Category: MIL-OSI

Source: The Conversation – USA (2) – By Ryan Herzog, Associate Professor of Economics, Gonzaga University

The Federal Reserve on Sept. 17, 2025, cut its target interest rate as it shifts focus from fighting inflation to supporting the choppy labor market.

As financial markets expected, the Fed lowered rates a quarter point to a range of 4% to 4.25%, its first cut since December 2024.

The Fed’s decision to begin cutting rates comes as evidence mounts that the U.S. labor market is losing momentum. The headline unemployment rate has stayed steady at near record lows, but the underlying trends are more concerning.

At the same time, the fight against inflation is not over yet. While a cooling jobs market could lead to a recession, cutting rates too much could drive inflation higher.

So if you’re the Fed, what do you do?

I’m an economist who tracks labor market data and monetary policy, examining how changes in hiring, wages and unemployment influence the Federal Reserve’s efforts to steer the economy. There’s an incredibly large amount of data the Fed, investors, economists like me and many others use to understand the state of the economy – and much of it often tells conflicting stories.

Here are some the data points I’ve been following most closely to better understand where the U.S. economy might go from here – and the tough choices the Fed has to make.

Underlying trouble in the labor market

The labor market looks stable on the surface, but more granular data tells a different story.

The unemployment rate has remained close to historic lows at 4.3% as of August 2025, according to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.

But the number of long-term unemployed – people out of work for 27 weeks or longer – rose to 1.9 million in August, up 385,000 from a year earlier. These workers now make up 25.7% of all unemployed people, the highest share since February 2022. Persistent long-term joblessness often signals deeper cracks forming in the labor market.

At the same time, new claims for unemployment benefits are spiking. Initial claims for unemployment insurance – a leading indicator of labor market stress – jumped by 27,000 to 263,000 for the week ending Sept. 6, according to the U.S. Department of Labor. That’s the sharpest increase in months and well above economists’ forecasts. It suggests layoffs are becoming more common.

We also got news that past payroll growth was overstated. In a process the Bureau of Labor Statistics undertakes annually to double-check its data, the bureau recently revised its jobs data downward from April 2024 through March 2025 by 911,000. In other words, the economy created roughly 75,000 fewer jobs per month than previously reported. This implies the labor market was weaker than it appeared all along.

Finally, workers are losing confidence. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York reported in August that confidence in finding a job fell to its lowest level – 44.9% – since it started surveying consumers in June 2013. That’s another sign workers are feeling less secure about their prospects.

Taken together, these data points paint a clear picture: The labor market is not collapsing, but it is softening. That helps explain why the Fed is beginning to cut rates now – hoping to stimulate spending – before the job market breaks more sharply.

Tariffs are complicating the inflation data

Even as the labor market softens, tariffs are pushing certain prices higher than they otherwise would be, complicating the Federal Reserve’s effort to bring inflation down.

Government data shows that businesses have begun passing the costs of President Donald Trump’s new import tariffs to consumers. In August, clothing prices rose 0.5% and grocery prices rose 0.6%, with especially strong gains for tariff-sensitive items such as coffee.

Lower-income households are getting hit hardest because they spend more of their budget on imported goods, which tend to be the lower-cost items most affected by tariffs. A report from the Yale Budget Lab found that core goods prices are about 1.9% above pre-2025 trends as tariffs raise costs for basic items such as appliances and electronics.

Phillip Swagel, director of the Congressional Budget Office, said recently that Trump’s tariffs have pushed inflation higher than CBO analysts had expected, even as overall economic activity has weakened since January.

Typically, a slowdown in the labor market is met with slower inflation. But while the CBO now projects that the tariffs will reduce the federal budget deficit by about US$4 trillion over the next decade – roughly $3.3 trillion in new revenue and $700 billion in lower debt service costs – but it will come at the cost of near-term upward pressure on prices.

This creates a difficult balancing act for the Fed: Cut rates too quickly, and tariff-driven price pressures could reignite inflation; move too slowly, and the softening labor market could tip into recession.

A narrow path to a soft landing

As it resumes cutting rates, the Federal Reserve is trying to thread a narrow needle – easing policy enough to keep the labor market from cracking while not reigniting inflation, which is proving stickier in part because of tariffs.

Markets are betting the Fed will keep cutting. The futures market is betting the Fed will cut rates by another half point by the end of the year. And the one-year Treasury yield has dropped about 150 basis points (1.5%) since June, signaling that investors expect a series of rate cuts through 2025 and into 2026.

At its latest meeting, the Fed signaled two more rate cuts in 2025 and at least one rate cut in 2026.

Such cuts would ultimately bring the federal funds rate closer to 3% and hopefully reduce 30-year mortgage rates to around 5% – from an average of 6.35% as of Sept. 11. If the labor market continues to weaken – with jobless claims climbing, payrolls revised down and more workers stuck in long-term unemployment – that expectation will likely harden into consensus.

But the path is far from certain. Cutting rates too quickly could cause inflation to spike, while going too slow could lead to further deterioration in the labor market. Either outcome would jeopardize the Fed’s credibility – whether by appearing unable to control prices or by allowing unemployment to rise unnecessarily. That would undermine its ability to influence markets and enforce its dual mandate of maximum employment and stable prices.

Another tricky issue is Trump’s public campaign to push the Fed to cut rates – appearing to do his bidding could also undercut Fed credibility. For what it’s worth, the Sept. 17 rate cut appears driven less by politics than by economic data. The Fed itself was projecting a year ago that rates would be much lower today than they actually are, suggesting it’s been following the data.

The economy appears to be slowing but remains resilient, which is why the Fed is likely to move gradually. The risk is that the window for a soft landing is closing. The coming months will determine whether the Fed can ease early enough to avoid recession, or whether it has already waited too long.

Ryan Herzog does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Fed rate cut is attempt to prevent recession without sending prices soaring – https://theconversation.com/fed-rate-cut-is-attempt-to-prevent-recession-without-sending-prices-soaring-265370

Source: The Conversation – USA (3) – By Matt Motta, Assistant Professor of Health Law, Policy and Management, Boston University

Trump officials intend to link 25 child deaths to COVID-19 vaccines, according to reporting from The Washington Post. These findings will reportedly be discussed during the Sept. 18-19, 2025, meeting of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices, with implications for who may be eligible for COVID-19 vaccines in the future.

These death reports are reportedly derived from the Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System, or VAERS, a database co-managed by the CDC and the Food and Drug Administration. It was originally established in 1990 to detect possible safety problems with vaccines. Unfortunately, the anti-vaccine movement has used this database to spread misinformation about the COVID-19 vaccine. Health and Human Services Secretary Robert F. Kennedy Jr., a prominent anti-vaccine activist, has promulgated this misinformation through the Make America Healthy Again movement in efforts to limit access to COVID-19 vaccines.

VAERS is ripe for exploitation because it relies on unverified self-reports of side effects. Anyone who received a vaccine can submit a report. And because this information is publicly available, misinterpretations of its data has been used to amplify COVID-19 misinformation through dubious social media channels and mass media, including one of the most popular shows on cable news.

We are political scientists who study the social, political and psychological underpinnings of vaccine hesitancy in the U.S. In our research, we argue that VAERS, despite its limitations, can teach us about more than just vaccine side effects – it can also offer powerful new insights into the origins of vaccine hesitancy in the U.S.

What the side effects database was designed to do

Medical experts at the Department of Health and Human Services are well aware of VAERS’ limitations. Rather than taking each individual report at face value, regulators remove clearly fraudulent reports. Demonstrating this, anesthesiologist and autism advocate James Laidler once used the system to report that a vaccine turned him into the “Incredible Hulk,” which was removed only after he agreed to have the data deleted.

Regulators also look for reporting patterns that can be corroborated by additional evidence. For example, reports of Guillain-Barré syndrome should be more common in people over 50 than in younger adults. This can help researchers identify potential adverse events that were not detected in clinical trials.

Because VAERS claims are self-reported, they tell us something about what ordinary people, as opposed to doctors and medical researchers, think about vaccine safety. In other words, people who feel that a vaccine is responsible for a side effect they might be experiencing can log that concern with the federal government, whether or not those claims would stand scrutiny in rigorous clinical testing.

Consequently, VAERS reports might not only document people’s negative experiences with vaccination but also their attitudes toward vaccination. People may be more likely to report side effects, for example, in response to media stories about vaccine safety concerns. If reports to VAERS increase following these stories, then the reporting system may be functioning similarly to a public opinion poll. It could reflect, in part, public attentiveness to and concern about potential side effects.

To see whether this is the case, we examined a well-known case of vaccine misinformation: the since-retracted paper that claimed a link between the measles-mumps-rubella vaccine (MMR) to childhood autism.

Is a fraudulent study responsible for MMR vaccine skepticism?

In 1998, former physician Andrew Wakefield and his colleagues published a since-retracted paper claiming that the MMR vaccine could cause autism in children. Although the study was rife with unreported conflicting interests and data manipulation, it nevertheless garnered significant media attention in the late 1990s. Some journalists and researchers have since argued that the paper played a major role in inspiring MMR vaccine hesitancy.

While this is plausible, there hasn’t been evidence to support the argument. Virtually no opinion polling about MMR existed prior to the publication of Wakefield’s paper. Consequently, researchers have not been able to directly observe whether the study influenced how Americans think about the MMR vaccine.

VAERS data, however, could offer some clues. In our study, we examined whether the number of VAERS reports following publication of Wakefield’s paper was significantly greater than expected based on typical report numbers prior to its publication. We found that the number of adverse event reports for MMR increased by about 70 reports per month following publication of the paper. This is significantly greater than what we would expect by chance based on previous reporting frequencies. Notably, we did not find a similar effect for other childhood vaccines in the same time period. This further underscores the power this since-debunked study has had in shaping public opinion about the MMR vaccine.

Importantly, we also found that adverse event reporting rates rose in tandem with negative media coverage of the MMR vaccine. Following the publication of Wakefield’s paper, television and print news published significantly more stories about MMR than before the paper was published. These results suggest that Wakefield’s article influenced how much more attentive Americans were about the MMR vaccine.

VAERS: A double-edged sword

Since the COVID-19 pandemic, interest in the side effects reporting system had significantly grown. Google search engine trends suggest that more Americans were looking up VAERS than ever before shortly after emergency use authorization of the first COVID-19 vaccines in the U.S. This trend continued to increase until a peak in August 2021.

This search behavior is likely a result of increased media attention to VAERS, particularly by right-leaning news outlets. According to the data from media research platform Media Cloud, there have been 459 stories in mainstream national news outlets, such as CNN or USA Today, mentioning VAERS between December 2020 and mid-August 2021. In right-wing media outlets such as Fox News, The Daily Caller and Breitbart, however, coverage soared to 3,254 stories – over seven times more than mainstream news media.

Consequently, VAERS data could be seen as something of a double-edged sword. On one hand, it has been weaponized by the anti-vaccine movement and political actors on the right to sow doubt and distrust about COVID-19 vaccinations. On the other hand, this data could also tell public health researchers something useful about how American vaccine skepticism might ebb and flow in response to events such as the brief pause in Johnson & Johnson COVID-19 vaccine administration or fluctuations in the tone of media coverage about COVID-19 vaccines.

VAERS data may even offer an important advantage over public opinion polls, which, with the exception of weekly vaccine uptake polls, have typically been administered much less frequently. Our research cautions that media attention to discredited vaccine-related claims may undermine public confidence in vaccination.

How to avoid another wave of misinformation

To ensure that VAERS is used properly, journalists and scientific researchers can team up to help the public interpret new findings. Journalists should, in our view, contextualize their coverage within a broader body of scientific evidence. Scientific researchers can aid in this by helping journalists accurately portray studies on vaccine side effects, clearly outlining their methodologies and results in accessible language.

By working together, researchers and journalists can take constructive action to address vaccine hesitancy before it has a chance to germinate.

This an updated version of an article originally published on Aug. 25, 2021.

Matt Motta has received funding from the National Science Foundation.

Dominik Stecuła receives funding from the National Science Foundation.

– ref. Vaccine death and side effects database relies on unverified reports – and Trump officials and right-wing media are applying it out of context – https://theconversation.com/vaccine-death-and-side-effects-database-relies-on-unverified-reports-and-trump-officials-and-right-wing-media-are-applying-it-out-of-context-265362

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Art Jipson, Associate Professor of Sociology, University of Dayton

After the Sept. 10, 2025, assassination of conservative political activist Charlie Kirk, President Donald Trump claimed that radical leftist groups foment political violence in the U.S., and “they should be put in jail.”

“The radical left causes tremendous violence,” he said, asserting that “they seem to do it in a bigger way” than groups on the right.

Top presidential adviser Stephen Miller also weighed in after Kirk’s killing, saying that left-wing political organizations constitute “a vast domestic terror movement.”

“We are going to use every resource we have … throughout this government to identify, disrupt, dismantle and destroy these networks and make America safe again,” Miller said.

But policymakers and the public need reliable evidence and actual data to understand the reality of politically motivated violence. From our research on extremism, it’s clear that the president’s and Miller’s assertions about political violence from the left are not based on actual facts.

Based on our own research and a review of related work, we can confidently say that most domestic terrorists in the U.S. are politically on the right, and right-wing attacks account for the vast majority of fatalities from domestic terrorism.

Political violence rising

The understanding of political violence is complicated by differences in definitions and the recent Department of Justice removal of an important government-sponsored study of domestic terrorists.

Political violence in the U.S. has risen in recent months and takes forms that go unrecognized. During the 2024 election cycle, nearly half of all states reported threats against election workers, including social media death threats, intimidation and doxing.

Kirk’s assassination illustrates the growing threat. The man charged with the murder, Tyler Robinson, allegedly planned the attack in writing and online.

This follows other politically motivated killings, including the June assassination of Democratic Minnesota state Rep. and former House Speaker Melissa Hortman and her husband.

These incidents reflect a normalization of political violence. Threats and violence are increasingly treated as acceptable for achieving political goals, posing serious risks to democracy and society.

Defining ‘political violence’

This article relies on some of our research on extremism, other academic research, federal reports, academic datasets and other monitoring to assess what is known about political violence.

Support for political violence in the U.S. is spreading from extremist fringes into the mainstream, making violent actions seem normal. Threats can move from online rhetoric to actual violence, posing serious risks to democratic practices.

But different agencies and researchers use different definitions of political violence, making comparisons difficult.

The FBI and Department of Homeland Security define domestic violent extremism as threats involving actual violence. They do not investigate people in the U.S. for constitutionally protected speech, activism or ideological beliefs.

Domestic violent extremism is defined by the FBI and Department of Homeland Security as violence or credible threats of violence intended to influence government policy or intimidate civilians for political or ideological purposes. This general framing, which includes diverse activities under a single category, guides investigations and prosecutions.

Datasets compiled by academic researchers use narrower and more operational definitions. The Global Terrorism Database counts incidents that involve intentional violence with political, social or religious motivation.

These differences mean that the same incident may or may not appear in a dataset, depending on the rules applied.

The FBI and Department of Homeland Security emphasize that these distinctions are not merely academic. Labeling an event “terrorism” rather than a “hate crime” can change who is responsible for investigating an incident and how many resources they have to investigate. “investigate IT”?

For example, a politically motivated shooting might be coded as terrorism in federal reporting, cataloged as political violence by the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, and prosecuted as homicide or a hate crime at the state level.

Patterns in incidents and fatalities

Despite differences in definitions, several consistent patterns emerge from available evidence.

Politically motivated violence is a small fraction of total violent crime, but its impact is magnified by symbolic targets, timing and media coverage.

In the first half of 2025, 35% of violent events tracked by University of Maryland researchers targeted U.S. government personnel or facilities – more than twice the rate in 2024.

Right-wing extremist violence has been deadlier than left-wing violence in recent years.

Based on government and independent analyses, right-wing extremist violence has been responsible for the overwhelming majority of fatalities, amounting to approximately 75% to 80% of U.S. domestic terrorism deaths since 2001.

Illustrative cases include the 2015 Charleston church shooting, when white supremacist Dylann Roof killed nine Black parishioners; the 2018 Tree of Life synagogue attack in Pittsburgh, where 11 worshippers were murdered; the 2019 El Paso Walmart massacre, in which an anti-immigrant gunman killed 23 people. The 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, an earlier but still notable example, killed 168 in the deadliest domestic terrorist attack in U.S. history.

By contrast, left-wing extremist incidents, including those tied to anarchist or environmental movements, have made up about 10& to 15% of incidents and less than 5% of fatalities.

Examples include the Animal Liberation Front and Earth Liberation Front arson and vandalism campaigns in the 1990s and 2000s, which were more likely to target property rather than people.

Violence occurred during Seattle May Day protests in 2016, with anarchist groups and other demonstrators clashing with police. The clashes resulted in multiple injuries and arrests. In 2016, five Dallas police officers were murdered by a heavily armed sniper who was targeting white police officers.

Hard to count

There’s another reason it’s hard to account for and characterize certain kinds of political violence and those who perpetrate it.

The U.S. focuses on prosecuting criminal acts rather than formally designating organizations as terrorist, relying on existing statutes such as conspiracy, weapons violations, RICO provisions and hate crime laws to pursue individuals for specific acts of violence.

Unlike foreign terrorism, the federal government does not have a mechanism to formally charge an individual with domestic terrorism. That makes it difficult to characterize someone as a domestic terrorist.

The State Department’s Foreign Terrorist Organization list applies only to groups outside of the United States. By contrast, U.S. law bars the government from labeling domestic political organizations as terrorist entities because of First Amendment free speech protections.

Rhetoric is not evidence

Without harmonized reporting and uniform definitions, the data will not provide an accurate overview of political violence in the U.S.

But we can make some important conclusions.

Politically motivated violence in the U.S. is rare compared with overall violent crime. Political violence has a disproportionate impact because even rare incidents can amplify fear, influence policy and deepen societal polarization.

Right-wing extremist violence has been more frequent and more lethal than left-wing violence. The number of extremist groups is substantial and skewed toward the right, although a count of organizations does not necessarily reflect incidents of violence.

High-profile political violence often brings heightened rhetoric and pressure for sweeping responses. Yet the empirical record shows that political violence remains concentrated within specific movements and networks rather than spread evenly across the ideological spectrum. Distinguishing between rhetoric and evidence is essential for democracy.

Trump and members of his administration are threatening to target whole organizations and movements and the people who work in them with aggressive legal measures – to jail them or scrutinize their favorable tax status. The administration’s focus is on left-wing organizations, but research shows that it’s organizations on the right that the government needs to focus on with prevention and investigation.

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Right-wing extremist violence is more frequent and more deadly than left-wing violence − what the data shows – https://theconversation.com/right-wing-extremist-violence-is-more-frequent-and-more-deadly-than-left-wing-violence-what-the-data-shows-265367