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February 15, 2026

The IOC’s ban of a Ukrainian athlete over his helmet reveals troubling double standards

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Adam Ali, Assistant Professor, School of Kinesiology, Western University

On Feb. 12, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) banned Ukrainian skeleton athlete Vladyslav Heraskevych from competition for wearing a helmet that featured images of fellow Ukrainian athletes who had been killed in Russia’s invasion of his home nation.

According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, close to 15,000 Ukrainian civilians have been killed and 40,000 have been injured since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022.

Over the past four years, more than 450 Ukrainian athletes — including those adorned on Heraskevych’s helmet — have been killed, with many more injured or left with long-term disabilities.

The IOC’s decision has once again placed the Olympic movement at the centre of a longstanding debate over neutrality, political expression and human rights.

Neutrality and expression

The IOC stated that Heraskevych violated the athlete expression guidelines, saying:

“It is a fundamental principle that sport at the Olympic Games is neutral and must be separate from political, religious and any other type of interference. The focus at the Olympic Games must remain on athletes’ performances, sport and the harmony that the Games seek to advance.”

The IOC’s current rules on athlete expression stem from Rule 50 of the Olympic Charter, which doesn’t permit any kind of “demonstration or political, religious or racial propaganda” in Olympic areas.

The IOC’s decision has already been decried as unlawful and discriminatory by legal and human rights experts, who argue that it is inconsistent with the IOC’s application of its own policies in other instances.

For example, Italian snowboarder Roland Fischnaller displayed a Russian flag on his helmet, even though Russia’s national symbols were officially banned at the Games.

After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the IOC initially barred Russian athletes from competing under their national flag but later permitted some to participate as neutral athletes. This has drawn criticism, particularly in cases where Russian athletes have been linked to activity supporting the war in Ukraine.

While some might justifiably point to contradictions in the application of Olympic rules on athlete expression, as well within the policies themselves, the IOC’s decision illuminates a longer-standing concern.

As many scholars, activists and others have argued for decades, the IOC, with its current structure, is ill-equipped to provide global leadership in promoting peace and human rights through sport.

The limits of the Olympic Truce

This contradiction can be traced as far back as the Olympic Truce, first instituted in the 9th century BC in ancient Greece. In its contemporary form, the truce is intended to protect “as far as possible, the interests of the athletes and sport in general, and to harness the power of sport to promote peace, dialogue and reconciliation.”

In practice, however, peacemaking has been more of a rhetorical than actualized endeavour within the Olympic movement. The IOC frequently emphasizes sport’s perceived ability to help athletes and fans from different parts of the world overcome prejudice and discrimination through the Olympic Games.

Yet this key part of the Olympic mission is complicated by the IOC’s wish to maintain its image as an “essentially apolitical international organization, as political scientist Liam Stockdale has noted.

Maintaining a politically neutral stance while claiming to promote peace in global conflicts — such as the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine — is both contradictory and a purposeful form of naivete that allows the IOC to “sportswash” its way to further fill its financial coffers.

Although the IOC has often remained silent — and at times restricted athletes’ voices — on matters of social justice and human rights, its sanctions on Russia demonstrate that it is willing to take explicit positions when it deems necessary.

This stands in stark contrast to its banning of Heraskevych for highlighting the costs of Russia’s military adventure — Ukrainian lives.

Double standards at play

The debate over neutrality has also extended beyond Ukraine. The IOC has faced intense criticism over its continued silence towards Israel’s military campaign in Palestine following the Oct. 7, 2023 attacks by Hamas.

Israel’s actions have been described as constituting genocide by human rights organizations Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, an independent United Nations commission and academic experts.

Hundreds of Palestinian athletes have been killed in Israeli attacks, according to the Palestine Olympic Committee and the Palestinian Football Association.

Committees, sport clubs, scholars and other advocates have called for Israel to be banned from the 2024 Paris Games and the current Winter Games in Italy.

To date, however, the IOC has not imposed restrictions on Israeli athletes or officials, maintaining its position that the Games must remain politically neutral. This reveals the IOC’s double standards in determining whose human rights and livelihoods are worth speaking up for, and whose they consider disposable.

Such actions mean it’s that much more imperative for athletes like Heraskevych to continue using one of global sport’s largest spectacles to shed light on atrocities taking place in Ukraine, Gaza and elsewhere, while athletic feats are celebrated on the ice, slopes and half-pipes in Italy.

Adam Ali does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. The IOC’s ban of a Ukrainian athlete over his helmet reveals troubling double standards – https://theconversation.com/the-iocs-ban-of-a-ukrainian-athlete-over-his-helmet-reveals-troubling-double-standards-275896

February 15, 2026

Gene-edited meat in Canada: To label or not to label?

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Gwendolyn Blue, Professor, University of Calgary

The Canadian government’s recent approval of the first gene-edited animal to enter the food system has reignited debates over whether foods produced using genetic engineering techniques should be labelled.

Gene-edited animals, including faster-growing fish, heat-tolerant cows and disease-resistant pigs, have already been approved in the United States, Japan and several countries in South America. These decisions, including Canada’s approval, were made with limited public awareness and input.

Advocacy groups such as the Canadian Biotechnology Action Network, political parties including the Bloc Québécois and organic pork producers are calling for mandatory labelling of gene-edited meat in Canada.

Public demand

Public opinion research indicates that many Canadians view labelling gene-edited foods as essential. Polling commissioned by the Canadian Health Food Association suggests many Canadians want greater transparency about the use of gene editing for food production.

Studies in the United States also suggest that consumer acceptance increases when the benefits of gene editing are clearly communicated.

Similarly, a survey commissioned by the company that developed Canada’s first approved gene-edited pig found that many Canadians would consider purchasing gene-edited pork if health and environmental benefits were delivered.

Why label gene-edited meat?

Food labelling serves multiple purposes: it provides information about a product’s ingredients and the production methods involved. Labels also play a democratic role by promoting transparency and accountability. This in turn allows consumers to make choices that reflect health considerations as well as their ethical, political and environmental values.

Debates over the labelling of gene-edited meat often hinge on tensions between ethical principles such as protection and autonomy. On the one hand, governments are tasked with protecting the food supply and ensuring food safety. On the other hand, individual consumers have the right to know how food is produced and to make choices accordingly.

Proponents of labelling argue that consumers have a fundamental right to know what’s in their food, how it was produced and what potential risks are involved.

With gene-edited meat, public concerns include health and safety risks, as well as environmental consequences, animal welfare, corporate control of the food system via patents and licensing and threats to food sovereignty.

For example, gene-edited animals could potentially be harmed by unintended consequences, including off-target side effects. It is imperative to ensure traceability in commercial settings with clear mechanisms to report on animal health and welfare.

By enhancing consumer choice, labelling can also foster market competition.

Opponents of labelling argue that gene-edited foods are scientifically proven to be safe and that labelling could mislead consumers into assuming there is a risk where none exists. They argue that labels can create fear and confusion, potentially undermining the adoption of breeding techniques that could enhance health, reduce environmental impacts and improve food security.

Labelling also has political consequences. Market-based approaches shift responsibility to individual consumers, which can foreclose other avenues for collective decision-making about how food systems should be governed.

Mandatory versus voluntary labelling

Canada currently doesn’t require the labelling of genetically modified (GMO) or gene-edited foods. Under the Food and Drugs Act, labelling is mandated only when a product poses a health or safety concern.

This is at odds with approaches elsewhere. For example, the U.S. National Bioengineered Food Disclosure Standard requires companies to label genetically engineered foods, while decisions about the labelling of gene-edited foods are made on a case-by-case basis.

In Canada, voluntary labelling is permitted provided it’s truthful and not misleading. The Canadian Standards Board, scheduled soon to cease operations due to budget cuts, provides guidance on voluntary labelling for genetically engineered foods. Notably, its definition of genetic engineering excludes both conventional breeding and gene editing.

The Canada organics sector relies on voluntary non-GMO food labelling. Similar to international organic standards, certified organic products in Canada prohibit the use of genetically engineered and gene-edited seeds, feed and food.

Following Health Canada’s approval of gene-edited pigs in January, organic pork producer duBreton introduced Canada’s first verified non-gene-edited and non-cloned meat label.

This proposed label was also a response to a now-paused federal proposal to exclude cloned animals from the definition of novel foods, a move that would allow cloned meat to enter the market without consumer or government notification.

A lack of public engagement

The labelling of gene-edited meat raises several questions. Food labels can support consumer autonomy and transparency, but labels are not good at conveying complicated information. Labels also privilege market forces for making collective decisions, instead of other democratic processes such as public deliberation and stringent regulation.

In a regulatory context that largely promotes biotechnology while offering few opportunities for meaningful public engagement, it remains unclear whether labelling is the most effective democratic approach to gene-edited meat in Canada.

As gene-edited animals potentially become more common in global food systems, the question is not just whether to label these products, but which political opportunities labelling creates or restricts — and for whose benefit.

Gwendolyn Blue receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council. She is also affiliated with the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council funded training program, Genome Editing for Food Security and Environmental Sustainability (GEFSES).

– ref. Gene-edited meat in Canada: To label or not to label? – https://theconversation.com/gene-edited-meat-in-canada-to-label-or-not-to-label-274904

February 15, 2026

Does South Africa have a future without power cuts? Ramaphosa intervenes, but the drama isn’t over

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Rod Crompton, Visiting Adjunct Professor, African Energy Leadership Centre, Wits Business School, University of the Witwatersrand

South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, in his 2026 State of the Nation address, announced that the country’s electricity transmission assets would move out of state-owned Eskom. This will happen once the newly established National Transmission Company of South Africa is unbundled into a fully independent company.

This is not the first time Ramaphosa has used his State of the Nation address to keep South Africa’s electricity reforms on track. In 2021, he raised the cap on private power generation from 1MW to 100MW. Minister Gwede Mantashe at the time admitted that the president had “twisted his arm”.

In 2022, Ramaphosa removed the cap altogether, unleashing a torrent of private investment.

Why did Ramaphosa need to intervene again in 2026?

Many would naturally expect a national electricity transmission company to have transmission assets. But for those who have followed South Africa’s long, zigzag road toward market reforms since it became government policy in the
white paper on Energy Policy in 1998, it is less of a surprise.

I was involved in drafting the white paper and the 2019 Eskom roadmap. I worked in the Department of Minerals and Energy, was a regulator at the National Energy Regulator of South Africa for 11 years and subsequently sat on the Eskom board for six years until I resigned in 2024.

If nothing else, Eskom management has a dogged determination in pursuit of their objectives. In this fight, where ideology and serious money are intertwined, it’s difficult to predict the outcome. It’s important because it’s a prelude to bigger fights to come.

Reverse creates alarm

In December 2025, Ramaphosa’s Minister of Electricity and Energy, Kgosientsho Ramokgopa, announced that instead of being unbundled into a fully independent company, the National Transmission Company of South Africa would remain a wholly owned Eskom subsidiary, with its assets staying inside Eskom. Only the System Operator would move outside Eskom.

This announcement was alarming for several reasons:

The South African Wholesale Electricity Market is meant to commence operations in April 2026. Eskom, as the dominant generator, would have a conflict of interest in a competitive market if it owned both generation and transmission assets.
It appeared, politically, to reverse an important advance made by the Electricity Regulation Amendment Act, which came into effect in January 2025. The act created the expectation that the National Transmission Company of South Africa would become fully independent outside Eskom within five years.
After severe electricity shortages between 2008 and 2024 (what Eskom terms “loadshedding”), analysts predict a return to power cuts around 2030 unless more renewable power stations are built in time. There is no shortage of willing investors, but the transmission grid is congested, especially in the western parts of the country where the wind and sunshine are best. The
bulk of electricity demand is in the east, so the grid must be strengthened to transport power from west to east.

Ramaphosa predicted in his 2026 State of the Nation address that “by 2030, more than 40% of our energy supply will come from cheap, clean, renewable energy sources”.

Eskom plans to debottleneck the grid, targeting 14,500km of new transmission lines and 133,000 MVA (MegaVolt-Ampere) of additional transformers by 2034 at an estimated cost of US$27.5 billion.

An independent National Transmission Company of South Africa will need assets to borrow against if it is to contribute to grid expansion.

However, both Eskom and the state are effectively broke. The government cannot afford to continue the massive bailouts Eskom has needed to stay afloat over the last decade. Consequently, it must turn to the private sector.

It is planning public-private partnerships to enable private investors to expand the grid. But if Eskom’s transmission assets remain inside Eskom, those investors – as well as prospective investors in new generation capacity – would be less inclined to invest.

Both groups would fear that Eskom, as controller of the transmission assets, would discriminate against them in the emerging competitive market. Both want a level playing field and a fully independent grid to underpin the electricity market. Allowing Eskom to own the grid threatens investment and the market reform trajectory and also raises the spectre of future loadshedding.

Politically, Ramaphosa’s announcement is a public rebuke of his Minister of Electricity and Energy, who appears to have fallen under Eskom’s sway as it seeks to prolong its near-monopoly in the electricity market. Globally, monopolies do not relinquish market power easily.

In effect, Ramaphosa was settling a dispute between Eskom and the faction in his African National Congress that supports a developmental state dominated by state-owned companies, on one hand, and the National Treasury and those who recognise that depending on Eskom to solve the country’s electricity problems is unlikely to end well, on the other.

Ramaphosa went out of his way to say:

We are establishing a level playing field for competition, so that we are never again exposed to the risk of relying on a single supplier to meet our energy needs.

Why do Eskom and Ramokgopa want to keep the transmission assets inside Eskom?

The battle lines

They point to Eskom’s US$25 billion debt and note that lenders provided funds against the security of Eskom’s assets. If those assets shrink by removing the transmission lines, the lenders will object and demand repayment. Eskom would be unable to comply. Lenders with government guarantees would then turn to the government, which would also be unable to repay, leading to financial collapse.

This alarmist view ignores that utilities with debts in many countries have been restructured during market reforms. If they could negotiate solutions with lenders, why can’t Eskom?

Some believe Eskom is using debt as an excuse to retain market power, pointing to its legal challenge against the National Energy Regulator’s decision to grant electricity trading licences to five private traders.

Others believe Eskom is not receiving good financial advice and wonder why the National Treasury is not more forthright, given its extensive work in this area.

Eskom also cites its worry over:

the US$6.27 billion owed by municipalities
the need “to take account of the establishment of Eskom Green … proposed new subsidiary to house Eskom’s renewable energy business” and
the requirement for lender consents on a loan-by-loan basis.

Energy Council of South Africa chief executive James Mackay describes the unbundling framework as a “hot potato,” noting that “timing, risk and ensuring Eskom Generation doesn’t collapse (are) equally important”.

Ramaphosa recognises that difficulties remain:

Given the importance of this restructuring for the broader reform of the electricity sector, I have established a dedicated task team under the National Energy Crisis Committee to address various issues relating to the restructuring process.

It must report to him in three months.

Ramaphosa’s comments in his address prompted Eskom’s probably shortest-ever press release, in which it pledged full support for the task team.

So, it’s not a done deal.

Notably, Eskom does not endorse the president’s announcement. It more likely sees the task team as another platform to advance its views in the ongoing contestation over the path and pace of South Africa’s electricity reforms.

It will be interesting.

Rod Crompton does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Does South Africa have a future without power cuts? Ramaphosa intervenes, but the drama isn’t over – https://theconversation.com/does-south-africa-have-a-future-without-power-cuts-ramaphosa-intervenes-but-the-drama-isnt-over-276015

February 15, 2026

As Alberta separatists court the U.S., prosperity is fuelling a sovereigntist turn

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Tamara Krawchenko, Associate Professor, School of Public Administration, University of Victoria

In the past year, leaders of Alberta’s main separatist organization have travelled repeatedly to Washington, D.C., for quiet meetings with senior American government officials in the Treasury and State departments. They’ve reportedly discussed everything from adopting the American dollar to building an independent Alberta military.

These highly unusual interactions — which prompted Canada to warn the Donald Trump administration to respect Canadian sovereignty — are unfolding just as a new Angus Reid poll shows 29 per cent of Albertans would vote, or are inclined to vote, for separation if a referendum were held today.

This is a clear minority, but it’s also an indication of some discontentment. The more interesting question is why a province that has long been among Canada’s richest feels so hard done by that some are willing to contemplate breaking up the country.

Alberta defies the usual template

Andrés Rodríguez‑Pose, a professor of economic geography at the London School of Economics, argues that populist eruptions are rooted in regions suffering persistent economic decline, demographic loss and a pervasive sense that they have been “left behind” in a globalized economy.

In Europe and the United States, voters in deindustrialized regions have used the ballot box to punish political leaders for abandoning them. The core grievance is material and territorial: my region is poorer, ignored and slipping further behind.

Alberta does not fit that template.

Its economy has grown faster than any other province since 1950, and it still sits near the top of Canada’s income and employment league tables, even after oil price shocks.

In fact, a central anomaly of Canadian federalism is that Alberta’s economic heft far exceeds its population and representation in Ottawa, feeding a sense of under‑recognized importance rather than marginality.

Alberta is not a place that “doesn’t matter” economically; the anger of those who want to separate stems from believing it matters a great deal and is nonetheless disrespected.

A long history of grievance politics

To understand today’s sovereigntist turn, we need to situate it in Alberta’s political culture. For nearly a century, Alberta political leaders have fused populism, “western alienation” and oil politics into a powerful narrative about Ottawa exploiting the province’s resources.

From Social Credit premiers William Aberhart and Ernest Manning through to Progressive Conservative Peter Lougheed, provincial governments portrayed hard‑working Albertans as besieged by federal political leaders and eastern “money powers” siphoning off “their” oil wealth.

That story hardened during the National Energy Program in the 1980s and was revived against former prime minister Justin Trudeau’s climate policies and carbon pricing, which UCP governments portrayed as an attack on a fossil‑fuel‑based way of life.

Recent scholarship shows how this individualism, free‑market ideology and fossil‑fuel identity has been continually updated through the Reform Party, the “firewall” letter, Jason Kenney’s “Fair Deal Panel” and, most recently, Premier Danielle Smith’s Alberta Sovereignty Within a United Canada Act.

Alberta’s sovereigntist politics are therefore less an aberration than a radicalization of longstanding themes: populist anti‑elite rhetoric, resentment of Ottawa and a deep attachment to oil and gas.

The Alberta Prosperity Project

The Alberta Prosperity Project (APP) crystallizes this paradox. Its leaders speak the language of hardship and urgency — “we see the writing on the wall” — and claim Alberta must seize “freedom, prosperity and sovereignty” from a confederation that no longer shares its “values” and “entrepreneurship.”

Their draft fiscal blueprint, The Value of Freedom, promises that independence would unleash tens of billions in savings, eliminate personal income tax, slash other taxes and transform Alberta into “the most prosperous country in the world.”

Central to this case is the complaint that Albertans pay too much to Ottawa and get too little back in return — especially through equalization and other transfers. In this telling, sovereignty — or at least a radically “restructured” relationship with Canada — is the only way to stop Ottawa from siphoning off the fruits of Alberta’s oil.

Yet this narrative glosses over Alberta’s own choices. During boom years, successive Conservative governments — strongly backed by many of the same constituencies now drawn to sovereigntist rhetoric — cut taxes, kept royalties comparatively low and resisted building a large, Norway‑style savings fund.

At the same time, Alberta chronically under-invested in health care, education and social services relative to its fiscal capacity, leaving systems stretched even before the COVID-19 pandemic. When oil prices fell, the result was not simply federal neglect but the exposure of a model that had privileged low taxes and immediate consumption over long‑term resilience.

In other words, the Alberta Prosperity Project is right that Albertans feel squeezed — but its account of who did the squeezing is selective. Sovereigntists who blame Ottawa and equalization for every shortfall ignore the role of provincial policy in creating the ongoing boom-and-bust cycle in Alberta.

‘Fossilized’ regionalism

Another source of discontent lies in the collision between Alberta’s oil‑dependent economy and the global climate transition.

Scholars say Alberta regionalism is “fossilized” — decades of political and economic investment in oil and gas have locked in expectations about jobs, identity and provincial autonomy.

As federal and international climate policies intensify, many Albertans interpret decarbonization as a threat. In a 2023 poll, three in five Albertans said they believe the province is right to resist the federal government’s net-zero goals.

The fear is not that Alberta has been excluded from growth, but that it will be deliberately left behind in the next economy while its existing wealth is constrained or stranded.

The Alberta Prosperity Project’s fiscal plan doubles down on hydrocarbons, promising prosperity through continued or expanded oil and gas development while railing against “externally imposed limits” on emissions.

Idiosyncrasies

The Alberta Prosperity Project embodies the idiosyncrasies of this approach. It calls for an independent, low‑tax petro‑state, denounces federal redistribution and promises world‑leading prosperity. Yet it rarely acknowledges that the same political camp has historically opposed higher royalties, stronger stabilization funds and robust social investment when times were good.

It presents the climate transition as an illegitimate imposition rather than a predictable structural shift that responsible governments could have prepared for.

Recent revelations that APP leaders have been workshopping state‑building with senior U.S. officials shows this isn’t just a symbolic protest, but an attempt to secure external backing for an oil‑centred future that Canada’s constitutional order and climate obligations cannot sustain.

Alberta’s sovereigntist discontent is a three-way collision: long‑cultivated politics of grievance against Ottawa; a self‑inflicted fiscal and social vulnerability rooted in decisions made during boom years; and a global energy transition that threatens a deeply embedded regional identity.

The danger? In insisting on a future of perpetual oil‑funded prosperity while railing against transfers and federal authority, movements like APP offer Albertans a superficially compelling story that cannot be reconciled with either Canada’s Constitution or the realities of a warming world.

Tamara Krawchenko is a Research Lead with the University of Victoria-led Accelerating Community Energy Transformation initiative; a Research Fellow with the Institute for Research on Public Policy; an expert panelist with the Canadian Climate Institute and; a board member with Ecotrust Canada.

– ref. As Alberta separatists court the U.S., prosperity is fuelling a sovereigntist turn – https://theconversation.com/as-alberta-separatists-court-the-u-s-prosperity-is-fuelling-a-sovereigntist-turn-274914

February 15, 2026

Africa’s trade blocs were designed to unite the continent: four reasons they haven’t delivered

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Chidi Anselm Odinkalu, Professor of Practice, International Human Rights Law, Tufts University

In a rapidly fracturing world, regional integration could be a source of resilience for the African continent.

The African Union agreed in 2019 to establish the African Continental Free Trade Area founded on the building blocks laid by eight regional economic communities. These are the Arab Maghreb Union, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (Comesa), the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (Cen-Sad), the East African Community (EAC), the Economic Community of Central African States (Eccas), the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

But integration has made slow progress.

The World Bank issued a report 45 years ago which said a larger regional market would increase production and reduce “long-term obstacles to development”. Those obstacles included infrastructure deficits, payment and settlement systems, and political risk.

They persist to this day. Based on my research over more than three decades of work on regionalism in Africa, I suggest there are four main reasons why.

Integration experiments suffer from colonial dependency.
Integration has failed to address the informal nature of enterprise in Africa.
African countries do integration as an add-on to pre-existing colonial arrangements, instead of re-imagining them.
Regional integration in Africa has been burdened by mission creep, which makes its goals unclear.

I argue that institutions created by Africa’s leaders for this purpose must facilitate the continent as a space in which every African can thrive and diminish the tendency for national politics to trump shared progress.

The burden of colonial dependency

At the conclusion of the Berlin West Africa Conference in February 1885, European powers and the United States of America appointed themselves “to regulate the conditions most favourable to the development of trade and civilization … in Africa.”

In 1973, a pioneering study of Foreign Investments in the East African Common Market concluded that most of Africa’s post-colonial regional integration arrangements were “based on pre-independence links and institutions.”

For instance, the East African Common Market was successor to Britain’s colonial East African Federation and precursor of today’s East African Community. The Community’s recent effort to expand beyond this original geography has come at the price of cohesion, which endangers it.

Ecowas was the first to transcend patterns of colonial dependency. Uniquely, it included countries that won their independence from France, Portugal and the United Kingdom. Fifty years after Ecowas was founded, recent developments suggest the experience continues to be uneasy.

One reason for this is because the post-colonial association or partnership agreements between the European Union and African, Caribbean and Pacific countries is designed to farm and extract goods that are sent to be processed in Europe. From there, African countries import the processed goods at higher prices. This makes it impossible for Africa to grow industries that can employ its own people to process what it produces.

Informal nature of business activity

Around Africa, colonial rule thrived by routing or taking over indigenous enterprise. Those who survived it did so by going underground or operating informally. Since independence, most governments in the continent have failed to redress this historical pattern criminalising African enterprise.

As recently as 2023, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa estimated informal cross-border trade in Africa at “between 30% and 72% of formal trade between neighbouring countries.” This excludes a huge proportion of African enterprise from the benefits of regional integration.

Integration as an add on, instead of a shared future

African countries continue to enter into regional integration not to re-imagine but as add-ons to pre-existing colonial arrangements. Recent estimates put the number of these arrangements at over 156. For a continent of 55 countries, this means confounding overlaps of both membership and mission.

In response, many have advocated rationalisation of Africa’s regional integration arrangements.

The AU’s decision to recognise eight regional economic communities was supposed to respond to this. But it has not eliminated the overlaps. For instance, Tanzania and the DRC respectively belong to the EAC and SADC. Eritrea and Sudan were simultaneously in the IGAD, Comesa, and Cen-Sad. French-speaking west African countries belong to both Ecowas and the Economic and Monetary Union of West Africa, better known as l’UEMOA.

What needs to happen next

Popular resentment against continuing colonial projects in parts of Africa may be high but it requires political imagination to transform that into constructive energy.

Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger exited Ecowas following rupture in relations with the colonial power, France. However, they still belong to l’UEMOA, whose currency system is backed by France.

It will take more than formal rules of market access or tax harmonisation to shrink informal trade. Women, for example, do over 70% of informal cross-border trade in Africa. An effective solution to this problem will require better frontier regimes and eliminate policies that discourage women from lawful enterprise.

Addressing mission creep

Rationalisation of Africa’s integration arrangements may already be quietly underway. Much of the focus is on membership overlaps. Since 2000, for instance, Ecowas has lost 25% of its membership, reducing it from 16 to 12 member states. Rwanda has withdrawn from Eccas and Eritrea from IGAD.

But the problem may be lack of clarity in the mission of Africa’s integration arrangements. In addition to economic issues, Africa’s regional integration regimes have also assumed burdens of collective security and governance oversight. The outcomes have been both unconvincing and destabilising. The exit in 2025 of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger from Ecowas is a recent example.

Without a clear political commitment to a shared future, Africa’s governments have been unable to manage the contradictions between economic integration, collective security and governance in one mission. The time has come for them to decide what they must prioritise so that regional integration in Africa will finally get the opportunity to prove and improve the continent’s prospects.

Chidi Anselm Odinkalu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Africa’s trade blocs were designed to unite the continent: four reasons they haven’t delivered – https://theconversation.com/africas-trade-blocs-were-designed-to-unite-the-continent-four-reasons-they-havent-delivered-274471

February 15, 2026

Digital monitoring is growing in South Africa’s public service – regulation needs to catch up

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Lesedi Senamele Matlala, Senior Lecturer and Researcher in Public Policy, Monitoring and Evaluations, University of Johannesburg

Government departments across South Africa are increasingly relying on digital tools to evaluate public programmes and monitor performance. This is part of broader public-sector reforms. Their aims are to improve accountability, respond to audit pressure and manage large-scale programmes with limited staff and budgets.

Here’s an example. National departments tracking housing delivery, social grants or infrastructure rollout rely on digital performance systems rather than periodic paper-based reports. Dashboards – a way of showing visual data in one place – provide near real-time updates on service delivery.

Another is the use platforms that collect mobile data. These allow frontline officials and contractors to upload information directly from the field.

Both examples lend themselves to the use of artificial intelligence (AI) to process large datasets and generate insights that would previously have taken months to analyse.

This shift is often portrayed as a step forward for accountability and efficiency in the public sector.

I am a public policy scholar with a special interest in monitoring and evaluation of government programmes. My recent research shows a worrying trend, that the turn to technology is unfolding much quicker than the ethical and governance frameworks meant to regulate it.

Across the cases I’ve examined, digital tools were already embedded in routine monitoring and evaluation processes. But there weren’t clear standards guiding their use.

This presents risks around surveillance, exclusion, data misuse and poor professional judgement. These risks are not abstract. They shape how citizens experience the state, how their data is handled and whose voices ultimately count in policy decisions.

When technology outruns policy

Public-sector evaluation involves assessing government programmes and policies. It determines whether:

public resources are used effectively
programmes achieve their intended outcomes
citizens can hold the state accountable for performance.

Traditionally, these evaluations relied on face-to-face engagement between communities, evaluators, government and others. They included qualitative methods that allowed for nuance, explanation and trust-building.

Digital tools have changed this.

In my research, I interviewed evaluators across government, NGOs, academia, professional associations and private consultancies. I found a consistent concern across the board. Digital systems are often introduced without ethical guidance tailored to evaluation practice.

Ethical guidance would provide clear, practical rules for how digital tools are used in evaluations. For example, when using dashboards or automated data analytics, guidance should require evaluators to explain how data are generated, who has access to them and how findings may affect communities being evaluated. It should also prevent the use of digital systems to monitor individuals without consent or to rank programmes in ways that ignore context.

South Africa’s Protection of Personal Information Act provides a general legal framework for data protection. But it doesn’t address the specific ethical dilemmas that arise when evaluation becomes automated, cloud-based and algorithmically mediated.

The result is that evaluators are often left navigating complex ethical terrain without clear standards. This forces institutions to rely on precedent, informal habits, past practices and software defaults.

Surveillance creep and data misuse

Digital platforms make it possible to collect large volumes of data. Once data is uploaded to cloud-based systems or third-party platforms, control over its storage, reuse and sharing frequently shifts from the evaluators to others.

Several evaluators described situations where data they’d collected on behalf of government departments was later reused by the departments or other state agencies. This was done without participants’ explicit awareness. Consent processes in digital environments are often reduced to a single click.

Examples of other uses included other forms of analysis, reporting or institutional monitoring.

One of the ethical risks that came out of the research was the use of this data for surveillance. This is the use of data to monitor individuals, communities or frontline workers.

Digital exclusion and invisible voices

Digital evaluation tools are often presented as expanding reach and participation. But in practice, they can exclude already marginalised groups. Communities with limited internet access, low digital literacy, language barriers or unreliable infrastructure are less likely to participate fully in digital evaluations.

Automated tools have limitations. For example, they may struggle to process multilingual data, local accents or culturally specific forms of expression. This leads to partial or distorted representations of lived experience. Evaluators in my study saw this happening in practice.

This exclusion has serious consequences especially in a country with inequality like South Africa. Evaluations that rely heavily on digital tools might find urban, connected populations and make rural or informal communities statistically invisible.

This is not merely a technical limitation. It shapes which needs are recognised and whose experiences inform policy decisions. If evaluation data underrepresents the most vulnerable, public programmes may appear more effective than they are. This masks structural failures rather than addressing them.

In my study, some evaluations reported positive performance trends despite evaluators noting gaps in data collection.

Algorithms are not neutral

Evaluators also raised concerns about the growing authority granted to algorithmic outputs. Dashboards, automated reports and AI-driven analytics are often treated as the true picture. This happens even when they conflict with field-based knowledge or contextual understanding.

For example, dashboards may show a target as on track. But in an example of a site visit, evaluators my find flaws or dissatisfaction.

Several participants reported pressure from funders or institutions to rely on the analysis of the numbers.

Yet algorithms reflect the assumptions, datasets and priorities embedded in their design. When applied uncritically, they can reproduce bias, oversimplify social dynamics and disregard qualitative insight.

If digital systems dictate how data must be collected, analysed and reported, evaluators risk becoming technicians and not independent professionals exercising judgement.

Why Africa needs context-sensitive ethics

Across Africa, national strategies and policies on digital technologies often borrow heavily from international frameworks. These are developed in very different contexts. Global principles on AI ethics and data governance provide useful reference points. But they don’t adequately address the realities of inequality, historical mistrust and uneven digital access across much of Africa’s public sector.

My research argues that ethical governance for digital evaluation must be context-sensitive. Standards must address:

how consent is obtained
who owns evaluation data
how algorithmic tools are selected and audited
how evaluator independence is protected.

Ethical frameworks must be embedded at the design stage of digital systems.

Lesedi Senamele Matlala is affiliated with the South Africa Monitoring and Evaluation Association (SAMEA). I am the chairperson

– ref. Digital monitoring is growing in South Africa’s public service – regulation needs to catch up – https://theconversation.com/digital-monitoring-is-growing-in-south-africas-public-service-regulation-needs-to-catch-up-273288

February 14, 2026

Cement has a climate problem — here’s how geopolymers with add-ins like cork could help fix it

Source: The Conversation – USA (2) – By Alcina Johnson Sudagar, Research Scientist in Chemistry, Washington University in St. Louis

Portland cement, widely used for concrete, is responsible for about 8% of global greenhouse gas emissions. Photovs/iStock/Getty Images Plus

Concrete is all around you – in the foundation of your home, the bridges you drive over, the sidewalks and buildings of cities. It is often described as the second-most used material by volume on Earth after water.

But the way concrete is made today also makes it a major contributor to climate change.

Portland cement, the key component of concrete, is responsible for about 8% of global greenhouse gas emissions. That’s because it’s made by heating limestone to high temperatures, a process that burns a large amount of fossil fuels for energy and releases carbon dioxide from the limestone in the process.

The good news is that there are alternatives, and they are gaining attention.

Portland cement: A greenhouse gas problem

Cementlike substances have been used in construction for thousands of years. Architects have found evidence of their use in the pyramids of Egypt and the buildings and aqueducts of the Roman Empire.

The Portland cement commonly used in construction today was patented in 1824 by Joseph Aspdin, a British bricklayer.

Modern cement preparation starts with crushing the excavated raw materials limestone and clay and then heating them in a kiln at around 2,650 degrees Fahrenheit (about 1,450 degrees Celsius) to form clinker, a hard, rocklike residue. The clinker is then cooled and ground with gypsum into a fine powder, which is called cement.

About 40% of the carbon dioxide emissions from cement production come from burning fossil fuels to generate the high heat needed to run the kiln. The rest come as the heat converts limestone (calcium carbonate) to lime (calcium oxide), releasing carbon dioxide.

In all, between half a ton and 1 ton of greenhouse gas is released per ton of Portland cement. Cement is a binding agent that, mixed with water, holds aggregate together to create concrete. It makes up about 10% to 15% of the concrete mix by weight.

Alternative technologies can lower emissions

As populations, cities and the need for new infrastructure expand, the use of cement is growing, making it important to find alternatives with lower environmental costs.

Concrete has seen the fastest growth among commonly used construction materials with rising population between 1950 and 2023 — As population has increased, annual global Portland cement production has risen with it.
Hao Chen, et al., 2025, CC BY-NC-ND

Some techniques for reducing carbon dioxide emissions include substituting some of the clinker – the hard residue typically made from limestone – with supplementary materials such as clay, or fly ash and slag from industries. Other methods reduce the amount of cement by mixing in waste sawdust or recycled materials like plastics.

The long-term solution for reducing cement’s emissions, however, is to replace traditional cement completely with alternatives. One option is geopolymers made from earthen clay and industrial wastes.

Geopolymers: A more climate-friendly solution

Geopolymers can be made by mixing claylike materials that are rich in aluminum and silicon minerals with a chemical activator through a process called geopolymerization. The activator transforms the silicon and aluminum into a structure that will look like cement. All of this can happen at room temperature.

The major difference between cement and geopolymer is that cement is mainly made of calcium, whereas geopolymers are made of silicon and aluminum with some possible calcium in their structure.

Geopolymers offer advantages with lower number of steps, lower CO2 emission and lower water requirement over Portland cement — How the production of Portland cement and geopolymers compare.
Alcina Johnson Sudagar, CC BY-NC

These geopolymers have been found to possess high strength and durability, including resilience in freeze-thaw cycles and resistance to heat and fire, which are important requirements in construction. Studies have found that some geopolymers can provide comparable if not better strength than traditional cement and, because they don’t require heat the way clinker does, they can be produced with significantly lower greenhouse gas emissions.

Geopolymers can also be produced from a variety of raw materials rich in aluminum and silicon, including earthen clays, fly ash, blast furnace slag, rice husk ash, iron ore wastes and recycled construction brick waste. Geopolymer technology can be adapted depending on the clay or industrial waste locally available in a region.

A brief history of cement and geopolymers. Geopolymer International.

An added advantage of geopolymers is that changes to the mixture can produce a range of features.

For example, I and my co-researchers at the University of Aveiro in Portugal added a small amount of cork industry waste – the leftovers from creating bottle corks – to clay-based geopolymer and found it could improve the strength of the material by up to twofold. The cork particles filled the spaces in the geopolymer structure, making it denser, which increased the strength.

Similarly, additives such as sisal fibers from the agave plant, recycled plastic and steel fibers can change geopolymer properties. The additives do not participate in the geopolymerization process but act as fillers in the structure.

The structure of geopolymers can also be designed to act as adsorbents, attracting toxic metals in wastewater and capturing and storing radioactive wastes. Specifically, incorporating materials like zeolite that are natural adsorbents in the geopolymer structure can make them useful for such applications as well.

Where geopolymers are used now

Geopolymers have been used in many types of construction, including roads, coatings, 3D printing, coastal environmental protection, the steel and chemical industries, sewer rehabilitation and building radiation shielding and rocket launchpad and bunker infrastructure.

One of the earliest examples of a modern geopolymer concrete project was the Brisbane West Wellcamp airport in Australia.

It was built in 2014 with 70,000 metric tons of geopolymer concrete, which was estimated to have reduced the project’s carbon dioxide emissions by as much as 80%.

The geopolymer market is currently estimated to be between US$7 billion and $10 billion, with the largest growth in the Asia-Pacific region.

Analysts have estimated that the market could grow at a rate of 10% to 20% per year and reach about $62 billion by 2033.

In several countries, greenhouse gas regulations and green-building certifications are expected to support the continued growth of geopolymers in the construction industry.

Expanding the use of cement alternatives

The advantage of using industrial wastes in geopolymers is a double-edged sword, however. The composition of industrial wastes varies, so it can be difficult to standardize the processing methods. The geopolymer components need to be mixed in particular ratios to achieve desired properties.

Producing the activator for the geopolymer, typically done in chemical facilities, can raise the cost and contribute to the carbon footprint. And the long-term data about these materials’ stability is only now being developed given their newness. Also, these geopolymers can take longer to set than cement, though the setting time can be sped up by using raw materials that react quickly.

Developing cheaper, naturally available activators like agricultural waste rice husk with sustainable supply chains could help lower the costs and environmental impact. Also, printing the recipe on the raw material packaging could help simplify the job of determining the mixing ratio so geopolymers can be more widely used with confidence.

Even though geopolymer technology has some drawbacks, these low-carbon alternatives have great potential for reducing emissions from the construction sector.

Alcina Johnson Sudagar has received funding from GeoBioTec.

– ref. Cement has a climate problem — here’s how geopolymers with add-ins like cork could help fix it – https://theconversation.com/cement-has-a-climate-problem-heres-how-geopolymers-with-add-ins-like-cork-could-help-fix-it-270354

February 14, 2026

La Chine se réarme à marche forcée, mais peut-elle vraiment rivaliser ?

Source: The Conversation – in French – By Laurent Vilaine, Docteur en sciences de gestion, ancien officier, enseignant en géopolitique à ESDES Business School, ESDES – UCLy (Lyon Catholic University)

La Chine se réarme massivement pour réduire son écart avec les États-Unis et consolider son statut de grande puissance. Son budget de défense augmente régulièrement, finance une modernisation rapide (marine, missiles, nucléaire) et place déjà les dépenses militaires de Pékin au rang des toutes premières mondiales, même si Washington demeure loin en tête de classement. Reste que l’Armée populaire de libération n’a plus mené de guerre majeure depuis le conflit sino‑vietnamien de 1979, si bien que l’on ignore comment elle encaisserait, en conditions réelles, une confrontation longue et coûteuse, par exemple autour de Taïwan.

Le réarmement chinois répond à une logique assez claire : il s’agit de rattraper les États-Unis dans la course au statut de première puissance mondiale et de se doter des moyens de reconquérir Taïwan dans les années à venir. Pékin veut dissuader, contraindre et se hisser au rang de superpuissance complète, non seulement économique et normative, mais également militaire. La montée en puissance est impressionnante. Les usines chinoises produisent avions, véhicules, bâtiments de guerre et missiles, entre autres, de manière massive. Reste à savoir si cette montée en puissance, impressionnante, réelle, traduit déjà un avantage face aux États-Unis en cas de confrontation militaire.

Le budget officiel de la défense de la République populaire de Chine (RPC) fait l’objet d’une hausse continue, et ses forces sont modernisées de manière accélérée, notamment en matière navale, nucléaire et de missiles. Le réarmement chinois n’est plus une perspective lointaine, c’est une réalité documentée. Si l’on se réfère aux bases de données internationales, la Chine est désormais parmi les tout premiers acteurs mondiaux en matière de dépenses militaires.

Néanmoins, la puissance militaire ne se réduit ni à la qualité ni à la quantité dde troupes et de matériels qu’un pays peut accumuler. Elle se juge également au travers de l’expérience opérationnelle réelle, de la qualité du commandement et de la capacité à durer en guerre moderne. Un parallèle peut être trouvé en Europe. La Pologne et l’Allemagne ont entamé un processus de réarmement réel. Mais ces armées mettront encore longtemps à devenir aussi performantes que l’armée française, habituée aux interventions extérieures et n’ayant pas la crainte des inévitables pertes humaines.

Un réarmement visible, chiffrable, assumé

Le mouvement se lit d’abord dans les budgets. Le budget de la défense chinoise se situe autour de 250 milliards de dollars (210,7 milliards d’euros), soit environ quatre fois le budget français, même si la RPC est encore loin du budget des États-Unis (autour de 962 milliards de dollars, soit plus de 810 milliards d’euros).

Le montant officiel des dépenses chinoises n’est pas toujours strictement comparable à celui d’autres pays en raison de périmètres budgétaires différents, mais il est l’expression d’une tendance : des hausses régulières, sur la durée, qui financent équipements, entraînement, recherche et développement (R&D) et transformation organisationnelle.

Certes, l’augmentation des dépenses militaires est un phénomène perceptible à l’échelle mondiale ; mais l’effort chinois est particulièrement vigoureux. La zone Indo-Pacifique, qui est la zone directe d’intérêt des Chinois, est devenue un centre de gravité de la compétition stratégique.

Pourquoi maintenant : rattrapage, modernisation, obsession du « retard » à combler

Dans le narratif chinois, la modernisation de l’armée n’est pas qu’un symbole de l’aspiration à devenir la première puissance mondiale en 2049 (année du centième anniversaire de l’avènement de la Chine communiste). La Chine ne veut plus « subir » et a donc décidé de combler, avant tout vis-à-vis des États-Unis, son écart technologique, capacitaire et organisationnel. Il s’agit de passer d’une armée principalement terrestre, très nombreuse en hommes, à un outil capable d’opérations conjointes.

Comme l’indique explicitement le dernier livre blanc officiel chinois, l’interopérabilité des différentes armées (terre, air, mer, espace, cyber) n’est pas totalement achevée et la numérisation du champ de bataille doit être accélérée, afin d’obtenir une force « de classe mondiale » au milieu du siècle. Pour les Chinois, cette modernisation reflète une obsession de crédibilité. En effet, exister comme superpuissance implique, aux yeux de Pékin, d’avoir une armée capable de dissuader, de contraindre et, si nécessaire, de vaincre.

Une logique de compétition avec Washington, mais pas le même type de puissance

La rivalité sino-américaine est centrale dans le réarmement chinois. Il ne s’agit pas seulement d’une course aux budgets mais d’une course aux capacités. Les États-Unis financent une posture mondiale, en rapport avec la superpuissance dominante qu’ils demeurent. Leur armée est structurée dans certaines parties du monde dans le cadre d’alliances, est capable de déploiements multi-théâtres et possède une expérience des opérations extérieures. Autant de capacités dont la Chine n’a pas encore fait la démonstration.

Mais la Chine cherche d’abord à réduire la liberté d’action américaine dans sa zone d’intérêt immédiat. Pour cela, elle aspire à rendre toute intervention de Washington plus risquée et plus coûteuse. Dans ce cadre, Pékin effectue d’importants efforts en matière de missiles, de défense aérienne, de capteurs, de guerre électronique, de capacités cyber et spatiales, tout en développant, comme nous venons de le voir, ses moyens navals et aériens.

L’objectif n’est donc pas nécessairement de « copier » la puissance américaine. Il s’agit de compliquer sa projection de puissance, en saturant les défenses des États-
Unis et de leurs alliés (principalement Taïwan, la Corée du Sud et le Japon).

Taïwan en ligne de mire : dissuader l’intervention, crédibiliser l’option militaire

Taïwan est une obsession chinoise de longue date et justifie en partie la montée en puissance de l’armée de la RPC.

Pékin peut conquérir l’île par divers moyens : la contraindre à se rendre à travers un blocus naval ou l’envahir militairement. Dans tous les cas, la Chine veut pouvoir imposer un fait accompli ou, si l’intervention armée est décidée, décourager l’aide extérieure à Taipei en tablant sur la crainte que pourraient inspirer ses nouvelles capacités.

La gesticulation régulière à laquelle procède la RPC autour de Taïwan (pression aérienne et navale, exercices, démonstrations de lancements de missiles) a pour fonction de montrer à Washington et à alliés que, sur ce dossier, la détermination de Pékin est absolue. Dans l’optique chinoise, l’objectif demeure de lui faire comprendre que le coût de l’escalade pourrait être très élevé. En rendant l’environnement opérationnel plus contesté, elle rend tout engagement des États-Unis plus coûteux.

Le nucléaire, accélérateur de statut – et de méfiance

Le nucléaire est l’expression parfaite de la bascule chinoise vers la puissance totale souhaitée à l’horizon 2049, parce qu’il touche au cœur de la dissuasion.

Les estimations publiques concluent à une expansion et à une modernisation de l’arsenal chinois, avec l’objectif d’atteindre 1 000 têtes à l’horizon 2030. Une telle progression de l’arsenal chinois modifie les calculs de stabilité stratégique et alimente les inquiétudes régionales.

Certes, les chiffres exacts restent incertains. Mais l’augmentation de l’arsenal nucléaire est une certitude. Ce phénomène change de facto la posture chinoise qui s’éloigne d’une posture de dissuasion minimale – l’équivalent de la « stricte suffisance » française – pour évoluer vers des capacités intimidantes et donc, par définition, plus agressives et démonstratives. L’augmentation de l’arsenal nucléaire chinois renforce le statut du pays, mais accroît aussi la méfiance qu’il suscite et durcit la compétition.

« Puissante sur le papier » : l’angle mort du « combat proven »

C’est ici que la prudence s’impose et doit être répétée. Les matériels, les budgets et les exercices ne remplacent pas l’épreuve du conflit. Or la Chine n’a pas, sur la période récente, l’expérience opérationnelle d’une guerre comparable à celle qui a forgé les réflexes de plusieurs armées, notamment américaine, française, britannique ou russe (même si cette dernière offre plutôt un contre-exemple en termes d’efficacité).

Le fait que la Chine n’ait plus combattu depuis 1979 ne prouve pas une faiblesse intrinsèque, mais questionne l’efficacité réelle de son armée le jour où elle se retrouvera sous stress, face à la surprise. Quelle sera son endurance morale ? Saura-t-elle supporter des pertes et s’adapter quand le plan initial devra être modifié sous la pression de la réponse adverse ? Une partie de la littérature stratégique rappelle au demeurant que moderniser une armée n’est pas qu’un processus technique et industriel, mais relève aussi d’une transformation humaine et organisationnelle.

Guerre moderne : ce que les chiffres ne mesurent pas (coordination, logistique, commandement, attrition)

Le grand public mesure souvent la qualité d’une armée à ses capacités létales. Pour autant, l’efficacité d’une armée se joue également au regard de qualités plus discrètes, telles la logistique, la maintenance, la capacité à durer, la formation des cadres, la circulation de l’information ou encore la résilience des communications sous attaque, comme la guerre entre la Russie et l’Ukraine l’a encore bien démontré, le plus souvent au détriment des Russes.

Un scénario militaire autour de Taïwan, objectif permanent de Pékin, serait un test majeur pour l’armée chinoise. En effet, l’invasion de l’île s’opérerait sous contraintes sévères : opérations maritimes et aériennes complexes ; distances maritimes importantes à parcourir (ce qui implique une grande vulnérabilité des flux) ; intensité de la guerre électronique ; et, probablement, une attrition rapide. Le matériel compte, c’est une affaire entendue. Mais la « capacité système », c’est-à-dire la capacité de planifier, de coordonner, de ravitailler, de réparer ou de remplacer, compte au moins tout autant. La qualité du haut commandement sera également vite testée dans sa capacité à réagir justement et vite dans l’incertitude.

La Chine est-elle capable de rivaliser avec les États-Unis ? Assurément. Est-elle capable de les dominer ? Non, à brève échéance. Mais la question reste ouverte pour les décennies à venir. La Chine a su construire, et continue de le faire, un outil militaire redoutable, surtout dans sa zone d’intérêt immédiat. Son plan de réarmement est cohérent, réel et fait l’objet d’une volonté politique assumée. Pour autant, l’écart est encore grand entre une armée chinoise en construction et sans expérience du combat et une armée américaine, elle aussi en cours de modernisation mais expérimentée. La maîtrise éprouvée d’opérations complexes sous le feu, sur la durée, avec des pertes et des imprévus est ce qui fait d’une armée moderne une armée moderne et efficace. C’est la réduction de cet écart, pas seulement en volume et en budget mais en qualité opérationnelle, qui seule permettra à la Chine de peut-être, un jour, supplanter la domination des États-Unis.

Laurent Vilaine ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.

– ref. La Chine se réarme à marche forcée, mais peut-elle vraiment rivaliser ? – https://theconversation.com/la-chine-se-rearme-a-marche-forcee-mais-peut-elle-vraiment-rivaliser-275457

February 14, 2026

Faut-il recourir à l’immigration pour lutter contre les déserts médicaux ?

Source: The Conversation – France in French (3) – By Iñaki Blanco-Cazeaux, Post-doctorant en économie de la santé, Université Bourgogne Europe

La pénurie globale de médecins en France et leur inégale répartition selon les territoires représentent l’un des enjeux des élections municipales de mars 2026. Pour lutter contre les déserts médicaux dans les zones où l’offre de soin est insuffisante, le système de santé fait appel à un contingent de praticiennes et praticiens étrangers issus de pays non membres de l’Union européenne. Avec quelle efficacité et quels sont les écueils à court et à long terme ?

La lutte contre les déserts médicaux est un enjeu international. En France, les inégalités d’accès aux soins, notamment pour des raisons territoriales, constituent une priorité des politiques de santé. Améliorer l’offre de soins à disposition de la population est également un des sujets de la campagne des prochaines élections municipales, particulièrement dans les territoires ruraux, même si, en périphérie des grandes agglomérations, des départements comme la Seine-Saint-Denis, présentée comme « le premier désert médical de France », ne sont pas non plus épargnés. Cette préoccupation repose sur un double constat : la pénurie globale de praticiens et leur répartition territoriale déséquilibrée.

Une des réponses politiques à ce problème est le recours aux médecins étrangers. Par exemple, en 2025, les décrets n°2025-467 et 468 ont ainsi visé à simplifier la régularisation des praticiens à diplôme hors Union européenne (Padhue).

Qu’en est-il des résultats de ces politiques en France et ailleurs ? Quelle est leur utilité à court terme ? Quels en sont les défis à long terme ? Un ensemble de travaux de recherche permettent de répondre à ces questions.

Combler les pénuries à court terme

Différents contextes ont montré que le recours aux médecins étrangers a permis de combler le manque d’offre médicale dans les zones rurales et/ou sous-desservies. Effectivement, cela permet une croissance rapide de l’offre de soins, contrairement à l’augmentation du nombre d’étudiants pour lesquels une décennie de formation est nécessaire, ce qui coûte en temps et en argent. Ainsi, lorsque des politiques publiques visent à orienter ces médecins vers les zones qui en ont le plus besoin, cela y réduit les pénuries à court terme.

De son côté, la France a connu une nette progression des effectifs de médecins diplômés à l’étranger depuis 2007, notamment grâce à la directive européenne de 2005 qui reconnaît automatiquement les qualifications professionnelles des praticien·nes ayant des diplômes européens. Une étude de l’Institut de recherche et de documentation en économie de la santé (Irdes) a montré que l’arrivée des médecins généralistes libéraux diplômés à l’étranger renforce l’offre de soins dans les zones sous-dotées, comme les marges rurales et les espaces périurbains.

Des politiques coercitives ou incitatives

Dans le cadre de ces politiques, deux stratégies sont possibles. L’une est coercitive, comme le programme de dérogation Conrad 30 aux États-Unis ou la section 19 AB du Health Insurance Act en Australie, dans la mesure où les médecins étrangers doivent travailler un certain temps en désert médical pour pouvoir exercer. L’autre est incitative, comme les programmes provinciaux d’immigration au Canada ou la liste des compétences en pénurie à long terme en Nouvelle-Zélande, mettant en place des ressources pour attirer les travailleurs qualifiés étrangers (y compris des médecins).

En France, la liberté d’installation est un principe fondamental de la médecine libérale, même si elle est de plus en plus contestée. Il n’y a donc pas de mécanisme coercitif pour que les médecins diplômés au sein de l’Union européenne s’installent en zone de sous-densité médicale.

En revanche, jusqu’à récemment, les praticiens à diplôme hors Union européenne (Padhue) devaient effectuer un « parcours de consolidation des compétences » durant lequel ils étaient affectés dans des structures de santé où les besoins sont les plus importants. Ce dispositif a cependant été assoupli en 2025 afin de faciliter l’installation pérenne des Padhue en France. Toutefois, leur orientation (par les agences régionales de santé, ou ARS), avant d’être pleinement autorisés à exercer en France, est supposée se faire selon les besoins locaux.

Bien que l’on puisse penser que les politiques coercitives luttent mieux contre les déserts médicaux que les politiques incitatives, cela n’a a priori pas été démontré. Un cadre coercitif, comme aux États-Unis, subit d’ailleurs ses propres limites puisque, là-bas, les déserts médicaux urbains bénéficient davantage des médecins étrangers que les déserts médicaux ruraux.

Des difficultés de rétention et d’intégration

Si ces politiques sont efficaces à court terme, on note cependant que les médecins étrangers ont tendance à être plus mobiles et à rester moins longtemps dans les déserts médicaux que les diplômés nationaux. En effet, l’intégration culturelle, linguistique, sociale et les conditions de travail sont des obstacles pour les médecins étrangers et leurs familles dans les communautés rurales.

Ces problèmes d’intégration peuvent également se manifester par des discriminations à l’encontre des médecins étrangers, certains subissant de la xénophobie ou du racisme. De même, les systèmes de santé dans lesquels ils sont impliqués ne les considèrent pas nécessairement a priori comme des médecins équivalents aux autres, ce qui peut induire un sentiment de déconsidération.

Un préjudice pour les systèmes de santé fragiles des pays d’origine

De plus, le recours aux médecins étrangers met en évidence un manque d’autosuffisance des pays développés pour gérer leurs propres pénuries médicales. Une telle dépendance rend l’accès aux soins vulnérable aux changements dans les politiques d’immigration et dans le contexte international. Si les médecins étrangers devaient se retirer, il y aurait sur l’accès aux soins une incidence négative aussi rapide que l’effet positif de l’immigration.

C’est de surcroît un processus préjudiciable aux pays en développement, contribuant à la fuite des cerveaux, notamment en Afrique et en Asie du Sud-Est. Ce phénomène affaiblit les systèmes de santé déjà fragiles des pays en développement, exacerbant les pénuries de médecins dans leurs propres zones mal desservies et créant des inégalités mondiales en matière d’accès aux soins.

Le recours à l’immigration de médecins est donc une politique qui tend à perpétuer, si ce n’est à amplifier, les inégalités Nord-Sud en matière de développement humain.

Une politique d’immigration qui ne peut pas tout

Les difficultés posées par le recours aux médecins étrangers supposent de ne pas s’en contenter.

Assurer la viabilité de l’accès aux soins pour tous sur le long terme suppose :

des investissements importants pour atteindre un nombre de praticiens suffisants dans chaque spécialité,
d’améliorer les conditions de travail et de vie dans les zones sous-dotées en personnel soignant, notamment dans les territoires ruraux, afin de les rendre plus attractives,
et de mettre en œuvre une planification efficace de l’offre de soin dans les déserts médicaux.

Iñaki Blanco-Cazeaux ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.

– ref. Faut-il recourir à l’immigration pour lutter contre les déserts médicaux ? – https://theconversation.com/faut-il-recourir-a-limmigration-pour-lutter-contre-les-deserts-medicaux-275114

February 14, 2026

La santé, un enjeu incontournable des prochaines élections municipales

Source: The Conversation – France in French (3) – By Laurent Chambaud, Médecin de santé publique, École des hautes études en santé publique (EHESP)

Alors que l’échelon des collectivités locales est particulièrement pertinent en matière de santé, les freins qui s’opposent à une réelle « territorialisation » de la santé sont nombreux. Fruit des échanges entre Laurent Chambaud, médecin de santé publique et inspecteur général des affaires sociales, qui a dirigé l’École des hautes études en santé publique (EHESP) de 2013 à 2022 et Gilbert Hangard, adjoint au maire d’Albi délégué à la santé et président de l’association Élus Santé Publique et Territoires (ESPT), ce texte fait le point sur la situation, à la veille des élection municipales 2026.

L’intérêt des Français pour leur santé ne se dément pas. Sur la période 2007 à 2022, ce sujet figurait selon l’Insee dans le top 3 de leurs principales préoccupations, une tendance confirmée par plusieurs sondages d’opinion.

Au fil des décennies, un élargissement progressif du périmètre d’intervention de la santé est maintenant acquis. Elle intègre désormais les déterminants sociauxDéterminants sociaux de la santé
Les déterminants sociaux de la santé sont les circonstances dans lesquelles les individus naissent, grandissent, vivent, travaillent et vieillissent ainsi que les systèmes mis en place pour faire face à la maladie., environnementauxDéterminants environnementaux de la santé
Ici, l’environnement est compris aussi bien au sens écologique qu’au sens du logement, du travail, de l’aménagement urbain, du tissu social, etc. et comportementauxLes déterminants comportementaux de la santé
Les déterminants comportementaux de la santé regroupent l’ensemble des comportements individuels et collectifs qui ont une influence directe sur la santé : tabagisme et autres addictions, consommation d’alcool, sédentarité, régime alimentaire inapproprié, etc. de la santé, conformément aux cadres proposés par l’OMS (Organisation mondiale de la santé).

Cette évolution a conduit à reconnaître le rôle essentiel des territoires dans la production de la santé et du bien-être. Même dans un pays comme la France, où le système de santé est centré sur le soin et ne reconnaît que marginalement la prévention et la promotion de la santé, ce changement devient inéluctable. Pour cette raison, il est essentiel que les questions de santé soient débattues dans le cadre des élections locales. Revenons sur les arguments qui plaident en ce sens.

Trois arguments en faveur d’un ancrage territorial des politiques de santé

Le premier argument en faveur de l’échelon des collectivités territoriales s’appuie sur le fait que la grande majorité des déterminants de la santé se concrétisent et sont perceptibles au niveau des lieux de vie, de travail, d’éducation…

Qu’il s’agisse de mettre en place une politique de mobilité active (qui peut s’inscrire dans le contexte plus large d’un aménagement du territoire visant à favoriser la transition écologique), de lutter contre des environnements polluants, de faire régresser les déserts médicaux, de circonscrire l’impact sanitaire des addictions, ou de lutter contre les inégalités de santé, l’échelon des collectivités territoriales s’avère essentiel pour incarner et adapter la stratégie nationale de santé.

Autre argument soulignant l’importance des collectivités territoriales : ces dernières sont des laboratoires d’innovation publique. Cette dynamique, réelle, est documentée depuis plus de dix ans, notamment dans les domaines de la coordination des acteurs, de la prévention populationnelle ou de la participation citoyenne.

Les exemples les plus fréquents et concrets sont les politiques locales de sport santé (dont les maisons sport santé) et les dispositifs territoriaux de santé mentale portés via les Conseils locaux de Santé mentale (CLSM). D’autres initiatives se développent, comme les services médicaux de proximité co-construits par les villes pour lutter contre les déserts médicaux, ou les plateformes d’entraide créées par plusieurs municipalités pour « aller vers » les publics isolés et permettre de conserver ou de développer les liens de proximité.

Enfin, un troisième argument est que le principe de « la santé dans toutes les politiques » formulé par l’OMS en 2014 constitue aujourd’hui un référentiel largement partagé. Il repose sur l’idée que la santé est influencée par l’ensemble des politiques publiques et à son tour, doit être prise en compte dans l’élaboration de politiques publiques dans de nombreux domaines.

De la même manière, le développement du concept « One Health » (une seule santé), demande à agir en prônant une approche transversale. Or les collectivités de proximité sont de véritables « tisseurs de politiques intersectorielles », ayant développé une compétence et un savoir-faire particuliers dans ce domaine.

La place stratégique des collectivités locales

Étant en mesure d’agir sur l’urbanisme, les mobilités, l’environnement, l’alimentation, le sport, la petite enfance et la vie scolaire ou la cohésion sociale, les collectivités locales apparaissent donc comme des acteurs stratégiques. Dans le même temps, les élus de proximité sont également interrogés sur l’organisation du système de santé, que ce soit du fait des déserts médicaux, ou de la disponibilité des structures et services pour accompagner les personnes âgées dépendantes.

Cette reconnaissance du rôle que les collectivités locales ont à jouer en matière de santé s’accompagne cependant d’une question centrale : disposent-elles réellement des moyens et des cadres institutionnels nécessaires pour assumer ces responsabilités croissantes ?

Les politiques territoriales de santé reposent actuellement sur des dispositifs contractuels (Contrats locaux de Santé, projets territoriaux, appels à projets…), qui favorisent l’innovation, mais entretiennent une ambiguïté institutionnelle. La santé demeure une compétence principalement étatique, tandis que les collectivités sont incitées à agir en mobilisant des compétences facultatives qui se révèlent « de plus en plus essentielles ».

Ainsi, ces dispositifs font peser une responsabilité importante sur les exécutifs locaux en matière de résultats, alors que les financements font régulièrement l’objet de discussions et négociations avec l’État qui dispose d’une compétence inscrite dans la loi. Dans ces conditions, nombre d’entre elles rechignent à se saisir de ces enjeux, pour diverses raisons.

Des questions financières

Le premier de ces freins majeurs est financier : le risque d’un transfert implicite des responsabilités de l’État vers les collectivités, sans transfert équivalent de moyens. Dans le contexte budgétaire actuel, cette logique conduit à transformer l’échelon local en amortisseur des défaillances structurelles du système national de santé, alors même que la soutenabilité de l’action locale est menacée.

Par ailleurs, si l’innovation de ces territoires est souvent saluée, l’innovation territoriale repose fréquemment sur des financements fragiles. En effet, bien souvent, les dispositifs innovants sont financés via des appels à projets, régionaux ou nationaux, limités dans le temps. Ce qui pose très vite la question de leur pérennité. Les expérimentations dites « article 51 » illustrent cette situation malsaine.

Développées dans le cadre de la loi de financement de la Sécurité sociale de 2018, ces expérimentations, qui ont mobilisé de nombreux acteurs locaux, n’arrivent pas à être généralisées ou simplement pérennisées. De plus, sur le terrain, la mise en œuvre de la transversalité se heurte à la segmentation administrative, à la rareté de l’ingénierie territoriale et à l’absence d’arbitrages clairs entre objectifs concurrents. Faute de hiérarchisation, la transversalité peut diluer les responsabilités et ralentir la prise de décision.

Un déficit d’évaluation

Peu de politiques territoriales de santé font l’objet d’analyses longitudinales, de comparaisons inter-territoriales ou d’évaluations économiques. Malgré la multiplication des initiatives locales, l’évaluation rigoureuse de leurs impacts reste limitée.

Ce déficit d’évaluation constitue une limite structurelle à la pérennité de l’action, car il affaiblit la capacité à distinguer les dispositifs réellement efficaces de ceux qui relèvent principalement d’une logique symbolique ou communicationnelle.

Les arbitrages, des angles morts

Autre frein : les arbitrages dans le domaine de la santé constituent souvent un angle mort du discours territorial. Les politiques de santé et de transition impliquent des choix politiques structurants : allocation des ressources, priorisation des publics, acceptabilité sociale des mesures. Or, le discours sur l’action locale tend à « naturaliser » ces politiques comme des évidences consensuelles.

Cette dépolitisation apparente masque des conflits d’intérêts légitimes et peut fragiliser la légitimité démocratique de l’action publique locale.

La nécessité d’arbitrage de politiques locales pour des raisons de santé publique peut s’illustrer par la mise en œuvre des Zones à Faible Emission (ZFE). La pollution atmosphérique est responsable de plus de 40 000 décès par an en France et les données scientifiques confirment le rôle positif de ces mesures de restriction de la circulation pour les véhicules les plus polluants. Pourtant, cette mesure fait l’objet de nombreuses contestations et alimente de nombreuses fausses informations.

La nécessité d’un cadre clair

Un point important à souligner est qu’une territorialisation de la santé sans cadre explicite pourrait avoir des effets négatifs, notamment dans l’offre de services ou dans le déploiement d’interventions en santé.

Il existe en effet des écarts significatifs en termes de ressources financières, de compétences techniques et de capital politique entre les différentes collectivités locales. Les territoires les mieux dotés concentrent les expérimentations, tandis que les collectivités les plus fragiles peinent à s’inscrire dans les dispositifs existants.

Les choix politiques peuvent également influencer la volonté de développer, voire juste préserver des dispositifs existants ou à venir. Ainsi, si certaines municipalités s’engagent dans des Contrats locaux de Santé, d’autres n’y voient pas d’intérêt ou ignorent même leur existence.

La territorialisation des politiques de santé, censée réduire les inégalités, peut paradoxalement contribuer à les renforcer si elle n’est pas accompagnée de mécanismes de solidarité et de péréquation.

Les collectivités locales au cœur d’un paradoxe

Toute cette situation crée un paradoxe : les collectivités sont appelées à jouer un rôle central à la fois dans la prévention et la réduction des inégalités de santé, ainsi que dans l’organisation en proximité de notre système de santé. Cependant, elles n’ont aucun pouvoir structurant sur les leviers essentiels du système de soins ou de redistribution…

Par ailleurs, le pouvoir central conserve un rôle stratégique et de cadrage des politiques. Les systèmes de santé évoluent vers une complexité croissante et la multiplication d’acteurs autonomes (établissements de santé, établissements médico-sociaux, acteurs libéraux, monde associatif, industries pharmaceutiques, acteurs technologiques…). Ainsi, l’État n’a plus les moyens humains, organisationnels et financiers pour mettre en œuvre sur le terrain des politiques de santé. Pourtant il rechigne à partager ses compétences et fragilise l’échelon régional de régulation, c’est-à-dire les Agences Régionales de Santé, chargées de traduire les orientations nationales sans disposer de leviers suffisants.

Tirer les leçons de la pandémie de Covid-19

Les collectivités locales constituent un levier indispensable pour répondre aux défis sanitaires, sociaux et environnementaux contemporains. Après la canicule de 2003, qui a montré le rôle majeur des dispositifs de proximité, la crise causée par la pandémie de Covid-19 a mis en lumière ce maillon indispensable pour la pleine efficacité d’une politique publique au plus près de la population (le dernier kilomètre).

Dans ce moment exceptionnel, elles ont par exemple mis en place de nombreux centres de dépistage et de vaccination, en mobilisant des locaux municipaux et du personnel. Elles ont aussi assuré la distribution de masques, le soutien aux personnes isolées (livraison de courses, aide sociale) et l’adaptation des services publics (écoles, transports, aides aux entreprises locales).

Pour autant, et en l’absence d’un retour d’expérience partagé entre État et collectivités locales sur les enseignements à en tirer pour avancer sur une territorialisation des politiques de santé, à ce jour rien n’a vraiment changé dans la répartition des compétences et des moyens qui doivent être investis pour promouvoir, rétablir et préserver la santé des populations.

Un rôle à repenser pour les collectivités de proximité

Les prochaines élections municipales constituent un moment stratégique pour mettre la santé territoriale au cœur du débat, car la commune agit déjà sur de nombreux déterminants (urbanisme, mobilités, pollution, logement, nature, sport, alimentation) et est interpellée régulièrement sur l’organisation en proximité de notre système de santé. Les candidats cherchent des projets concrets et visibles, et ces sujets de santé parlent directement au quotidien des habitants.

L’enjeu est de présenter la santé comme une politique de qualité de vie, pas seulement comme une question médicale. Il est temps d’interpeller les échelons central et régional sur le nécessaire cadrage des politiques de santé et sur la garantie d’une équité des dispositifs sur l’ensemble du territoire.

Dans le même temps, il est indispensable de proposer un plan municipal de santé, de garantir la présence d’un élu référent, et de mettre en place des dispositifs de concertation (à l’instar du contrat local de santé). De telles initiatives permettront de structurer des actions locales crédibles et de fédérer largement.

Pour conclure, soulignons que la montée en responsabilité des collectivités de proximité en matière de santé ne saurait se substituer à une politique nationale structurante. Une territorialisation efficace se doit d’être lucide et suppose un cadre institutionnel clair, des moyens pérennes, une évaluation robuste et une reconnaissance explicite des arbitrages politiques. À défaut, l’ambition territoriale ne fera que fragiliser l’action publique au lieu de la renforcer.

Pour aller plus loin :

– Le site de l’association Élus Santé Publique et Territoires (ESPT), dont l’objet est la promotion et la reconnaissance du rôle des villes et des élus locaux en santé.

Laurent Chambaud est membre de Place Publique

– ref. La santé, un enjeu incontournable des prochaines élections municipales – https://theconversation.com/la-sante-un-enjeu-incontournable-des-prochaines-elections-municipales-275294