Category: Academic Reportage

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Karen Hofman, Professor and Programme Director, SA MRC Centre for Health Economics and Decision Science – PRICELESS SA (Priority Cost Effective Lessons in Systems Strengthening South Africa), University of the Witwatersrand

By 2030, non-communicable diseases will account for 75% of all deaths annually. Eighty percent of these will be in the global south. Most of these diseases are what we call silent killers: type 2 diabetes, high blood pressure and heart disease, as well as certain types of cancer at increasingly younger ages.

The consumption of sugary drinks and processed foods high in sugar, salt and saturated fats is fuelling these pandemics. And increasingly advertising is being seen as the means by which the consumption of unhealthy products is promoted. This translates into the growth of non-communicable diseases in populations across the globe. This rising threat is driven largely by the way in which markets and industries are organised, which, in turn, shapes social norms towards consumption of tobacco, alcohol, food and sugary beverages.

This process is what’s known as commercial determinants of health.

Products that top the list in terms of their risk to health are tobacco, sugary beverages, ultra processed food and alcohol.

These products are heavily advertised. For example, in South Africa from 2013 to 2019, sugary beverage manufacturers spent US$191 million (R3.7 billion) to advertise their products. Many of the TV advertisements for sugary drinks were placed during child and family viewing time, between 3pm and 7pm.

Over the past decade a number of countries have introduced policies in a bid to limit the use and intake of harmful food and beverages. These have ranged from taxes on certain products, such as sugar, alcohol and tobacco, to bans on advertising. Many have proved effective. But there are still big gaps in policies to control these harmful products.

As academics who have researched this field for three decades we believe that the G20 can play a significant role in plugging these gaps. The countries under the G20 umbrella, which represent two thirds of the world’s population, have reason to act: all are experiencing a mounting burden of obesity-related illness such as diabetes, high blood pressure and cancer at ever-younger ages.

One of South Africa’s G20 presidency health priorities is “stemming the tide of non-communicable diseases”. In our view this is an invitation for the G20 to pledge to combat the drivers of non-communicable diseases.

The G20 can acknowledge that these diseases are part of a pathological system in which commercial actors are causing ill health. And G20 leaders can acknowledge that progress enacting health taxes has stagnated in most countries.

By galvanising attention in this way, the G20 can give impetus to a high level United Nations meeting in 2025 at which a new vision for the control and prevention of non-communicable diseases is due to be set. Health taxes and bans on marketing are focus areas.

What stands in the way of progress

Efforts by various countries to curb consumption of these harmful products have shown one thing clearly: there’s no silver bullet.

Nevertheless, evidence shows that consumers are responsive to price. This points to the fact that taxes are a key tool for decreasing demand, especially for young consumers.

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Read more:
Sugary drinks are a killer: a 20% tax would save lives and rands in South Africa

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There is also mounting evidence that health taxes are progressive for health at a population level – in other words they lead to better health outcomes. Research also shows that they scarcely affect overall employment, if at all.

But advances on alcohol and tobacco taxes are slow. And there has been little progress on taxes on sugary beverages.

These taxes remain far too low because health promotion taxes face tough resistance from industry. When any health promotion taxes are proposed, industries deny harms, promote doubt, divert attention, spread disinformation, create front organisations, and varnish their reputations through corporate social responsibility initiatives.

When taxes do proceed through the legislative or regulatory process, industries influence proposals to make them less effective. They also offer to replace legislation with voluntary commitments. Evidence shows that voluntary commitments do not work.

What would be gained

In 2024, a report by a panel of experts showed that US$3.7 trillion in additional revenue could be generated over five years if all countries increased prices of tobacco, alcohol and sugary beverages by 50%.

This money is sorely needed to boost healthcare. Non-communicable diseases disproportionately affect the most poor and vulnerable and healthcare systems are increasingly unable to cope. Screening, diagnosis, medications and treatment are very expensive for both ministries of finance and at the household level, where health needs can result in catastrophic expenditure.

And taxes that generate a 50% increase in real prices of tobacco, alcohol and sugary beverages would save 50 million lives globally over 50 years.

Where to begin

We believe the G20 platform is a sound one on which to champion efforts to curb the consumption of harmful products. This is because half of the countries in the group have one or two policies for food such as taxes on sweetened beverages. Their experiences can therefore inform debates about how to protect the public from the fatal effects of diet-influenced diseases.

But building a solid foundation won’t be easy. What’s needed is for the G20 to put its weight behind these key points:

• Promoting good health before people get sick should be an imperative because the cost of inaction in financial and human terms is just too high.

• Promoting the case for raising tobacco taxes, because tobacco continues to cause the most death and illness. But taxation has stalled. Approximately 90% of smokers live in countries where cigarettes were equally or more affordable in 2022 than they were five years earlier.

• A renewed focus on alcohol taxes, which have shown little improvement in the last decade. Alcohol excise taxes are not being used effectively.

• Fresh impetus behind increasing the level of taxes as a percentage of the cost of sugar sweetened beverages. Evidence suggests that to be effective, taxes on sugar sweetened beverages should increase product prices by at least 20%.

• Champion nutrition regulation when navigating the trade and nutrition policy environment. Trade policies can be inconsistent with health policies.

• Lastly, push for stronger global monitoring frameworks to track corporate accountability in health. This should include clear conflict of interest policies, information management, and exposing when corporations try to shape their own evidence-base or discredit research that would be supportive of public health policies.

Susan Goldstein receives funding from the SAMRC, the NIHR and UNICEF. She is a Board Member of the Southern African Alcohol Policy Alliance: South Africa,

Karen Hofman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Sugary drinks, processed foods, alcohol and tobacco are big killers: why the G20 should add its weight to health taxes – https://theconversation.com/sugary-drinks-processed-foods-alcohol-and-tobacco-are-big-killers-why-the-g20-should-add-its-weight-to-health-taxes-256024

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Johann Kirsten, Director of the Bureau for Economic Research, Stellenbosch University

When world leaders engage, the assumption is always that they engage on issues based on verified facts, which their administrative staff are supposed to prepare. Under this assumption, we thought the meeting at the White House on 21 May between South Africa’s president, Cyril Ramaphosa, and US president Donald Trump would follow this pattern.

Disappointingly, the televised meeting was horrifying to watch as it was based on misrepresenting the reality of life in South Africa.

Issues of agriculture, farming and land (and rural crime) were central to the discussions. What is clear to us as agricultural economists is that the skewed views expressed by Trump about these issues originate in South Africa. This includes Trump’s statement: “But Blacks are not farmers.”

In our work as agricultural economists, we have, in many pieces and books (our latest titled The Uncomfortable Truth about South Africa’s Agriculture), tried to present South Africans with the real facts about the political economy policy reforms and structural dimensions of South African agriculture.

Writing on these matters was necessary given that official data – agricultural census 2017, as well as the official land audit of 2017 – all provide an incomplete picture of the real state and structure of South African agriculture. The reason is that the agricultural census, which is supposed to provide a comprehensive and inclusive assessment of the size and structure of the primary agricultural sector, and the land audit, which was supposed to record the ownership of all land in South Africa, are incomplete in their coverage.

The incomplete and inaccurate official data provides fertile ground for radical statements by the left and the right – and novices on social media. This is why South Africa has to deal with falsehoods coming from the US. These include Trump’s statement that black people are not farmers in South Africa.

South Africa is to blame for providing inaccurate data to feed these false narratives.

The facts presented here should allow a more nuanced interpretation of South Africa’s farm structure. Firstly, there are more black farmers in South Africa than white farmers. And not all white commercial farm operations are “large-scale”, and not all black farmers are “small-scale”, “subsistence” or “emerging”. Most farm operations can be classified as micro, or small in scale.

This is important so that one doesn’t view South Africa’s agriculture as mainly white farmers. Indeed, we are a country of two agricultures with black farmers mainly at small scale and accounting for roughly 10% of the commercial agricultural output. Still, this doesn’t mean they are not active in the sector. They mainly still require support to expand and increase output, but they are active.

The facts

In the wake of the circus in the Oval Office, we were amazed by the total silence of the many farmers’ organisations in South Africa. We have not seen one coming out to reject all of Trump’s claims. The only thing we can deduce from this is that these falsehoods suit the political position of some farmer organisations. But at what cost? Will many of their members be harmed by trade sanctions or tariffs against South Africa? The US is an important market for South Africa’s agriculture, accounting for 4% of the US$13.7 billion exports in 2024.

When Ramaphosa highlighted the fact that crime, and rural crime in particular, has an impact on all South Africans and that more black people than white people are being killed, Trump’s response was disturbing, to say the least: “But Blacks are not farmers”. This requires an immediate fact check.

We returned to the text from our chapter in the Handbook on the South African Economy we jointly prepared in 2021. In the extract below, we discuss the real numbers of farmers in South Africa and try to provide a sensible racial classification of farmers to denounce Trump’s silly statement.

As highlighted earlier, the two latest agricultural censuses (2007 and 2017) are incomplete as they restricted the sample frame to farm businesses registered to pay value added tax. Only firms with a turnover of one million rands (US$55,500) qualify for VAT registration.

We were able to expand the findings from the censuses with numbers from the 2011 population census and the 2016 community survey to better understand the total number of commercial farming units in South Africa. The Community Survey 2016 is a large-scale survey that happened between Censuses 2011 and 2021. The main objective was to provide population and household statistics at municipal level to government and the private sector, to support planning and decision-making.

Data from the 2011 population census (extracted from three agricultural questions included in the census) shows that 2,879,638 households out of South Africa’s total population, or 19.9% of all households, were active in agriculture for subsistence or commercial purposes.

Only 2% of these active households reported an annual income derived from agriculture above R307,000 (US$17,000). This translates into 57,592 households that can be considered commercial farmers, with agriculture as the main or only source of household income. This corresponds in some way with the 40,122 farming businesses that are registered for VAT as noted in the 2017 agricultural census report.

If we use the numbers from the agricultural census it is evident almost 90% of all VAT-registered commercial farming businesses could be classified as micro or small-scale enterprises. If the farm businesses excluded from the census are accounted for under the assumption that they are too small for VAT registration, then the fact still stands that the vast majority of all farm enterprises in South Africa are small family farms.

There are, however, 2,610 large farms (with turnover exceeding R22.5 million (US$1.2 million per annum) which are responsible for 67% of farm income and employed more than half the agricultural labour force of 757,000 farm workers in 2017.

Another way to get to farm numbers is to use the 2016 Community Survey. Using the shares as shown in Table 2, we estimate there are 242,221 commercial farming households in South Africa, of which only 43,891 (18%) are white commercial farmers. (This is very much in line with the VAT registered farmers but also acknowledging the fact that many white farm businesses are not necessarily registered for VAT.)

Let’s consider only the agricultural households with agriculture as their main source of income, surveyed in the 2016 community survey. We end up with a total of 132,700 households, of whom 93,000 (70%) are black farmers. This reality is something that policy makers and farm organisations find very difficult to deal with and it seems that Trump also found this too good to be true.

We have tried here in a long winded way to deal with farm numbers and how to get to a race classification of farmers in South Africa. In the end we trust that we have managed to show that there are more black farmers in South Africa than white farmers. Their share in total output is smaller than that of their white counterparts. The National Agricultural Marketing Council puts black farmers’ share of agricultural production as roughly 10%. But these numbers are also incomplete and largely an undercount.

It will always be challenging to get to the real number of black farmers’ share of agricultural output as nobody would ever know whether the potato or the cabbage on the shelf came from a farm owned by a black farmer or a white person but operated by a black farmer, for example. As South Africans know, the labour on farms, in pack houses, distribution systems and retail are all black. So, the sweat and hard work of black South African workers are integral to the food supply chain in South Africa.

Let’s get these facts straight and promote them honestly.

Wandile Sihlobo is the Chief Economist of the Agricultural Business Chamber of South Africa (Agbiz) and a member of the Presidential Economic Advisory Council (PEAC).

Johann Kirsten does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Most South African farmers are black: why Trump got it so wrong – https://theconversation.com/most-south-african-farmers-are-black-why-trump-got-it-so-wrong-257668

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Amani Karisa, Associate Research Scientist, African Population and Health Research Center

Kenya has long recognised the rights of persons with disabilities in law. The 2010 constitution guarantees access, dignity and inclusion for people living with disabilities.

Two years earlier in 2008, Kenya ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. And Kenya’s 2003 Persons with Disabilities Act formed the legal foundation for promoting the rights and welfare of persons with disabilities.

But these legal promises remain largely aspirational. Their provisions are rarely translated into everyday realities. Many Kenyans with disabilities still face stigma, inaccessible environments, unequal education opportunities and limited access to employment.

Many schools remain exclusionary due to inaccessible physical infrastructure. This includes classrooms and latrines that lack ramps or hinder mobility for children with disabilities.

Public transport is often unusable for wheelchair users.

Employers continue to overlook applicants with disabilities. Between 2019 and 2023, for instance, persons with disabilities faced higher unemployment rates at around 10.4% against a national average of 5.2%.

The fact that there are disputes over the number of Kenyans with disabilities is also telling. The 2019 census recorded 2.2% of the population – fewer than 1 million people – as having disabilities. This is far below the World Report on Disability’s estimates of an average of around 15%. This undercount reflects both cultural stigma and systemic gaps in how disability is understood and reported.

As someone who has spent more than a decade researching disability in Kenya, I have seen how the promise of rights is often undercut by structural and social barriers. This has come through in my own research and that of others.

The persistent failure to translate rights into tangible outcomes for persons with disabilities created urgency for change.

The Kenyan government has finally acted. In May 2025, the country’s parliament passed the Persons with Disabilities Act 2025.

The new law expands the definition of disability to encompass a broader range of impairments. This ensures more individuals are recognised and protected under the law. The law also mandates accessibility across sectors such as education, employment, healthcare and public services, requiring reasonable accommodations and prohibiting discrimination.

In my view, the new law reflects a broader move from symbolic recognition to legal obligation. But passing a law is just the beginning. Implementation will be the real test.

What’s been missing

In my research, and that of others, the question of why the 2003 law did little to shift everyday exclusion has been addressed. A few things were apparent.

First, employment quotas were suggested but never enforced. Discrimination in hiring and promotions was prohibited in theory, but was common in practice.

Second, there has been little support for caregivers.

Third, there was minimal access to assistive technologies (which are tools designed to help persons with disabilities perform tasks and improve their quality of life, such as mobility aids, communication devices and adaptive software).

Fourth, children with disabilities in Kenya have faced significant barriers to education. Their enrolment and completion rates are consistently lower than those of their non-disabled peers.

Rather than disability being the problem, it is the lack of accommodation, inclusive policies and public understanding that creates exclusion. This is a core insight of the social model of disability, which views disability as arising from the interaction between individuals and an unaccommodating society. This perspective explains that people are disabled not by their bodies but by barriers in society – like stairs without ramps or employers who won’t adapt.

What the new law promises

Some key changes in the new law stand out:

• Workplace inclusion: public bodies must now ensure that at least 5% of jobs are held by persons with disabilities. This provision, although previously suggested, now comes with clearer oversight requirements. Private employers are both mandated and incentivised to create inclusive workplaces. Reasonable accommodations, such as accessible workstations or flexible hours, can be counted as deductible expenses.

• Access to public services and spaces: the law requires that buildings, roads and services be made accessible. Hospitals must have trained sign language interpreters. Schools must adapt their admission criteria, curricula and facilities to include learners with disabilities. These requirements signal a move away from treating accessibility as optional or charitable.

• Tax relief and registration reforms: caregivers can now qualify for tax exemptions. Additionally, persons with long-term disabilities now receive permanent registration, ending the need for repeated reassessments – a process many found tedious, involving hospital visits, missing forms, long delays and limited assessment centres.

• Stronger institutional framework: the National Council for Persons with Disabilities has been given more robust powers, including enforcement, monitoring and management of disability-related funding. The law also recommends the use of affirming and respectful language in public communication – a subtle but essential step in reducing stigma.

The law incorporates disability considerations into sector-specific practices. For example, the law requires justice sector actors to consider disability when arresting, detaining or trying someone.

What needs to happen now

The government must act swiftly to implement supporting regulations. Funding is needed to retrofit public buildings, hire staff to support individuals with disabilities, and subsidise assistive devices. Without proper budgeting, the law risks becoming another unfulfilled promise.

Employers and institutions must do more than comply: they must transform their attitudes. Disability inclusion should be built into human resources practices, school policies and service design. Training will be key.

Public awareness must improve. Many Kenyans still see disability through a medical or charitable lens. There need to be national campaigns on radio, TV and social media that shift public understanding toward inclusion and equality.

Finally, persons with disabilities must be central to the law’s implementation. Inclusion must be driven by those who live the reality of exclusion. Their insights are essential to making services responsive and respectful.

The 2025 Act is an important step. But if it is not backed by funding, political will and public education, its potential will remain unrealised.

The real question is not whether the law is good enough, but whether Kenya’s institutions, communities and leaders are prepared to make it work for those it was designed to serve.

Amani Karisa works for the African Population and Health Research Center. He receives funding from Gates Foundation and Echidna Giving.

– ref. Kenya has a bold new disability law: now to make it work – https://theconversation.com/kenya-has-a-bold-new-disability-law-now-to-make-it-work-256646

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Jackson K. Njau, Associate professor, Indiana University

The ancestors of humans started making tools about 3.3 million years ago. First they made them out of stone, then they switched to bone as a raw material. Until recently, the earliest clear evidence of bone tool making was from sites in Europe, dated to 400,000 years ago. But archaeologists have now found and dated bone tools in Tanzania that are a million years older.

The tools are made from the bones of large animals like hippos and elephants, and have been deliberately shaped to make them useful for butchering large carcasses.

The discovery of bone implements that are the oldest ever found, by far, casts light on human evolution. It shows that our hominin ancestors were able to think about and make this technology a lot earlier than anyone realised.

I am a scientist who co-directs a multidisciplinary research project team at the Olduvai Gorge in Tanzania, focusing on hominin evolution. Our project’s main goal has been to investigate the changes in hominin technology and behaviour that happened between 1.66 million and 1.4 million years ago.

We’re interested in this time period because it marks a pivotal change in human technology, from the rudimentary stone knives and cores of the Oldowan culture to the more advanced crafted stone handaxes of the Acheulean culture.

We found the Olduvai bone tools in 2018 and recently described them in the journal Nature. They show that by 1.5 million years ago, our ancestors (Homo erectus) had already developed the cognitive abilities required to transfer skills from making stone tools to making bone tools.

This leap in human history was a game-changer because it allowed early hominins to overcome survival challenges in landscapes where suitable stone materials were scarce.

Tools at Olduvai

Olduvai Gorge is a Unesco World Heritage site. It became well known in 1959 through the pioneering work of palaeontologists Louis and Mary Leakey, whose discoveries of early human remains reshaped our understanding of human evolution. The site offers an unparalleled window into human history, spanning nearly 2 million years.

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Read more:
Finds in Tanzania’s Olduvai Gorge reveal how ancient humans adapted to change

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Aside from fossilised bones, it has yielded the most detailed record of stone tool cultures in the world. It has documented the evolution from the simple chopping tools and stone knives of the Oldowan industry (about 2 million years ago) to the more advanced Acheulean tools (1.7 million years ago), such as handaxes, cleavers, picks and spheroids and then on – through arrowheads, points and blades (about 200,000 years ago) to the micro-blades of the Later Stone Age (about 17,000 years ago).

All these tools provide a glimpse into the ingenuity and cultural advancements of our early ancestors.

And now the picture has new detail.

Our team uncovered 27 ancient bone tools during excavations at the T69 Complex, FLK West site at Olduvai. We know how old they are because we found them securely embedded underground where they had been left 1.5 million years ago, along with thousands of stone artefacts and fossilised bones. We dated them using geochronological techniques.

Unlike stone, bone shafts crack and break in a way that allows the systematic production of elongated, well-shaped artifacts. Flaking them by hitting them with another object – a process called knapping – results in pointed tools that would be ideal for butchering, chopping and other tasks.

The knapped tools we found were made from large shaft fragments that came from the limb bones of elephants and hippos, and were found at hippo butchery sites. Hominins likely brought elephant bones to the site on a regular basis, and obtained limb bones from butchered hippos at the site itself.

What Homo erectus knew

The find shows that 1.5 million years ago, Homo erectus could apply knapping skills to bone. Homo erectus, regarded as the evolutionary successor to the smaller-brained Homo habilis, left a lasting imprint on history. Its fossils, found at Olduvai, offer a glimpse into a span of about a million years, stretching from 1.5 million to roughly 500,000 years ago.

Now we know that these hominins not only understood the physical properties of bones but also knew about skeletal anatomy. They could identify and select bones suitable for flaking. And they knew which animals had skeletons large enough to craft reliable tools after the animals’ death.

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Read more:
Large mammals shaped the evolution of humans: here’s why it happened in Africa

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We don’t know exactly why they chose bones as a raw material. It may have been that suitable stone material was scarce, or they recognised that bones provided a better grip and were more durable.

Why haven’t such old bone tools been found before? The answer is likely that they are destroyed by weathering, abrasion from water transport, trampling and scavenger activity. Organic materials don’t always get time to fossilise. Also, analysts were not used to looking for bone tools among fossils.

This discovery will likely encourage researchers to pay closer attention to the subtle signs of bone knapping in fossil assemblages. This way we will learn more about the evolution of human technology and behaviour.

Jackson K. Njau does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. 1.5 million-year-old bone tools discovered in Tanzania rewrite the history of human evolution – https://theconversation.com/1-5-million-year-old-bone-tools-discovered-in-tanzania-rewrite-the-history-of-human-evolution-251826

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Charles Helm, Research Associate, African Centre for Coastal Palaeoscience, Nelson Mandela University

“The art of tracking may well be the origin of science.” This is the departure point for a 2013 book by Louis Liebenberg, co-founder of an organisation devoted to environmental monitoring.

The connection between tracking in nature, as people have done since prehistory, and “western” science is of special interest to us as ichnologists. (Ichnology is the study of tracks and traces.) We learned our skills relatively late in life. But imagine if we had learned as children and if, as adults, we tracked as if our lives depended on it? What additional visual and cognitive talents would we bring to our field work as scientists?

Our mission is to find and document the fossilised tracks and traces of creatures that existed during part of the Pleistocene Epoch, between 35,000 and 400,000 years ago, on the Cape coast of South Africa. Since 2008, through the Cape South Coast Ichnology project, based in the African Centre for Coastal Palaeoscience at Nelson Mandela University, more than 370 vertebrate tracksites have been identified. They have substantially complemented the traditional record of body fossils. Examples include trackways of giant tortoises and giraffe.

Given the challenges inherent in identifying such tracks, we wondered how hunters who’ve been tracking all their lives would view our work, and how age-old indigenous expertise might align with our approach.

Fortunately we could call on experts with these skills in southern Africa. The Ju/’hoansi (pronounced “Juun-kwasi”) San people of north-eastern Namibia are perhaps the last of southern Africa’s indigenous inhabitants who retain the full suite of their ancient environmental skills. The Nyae Nyae conservancy in which they live gives them access to at least some of their historical land with its remaining wildlife. They still engage in subsistence hunting with bow and poisoned arrow and gather food that’s growing wild.

A handful among them have been recognised as Indigenous Master Tracker, a title created by Liebenberg’s CyberTracker initiative in recognition of their top-flight hunter-gatherer status. And so, late in 2023, the Master Trackers #oma (“Komma”) Daqm and /uce (“Tchu-shey”) Nǂamce arrived in Cape Town.

We were not the first to think along these lines. Ju/’hoansi Master Trackers have assisted scientists in the interpretation of hominin tracksites in French caves, and prehistoric tracks in the rock art record in Namibia. However, we knew that our often poorly preserved tracksites in aeolianites (cemented dunes) might present a stiffer challenge.

Our purpose was to compare our own interpretations of fossil trackways with those of the Master Trackers, and possibly find some we had overlooked. As we’ve set out in a recently published paper with the Ju/’hoansi trackers and our colleague Jan De Vynck as co-authors, they did exactly this, confirming the first fossil hyena trackway ever to be found.

Swapping techniques

The Late Pleistocene is not that far distant from the present (a mere 125,000 years), and many of the species that made tracks on the Cape south coast then are still with us. Some are extinct but have recognisable tracks, like the giant long-horned buffalo and giant Cape zebra.

We knew, though, that tracking in Kalahari sand, like the Ju/’hoansi do, is not the same as tracking on Pleistocene rock surfaces. Many of our tracks are preserved on the undersides of ceilings and overhangs, or are evident in profile in cliff exposures. Our track-bearing surfaces are usually small, and present no associated signs. We can’t follow the spoor for any distance. We don’t know at what time of day the tracks were made or the role of dew, and we have never succeeded in actually tracking down our quarry. Coprolites – fossilised droppings – are seldom found conveniently beside the tracks of the depositor.

We showed our new colleagues known fossil tracksites, without providing our own interpretations. #oma and /uce discussed these between themselves and presented their conclusions about what had made the tracks and how the animal had been behaving. We then shared our insights and our 3D photogrammetry data where applicable, and reached joint conclusions.

Soon they were identifying freshly exposed tracksites without our input, and were providing fascinating, new interpretations for sites which had puzzled us. For example, they saw ostrich tracks which we had missed, beside ostrich egg remnants, and concluded that we were probably looking at a fossilised ostrich nest. On another occasion they pointed out the distinctive track pattern of a scrub hare on the hanging wall of an eroded piece of cliff.

First fossilised hyena trackway

One of the most memorable experiences involved a 400,000-year-old trackway on a rock surface at Dana Bay, identified a few years earlier by local geologists Aleck and Ilona Birch. This rock had only been transiently exposed for a few days in the past decade, usually being covered by beach sand.

Our earlier interpretation had been that the trackmaker might have been a hyena, probably the brown hyena.

We were vindicated when our master tracker colleagues independently reached the identical conclusion. Examining our digital 3D images together fortified our collective judgement.

This was a big deal: it was the first fossil hyena trackway to be confidently identified, as previous examples had involved only individual tracks or poorly preserved possible trackway segments. Hyena trackways are distinctive: the forefoot tracks are substantially larger than those of the hindfoot.

Different ways of seeing

Both of us are privileged to have university degrees and institutional affiliations. But there is another way in which acumen can be measured: the ability to use the ancient methods of discernment and pattern recognition to support and feed one’s family and community through tracking, hunting and gathering.

What we have demonstrated, we believe, is a novel confluence of old and new ways to reveal fascinating features of the past. We use geological understanding, satellite technology, paleontological databases, tracking manuals and sophisticated dating methods. But hunter-gatherers see what escapes us and our drones: obscure strokes and enigmatic configurations on time-beaten surfaces. They tap an alternative knowledge base, both culturally received and cultivated from childhood.

The follow-through challenge must be to develop this partnership for mutual discovery and reward, understanding the past to better equip us for our uncertain future.

Clive Thompson is a trustee of the Discovery Wilderness Trust, a non-profit organization that supports environmental conservation and the fostering of tracking skills.

Charles Helm does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. First fossil hyena tracks found in South Africa – how expert animal trackers helped – https://theconversation.com/first-fossil-hyena-tracks-found-in-south-africa-how-expert-animal-trackers-helped-251377

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Hamza Benattia, Prehistory, Universitat de Barcelona

A new archaeological discovery at Kach Kouch in Morocco challenges the long-held belief that the Maghreb (north-west Africa) was an empty land before the arrival of the Phoenicians from the Middle East in around 800 BCE. It reveals a much richer and more complex history than previously thought.

Everything found at the site indicates that during the Bronze Age, more than 3,000 years ago, stable agricultural settlements already existed on the African coast of the Mediterranean.

This was at the same time as societies such as the Mycenaean flourished in the eastern Mediterranean.

Our discovery, led by a team of young researchers from Morocco’s National Institute of Archaeology, expands our knowledge of the recent prehistory of north Africa. It also redefines our understanding of the connections between the Maghreb and the rest of the Mediterranean in ancient times.

How the discovery was made

Kach Kouch was first identified in 1988 and first excavated in 1992. At the time, researchers believed the site had been inhabited between the 8th and 6th centuries BCE. This was based on the Phoenician pottery that was found.

Nearly 30 years later, our team carried out two new excavation seasons in 2021 and 2022. Our investigations included cutting-edge technology such as drones, differential GPS (global positioning systems) and 3D models.

A rigorous protocol was followed for collecting samples. This allowed us to detect fossilised remains of seeds and charcoal.

Subsequently, a series of analyses allowed us to reconstruct the settlement’s economy and its natural environment in prehistoric times.

What the remains revealed

The excavations, along with radiocarbon dating, revealed that the settlement underwent three phases of occupation between 2200 and 600 BCE.

The earliest documented remains (2200–2000 BCE) are scarce. They consist of three undecorated pottery sherds, a flint flake and a cow bone.

The scarcity of materials and contexts could be due to erosion or a temporary occupation of the hill during this phase.

In its second phase, after a period of abandonment, the Kach Kouch hill was permanently occupied from 1300 BCE. Its inhabitants, who probably numbered no more than a hundred, dedicated themselves to agriculture and animal husbandry.

They lived in circular dwellings built from wattle and daub, a technique that combines wooden poles, reeds and mud. They dug silos into the rock to store agricultural products.

Analysis shows that they cultivated wheat, barley and legumes, and raised cattle, sheep, goats and pigs.

They also used grinding stones for cereal processing, flint tools, and decorated pottery. In addition, the oldest known bronze object in north Africa (excluding Egypt) has been documented. It is probably a scrap metal fragment removed after casting in a mould.

Interactions with the Phoenicians

Between the 8th and 7th centuries BCE, during the so-called Mauretanian period, the inhabitants of Kach Kouch maintained the same material culture, architecture and economy as in the previous phase. However, interactions with Phoenician communities that were starting to settle in nearby sites, such as Lixus, brought new cultural practices.

For example, circular dwellings coexisted with square ones made of stone and wattle and daub, combining Phoenician and local construction techniques.

Furthermore, new crops began to be cultivated, like grapes and olives. Among the new materials, wheel-made Phoenician ceramics, such as amphorae (storage jugs) and plates, and the use of iron objects stand out.

Around 600 BCE, Kach Kouch was peacefully abandoned, perhaps due to social and economic changes. Its inhabitants likely moved to other nearby settlements.

So who were the Bronze Age inhabitants?

It’s unclear whether the Maghreb populations in the Bronze Age lived in tribes, as would later occur during the Mauretanian period. They were probably organised as families. Burials suggest there were no clear signs of hierarchy.

They may have spoken a language similar to the Amazigh, the indigenous north African language, which did not become written until the introduction of the Phoenician alphabet. The cultural continuity documented at Kach Kouch suggests that these populations are the direct ancestors of the Mauretanian peoples of north-west Africa.

Why this matters

Kach Kouch is not only the first and oldest known Bronze Age settlement in the Maghreb but also reshapes our understanding of prehistory in this region.

The new findings, along with other recent discoveries, demonstrate that north-west Africa has been connected to other regions of the Mediterranean, the Atlantic and the Sahara since prehistoric times.

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Read more:
Discovery of 5,000-year-old farming society in Morocco fills a major gap in history – north-west Africa was a central player in trade and culture

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Our findings challenge traditional narratives, many of which were influenced by colonial views that portrayed the Maghreb as an empty and isolated land until it was “civilized” by foreign peoples.

As a result, the Maghreb has long been absent from debates on the later prehistory of the Mediterranean. These new discoveries not only represent a breakthrough for archaeology, but also a call to reconsider dominant historical narratives. Kach Kouch offers the opportunity to rewrite north Africa’s history and give it the visibility it has always deserved.

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Read more:
Ancient DNA reveals Maghreb communities preserved their culture and genes, even in a time of human migration

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We believe this is a decisive moment for research that could forever change the way we understand not only the history of north Africa, but also its relationship with other areas of the Mediterranean.

Hamza Benattia, director of the Kach Kouch Archaeological Project, received funding from the National Institute of Archaeology and Heritage of Morocco (INSAP), the Prehistoric Society Research Fund, the Stevan B. Dana Grant of the American Society of Overseas Research, the Mediterranean Archaeological Trust Grant, the Barakat Trust Early Career Award, the Centre Jacques Berque Research Grant, the Institute of Ceutan Studies Research Fund and the University of Castilla La Mancha.

– ref. Discovery of a 4,000-year-old Bronze Age settlement in Morocco rewrites history – https://theconversation.com/discovery-of-a-4-000-year-old-bronze-age-settlement-in-morocco-rewrites-history-253172

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Donrich Thaldar, Professor, University of KwaZulu-Natal

In the digital economy, data is more than just information – it is an asset with immense economic and strategic value. Yet, despite its significance, a fundamental legal question remains unresolved: Can data be owned? While privacy laws worldwide focus on protecting individuals’ rights over their personal data, they often sidestep the issue of ownership. This has led to legal uncertainty, particularly in South Africa, where the Protection of Personal Information Act (Popia) grants data subjects various rights over their personal information but does not explicitly address ownership.

This gap in legal clarity raises pressing questions: If personal data – such as private health information – exists within a vast and ever-growing digital landscape, can it be owned? And if so, who holds the rightful claim?

Legal academic Donrich Thaldar, whose research focuses on data governance, explores these questions in a recent academic article. He unpacks his findings for The Conversation Africa.

Why does it matter who owns data?

In today’s digital economy, data is the most valuable asset – it’s often referred to as “the new oil”. Whether in commerce, research, or social interactions, the ability to generate, use and trade with data is central to economic competitiveness.

If data ownership is not clearly established, it could stifle innovation and investment. Companies require legal certainty to operate effectively in a knowledge-driven economy.

Countries have taken different legal approaches to tackling the question of who owns data. China, for instance, formally recognises the proprietary rights of data generators, meaning that businesses and individuals who generate data have legally defined rights over its use and commercialisation. This provides legal support for the country’s digital industries.

What does South African law say?

In the past, the South African Information Regulator has taken the position that personal information is automatically owned by the data subject – the person to whom the data relates – rather than by the entity generating the data. In this view, the rights created by Popia imply that data subjects themselves are the owners of their personal data, and nobody else.

I suggest that this stance is legally flawed, as it conflates two different branches of the law: privacy law and property law. Moreover, it could severely disrupt the digital economy. The digital economy depends on data as a tradeable asset – it must be capable of being sold, licensed and commercialised like any other economic object. If ownership must always be with data subjects, businesses face uncertainty in using and monetising data. Uncertainty stifles innovation, discourages investment, and undermines South Africa’s digital competitiveness.

You applied property law to the question of data ownership. Why?

Ownership is a concept in property law, not privacy law. Therefore, to answer the data ownership question, we need to look for answers in property law.

Property law governs the relationship between subjects (legal persons) and objects (things external to the body, whether physical or not). Ownership is about the rights that a subject has over an object. For an object to be capable of being owned, it must be valuable, useful, and – importantly – capable of human control. A bottle of water meets these criteria, but the vast oceans do not, as they are not within human control.

Personal data in the abstract is like the water in the ocean – vast, uncontained, and beyond individual control. However, a digital instance of personal data, such as a computer file, is more like a bottled version of that water – defined and subject to human control. Just like digital money and other valuable digital assets, a specific instance of personal data meets all the requirements under South African common law for private ownership. Thus, in this sense personal data can be owned.

Is the data owner not the data subject?

At first glance this might seem so, but no, not necessarily. The reason that it might seem so, is because some of the privacy rights created by Popia resemble ownership rights. For example, an owner’s agreement is required before someone else can use the owned object (e.g., loan for use and rent). Similarly, a data subject’s consent is in most cases required before personal data can be processed. Furthermore, the owner of a thing has the right to destroy it; similarly, a data subject typically has the right to have personal data deleted.

Do these privacy rights mean that data subjects actually own their personal data? I suggest not. Wearing a feather in one’s hat does not make one a bird. In the same way, privacy rights that resemble ownership rights do not mean that they constitute ownership. Ownership is acquired by following the rules of property law.

So who owns the data?

Because a newly created personal data instance has no antecedent legal object – in other words, it is not created out of another legal object – it initially belongs to no one. It is res nullius. Ownership of res nullius is acquired through appropriation, which requires two elements: control and the intention to own.

This means that the entity generating the data, such as a company or university collecting and recording it, is best positioned to acquire ownership. Since it already has control over the data, the only remaining requirement is simply the intention to be the owner.

If an entity like a university generates data and intends to own it, then – provided it is in control of that data – it will legally become the owner. This in principle allows the entity to use, license and trade the data as an economic asset. Indeed, it is prudent for data-generating entities, such as universities, to explicitly assert ownership over the data they produce. This not only establishes their legal rights with clarity but also serves as a safeguard against unauthorised access and misuse by malicious actors.

Doesn’t this compromise data privacy?

No, it should not. Ownership is always limited by other legal rules. For example, while I might own a car, I cannot drive it in any way I like – I must obey the rules of the road. Similarly, ownership of personal data is subject to strict limitations, particularly the privacy rights of data subjects under Popia.

However, it is also important to understand that privacy rights apply only to personal data. If personal data is de-identified, meaning that it can no longer be linked to the data subjects, privacy rights cease to apply. What remains are the ownership rights in the data itself. It can be a fully tradeable asset.

Recognising that a digital instance of personal data can be owned – and that the rightful owner is typically the data generator – does not undermine the privacy protections of Popia. Rather, it clarifies the legal landscape, ensuring that the rights of both data subjects and data generators are recognised and protected.

Donrich Thaldar receives funding from the NIH.

– ref. Who owns digital data about you? South African legal scholar weighs up property and privacy rights – https://theconversation.com/who-owns-digital-data-about-you-south-african-legal-scholar-weighs-up-property-and-privacy-rights-249741

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By David William Hedding, Professor in Geography, University of South Africa

A media storm blew up in mid-March 2025 when a researcher at South Africa’s isolated Sanae IV base in Antarctica accused one of its nine team members of becoming violent.

The Conversation Africa asked geomorphologist David William Hedding, who has previously carried out research from the frozen continent, about the work researchers do in Antarctica, what conditions are like and why it matters.

What do researchers focus on when they’re working in Antarctica?

Currently, the main focus of research in the Antarctic revolves around climate change because the White Continent is a good barometer for changes in global cycles. It has a unique and fragile environment. It’s an extreme climate which makes it highly sensitive to any changes in global climate and atmospheric conditions. Importantly, the Antarctic remains relatively untouched by humans, so we are able to study processes and responses of natural systems.

Also, the geographic location of Antarctic enables science that is less suitable elsewhere on the planet. An example of this is the work on space weather (primarily disturbances to the Earth’s magnetic field caused by solar activity). Studying space weather is significant because the magnetic field of the Earth can impact communication platforms, technology, infrastructure and even human health.

How many countries have teams working there? Where does South Africa fit in?

Currently, about 30 countries have research stations in the Antarctic but these bases serve a far wider community of researchers. Collaboration is a key component of research in the Antarctic because many study sites are isolated, logistics are a challenge and resources are typically limited.

The South African base in Antarctica, named SANAE IV usually has between 10 and 12 researchers and base personnel. This research station is situated on a nunatak (a mountain piercing through the ice) in Western Dronning Maud Land. It is an extremely remote location approximately 220km inland from the ice-shelf.

The researchers and base personnel remain in Antarctica for approximately 15 months working through the cold and dark winter months.

What have been some of the biggest ‘finds’?

The biggest research finding from the Antarctic was the discovery of the ozone hole in 1985 by scientists from the British Antarctic Survey. This discovery led to the creation and implementation of the Montreal Protocol, a treaty to phase out chlorofluorocarbons (synthetic chemical compounds composed of chlorine, fluorine, and carbon) which destroy ozone. This was a major breakthrough in terms of slowly healing the ozone layer.

The second most significant piece of research to come from the Antarctic has been the use of ice cores to reconstruct past climates. Ice cores preserve air bubbles which provide a wealth of information about the conditions of the atmosphere over time. Importantly, ice cores provide an uninterrupted and detailed window into the past 1.2 million years. This is important because only by understanding past climates and the earth’s responses to those changes are we able to predict future responses. This is significant because of the imminent threats resulting from anthropogenic (human-induced) climate change.

What conditions do scientists work under?

Conducting research in the Antarctic is extremely difficult for three primary reasons: remoteness, the cold and daylight.

The remoteness of many study sites makes it difficult to reach. Distances are vast from the limited number of bases in the Antarctic. Thus, logistics for science in the Antarctic is a major challenge and requires collaboration and planning. For example, the geologists from the University of Johannesburg, who work from the SANAE IV base in Antarctica, often spend weeks in the field collecting samples. They travel significant distances via snow mobile and remain self-sufficient while conducting science in tough conditions.

These tough conditions relate specifically to the cold. Most science only occurs in the austral summer months when temperatures become marginally bearable. Also, the summer season only provides a short window in which to operate because access to Antarctic by sea is limited by extent and thickness of the sea ice.

Lastly, during summer there is 24 hours of daylight which lengthens the working day but these conditions are also short-lived.

Why it is important to do scientific work in the area?

The Antarctic is intricately linked to global systems and plays a major role in influencing these systems.

For example, climate change will cause significant melting of land-based ice in Antarctica which when added to the oceans will cause sea-level rise and disruptions to global oceanic currents. Therefore, it is critical that we obtain a better understanding of how responses of terrestrial systems, such as the Antarctic, will impact oceanic systems because ultimately changes in ocean currents will impact the oceanic food web.

In the context of climate change, sea-level rise is a major concern as it will have global impacts for society, so it is critical that the impacts are investigated to enable society to build resilience and adapt.

David William Hedding receives funding from the National Research Foundation.

– ref. Scientists in Antarctica: why they’re there and what they’ve found – https://theconversation.com/scientists-in-antarctica-why-theyre-there-and-what-theyve-found-252752

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Papa Sow, Senior Researcher, The Nordic Africa Institute

Benin’s Pendjari Biosphere Reserve, also called Pendjari National Park, and its surroundings have been targeted by non-state armed groups since 2019.

Pendjari National Park, which covers approximately 4,800km², is one of five protected areas in Benin and is one of the main biodiversity conservation areas in west Africa. It has been a World Heritage Site since 2017.

It is an integral part of the W-Arly-Pendjari complex, a transboundary biosphere reserve. The W Park is shared by Niger, Benin and Burkina Faso. Arly is located in Burkina Faso and Pendjari in Benin.

The geographical configuration of the park facilitates all kinds of movements. Non-state armed groups attempt to exploit the porous borders to hide, stock up on natural resources — including gold and poached wildlife — or turn them into rear bases. Non-state armed groups take advantage of the park’s inaccessibility and its dense, wild forests to turn them into refuges.

Bloody battles are underway to conquer special forest territories, which I call “protected jihadism areas” because of their use by armed movements claiming to be jihadists.

As part of a study on the causes of migration in and from the northern parts of Benin Republic, close to Burkina Faso, Niger, Togo and Nigeria, I analysed the impact that these non-state armed groups were having on local populations and protected areas.

I have been working on migration issues for about 25 years, and most of my observations in west Africa show that armed groups cause displacements in the sub-region. They contribute to a land and pastoral crisis, inconsistency in the distribution of forest resources, and a poorly integrated approach to the management of protected areas.

I interviewed experts, local journalists, research assistants who I worked with during several years and displaced people in Benin and the west African sub-region about the direct impacts of smuggling, the depletion of natural resources, threats, and the use of violence in forest reserves.

My observations are that the spiral of violence by non-state armed groups is dangerously disrupting the conservation and protection of the environment, increasing fear and insecurity among communities, and ruining the local economy, especially activities that revolve around the tourism sector.

The violence

On 8 January 2025, close to 30 soldiers were killed in the north of Benin, in Karimama near the “Triple Point” – an extensive area in the W-Arly-Pendjari complex where Benin, Niger and Burkina Faso meet.

More than 120 soldiers were killed in the area between 2021 and 2024. There has also been carnage of the animals and plants.

Since 2018, the Katiba Ansar-ul Islam, Serma, Sekou Muslimou and Abou Hanifa have been operating in Burkina Faso. They are considered jihadists – mostly under the aegis of Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM), the Al Qaeda branch in the Sahel.

Reasons for the proliferation of non-state armed groups in the park are multiple. It’s difficult for the state authorities to reach them there. There is the battle among non-state armed groups over the control of pastures and water bodies in the area. The park is also a place where non-state armed groups work with traffickers of adulterated gasoline from Nigeria, called Kpayo in Benin. They buy thousands of litres of gasoline from them every week at exorbitant prices.

The Beninese state is is not very visible in some places despite the anti-terrorist Operation Mirador launched in 2021 with more than 3,000 soldiers. Since the first attack in 2019, more than US$120 million has been spent on security by Benin. But the number of attacks and kidnappings has multiplied.

The main reason is the fragility of the security of the three state border areas.

The non-State armed groups have their own crossing points that they control. Sub-regional collaboration between states is almost non-existent. The 2017 Accra Initiative, composed of five countries – Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire and Togo – seems to have stagnated since some member states pulled out of the regional grouping Ecowas. A genuine regional force capable of countering the activities of these non-state armed groups is necessary.

Benin is developing a military partnership with France. But the already tense diplomatic relationship between Benin and its neighbours – Niger and Burkina Faso – and the ambivalent policy of Togo, which “threatens” to join the Alliance of Sahel States – are not factors conducive to effective regional military cooperation.

How people are being affected

The park depends, in part, on funding generated by tourism and external partners. Conservation has been managed, since 2020, by the APN – Rangers African Parks Network. In 2024, it employed 337 eco-guards, including six expatriates. These eco-guards, on the front lines against non-state armed groups, are also being killed. Their work in gathering threat-related information is important to the Beninese Armed Forces.

The activities of residents living near the park, transport networks and systems, and trekking services are the hardest hit. The work of NGOs that supported local populations has been reduced. Many NGOs have withdrawn from their activities. Small businesses are under threat.

But the hardest-hit sector is tourism, which has affected the livelihoods of people. There has been a significant decline in the number of tourists. This directly affects local communities for whom tourism activities remain an important source of income.

Tanguiéta, a town 70km from the border with Burkina Faso and not far from Pendjari Park, has been the worst affected due to a decline in income from accommodation and catering activities. Jobs have been lost.

Migrants from the sub-region who had specialised in tourism entrepreneurship, including tour guides and artisans, have turned to other activities or left the town.

What needs to be done

The following measures could help protect the park and local people:

• strengthen communication and surveillance capabilities

• increase surveillance aircraft, helicopters and drones with the support of international donors and the Ecowas

• train Beninese Armed Forces in conservation practices

• increase support for community development projects

• diversify activities to reduce dependence on tourism.

Papa Sow does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Armed groups are invading Benin’s forest reserves. Why and what to do about it – https://theconversation.com/armed-groups-are-invading-benins-forest-reserves-why-and-what-to-do-about-it-256136

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Roger Southall, Professor of Sociology, University of the Witwatersrand

South Africans are wearily attuned to governments’ Orwellian misuse of language. After all, South Africa is a country where a one-time government passed a law (the Natives Abolition of Passes and Coordination of Documents Act of 1952) which extended rather than abolishing the notorious pass system. This made it compulsory for black South Africans over the age of 16 to carry a passbook. And the same government passed the Extension of University Education Act of 1959 which made it more, not less, difficult for black students to register at “open” (or white) universities.

So perhaps they should not be unduly surprised that the government of the US has imported 49 Afrikaners and labelled them as “refugees”. The claim is that they are escaping from the persecution of Afrikaners – and white people more broadly – in South Africa today.

The Trump administration knows perfectly well this claim is a complete fabrication. As President Cyril Ramaphosa and his government have pointed out, there is no evidence whatsoever that Afrikaners or white people more generally are subject to genocide.

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Read more:
Trump and South Africa: what is white victimhood, and how is it linked to white supremacy?

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True, South Africa has one of the highest murder rates in the world. But it is poor black South Africans – not whites – who are principal victims of such deadly violence. Nor are Afrikaners/whites subject to persecution. Along with all other South Africans, their human rights are protected by a constitution. This is no mere piece of paper. Its provisions are (albeit imperfectly, and unlike in the US these days) largely enforced by the courts.

Furthermore, genocide implies the deliberate elimination of a people on racial, ethnic, or religious grounds. Therefore, if a genocide of whites and Afrikaners was taking place, we might assume that their numbers would be falling. In fact the reverse is true. The white population has continued to grow (albeit slowly) in absolute numbers since 1994.

Worse, the characterisation of Afrikaners as refugees at a moment in time when the people of Gaza are daily subject to a regime of death, terror, and murder inflicted on them by the Israeli government is not merely an absurdity but a downright insult to those genuinely subject to genocide.

So, what is really going on?

The drivers

Extensive commentary has correctly highlighted the motivations of the Trump administration.

First, the administration has launched an attack on what it terms the “tyranny” of “diversity, equity and inclusion” policies across the entire spectrum of public and private institutions in America. Critics argue this is driven by an appeal to Trump’s white Christian nationalist political base. Because post-apartheid South Africa, rightly or wrongly, has become the poster-country of diversity, equity and inclusion policies internationally, because of its constitutional commitment to non-racialism and diversity, it has been singled out for attack.

Secondly, labelling Afrikaners as refugees plays to the insecurities of Trump’s political base. This finds the idea of a white minority being ruled by a black majority government difficult to swallow.

Third, characterising Afrikaners as subject to genocide is a very deliberate response to South Africa’s charging of Israel as guilty of genocide against the Palestinian people before the International Court of Justice. But this is unacceptable to the US Christian nationalist right. For them the existence of Israel represents the realisation of Biblical truth – the return of Jews to the Holy Land.

Trump is saying that the US can and will play the same game, using it to clobber South Africa regardless of the groundlessness of the charge. But, being Trump, he will balance pandering to his support base against what economic benefits he can extract from South Africa.

The landscape

But what of the 49 Afrikaners themselves? Why have they chosen to accept the opportunity offered to them by the US government? After all, extensive attention in the South African media has been given to Afrikaners who have defiantly stated that they are committed to staying in South Africa. The reasons they give are that it’s their home. And they fully accept that, at least formally, South Africa has become a non-racial democracy.

Likewise, as I have detailed in my book on Whites and Democracy in South Africa, Afrikaners and whites have not only survived in democratic South Africa but, generally, have prospered economically. Furthermore, whites as a “population group” (to use outdated apartheid-era terminology) have participated fully in South African democracy. They are more highly disposed to voting in elections than other racial groupings, and de facto, they are well represented in parliament and local government by the Democratic Alliance, which is a vigorous defender of their interests.

But (there is always a but), if we want to guess the motivations of Trump’s 49 “refugees”, we need to bear in mind the following.

First, until we know more about the personal circumstances of the individuals involved, we cannot really know what has driven them to take the drastic step of leaving families and their personal history behind by moving to America.

Second, most whites have responded to the arrival of democracy pragmatically. They have their numerous complaints, notably about equity employment (affirmative action policies in favour of blacks) which they view as discriminatory against whites. But they have continued to enjoy high rates of employment. Indeed they continue to occupy the higher ranks of employment in the private sector in disproportionate numbers.

However, although many whites continue to live in a de facto overwhelmingly white world, both at work and at their homes in suburbia, there remains a minority which has remained wholly unreconciled to the changes which have taken place politically and economically since 1994. The armed opposers linked to the far-right have long been defeated. But we may presume the 49 belong to a broader category of passive resisters who have withdrawn into a white world as much as possible.

Third, although most whites continue to do well economically, the changes which have taken place since 1994 have led to the re-appearance of a small class of largely uneducated poor whites who feel excluded from employment by equity employment legislation. And who generally feel the loss of their racial status under democracy.

Opportunists, not refugees

Having said all that, some interesting questions remain.

Presumably the Afrikaner 49 belonged to that category of whites which, for one reason or another, is disposed to leave South Africa. However, emigrating requires jumping through numerous hoops; meeting educational and professional qualifications, getting a job offer, having sufficient financial resources to take with them to support themselves and their families before they can qualify for recipient countries’ social security systems, and so on. Apart from the emotional costs involved, emigration is not always the easiest of options, even for those who wish to “escape”.

The evidence suggests that the heads of household among the Afrikaner 49 are drawn not only from that minority of Afrikaners who are totally unreconciled to democracy, but who – quite simply – are opportunists who have availed themselves of a short cut to emigrate.

Roger Southall does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Trump’s Afrikaners are South African opportunists, not refugees: what’s behind the US move – https://theconversation.com/trumps-afrikaners-are-south-african-opportunists-not-refugees-whats-behind-the-us-move-257017