Category: English

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Derek Yu, Professor, Economics, University of the Western Cape

Child labour is a big concern across the world. It is particularly acute in countries in the global south, where it is estimated that about 160 million children are engaged in child labour, about 87 million of them in sub-Saharan Africa.

A range of countries have sought to outlaw child labour because it denies children their childhood as well as physical and mental development.

In South Africa data on the work activities of children aged between 7 and 17 years are collected in the Survey of Activities of Young People, conducted by Statistics South Africa. Despite the survey having taken place four times (1999, 2010, 2015 and 2019), the dataset has been seriously under-used. There has hardly been any comprehensive research done on the state of South Africa’s child labour and child work activities.

In a recently published study we looked at child labour activities in the country. We compared the 2010, 2015 and 2019 Survey of Activities of Young People.

We first looked at personal and geographical characteristics of children, such as their gender, ethnic group and province of residence. We went on to look at their work activities, as well as the relationship (if any) between adults’ employment status and the probability of children from the same households having to work.

The reason we chose to look at the relationship between child labour and work activities of adults is that South Africa has an extremely high level of unemployment. At the end of 2024 the unemployment rate was 31.8%.

The Basic Conditions of Employment Act, which was passed in 1997, bans the employment of children until the last school day of the year when they turn 15 years old. Nonetheless, as some adult household members struggle to find work successfully, it is possible that child members of households are exploited to help the households survive financially.

Two striking and alarming findings stand out from the study.

First, the fewer adults were employed in a household, the more likely it was that children in the household were working. Secondly, the presence of child labour in the household had a discouraging impact on the adult members’ job-seeking action.

The first key finding implies that if adults were employed, children might not be working. The second implies that jobless adult members most likely relied on the (illegal) income earned by the child labour, discouraging the adults from seeking work actively.

The number of children working in South Africa has dropped from 778,000 in 2010 to 577,000 in 2019. This downward trend implies the success of South African legislation in prohibiting child labour over the years. But, we conclude, laws and regulations are not enough. In South Africa, the enforcement as well as the public awareness and understanding of the child labour related legislation must be improved to safeguard children.

Thus, a coordinated programme of action by the government is important to bring all stakeholders into the fight against child labour and unemployment of the working-age population.

About the survey

The Survey of Activities of Young People was first introduced in 1999 by Statistics South Africa, two years after the 1997 legislation that banned child labour. However, since the 1999 survey was not linked to the Labour Force Survey and the 1999 survey questions were asked very differently from the 2010, 2015 and 2019 waves, we decided to exclude the 1999 survey wave from the analysis. Hence, we focus on examining the 2010, 2015 and 2019 results, notably because these three waves of data about young people are linked to the Labour Force Survey data taking place in the same year.

This makes it possible to investigate the relationship between the employment status of child and adult household members.

The 2019 survey findings show that, if a household had no employed adult members, the probability of the child from the same household ending up as child labour was 6.5%.

If the household had one employed adult member, child labour probability dropped to 4.7%. Lastly, if the household had at least two employed adult members, child labour likelihood decreased further to 2.7%.

Using the same 2019 data, we found that if a household had no child involved in labour, the probability of an adult member from the same household seeking work in the labour market was 60%. Adult members’ labour force participation rate from households where at least once child worked as child labour was much lower at 44%.

Looking at other child labour statistics, we found that the majority (90%) of working children were Africans; above 60% were in the illegal age cohort of 7-14 years; and most were living in the rural areas of KwaZulu-Natal, Gauteng and Eastern Cape.

In addition, 98% of them were still attending school while working as child labour.

Lastly, most child labour worked 1-5 hours per week in elementary occupations in the wholesale and retail industry. The top three reasons for children working were “to obtain pocket money”, “to assist family with money” and “duty to help family”.

The road ahead

Some children spent many hours on household chores (which is not classified as child labour, strictly speaking). Parents, employers and the community must be educated about the dangers of long hours on domestic chores and even child labour.

The government should consolidate its infrastructure development programmes, especially the delivery of electricity, water and sanitation in areas where children spend time on domestic chores. These actions will shorten the duration of child household chores and allow children more time for school activities. The surveys used for the study did not include questions about specific activities children were involved in. They only asked if the child was involved in chores such as cleaning, cooking and looking after elderly members.

It is also worthwhile if questions relating to child labour are included in the child questionnaire of the National Income Dynamics Study (the only national panel data survey in South Africa) to more thoroughly investigate whether child labour is a short-term or long-term phenomenon, and whether there is any relationship between poverty (and receipt of social grants) and child labour incidence.

Lastly, it has been six years since the Survey of Activities of Young People was last conducted. It is time for Statistics South Africa to collect the latest data on the state of child labour in the country.

This article is based on a journal article which the writers co-authored with Clinton Herwel (Economics Masters student at the University of the Western Cape).

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Child labour numbers rise in homes where adults are jobless – South African study – https://theconversation.com/child-labour-numbers-rise-in-homes-where-adults-are-jobless-south-african-study-259398

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Salah Ben Hammou, Postdoctoral Research Associate, Rice University

August 2025 makes it five years since Malian soldiers ousted President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta in a coup d’état. While the event reshaped Mali’s domestic politics, it also marked the beginning of a broader wave of military takeovers that swept parts of Africa between 2020 and 2023.

Soldiers have toppled governments in Niger, Burkina Faso (twice), Sudan, Chad, Guinea and Gabon.

The return of military coups shocked many observers. Once thought to be relics of the cold war, an “extinct” form of regime change, coups appeared to be making a comeback.

No new coups have taken place since Gabon’s in 2023, but the ripple effects are far from over. Gabon’s coup leader, Gen. Brice Oligui Nguema, formally assumed the presidency in May 2025. In doing so he broke promises that the military would step aside from politics. In Mali, the ruling junta dissolved all political parties to tighten its grip on power.

Across the affected countries, military rulers remain entrenched. Sudan, for its part, has descended into a devastating civil war following its coup in 2021.

Analysts often cite weak institutions, rising insecurity, and popular frustration with civilian governments to explain coups. While these factors play a role, they don’t capture the patterns we have observed.

I have studied and written on military coups for nearly a decade, especially this coup wave.

After a close analysis of the coup cascade, I conclude that the international community must move beyond the view of coups as isolated events.

Patterns suggest that the Sahelian coups are not isolated. Coup leaders are not only seizing power, they are learning from one another how to entrench authority, sidestep international pressure and craft narratives that legitimise their rule.

To help preserve democratic rule, the international community must confront five lessons revealed by the recent military takeovers.

Key lessons

Contagion: Just a month after Guinea’s military ousted President Alpha Condé, Sudan’s army disrupted its democratic transition. Three months later, Burkina Faso’s officers toppled President Roch Marc Christian Kaboré amid rising insecurity.

Each case had unique triggers, but the timing suggests more than coincidence.

Potential coup leaders watch closely, not just to see if a coup succeeds but what kinds of challenges arise as the event unfolds. When coups fail and plotters face harsh consequences, others are less likely to follow.

Whether coups spread depends on the perceived risks as much as on opportunity. But when coups succeed – especially if new leaders quickly take control and avoid immediate instability – they send a signal that can encourage others to act.

Civilian support matters: Civilian support for coups is real and observed.

Since the start of Africa’s recent coup wave, many commentators have highlighted the cheering crowds that often welcome soldiers, celebrating the fall of unpopular regimes. Civilian support is a common and often underestimated aspect of coup politics. It signals to potential coup plotters that military rule can win legitimacy and public backing.

This popular support also helps coup leaders strengthen their grip on power, shielding their regimes from both domestic opposition and international pressure. For example, following Niger’s 2023 coup, the putschists faced international condemnation and the threat of military intervention. In response, thousands of supporters gathered in the capital, Niamey, to rally around the coup leaders.

In Mali, protesters flooded the streets in 2020 to welcome the military’s ousting of President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta. In Guinea, crowds rallied behind the junta after Alpha Condé was removed in 2021. And in Burkina Faso, both 2022 coups were met with widespread approval.

International responses: The international community’s response sends equally powerful signals. When those responses are weak, delayed, or inconsistent – such as the absence of meaningful sanctions, token aid suspensions, or symbolic suspensions from regional bodies – they can send the message that the illegal seizure of power carries few legitimate consequences.

International responses to recent coups have been mixed. Some, like Niger’s, triggered strong initial reactions, including sanctions and threats of military intervention.

But in Chad, Mahamat Déby’s 2021 takeover was effectively legitimised by key international actors, which portrayed it as a necessary step for stability following the battlefield death of his father, President Idriss Déby, at the hands of rebel forces.

In Guinea and Gabon, regional suspensions were largely symbolic, with little pressure to restore civilian rule. In Mali and Burkina Faso, transitional timelines have been extended repeatedly without much pushback.

The inconsistency signals to coup leaders that seizing power may provoke outrage, but rarely lasting consequences.

Coup leaders learn from one another: Contagion isn’t limited to the moment of takeover. Coup leaders also draw lessons from how others entrench themselves afterwards. They watch to see which tactics succeed in defusing opposition and extending their grip on power.

Entrenched military rule has become the norm across recent coup countries. On average, military rulers have remained in power for nearly 1,000 days since the start of the current wave. Before this wave, military leaders had retained power on average for 22 days since the year 2000.

In Chad, Mahamat Déby secured his grip through a contested 2024 election. Gabon’s Nguema followed in 2025, winning nearly 90% of the vote after constitutional changes cleared the path. In both cases, elections were used to re-brand military regimes as democratic, even as the role of the armed forces remains unchanged.

Connecting the dots

Coup governments across Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have shifted away from western alliances and towards Russia, deepening military and economic ties. All three exited the Economic Community of West African States and formed the Alliance of Sahel States, denouncing regional pressure.

Aligning with Russia offers these regimes external support and a veneer of sovereignty, while legitimising authoritarianism as independence.

The final lesson is clear: when coups are treated as isolated rather than interconnected, it’s likely that more will follow. Would-be plotters are watching how citizens react, how the world responds, and how other coup leaders consolidate power.

When the message they receive is that coups are tolerable, survivable and even rewarded, the deterrent effect weakens.

Poema Sumrow, a Baker Institute researcher, contributed to this article

Salah Ben Hammou does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Coups in west Africa have five things in common: knowing what they are is key to defending democracy – https://theconversation.com/coups-in-west-africa-have-five-things-in-common-knowing-what-they-are-is-key-to-defending-democracy-258890

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Maria S. Floro, Professor Emerita of Economics, American University

The world is witnessing the consequences of climate change: long-lasting changes in temperature and rainfall, and more intense and frequent extreme weather events such as heat waves, hurricanes, typhoons, flooding and drought. All make it harder for families and communities to meet their care needs.

Climate change affects care systems in various ways. First, sudden illnesses and unexpected disabilities heighten the need for care. Second, it reduces access to important inputs for care such as water, food and safe shelter. Third, it can damage physical and social care infrastructures.

It can also lead to breakdowns of traditional units of caregiving such as households and communities. And it creates new situations of need with the increase in displaced person settlements and refugee camps.

Climate change creates sudden spikes in the demand for care, and serious challenges to meeting the growing need for care. All this has immediate and long lasting effects on human well-being.

The size of the current unmet care needs throughout the world is substantial. In childcare alone, about 23% of children worldwide – nearly 350 million – need childcare but do not have it. Families in low- and lower-middle-income countries are the most in need.

Similarly, as the world’s population ages rapidly, only a small proportion of the elderly who need assistance are able to use formal care (in an institution or paid homecare). Most are cared for by family members or other unpaid caregivers. Much of this unpaid care and formal care work is provided by women and girls.

Hundreds of millions of people around the world struggle to get healthcare. Expansion of access to essential health services has slowed compared to pre-2015 . And healthcare costs still create financial hardship.

Without comprehensive public and global support for care provision and the integration of care in the climate agenda, unmet care needs will only grow and inequalities will widen.

Impact

Climate change interacts with human health in complex ways. Its impact is highly uneven across populations. It depends on geographical region, income, education, gender roles, social norms, level of development, and the institutional capacity and accessibility of health systems.

In 2018-22, Africa experienced the biggest increase in the
heat-related mortality rate since 2000-05. This is not surprising as the continent has more frequent health-threatening temperatures than ever before and a growing population of people older than 65.

Africa is also the region most affected by droughts in 2013-22, with 64% of its land area affected by at least one month of extreme drought per year on average. It was followed by Oceania (55% of its land area) and South and Central America (53%).

Scientific evidence also points to increases in health inequalities caused by climate change. The health effects of climate change are not uniformly felt by different population groups.

Exposure, severity of impact, and ability of individuals to recover depend on a variety of factors. Physiological characteristics, income, education, type of occupation, location, social norms and health systems are some of them.

For example, older people and young children face the greatest health risks from high temperatures.

There is also evidence of the disproportionate effect of climate change on the health of people living in poverty and those who belong to disadvantaged groups.

Women of lower social and economic status and with less education are more vulnerable to heat stress compared to women in wealthier households and with higher education or social status. They are exposed to pollution in the absence of clean cooking fuel, and to extreme heat as they walk to gather water and fuel, or do other work outdoors.

Bad sanitation in poor urban areas increases the incidence of water-borne diseases after heavy rains and floods.

Lack of access to healthcare services and the means to pay for medicines make it difficult for women and men in low-income households to recover from illness, heat strokes, and air pollution-related ailments.

Mental health problems are being attributed to climate change as well. Studies show that the loss of family or kin member, home, livelihood and a safe environment can bring about direct emotional impacts.

These adverse impacts increase the demand for caregiving and the care workload. Climate-induced health problems force family and community caregivers, particularly women, to spend more time looking after the sick and disabled, particularly frail elderly people and children.

Effect on food and water

Climate change threatens the availability of food, clean water and safe shelter. It erodes households’ and communities’ care capacity and hence societies’ ability to thrive.

Fluctuations in food supply and rising food prices as a result of environmental disasters, along with the inadequacy of government policies, underscore the mounting challenge of meeting food needs.

The threat of chronic shortage of safe drinking water has also risen. Water scarcity is an area where structural inequalities and gender disparities are laid bare.

Care for the sick and disabled, the young and the elderly is compromised when water is scarce.

Effects on providing care

Extreme weather events disrupt physical care infrastructures. It may be hard to reach hospitals, clinics, daycare centres, nursery schools and nursing homes. Some facilities may be damaged and have to close.

Another type of care system that can break down is family networks and support provided by friends and neighbours. These informal care sharing arrangements are illustrated in a study of the three large informal settlements in Nairobi.

About half (50.5%) of the sampled households reported having had a sick member in the two weeks before the survey. The majority relied on close friends and family members living nearby for care and support.

Studies have shown that climate change eventually leads to livelihood loss and resource scarcity, which can weaken social cohesion and local safety nets in affected communities.

Heightened risks and uncertainty and imminent changes in socio-economic and political conditions can also compel individuals or entire households to migrate. Migration is caused by a host of factors, but it has increasingly been a climate-related response.

The World Bank’s Groundswell Report released in 2018, for example, projected that climate change could force 216 million people to move within their countries by 2050 to avoid the slow-onset impacts of climate change.

A possible consequence of migration is the withdrawal of care support provided by the migrating extended kin, neighbours or friends, increasing the caregiving load of people left behind.

In the case of forced displacements, the traditional social networks existing in communities are disrupted entirely.

What’s needed

There are compelling reasons to believe that meeting care needs can also help mitigate the effects of climate change. And actions to meet carbon-zero goals, prevent biodiversity loss and regenerate ecosystems can reduce the care work burden that falls heavily on families, communities and women.

Any effort to tackle these grave problems should be comprehensive in scope and must be based on principles of equality, universality, and responsibility shared by all.

This article is part of a series of articles initiated through a project led by the Southern Centre for Inequality studies, in collaboration with the International Development Research Centre and a group of feminist economists and climate scientists across the world.

Maria S. Floro does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Climate change is making it harder for people to get the care they need – https://theconversation.com/climate-change-is-making-it-harder-for-people-to-get-the-care-they-need-240557

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Steven Matome Mathetsa, Senior Lecturer at the African Energy Leadership Centre, Wits Business School, University of the Witwatersrand

South Africa’s state-owned electricity company, Eskom, has applied to the National Energy Regulator of South Africa to approve a 36.1% electricity price hike from April 2025, a 11.8% price increase in 2026 and an 9.1% increase in 2027. Steven Mathetsa teaches and researches sustainable energy systems at the University of the Witwatersrand’s African Energy Leadership Centre. He explains some of the problems with the planned tariff increase.

Why such a big hike?

Eskom says the multi-year price increase is because of the need to move closer a cost-reflective tariff that reflects the actual costs of supplying electricity.

However, Eskom’s electricity tariff increases have been exorbitant for several years – an 18% increase in 2023 and a 13% increase in 2024. This is a price increase far above inflation, which is currently at 4.4%.

Some companies have installed their own generation capacity, and individuals have moved to rooftop solar systems. As a result electricity sales have fallen by about 2% , resulting in a drop in revenue.

There’s a knock on effect for municipalities, the biggest distributors of electricity, which have also been forced to hike tariffs in line with Eskom’s increases.

All these costs are passed onto the consumers.

What will the impact be on South Africans?

If the hike is approved it will certainly worsen the economic difficulties facing
South Africa. One of the most unequal countries in the world, South Africa has an extremely high unemployment rate – 33.5%at the last count.

Economic growth is also very slow, at a mere 0.6% in 2023. The cost of living is high.

Exorbitant increases in electricity costs aggravate these problems.

South Africans and businesses in the country have little choice about where they source their energy. Eskom is still the sole supplier for nearly all the country’s electricity needs. This means that ordinary citizens are likely to continue relying on electricity supplied by Eskom, irrespective of the costs.

The high costs affect businesses negatively. Large industrial and small, medium, and micro enterprises have all highlighted that costs associated with utilities, mainly electricity, are affecting their sustainability.

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Read more:
Competition in South Africa’s electricity market: new law paves the way, but it won’t be a smooth ride

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The Electricity Regulation Amendment Act implementation will make major changes to Eskom. The reforms establish an independent Transmission Systems Operator tasked with connecting renewable energy providers to the grid. This will allow the creation of a competitive market where renewable energy providers can sell power to the grid.

But it’s not yet clear if these changes will address the issue of exorbitant electricity price rises.

What are the problems?

The country’s energy frameworks are drafted on the basis of the World Energy Trilemma Index. The index promotes a balanced approach between energy security, affordability, and sustainability. In other words, countries must be able to provide environmentally friendly and reliable electricity that their residents can afford.

South Africa is currently unable to meet these goals because of different energy policies that do not align, a lack of investment in electricity and dependency on coal-fired power. Electricity is increasingly becoming unaffordable in the country. Although there’s been a recent reprieve from power cuts, security of supply is still uncertain.

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Read more:
South Africa’s new energy plan needs a mix of nuclear, gas, renewables and coal – expert

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Furthermore, over 78% of the country’s electricity is produced by burning coal. This means South Africa is also far from attaining its 2015 Paris Agreement greenhouse gas reduction goals.

Compounding this problem is that Eskom is financially unstable – it needed R78 billion from the government in debt relief in 2024. For years, there was a lack of effective maintenance on the aging infrastructure.

The country has made some inroads into improving security of supply. To date, recent interventions have resulted in over 200 days without power cuts. This should be commended. The same focus must be placed on ensuring that electricity remains affordable while giving attention to meeting the goals of the Paris Agreement.

What needs to change?

South Africa’s 1998 Energy Policy White Paper and the new Electricity Regulation Amendment Act promote access to affordable electricity. However, they’ve been implemented very slowly. Affordable electricity needs to be taken seriously.

The question is whether the country’s electricity tariff methodology is flexible enough to accommodate poor South Africans, especially during these challenging economic times.

In my view, it is not. In its current form, vulnerable communities continue to foot the bill for various challenges confronting Eskom, including financial mismanagement, operational inefficiencies, municipal non-payment, and corruption.

I believe the following steps should be taken.

Firstly, South Africa should revise its tariff application methodologies so that consumers, especially unemployed and impoverished people, are protected against exorbitant increases.

Secondly, the National Energy Regulator of South Africa should strengthen its regulations to ensure its compliance and enforcement systems are effective. For example, Eskom should be held accountable when it does not deliver efficient services or mismanages funds, and be transparent about costs associated with its processes. Municipalities should also be held accountable for non-payment and other technical issues they regularly struggle with. Both affect the revenue of the power utility.

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Read more:
South Africa’s economic growth affected by mismatch of electricity supply and demand

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Thirdly, the government must make sure that price increases are affordable and don’t hurt the broader economy. It can do this by adjusting its policies to make sure that increases in electricity tariffs are in line with the rate of inflation.

Fourthly, communities can play a vital role in saving electricity at a household level. This will reduce the country’s overall energy consumption. Furthermore, both small and large businesses should continue to consider alternative energy technologies while implementing energy saving technologies.

Lastly, the level of free-basic electricity is not sufficient for poor households. Subsidy policies should also be reviewed to allow users access to affordable electricity as their financial situation changes negatively.

Steven Matome Mathetsa does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. South Africa’s 36.1% electricity price hike for 2025: why the power utility Eskom’s request is unrealistic – https://theconversation.com/south-africas-36-1-electricity-price-hike-for-2025-why-the-power-utility-eskoms-request-is-unrealistic-240941

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Olasunkanmi Habeeb Okunola, Senior Research Associate, United Nations University – Institute for Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS), United Nations University

Extreme climate events — floods, droughts and heatwaves — are not just becoming more frequent; they are also more severe.

It’s important to understand how communities can recover from these events in ways that also build resilience to future events.

In a recent study, we analysed how communities affected by the extreme flood events of 2021 in Germany’s Ahr Valley and in Lagos, Nigeria, grappled with recovery from floods.

Our aim was to identify the factors – and combinations of factors – that served as barriers (or enablers) to recovery from disasters.

We found that financial limitations, political interests and administrative hurdles led to prioritising immediate relief and reconstruction over long-term sustainable recovery.

In both cases immediate and long-term recovery efforts were siloed, underfunded and focused on reconstruction to pre-disaster conditions.

We concluded from our findings that the success of recovery efforts lies in balancing short-term relief and a long-term vision. While immediate aid is essential after a disaster, true resilience hinges on proactive measures that address systemic challenges and empower communities to build a better future.

Recovery should not be merely action-oriented and building back infrastructure (engineering). It should also include insights in other areas, like governance and psychology, helping people to deal with losses and to heal.

What worked

To understand the recovery pathways of the two regions, we reviewed relevant literature, newspaper articles and government documents. We also interviewed government agencies, NGO representatives, volunteers and local residents in the communities where these floods occurred.

We found that in the Ahr Valley, recovery wasn’t just about rebuilding structures, it was about empowering individuals.

Through initiatives like mental health and first aid courses, residents learned to support one another. This fostered a sense of community and resilience that was essential for meeting the emotional challenges posed by the disaster.

The focus on rebuilding with a sustainable vision also included environmental initiatives. For example, a type of heating system was put in place that didn’t rely on fossil fuels.

Not only did this reduce carbon emissions, it also served as a symbol of hope. It showed there was an opportunity to create a more sustainable and environmentally friendly community.

In Lagos, too, residents found strength in community and innovation. Grassroots efforts using sustainable materials like bamboo and palm wood highlighted the ingenuity and resourcefulness of the people. Faith-based organisations provided material aid as well as emotional and spiritual support. This reinforced the bonds that held the community together.

Each community faced unique challenges. But they shared a common thread: the importance of adaptive governance – flexible decision-making and strong community ties.

For example, established building codes in the Ahr Valley provided a framework for reconstruction, ensuring that new structures were resilient and safe.

In Lagos, the absence of strong government support highlighted the critical role of community organisations in providing services and fostering a sense of shared responsibility.

What needs improvment

In both the Ahr Valley and Lagos, the journey towards recovery has been fraught with obstacles as well.

In the Ahr Valley, bureaucratic red tape has become a formidable barrier. Residents, eager to rebuild their lives, find themselves entangled in a complex web of regulations and lengthy approval processes. This has delayed their access to insurance and recovery funds. Waiting for months or even years has eroded hope and fuelled a sense of abandonment.

Meanwhile, in Lagos, insufficient government support has left communities to fend for themselves, creating a breeding ground for uncertainty and conflict.

Land tenure disputes, fuelled by a lack of clear property rights, sow seeds of distrust and hinder resettlement efforts. Political disagreements complicate the picture, as competing interests divert attention and resources away from those who need them most.

In Lagos, none of the respondents reported having insurance to help them to recover from disaster-related losses.

While some residents in the Ahr Valley did have insurance, many were under-insured.

The Ahr Valley’s building codes offer a framework for reconstruction. But it’s clear that processes should be streamlined so communities can take ownership of their recovery.

In Lagos, the importance of robust social safety nets is clear. Partnerships between communities and authorities are also needed.

A different approach

Recovery isn’t a separate process that occurs after disasters only. It should be seen as an essential part of managing risks. It’s important to understand what recovery involves and what resources are needed.

This will help reduce future risks and increase resilience after extreme events.

Governments should encourage flexible governance structures that value community voices and local knowledge to enable recovery. A good example is the New Orleans Recovery Authority, established after Hurricane Katrina. It involved local residents and city officials in planning and rebuilding efforts.

Grassroots efforts in Lagos demonstrated the power of sustainable materials and community-led initiatives. Seeing things from the community’s point of view can help tailor solutions that fit the situation and adapt to evolving challenges.

Training and capacity-building programmes empower communities to be active in their own recovery.

Mental health and first aid courses were successful in the Ahr Valley. Equipping individuals with skills in sustainable practices and disaster preparedness helps weave a social fabric capable of weathering future storms.

Olasunkanmi Habeeb Okunola is a Visiting Scientist at, the United Nations University – Institute for Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS)

Saskia E. Werners works with United Nations University, Institute for Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS). She is grateful to have received research grants in support of her research on climate change adaptation and recovery.

– ref. Post-flood recovery: lessons from Germany and Nigeria on how to help people cope with loss and build resilience – https://theconversation.com/post-flood-recovery-lessons-from-germany-and-nigeria-on-how-to-help-people-cope-with-loss-and-build-resilience-240260