Source: The Conversation – France – By Frédéric Sawicki, professeur de science politique, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne
French Prime Minister François Bayrou on Monday failed to win a confidence vote in parliament (194 votes in favour, 364 against) and has submitted his resignation to President Emmanuel Macron, who will have to appoint a new head of government or dissolve the National Assembly. How may the result of the vote be interpreted? What are the possible scenarios for a way out of the crisis? An interview with political scientist Frédéric Sawicki.
The Conversation: François Bayrou has resigned. What is your assessment of his actions and methods leading up to the vote?
Frédéric Sawicki: How can we understand such a fiasco? How can we understand this political suicide, which is a vote of confidence chosen by the prime minister when he does not have a majority?
By refusing to engage in negotiations since his nomination that could have led to some kind of governing agreement, particularly with the Socialist Party, Bayrou has deprived himself of any chance of political survival. This is a paradox for this Christian democrat who, throughout his political career, has constantly called for the right-left divide to be overcome. Remember that, to this end, in 2002 he refused to join the UMP, then France’s largest centre-right party (which was later rebranded Les Républicains or LR), and called for a vote for Socialist and former president François Hollande in 2012 and a search for compromise.
His leadership as prime minister has also been marked by a series of failures and blunders that have only served to widen the gap with the left, starting with the disastrous handling of the revelations concerning Bétharram, an episode during which Bayrou struggled to clarify his role but, above all, showed little compassion for the victims, appearing to be a man from another era. (Editor’s note: a French parliamentary inquiry found that students at Notre-Dame de Bétharram school had been victims of “physical and sexual violence”, including during a period when Bayrou, some of whose children had attended the school, served as French education minister in the 1990s.) Previously, in January, there was a total omission of climate and environmental issues in his general policy statement, followed by the use of the expression submersion migratoire “migrant flooding”, two strong signals sent to the right and the far right. If these political forces could applaud the adoption of the Duplomb law in unison with the National Federation of Farmers’ Unions (FNSEA), the Socialist Party and the large French trade union CFDT could only note that they had been duped after the failure of the “conclave” on pensions last June.
Finally, after humiliating the left in this way, the prime minister delivered the coup de grâce by announcing a €44 billion austerity plan, mainly borne by employees and pensioners, with the grotesque measure of eliminating two public holidays, which has definitively alienated the National Rally (Rassemblement National or RN), the far-right party with 120 members in the National Assembly.
Beyond Bayrou himself, what are the structural causes of this failure?
F. S.: We must look at Bayrou’s individual responsibility in context, despite his blunders.
The primary reason for this failure lies in the president’s decision to disregard the new balance of power within the National Assembly elected in July 2024. This, it should be remembered, should have led to the appointment of a prime minister from the New Popular Front, even if this government failed and the president then appointed another prime minister. Instead, Emmanuel Macron chose to rely on the Les Républicains (LR) group and its 48 MPs, who had been in opposition until then, by appointing Michel Barnier. In December, Macron did not even pretend to acknowledge his defeat by appointing Bayrou, who, with the MoDem group (36 MPs), has been part of his majority since 2017.
To have had any chance of succeeding, Bayrou and Barnier would have needed to broaden their support beyond their parties and the central bloc. If France were a “classic” parliamentary democracy, there would surely have been extensive negotiations between the parties willing to participate in the government. These negotiations would undoubtedly have taken several weeks, but they would have ensured a degree of stability around a few compromise measures. By appointing a prime minister of his choosing, interfering in the composition of the government and leaving it to them to cobble together a balancing strategy (one move to the left, two or three moves to the right and to the far right), Macron condemned it to failure.
Much criticism has been levelled at the political parties’ lack of a culture of compromise. Is this lack also a reason for this failure?
F. S.: Indeed, but it is less the culture than our institutions that do not encourage actors to act responsibly. The presidential election is always seen as the decisive moment for setting a new course for the next five years. As a result, agreeing to compromises has meant risking being “burned” at the next presidential election. This explains, for example, the attitude of LR in 2022, when it refused to join the majority even though Macron’s programme was largely in line with its own.
Hyper-“presidentialisation” prevents compromise. The freedom given to the president to appoint the prime minister without fully taking into account the results of the vote, as well as the president’s intrusion into government policy even when disavowed by the ballot box, illustrate the perversion of our institutions. They guarantee Macron’s total irresponsibility. Even if voices are beginning to be heard calling for his resignation or impeachment, nothing obliges him to act. The flip side of this irresponsibility is that it creates equally irresponsible parties: they pass the buck back to the president, it’s up to him to find the answers, and see you at the next presidential election!
Finally, the two-round majority voting system for electing MPs does not encourage parties to seek compromise either. On the one hand, the moderate left must join forces with the radical left in order to win seats, while on the other, the right is facing increasing competition from the far right in many constituencies.
What solutions could break this deadlock?
F. S.: I advocate for a proportional voting system that would make political parties and parliamentarians more accountable. Our excessively presidential system and the two-round majority vote not only fail to provide adequate representation of the diversity of political ideas and social interests, but they also no longer produce clear majorities. There are sociological, political and ideological divisions that fracture the country far beyond the old left-right divide. Bipolarisation is not about to happen again, and this is true for many countries today.
Today, these various divisions are not properly reflected in the National Assembly because French citizens are often forced to vote to eliminate one party or another. Proportional representation, on the other hand, encourages people to vote for the programme they feel closest to. It prevents any single party from governing alone and makes it easier for politicians to negotiate policy directions.
But will reforming the legislative election system be enough? Isn’t one of the challenges also to reduce the power of the president?
F. S.: Indeed, there are undoubtedly other projects to be undertaken. Some believe that we should return to a single seven-year term for the president. Others think that the president should no longer have the power to appoint the prime minister, making a vote of confidence by the National Assembly mandatory, as was the case in France’s Third and Fourth Republics. Others would like to develop shared-initiative referendums or citizen-initiated referendums. All of this will have to be discussed during the next presidential election, but in the immediate term, in order to put the Fifth Republic back on a more democratic track and break the current deadlock, proportional representation seems to me to be the first reform to consider. Political scientist Bastien François has proposed a referendum on proportional representation followed by a dissolution that would allow a new assembly to be elected. This reform could also be seen as a bargaining chip in negotiations to form a future government between the centre and the left.
What options are available to Macron today?
F. S.: Macron can now dissolve the Assembly, but this would be a risky move: it would cause his camp to lose votes. Furthermore, in a volatile social climate – with the Bloquons tout movement – dissolution could amplify the vote against the president.
Second scenario: Macron continues along the same lines, hoping that a prime minister from his camp will push the budget through using Article 49.3, even if it means dissolving parliament afterwards. But the National Rally no longer seems willing to play the neutrality game, and the Socialists are unlikely to be any more lenient. This choice would therefore amount to taking a step back in order to take a bigger leap, and would most likely lead to a new vote of no confidence in a few weeks’ time, depriving France of a budget.
Third scenario: Macron gives Olivier Faure, the leader of the Socialist Party, or a left-wing prime minister a chance. It seems to me that this would be the only rational decision to avoid dissolution. The Socialists could push through a few left-wing reforms such as the Zucman tax on ultra-rich individuals, measures that take into account the hardship of retirement, and even measures in favour of hospitals and education, which are widely supported by the French. This would undoubtedly be difficult for Macron to swallow, but he can always hope that the Constitutional Council will prohibit the Zucman tax or that the hard-left party La France insoumise (LFI or France Unbowed), will torpedo the Socialist Party. He could also try to divide the Socialists by proposing a former member of their party, such as Bernard Cazeneuve, for prime minister, but the Socialists seem more united today than they were last December – when the Barnier government collapsed and Bayrou was picked to replace him – and are likely to reject this manoeuvre.
If there is a dissolution, is the National Rally getting closer and closer to power?
F. S.: One might think that the main victims of a dissolution would be the MPs from the presidential camp. For the moment, the left seems to be holding its own in the polls. The National Rally is also holding steady, with around a third of the vote. The question is, what will the parties do? Will Les Républicains definitively shift toward an alliance with the National Rally? Will the left go into these elections united (as in 2022 and 2024), or divided? Will some voters, disappointed with Macronism, turn to the Socialists, who are ultimately considered more responsible and reasonable? It is difficult to predict the current balance of power, as measured by polls, in a context of a two-round majority election and with so many uncertainties.
Interview by David Bornstein.
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Frédéric Sawicki ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.
– ref. Why France’s government collapsed (again), and what Macron might do next – https://theconversation.com/why-frances-government-collapsed-again-and-what-macron-might-do-next-264940
