sexuel et les styles de leadership toxiques. Le burn-out est notamment étroitement lié à l’implication des dirigeants — ou à son absence. Par exemple, une étude a montré que les professionnels en milieu de carrière, en particulier les femmes, sont plus exposés au burn-out lorsque leurs efforts ne sont pas reconnus par leurs supérieurs.

À l’inverse, des responsables qui écoutent, reconnaissent le travail accompli et valorisent l’engagement peuvent réduire significativement le risque de burn-out. En somme, le fait de sentir que son travail compte et qu’il est apprécié fait une différence mesurable.

Les dirigeants peuvent concevoir le travail dans une logique de durabilité plutôt que d’endurance. Cela suppose de veiller à ce que les charges et les objectifs soient réalistes, mais aussi de mettre fin aux cultures où la disponibilité permanente est valorisée.

Les fonctions d’encadrement en milieu de carrière doivent être véritablement soutenues, et les salariés devraient disposer d’un temps sacralisé pour la formation et le développement de compétences, au lieu d’être contraints à apprendre par essais et erreurs successives. Leurs supérieurs devraient s’efforcer d’instaurer un environnement sûr : écouter réellement, réagir dès les premiers signaux d’alerte et intervenir avant que le stress ne dégénère en burn-out.

Enfin, un travail d’équipe solide et un véritable sentiment d’appartenance au sein de l’organisation donnent du sens et constituent un rempart contre le burn-out. En milieu de carrière, lorsque les pressions convergent de toutes parts, le lien aux autres n’est pas un luxe, mais une nécessité.

L’importance de l’épanouissement au travail est souvent sous-estimée. Les occasions de créer du sens, de nourrir les relations et de prendre plaisir à son activité ne sont pas des bonus superflus : elles constituent une protection réelle contre le stress chronique et le burn-out.

The Conversation

Katie Green ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.

– ref. Burn-out : pourquoi le milieu de carrière est la zone la plus à risque – https://theconversation.com/burn-out-pourquoi-le-milieu-de-carriere-est-la-zone-la-plus-a-risque-277009

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Contrairement aux idées reçues, les armes imprimées en 3D ne sont pas impossibles à retracer

Source: The Conversation – France in French (2) – By Georgina Sauzier, Senior Lecturer in Forensic Chemistry, Curtin University

Des plans diffusés assez largement sur Internet permettent de fabriquer une arme avec une simple imprimante 3D. Jakub Zerdzicki/Unsplash

Les plans d’armes imprimées en 3D circulent librement en ligne et les saisies se multiplient. Mais ces armes sont-elles vraiment intraçables ? En Australie, une nouvelle étude démontre que leur signature chimique pourrait aider les enquêteurs à remonter les filières.

Les armes imprimées en 3D représentent une menace croissante pour la sécurité publique. Les plans permettant de fabriquer ces armes à feu sont disponibles en ligne, ce qui les rend facilement accessibles. Avec une imprimante 3D relativement bon marché et une simple recherche sur Internet, n’importe qui pourrait imprimer sa propre arme non déclarée.

Ces armes ont été qualifiées d’« intraçables ». De nouvelles recherches viennent désormais mettre cette affirmation à l’épreuve.

Notre nouvelle étude, publiée dans la revue Forensic Chemistry, montre que certains filaments – les matériaux utilisés dans les imprimantes 3D – présentent des profils chimiques distincts susceptibles d’aider à relier des armes imprimées en 3D saisies.

La menace des « armes fantômes »

En octobre dernier, une opération de l’Australian Border Force a permis de découvrir 281 armes à feu imprimées en 3D ou des composants associés. Ces pièces imprimées en 3D peuvent être combinées avec des éléments courants achetés en magasin de bricolage pour fabriquer des armes « hybrides », ce qui en accroît la solidité et la durabilité. Les armes entièrement imprimées en 3D comme les modèles hybrides peuvent être tout aussi létales que celles fabriquées en usine.

En Australie, des événements récents ont conduit à des appels demandant aux détaillants d’aider à endiguer la prolifération des armes imprimées en 3D. Parmi les propositions figurent l’installation de technologies de blocage sur les imprimantes 3D ou le signalement de l’achat d’articles susceptibles d’être utilisés pour fabriquer des armes hybrides.

Mais que peut-on faire face aux armes déjà en circulation dans la communauté ?

Les armes imprimées en 3D ont hérité du surnom d’« armes fantômes », car elles sont difficiles à retracer par les méthodes classiques d’analyse balistique. Alors que les forces de l’ordre peinent à identifier l’origine des armes fantômes saisies, il revient aux chercheurs de trouver une solution alternative. L’analyse chimique des filaments utilisés pour imprimer ces armes pourrait être la clé pour mettre fin à leur réputation d’armes « intraçables ».

Que sont les filaments d’impression 3D ?

Les filaments d’impression 3D sont composés de différents polymères, c’est-à-dire de plastiques. Le principal polymère utilisé pour l’impression 3D à domicile est l’acide polylactique, ou PLA, un bioplastique notamment employé pour fabriquer des sacs-poubelle compostables. D’autres filaments courants sont fabriqués à partir d’ABS – le matériau principal des briques LEGO, apprécié pour sa robustesse – et de PETG, un polymère souple que l’on retrouve dans les gourdes de sport.

Certains filaments spécialisés sont obtenus en combinant plusieurs polymères. Beaucoup contiennent également des additifs – des ingrédients supplémentaires destinés à améliorer la résistance, la flexibilité ou l’apparence.

Boîte de Petri contenant des fragments de matériau violet, visibles sur fond noir.
Vue microscopique de fragments de filament d’impression 3D prêts à être analysés.
Fourni par l’auteur

Les filaments d’impression 3D étant généralement brevetés afin de protéger leurs formulations spécifiques, leurs additifs et autres composants mineurs ne sont en général pas mentionnés sur l’emballage. Or, ce sont précisément ces ingrédients qui pourraient détenir la clé pour retracer les « armes fantômes ».

Le mélange d’ingrédients utilisé dans les filaments d’impression 3D confère à chaque type de filament une signature chimique particulière. Nous pouvons identifier ces signatures grâce à la spectroscopie infrarouge, une méthode qui mesure la manière dont le filament absorbe la lumière infrarouge. Ce motif d’absorption – un profil infrarouge – varie en fonction des molécules présentes dans le filament.

Gros plan sur un instrument en acier dont la sonde est posée sur un petit fragment de plastique vert.
Un spectromètre infrarouge est utilisé pour mesurer la signature chimique d’un matériau.
Fourni par l’auteur

Ce que nous avons découvert

Dans le cadre de nos travaux, menés en collaboration avec ChemCentre – un laboratoire médico-légal public d’Australie-Occidentale – nous avons analysé plus de 60 filaments provenant du marché de détail australien. Nous avons constaté que nombre de ces filaments pouvaient être distingués grâce à leur profil infrarouge, bien qu’ils paraissent identiques à l’œil nu.

Les filaments en PLA, en ABS et en PETG se différencient aisément en raison des différences marquées dans la composition chimique de chacun de ces polymères. Nous avons également réussi à distinguer certains filaments fabriqués à partir du même polymère, grâce à la présence d’additifs mineurs qui modifiaient leur profil infrarouge.

Dans un filament, par exemple, nous avons détecté la présence d’un compatibilisant – un additif qui permet à deux polymères de se mélanger. Cet ingrédient n’a pas été retrouvé dans d’autres filaments reposant sur le même polymère de base, ce qui suggère qu’il pourrait constituer un élément distinctif de la formulation de la marque. Cela indique également que ce filament contenait probablement deux polymères différents, alors qu’un seul était mentionné sur l’emballage.

Ces résultats montrent que l’analyse chimique des filaments peut s’avérer utile, bien qu’il s’agisse de produits de consommation largement disponibles.

Retrouver ce qui semble intraçable

La capacité à distinguer ou identifier différents filaments d’impression 3D pourrait permettre aux experts médico-légaux d’établir des liens entre une arme saisie et un filament saisi, ou entre des armes provenant d’affaires distinctes.

Ces rapprochements peuvent aider les forces de l’ordre à remonter jusqu’aux fournisseurs de ces armes, perturbant ainsi les chaînes d’approvisionnement et la production future.

Si nos travaux montrent que certains filaments d’impression 3D peuvent être différenciés, ce n’est pas le cas de tous. Nous menons désormais des recherches complémentaires en recourant à d’autres techniques analytiques, susceptibles d’apporter des informations supplémentaires, notamment sur les éléments chimiques présents dans les filaments.

La combinaison de différentes techniques nous permettra d’établir un profil chimique complet de chaque filament. Nous espérons que ces informations nous aideront à établir des liens entre une arme imprimée en 3D saisie, le filament à partir duquel elle a été fabriquée et l’imprimante 3D utilisée pour l’imprimer.

En retraçant l’empreinte chimique des armes imprimées en 3D, les criminels ne pourront plus se croire protégés par leur voile d’« intraçabilité ».

The Conversation

Les auteurs ne travaillent pas, ne conseillent pas, ne possèdent pas de parts, ne reçoivent pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’ont déclaré aucune autre affiliation que leur organisme de recherche.

– ref. Contrairement aux idées reçues, les armes imprimées en 3D ne sont pas impossibles à retracer – https://theconversation.com/contrairement-aux-idees-recues-les-armes-imprimees-en-3d-ne-sont-pas-impossibles-a-retracer-277005

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Trump and Netanyahu want regime change, but Iran’s regime was built for survival. A long war is now likely

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Amin Saikal, Emeritus Professor of Middle Eastern Studies, Australian National University; The University of Western Australia; Victoria University

The joint US–Israel strikes on Iran, which killed the Iranian supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and Tehran’s retaliatory strikes on Israel and neighbouring Arab countries have again plunged the Middle East into war.

US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said their aim is to bring about a favourable regime change in Iran. The implications of this for Iran, the region and beyond should not be underestimated.

Although Khamenei’s killing is a significant blow to the Islamic regime, it is not insurmountable. Many Iranian leaders have been killed in the past, including Qassem Soleimani, Tehran’s regional security architect, who was assassinated by the US in January 2020.

But they have been replaced relatively smoothly, and the Islamic regime has endured.

Khamenei’s departure is unlikely to mean the end of the Islamic regime in the short run. He anticipated this eventuality, and reportedly last week arranged a line of succession for his leadership and that of senior military, security and political leaders if they were “martyred”.

However, Khamenei was both a political and spiritual leader. He has commanded followers not only among devout Shias in Iran, but also many Muslims across the wider region. His assassination will spur some of them to seek revenge, potentially sparking a wave of extremist violent actions in the region and beyond.

A regime built for survival

Under a constitutional provision of the Islamic Republic, the Assembly of Experts – the body responsible for appointing and dismissing a supreme leader – will now meet and appoint an interim or long-term leader, either from among their own ranks or outside.

There are three likely candidates to be his successor:

  • Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i, the head of the judiciary
  • Ali Asghar Hejazi, Khamenei’s chief-of-staff
  • Hassan Khomeini, the grandson of the founder of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Rohullah Khomeini.

The regime has every incentive to do what it must to ensure its survival.
There are many regime enforcers and defenders, led by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its subordinate paramilitary Basij group, across the country to suppress any domestic uprisings and fight for the endurance of the regime.

Their fortunes are intimately tied to the regime. So are a range of administrators and bureaucrats in the Iranian government, as well as regime sympathisers among ordinary Iranians. They are motivated by a blend of Shi’ism and fierce nationalism to remain loyal to the regime.

Trump and Netanyahu have called on the Iranian people – some 60% of whom are below the age of 30 – to topple the regime once the US-Israeli operations have crippled it.

Many are deeply aggrieved by the regime’s theocratic impositions and dire economic situation and took to the streets in protests in late 2025 and early 2026. The regime cracked down harshly then, killing thousands.

Could a public uprising happen now? So far, the coercive and administrative state apparatus seems to be solidly backing the regime. Without serious cracks appearing among these figures – particularly the IRGC – the regime can be expected to survive this crisis.

Global economic pain

The regime has also been able to respond very quickly to outside aggression. It has already hit back at Israel and US military bases across the Persian Gulf, using short-range and long-range advanced ballistic missiles and drones.

While many of the projectiles have been repelled, some have hit their targets, causing serious damage.

The IRGC has also set out to choke the Strait of Hormuz – the narrow strategic waterway that connects the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman and Indian Ocean. Some 20% of the world’s oil and 25% of its liquefied gas flows through the strait every day.

The United States has vowed to keep the strait remain open, but the IRGC is potentially well-placed to block traffic from going through. There could be serious implications for the global energy supply and broader economy.

Both sides in this conflict have trespassed all of the previous red lines. They are now in open warfare, which is engulfing the entire region.

A prolonged war looks likely

If there was any pretence on the part of Washington and Jerusalem that their attacks would not lead to a regional war, they were wrong. This is
already happening.

Many countries that have close cooperation agreements with Iran, including China and Russia, have condemned the US-Israeli actions. The United Nations secretary-general António Guterres has also urgently called for de-escalation and a return to diplomatic negotiations, as have many others.

But the chances for this look very slim. The US and Iran were in the middle of a second round of talks over Tehran’s nuclear program when the attacks happened. The Omani foreign minister, who mediated between the two sides, publicly said just days ago that “peace was within reach”.

But this was not enough to convince Trump and Netanyahu to let the negotiations continue. They sensed now was the best time to strike the Islamic Republic to destroy not just its nuclear program but also its military capability after Israel degraded some of Tehran’s regional affiliates, such as Hamas and Hezbollah, and expanded its footprint in Lebanon and Syria over the last two and a half years.

While it is difficult to be definitive about where the war is likely to lead, the scene is set for a long conflict. It may not last days, but rather weeks. The US and Israel do not want anything short of regime change, and the regime is determined to survive.

With this war, the Trump leadership is also signalling to its adversaries – China, in particular – that the US remains the preeminent global power, while Netanyahu is seeking to cement Israel’s position as the dominant regional actor.

Pity the Iranian people, the region and the world that have to endure the consequences of another war of choice in the Middle East for geopolitical gains in an already deeply troubled world.

The Conversation

Amin Saikal does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Trump and Netanyahu want regime change, but Iran’s regime was built for survival. A long war is now likely – https://theconversation.com/trump-and-netanyahu-want-regime-change-but-irans-regime-was-built-for-survival-a-long-war-is-now-likely-277193

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Joseph Kony: how a Ugandan war criminal and his soldiers have evaded capture and endured for decades

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Kristof Titeca, Professor in International Development, University of Antwerp

Joseph Kony, the leader of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), remains at large two decades after the International Criminal Court issued its first arrest warrants against him and four of his commanders.

The LRA emerged nearly 40 years ago. Between 1987 and 2006, northern Uganda’s civilians were caught between LRA brutality – massacres and mass abductions – and a government counterinsurgency. This forced nearly two million people into camps for internally displaced people.

The LRA framed its struggle as resistance to President Yoweri Museveni and the sidelining of the Acholi, the dominant ethnic group in northern Uganda. However, over time violence ceased to be merely a strategy. It became the organising logic of the movement itself.

The YouTube video Kony 2012, produced by the American advocacy organisation Invisible Children, went viral in 2012. It turned a long war into a global cause célèbre. In 2013, Washington followed with a US$5 million bounty, which remains in place.

The International Criminal Court arrest warrants were for war crimes and crimes against humanity between 1 July 2002 (when the court’s jurisdiction took effect) and July 2005 (when the arrest warrants were issued).

Today, the LRA is no more than a small, mobile group (possibly 12 to 20 fighters) living off trade, agriculture and protection in one of Africa’s least governed border zones. It operates within the remote borderlands of the Central African Republic (CAR), Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

The LRA may now be small, but its survival matters.

Kony’s continued evasion of arrest – despite two decades of warrants, bounties and military operations – exposes the limits of both regional security cooperation and international justice. Recent intelligence and defector accounts suggest he is still alive, operating in the Sudan-CAR borderlands.

As long as he remains at large, the International Criminal Court’s first arrest warrants risk becoming a symbol – not of global justice, but of its limits.

I have been researching the LRA for more than 20 years and in a recently published article, I answer the question: how has the group survived, even in extreme decline?

Drawing on interviews with former combatants, local actors and policymakers, my analysis looks as the LRA’s evolving strategies of endurance since 2011.

Two things have been crucial: borderlands and the lack of political priority.

Borderlands – particularly between Sudan and the CAR, and to a lesser extent with the DRC – have offered Kony and his LRA members a way to disappear, to trade and to buy protection.

At the same time, the shifting political priorities of the states tracking Kony have repeatedly undermined their own goals.

Why borderlands matter

Given their weak state presence, borderlands are often described as peripheral, marginal or forgotten. But in much of Africa, they are not empty spaces. They are active political and economic zones, shaped by cross-border networks of trade, migration, armed mobilisation and patronage.

For rebel groups, borderlands offer a particular set of advantages: access to sanctuaries across borders; rough terrain and low population density; cross-border trade routes; and opportunities to link into alternative centres of power.

This is precisely the kind of environment in which the LRA has been operating.

For roughly two decades, between 1987 and 2006, the LRA was primarily fighting a Ugandan war. The conflict produced vast civilian suffering, including the displacement of nearly two million people into camps – what has been described as “social torture”.

From 1994 onwards, southern Sudan became crucial to the war, as Khartoum offered the LRA sanctuary and weapons. Further, before peace talks began in 2006 between Uganda and an LRA delegation, the rebel group crossed into the DRC and established itself in the dense and (at the time) mostly ungoverned Garamba National Park.

Following the collapse of negotiations, Uganda launched Operation Lightning Thunder in late 2008. The operation failed, and the LRA retaliated with massacres in north-eastern DRC in 2008-10.

These attacks were the LRA’s last moment of large-scale violence. Military pressure did not destroy the group, but fragmented it and pushed it out of the DRC.

Anticipating further offensives, the LRA began moving into the remote borderlands between the CAR, Sudan and South Sudan.

By 2010, it was operating around the contested Kafia Kingi enclave – a strip of territory that is, in principle, part of South Sudan but has long been controlled by Sudan.

From this point onward, Kony’s strategy shifted: the group reduced attacks, limited abductions and tried to become less visible.

It was no longer trying to win a war, but trying to avoid being found.

The borderland economy

As looting declined, the LRA needed income streams that attracted little attention. Trade and agriculture became central. In the Sudan-CAR borderlands, established routes for licit goods like bamboo intersect with trade in cannabis, gold, ivory and diamonds.

The LRA did not only participate in this economy, but also taxed it. It set up checkpoints along trading routes. It also cultivated a variety of crops on a large scale and was active in the trade of honey.

All of this allowed the group to survive quietly from around 2010 onwards, and become part of the border landscape. Its relationships included nomadic cattle herders, armed groups in the CAR and elements of the Sudanese military.

Kony also bought protection with the proceeds of illicit trade. Armed groups provided warnings about military threats and information about who was moving where. When necessary, Kony could move across borders quickly.

But borderlands are not only spaces of opportunity: they are also volatile.

Under military pressure, Kony divided his troops into smaller units to avoid detection. That made control harder. His violent internal rule – including the killing of commanders – pushed more people towards defection, leading to two splinter groups in 2014 and 2018.

They still operated under the LRA banner (in the CAR-DRC borderlands), but were no longer under Kony’s command. In 2023, through the work of the Dutch NGO PAX and Congolese NGO APRU, and amid growing insecurity, these groups demobilised in the largest LRA defection ever.

The outbreak of war in Sudan in 2023 disrupted the borderland economy. Trade slowed dramatically, increasing hardship and fuelling more defections.

The politics of the chase

The LRA has not been a security priority for Uganda, the CAR, the DRC, Sudan or South Sudan for decades.

The group operates far from capitals, poses little direct threat to state power and is expensive to pursue.

It has largely disappeared from the American political horizon. Advocacy networks that once kept the issue alive have faded.

Even when Kony’s location has been known by various intelligence services and analysts, it has not reliably triggered action. As my recent article shows, this was the case as recently as 2022-2023. In April 2024, reports surfaced that the Wagner group had attacked Kony’s trading camp in eastern CAR – but failed to capture him.

The end game that never arrives

The LRA’s survival reflects the sanctuary offered by borderlands, and uneven and inconsistent political will, shaped by shifting interests that often have little to do with justice for victims.

The ICC hearings in November 2025 that confirmed war crimes charges against Kony underline this paradox. While the court has built a legal case against him, the conditions that have kept him alive remain largely intact.

The Conversation

Kristof Titeca does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Joseph Kony: how a Ugandan war criminal and his soldiers have evaded capture and endured for decades – https://theconversation.com/joseph-kony-how-a-ugandan-war-criminal-and-his-soldiers-have-evaded-capture-and-endured-for-decades-276680

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Trump’s tariffs have gutted Agoa’s duty‑free promise: our model shows how

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Tim Vogel, Researcher, German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)

The African Growth and Opportunity Act (Agoa) was introduced in 2000 as the cornerstone of US development-oriented trade policy towards sub-Saharan Africa. It was designed to grant eligible countries duty-free access to the US market.

In February 2026, President Donald Trump signed a one-year extension after the programme lapsed in September 2025.

Yet the programme’s core benefit has already been effectively eliminated.

Since April 2025, the US has imposed additional bilateral “reciprocal” tariffs ranging lately from 10% to 30% on countries eligible for the Agoa terms. Critically, Agoa only waives the standard tariff rate the US applies to all World Trade Organisation members (called the Most Favoured Nation tariff). This averaged just 3.3% in 2017.

The US Supreme Court struck down the much larger reciprocal surcharges on 20 February 2026. But the White House responded immediately, imposing a 15% surcharge on most imports, effective 24 February 2026 for 150 days.

Agoa technically lives on after a one-year extension. But its main advantage has largely disappeared since the US added tariffs on top of it.

As economists and trade modellers at the German Institute of Development and Sustainablity, we are interested in quantifying the effects of the changing US tariff regime. We ran a model that captures economy-wide adjustments across sectors and countries after a tariff shock via prices, production, consumption and trade diversion.

Our simulations show that new Trump-era tariffs drive large declines in US-bound exports from Africa. The steepest damage is in a few Agoa-dependent countries and sectors such as apparel. Our results remain valid after the latest shift to the 15% tariff surcharge.

African exporters face substantial duties. Agoa offers only a modest advantage over other developing countries still subject to Most Favoured Nation status tariffs.

Thus, the promise of duty-free access has been hollowed out.

When preferences vanish but ‘America First’ stays

Our simulations of the “Liberation Day” tariff package – the April 2025 “America First” tariffs applied on top of Agoa expiry – show that Agoa-eligible countries do lose out, but the aggregate effect on all countries at large is relatively small.

Agoa countries’ exports to the US fall sharply by 34.7%. But in context of their global exports the decline equates only to 1.1%. Real GDP of Agoa-eligible countries remains largely unchanged.

Behind this average, however, some countries and sectors are hit hard. Lesotho’s total exports could drop by about 5.9%, Madagascar’s by 3.3%, and those of both Chad and Botswana by 1.9%.

Wearing apparel is the most affected sector: bilateral Agoa exports to the US fall by nearly half. For Madagascar and Mauritius they are almost wiped out, with losses of roughly US$128.5 million and US$147 million respectively.

According to our latest simulation updates accounting for the lower November 2025 tariff rates, negotiating tariff cuts with Washington or accepting US concessions seem to change little. Agoa-eligible countries still face a 9.2 percentage point rise in their trade-weighted average US tariff (vs 14.8 percentage points in April), leading to a fall of Agoa exports to the US by 9.6%.

Total exports in our simulation decline only by 0.7% as trade diversion to other markets offsets over 40% of US losses.

The limits of preferences

Even before the “Liberation Day” tariffs, Agoa’s effectiveness was limited. Our simulations of a simple shift from Agoa preferences to standard Most Favoured Nation tariffs show only modest impacts on beneficiary countries. Bilateral exports to the US fall by 3.7%, but total exports for Agoa-eligible countries decline by just 0.1%.

This underscores how little Agoa mattered for African trade growth on a larger scale.

This limited effectiveness stems from three main factors.

First, for most sub-Saharan Africa economies, the US is no longer the primary export destination. EU and Chinese markets have become more important.

Second, meeting Agoa’s rules of origin – if a product qualifies for the preferences based on location of value creation – is often costly. In contrast, the tariff advantage has been narrow due to already low US Most Favoured Nation rates.

Third, uncertainty over programme renewals and eligibility reviews has long discouraged firms from investing in Agoa compliance.

To make Agoa work for development again would require substantial reforms. These would need to include:

  • longer timelines and automatic continuation provisions

  • more predictable eligibility through transparent biennial reviews

  • updated rules of origin

  • broader coverage of increasingly important trade issues, such as digital trade, services, as well as non-tariff related trade barriers.

The bipartisan Agoa Renewal and Improvement Act of 2024 proposed some of these improvements, including a 16-year extension to 2041. But it stalled under the “America First” priorities.

Alternatives

In practice, deep reform looks unlikely amid volatile tariffs and short extensions, leaving Agoa increasingly irrelevant.

African policymakers must look elsewhere for new trade opportunities.

China’s new zero-tariff policy for 53 African countries beginning 1 May 2026 offers some relief from US protectionism.

Covering all tariff lines, it extends previous preferences for the continent’s 33 least developed countries to a much wider group of African partners. Middle-income exporters such as Kenya, South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt and Morocco stand to benefit. These countries previously faced Chinese tariffs of up to 25% on processed goods. They will now gain duty-free access on the same terms as the poorest African economies.

Such policies have boosted export diversification modestly for least developed countries in the past. But the benefits will depend on product fit and value-chain dynamics. Until now African exports to China have largely been dominated by low-value, primary products. African countries would need substantial investments to make use of preferential market access to China.

Beyond Chinese offers, the EU offers a stable partnership with substantial market scale. Its own unilateral tariff preferences through Generalised System of Preferences, Everything But Arms and reciprocal Economic Partnership Agreements provide more predictable access than the US tariff rollercoaster.

On top of this, the EU actively tries to pursue strategic alignment around critical raw materials, green energy and sustainable investment. It does this via Clean Trade and Investment Partnerships and Sustainable Investment Facilitation Agreements.

Developing countries, however, often criticise the EU sustainability measures or costly compliance to EU standards which worsen their trade opportunities. Hence, the EU has to find a better balance of its sustainable trade and development playbook to build trust with the global south.

What needs to be done

African policymakers should seize this moment to build a foundation for a trade system that doesn’t depend on uncertain preferences and external policy shocks. Accelerating the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) serves as the most credible route to trade resilience, diversification and industrial upgrading.

The free trade area agreement can’t immediately replace US demand (different products, limited value-chain overlap). But it can reduce structural vulnerability to external shocks like US tariff volatility.

The Conversation

Tim Vogel receives funding from the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ).

Zoryana Olekseyuk receives funding from the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). .

– ref. Trump’s tariffs have gutted Agoa’s duty‑free promise: our model shows how – https://theconversation.com/trumps-tariffs-have-gutted-agoas-duty-free-promise-our-model-shows-how-276641

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Despite massive US attack and death of Ayatollah, regime change in Iran is unlikely

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Donald Heflin, Executive Director of the Edward R. Murrow Center and Senior Fellow of Diplomatic Practice, The Fletcher School, Tufts University

A group of demonstrators in Tehran wave Iranian flags in support of the government on Feb. 28, 2026 AP Photo/Vahid Salemi

After the largest buildup of U.S. warships and aircraft in the Middle East in decades, American and Israeli military forces launched a massive assault on Iran on Feb. 28, 2026.

President Donald Trump has called the attacks “major combat operations” and has urged regime change in Tehran. Iranian media reported Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was killed in the strikes.

To better understand what this means for the U.S. and Iran, Alfonso Serrano, a U.S. politics editor at The Conversation, interviewed Donald Heflin, a veteran diplomat who now teaches at Tufts University’s Fletcher School.

Widespread attacks have been reported across Iran, following weeks of U.S. military buildup in the region. What does the scale of the attacks tell you?

I think that Trump and his administration are going for regime change with these massive strikes and with all the ships and some troops in the area. I think there will probably be a couple more days’ worth of strikes. They’ll start off with the time-honored strategy of attacking what’s known as command and control, the nerve centers for controlling Iran’s military. From media reporting, we already know that the residence of Khamenei was attacked.

What is the U.S. strategic end game here?

Regime change is going to be difficult. We heard Trump today call for the Iranian people to bring the government down. In the first place, that’s difficult. It’s hard for people with no arms in their hands to bring down a very tightly controlled regime that has a lot of arms.

The second point is that U.S. history in that area of the world is not good with this. You may recall that during the Gulf War of 1990-1991, the U.S. basically encouraged the Iraqi people to rise up, and then made its own decision not to attack Baghdad, to stop short. And that has not been forgotten in Iraq or surrounding countries. I would be surprised if we saw a popular uprising in Iran that really had a chance of bringing the regime down.

Several men wave flags in front of a building.
A group of men wave Iranian flags as they protest U.S. and Israeli strikes in Tehran, Iran, on Feb. 28, 2026.
AP Photo/Vahid Salemi

Do you see the possibility of U.S. troops on the ground to bring about regime change?

I will stick my neck out here and say that’s not going to happen. I mean, there may be some small special forces sent in. That’ll be kept quiet for a while. But as far as large numbers of U.S. troops, no, I don’t think it’s going to happen.

Two reasons. First off, any president would feel that was extremely risky. Iran’s a big country with a big military. The risks you would be taking are large amounts of casualties, and you may not succeed in what you’re trying to do.

But Trump, in particular, despite the military strike against Iran and the one against Venezuela, is not a big fan of big military interventions and war. He’s a guy who will send in fighter planes and small special forces units, but not 10,000 or 20,000 troops.

And the reason for that is, throughout his career, he does well with a little bit of chaos. He doesn’t mind creating a little bit of chaos and figuring out a way to make a profit on the other side of that. War is too much chaos. It’s really hard to predict what the outcome is going to be, what all the ramifications are going to be. Throughout his first term and the first year of his second term, he has shown no inclination to send ground troops anywhere.

Speaking of President Trump, what are the risks he faces?

One risk is going on right now, which is that the Iranians may get lucky or smart and manage to attack a really good target and kill a lot of people, like something in Jerusalem or Tel Aviv or a U.S. military base.

The second risk is that the attacks don’t work, that the supreme leader and whoever else is considered the political leadership of Iran survives, and the U.S. winds up with egg on its face.

The third risk is that it works to a certain extent. You take out the top people, but then who steps into their shoes? I mean, go back and look at Venezuela. Most people would have thought that who was going to wind up winning at the end of that was the head of the opposition. But it wound up being the vice president of the old regime, Delcy Rodríguez.

I can see a similar scenario in Iran. The regime has enough depth to survive the death of several of its leaders. The thing to watch will be who winds up in the top jobs, hardliners or realists. But the only institution in Iran strong enough to succeed them is the army, the Revolutionary Guards in particular. Would that be an improvement for the U.S.? It depends on what their attitude was. The same attitude that the vice president of Venezuela has been taking, which is, “Look, this is a fact of life. We better negotiate with the Americans and figure out some way forward we can both live with.”

But these guys are pretty hardcore revolutionaries. I mean, Iran has been under revolutionary leadership for 47 years. All these guys are true believers. I don’t know if we’ll be able to work with them.

Smoke rises over a city center.
Smoke rises over Tehran on Feb. 28, 2026, after the U.S. and Israel launched airstrikes on Iran.
Fatemeh Bahrami/Anadolu via Getty Images

Any last thoughts?

I think the timing is interesting. If you go back to last year, Trump, after being in office a little and watching the situation between Israel and Gaza, was given an opening, when Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu attacked Qatar.

A lot of conservative Mideast regimes, who didn’t have a huge problem with Israel, essentially said “That’s going too far.” And Trump was able to use that as an excuse. He was able to essentially say, “Okay, you’ve gone too far. You’re really taking risk with world peace. Everybody’s gonna sit at the table.”

I think the same thing’s happening here. I believe many countries would love to see regime change in Iran. But you can’t go into the country and say, “We don’t like the political leadership being elected. We’re going to get rid of them for you.” What often happens in that situation is people begin to rally around the flag. They begin to rally around the government when the bombs start falling.

But in the last few months, we’ve seen a huge human rights crackdown in Iran. We may never know the number of people the Iranian regime killed in the last few months, but 10,000 to 15,000 protesters seems a minimum.

That’s the excuse Trump can use. You can sell it to the Iranian people and say, “Look, they’re killing you in the streets. Forget about your problems with Israel and the U.S. and everything. They’re real, but you’re getting killed in the streets, and that’s why we’re intervening.” It’s a bit of a fig leaf.

Now, as I said earlier, the problem with this is if your next line is, “You know, we’re going to really soften this regime up with bombs; now it’s your time to go out in the streets and bring the regime down.” I may eat these words, but I don’t think that’s going to happen. The regime is just too strong for it to be brought down by bare hands.

This article was updated on Feb 28, 2026, to include confirmation of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s death.

The Conversation

Donald Heflin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Despite massive US attack and death of Ayatollah, regime change in Iran is unlikely – https://theconversation.com/despite-massive-us-attack-and-death-of-ayatollah-regime-change-in-iran-is-unlikely-277180

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Ayatollah Ali Khamenei ruled Iran with defiance and brutality for 36 years. For many Iranians, he will not be revered

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Andrew Thomas, Lecturer in Middle East Studies, Deakin University

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader for 36 years, has been killed in US and Israeli airstrikes on his country, Iranian state media reported.

As one of Iran’s longest-serving leaders, Khamenei was almost as ubiquitous in Iranian society as his predecessor, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who founded the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979.

And despite the fact Khomeini authored the Iranian Revolution, some say Khamenei was actually the most powerful leader modern Iran has had.

In more than three decades as supreme leader, Khamenei amassed unprecedented power over domestic politics and cracked down ever more harshly on internal dissent. In recent years, he prioritised his survival – and that of his regime – above all else. His government brutally put down a popular uprising in December 2025–January 2026 that killed thousands.

Ultimately, though, Khamenei will not be remembered by most Iranians as a strong leader. Nor will he be revered. Instead, his legacy will be the profound weakness his regime brought the Islamic Republic on all fronts.

Khamenei’s rise through the ranks

Khamenei was born in the city of Marshad in northeastern Iran in 1939. As a boy, he began to form his political and religious world view by studying at Islamic seminaries in Najaf and Qom. At 13, he started to embrace ideas relating to revolutionary Islam. These included the teachings of cleric Navab Safavi, who often called for political violence against the rule of the shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.

Khamenei met Khomeini in 1958 and immediately embraced his philosophy, often referred to as “Khomeinism”.

This world view was informed by anti-colonial sentiment, Shia Islam and elements of social engineering through state planning, particularly when it came to preserving a “just” Islamic society. Khomeinism stipulates that a system of earthly laws alone cannot create a just society – Iran must draw its legitimacy from “God Almighty”.

The concept of velayat-e faqih, also known as guardianship of the jurist, is central to Khomeinism. It dictates that the supreme leader should be endowed with “all the authorities that the Prophet and infallible Imams were entitled”.

Essentially, this means Iran was to be ruled by a single scholar of Shia Islam. This is where Khomeini, and later Khamenei, would draw their sweeping power and control.

From 1962, Khamenei began almost two decades of revolutionary activity against Pahlavi (the shah) on behalf of Khomeini, who was exiled in 1964. Khamenei was arrested by the shah’s secret police in 1971 and tortured, according to his memoirs.

When the shah was overthrown in the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Khomeini returned from exile to become the new supreme leader.

Khamenei was selected to join the Revolutionary Council, which ruled alongside the provisional government. He then became deputy defence minister and assisted in organising the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). This military institution – initially created to protect the revolution and supreme leader – would become one of the most powerful political forces in Iran.

Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (sitting on chair), Ali Khamenei (middle), and Khomeini’s son, Ahmad Khomeini (left), pictured in 1981.
Wikimedia Commons

After surviving an assassination attempt in 1981, Khamenei was elected president of Iran in 1982 and again in 1985. He held the presidency during the majority of the Iran–Iraq war – a conflict that devastated both countries in both human and economic cost.

Although subordinate to the supreme leader, Khamenei wielded significant power compared to later presidents, given the revolution was still very young and the Iraq war posed a great threat to the regime. But he remained in lock-step with Khomeini’s wishes. He also managed to build a close relationship with the IRGC that would go far beyond his presidency.

Then-President Ali Khamenei during a state visit to China in May 1989.
Forrest Anderson/Getty Images

A surprising choice for supreme leader

Khomeini died in June 1989 after a period of deteriorating health, with no clear successor.

Khomeini had initially supported Grand Ayatollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri to be his successor. However, Montazeri had become increasingly critical of the supreme leader’s authority and human rights violations in the country. He resigned in 1988 and was put under house arrest until his death in 2009.

Khamenei had the political credentials to lead. He was also a steadfast support of Khomeinism. However, he was seen a surprising choice for supreme leader when he was elected by the Assembly of Experts, a group of Islamic clerics.

In fact, his appointment sparked a significant amount of controversy and criticism. Some Islamic scholars believed he lacked the clerical rank of grand ayatollah, which was required under the constitution to ascend to the position. These critics believed the Iranian people would not respect the word of “a mere human being” without a proper connection to God.

A referendum was held in July 1989 to change the constitution to allow for a supreme leader who has shown “Islamic scholarship”. It passed overwhelmingly and Khamenei became an ayatollah.

Khamenei’s position had been consolidated on paper, but despite being president since 1982, he did not enjoy the same popularity as Khomeini within both the clerical elite and general public.

The constitutional amendments, however, had given Khamenei significantly more power to intervene in political affairs. In fact, he had far more power as supreme leader than Khomeini ever enjoyed.

This included the ability to determine general policies, appoint and dismiss members of the Council of Guardians, and order public referendums. He also had enough power to silence dissent with relative ease.

Consolidating power over the decades

Khamenei worked with his presidents to varying degrees, though he exercised his power to undermine legislation when he disagreed with it.

For example, he largely backed the economic agenda of President Hashemi Rafsanjani (who served from 1989 to 1997), but he often stood in the way of Mohammad Khatami (1997–2005) and Hassan Rouhani (2013–21). Both had attempted to reform Iran’s political system and foster a better relationship with the West.

Khamenei’s most famous intervention in domestic politics occurred after the first term of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005–13). After Ahmadinejad claimed victory in the disputed 2009 presidential election, thousands of Iranians took to the streets in one of the largest protest movements since the revolution. Khamenei backed the election result and cracked down harshly on the protesters. Dozens were killed (perhaps more), while thousands were arbitrarily arrested.

Khamenei later clashed with Ahmadinejad and warned him against seeking the presidency again in 2017. Ahmadinejad defied him, but was later barred from running.

After the death of hardline President Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash in 2024, Khameini continued his manoeuvring behind the scenes. After the reformist Masoud Pezeshkian won the presidency, Khameini immediately blocked him from negotiating with the United States over sanctions relief and used his influence to thwart his economic reform agenda.

And when protests again broke out at the end of 2025 over the struggling economy, Khamenei again ordered them to be crushed by any means necessary.

A tarnished legacy

Thanks to the powers vested in him in the constitution, Khamenei also had extraordinary control over Iran’s foreign policy.

Like his mentor, Khomeini, he staunchly supported the regime’s resistance to what it considered “Western imperialism”. He was also a key architect of Iran’s regional proxy strategy, funding militant groups like Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis and others to carry out Iran’s military objectives.

Khamenei had, at times, been amenable to cooperation with the West – namely negotiating with the US over Iran’s nuclear enrichment program.

During the first Trump administration, however, Khamenei returned to a staunchly anti-Western posture. His government railed against Trump’s scuttling of the 2015 nuclear deal, the reimposed economic sanctions on Iran’s energy sector and the assassination of the head of the IRGC’s Quds force, Qassem Soleimani.

After Trump returned to office in 2025, Iran grew even weaker. And Khamenei’s anti-Western posture began to look increasingly hollow. Iran’s defeat in the 12-day war with Israel in 2025 shredded whatever legitimacy his regime had left.

In the months that followed, Khamenei ruled over a population increasingly resentful of the Iranian political system and its leadership. In the 2025–26 protests, some openly chanted for Khamenei’s death.

When Khomenei died in 1989, his state funeral was attended by millions. Mourners pulled him out of his coffin and scrambled for sacred mementos.

Though Khameini served longer, Iranians will likely not show the same grief for him.

The Conversation

Andrew Thomas does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei ruled Iran with defiance and brutality for 36 years. For many Iranians, he will not be revered – https://theconversation.com/ayatollah-ali-khamenei-ruled-iran-with-defiance-and-brutality-for-36-years-for-many-iranians-he-will-not-be-revered-259268

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Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has ruled Iran with defiance and brutality for 36 years. For many Iranians, he will not be revered

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Andrew Thomas, Lecturer in Middle East Studies, Deakin University

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader for 36 years, has been killed in US and Israeli airstrikes on his country, according to US President Donald Trump. Iran did not immediately confirm his death.

As one of Iran’s longest-serving leaders, Khamenei has been almost as ubiquitous in Iranian society as his predecessor, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who founded the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979.

And despite the fact Khomeini authored the Iranian Revolution, some say Khamenei was actually the most powerful leader modern Iran has had.

In more than three decades as supreme leader, Khamenei amassed unprecedented power over domestic politics and cracked down ever more harshly on internal dissent. In recent years, he prioritised his survival – and that of his regime – above all else. His government brutally put down a popular uprising in December 2025–January 2026 that killed thousands.

Ultimately, though, Khamenei will not be remembered by most Iranians as a strong leader. Nor will he be revered. Instead, his legacy will be the profound weakness his regime brought the Islamic Republic on all fronts.

Khamenei’s rise through the ranks

Khamenei was born in the city of Marshad in northeastern Iran in 1939. As a boy, he began to form his political and religious world view by studying at Islamic seminaries in Najaf and Qom. At 13, he started to embrace ideas relating to revolutionary Islam. These included the teachings of cleric Navab Safavi, who often called for political violence against the rule of the shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.

Khamenei met Khomeini in 1958 and immediately embraced his philosophy, often referred to as “Khomeinism”.

This world view was informed by anti-colonial sentiment, Shia Islam and elements of social engineering through state planning, particularly when it came to preserving a “just” Islamic society. Khomeinism stipulates that a system of earthly laws alone cannot create a just society – Iran must draw its legitimacy from “God Almighty”.

The concept of velayat-e faqih, also known as guardianship of the jurist, is central to Khomeinism. It dictates that the supreme leader should be endowed with “all the authorities that the Prophet and infallible Imams were entitled”.

Essentially, this means Iran was to be ruled by a single scholar of Shia Islam. This is where Khomeini, and later Khamenei, would draw their sweeping power and control.

From 1962, Khamenei began almost two decades of revolutionary activity against Pahlavi (the shah) on behalf of Khomeini, who was exiled in 1964. Khamenei was arrested by the shah’s secret police in 1971 and tortured, according to his memoirs.

When the shah was overthrown in the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Khomeini returned from exile to become the new supreme leader.

Khamenei was selected to join the Revolutionary Council, which ruled alongside the provisional government. He then became deputy defence minister and assisted in organising the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). This military institution – initially created to protect the revolution and supreme leader – would become one of the most powerful political forces in Iran.

Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (sitting on chair), Ali Khamenei (middle), and Khomeini’s son, Ahmad Khomeini (left), pictured in 1981.
Wikimedia Commons

After surviving an assassination attempt in 1981, Khamenei was elected president of Iran in 1982 and again in 1985. He held the presidency during the majority of the Iran–Iraq war – a conflict that devastated both countries in both human and economic cost.

Although subordinate to the supreme leader, Khamenei wielded significant power compared to later presidents, given the revolution was still very young and the Iraq war posed a great threat to the regime. But he remained in lock-step with Khomeini’s wishes. He also managed to build a close relationship with the IRGC that would go far beyond his presidency.

Then-President Ali Khamenei during a state visit to China in May 1989.
Forrest Anderson/Getty Images

A surprising choice for supreme leader

Khomeini died in June 1989 after a period of deteriorating health, with no clear successor.

Khomeini had initially supported Grand Ayatollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri to be his successor. However, Montazeri had become increasingly critical of the supreme leader’s authority and human rights violations in the country. He resigned in 1988 and was put under house arrest until his death in 2009.

Khamenei had the political credentials to lead. He was also a steadfast support of Khomeinism. However, he was seen a surprising choice for supreme leader when he was elected by the Assembly of Experts, a group of Islamic clerics.

In fact, his appointment sparked a significant amount of controversy and criticism. Some Islamic scholars believed he lacked the clerical rank of grand ayatollah, which was required under the constitution to ascend to the position. These critics believed the Iranian people would not respect the word of “a mere human being” without a proper connection to God.

A referendum was held in July 1989 to change the constitution to allow for a supreme leader who has shown “Islamic scholarship”. It passed overwhelmingly and Khamenei became an ayatollah.

Khamenei’s position had been consolidated on paper, but despite being president since 1982, he did not enjoy the same popularity as Khomeini within both the clerical elite and general public.

The constitutional amendments, however, had given Khamenei significantly more power to intervene in political affairs. In fact, he had far more power as supreme leader than Khomeini ever enjoyed.

This included the ability to determine general policies, appoint and dismiss members of the Council of Guardians, and order public referendums. He also had enough power to silence dissent with relative ease.

Consolidating power over the decades

Khamenei worked with his presidents to varying degrees, though he exercised his power to undermine legislation when he disagreed with it.

For example, he largely backed the economic agenda of President Hashemi Rafsanjani (who served from 1989 to 1997), but he often stood in the way of Mohammad Khatami (1997–2005) and Hassan Rouhani (2013–21). Both had attempted to reform Iran’s political system and foster a better relationship with the West.

Khamenei’s most famous intervention in domestic politics occurred after the first term of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005–13). After Ahmadinejad claimed victory in the disputed 2009 presidential election, thousands of Iranians took to the streets in one of the largest protest movements since the revolution. Khamenei backed the election result and cracked down harshly on the protesters. Dozens were killed (perhaps more), while thousands were arbitrarily arrested.

Khamenei later clashed with Ahmadinejad and warned him against seeking the presidency again in 2017. Ahmadinejad defied him, but was later barred from running.

After the death of hardline President Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash in 2024, Khameini continued his manoeuvring behind the scenes. After the reformist Masoud Pezeshkian won the presidency, Khameini immediately blocked him from negotiating with the United States over sanctions relief and used his influence to thwart his economic reform agenda.

And when protests again broke out at the end of 2025 over the struggling economy, Khamenei again ordered them to be crushed by any means necessary.

A tarnished legacy

Thanks to the powers vested in him in the constitution, Khamenei also had extraordinary control over Iran’s foreign policy.

Like his mentor, Khomeini, he staunchly supported the regime’s resistance to what it considered “Western imperialism”. He was also a key architect of Iran’s regional proxy strategy, funding militant groups like Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis and others to carry out Iran’s military objectives.

Khamenei had, at times, been amenable to cooperation with the West – namely negotiating with the US over Iran’s nuclear enrichment program.

During the first Trump administration, however, Khamenei returned to a staunchly anti-Western posture. His government railed against Trump’s scuttling of the 2015 nuclear deal, the reimposed economic sanctions on Iran’s energy sector and the assassination of the head of the IRGC’s Quds force, Qassem Soleimani.

After Trump returned to office in 2025, Iran grew even weaker. And Khamenei’s anti-Western posture began to look increasingly hollow. Iran’s defeat in the 12-day war with Israel in 2025 shredded whatever legitimacy his regime had left.

In the months that followed, Khamenei ruled over a population increasingly resentful of the Iranian political system and its leadership. In the 2025–26 protests, some openly chanted for Khamenei’s death.

When Khomenei died in 1989, his state funeral was attended by millions. Mourners pulled him out of his coffin and scrambled for sacred mementos.

Though Khameini served longer, Iranians will likely not show the same grief for him.

The Conversation

Andrew Thomas does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has ruled Iran with defiance and brutality for 36 years. For many Iranians, he will not be revered – https://theconversation.com/ayatollah-ali-khamenei-has-ruled-iran-with-defiance-and-brutality-for-36-years-for-many-iranians-he-will-not-be-revered-259268

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Massive US attacks on Iran unlikely to produce regime change in Tehran

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Donald Heflin, Executive Director of the Edward R. Murrow Center and Senior Fellow of Diplomatic Practice, The Fletcher School, Tufts University

A group of demonstrators in Tehran wave Iranian flags in support of the government on Feb. 28, 2026 AP Photo/Vahid Salemi

After the largest buildup of U.S. warships and aircraft in the Middle East in decades, American and Israeli military forces launched a massive assault on Iran on Feb. 28, 2026.

President Donald Trump has called the attacks “major combat operations” and has urged regime change in Tehran.

To better understand what this means for the U.S. and Iran, Alfonso Serrano, a U.S. politics editor at The Conversation, interviewed Donald Heflin, a veteran diplomat who now teaches at Tufts University’s Fletcher School.

Widespread attacks have been reported across Iran, following weeks of U.S. military buildup in the region. What does the scale of the attacks tell you?

I think that Trump and his administration are going for regime change with these massive strikes and with all the ships and some troops in the area. I think there will probably be a couple more days’ worth of strikes. They’ll start off with the time-honored strategy of attacking what’s known as command and control, the nerve centers for controlling Iran’s military. From media reporting, we already know that the residence of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was attacked.

What is the U.S. strategic end game here?

Regime change is going to be difficult. We heard Trump today call for the Iranian people to bring the government down. In the first place, that’s difficult. It’s hard for people with no arms in their hands to bring down a very tightly controlled regime that has a lot of arms.

The second point is that U.S. history in that area of the world is not good with this. You may recall that during the Gulf War of 1990-1991, the U.S. basically encouraged the Iraqi people to rise up, and then made its own decision not to attack Baghdad, to stop short. And that has not been forgotten in Iraq or surrounding countries. I would be surprised if we saw a popular uprising in Iran that really had a chance of bringing the regime down.

Several men wave flags in front of a building.
A group of men wave Iranian flags as they protest U.S. and Israeli strikes in Tehran, Iran, on Feb. 28, 2026.
AP Photo/Vahid Salemi

Do you see the possibility of U.S. troops on the ground to bring about regime change?

I will stick my neck out here and say that’s not going to happen. I mean, there may be some small special forces sent in. That’ll be kept quiet for a while. But as far as large numbers of U.S. troops, no, I don’t think it’s going to happen.

Two reasons. First off, any president would feel that was extremely risky. Iran’s a big country with a big military. The risks you would be taking are large amounts of casualties, and you may not succeed in what you’re trying to do.

But Trump, in particular, despite the military strike against Iran and the one against Venezuela, is not a big fan of big military interventions and war. He’s a guy who will send in fighter planes and small special forces units, but not 10,000 or 20,000 troops.

And the reason for that is, throughout his career, he does well with a little bit of chaos. He doesn’t mind creating a little bit of chaos and figuring out a way to make a profit on the other side of that. War is too much chaos. It’s really hard to predict what the outcome is going to be, what all the ramifications are going to be. Throughout his first term and the first year of his second term, he has shown no inclination to send ground troops anywhere.

Speaking of President Trump, what are the risks he faces?

One risk is going on right now, which is that the Iranians may get lucky or smart and manage to attack a really good target and kill a lot of people, like something in Jerusalem or Tel Aviv or a U.S. military base.

The second risk is that the attacks don’t work, that the supreme leader and whoever else is considered the political leadership of Iran survives, and the U.S. winds up with egg on its face.

The third risk is that it works to a certain extent. You take out the top people, but then who steps into their shoes? I mean, go back and look at Venezuela. Most people would have thought that who was going to wind up winning at the end of that was the head of the opposition. But it wound up being the vice president of the old regime, Delcy Rodríguez.

I can see a similar scenario in Iran, if Khamenei and a couple of other leaders were taken out. But the only institution in Iran strong enough to succeed them is the army, the Revolutionary Guards in particular. Would that be an improvement for the U.S.? It depends on what their attitude was. The same attitude that the vice president of Venezuela has been taking, which is, “Look, this is a fact of life. We better negotiate with the Americans and figure out some way forward we can both live with.”

But these guys are pretty hardcore revolutionaries. I mean, Iran has been under revolutionary leadership for 47 years. All these guys are true believers. I don’t know if we’ll be able to work with them.

Smoke rises over a city center.
Smoke rises over Tehran on Feb. 28, 2026, after the U.S. and Israel launched airstrikes on Iran.
Fatemeh Bahrami/Anadolu via Getty Images

Any last thoughts?

I think the timing is interesting. If you go back to last year, Trump, after being in office a little and watching the situation between Israel and Gaza, was given an opening, when Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu attacked Qatar.

A lot of conservative Mideast regimes, who didn’t have a huge problem with Israel, essentially said “That’s going too far.” And Trump was able to use that as an excuse. He was able to essentially say, “Okay, you’ve gone too far. You’re really taking risk with world peace. Everybody’s gonna sit at the table.”

I think the same thing’s happening here. I believe many countries would love to see regime change in Iran. But you can’t go into the country and say, “We don’t like the political leadership being elected. We’re going to get rid of them for you.” What often happens in that situation is people begin to rally around the flag. They begin to rally around the government when the bombs start falling.

But in the last few months, we’ve seen a huge human rights crackdown in Iran. We may never know the number of people the Iranian regime killed in the last few months, but 10,000 to 15,000 protesters seems a minimum.

That’s the excuse Trump can use. You can sell it to the Iranian people and say, “Look, they’re killing you in the streets. Forget about your problems with Israel and the U.S. and everything. They’re real, but you’re getting killed in the streets, and that’s why we’re intervening.” It’s a bit of a fig leaf.

Now, as I said earlier, the problem with this is if your next line is, “You know, we’re going to really soften this regime up with bombs; now it’s your time to go out in the streets and bring the regime down.” I may eat these words, but I don’t think that’s going to happen. The regime is just too strong for it to be brought down by bare hands.

The Conversation

Donald Heflin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Massive US attacks on Iran unlikely to produce regime change in Tehran – https://theconversation.com/massive-us-attacks-on-iran-unlikely-to-produce-regime-change-in-tehran-277180