What’s behind Pakistan’s war with Afghanistan’s Taliban government?

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Michael Semple, Visiting Research Professor, The Senator George J. Mitchell Institute for Global Peace Security and Justice, Queen’s University Belfast

Pakistan has been at war with Afghanistan’s Taliban regime for just under one month. Yet the conflict, which was officially declared by Pakistan the day before the US and Israel launched their strikes on Iran, has been overshadowed by events in the Gulf.

Pakistan and the Taliban have made widely differing claims regarding the numbers of people killed on either side. The rising casualty toll only briefly captured global attention when a Pakistani airstrike hit a drug rehabilitation centre in Kabul on March 16, killing more than 100 people.

But the three weeks of fighting, with a brief pause for the Eid al-Fitr holiday between March 20 and 23, confirm for anyone who still doubted it, that the schism between Pakistan and the Taliban is real. Of course there are complex geopolitical and regional interests at play. India provides some support for the Taliban while China tries to balance its alliance with Pakistan and its more tentative relationship with the Taliban. But the conflict tells us more about the politics of the Taliban movement itself and its relationship with Pakistan.

The Taliban are happy to exploit the spectacle of the conflict with Pakistan as their latest bid for legitimacy. They pose to the Afghan population as defenders of national sovereignty. And they believe that their guerrilla tactics give them an advantage in ground fighting against what they disparagingly refer to as the “Punjabi army”. Meanwhile, their ideology, which is based on religious zeal tinged with nationalism, plays to historical Afghan ideas around resisting foreigners, including the defeat of the British Army of the Indus in the 1838-42 war, is a potent recruiting tool.

Pakistani militants

The Pakistani Taliban (TTP) are the key factor behind the breakdown in Afghanistan’s relations with Pakistan. The TTP are a group of Pakistani militants, inspired by the Afghan Taliban, but with their own leadership and structure. The Afghan Taliban have provided a haven in Afghanistan to the TTP that mirrors the refuge they themselves received in Pakistan until 2021.

In the run up to the latest war, the TTP escalated their insurgency against the Pakistan state. Now TTP leaders have declared themselves a part of the Taliban’s emirate. They claim to be fighting to impose the Taliban version of the emirate on the whole of Pakistan, not just the tribal areas of the frontier, where the TTP originated.

This may help Pakistan persuade other regional powers that the Taliban pose a threat to stability analogous to that posed by Iran – but with IEDs and suicide bombers instead of ballistic missiles and drones. The problem for the Pakistan army is that neither previous efforts at containment of the Taliban nor the current limited aerial campaign against them has made the extremist regime amenable to cooperation.

Building grievance

For years, the Taliban were widely denigrated as a proxy force that had been created and supported by Pakistan and served Islamabad’s interests. This is simply wrong. The Taliban as a movement is rooted in Afghan culture and history, dominated by conservative Sunni clerics and madrassah (Islamic school) students from the Kandahari branches of Afghanistan’s Pashtun tribes. It was these tribes’ 18th-century rebellions against their Persian overlords which led to the emergence of modern Afghanistan. For three decades the movement has pursued a vision of imposing the Taliban’s Islamic system on Afghanistan.

They only accepted safe haven in Pakistan because they saw it as their best chance of outlasting the US intervention in Afghanistan.

The Taliban never felt much gratitude towards their hosts. Instead they accumulated grievances against their benefactors during the safe haven period. These grievances started soon after 9/11, when Pakistan helped the US detain numerous Taliban leaders. By August 2021 the Taliban had a pantheon of senior figures whose deaths they blamed on Pakistan – such as their former defence minister Obaidullah Akhund in 2010 and their second leader Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansoor in 2016.

When the Taliban leaders and security chiefs returned to government in Afghanistan in 2021, they were still nursing these grievances. As a result they have adopted policies to reduce Pakistan’s influence in their country. Taliban with families and assets in Pakistan were pressurised to repatriate them to Afghanistan. They have also redirected Afghanistan’s trade so that, by 2025, Iran had replaced Pakistan as the main source of Afghanistan’s imports. Meanwhile India has replaced it as the main destination for Afghan exports.

Since taking power, the Taliban have built their insurgent fighters into coherent national security forces – but forces that are subject to intense religious indoctrination. Anticipating the current conflict, they built a series of underground storage facilities for weaponry and to shelter their leaders if required. For now, they rely on vehicle-mounted heavy machine guns as air defence, but they continue trying to acquire more advanced capabilities, for example by showing up at Russian arms exhibitions.

Risk of escalation

If the Taliban were dancing to Islamabad’s tune, they would have answered Pakistan’s call to help deal with the TTP insurgency. Instead, the Taliban has sheltered the TTP allowing them to conduct attacks against Pakistan, despite repeated Pakistani protests and airstrikes against TTP targets in Afghanistan.

But in the fighting since the end of February, Pakistan has escalated from bombing the “guests”“ – TTP targets in Afghanistan – to bombing the “hosts” – the Afghan Taliban. So Afghanistan’s Taliban government has escalated by openly sending Afghan fighters across the border.

The war in the Persian Gulf rapidly overshadowed the Taliban’s war with Pakistan. But that does not diminish the potential for serious consequences from the latest twist in Afghanistan’s conflict. By openly allying themselves with a movement which seeks the overthrow of Pakistan’s government, the Taliban pose a threat to the stability of the second most populous Muslim majority state – a country with a nuclear arsenal.

And this, in turn, increases pressure on the Pakistan army to expand its campaign against the Taliban, contemplating regime change if the regime cannot be reformed. But regime change would require an alternative to the Taliban, which does not currently exist. This suggests that achieving Pakistan’s objectives will require more ambition than yet seen in the air campaign.

The Conversation

Michael Semple has received European and UK government funding for his research on the Taliban

ref. What’s behind Pakistan’s war with Afghanistan’s Taliban government? – https://theconversation.com/whats-behind-pakistans-war-with-afghanistans-taliban-government-277105

The News from Dublin: Colm Tóibín’s latest short story collection resonates with emotional truth

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Manjeet Ridon, Associate Dean International, Faculty of Arts, Design & Humanities, De Montfort University

Colm Tóibín’s latest collection of short stories delivers a quietly powerful collection of nine stories that traverse Ireland, Spain, Argentina and the US. The News from Dublin offers intimate portraits of people shaped by history, disappointment, tragedy, grief and the long shadows of secrecy. These narratives favour restraint over spectacle, revealing emotional truths through subtle gestures, silences and missed connections.

Several stories are rooted in Ireland’s past, foregrounding families and communities under pressure. The Journey to Galway, set during the first world war, follows a mother travelling by train to deliver the telegram announcing her son’s death to his wife, and the impact of the war on the home front.

The drama lies not in external events but in her internal reckoning with grief, duty and the weight of carrying devastating news that will shatter the lives of her family and grandchildren. Tóibín’s spare prose mirrors the emotional austerity of the moment, highlighting how tragedy reverberates through ordinary lives.

A Sum of Money similarly explores Irish social realities, focusing on poverty and moral ambiguity. The young protagonist’s thefts at a religious boarding school are portrayed with empathy rather than condemnation, revealing how deprivation and shame can warp childhood.

The muted reaction when he is discovered and expelled from the school underscores a recurring motif in the collection: the unsaid, the unresolved, and the quiet accommodation of wrongdoing within institutions and families.

In the titular story, The News from Dublin, a schoolteacher’s attempt to navigate the complexities of local politics to secure experimental treatment for his sick brother results in him returning home unable to deliver the much hoped-for news. The absence of “news” is itself the story’s emotional climax, reflecting the moral complexities of familial duty, disappointment and avoidance.

Beyond Ireland, Tóibín examines themes of migration and displacement. Five Bridges follows an undocumented Irish immigrant in San Francisco returning to Ireland after three decades in the US.

His last weekend with his American daughter becomes a poignant reckoning with belonging, fatherhood and the precarity of immigrant life, framed against the spectre of contemporary US immigration raids and law enforcement under Donald Trump’s second term as president. The story captures the solidarity and belonging of diasporic and expatriate communities living precarious lives.

Sleep and Barton Springs delve into grief and sexuality with subtlety. In Sleep, a gay man’s relationship with his lover falters under the strain of his unresolved grief about his deceased brother, prompting a journey back to Dublin for therapy. The story delicately probes how cultural identity shapes the articulation of pain and trauma.

Barton Springs, the shortest story in the collection, also concerns a man grieving the death of his brother and offers a fleeting, sensuous moment of connection amid grief when one swimmer is transfixed in admiration of the physical beauty of another.

The Spanish stories in the collection introduce broader political and historical dimensions. Summer of ’38, narrated by an elderly Marta, reflects on a youthful affair during the Spanish civil war and the lifelong consequences of concealed parentage. Her silence about her daughter’s father encapsulates the collection’s recurring tension between truth and secrecy.

A Free Man, set in Barcelona, is perhaps the most unsettling story: an Irish ex-prisoner unrepentant about his crimes attempts to establish a new life in Spain free from detection. The narrative forces readers to confront moral discomfort without offering easy judgement, echoing biblical and existential motifs.

The collection concludes with The Catalan Girls, a novella-length story that presents a richly layered family saga centred on three sisters whose lives unfold across Spain and Argentina. Narrated from the perspective of the youngest sister, Montse, the story examines sisterhood, sibling rivalry, family poverty and the fragile formation of female identity in patriarchal societies.

The story ends with Montse stealing her sister’s Spanish passport so that she may have a life of independence and financial freedom away from her sisters. This act of betrayal becomes a powerful symbol of her self-preservation and defiance.

Across these stories, Tóibín returns to recurring themes: the burdens of history, the complexities of family and sexuality, the scars of poverty and migration, and the quiet tragedies of withheld truths. His prose is measured, empathetic and unsentimental, allowing readers to inhabit moral grey zones without overt authorial judgement.

The News from Dublin emerges as a complex collection of family histories and profound interior lives, rendered with quiet precision and emotional intelligence, and a set of stories that resonate strongly with contemporary political and social concerns.

The Conversation

Manjeet Ridon does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. The News from Dublin: Colm Tóibín’s latest short story collection resonates with emotional truth – https://theconversation.com/the-news-from-dublin-colm-toibins-latest-short-story-collection-resonates-with-emotional-truth-276230

Why hasn’t the US military used force to secure the Strait of Hormuz?

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Justin Bergman, International Affairs Editor, The Conversation

The Conversation, CC BY-SA

Since the United States and Israel launched their war against Iran in late February, Iran has retaliated by targeting commercial ships in the Strait of Hormuz, effectively shutting down the narrow channel of water.

It’s caused a global fuel crisis, even though some ships are managing to get through the strait. US President Donald Trump has given Iran an ultimatum to fully reopen the waterway to oil and gas shipments, and called on NATO allies to help in the effort.

We asked naval expert Jennifer Parker, who served for 20 years with the Royal Australian Navy, to explain what kind of military force would be required to reopen the strait to commercial shipping and why the US hasn’t yet taken this step.

Why is it so hard to prevent attacks on ships?

The geography of the region has a lot to do with this.


The Conversation, CC BY-SA

Iran clearly dominates the northern part of the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman. That proximity allows it to use its cheaper weapons such as drones to target ships.

Creating the conditions to make merchant shipping safe – or at least reduce the risk – requires a two-phase campaign.

The first phase is taking out Iran’s ability to target ships. There are two ways to do this:

  • persuade or force Iran to stop attacking ships
  • destroy Iran’s ability to attack ships by taking out its radar facilities, command and control structure and weapons bunkers along the coast.

The US has air power, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities to identify and destroy most of these targets. Locating and destroying Iran’s masses of drones will be harder, as they can be stored almost anywhere, so intelligence will be crucial here.

The Malta-flagged container vessel Safeen Prestige on fire in the Strait of Hormuz on March 18 after being hit by Iranian explosives.
Copernicus Sentinel-2 satellite, CC BY-SA

Once you reduce the risk through a bombing campaign, the second element of getting ships back through the strait is a reassurance campaign.

This requires airborne early warning aircraft and maritime patrol aircraft to monitor not only the strait, but also the Gulf of Oman, the Persian Gulf and along Iran’s coastline.

Fighter aircraft would need to be stationed above the strait and gulf, as combat air patrol and helicopters would need to be ready to deploy against attacks, if necessary. And in the water, the US would need to station warships to provide the occasional escort.

If mines are confirmed or even suspected of being in the strait, this complicates things. The US would require an extensive and time-consuming mine clearance operation.

So, why won’t the US try to militarily secure the strait?

There are four key reasons the US won’t attempt to militarily secure the strait without first achieving phase one (taking out Iran’s ability to target ships) — and why it hasn’t been a focus of the campaign thus far.

First, it would divert military assets, such as aircraft, that are needed elsewhere to carry out Trump’s war objectives.

Second, to make the strait safe for shipping, you actually need to secure not just the water, but the land on either side of it. And this would likely require ground forces – or perhaps raiding parties on Iran’s coastline – which would be complicated and risky for the US military.

Third, securing shipping would require a significant number of naval ships. Realistically, you’d need one or two naval ships per escort operation. A convoy any larger than that would be at increased risk of attack, unless the US and Israel have dramatically reduced Iran’s ability to target the ships.

President Trump has ordered reinforcements from two naval groups into the Middle East, consisting of around 4,500 marines and dozens of aircraft.
The Conversation, NYT, Al Jazeera, CC BY-SA

And fourth, the military needs to think about the risk to its assets versus the benefits of opening the strait. A US warship has a crew of more than 200 personnel. Given Iran’s ability to hit ships with uncrewed surface vessels, drones and cruise missiles, is it worth putting those personnel at risk before you’ve reduced the threats from Iran’s coastline?

What about mines in the strait?

This would be a significant challenge. But one thing first: Iran doesn’t actually need to physically lay the mines, it just needs to convince the US and others that it has. This is enough to prevent civilian ships from wanting to transit through the strait.

The possible types of mines Iran may have laid in the Strait of Hormuz, though there has been no clear evidence mining has occurred.
NYT, CC BY-SA

Sometimes mines can be floating on the surface of the water, so they’re visible. Often, though, mines are submerged or moored. The US would need to send in divers or remote-controlled vehicles launched from ships to remove them. This would take weeks or perhaps even months.

Although it’s not been confirmed publicly, I think it’s unlikely Iran would extensivley lay mines. There are two reasons for this.

First, Iran’s economy relies on its ability to ship its own oil from Kharg Island in the Persian Gulf through the strait. Iran does have other ports outside the strait, but they can’t accommodate bigger ships, so mining would interfere with their trade.

Second, some reports have suggested Iran has used acoustic mines, a type of influence mine that detonates based on an acoustic “signature”, essentially what a ship sounds like as it moves through the water. While this technology certainly exists, it is unlikely such mines would be designed to reliably differentiate between Iranian-flagged merchant vessels and those flagged to other countries.

Maintaining accurate and comprehensive signature data for large numbers of commercial vessels — particularly in a dense and dynamic shipping environment such as the strait — would be extremely challenging. In practice, these mines would pose risks to a wide range of shipping.

The US also has significant intelligence assets and surveillance and reconnaissance systems along the Iranian coast, so it would likely detect mine-laying operations, although this can also occur from any vessel, including fishing boats.

And what about Iran’s ability to target ships with drones?

Iran has used different types of drones so far in the war. The uncrewed aerial craft or uncrewed surface vessels are remotely controlled and have been used to hit merchant tankers.

Compared with other weapons, such as missiles, it’s much harder for the US and Israel to target Iran’s drones on the ground because they can be launched from almost anywhere. And while they can’t be built anywhere, drones don’t require the same advanced manufacturing facilities as missiles. In short, they are harder to detect and wipe out.

But the US can bomb some of Iran’s launching points and drone stockpiles along the coast to prevent some attacks on ships.

What is the main priority for the US in Iran right now?

Although there has been much debate about regime change, the Trump administration has been clear about its four key military objectives, which are to destroy:

  • Iran’s ballistic missile capability
  • its nuclear capability
  • its navy (which has largely been achieved)
  • and its proxy networks, including Hezbollah in Lebanon, which has been under attack by Israel for the past several weeks.

The destruction of Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities requires significant aircraft and weaponry – as the US and Israeli bombing campaigns have already made clear. Diverting these assets to secure the Strait of Hormuz could undermine the achievement of these military objectives.

The Conversation

ref. Why hasn’t the US military used force to secure the Strait of Hormuz? – https://theconversation.com/why-hasnt-the-us-military-used-force-to-secure-the-strait-of-hormuz-279224

Is lighter sleep a normal part of ageing – or a sign of something more serious?

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Elena Urrestarazu Bolumburu, Consultor Clínico. Servicio de Neurofisiología Clínica. Unidad de Sueño., Universidad de Navarra

Microgen/Shutterstock

As you get older, it’s normal to notice changes in your sleep. These can include fewer hours of shuteye, waking up more during the night, and finding it harder to drop off. However, despite the general view that older people tend to need less sleep, scientific evidence suggests that this change isn’t actually a question of needing less rest, but of a reduced ability to fall into a deep, continuous sleep.

Older brains still need to rest, but they find it harder and do it more superficially. It’s as if the “off switch” that keeps us asleep works less effectively as time goes on.

Lighter sleep and ageing

One of the main reasons we get worse sleep as we age is the loss of stability in the system that regulates sleep and wakefulness.

In the young brain, this system functions like a firm switch: it is either awake or asleep. But as we get older, some neurons that promote and maintain sleep are lost, while others that sustain wakefulness also get weaker. As a result, the brain shifts states more easily, leading to lighter and more fragmented sleep.

Our biological clocks also change with age. The group of neurons that coordinates the entire body’s circadian rhythms (known as the suprachiasmatic nucleus) continues to function, but its “day” becomes shorter and starts earlier, and its signal becomes less intense.

This partly explains why older people tend to fall asleep and wake up earlier. It also explains why their night-time sleep is more sensitive to external stimuli, and why they can experience more drowsiness during the day. Put simply, the brain receives a less clear signal about when to sleep and when to stay awake.

Another significant change is in our “sleep pressure”. This urge builds up throughout the day and causes us to sleep at night, and depends on a substance known as adenosine. As we age, the brain continues to accumulate fatigue but responds less effectively to this signal. Although the need for sleep remains, it becomes more difficult to translate the signal into deep, uninterrupted sleep.

Deep sleep, which is essential for brain recovery, is also directly affected by structural changes in the brain. This phase of sleep occurs primarily in the frontal regions, which lose thickness and connections as we age. As a result, the slow brainwaves that characterise deep sleep become weaker and less frequent – especially at the start of the night.




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During sleep, the brain also sends out brief signals that help consolidate memories from the day. As we age, these signals diminish and become less synchronised with deep sleep. This contributes to a decline in learning and memory efficiency, even in healthy older people.

Finally, ageing affects the connections that enable different regions of the brain to work in sync during the night. Although the neurons that generate sleep are still present, their signals are transmitted less effectively. The result is less deep, more fragmented, and less restorative sleep.

It is important to note that lighter sleep is considered part of the brain’s natural ageing process in healthy older adults. These changes do not necessarily lead to cognitive problems.

Lifestyle factors

In addition to these biological changes, other factors can have a decisive influence on sleep in older people, and often interact with neurobiological mechanisms. For instance, the loss of daily routine – such as regular working hours, structured physical activity and consistent exposure to natural light – weakens the external cues that help synchronise the biological clock, exacerbating sleep fragmentation.

At this stage of life, sleep disorders such as insomnia and obstructive sleep apnoea are more common. At the same time, a greater burden of chronic conditions – persistent pain, cardiovascular or respiratory diseases – and mood disorders leads to additional night-time awakenings and breaks up sleep.

While essential, frequent use of medicines can also disrupt sleep patterns. These range from sleep aids and anxiolytics that affect deep sleep, to antidepressants, beta-blockers and diuretics that interfere with the onset, stability or continuity of sleep.

Taken together, these factors act as modulators. While they do not in themselves cause sleep ageing, they can exacerbate it, and make it clinically significant when they occur in a brain that is already more vulnerable.




Leer más:
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What is “normal” sleep ageing?

In recent years, there has been a growing body of evidence regarding the harmful effects of sleep deprivation and sleep disorders on brain health. Poor sleep is not only associated with poorer cognitive performance in the short term, but also with a higher risk of cognitive decline and dementia in the long term.

This growing interest has placed a spotlight on sleep in old age, a stage of life where sleep patterns almost universally change. However, one of the greatest challenges is to draw a clear line between changes in sleep that are part of normal ageing – meaning they don’t entail any negative physical or mental consequences – and those that may constitute an early, subclinical symptom of neurodegenerative processes.

As they age, a person might begin to notice a deterioration in their sleep patterns (waking up during the night, more superficial sleep, and so on). But there are no biomarkers that can determine whether these are normal changes to be expected with age, or whether they are in fact a manifestation of neurodegenerative disease.

Although it’s normal for sleep to become lighter with age, some changes go beyond what is to be expected and may indicate unhealthy brain ageing. One of the main warning signs is marked and progressive sleep fragmentation, with multiple prolonged night-time awakenings and a persistent feeling of non-restorative sleep, even when the total time spent in bed is enough. Unlike normal ageing, in these cases sleep loses its stability and continuity.




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Another key sign is the rapid onset or worsening of excessive daytime sleepiness, particularly when it interferes with daily activities or is disproportionate to the amount of sleep obtained. This would suggest that a person’s sleep has lost its restorative function.

When should you worry?

From a neurocognitive perspective, the coexistence of sleep disturbances with subtle cognitive changes – such as recent difficulties with memory, attention or learning, even if these do not yet meet the criteria for cognitive impairment – is particularly concerning. Recent research suggests that this combination may reflect early-stage neurodegenerative processes.

Changes in quality of sleep, rather than simply a reduction in sleep duration, are also considered warning signs. This can mean the almost complete disappearance of deep sleep, a marked reduction in REM sleep, or a progressive reversal of the sleep-wake cycle, with increased night-time activity and daytime sleepiness. These patterns are not typical of healthy ageing.

Other warning signs are a growing dependence on medical sleeping aids or sedatives to sleep, as well as treatments that previously worked becoming suddenly ineffective. In these cases, the problem is usually not just insomnia, but an underlying disturbance of the brain’s sleep mechanisms.

These signs alone are not sufficient to diagnose a neurodegenerative disease, but they do show why we need to assess sleep as a potential early risk marker, especially when the changes are recent, progressive and associated with cognitive impairments.


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The Conversation

Elena Urrestarazu Bolumburu no recibe salario, ni ejerce labores de consultoría, ni posee acciones, ni recibe financiación de ninguna compañía u organización que pueda obtener beneficio de este artículo, y ha declarado carecer de vínculos relevantes más allá del cargo académico citado.

ref. Is lighter sleep a normal part of ageing – or a sign of something more serious? – https://theconversation.com/is-lighter-sleep-a-normal-part-of-ageing-or-a-sign-of-something-more-serious-278836

UK government recommends maximum two hours of screen time for younger children: what the evidence says

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Olga Fotakopoulou, Associate Professor in Developmental Psychology, Birmingham City University

ADDICTIVE STOCK/Shutterstock

New UK government guidance recommends that screen time for children under two should be avoided, except for shared activities such as video calls. For children aged two to five, a maximum of an hour a day is suggested. The guidance also outlines that watching screens together is better than children viewing alone.

This echoes guidance from the World Health Organization recommending no screen time for infants under two, and no more than one hour per day for older children aged four and under.

The early years, especially from birth to age six, are a critical period for developing social and communication skills. This is when children are learning how to connect with others, communicate their needs and understand the signals people give them. Given the increasing presence of touchscreen technologies in young children’s environments, understanding how these tools influence early developmental trajectories is essential.

Touchscreen technology offers new opportunities for learning and play. But there are also questions about its impact on children’s social development, communication and school readiness. Researchers and health organisations have been working to consider how digital media interacts with children’s development and shapes their early experiences.

Excessive touchscreen use has been associated with delays in expressive language, reduced attention spans, and poorer interactions between parents and children.

Yet the picture is not one-sided. My research with colleagues highlights that early exposure to multi-modal technologies – tools that combine sound, images, touch and movement – can shape children’s social development in both positive and negative ways.

Language skills and collaboration

On the positive side, interactive and engaging uses of technology can foster language development. Studies show that digital platforms encouraging storytelling, role play and collaborative activities can enhance children’s competence in communication.

Touchscreens can also help children to work together on shared tasks. Multi-touch interfaces promote joint problem-solving, turn-taking and dialogue. This can strengthen cooperation and peer relationships.

In classrooms, tablets often become focal points for group activities. Children share knowledge, assist one another and collaborate on projects, which can enhance social interaction skills and confidence.

Touchscreens also create opportunities for social play and communication across distance. Video-communication apps such as Skype and FaceTime allow children to maintain relationships with family and friends, supporting emotional bonds and social connection.

Three children using a tablet together
Children can collaborate using screens.
Mkosi Omkhulu/Shutterstock

Creative expression is another area where digital tools can shine. Drawing, animation, and storytelling apps encourage children to share ideas and collaborate. This can promote cooperation and social bonding.

Passive use

However, these benefits coexist with significant challenges. Excessive screen time can reduce opportunities for face-to-face interaction, limiting children’s practice of conversational skills and emotional understanding. When children use screens passively or in isolation, they may become less engaged in socialising with others.

Parents’s use of screens is another concern. When parents are absorbed in their own devices, they talk less with their children. This reduces opportunities for educationally meaningful conversations.

Touchscreen use can also affect communication more directly. Studies show that electronic books may shift parents’ attention toward the device rather than the story, displacing meaningful conversation and reducing the quality of shared reading experiences. Some research suggests that heavy touchscreen use may make it harder for children to pick up social and emotional cues. This may affect their ability to decode social situations.

Importantly, the impact of touchscreen use is shaped by several mediating factors. Children learn more effectively when adults or their classmates model how to use touchscreen devices. As the government guidance states, it’s also better if adults watch screens together with their child, rather than their child watching alone.

Parents’ views and wider culture matter too. In research I carried out with colleagues, we found that cultural perceptions about what makes a good childhood shaped parents’ choices. In Portugal and Norway, strong cultural emphasis on outdoor play, social interaction, and connection with nature led parents to prioritise these activities over touchscreen use.

These cultural expectations influence how parents interpret and regulate young children’s digital practices, showing that attitudes toward technology are closely tied to wider national discourses about childhood. Educational settings further influence this. The way technology is integrated into classrooms can reinforce social behaviour.

These findings have important implications for school readiness. Social communication skills, such as turn-taking, listening, expressing ideas, and understanding others, are foundational for success in early education. Touchscreens can support these skills when used interactively and collaboratively. But when screen use replaces conversation, imaginative play or peer interaction, it may hinder the development of the very abilities children need for school and their social lives.

The evidence suggests that the question is not whether children should use touchscreens, but how. High-quality, interactive, and socially supported digital experiences can enrich development. Passive or excessive use can undermine it.

However, it’s vital to recognise that not all digital content is created equal. The quality and context of technology use can have a significant impact. As digital technologies continue to evolve, ensuring that young children’s screen experiences are balanced, meaningful, and socially engaging will be essential.

The Conversation

I have received funding from EU and Nuffield Foundation (but not for this project).

ref. UK government recommends maximum two hours of screen time for younger children: what the evidence says – https://theconversation.com/uk-government-recommends-maximum-two-hours-of-screen-time-for-younger-children-what-the-evidence-says-275752

Congo-Brazzaville : après le plébiscite électoral, les défis de Denis Sassou Nguesso

Source: The Conversation – in French – By Ngodi Etanislas, enseignant-chercheur, Université Marien Ngouabi

Le scrutin présidentiel du 15 mars 2026 en République du Congo s’est conclu par la réélection de Denis Sassou Nguesso dès le premier tour, avec un score provisoire de 94,82 % des suffrages et un taux de participation officiel autour de 84,65 %.

Ngodi Etanislas, dont les travaux portent sur les enjeux électoraux et les recompositions politiques en République du Congo, explique à The Conversation Africa les enseigneemts à tirer de ce scrutin.


Quels sont les principaux facteurs politiques qui ont façonné le résultat de l’élection ?

La victoire de Denis Sassou-Nguesso avec un « score à la soviétique » de 94,82 % des voix exprimées n’est pas le résultat d’une compétition électorale ouverte. Elle est plutôt l’aboutissement d’un système politique bâti sur plusieurs décennies de consolidation du pouvoir depuis la fin de la guerre civile de 1997.

Plusieurs facteurs politiques clés peuvent être mis en avant pour justifier cette légitimation électorale.

Il y a, d’abord, la longévité politique de Denis Sassou Nguesso au pouvoir depuis 1979 (avec une interruption de 1992 à 1997). Cette omniprésence de plus de quatre décennies lui permet d’assurer un contrôle absolu de l’appareil politique, institutionnel et sécuritaire du pays, rendant l’alternance politique non seulement difficile, mais systémiquement peu probable.

Par ailleurs, le verrouillage du processus électoral, opéré notamment à travers le contrôle de l’appareil d’État et des organes de gestion des élections, a contribué à cette victoire.

L’élection s’est déroulée dans un contexte marqué par un rapport de force structurellement déséquilibré en faveur du président sortant. La campagne, très asymétrique, a pris la forme d’une véritable « tournée nationale », s’appuyant sur une stratégie de démonstration de force destinée à donner l’image d’un leader proche des populations.

Les divisions de l’opposition ont-elles eu un impact sur le résultat final ?

La fragmentation de l’opposition politique est sans doute le facteur le plus déterminant dans l’ampleur du score final de cette élection. L’opposition a abordé le scrutin en rangs dispersés, incapable de trouver un consensus pour une candidature unique, réduisant fortement les chances d’une alternance démocratique.

Le scrutin a été marqué par l’absence des figures historiques de la vie politique congolaise dont certaines sont toujours emprisonnées (Jean-Marie Michel Mokoko ou André Okombi Salissa ) et d’autres leaders ayant décidé de boycotter. Ils estiment que les conditions d’une élection libre et transparente n’étaient pas réunies. Ce boycott a vidé la compétition de tout enjeu réel. Il a contribué à la victoire dès le premier tour de Denis Sassou Nguesso qui avait obtenu en 2016 le score de 60,4 % des suffrages face à une opposition forte.

Pour de nombreux observateurs, les six candidats en lice, peu connus ou sans réelle assise politique, cherchant à assurer une certaine visibilité, ou mieux une légitimité politique aux yeux de l’opinion publique pour de prochaines batailles électorales, ne pouvaient pas faire face à Sassou Nguesso. Ils ont disposé de peu de moyens financiers pour se déployer sur l’ensemble du territoire et structurer les dynamiques locales sur le terrain pour défendre leurs projets de société.

Enfin, le black-out numérique marqué par la coupure totale des réseaux téléphoniques et d’Internet sur l’ensemble du territoire le jour du vote a contribué à l’opacité du processus. Il a créé un isolement informationnel sans précédent.

Cette mesure a permis de réduire la capacité d’organisation collective et de déploiement des délégués de l’opposition. Elle visait également à limiter la diffusion, sur les réseaux sociaux, de rumeurs sur les bourrages d’urnes, l’achat de consciences et d’autres contenus politiquement sensibles ou embarrassants pour le candidat sortant, qui craignait un fort taux d’abstention.




Read more:
Congo-Brazzaville : face à une opposition divisée, Sassou Nguesso en route pour prolonger son règne


Comment évaluez-vous la participation citoyenne et le rôle des électeurs dans ce scrutin ?

La participation citoyenne a été marquée par une désaffection électorale profonde. Celle-ci a été alimentée par le boycott de l’opposition et par le sentiment d’inutilité du vote chez de nombreux jeunes. Elle s’est également inscrite dans un climat de peur entretenu par l’environnement répressif, notamment les opérations menées au début du mois de janvier 2026 par la Direction générale de la sécurité présidentielle dans le département du Pool, ainsi que par les intimidations et répressions à l’égard des activistes et opposants.

La question de la participation électorale est au cœur de la controverse entourant ce scrutin.

Deux scénarios sont envisageables à ce niveau.

Le premier scénario est celui d’une mobilisation encadrée par le pouvoir, à travers les réseaux politiques, clientélistes et les structures locales du parti présidentiel et de ses alliés. L’objectif est de stimuler la participation afin de légitimer le processus électoral et renforcer la crédibilité des résultats.

Le deuxième scénario est celui du boycott du scrutin encouragé par l’opposition, pour parvenir à une faible participation, pouvant susciter des contestations politiques et des débats sur la légitimité du scrutin.

L’évaluation du scrutin du 15 mars 2026 met en évidence un contraste marqué entre les chiffres officiels et les observations de terrain, suggérant une participation citoyenne plus complexe qu’il n’y paraît. Le taux de participation officiel aurait ainsi bondi de près de 17 points. Il est passé d’environ 67,57 % en 2016 – lors d’un scrutin marqué par la présence de figures importantes de l’opposition – à 84,65 % en 2026, malgré un contexte de boycott généralisé.

Quatre constats peuvent être faits au sujet de la participation citoyenne à cette élection :

  • Un corps électoral autour de 2,64 millions d’électeurs inscrits sur les listes électorales, mais absent dans les bureaux de vote au regard de la faible affluence dans 6 620 bureaux de vote répartis dans 4 011 centres sur l’ensemble du territoire ;

  • Une abstention massive anticipée, confirmée par les observateurs nationaux et internationaux, malgré la forte mobilisation citoyenne constatée lors de la campagne électorale ;

  • Une démotivation totale des électeurs du fait de l’absence de candidats de taille, du manque de transparence et du verrouillage du processus électoral, ainsi que d’une participation asymétrique à travers la mobilisation forte des réseaux proches du pouvoir et la démobilisation des électeurs critiques.

  • Une mobilisation limitée, notamment par la faible affluence dans les centres urbains, le désintérêt marqué des jeunes et le sentiment répandu que “le résultat est connu d’avance”.

Le rôle des électeurs a oscillé entre adhésion et contrainte. Si certains ont soutenu Denis Sassou Nguesso par conviction ou fidélité politique, d’autres ont voté de manière stratégique sous l’effet de pressions sociales, administratives ou de logiques clientélistes.

Quels défis démocratiques le Congo Brazzaville doit-il relever après une cinquième victoire consécutive de Denis Sassou Nguesso ?

Cette réélection place la République du Congo face à des défis structurels majeurs. Pour que le pays sorte de la stagnation politique et sociale, plusieurs chantiers démocratiques s’imposent. Six défis majeurs se dessinent.

  • La restauration de la crédibilité électorale et l’indépendance des institutions constituent l’un des enjeux les plus sensibles. Elle met en lumière les lacunes concernant la gouvernance électorale, le manque de transparence, de caractère inclusif et d’équité constatées dans le cadre du scrutin de mars 2026.

  • La fiabilité des listes électorales, l’impartialité de la Commission nationale électorale indépendante (CNEI) et l’accès inégal aux médias posent des problèmes constants, sans audit indépendant effectif. Sans une réforme profonde du système électoral, l’abstention réelle et le désintérêt, notamment des jeunes, continueront de croître et de peser sur l’engagement citoyen et la participation politique.

  • La mise en place d’un espace politique pluraliste et d’une opposition viable en vue d’une recomposition du paysage politique congolais. Dans ce contexte, la libération des prisonniers politiques et la garantie d’un droit à l’opposition effectif seraient des conditions sine qua non de toute réconciliation nationale. L’élection de 2026 s’est déroulée avec une opposition largement “muselée” ou ayant choisi le boycott.

  • La protection des libertés fondamentales et de l’espace civique afin de répondre aux questions liées à la recrudescence des violations des droits humains dans un contexte d’absence de dialogue politique entre le régime, l’opposition, et la société civile.

  • La question cruciale de la succession et de la transition dans l’optique d’une conservation du pouvoir au sein de la majorité présidentielle et/ou de la continuité d’un nouveau mandat en 2031. À cela s’ajouteraient des scénarios de succession dynastique au sein de la famille présidentielle.

  • La réconciliation de la richesse pétrolière avec le développement humain pour un pays, où, près de la moitié de la population vit en dessous du seuil de la pauvreté. Le défi est de transformer la rente pétrolière en services publics (santé, éducation) et en opportunités pour la jeunesse.

  • La nécessité de reconnecter la participation citoyenne, notamment des jeunes aspirant au changement et la société civile au processus politique. La participation citoyenne demeure cruciale pour la légitimité du processus électoral.




Read more:
Cameroun, Guinée équatoriale, Congo : les guerres de succession menacent la stabilité régionale


Quelles implications cette élection pourrait-elle avoir pour la stabilité politique ?

Cette stabilité repose sur des équilibres précaires, notamment la faible légitimité du pouvoir perçue par une partie de la population, la méfiance envers le processus électoral et la frustration politique accumulée au fil des années. Elle s’appuie également sur la continuité des institutions et des élites au pouvoir, l’absence de rupture brutale et le maintien des équilibres internes.

La stabilité du pays repose actuellement sur un équilibre fragile maintenu par une forte centralisation du pouvoir et le renforcement de la mainmise institutionnelle.

La frustration de la jeunesse constitue un baromètre particulièrement préoccupant. Les enquêtes Afrobarometer réalisées en République du Congo en 2024 indiquent que les jeunes ont une faible confiance dans le système politique. Ce qui donne d’ailleurs l’impression d’un sentiment d’inutilité du vote, dont les résultats sont connus d’avance et que l’élection présidentielle ne changera rien dans leur quotidien.

Il y a aussi des frustrations du fait des problèmes de survie économique, le désenchantement face au chômage chronique et l’absence de perspectives économiques dans le pays.

La bataille interne au sein du parti au pouvoir pour “l’après-Sassou” pourrait devenir la principale source d’instabilité si aucun dauphin clair et consensuel n’émerge. Les dissensions internes constatées lors du Congrès ordinaire du parti en décembre 2025 montrent que les problèmes de succession demeurent au centre de la reconfiguration des équilibres internes au sein du parti au pouvoir et du repositionnement des élites dans le champ politique congolais.

L’élection présidentielle de mars 2026 a permis de consolider le pouvoir en place, sans pourtant résoudre les questions liées à la gouvernance électorale, à la participation citoyenne et à l’ouverture démocratique.

The Conversation

Ngodi Etanislas does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Congo-Brazzaville : après le plébiscite électoral, les défis de Denis Sassou Nguesso – https://theconversation.com/congo-brazzaville-apres-le-plebiscite-electoral-les-defis-de-denis-sassou-nguesso-279000

Two verdicts in two days: How American courts are rewriting the rules for Big Tech and children

Source: The Conversation – USA (3) – By Carolina Rossini, Professor of Practice and Director for Program, Public Interest Technology Initiative, UMass Amherst

Judge Bryan Biedscheid of New Mexico could order significant changes to how Instagram and Facebook operate. Nathan Burton/Santa Fe New Mexican via AP, Pool

Within 48 hours, the legal landscape governing social media and children shifted in ways that will take years to fully understand and verify.

On March 24, 2026, a Santa Fe jury ordered Meta to pay US$375 million for violating New Mexico’s consumer protection laws. The next day, a Los Angeles jury found Meta and Google’s YouTube negligent in the design of their platforms, awarding almost $6 million in damages to a single plaintiff.

The dollar figures are drawing headlines, but a $375 million penalty against a company worth $1.5 trillion is a rounding error. The award is less than 2% of Meta’s $22.8 billion net income in 2025. Meta’s stock rose 5% on the day of the New Mexico verdict, indicating how the market assessed the effect of the penalty on the company.

Fines without structural change are more akin to licensing fees than accountability. As a technology policy and law scholar, I believe the question of whether these verdicts will produce real changes to the products that millions of children use every day is more consequential than the jury awards.

The answer is not yet, and not automatically. A financial penalty does not rewrite a single line of code, remove an algorithm or place a safety engineer in a role that was eliminated to protect a quarterly earnings report. Meta and Google have signaled they will appeal, with First Amendment challenges to the product-design theory the likely central battleground.

The companies’ lawyers are likely to argue, with some justification, that the science linking the design of platforms to mental health harm remains contested, and that the companies have already implemented safety measures. In the meantime, Instagram, Facebook anf YouTube will continue to operate exactly as they did before the verdicts.

The verdicts against Meta pave the way for hundreds or even thousands of similar cases.

Consumer protection

Most coverage framing the New Mexico verdict casts it as a child safety case. It is that, but it also presents a more technically significant dimension: a consumer protection claim grounded in allegations of corporate deception. New Mexico Attorney General Raúl Torrez did not sue Meta for what users posted, but instead sued Meta for its false statements about its own platform safety, employing a novel legal approach.

For three decades, Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act has shielded internet platforms from liability for content generated by their users. Courts have interpreted Section 230 immunity broadly, and many earlier attempts to hold platforms accountable for child harm have foundered on it.

The New Mexico complaint, filed in December 2023, was drafted with explicit awareness of this obstacle. It asked a single question: Did Meta knowingly lie to New Mexico consumers about the safety of its products?

The jury’s answer was yes, on all counts, and its verdict rested on three distinct legal theories under New Mexico’s Unfair Practices Act.

The first was straightforward deception: Meta’s public statements, ranging from CEO Mark Zuckerberg’s congressional testimony claiming research about the platform’s addictiveness was inconclusive to parental guidance materials that omitted known risks of grooming and sexual exploitation, qualify as representations made in connection with a commercial transaction.

Users pay for Meta’s platforms not with money but with their data, which Meta then converts into advertising revenue. New Mexico successfully argued that this data-for-services exchange constitutes commerce under the state’s consumer protection statute, and that misrepresentations made within it are actionable regardless of Section 230.

The second theory was unfair practice, or conduct offensive to public policy, even if not technically deceptive. Here, the evidence centered on what Meta’s own engineers and executives knew and then ignored.

Internal documents showed repeated warnings. These alarm bells centered around child sexual abuse material proliferating on the platforms, about algorithms that amplified harmful content because it generated engagement, and about age verification systems that were essentially cosmetic. The company overrode those warnings for commercial reasons.

The jury was shown a specific sequence: Meta executives requested staffing to address platform harms, Zuckerberg declined, and the company continued to publicly represent its safety efforts as adequate.

The third theory was unconscionability: taking advantage of consumers who lacked the capacity to protect themselves. Children are the clearest possible case. Children cannot evaluate terms of service, cannot negotiate platform architecture, and cannot assess the neurological implications of engagement-maximizing design. Meta had comprehensive internal research documenting these vulnerabilities and chose to ignore rather than mitigate them.

Bellwether on addictiveness

The Los Angeles case, which concluded on March 25, tested a different theory. It was a personal injury trial rather than a government enforcement action.

The plaintiff, identified in court as KGM, is a 20-year-old woman who began using YouTube at age 6 and Instagram at age 9. Her lawyers argued that the platforms’ deliberate design choices such as infinite scroll, autoplay video and engagement-based recommendation algorithms were the causes of her addiction, depression and self-harm.

The jury found both Meta and YouTube negligent in the design of their platforms and found that each company’s negligence was a substantial factor in causing harm to KGM. Meta bears 70% of the liability; YouTube 30%. The individual $3 million compensatory award is modest. The punitive damages phase, still to come, will be calculated against each company’s net worth and is likely to produce a very different number.

six woman seated outside a building have facial expressions indicating surprise and happiness
An attorney for, and family members of, child victims of social media harms react to the verdict in a lawsuit in Los Angeles on March 25, 2026.
Frederic J. Brown/AFP via Getty Images

Beyond the general precedent, this case matters because it is a bellwether. It was selected from a consolidated group of hundreds of similar lawsuits to test whether a product-design theory of liability could survive a jury trial, and it did. That finding has immediate and concrete implications: Each of those plaintiffs now litigates on a stronger footing, and if the damages awarded to KGM are even partially scaled across similar cases, the total financial exposure for Meta and YouTube moves from hundreds of millions to billions of dollars.

More importantly, the bellwether verdict signals to every other plaintiff, attorney and state attorney general that this legal pathway is viable, and to every platform that the courtroom is no longer a safe harbor. The legal strategy established that negligence claims against platform design are viable in California courts.

Public nuisance

Beginning May 4, 2026, Judge Bryan Biedscheid in the New Mexico case is scheduled to hear the public nuisance count without a jury in a bench trial. Public nuisance is a legal doctrine traditionally used to address conditions that harm the general public. This doctrine has been used in concern over contaminated water, lead paint in housing stock and opioid distribution networks.

New Mexico is arguing that Meta’s platform architecture constitutes exactly such a condition. If the judge agrees, the remedy is not a fine. Instead, it is an abatement: a court order requiring Meta to eliminate the harmful condition.

Attorney General Torrez has already been explicit about what he will ask for: real age verification, not a checkbox asking users to confirm they are old enough; algorithm changes; and an independent monitor with authority to oversee compliance. These are structural demands on how the platform operates.

This is where drawing a parallel with Big Tobacco is apt. The tobacco litigation of the 1990s ultimately produced not just financial settlements but the Master Settlement Agreement, which imposed permanent restrictions on marketing practices and funded public health programs for decades. The public nuisance theory in the New Mexico case is designed to produce an analogous structural outcome for social media.

Precedent for tidal wave of cases

The significant effects of two verdicts are about evidence and precedent. For the first time, a jury has examined Meta’s internal documents – emails from engineers warning about self-harm, the rejected safety proposals and Zuckerberg’s personal decisions to prioritize engagement over protection – and returned a verdict that those documents mean precisely what they appear to say.

That finding, and the legal theories that produced it, is now part of the foundation on which 40-plus pending state attorney general cases, thousands of individual lawsuits and a federal trial later this year are likely to be built.

The abatement phase, beginning May 4, may prove more consequential than the dollar amounts. If the judge in the New Mexico case – or any judge in a subsequent case – orders real age verification, algorithm changes and an independent monitor, that would be a true structural change.

The Conversation

I was staff at organizations including the Electronic Frontier Foundation, Public Knowledge, and the Harvard Berkman Klein Center, which were funded by various foundations and companies. Refer to their websites for disclosures. I was a staff member in the connectivity policy team at Facebook (2016-2018). I am an advisory board member of non-profits, including Internet Lab (Brazil) and Derechos Digitales (Chile). I am a senior advisor (without any honorarium) at the Datasphere Initiative and Portulans Institute. More details at https://www.carolinarossini.net/bio

ref. Two verdicts in two days: How American courts are rewriting the rules for Big Tech and children – https://theconversation.com/two-verdicts-in-two-days-how-american-courts-are-rewriting-the-rules-for-big-tech-and-children-279401

What does China’s host bid mean for the High Seas Treaty?

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Philippe Le Billon, Professor, Geography Department and School of Public Policy & Global Affairs, University of British Columbia

Delegates are meeting in New York for the third session of the preparatory commission (PrepCom 3) on the Agreement on Marine Biological Diversity of Areas beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ), also known as the High Seas Treaty.

After nearly 20 years of negotiations, United Nations member states adopted the treaty in June 2023. When it opened for signatures that September, 67 countries signed immediately. In January 2026, Morocco and Sierra Leone then became the 60th and 61st states to ratify, triggering the treaty’s entry into force.

The treaty is now international law. At the time of writing, 145 countries have signed and 85 have ratified.

The third session of the preparatory commission must now work through how the treaty will actually function. A key question in corridor conversations is: who should host the secretariat?

Every international treaty needs an institutional home. The High Seas Treaty is no different. It requires a secretariat to co-ordinate between parties, service meetings and manage information.

For months, Belgium and Chile were the only contenders, their bids quietly taking shape in the background of treaty negotiations. Then, in January 2026, China submitted a formal bid with Xiamen as the proposed host city. That announcement changed the optics of the negotiations.

The geography of diplomacy

A city with highrises and other buildings near a bay
Valparaíso in Chile is one of the three cities being considered to host the High Seas Treaty’s secretariat.
(Roz Lawson), CC BY-NC-ND

Where that secretariat sits may be seen as an administrative question, a matter of office space and convenience. It is not.

The location of secretariats, and diplomatic venues in general, shapes how they function in practice. It influences who gravitates toward the institution and which delegations can afford to attend. It sways what issues get quietly elevated and what institutional culture takes root. Location is a form of proximity and proximity is a form of influence.

Belgium has put forward Brussels, pointing to its dense ecosystem of international organizations and more than 300 diplomatic missions.

Chile has offered Valparaíso on an equity argument: Latin America has never hosted a universal-membership environmental secretariat and the Global South deserves a seat at the table.

China’s late entry adds a strong contender to the process.

Concerns about China’s influence

China has more at stake in how the high seas are governed than almost any other state. It has the world’s largest distant-water fishing fleet and has faced sustained international criticism over illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing. It also holds more deep-sea mineral exploration contracts through the International Seabed Authority than any other nation.

It has been among the most assertive in defending its maritime claims, even when those claims have been rejected by international courts, including through declaring a “nature reserve” on the disputed Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea.

Though fishing controversially remains largely outside its scope, the BBNJ agreement intervenes in key pressure points, most notably through enforceable marine protected areas and new environmental standards for activities that have historically escaped meaningful oversight.

For some observers, that combination makes the secretariat bid difficult to reconcile. Lyn Goldsworthy, a veteran Southern Ocean researcher at the University of Tasmania, has pointed to China’s reluctance over the creation of marine protected areas in the Antarctic high seas. “If they are in that influential [position],” she told Dialogue Earth, “they can slow things down.”

Analysts at India’s National Maritime Foundation have raised the further risk of what they call procedural drift, the idea that formally neutral administrative practices can quietly embed particular governance norms over time.

However, the case is less clear-cut than it looks.

Giving China a stake in the treaty’s success

A coastal cityscape with tall glass buildings and smaller structures
China has proposed the city of Xiamen in Fujian Province as a potential host city for the High Seas Treaty secretariat.
(Unsplash/Letian Zhang)

Skepticism about China’s bid is understandable, but the case against it is weaker than it first appears. Begin with the international picture. Li Shuo, director of the China Climate Hub at the Asia Society Policy Institute, has described the bid as a “significant escalation” in China’s engagement with global governance, one that signals the Chinese want to play an active role in shaping international rules.

If China’s institutional credibility is visibly tied to BBNJ’s success, it has more reasons to want the treaty to function. China has ratified the agreement. It joined the Port State Measures Agreement, the principal instrument targeting illegal fishing, despite late accession and uneven implementation.

Its navy is the fastest-growing maritime force in the world. Its financial, infrastructural and human capacity to run a serious international institution is not in question.

There is possibly an even more important dimension. Scholars focused on Chinese fisheries governance have documented the persistent tension between central government policy and the behaviour of provincial authorities and distant-water operators, a gap that domestic regulation has struggled to close.




Read more:
China is struggling to control its provinces as they expand distant-water fishing


International treaty commitments can, in principle, function as a mechanism for central governments to exert leverage that internal channels cannot easily provide. Whether the BBNJ treaty might operate that way for China is an open question, but it is one worth taking seriously.

A China genuinely embedded in the framework may behave differently within it than a China left on the outside. The UN’s 30-by-30 target to protect 30 per cent of the world’s oceans by 2030 depends heavily on what happens in the high seas. So does any serious effort to crack down on illegal fishing or establish enforceable marine protected areas in international waters.

None of this is a straightforward argument for or against China hosting. It is a narrower claim: that the case against it is weaker than it first appears because it assumes that Chinese involvement would inevitably hollow out the treaty’s environmental ambition. That assumption is not obviously correct.

What conditions that would make the treaty work rather than fail are not mysterious. The secretariat would need genuine independence in its leadership. Governance structures would need to be transparent and enforceable. The treaty culture would need to be robust enough to resist pressure from the host state and to be responsive to all parties. These are demanding conditions. They are also conditions being negotiated right now.

What is actually at stake

The formal decision on where to locate the secretariat will be taken at the first Conference of the Parties, expected in early 2027. The institutional architecture being built at PrepCom 3 will shape what kind of institution the secretariat becomes before that vote is ever taken.

The governance rules and independence provisions being drafted now will determine whether the hosting question is a story about institutional capture or about the diligent implementation of a treaty that covers nearly half the planet.

The BBNJ agreement is a test of something larger than ocean governance. It is a test of whether international institutions can still function as common ground as the United States withdraws from international organizations and treaties.

Where the secretariat sits is not a technicality. It is about whether the high seas remain a global common in practice, not just in name, through an institution operating with independence, credibility and authority.

The Conversation

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. What does China’s host bid mean for the High Seas Treaty? – https://theconversation.com/what-does-chinas-host-bid-mean-for-the-high-seas-treaty-279317

‘I didn’t come here to get rich’: new research on the lives of Ukrainian women in Georgia’s surrogacy boom

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Olga Oleinikova, Associate Professor and Director of the SITADHub (Social Impact Technologies and Democracy Research Hub) in the School of Communication, University of Technology Sydney

Jonas Gratzer/LightRocket via Getty Images

“I didn’t come here to get rich. I came because I had no other way to keep my son safe and care for my displaced family”.

Anna is a 28-year-old woman from eastern Ukraine. She fled the country in 2023 after Russian troops invaded. Two years later, she agreed to become a surrogate in Georgia for wealthy foreign couples.

We met Anna, who was already pregnant, in a quiet apartment that had been rented for her by a surrogacy agency on the outskirts of the capital, Tbilisi.

Our multidisciplinary team was in Georgia to conduct a pilot research project examining the small country’s rapidly expanding surrogacy industry.

We conducted in-depth interviews with Ukrainian women to better understand their motivations for entering surrogacy arrangements, their experiences within the system, and the social, economic, and legal factors shaping their decision-making and wellbeing.

We also analysed publicly available policy and regulatory documents from the government to examine how the sector operates. We paid particular attention to emerging regulatory challenges, gaps in oversight and the state’s efforts to balance economic opportunity with ethical and human rights considerations.

The shifting geography of surrogacy

Surrogacy laws vary widely around the world. Some countries, including Australia, prohibit commercial surrogacy. Others allow it under specific conditions. These differences create cross-border markets, where intended parents travel abroad to access services that are restricted, expensive or unavailable at home.

Before Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, Ukraine was one of the world’s largest commercial surrogacy hubs. Estimates suggest between 2,000 and 2,500 babies were born each year through surrogacy arrangements.

War disrupted the industry. Clinics closed or relocated. Travel became dangerous. Media outlets reported on intended parents struggling to reach newborns and surrogates displaced by fighting. Georgia became a safe alternative.

The Beta Fertility clinic run by the New Life Georgia surrogacy agency in Tbilisi in November 2023.
Photo by Marie Audinet / Hans Lucas via AFP

International surrogacy has been legal in Georgia since 1997. That’s when the country adopted legislation allowing both gestational (a woman carrying an embryo not genetically related to her) and traditional surrogacy (a woman carrying an embryo for another couple using her own egg). The first children were born through gestational surrogacy around 2007.

The country’s clear legal framework – recognising intended parents as the child’s legal guardians from birth and granting no parental rights to the surrogate – has been a key factor in its appeal.

Costs are also significantly lower than in the United States. As independent international surrogacy consultant Olga Pysana told us:

In the last year, surrogacy in Georgia cost approximately US$55,000 to $85,000 (A$78,000 to A$120,000), whereas surrogacy in the United States can cost as much as US$250,000 (A$350,000).

With international demand surging in the 2010s, Georgia (a small country of 3.7 million people) quickly became unable to meet the needs of so many parents with local women alone. So clinics began recruiting potential surrogates from abroad, including from Ukraine, Central Asian countries, Russia, Belarus, Thailand and the Philippines.

Mobile surrogates

Several of the women we interviewed had previously worked with Ukrainian agencies. After the invasion, recruiters contacted them again – this time offering placements in Georgia.

Displacement has produced a new and economically vulnerable workforce. We describe these women as “mobile surrogates”: women who move across borders to provide reproductive labour in response to war, economic crises or changing surrogacy laws. “If there was no war, I would never have left,” Anna told us.

Most of the women we interviewed had lost homes, jobs or partners. Many were supporting children and extended family members across borders. Anna had worked in a shop before the war, then cleaned houses in Poland. “Surrogacy in Georgia pays in nine months what I would earn in years,” she said.

Our research found that surrogates are typically paid around US$20,000 (A$35,500) in instalments. For families displaced by war, this amount of money can cover rent, relocation costs and schooling.

A surrogate undergoes an ultrasound scan at the Beta Fertility Clinic in Tbilisi, Georgia, in November 2023.
Marie Audinet/Hans Lucas/AFP/Getty images

But the arrangements come with strict contractual conditions. Women may face limits on travel, their diets and daily routines. Some live in shared apartments organised by agencies.

Independent legal advice is rare. Anna signed a contract in a language she did not fully understand, but felt she had little alternative: “I just needed something stable. I couldn’t keep moving from place to place”.

Georgia’s legal framework says little about labour standards, housing conditions or long-term health support for surrogates after birth. The result is an imbalance: strong protections for intended parents, and weaker safeguards for the women carrying babies.

A draft bill was introduced in 2023 aimed at curbing paid surrogacy for foreigners, due to growing concerns about the commercialisation of the industry and potential exploitation of surrogate mothers. However, it is still pending. As of early 2026, surrogacy remains legal in Georgia for foreign heterosexual couples.

Three trends we are seeing

First, reproductive markets are highly responsive to crises. When Ukraine’s industry became unstable, demand shifted rapidly to Georgia. Global fertility markets operate like other transnational industries: when one site contracts, another expands.

Second, economic inequality shapes who participates. Displacement and financial insecurity increase women’s willingness to enter demanding reproductive arrangements.

Third, the surrogates bear the brunt of regulatory ambiguities and associated risks and challenges. This includes dealing with contracts and medical procedures in languages they don’t understand.

Reform is needed

In Georgia, clearer labour protections are essential: minimum housing standards, transparent payment schedules, and mandatory, independent legal advice in a language surrogates understand. Health coverage for the women should also extend beyond birth.

The major markets for surrogacy services, including China, the US, Australia, Israel, Germany and others, should also review how their citizens engage in overseas surrogacy. This includes stronger regulation of agencies marketing abroad and clearer ethical guidance for intended parents.

Finally, greater international coordination is needed. Shared standards for cross-border surrogacy would improve transparency and accountability in a rapidly expanding and loosely regulated global market.

As demand grows, the central question is not whether cross-border surrogacy will continue, but whether it can be governed in ways that safeguard fairness, transparency and the rights of the women whose bodies sustain it.

The Conversation

Nothing to disclose.

Olga Oleinikova and Polina Vlasenko do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. ‘I didn’t come here to get rich’: new research on the lives of Ukrainian women in Georgia’s surrogacy boom – https://theconversation.com/i-didnt-come-here-to-get-rich-new-research-on-the-lives-of-ukrainian-women-in-georgias-surrogacy-boom-276173

A Bible Belt track without a pulse – it’s no surprise fans hate the 2026 FIFA World Cup song Lighter

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Brent Keogh, Lecturer in the School of Communications, University of Technology Sydney

The release of the first FIFA World Cup 2026 song Lighter by American country artist Jelly Roll, Mexican singer Carín León and Canadian producer Cirkut, has left an odd taste in the mouth of fans, like waking up in the back of a Chevy truck after accidentally downing a bottle of bargain-bin bourbon.

As the United States, Canada and Mexico prepare to host the World Cup in June, the change in genre from “world-infused” pop to Bible Belt-style country-rock reflects the awkwardness of the tournament being hosted in an increasingly isolationist America.

Themes of unity and diversity

Since the early 1990s, FIFA World Cup songs and anthems have usually reflected something of the local flavour of the host country while simultaneously promoting the ideals of global unity.

For example, the 2022 song Hayya Hayya promotes the ideal that “we are better together”. It vibrates with the rhythmic complexity of North African folk traditions, before moving into a more commercial reggae groove.

Jennifer Lopez and Pitbull’s 2014 song, We are One, incorporates Brazilian inflections in an otherwise characteristically in-your-face Pitbull dance track. Nevertheless, the global sentiment remains: “it’s your world, my world, our world today, and we invite the whole world, whole world to play”.

Similarly, Jason Derulo’s 2018 World Cup track Colors (also a Coca Cola promotional song), celebrates national pride – “I’m going to wave my flag” – while also declaring “there’s beauty in the unity we’ve found”.

Where is the excitement?

Though Lighter is a collaboration between the three host countries, it marks a significant musical shift from the characteristic European, Latino and “World” inflected pop of previous songs.

There have been other stylistic shifts in the past. The 2006 World Cup track was Time of Our Lives, a slow operatic pop ballad by Il Divo and Toni Braxton.

But Lighter isn’t another example of this. It isn’t a ballad – yet it still lacks the high energy buzz of fan favourites such as Shakira’s Waka Waka (2010 South Africa World Cup), Santana’s Dar Um Jeito (We Will Find a Way) (2014 Brazil World Cup) and Ricky Martin’s The Cup of Life (1998 France World Cup).

The usual rhythmic vitality of a World Cup song is stripped back to a country-rock dirge with an odd, almost tokenistic Spanish bridge – an offering that might more appropriately feature in a Trolls World Tour. Fans are not having it.

As one user in the YouTube comments asks: “La emoción, la pasión y el ritmo mundialista, dónde está todo eso?” (“The excitement, the passion and the World Cup rhythm, where is all that?”).

Roll between the Lord and the Devil

Lighter has also been criticised for its religious allusions. One listener bemoans: “It’s a football tournament, but let’s make a song about church choirs, Chevy trucks, chains and muddy boots”.

Although past World Cup songs have contained religious allusions, Lighter’s odd sense of the sacred is more like trying to pass off a Lord Elrond action figure as a statue of Saint Anthony.

The song is replete with the forced language of a sinner’s conversion (“chains don’t rattle no more”, “lay my burdens down”), as analogous to the flow-state of a footballer, free from whatever personal or collective trials that might have been holding them back.

As in many a good country song, the protagonist is involved in a cosmic battle for his soul.

Jelly Roll is “praying [his] way out of […] hell”. He even has a run in with the Devil, although he doesn’t trade his soul for musical talent. Rather, he escapes the Devil’s attempts to “catch” him as his boots have left the ground.

You could be forgiven for questioning whether this song was about football at all, or whether it is more reflective of Jelly Roll’s own personal conversion story (he has recently been open in proclaiming his faith in Jesus).

In Lighter, the collective “we” of previous World Cup songs has been replaced with the individualistic “I” – the local taking precedence over the global.

The elephant in the room

Now, to be fair, there are some aspects of Lighter that align with the values of its predecessors. One key theme of the song is the sense of the fight, of overcoming obstacles, and gaining individual freedom. This aligns with FIFA’s stated purpose of the song, which it says was “created for the most inclusive FIFA World Cup in history”.

However, with ICE agents likely to be haunting football stadiums like dementors – and strained relationships between the US and neighbours such as Venezuela, Mexico, Canada and Cuba (not to mention Iran) – it is questionable whether FIFA’s goals of inclusivity will be felt and realised.

Instead, Jelly Roll and Carín León’s country-rock tune seems to more accurately reflect the current US administration’s isolationist approach to global foreign policy: we know we’re in the world, but we’d rather not be.

Perhaps the next World Cup song in 2030 will bring back the excitement, passion and rhythm that fans love, and reiterate the globalist ideals of the game. For now, Lighter remains a missed penalty shot.

The Conversation

Brent Keogh does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. A Bible Belt track without a pulse – it’s no surprise fans hate the 2026 FIFA World Cup song Lighter – https://theconversation.com/a-bible-belt-track-without-a-pulse-its-no-surprise-fans-hate-the-2026-fifa-world-cup-song-lighter-279111